42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 claim challenging medical treatment accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the challenged treatment; continuing effects alone do not extend the limitations period.

MacGregor v. Dial · filed 2016-11-23

The district court properly dismissed MacGregor’s action as barred by the statute of limitations. ... Contrary to MacGregor’s contentions, his claims accrued when defendants treated him, and MacGregor failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants’ treatment of him constituted a continuing violation.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff learns that the defendants caused the injury in a way actionable under the statute, rather than merely when the plaintiff learns of the injury.

Hicks v. Clark · filed 2017-01-04

In identifying when the statute of limitations begins to run, a key distinction must be made between a victim’s knowledge that an injury has been wrongfully caused and the victim’s first learning that the targeted defendants caused the injury sued upon in a sense expressly made actionable under Section 1983. For that purpose it is vital to note that Section 1983 itself imposes liability on any person who under color of law either “subjects, or causes to be subjected” (emphasis added) a victim to the deprivation of that person’s constitutional rights.

A § 1983 claim based solely on the DPPA accrues when the alleged DPPA violation occurs.

Foudy v. Indian River County Sheriff's Office · filed 2017-01-09

Accordingly, we hold that a § 1983 claim based solely on the DPPA accrues at the same time as one brought under the underlying statute itself: upon the occurrence of the alleged violation.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and the municipal policy that caused it.

Wilson v. Hays · filed 2017-01-13

It follows that Plaintiffs claim accrued when she “knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known” of not only her injury, but also the City’s alleged wrongful policies—the cause of her injury for her Mo-nell claim.

Section 1983 claims involving misconduct in the trial process can accrue when the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Wright v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2017-01-17

Accordingly, the claims asserted by Mr. Wright in Counts 2-4 did not accrue until Mr. Wright’s criminal proceeding terminated in his favor upon his August 2016 acquittal.

A § 1983 claim challenging a parole decision accrues when the parole board makes the final decision that causes the alleged injury.

Neelley v. Walker · filed 2017-01-25

Here, there was no final decision in 2003; the relevant action occurred in 2014 when the State, by way of the Parole Board, decided to apply retroactively the Act to Neelley.

A § 1983 Brady claim accrues when the underlying conviction is vacated; the possibility of a future retrial does not delay accrual under Heck.

Buckley v. Ray · filed 2017-02-16

No extant conviction exists for his § 1983 claims to impugn. The possibility that the State may have re-tried and convicted him of the cocaine charges—“an anticipated future conviction”—does not implicate the Heck rule. ... The trial court vacated his conviction on November 1, 2010. That is the date on which his cause of action accrued.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim accrues when the arrest ends and detention under legal process begins.

Cannon v. Newport · filed 2017-03-03

Cannon was brought before a judge three days after his March 2009 arrest, and his Fourth Amendment claim accrued then because by virtue of the arrest he was now “detained pursuant to legal process.”

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Vreeland v. Fisher · filed 2017-03-16

“Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.”

Section 1983 claims look first to tort common law to define their prerequisites and accrual rules.

Manuel v. City of Joliet · filed 2017-03-21

In defining the contours and prerequisites of a §1983 claim, including its rule of accrual, courts are to look first to the common law of torts.

A § 1983 claim challenging a prison regulation accrues when the regulation is enacted if the plaintiff then knows or should know of the injury.

Arthur v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2017-05-24

But regardless of whether this claim is best analyzed under the method-of-execution or the aecess-to-courts framework, the statute of limitations began to run when the ADOC regulation at issue was enacted, because at that point Arthur knew or should have known of the injury for which he seeks relief.

Section 1983 method-of-execution claims receive a new accrual date only after a substantial change to the execution protocol, and only for the portion that changed.

Whitaker v. Bryan Collier · filed 2017-07-07

We agree with the Eleventh Circuit: To reset the accrual date, a change to an execution protocol must be substantial, and any new accrual date is applicable only to the portion of the protocol that changed.

A § 1983 judicial deception claim accrues when the underlying search warrant affidavit becomes reasonably available to a diligent plaintiff.

Klein v. City of Beverly Hills · filed 2017-08-04

We therefore hold that the discovery rule applies to a judicial deception claim. Here, Klein’s judicial deception claim as to the first search warrant in August of 2009 began accruing when the underlying affidavit became reasonably available.

A § 1983 claim generally accrues when the alleged wrongful conduct occurs.

Canuto v. Carter · filed 2017-08-10

A § 1983 claim generally accrues when the alleged wrongful conduct occurs.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim and its cause.

Gregg v. Hawaii Dept. of Public Safety · filed 2017-08-29

The accrual date of a § 1983 claim is a matter of federal law, “governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). The general common law principle is that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action and the cause of that injury.

A §1983 damages claim accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action; where ongoing state proceedings prevented the claim, accrual waited until those proceedings ended.

Wilson v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation · filed 2017-09-07

It is enough to conclude that Wilson did not have a complete federal claim under §1983 until May 2014, when proceedings in state court ended, so as a matter of federal law his federal claim did not accrue until then.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury; an official notice can start the limitations period before later fines or bills.

Williams v. Borough of Highland Park · filed 2017-09-11

The appellants knew of the injury forming the basis of their due process claims when they received the 2012 notices from the Borough, and they could have brought their “as applied” claims challenging the ordinance on vagueness grounds when they received those notices.

A § 1983 search-and-seizure claim accrues when the challenged conduct ends; bad legal advice does not delay discovery of the claim.

Goodman v. Cook County · filed 2017-09-25

His claim accrued when the challenged search and seizure ended—in July 2014. ... Any bad legal advice did not affect his discovery of the claim, so Goodman may not shift the consequences of that advice to the defendants.

A § 1983 retaliation claim accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action; awareness of the acts cannot be postponed by alleging a conspiracy.

