42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against federal defendants because it applies only to state action.

Stoyanov v. Winter · filed 2009-08-06

Plaintiff cannot sue a federal defendant under either the Fourteenth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since these provisions apply only to the states.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against federal defendants.

Abney v. Jopp · filed 2009-09-18

As to Schrader and Gunther, § 1983 does not provide a remedy against federal defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against federal defendants.

Libbett v. Doody · filed 2010-02-23

First, to the extent that plaintiff purports to bring his claims against them under § 1983, those claims must be dismissed, as § 1983 does not provide a remedy against federal defendants.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors acting under color of federal law.

Allen v. US EEOC Office · filed 2010-02-24

We also find no error in the district court’s dismissal of the § 1983 claim against the EEOC, a federal agency, because as the district court correctly notes, “[s]ection 1983 does not apply to federal actors acting under color of federal law.” Hindman v. Healy, 278 F. App’x. 893, 895 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424–25 (1973)).

Section 1983 claims against federal employees acting in that capacity may be construed as Bivens claims.

Aikman v. County of Westchester · filed 2010-03-02

Section 1983 actions are not properly brought against federal employees. ... Thus, this Court construes Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Luciano as Bivens claims.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not provide a claim against the federal government, its agencies, or employees acting as federal officials.

Feldman v. Lyons · filed 2012-04-04

It is well-settled that a § 1983 claim does not lie against the federal government, its agencies, or employees.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state and District of Columbia actors, but not federal defendants.

Staples v. United States of America · filed 2013-06-07

The complaint is subject to dismissal because, by its terms, section 1983 creates a cause of action against state and District of Columbia actors who are alleged to have violated one’s constitutional, not the federal defendants sued here.

Section 1983 applies only to state officials, so it does not provide a claim against the United States or federal agencies.

Moorman v. United States · filed 2013-10-16

This statute applies only to state officials. ... As plaintiff names only the United States and federal agencies as defendants, a section 1983 claim is not available to him.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal defendants.

Morris v. United States Sentencing Commission · filed 2014-07-31

The form complaint cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis of jurisdiction but defendants argue correctly that this statute does not apply to federal defendants, Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. at 14-15, and plaintiff seems to agree.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal defendants.

Padilla-Ruiz v. United States · filed 2015-02-02

We also agree that Padilla's claims against the federal defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (which has no application to federal defendants) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), (which does), are time-barred.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against the United States for actions of federal officials.

Canuto v. United States · filed 2015-09-14

Lastly, Ms. Canuto’s § 1983 claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because § 1983 does not pro- vide a cause of action against the United States for ac- tions of federal officials.

Section 1983 authorizes suits against persons acting under color of state law and does not waive federal sovereign immunity.

Kucera v. Cent. Intelligence Agency · filed 2018-05-31

If Kucera intends the Complaint to be a § 1983 action, the Court must dismiss the action without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because a § 1983"authorizes suits only against persons acting under color of state [and not federal] law," and does not waive federal sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide a right of action against the federal highway defendants for the conduct alleged here.

Coalition for the Advancement of Regional Transportation v. Federal Highway Administration · filed 2013-07-17

However, in the introductory section of that brief, CART states that it cannot maintain its § 1983 claims against the Federal Defendants. The Court agrees. Accordingly, the Court finds that CART has dismissed any § 1983 claims against Federal Defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the United States or federal actors, including federal employees.

Mierzwa v. Dudek · filed 2019-11-29

Additionally, as noted by the District Court, Appellant’s section 1983 claims against the United States fail, as neither the United States nor federal actors, such as employees, can be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 applies to constitutional violations committed under color of state law and does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Aden v. United States · filed 2020-02-12

Section 1983 authorizes a cause of action against individuals who violate constitutional rights while acting “under color of state law”; it “does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 does not provide an employment discrimination claim against federal defendants.

Ercole v. Wilkie · filed 2020-03-27

Accordingly, an employment discrimination action under § 1981 or § 1983 does not lie against a federal defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against federal agencies such as the Department of Justice.

Gray v. United States Department Of Justice · filed 2020-04-17

The DoJ cannot be sued under either of those statutes.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal agency because it reaches conduct under color of state law.

Diamond v. U.S. Bank N.A. · filed 2020-05-11

Even if the Diamonds’ Monell claim were construed as a claim under § 1983 more generally, the FHFA would still be an improper defendant because it is a federal agency.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal defendants.

McCarthy v. Cuomo · filed 2020-06-18

Plaintiffs purport to bring their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is a fatal flaw to this approach: that statute does not provide a cause of action against federal defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim against federal entities; a civil rights damages claim against federal actors must proceed under Bivens.

Akinmulero v. United States Attorney General · filed 2020-08-07

Although plaintiff asserts that he is bringing suit against state or local officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. # 5 at 4), all of the named defendants are federal entities. As such, a civil rights claim for damages can be brought only under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 provides a remedy against persons acting under color of state law, so it does not support a claim against the Secretary of the Air Force for federal conduct.

Lesofski v. United States Secretary for the United States Air Force · filed 2020-08-20

As Plaintiff names only the Secretary for the United States Air Force as a Defendant, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s constitutional claims.

Section 1983 does not support claims against the United States or its officials, and the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims brought under it.

Meleika v. United States · filed 2020-11-04

The plaintiff’s failure to identify acts by the federal government or a federal official is evidenced further by the plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute which only supports claims against a state and its instrumentalities, not the United States or its officials. This Court lacks jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against the FBI or the United States.

Pole v. The Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2021-01-21

In sum, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims under § 1983 or Bivens against the FBI or the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for claims concerning a prisoner’s sentence; those claims must be brought through habeas corpus.

Woods v. Grady County, Oklahoma · filed 2020-02-21

Because the relief Plaintiff seeks is not available in a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit an unlawful imprisonment claim when the confinement has not been invalidated.

Wright v. Smith · filed 2000-08-23

Wright has failed to demonstrate that his confinement has been invalidated; therefore, his claim of unlawful imprisonment is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge must proceed through habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies.

Witzke v. Gloria J. Richardson, Parole Board Member, Michigan Department of Corrections, in Her Individual · filed 1988-05-02

First, plaintiff's complaint essentially concerns the fact or duration of his confinement and may not be pursued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam). An attack upon the fact or duration of confinement must be pursued through a habeas corpus proceeding after exhaustion of state remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact of confinement and seek immediate release; that relief must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Johnny Mack Porter v. Billy Compton, Warden · filed 1988-05-13

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiff's action, as a complaint challenging the fact of confinement and seeking immediate release may not properly be brought under Sec. 1983, but must be pursued through a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); Dixon v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 121, 124-25 (6th Cir.1984).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking release from confinement; a challenge to the fact and duration of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus.

Davis v. Ron Simmons, Newton McCravy Larry Ball, Joanie Abramson-Miller, John Runda, Dennis Langley and Helen Hugh · filed 1988-06-15

The plaintiff's request for relief, however, only seeks release from confinement in the form of parole. If a prisoner challenges the fact and duration of his confinement, his sole remedy is habeas corpus, not Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s challenge to the duration of confinement, which is cognizable only under the habeas corpus statute.

Weaver v. Hamilton County · filed 1988-08-23

Upon review, we conclude that the district court correctly determined plaintiff's suit to be a challenge to the duration of his confinement and therefore cognizable only under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s claim challenging the duration of confinement; the claim must proceed as habeas corpus.

Redfearn v. Hopkins · filed 1988-09-06

The district court erred in treating Redfearn's action as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. As Redfearn's complaint puts in issue the proper duration of his confinement, the suit is properly construed as a habeas corpus action.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that requires deciding whether the fact or duration of confinement is valid.

Benjamin Butler, Jr. v. Hudson · filed 1988-10-24

Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, a claim for damages is not actionable under Sec. 1983 if it requires a determination of the validity of the fact or duration of the confinement.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge the length of confinement; that challenge belongs in a habeas action after exhaustion of state remedies.

Manning v. Harrison · filed 1988-11-14

Manning's complaint also challenges the length of his confinement. As such, the complaint is properly brought as a habeas action after exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of state-imposed incarceration.

Bearden v. Stephen Norris, George Little, Betty Stiddum, Glenn W. Rogers, Joe Fowler, Michael W. Moyers, Brad Smy · filed 1989-06-09

An individual challenging the fact or duration of his state-imposed incarceration may not do so in a civil rights action.

A complaint attacking the length or duration of confinement is properly treated as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 rather than a Section 1983 action.

Washington v. Virginia State Parole Board · filed 1989-06-19

We construe Washington's core complaint as an attack on the length or duration of his confinement and thus, it is more properly classified as a 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 petition.

An action challenging the duration of confinement is treated as a habeas petition rather than a Section 1983 action.

William Hunt Carroll v. John Baker, Sheriff · filed 1989-08-31

William Hunt Carroll appeals from the district court's order denying relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The district court correctly treated the action as a habeas petition challenging the duration of confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking a speedier release by challenging the duration of confinement; the remedy is habeas corpus.

Cavender v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Corrections · filed 1989-10-16

Regarding the administrative gain time issue, Cavender is challenging the duration of his imprisonment and is essentially seeking a speedier release from his confinement. As such, his sole remedy lies in a writ of habeas corpus filed in the territorial district of his confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact of confinement; that challenge must be brought through a habeas corpus petition.

Collins v. Deborah Wilson, State of Michigan, Attorney General Office · filed 1989-11-21

A challenge to the fact of confinement is only properly brought pursuant to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement; the sole federal remedy is habeas corpus.

Latham v. Commonwealth of Kentucky John T. Wigginton Stephen T. Smith Luther Luckett Correctional Complex Kathy · filed 1990-04-17

In effect, Latham challenges the fact or duration of his confinement by asking the court to correct his prison records to reflect the amount of time that he has yet to serve on his sentence and to set the correct date for his release. Thus, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking speedier release from confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Hatton v. Wilson · filed 1990-06-19

To the extent plaintiff sought a speedier release, the suit was properly dismissed as it should have been filed as a habeas corpus action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims that essentially challenge the duration of confinement; those claims belong in habeas corpus.

Peters v. Runda · filed 1990-08-15

The district court properly dismissed the complaint without prejudice to Peters' right to file a petition for habeas corpus raising the issues he now presents, in that Peters is essentially challenging the duration of his confinement, with the appropriate remedy found in habeas relief rather than in a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims challenging a parole revocation process that call into question the validity of present confinement are more properly treated as habeas claims.

Griffin v. Evatt · filed 1990-08-27

We note that Griffin's challenges to the parole revocation process employed in his case, which call into question the validity of his present confinement, are more properly construed as habeas claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge must proceed by habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies.

Dee v. Summit County Prosecutor, John W. Reece, Judge · filed 1990-08-30

Dee's sole remedy in challenging the fact and duration of his confinement is a writ of habeas corpus, and he must exhaust his state remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a state prisoner relief that would effectively reduce the term of confinement; the prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Rial v. McGinnis · filed 1991-01-16

All four of those claims may be grouped together for analytical purposes, for each of them seeks relief that would effectively reduce the term of Rial’s confinement — and a state prisoner can obtain such relief from a federal court only by filing a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Section 2254”) (Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93 (7th Cir.1986)). ... Rial simply cannot sustain any of his four already-described claims in this Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a damages claim ancillary to an attack on a conviction or the length of confinement; that claim must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Nathson Fields v. City of Chicago, Fred Rice and James Delaney · filed 1991-04-18

Thus, Mr. Fields' complaint can fairly be characterized as one that is ancillary to his post-conviction proceeding, and therefore not properly pursued under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge must proceed through habeas corpus.