Thomas v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2017-10-11

The district court properly dismissed Thomas’s complaint, and we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its August 31, 2016 decision. As the district court reasoned, Thomas’s cause of action accrued, at the latest, in 2010, when he had a “complete and present cause of action” for First Amendment retaliation.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Poulain v. Gulick · filed 2017-11-02

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Poulain’s § 1983 action because no material issue of fact existed regarding when Poulain discovered his injury. Poulain’s injury accrued on February 21, 2007, when he learned that the removed growth was benign.

A § 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury on which it is based.

Mullin v. Balicki · filed 2017-11-06

Generally, a constitutional claim under § 1983 accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it, even if the plaintiff later learns more about who was responsible.

Glasser v. King · filed 2018-01-09

As the district court recognized, “[a] civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” ... Thus, the district court didn’t err in concluding that Glasser’s § 1983 claims accrued on that date.

Section 1983 claims accrue under federal law when the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury.

Buchanan v. Alexander · filed 2018-01-10

However, the date that a Section 1983 claim accrues is governed by federal law, not state law. Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff "becomes aware that [she] has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that [she] has been injured."

A Section 1983 claim challenging a removal without due process accrues no later than the final administrative decision when the plaintiff can file suit.

Arezzo v. City of Hoboken · filed 2018-01-17

Arezzo’s Section 1983 claim accrued, at the latest, on September 19, 2012, when the Commission issued its final administrative decision.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the alleged constitutional violation.

Storey v. City of Alton, Illinois · filed 2018-02-02

His claim accrued when he knew or should have known that his constitutional right to equal protection purportedly was violated.

A § 1983 claim for arrest under a warrant obtained through material omissions and misstatements accrues when the criminal proceedings end in the plaintiff’s favor.

Richard Winfrey, Jr. v. San Jacinto County · filed 2018-02-05

Because Junior’s claim suggests malicious prosecution rather than false imprisonment, his claim accrued when his criminal proceedings ended in his favor on June 12, 2009.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim accrues when the prisoner knows of the acts and injury; mandatory exhaustion may toll the limitations period but does not delay accrual.

Soto v. Unknown Sweetman · filed 2018-02-09

When, as here, the inmate knows of the acts when they occurred and knows that he was injured, the claim accrues. The exhaustion requirement justifies tolling the statute of limitations, but it does not ... justify creating a new accrual rule.

A Brady claim under § 1983 accrues when the criminal proceeding ends in the plaintiff’s favor; vacating a conviction with further proceedings pending does not start the limitations period.

Jordan v. Blount Cty. · filed 2018-03-15

A Brady claim under § 1983 cannot accrue, therefore, until the criminal proceeding so terminates. ... Here, Jordan’s criminal proceeding likewise continued after the vacatur of his conviction, and ended only upon his acquittal in March 2015. Hence his claim did not accrue until then.

Section 1983 claims for wrongful conviction based on a coerced confession accrue when the conviction is vacated.

Richardson v. City of Chi. · filed 2018-05-29

Thus, Richardson's claims-which all presume that his conviction was obtained wrongfully based on a false, coerced confession-accrued not when he received the 302 Report, but when his conviction was vacated.

A § 1983 claim based on a criminal prosecution accrues when the prosecution conclusively ends.

Thompson v. Rovella · filed 2018-05-30

Viewing these facts most favorably to Thompson, “the underlying criminal action” against him had been “conclusively terminated” by at least July 19, 2012, Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1995); see Spak v. Phillips, 857 F.3d at 464, such that the statute of limitations on his § 1983 claims started to run no later than July 19, 2012.

A § 1983 claim based on fabricated evidence accrues when the plaintiff learns the evidence was fabricated and used against them and suffers a deprivation of liberty.

McDonough v. Smith · filed 2018-08-03

We thus conclude that, under the circumstances here, the § 1983 action based on fabrication of evidence accrued when McDonough (1) learned of the fabrication of the evidence and its use against him in criminal proceedings, and (2) was deprived of a liberty interest by his arrest and trial.

Section 1983 claims for trial-based Fifth Amendment self-incrimination violations that result in conviction do not accrue until the conviction is overturned.

Johnson v. Winstead · filed 2018-08-14

A claim of this kind seeks a civil remedy for a trial-based constitutional violation that results in wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Such a claim, if successful, necessarily implies the invalidity of the conviction and under Heck is neither cognizable nor accrues until the conviction has been overturned.

A § 1983 claim based on an arrest under a warrant obtained through wrongful legal process accrues when the criminal proceedings end in the plaintiff’s favor.

Richard Winfrey, Jr. v. San Jacinto County · filed 2018-08-20

Because Junior’s claim suggests malicious prosecution rather than false imprisonment, his claim accrued when his criminal proceedings ended in his favor on June 12, 2009.

A § 1983 claim challenging a conviction accrues upon acquittal after retrial when a conditional habeas writ leaves the plaintiff subject to retrial.

Taylor v. Chicago · filed 2018-08-27

Thus, the overwhelming weight of authority weighs in favor of finding that Taylor’s § 1983 claim accrued only once he was acquitted following retrial.

A § 1983 claim challenging judicially authorized detention without probable cause accrues when the detention ends and the plaintiff can sue.

Manuel v. City of Joliet · filed 2018-09-10

Still, his detention was ju- dicially authorized, which given Preiser means that a §1983 suit had to wait until his release. Heck tells us that a claim does not accrue before it is possible to sue on it. 512 U.S. at 489–90. Once he was out of custody and could sue, Manuel’s claim accrued.

A § 1983 claim challenging wrongful pretrial detention accrues when the detention ends.

McWilliams v. City Of Chicago · filed 2018-09-17

As the Seventh Circuit observed, this type of claim accrues when the complained-of wrong ends. ... McWilliams filed an amended complaint naming the Defendant Officers on January 29, 2016, which was within the two-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim as barred by the statute of limitations is denied.

The limitations period for a § 1983 challenge to a licensing board decision begins when the board issues its decision, even if state appellate review remains pending.

Turner v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy · filed 2018-12-12

In sum, we conclude that New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations on Turner’s § 1983 and § 1985 claims began to run when the BOL issued its decision.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and the defendant's role in causing it.

J. M. v. Or. Youth Auth. · filed 2019-01-17

We hold that an action under section 1983 accrues when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and the defendant's role in causing the injury.

Section 1983 deliberate-indifference claims against multiple defendants must be assessed separately to determine when each claim accrued.

Estate of James Roemer v. Johnson · filed 2019-03-07

For the reasons discussed above, the district court erred in concluding that the Estate’s claims against all the defendants were time-barred without first asking when the Estate’s claims against each defendant accrued.

A § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention accrues when the detention ends.

Regains v. City of Chicago · filed 2019-03-13

Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ argument that his seventeen-month detention for a crime that he was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con- clude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem- ber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff learns of the constitutional injury and who caused it; discovering a physical condition alone does not start the limitations period.

Dorsey v. Obaisi · filed 2019-03-19

As a general rule, a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff learns that “he has been injured and who caused the injury.” Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Mun. Airport Comm’n, 377 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). However, the applicable injury is Dorsey’s alleged constitutional injury, not his physical injury.

A § 1983 due process claim challenging a license revocation accrues no later than the revocation’s effective date when the DMV gives notice of that date.

Johnson v. Jessup · filed 2019-03-31

Since Plaintiffs claim that the Constitution requires pre-deprivation notice and an ability-to-pay hearing before a driver's license may be revoked under section 20-24.1(a)(2), and since the DMV notifies traffic defendants of the day that the revocation order will go into effect, each Plaintiff's claim accrued at least by the day that the DMV's revocation order became effective.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury; for an ordinance affecting real property, that notice occurs when the ordinance is enacted.

Bayou Vista, L.L.C. v. City of Oxford, Mississippi · filed 2019-04-05

A cause of action under § 1983 accrues when the “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”

Section 1983 claims based on wrongful pretrial detention accrue when the detention ends.

Hallom v. Chicago · filed 2019-04-22

Because Hallom’s Section 1983 claims are based on his wrongful pretrial detention, they accrued on March 12, 2018, the day he was released from detention.

A § 1983 claim for denial of medical care accrues when treatment is denied.

Harris v. Westchester Medical Center · filed 2019-05-03

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, which all relate to the alleged denial of medical treatment on January 6, 2015, therefore accrued on that date.

A § 1983 wrongful detention claim accrues when the plaintiff is released from custody.

Harris v. Wainscott · filed 2019-05-05

Harris asserts a claim for wrongful detention, which accrues on the date he was released from custody.

A § 1983 cause of action can accrue when later medical evaluations reveal the injury underlying the claim.

Mahler v. Jamaludeen · filed 2019-05-13

Elihue Martin Mahler appeals the district court’s orders and judgment denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. We have reviewed the record and hold that Mahler’s cause of action against Dr. Jamaludeen did not accrue until the subsequent x-ray evaluations in 2016. As such, Mahler’s appeal was not barred by the statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Richer v. Parmelee · filed 2019-06-04

The Court agrees with the Town. "[A] section 1983 claim accrues at the moment the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury that is the basis for the claim." ... His Fourth Amendment claim accrued on the same day as the allegedly unlawful search and seizure, so it is time barred.

A § 1983 claim challenging an improperly imposed probation sentence accrues when the sentence is imposed, rather than when it is vacated.

Parker-El v. City of New York · filed 2019-06-14

Finally, Plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1983 accrued on or about October 30, 2014, the date the sentence was imposed, and not on the date the sentence was vacated.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

C. Helm v. Ratterman · filed 2019-06-18

Federal law governs when the limitations period begins to run; a § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.”

A §1983 claim alleging that fabricated evidence was used to prosecute a person and deprive him of liberty accrues when the criminal proceedings terminate in his favor.

McDonough v. Smith · filed 2019-06-20

We follow the analogy where it leads: McDonough could not bring his fabricated-evidence claim under §1983 prior to favorable termination of his prosecution.

Section 1983 claims follow federal accrual rules, so Virginia’s special accrual rule for childhood sexual abuse does not apply.

Graham v. City of Manassas Sch. Bd. · filed 2019-07-01

Under these decisions, the relevant accrual principles for plaintiffs' Title IX and § 1983 claims are found in federal common law, not in section 8.01-249(6).

A section 1983 claim accrues when the claimant knows of the injury, not when counsel identifies a legal theory of relief.

Yu v. ID State University · filed 2019-07-10

The knowledge requirement for a section 1983 action falls on the date when there is knowledge of an injury by the claimant, not the date when a specific theory of relief is identified by counsel.

A § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention accrues when the detention ends.

Wright v. Runyan · filed 2019-08-12

Such a claim accrues when detention ends.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that her constitutional rights have been violated.

Simpson v. City of Chicago · filed 2019-08-12

Under federal law, § 1983 claims accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know that her constitutional rights have been violated.

Section 1983 false arrest claims accrue upon arrest, while claims for detention caused by wrongful legal process accrue when criminal proceedings end in the plaintiff’s favor.

Garcia v. San Antonio, Texas · filed 2019-08-19

A detention instituted in the absence of legal process is akin to the tort of false arrest and accrues upon arrest. ... Though somewhat distinct in its facts, Winfrey’s integrated analysis of Wallace and Manuel applies here as well: Garcia’s claim for detention caused by the wrongful institution of legal process accrued when criminal proceedings ended in his favor on December 4, 2015. Because Garcia filed his complaint less than two years later, this claim was timely.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would challenge custody under a still-valid conviction; Taylor’s wrongful detention claim could proceed after his release.