Williams v. Michigan Department of Corrections, Robert Brown, Jr., Director · filed 1991-06-13

Upon review, we conclude that dismissal was proper because plaintiff's complaint essentially concerns the fact or duration of his confinement and may not be pursued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner challenging parole eligibility when the challenge concerns the length of confinement; the federal remedy is habeas corpus.

Wilson v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1991-11-27

We agree with the District Court that Wilson was challenging the length of his confinement, his sole federal remedy was a writ of habeas corpus, and he had not exhausted his state remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for determining a prisoner’s release date.

Campbell v. Williamson · filed 1992-02-10

Although the Court notes that the Plaintiffs sentence computation was confirmed at several levels of review, a civil rights action is not the proper vehicle for determination of the Plaintiffs proper release date.

Section 1983 does not provide the remedy for a claim challenging the fact of confinement; such a claim sounds in habeas corpus.

Brogden v. Jesse Odon, Police Officer, South Western District · filed 1992-02-19

Although Brogden filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), the district judge properly treated the claims as sounding in habeas because Brogden challenged the fact of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to the length of confinement; that claim is construed as a habeas corpus petition.

Sykes v. Edward W. Murray, Director Lou Ann White, Manager, Court & Legal Services · filed 1992-02-19

Because Sykes challenges the length of his confinement, his claim is properly construed as a habeas corpus petition.

A prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release must use habeas corpus; a § 1983 damages claim may be refiled after habeas relief establishes the denial of a constitutional right.

Clark v. Sewell · filed 1992-04-02

The judgment of the district court should be affirmed because Clark challenges the fact and duration of his confinement and seeks a speedier or immediate release. His sole remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973). The suit should be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to refile his claim for damages under § 1983 if and when he can establish through a writ of habeas corpus that he was denied a constitutional right.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge the length or duration of a state prison sentence; such a challenge belongs in habeas corpus.

Robert Unger, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1992-05-08

Robert Unger, Jr., appeals from the district court's order dismissing without prejudice his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). ... The appropriate vehicle for challenging length or duration of a state prison sentence is a habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 is not the vehicle for challenging the length or duration of a state prison sentence; that challenge belongs in habeas corpus.

Robert Unger, Jr. v. Cole · filed 1992-05-08

The appropriate vehicle for challenging length or duration of a state prison sentence is a habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims seeking credit for time served or challenging the length of imprisonment; those claims must be brought in habeas corpus.

Robbins v. Franklin M. Lotter, Miss Mary Kimbill, Milwaukee County House of Corrections Medical Staff, and the · filed 1992-06-10

The claims for credit for time served and the alleged due process violations arising therefrom are not cognizable as § 1983 actions, but rather are issues for a habeas corpus action.

Section 1983 does not provide declaratory or injunctive relief that attacks the legality of current confinement; habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy for that challenge.

Greenlaw v. Smith · filed 1992-08-21

Greenlaw also sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. We construe this portion of Greenlaw's complaint as an attack on the legality of his current confinement for which his "sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 F.2d 475, 500 (1973).

A state prisoner’s § 1983 claim attacking the manner or length of confinement is construed as a habeas petition, and the civil rights claim is stayed until state remedies are exhausted.

Joel W. Ellington, Dr. v. Nancy Becker, Judge, and R. Caruso, Attorney · filed 1993-02-01

When a state prisoner brings a section 1983 action attacking the manner or length of his incarceration, the district court will construe his claim as a habeas petition and stay his civil rights claim until he has exhausted state remedies.

A complaint under § 1983 that attacks the fact or duration of confinement is properly treated as a habeas corpus request and dismissed to allow pursuit of state remedies.

Jones v. Superior Court of Cumberland County · filed 1993-03-23

Because he is attacking the fact or duration of his confinement, his complaint is properly construed as a request for habeas corpus, and the district court properly dismissed the complaint to allow Jones to pursue his state remedies.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge the fact of incarceration; such a challenge belongs in a habeas petition.

LANE v. STATE Of KANSAS · filed 1993-04-08

The district court determined that Lane was challenging the fact of his incarceration, a challenge properly brought in a habeas petition, not a civil rights complaint, and dismissed the complaint. We agree.

Section 1983 relief is premature when deciding the claim would require comment on the legality of a state conviction; the prisoner must first establish the constitutional violation through habeas corpus.

Hawkins v. Steible · filed 1994-02-01

Moreover, a request for relief under Sec. 1983 is premature. Because a decision on the merits would require comment on the legality of his state court conviction, Hawkins must first establish that he was denied his constitutional rights through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims challenging the duration of confinement through parole revocation are construed as habeas corpus petitions.

Green v. Bryn Armstrong Danny D'ArpA Nikki Kinsley, Thomas Chickery the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioner · filed 1994-06-07

In challenging the revocation of parole, Green was challenging the "duration of his confinement" and therefore the district court did not err in construing the action as a habeas petition.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of incarceration, for which habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.

Curry v. Kate Flack, Timothy Sell, Ronald Abernathy, Rita Griffith, and Dorothy Stiles · filed 1994-07-22

Where an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 challenges the fact or duration of incarceration, habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.

Section 1983 cannot provide damages to current prisoners when an award would require declaring their confinement improper and compel their release.

Rooding v. Peters · filed 1994-08-17

That conclusion, if applied to prisoners, would compel their release, which cannot be done in a § 1983 action. Because the court could not award money damages to prisoners without declaring their confinement improper, this action cannot include them.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement unless the challenged basis for confinement has first been invalidated.

Miller v. Indiana Department of Corrections · filed 1994-08-19

It follows that Miller has no cause of action under Sec. 1983 until he first proves that the alleged misclassification has been invalidated by the state or by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide injunctive relief that would affect the duration of confinement, and damages that would call the duration into question require prior invalidation of the imprisonment.

Shepard v. Franklin E. Freeman, Jr. Hazel W. Keith · filed 1994-12-16

Because a judgment in Appellant's favor on his claim for injunctive relief would affect the duration of his confinement, his claim is not cognizable under Sec. 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70, 72-73 (4th Cir.1983). A Sec. 1983 claim that calls into question the validity or duration of confinement, even if not seeking habeas relief, is subject to the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b) (1988). Id. To the extent that a judgment in Appellant's favor on his claim for compensatory and punitive damages would call into question the duration of his confinement, he cannot seek relief under Sec. 1983 before showing that his imprisonment has been invalidated either in state court or through federal habeas relief. See Heck v. Humphrey, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594, 4597 (U.S.1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge confinement when success would necessarily imply its invalidity unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Bass v. Cranston Mitchell James Purkett Missouri Board of Probation and Parole Kevin Whaley · filed 1995-04-28

Since the district court's ruling, we have held that inmates cannot maintain a section 1983 challenge to the application of the 1990 amendment unless their convictions or sentences are reversed, expunged, or called into question because if they prevailed, "the result would necessarily imply the invalidity of [their] continued confinement." See Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372-73 (1994).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim challenging the length of confinement based on an inability to earn good time credits.

Biliski v. Harborth · filed 1995-05-09

Bilski's argument that he has been denied the ability to earn good time credits was not set forth in his complaint. In any event, constituting (as it does) a challenge to the length of his confinement, it would not be cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge to the length of confinement based on the denial of an opportunity to earn good time credits.

Biliski v. Melvin Harborth, Sheriff, Guadalupe County and James A. Collins, Director Tdc. · filed 1995-06-13

Bilski’s argument that he has been denied the ability to earn good time credits was not set forth in his complaint. In any event, constituting (as it does) a challenge to the length of his confinement, it would not be cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement, even when the suit seeks money damages unavailable through habeas corpus.

Levert K. Griffin v. John Ison Harold Soice, Chief Placement Office, Department Rehab. & Corrections · filed 1995-06-16

A state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of his confinement must utilize, as his sole federal remedy, the writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2371-72 (1994). A federal court should not entertain the action even though the Sec. 1983 suit contemplates monetary damages unavailable under Sec. 2254.

Section 1983 does not permit an inmate to challenge a restriction on early release when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of continued confinement, unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, or called into question.

Suter v. Moore · filed 1995-07-05

Since the district court's ruling, we have held that inmates cannot maintain a section 1983 challenge to the application of the 1990 amendment unless their convictions or sentences are reversed, expunged, or called into question because if they prevailed, "the result would necessarily imply the invalidity of [their] continued confinement." See Schafer v. Moore, No. 92-3555, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. Jan. 27, 1995) (per curiam); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372-73 (1994). Because the plain language of the complaint demonstrates Suter is challenging the duration of his confinement, the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not permit declaratory or injunctive relief for claims challenging the fact or duration of confinement.

Abella v. Rubino · filed 1995-09-12

Therefore, injunctive and declaratory relief claims which challenge the fact or duration of confinement are simply never cognizable in § 1983 or Bivens actions.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for challenges to the fact or length of imprisonment, which must be brought in habeas.

Rome v. Morales · filed 1995-09-21

At bottom, Rome's contention is that Texas has kept or will keep him incarcerated for too long. That claim is not cognizable in a suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a prisoner’s challenge to the length of confinement; that claim sounds in habeas corpus.

Edmonds v. Mr. Vincent, Classification Counselor William Smith, Warden Marlene Cougar · filed 1995-09-29

At the core of Edmonds' lawsuit is an attack on the length of his confinement. Such a claim sounds in habeas corpus, rather than under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge parole rules or procedures when success would automatically entitle the inmate to accelerated release; the challenge must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Hudgins v. Scott · filed 1995-10-17

The district court did not err by dismissing the action, because Hudgins contends that he is entitled to be released from confinement. If an inmate "is challenging a parole board's rules and procedures that affect his release, and resolution would automatically entitle him to accelerated release, then the challenge must be pursued by writ of habeas corpus."

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a parole decision that necessarily implies the invalidity of continued confinement until that invalidity has been established through an appropriate avenue.

Cooper v. Missouri Parole Bd. · filed 1995-10-19

Cooper's claim that the parole board is applying the wrong law to deny him parole is an attack on the duration of his confinement. As such, a favorable decision would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement; thus his section 1983 claim is foreclosed until he has demonstrated such invalidity through an appropriate avenue.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim that, in substance, challenges continued confinement after revocation of conditional release; the claim belongs in habeas under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

Royal D. Ross, Margaret Ross v. Rosscoff Jerry Terlle John Souza Steve Reeves Joe Noose · filed 1995-11-01

The district court correctly observed and Ross appears to concede that his claim concerning the revocation of his conditional release from the hospital is actually a challenge to his continued confinement under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

A prisoner cannot pursue § 1983 damages for the denial of good-time credits when the claim challenges the lawfulness of continued confinement without first invalidating that confinement through the proper procedures.

Miller v. Indiana Department of Corrections · filed 1996-02-05

Although the only remedy that Miller seeks is damages, he claims that as a result of the alleged denial of due process he was deprived of good-time credits to which he was entitled. So he is challenging the lawfulness of his continued confinement, and having failed to vindicate the challenge through the proper means he is barred from seeking vindication in this suit for damages.

Section 1983 does not provide relief to a state prisoner who challenges the duration of confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release; that claim must be brought in habeas corpus.

Cochrell v. Purkett · filed 1996-02-23

Because Cochrell's claim was cognizable only in a habeas corpus action, dismissal without prejudice to bringing a habeas petition after exhausting his state remedies was the proper course.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to confinement based on the validity of a conviction or parole.