Taylor v. City Of Chicago · filed 2019-09-23

It is well-established that “§ 1983 cannot be used to contest ongoing custody that has been properly authorized.” Manuel II, 903 F.3d at 670. ... Accordingly, Taylor could not have challenged his detention after his conviction until 2013, when he was released.

A § 1983 fabrication-of-evidence claim arising from a conviction does not accrue until the conviction is vacated and the charges are dropped, even if an earlier conviction was overturned before retrial.

Brown v. City Of Chicago · filed 2019-09-26

As in McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2154–55, Plaintiff’s fabrication-of-evidence claim regarding the 1990 trial and convictions did not begin to accrue until 2017, when his convictions were vacated and the charges against him were finally dropped.

A § 1983 fabricated-evidence claim resulting in imprisonment accrues when the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Pippin v. City of Reynoldsburg · filed 2019-09-27

As discussed above, McDonough held that where plaintiff presents a fabricated-evidence claim that results in false imprisonment, the statute of limitations begins to run only when the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor. This is squarely on-point with the facts of this case.

A § 1983 claim based on a continuing denial of medical care in custody accrues when the plaintiff is released from that custody.

Watts v. Quality Correctional Care LLC · filed 2019-10-17

In this case, there was not a continuing denial of medical care because the Plaintiff was initially released from custody. Due to this release from custody, the Plaintiff’s claim regarding his first period of custody accrued at his initial release sometime before January 11, 2017.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

Doe v. Sch · filed 2000-11-01

Under federal law, a cause of action accrues at the time the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”

A Section 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Harris v. Doe · filed 2019-11-05

Accrual of a claim under § 1983 is determined by federal law, under which a claim generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury giving rise to the cause of action.

A § 1983 claim for an allegedly unlawful search accrues when the plaintiff learns of the search injury; learning later that no charges will be filed does not delay accrual.

McGinnis v. Klein Independent School District · filed 2019-11-06

But under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations on Ms. McGinnis’s state law claims and her federal § 1983 claim begin to run from the time she learns of the wrongful injury. ... Because the tolling theory Ms. McGinnis relies on is without legal basis, her claim accrued the day the Harris County Sheriff’s Office executed the search warrant, February 18, 2017.

A Section 1983 damages claim arising from a wrongful conviction does not accrue until the conviction is invalidated.

In re Marriage of Rivera · filed 2016-11-03

Similarly, since a suit under section 1983 must await a favorable termination, no property interest arises until such termination.

A section 1983 claim for damages arising from a conviction does not accrue until the conviction is invalidated.

In re Marriage of Rivera · filed 2016-12-07

Similarly, since a suit under section 1983 must await a favorable termination, no property interest arises until such termination.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying them.

Bennett v. City of Florissant Police Department · filed 2019-12-03

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of her action.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows the fact and cause of the injury.

Flynn v. Donnelly · filed 2019-12-04

A claim under § 1983 for the violation of a federal law accrues “when a plaintiff knows the fact and the cause of an injury.” Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Village of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted).

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury; recurring bills resulting from an earlier decision do not restart the limitations period.

Ellis v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District · filed 2020-01-10

The “operative decision” is the Board’s approval of the SEPPs on February 26, 2015. ... Similarly, recurring monthly bills are inevitable consequences of the initial “operative decision” and do not toll the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue when the claimant is detained pursuant to legal process.

ALLEN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-01-10

Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue when the claimant is detained pursuant to legal process.

The accrual date of a Section 1983 claim is determined by federal law.

Mueller v. State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety · filed 2020-03-18

The determination of when a federal law Section 1983 cause of action begins to accrue turns on federal law.

A § 1983 claim challenging detention under a warrant procured through misstatements accrues when the criminal proceedings end in the plaintiff’s favor.

Fusilier v. Zaunbrecher · filed 2020-03-26

The Supreme Court has set out a sequential process for determining when a § 1983 claim accrues. ... Instead, his claim accrued when he was acquitted.

Federal law governs when a § 1983 claim accrues.

Kalbaugh v. Jones · filed 2020-03-30

Plaintiff’s proposed new claims were § 1983 claims, so federal law governs when the action accrues.

A § 1983 claim based on an ongoing criminal prosecution does not accrue until the prosecution ends in the claimant’s favor or a resulting conviction is invalidated.

Boudreau v. Petit · filed 2019-11-18

As pertinent to this case, in McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2158 (2019), the Supreme Court clarified that a § 1983 claim that a criminal arrest or proceeding was based on intentionally fabricated evidence is not ripe as long as the criminal proceeding is ongoing; and the § 1983 cause of action does not accrue until the criminal proceeding has ended in the defendant’s favor, or a resulting conviction has been invalidated within the meaning of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). ... Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007), and Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1251 (1st Cir. 1974), as well as the abstention doctrine first articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 38 (1971), still provide the guiding principles, now reaffirmed by McDonough’s holding that a claim like Boudreau’s does not even accrue until the State prosecution is over.

A § 1983 fabricated-evidence claim did not accrue when the state let its retrial deadline pass while the conviction remained in force; it accrued when the conviction was vacated and the charges dismissed.

Krause v. Yavapai, County of · filed 2020-04-03

However, the State’s decision not to retry Plaintiff, in itself, did not render the extant conviction invalid or equate to dismissal of the charges. ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims did not accrue until February 22, 2017.

Federal law determines when a Section 1983 claim accrues.

Roy v. Parson · filed 2020-04-13

When a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim accrues is dictated by federal law.