Rogers v. Boydston · filed 1996-03-11

Rogers’s arguments related to the validity of his conviction and his parole constitute a challenge to his confinement and are not cognizable under § 1983.

A state prisoner’s section 1983 claim concerning the duration of confinement is properly treated as a habeas petition.

Calder v. Bryn Armstrong Beatrice Franklin, Thomas Chickory Thomas P. Wright Richard E. Wyett Nykki Kinsley a · filed 1996-03-18

Because Calder raised an issue concerning the duration--as opposed to the condition--of his confinement, the district court properly construed his section 1983 action as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge to good-time credits that affects the length of confinement; the federal remedy is habeas corpus.

Spearman v. Collins · filed 1996-04-23

Spearman's arguments related to good-time credit constitute a challenge to the length of his confinement; the appropriate federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490-93 (1973). His civil rights complaint based on these assertions is not cognizable.

A § 1983 claim that calls into question the validity of confinement fails unless the plaintiff establishes that the conviction has been rendered invalid.

Ricks v. Donald Waltemeyer William Cole · filed 1996-05-21

Appellant's motion fails because his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claim calls into question the validity of his confinement, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973), and he has not established that his conviction has been rendered invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that calls the validity of confinement into question when the underlying conviction has not been rendered invalid.

Ricks v. Waltemeyer · filed 1996-05-29

Appellant's motion fails because his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claim calls into question the validity of his confinement, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973), and he has not established that his conviction has been rendered invalid.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to challenge a state conviction or the legality of incarceration; that challenge must proceed through habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies.

L'Ggrke v. Tulsa Municipal · filed 1996-06-28

The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint was an attack on his criminal conviction and the legality of his incarceration. Consequently, as determined by the district court, his recourse was by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, after exhausting his state court remedies.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement, but not the fact or duration of confinement.

Vann v. State of Oklahoma · filed 1996-07-02

An action under § 1983 is a proper remedy for a state prisoner making a constitutional challenge to conditions of his confinement, but not of the fact or duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim challenging the application of parole law when the claim implicates the duration of a prisoner's sentence.

Balawajder v. Lynaugh · filed 1996-07-17

Balawajder's claim that Texas Adult Parole and Mandatory Supervision Law, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.18 § 8(c) was not properly applied to him implicates the duration of his sentence and therefore, is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner challenging loss of good-time credits that affects the duration of confinement must first successfully challenge the decision in habeas corpus before bringing a § 1983 action.

Dorsey v. Stine · filed 1996-08-13

Because Dorsey’s claim calls into question the duration of his confinement, he must challenge successfully the decision denying his good-time credits in a habeas corpus action before bringing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a parole revocation or resulting sentence unless the revocation decision has been reversed or otherwise set aside.

McDaniel v. W. Stachowski, John Doe, Jane Doe, Frank E. Smith, Anthony Dasilva, Gary D. Kresser, Kay Baase, and Ke · filed 1996-09-13

Unless that revocation decision is reversed or otherwise set aside, McDaniel may not pursue a § 1983 claim challenging the revocation or ensuing sentence.

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to challenge continued confinement when success would necessarily invalidate it unless the basis for confinement has first been invalidated.

Birdo v. Helen Hughes Homer Shumate Bud Rankin · filed 1996-09-30

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim challenging his imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A prisoner cannot use § 1983 to challenge the length of confinement before that confinement has been remedied through habeas corpus, whether the prisoner seeks injunctive or monetary relief.

Henderson v. McWherter · filed 1996-10-16

The plaintiffs' challenge to the governor's directive is, in essence, a challenge to the length of their sentences. ... Furthermore, a § 1983 claim must be dismissed regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks injunctive or monetary relief. ... As the plaintiffs' confinement has not been remedied by a writ of habeas corpus, their claims are not cognizable and the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for an alleged loss of good-time credits that challenges the duration of confinement; that claim must be brought through habeas corpus.

Molina v. Wilkinson · filed 1996-11-21

Fourth, Molina's claim for monetary damages due to the alleged loss of good-time credits is not cognizable as it is a challenge to the duration of his confinement and must be brought in a petition for habeas corpus relief.

Section 1983 claims for damages or restoration of good-time credits that attack the validity or length of confinement require exhaustion of state remedies before the prisoner may bring them in federal court.

J.T. Smith v. Odie Washington, 1 · filed 1996-11-21

Smith challenges the legality of this disciplinary proceeding, and seeks monetary damages and the restoration of all good time credits that he lost. As both of these claims attack the validity or lawfulness of the length of Smith's confinement, he is required to exhaust state remedies prior to bringing this claim in federal court.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim that affects the duration of a prisoner’s sentence; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

J.R. Wilkerson v. T. Peete, Chief Deputy Warden Pelican Bay State Prison, P. Dillard, E. Hepburn, J.R. O'COyne · filed 1996-12-05

To the extent that Wilkerson is contending that defendants' actions have resulted in denial of parole, this claim affects the duration of his sentence for which Wilkerson's exclusive remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a parole eligibility calculation affecting the duration of confinement unless that calculation has first been invalidated by a state tribunal or through federal habeas relief.

Benson v. New Jersey State Parole Board · filed 1996-12-06

The inevitable conclusion that Benson presents the same issues in his habeas and § 1983 actions, when viewed in the light of federal-state comity concerns and the holding of Heck, compels the further conclusion that Benson’s § 1983 action is not cognizable, unless Benson can prove that his sentence, or more specifically the calculation of the duration of his sentence, has been invalidated by a state tribunal or impugned by the grant of federal habeas relief.

Section 1983 does not provide expungement of a prison disciplinary conviction when that relief would affect the duration of confinement; the prisoner must seek habeas relief and exhaust state remedies.