A § 1983 unlawful detention claim that would be incompatible with a conviction on pending criminal charges does not accrue until those proceedings end in the plaintiff’s favor.

Culp v. Harrah's Illinois Corporation · filed 2020-04-15

It follows under Savory’s understanding of McDonough and Heck that Culp’s Fourth Amendment unlawful detention claim—even if that claim were limited to the time he spent in jail, and did not extend through the time he was on bond—did not accrue until the charges against him were dismissed on January 12, 2016.

A § 1983 fabricated-evidence claim accrues when the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

O'Hara v. City of New York · filed 2020-04-21

Carroll argues that the claims accrued in 2005, when plaintiff unsuccessfully “exhausted his post-conviction avenues of relief,” rather than 2017, when his charges were vacated. (ECF No. 95 at 5). That is plainly irreconcilable with McDonough II, which begins the clock when criminal proceedings have terminated in the § 1983 plaintiff’s favor.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the constitutional injury, even if the plaintiff learns more about the assault later.

Tillman v. Barber · filed 2020-05-15

The Court concludes that “the constitutional injury, the injury which trigger[ed] the statute of limitations for purposes of § 1983,” occurred in December 2014 when Plaintiff was assaulted by Barber, not when Barber was prosecuted or sentenced for the assault.

A § 1983 claim for damages from an unconstitutional conviction does not accrue until the conviction is invalidated.

KELLEY v. REYES · filed 2020-07-01

The Court holds that under either the Heck or McDonough and Wallace framework, because Plaintiffs’ claims accrued on September 15, 2017 at the earliest, and they filed suit on September 11, 2019—within the two year statute of limitations period—their claims are timely.

A § 1983 unlawful pretrial detention claim that would imply the invalidity of criminal proceedings does not accrue until those proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Spencer v. Village Of Arlington Heights · filed 2020-07-30

Thus, Spencer’s claim did not accrue until the proceedings terminated in his favor, in other words, until the charges were dismissed on January 25, 2016.

Section 1983 excessive force and failure to intervene claims accrue when the alleged conduct occurs; they do not require favorable termination of related criminal proceedings.

Stewart v. Frankenreiter · filed 2020-09-01

Plaintiff’s case is distinguishable because both these claims arose when he was shot, and favorable termination of criminal proceedings is not an element of either claim.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Shaw v. State of Texas · filed 2020-09-08

A cause of action under § 1983 accrues when the aggrieved party knows, or has reason to know of, the injury or damages which form the basis of the action.

Section 1983 fair trial and due process claims based on fabricated evidence accrue when the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Days v. Police Department · filed 2020-09-09

Plaintiff’s denial of fair trial and due process claims therefore do not accrue until the conclusion of Plaintiff’s fifth trial, when he was acquitted, on September 12, 2017.

Section 1983 deliberate indifference claims involving latent injuries accrue under the discovery rule.

Johnson v. Chudy · filed 2020-09-22

We apply the discovery rule in § 1983 actions of this nature.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality or supervisor does not accrue merely because the plaintiff knows who employed or supervised the alleged wrongdoer.

Ouellette v. Beaupre · filed 2020-10-07

In the context of § 1983, knowledge of a constitutional tortfeasor's employer and supervisor does not necessarily equate to knowledge of a causal connection between the tort and the employer and supervisor.

A Section 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction does not accrue until the conviction is invalidated.

Hines v. Asotin County · filed 2020-10-19

Because Plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction has been invalidated, any claim he may have under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages has not yet accrued.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury and who caused it; learning later that the claim is legally viable does not delay accrual.

McGroarty v. Swearingen · filed 2020-10-20

First, our § 1983 accrual doctrine says nothing about a plaintiff knowing the “viability” of the claim—rather, simply knowing “they were injured” and “who inflicted the injury” is enough.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the challenged conduct causes an injury that gives the plaintiff a complete and present cause of action.

Camarata v. Portland Community College · filed 2020-10-25

Plaintiff had a “complete and present cause of action” under section 1983 on January 9, 2017, because that is the date that both the alleged conduct causing his injury and causation of his damages occurred.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

McDowell v. Fox · filed 2020-10-30

A section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim.

Section 1983 claims accrue when plaintiffs know of their injury, even if they have not identified every officer involved.

Cornelius v. City of Mount Washington, Kentucky · filed 2020-10-30

Thus, when Cornelius knew of his injuries and identified some of the officers allegedly responsible for those injuries, his Section 1983 claim accrued. Accordingly, Cornelius’ Section 1983 claim against Ford is time barred, and the motion will be granted on this claim.

A Section 1983 claim for detention without probable cause accrues when the detention ends.

BARNHOUSE v. CITY OF MUNCIE · filed 2020-11-04

In any event, the case law is clear that Barnhouse's claim—liberty deprivation without probable cause—accrued when his detention ended. Thus, his claim was timely brought within the two-year statute of limitations.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim based on a conviction accrues when the conviction is vacated.

Greene v. Mullis · filed 2020-11-17

Because the Monell claim relating to the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia did not accrue until the state court vacated that conviction in 2016, we conclude that this portion of the claim is timely.

A Section 1983 excessive-force claim accrues on the date of the incident, regardless of when the injury is discovered.

Haywood v. Officer Maue · filed 2020-11-19

In any event, the date of discovery of an injury is irrelevant to accrual because excessive-force claims are “immediately” actionable from the date of the incident.

Section 1983 claims alleging that deliberate indifference delayed a cancer diagnosis accrue when the plaintiff discovers the cancer.

(PC) Johnson v. Beard · filed 2021-01-06

Upon reconsideration, the Court adopts the discovery rule as applied by the Ninth Circuit in Chudy to determine the accrual date of Plaintiff’s claims against Chen. ... To the extent Plaintiff claims Chen’s deliberate indifference resulted in Plaintiff developing cancer and obtaining a late diagnosis, Plaintiff’s claim accrued on July 16, 2013, when Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer.

Federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues.

Stringer v. Town of Jonesboro · filed 2021-01-19

Federal law, however, governs when a § 1983 claim accrues.

Federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues and its limitations period begins.

Donald Berg Et Ano v. City Of Kent · filed 2021-01-19

Federal law determines when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues and the statute of limitations beings to run.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily challenge the validity of a conviction are barred by Heck unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Marshall v. Hancock · filed 2001-06-13

The arguments in Marshall’s brief make it clear that he is attempting to challenge his conviction in this § 1983 action. ... The district court correctly held that Marshall’s claim that his indictment was fraudulently obtained necessarily implicates the constitutionality of his conviction and is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims that indirectly attack the validity of a conviction are barred by Heck.

McAnally v. McCollough · filed 2000-12-13

This error is harmless, however, because even if McAnally had amended his complaint to plead state action, his complaint is an indirect attack on the validity of his conviction, and that attack is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 bars a damages claim alleging unfair jury selection when success on the claim would invalidate an outstanding conviction.

Timothy T. Ryan, Jr. v. Dupage County Jury Commission and Daniel J. Amati, Jury Administrator · filed 1996-12-23

Stated another way, winning on his unfair jury claim would render his convictions invalid. Thus, Ryan's § 1983 claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for conduct that would invalidate a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

McDonald v. Luchirini · filed 1995-01-19

Thus, McDonald is seeking to recover damages for conduct which if proven true, would invalidate his convictions. His convictions have not been invalidated. Therefore, he cannot state a cognizable Sec. 1983 claim for damages based on the challenged conduct of the defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Raymond D. Markley, Jr. v. J.E.A.N. Team · filed 1994-09-06

Since Markley has failed to demonstrate the invalidity of his state convictions, these claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence requires proof that the conviction or sentence was previously invalidated.

Hand v. Young · filed 1994-08-24

Under Heck v. Humphrey, a § 1983 cause of action which would necessarily imply the invalidity of [a state] conviction or sentence has an additional element, proof that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim attacking the validity of a conviction is properly construed as a habeas petition.

Walton v. W. Q. Overton Vicky Meadows, Lieutenant J. Michael Howerton · filed 1992-07-08

Because Walton's claim attacks the validity of his conviction it is properly construed as a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).

A Section 1983 action challenging the validity of a state conviction must be dismissed without prejudice until the plaintiff establishes the denial of a constitutional right through habeas corpus.

Booth v. Hicks · filed 1989-02-14

In this case, plaintiff essentially argues that the Kentucky state court lacked jurisdiction to try him for the James robbery. Resolution of this claim favorable to the plaintiff would involve a ruling that plaintiff's state robbery conviction is illegal. Therefore, the district court should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice to plaintiff's right to refile the Sec. 1983 action if he can establish through a writ of habeas corpus the denial of a constitutional right.

A Section 1983 complaint attacking the validity of a conviction and sentence is more properly construed as a habeas corpus petition.

Clay v. Arch A. Moore, Jr., Governor of West Virginia State Legislature, Defendants · filed 1989-03-13

As an initial matter we note that because Clay's allegations attack the validity of his conviction and sentence, his Sec. 1983 complaint is more properly construed as a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 3 On September 9, 1988, Clay filed in this Court a motion for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause in which he contends that he was wrongfully denied an emergency furlough to attend his father's funeral.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge that could imply the illegality of a conviction before a successful habeas petition premised on the same claims.

Robert J. Hodges, James Durrah v. William S. Mallory, State Representative, David L. Hobson, State Senator · filed 1989-04-21

Upon consideration, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed this action because a ruling on the merits of plaintiff's claims could imply the illegality of his underlying conviction and he has not yet filed a successful habeas petition premised on these claims.

Section 1983 cannot be used in place of federal habeas corpus to attack a state court conviction.

Eutzy v. Tesar · filed 1989-08-03

A petitioner may not obviate the comity concerns of exhaustion and procedural forfeiture by substituting section 1983 for federal habeas corpus to attack a state court conviction.

A § 1983 claim whose merits would imply that the plaintiff’s conviction is unlawful is subject to dismissal without prejudice while the conviction remains uninvalidated through habeas corpus.

Marsch v. Phil Bozarth Merle Quinn Anita Potts Donna E. Wilson Jim Wheeler Ronnie C. Dortch Gene Hawkins · filed 1990-01-30

Despite plaintiff's contention on appeal, a resolution of the merits of plaintiff's claims would imply a ruling involving the legality of his convictions. Under these circumstances, this court has determined that dismissal without prejudice is appropriate.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights action alleging a conspiracy to secure an illegal state conviction until the plaintiff has successfully adjudicated those claims in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Oliver v. Lorain County, Ohio · filed 1990-05-09

Plaintiff can not presently maintain a civil rights action based upon the allegation that defendants conspired to achieve his illegal conviction in state court unless he has first successfully adjudicated those claims in a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

A prisoner whose Section 1983 claim would imply that his state conviction is illegal may refile it after establishing through habeas corpus that his constitutional rights were denied.

Jones v. Detroit Police Dept. · filed 1990-09-19

The dismissal on the counsel and confession issues is without prejudice to Jones' right to refile his claim under Sec. 1983 if and when he can establish through a writ of habeas corpus that he was actually denied his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a state prisoner a means to obtain federal review of the constitutionality of state convictions; habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy for that challenge.