Tebbetts v. Whitson · filed 1997-01-03

The district court did not err in treating the portion of his action which sought expungement of his disciplinary conviction as a habeas action, subject to exhaustion requirements.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge belongs in habeas corpus.

Grove v. Kadlic · filed 1997-05-05

We particularly note that Plaintiff may petition for habeas corpus, and that even if he had standing in this case, a § 1983 action is not cognizable where, as here, a plaintiff challenges the fact or duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a conviction or unlawful confinement; that challenge belongs in a habeas petition.

Elliott v. Robert D. Hannigan and Charles E. Simmonies, Secretary of Corrections, Kdoc · filed 1997-06-04

Applying the rules of liberal construction we afford pro se pleadings, see Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.1996), if Mr. Elliott is arguing he is illegally held and wishes to challenge his conviction, a civil rights civil suit cannot be used to raise this issue. Instead, Mr. Elliott should file a habeas petition.

Section 1983 does not provide the remedy for a prisoner’s claim attacking the legality of imprisonment; the prisoner must bring that claim under § 2254 after exhausting state remedies.

Profit v. Cty. of Hennepin · filed 1997-06-06

After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we agree with the district court that Profit essentially attacks the legality of his imprisonment, and that his claim thus must be brought in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, after he exhausts his state remedies.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek sentence conversion and release when the claim necessarily implies the invalidity of the punishment imposed.

Whiteside v. Bruce · filed 1997-09-02

His claim “necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of the punishment imposed, [and is therefore] not cognizable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a prison sentence and seeks release; the claim must proceed through habeas corpus.

Whiteside v. Louis E. Bruce, Warden, El Dorado Correctional Facility, and Charles Simmons, Secretary of Corre · filed 1997-09-02

Nonetheless, while he claims only to seek to have the procedures of the statute applied to him, the essential relief he seeks is to have his indeterminate sentence converted to a determinate one and to be released within 90 days. His claim "necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of the punishment imposed, [and is therefore] not cognizable under § 1982." Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1589 (1997); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 575, 500 (1973). Accordingly, the district court properly treated Mr. Whiteside's action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and properly dismissed his petition, without prejudice, to permit him to exhaust state remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for prisoner claims that implicate the duration of confinement; the sole remedy is habeas corpus.

Howard Lee Vaughn, Jr. v. M. Smith P. Vasconcellos A. Guerrero, Lt. · filed 1997-10-27

Because these claims implicate the duration of his confinement, his sole remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge reports underlying an increase in his minimum sentence when the claim necessarily affects the sentence’s duration and the reports have not been expunged.

David Cerda, Jr. v. Robert Ayers Joe McGrath S. Lawrence D. Martel G. Bonnie · filed 1997-12-19

Cerda's contentions necessarily affect the duration of his sentence and Cerca has not demonstrated that the reports upon which his minimum sentence increase were based have been expunged. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

A complaint filed under § 1983 may be construed as a habeas petition when the relief sought includes an injunction affecting the duration of confinement.

Patrick v. Bruce · filed 1998-01-09

Although filed as a civil rights complaint seeking damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court construed the complaint as a challenge to the duration of confinement. ... Although Mr. Patrick takes issue with this conversion of his complaint, in light of his contentions on appeal, it is apparent that there is an injunctive component of the relief he seeks. Accordingly, the complaint is properly construed as a habeas petition at this point.

Section 1983 does not provide monetary relief for a challenge to the duration of confinement until the confinement has been determined unconstitutional.

Shaw v. Simmons · filed 1998-01-30

Therefore, we agree with the district court that habeas corpus is Shaw’s exclusive remedy, id.; and that Shaw would not be entitled to any monetary relief until such time as it was determined he had been unconstitutionally confined, id. at 486.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge parole denial procedures when the challenge necessarily implicates the validity of continued confinement; the claim must be brought in habeas corpus.

Brown v. Patterson · filed 1998-02-20

Because a challenge to the procedures used in the denial of parole necessarily implicates the validity of the denial of parole and, therefore, the prisoner's continued confinement, Brown's claim must be brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s challenge when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence and continuing confinement.

Walker v. State of California Dan Lungren, Attorney General · filed 1998-03-17

We affirm the district court's dismissal of Walker's challenge to Cal. Evid.Code § 1107, because a successful challenge would necessarily imply the invalidity of Walker's sentence and continuing confinement.

A § 1983 claim challenging prison discipline that affects the length of confinement must be dismissed without prejudice pending exhaustion of state remedies.

Johnson v. M. D. Reed · filed 1998-06-15

We conclude the district court correctly construed Johnson&s claim regarding his disciplinary action as including a challenge to the length of his confinement, for which Johnson must first exhaust his state remedies. ... We modify the stay order, however, to dismiss this claim without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner to challenge confinement when success would necessarily invalidate it unless the basis for confinement has been invalidated.

Lutchey v. City of Napoleon, Unpublished Decision (12-20-1999) · filed 1999-12-20

Moreover, a state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 .

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims challenging the fact or duration of confinement; habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy for those claims.

Stinson v. Scott · filed 2000-01-31

Stinson’s habeas claims are therefore not cognizable in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking restoration of good-time credits that would shorten confinement; that claim must be brought in habeas corpus.

Weatherall v. Scherbarth · filed 2000-02-28

We agree with the magistrate judge that, to the extent plaintiff attacks the substantive validity of the disciplinary proceedings and seeks injunctive relief requiring restoration of his good-time credits, with the consequent reduction of the length of his confinement, the claim is cognizable only in a § 2254 habeas corpus action, not a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus after exhaustion of state court remedies.

Williams v. H.W. Stanton · filed 1986-06-16

In addition, by all appearances, plaintiff really sought to attack the fact and duration of his confinement which he may only do by seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 after exhaustion of state court remedies.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for challenging the facts of confinement; such a petition is properly construed under § 2254.