Stone-El v. Illinois · filed 1990-09-24

But a Section 1983 complaint is not the appropriate vehicle for a federal judicial review of the constitutionality of Stone-El’s 1972 and 1973 convictions. Ha-beas corpus, with its concomitant requirement of exhaustion of state court remedies, provides the exclusive federal remedy for a state prisoner posing such a challenge (see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841-42, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 378-79 (7th Cir.1989)).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a conviction; that challenge must be brought in habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies.

Turner v. The City of Cincinnati, City Council of Cincinnati · filed 1991-02-08

Insofar as plaintiff seeks to challenge the validity of his conviction, he may do so only in habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a state court conviction in place of postconviction relief.

Cannady v. M.E. Wilson B.L. Radford B.N. Thompson Russell Kirby · filed 1991-03-20

Though Cannady may have a valid constitutional claim, Sec. 1983 is not the proper forum for challenging his state court conviction.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply a state conviction is illegal may be dismissed without prejudice until the plaintiff resolves a habeas corpus challenge.

Lewis v. Kenneth B. Ater, Judge Donald N. Cox, Judge Stewart J. Kaiser Donald Capper Charles L. Burd, Honorable · filed 1991-11-06

The district court dismissed the action on the ground that it should abstain from ruling on the action because disposition of the action would imply that the plaintiff's state conviction was illegal. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint without prejudice to his right to refile his damage claim after resolution of his habeas corpus petition. ... Upon review, we have determined that the district court understood the intent of the plaintiff to seek damages for actions which led to his conviction and incarceration. We affirm the district court's order for the reasons stated by the district court in its order filed July 2, 1991.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for claims that necessarily challenge the validity of a state criminal conviction unless the conviction has first been successfully challenged.

Tedford v. Hepting · filed 1993-03-31

We conclude, therefore, that plaintiff cannot obtain relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the grounds asserted in this case, absent a successful challenge to the underlying conviction.

Section 1983 is not a proper vehicle to attack a state court conviction; habeas corpus is the exclusive means to do so.

Langford v. James Haynes, Phillips County Sheriff's Department, Helena, Arkansas · filed 1993-10-21

Because a Sec. 1983 action is not the proper vehicle to advance these arguments, we decline to review them. See Eutzy v. Tesar, 880 F.2d 1010, 1011 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (habeas corpus petition is exclusive means to attack state court conviction).

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Heck v. Humphrey · filed 1994-06-24

Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a §1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

A state prisoner cannot state a § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Boyd v. Biggers · filed 1994-08-08

Under Heck, when a state prisoner brings a § 1983 action seeking damages, the trial court must first ascertain whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Id. at 2372. If it would, the prisoner must show that his conviction has been "reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus," id. at 2373, in order to state a claim.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to pursue damages that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence only after the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Boyd v. Neal B. Biggers, Jr. · filed 1994-08-26

Under Heck, when a state prisoner brings a § 1983 action seeking damages, the trial court must first ascertain whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. ... If it would, the prisoner must show that his conviction has been “reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus,” ... in order to state a claim.

Section 1983 bars a damages action that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Trudell v. Kathryn S. Bail Donna Larson · filed 1994-11-21

The district court properly dismissed his action without prejudice because a judgment in Trudell's favor would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction" and his conviction has not been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence are premature until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Kelley v. Pearson · filed 1994-11-29

Given the appellant admits he has a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before this court raising the same issues, case no. 93-2105, he clearly has not met the Heck standard. Therefore, his Section 1983 claim must be dismissed as premature.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge state convictions that have not been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by a grant of habeas relief.

Freeman v. Parks · filed 1994-12-09

Contrary to a suggestion appearing in this court's September 1, 1994 order construing Freeman's certificate request, his habeas claims cannot be construed as claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because his state convictions have not previously been "reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2373 (1994).

A Section 1983 claim challenging the legality of a conviction is not cognizable unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Arvie v. Broussard · filed 1994-12-28

... where, as here, a suit brought pursuant to § 1983 challenges the legality of the plaintiff's conviction, the claim is not cognizable unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would undermine a criminal conviction unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Reed v. City of Meridian Police Department · filed 1995-02-17

Consequently, this court finds that because Reed’s conviction has not been declared invalid, Reed is barred by the jurisprudence of Heck v. Humphrey from bringing this action under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim seeking to undermine a conviction or sentence is subject to dismissal unless the underlying conviction has been successfully challenged.

Robert Darnell Roberts, A/K/A Abdullah Rahim Ibn Yusuf v. Edward D.E. Rollins, Jr., Hon John L. Scarborough Mark A. Fabe · filed 1995-05-30

To the extent that the claim could be construed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988), dismissal was likewise proper pursuant to Sec. 1915(d) because Appellant made no showing that his underlying conviction had been successfully challenged.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would necessarily invalidate a conviction that has not been overturned.

Aleotti v. Baars · filed 1995-07-20

In this case, the answer is clear: Mr. Aleotti's claims of entrapment, false testimony, perjury and tampering with evidence, as well as those relating to his Miranda rights and false arrest, all must fail under section 1983 and the reasoning of Heck v. Humphrey because for him to succeed necessarily would invalidate his conviction that already has been affirmed on appeal.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that calls the validity of a conviction into question unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Bowie v. Glaser · filed 1995-08-22

With respect to Appellant's damages claim, we note that this claim is not cognizable under Sec. 1983 because Appellant's claims place in issue the validity of his convictions and because he has not shown that his convictions have been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence that has not been invalidated.

Richie v. Scott · filed 1995-08-30

A judgment in favor of Richie would necessarily implicate the validity of his sentence, which has not been invalidated; therefore, his claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Krueger v. Reimer · filed 1995-09-14

To the extent that Krueger's claims, if successful, would necessarily imply that his state criminal conviction is invalid, they are not cognizable under section 1983 because Krueger has not proved that his conviction and sentence for burglary have been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Krueger v. Bill Reimer, District Attorney Fred Moore, Judge, Comal County · filed 1995-09-26

To the extent that Krueger’s claims, if successful, would necessarily imply that his state criminal conviction is invalid, they are not cognizable under section 1983 because Krueger has not proved that his conviction and sentence for burglary have been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that call into question the validity of a conviction or sentence cannot be considered unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Rudd v. Davis · filed 1995-10-16

Lafeldt Rudd's claims against the remaining defendants call into question the validity of his conviction and sentence and may not be considered in a § 1983 action, under the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), because Rudd has not demonstrated that his conviction and sentence have been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Shores Jr. v. W.R. John Foster James J. Coman H. Dean Bowman John H. Waters Rebel Good the Tribune Amanda Jane Durh · filed 1995-10-30

Because a judgment in favor of Appellant in this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) action for damages would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction," his claim is not cognizable unless and until the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid or called into question by the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence under Heck.

Ferris v. Cavallaro · filed 1995-11-01

Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing Ferris's section 1983 claims for money damages which would have challenged the validity of his conviction and sentence.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging the validity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned.

Igbo v. Church of Latter Day Saints · filed 1995-11-27

Appellant's damages claim is not cognizable under Sec. 1983 because he has not shown that his convictions have been overturned.

Section 1983 does not yet permit a claim attacking criminal punishment for a conviction that remains intact.

Joseph v. Gillespie · filed 1995-12-21

If the claim attacks the criminal punishment for the conviction, it is not yet cognizable, Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594, 4597 (U.S. June 24, 1994) (No. 93-6188), and it would not stand up to even cursory review for gross proportionality in any event, see United States v. Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63, 67 (4th Cir.1995).

Section 1983 claims that challenge the validity of a conviction are frivolous unless the conviction has been declared invalid.

Robinson v. Dallas County Texas · filed 1996-03-25

Robinson's § 1983 claims are legally frivolous because they question the validity of his conviction and his conviction ... has not been declared invalid pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994).

Section 1983 claims directly attacking a conviction are barred while the conviction remains valid.

Hicks v. Unell · filed 1996-04-23

The district court properly dismissed with prejudice Hicks’ § 1983 claims which directly attack his underlying conviction because Hicks’ conviction has not been invalidated or called into question and because district attorney Vance is absolutely immune from damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Joseph Marion Head, Jr. v. State of North Carolina, Joseph Marion Head, Jr v. Leonard Lowe State of North Carolina · filed 1996-05-03

Appellant's claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because he has not shown that the challenged convictions have been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims challenging convictions unless those convictions have been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Head v. State of NC · filed 1996-05-03

Appellant's claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because he has not shown that the chal- lenged convictions have been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner’s claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

McGlone v. Virgil Cole, in His Individual Capacity Lewis County Sheriff · filed 1996-05-24

A judgment in McGlone's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state court conviction. McGlone claims that he was denied his right to compel witnesses to testify at his criminal trial because the defendants did not timely serve subpoenas. McGlone's conviction has not been invalidated. Therefore, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that remains in force.

Lal v. Borough of Kennett Square · filed 1996-07-25

Because Lai’s state convictions are presently valid, the claims involving them are not cognizable in a section 1983 action and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to pursue a claim that would necessarily invalidate a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Moss v. Phillips · filed 1996-08-22

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his conviction or sentence invalid, until his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been questioned by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge convictions indirectly by seeking to block enforcement of detainers based on those convictions; the prisoner must pursue state remedies and then habeas relief.

Ketcher v. Fields · filed 1996-09-18

Thus, although he is not expressly asking the court to overturn the Ohio and Tennessee convictions, he is nevertheless asking the court to review the validity of those convictions. As indicated by the magistrate judge, a § 1983 action is not the proper vehicle for accomplishing this task. Instead, plaintiff must first exhaust his state court remedies and then, if necessary, pursue relief in federal court by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim based on an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Corum v. Thomas McGuire, Jr. · filed 1996-10-15

Furthermore, to the extent Corum seeks damages for his allegedly unconstitutional conviction and sentence, his section 1983 action is barred until he can show his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily invalidate a conviction until the conviction has been invalidated through another process, regardless of the relief sought.

Cass v. City of Adamsville · filed 1996-10-16

Regardless of the type of relief sought, if a ruling on a claim would necessarily render the plaintiff's conviction invalid, the claim must be dismissed because it is not cognizable until the challenged conviction has been remedied by some other process.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a conviction; that challenge must be brought through a habeas corpus petition.

Dever v. Turner · filed 1996-10-21

However, a challenge to a conviction is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be brought under a petition for habeas corpus relief.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action for claims whose success would call a conviction into question until the conviction has been invalidated.

Powell v. Duplessie · filed 1996-11-05

Success on Powell’s underlying claims would call his conviction into question; Powell has no § 1983 cause of action on those claims until he demonstrates that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 relief is precluded when it would imply the invalidity of a state-court sentence.

Everett v. Hargett · filed 1996-11-06

Everett’s claim is precluded by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, ... because the relief he seeks would imply the invalidity of his state-court sentence.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim challenging a criminal conviction or sentence unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Borders v. Smucker · filed 1996-11-13

Upon our review of the record, we agree with the district court that Borders failed to present a cognizable section 1983 claim because Borders did not demonstrate that either his criminal conviction or sentence had been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner to bring a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate a conviction unless that conviction has already been invalidated through direct appeal, executive action, a state tribunal, or federal habeas relief.

Mathis v. Kevin Ziegler, Stenographer at Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit in Official and Personal Cap · filed 1996-12-02

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim challenging his conviction if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his conviction invalid, until and unless his conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.