Robert Clifton Johnson, Jr. v. Siebert · filed 1990-06-14

The petition for relief was mislabeled as a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action; however, as Johnson was challenging the facts of his confinement, rather than the conditions, the petition is more properly construed as a 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain damages as a way to challenge the lawfulness or length of confinement; the dismissal of such a claim is without prejudice.

Childs v. Howard · filed 2000-12-21

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Latasha L. Childs claimed her parole-eligibility date had passed and asked for an award of good time credit, her release, and damages. The district court1 dismissed her complaint, finding she could not challenge the fact or length of her confinement in this proceeding. Based on our review of the record, we ... affirm, but modify the dismissal to be without prejudice. See 8th Cir. R. 47B; Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 232-34 (8th Cir. 1996) (prisoner cannot use damages suit to avoid established procedures, like habeas corpus, for challenging lawfulness of fact or length of confinement).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a prisoner’s challenge to a parole denial that is, in substance, a challenge to the length of his sentence.

Clifton v. Sundquist · filed 2001-01-26

In addition, to the extent Clifton claims that he was wrongly denied parole in July 1999, he failed to state a claim under § 1983 as his challenge to the parole board’s decision, in essence, is a challenge to the length of his sentence.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a prisoner's continued confinement.

Andrade v. Mitchell, Unpublished Decision (3-13-2001) · filed 2001-03-13

Appellant cannot challenge the validity of his continued confinement under a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when success would necessarily invalidate a prisoner’s sentence unless the sentence has already been invalidated through an accepted procedure.

Coffey v. Tennessee · filed 2001-05-01

A state prisoner does not have a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his sentence invalid unless his sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been questioned by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Lorne Lei Wray v. Mr./Mrs. Ross · filed 2001-05-18

Wray failed to state a section 1983 claim against any of the defendants, and he cannot attack the fact or duration of his confinement in a section 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge his conviction or confinement through a civil rights claim.

Robertson v. Means · filed 2001-06-13

Because Robertson’s complaint revolves around the dismissal of his federal habeas petition, to the extent that he attempts to challenge his conviction or confinement, his claims are barred.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when success would affect the validity of a prisoner's confinement.

English v. Ghee · filed 2001-06-15

Because a ruling on these arguments would affect the validity of his confinement, these claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims challenging confinement or prosecution; those claims must be brought through habeas after exhaustion in state court.

James v. York County Police Dept. · filed 2001-09-18

Such claims are not cognizable under § 1983 and must be brought in a habeas proceeding following exhaustion in the state forum.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek immediate or speedier release from imprisonment; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Farrell v. Ramsey · filed 2001-09-25

Under Preiser, Mr. Farrell should not have filed a § 1983 claim to obtain the relief he desired but rather a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a parole or furlough denial when success would undermine the validity of continued confinement and the decision has not been invalidated.

Bell v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority · filed 2001-11-30

To the extent that Bell challenges the denial of furlough and parole by Jones and Upper, respectively, his claim is not cognizable in a § 1983 proceeding since a ruling in his favor would undermine the validity of his continued confinement.

Section 1983 is not the remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement; the proper remedy is habeas corpus.

Rudd v. Sedgwick County District Court · filed 2002-01-08

Moreover, it is apparent that Mr. Rudd is challenging the fact or duration of his confinement — the proper remedy is habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, with its requirement of exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim challenging a parole denial when success would imply that the confinement is invalid.

Hill v. Ghee · filed 2002-03-21

As a ruling on these arguments would effect the validity of his confinement, these claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim that necessarily challenges the legality of confinement unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Watkins v. Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 2002-03-26

Watkins’s § 1983 suit is not cognizable in the light of Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the duration of a prisoner’s confinement; that claim must be brought under the habeas corpus statute.

Walker, Tony v. Thompson, Tommy · filed 2002-05-01

She based dismissal of the first of the plaintiff’s charges on alternative grounds: that the complaint failed to allege an overt act, and that a federal suit complaining of the duration of a prisoner’s confinement must be brought under the habeas corpus statute. The second ground is of course solid, but the first is not.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a parole denial when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply that the prisoners’ confinement is invalid.

Nelson v. Davis · filed 2002-05-29

The district court properly dismissed Appellants’ action because it challenged the denial of their parole, and a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of their confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the duration of confinement; that challenge must be raised in a habeas corpus petition.

Chapman v. Cletha · filed 2002-08-23

To the extent that Chapman’s brief can be construed to raise the issue whether his time served has been correctly computed, that issue is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because it challenges the duration of his confinement, and it should therefore be raised in a petition for habeas corpus.

Section 1983 proceedings cannot be used to attack a conviction or claim illegal confinement.

Waldrup v. Quada · filed 2002-08-23

Waldrup’s assertions that he is being illegally confined and that he was convicted by “planted” evidences are attacks on his conviction and cannot be considered in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the duration of imprisonment; that claim must be brought in a habeas petition.

Johnson v. Paparozzi · filed 2002-09-16

Therefore, plaintiffs complaint will be dismissed insofar as it seeks to challenge the duration of his sentence, as he must bring such a claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s claim attacking the length of confinement; that claim belongs in habeas corpus.

Ewell v. Angelone · filed 2003-01-30

Such a claim sounds in habeas corpus, rather than § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity or length of confinement under a state court judgment, including civil commitment.

Von Flowers v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Family Servs. · filed 2003-02-13

Individuals who, like Von Flowers, are in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court may not utilize § 1983 to attack the validity of the fact or length of their confinements; rather, they must seek relief first in a state forum and, if unsuccessful there, file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge allegedly illegal incarceration; that challenge belongs in a habeas petition.

Long v. Morgan · filed 2003-02-20

In May 1989, Long’s original action was construed as a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In addition, Long should have pursued his challenge of alleged illegal incarceration in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot provide relief for a challenge that necessarily implies the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Partee v. Engler · filed 2003-03-11

The writ of habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy for challenges that necessarily imply the invalidity of the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner challenging the existence of a conviction or confinement; habeas corpus is the sole remedy.

Atencio v. Ipson · filed 2003-03-25

It is axiomatic that when a state prisoner, though asserting jurisdiction under § 1983, challenges the existence of confinement rather than the conditions of confinement, the writ of habeas corpus constitutes the sole remedy available.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a prison disciplinary conviction affecting the duration of confinement unless and until that conviction is overturned.

Newsome v. Stewart · filed 2003-05-15

Newsome’s action is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-84, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because Newsome’s claims challenge the duration of his confinement, and Newsome may not bring such a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action unless and until his disciplinary conviction is overturned.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim when a ruling for the plaintiff would necessarily implicate the continued validity of imprisonment or a prison disciplinary conviction.

Bey v. Powell · filed 2003-06-09

Further, plaintiffs claims are not cognizable under § 1983 insofar as a ruling in plaintiff’s favor in a § 1983 action would necessarily implicate the continued validity of his imprisonment or of a prison disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge that necessarily implies the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Weatherly v. Kingsport Police Department · filed 2003-06-19

The writ of habeas corpus, however, provides the exclusive remedy for challenges that necessarily imply the invalidity of the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a prison disciplinary result affecting the duration of confinement unless that result has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Pugh v. Sheppard · filed 2003-06-24

Accordingly, regardless whether the district court erred in determining that Pugh’s claims for relief were precluded based on his transfer to a different prison unit, Heck bars the instant suit since Pugh has not shown that his disciplinary case has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a prisoner seeking a mandatory-release date.

Hill v. Cockrell · filed 2003-08-19

Thus, Hill’s complaint did not state a cognizable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim challenging a parole denial that would imply the invalidity of continued confinement unless the parole determination has been invalidated.

Portis v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2003-11-19

Portis’s complaint is, in essence, a challenge to the validity of his continued confinement, and he has not shown that his parole determination has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid. Accordingly, Portis has no § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims that challenge the denial of parole and the validity of current confinement, even when framed as procedural claims.

Bratton v. California Board of Prison Terms · filed 2003-12-16

All of Bratton’s claims, even those framed as procedural, ultimately concern the denial of his parole and the validity of his current confinement. ... Therefore, they are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner’s challenge to the validity of confinement; that challenge must proceed through habeas corpus.

Franklin v. Webb · filed 1981-03-23

It found that although section 1983 was arguably broad enough to include actions challenging the validity of state prisoners’ custody, such claims could not be brought thereunder because section 2254 was the specific avenue promulgated by Congress to redress such wrongs. Prisoners “attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement” must rely upon the remedy of habeas corpus as their sole federal remedy. ... The plaintiff at bar challenges the judicial process which resulted in the affirmance of his conviction. In effect, this is an attack on the validity of his confinement pursuant to that conviction.

Section 1983 complaints primarily challenging the fact and duration of confinement are treated as habeas corpus petitions.

Glatz v. Kort · filed 1984-05-03

On September 28, 1978 and October 31, 1978, respectively, the two class representatives, James Edward Glatz and Hugh Jan Cornell, filed separate pro se actions in this court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which each alleged that his commitment and continued confinement violated his constitutional rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The pro se complaints were considered as petitions seeking habeas corpus relief because the claims primarily concerned the fact and duration of continued confinement at the Colorado State Hospital, rather than the conditions of confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the duration of confinement and seek speedier release from prison; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus after exhausting state court remedies.

Hewins v. Wigginton · filed 1988-10-21

Upon consideration, we affirm but for reasons other than those stated by the district court. Rather than considering this case as a civil rights action, we believe plaintiff essentially sought a writ of habeas corpus. In effect, he challenged the duration of his confinement and sought a speedier release from prison. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); Dixon v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 121, 124-25 (6th Cir.1984). He may not do this, however, in a civil rights complaint. He may do this only in a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 following exhaustion of state court remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide the federal remedy for a state prisoner's challenge to the length or duration of confinement; the remedy is habeas corpus.

Nelson v. Rimmer · filed 2004-07-01

The sole federal remedy for a state prisoner bringing such a challenge is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the legality of continued confinement.

Vernon Moves Camp v. Barnett · filed 2004-08-06

To the extent Moves Camp is arguing that his motions for permanent or emergency injunctions were wrongfully denied, we agree with the district court that he cannot challenge the legality of his continued confinement in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the fact of confinement unless the basis for confinement has been invalidated.

Northrop v. City of Detroit · filed 2004-09-16

Upon de novo review, we conclude that Northrop’s claim is not cognizable under the civil rights statutes because Northrop challenges the fact of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a parole denial when success would necessarily call into question the duration of confinement.

Bodie v. Morgenthau · filed 2004-09-23

Though Boddie protests that he seeks damages for use of an erroneous procedure and not for an incorrect parole determination, any ruling in his favor would necessarily call into question the determination to deny him parole and, consequently, the duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner's claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of continued confinement.

Diaz v. Van Norman · filed 2005-01-05

Ruling on the claims raised would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement. ... Such claims are not properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens.

Section 1983 cannot be used in place of a habeas corpus petition to challenge the duration of confinement.

Christensen v. Stammen · filed 2005-01-14

On appeal, Christensen continues to argue the merits of his due-process claim, but he does not address the district court’s reason for dismissing his case: a § 1983 lawsuit cannot be used in place of a petition for habeas corpus. ... Christensen was challenging the duration of his confinement, and the district court properly dismissed the complaint.

Section 1983 claims whose success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction are premature until the basis for that conviction is invalidated.

Winters v. Devecka · filed 2005-05-12

Because success on Winters’ claims, which attack the validity of his criminal conviction in state court, would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement, they are not properly raised at this time in a § 1983 action.