42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to seek release by challenging the fact or duration of confinement; that claim must be brought in habeas.

Thomas v. Barker · filed 2005-06-06

To the extent Plaintiff is seeking his release from custody, his claim fails. A prisoner in .state custody may not utilize a § 1983 action to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement.”

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a prison disciplinary action that affects the duration of a prisoner’s sentence.

McMillan v. Fielding · filed 2005-06-07

To the extent that the duration of McMillan’s sentence was affected by the disciplinary action, he may not challenge it with a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a civil commitment unless that commitment has been invalidated.

Banda v. New Jersey · filed 2005-06-07

Success on Banda’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement and are not cognizable at this time in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to parole proceedings that would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or its duration until the parole denial has been invalidated.

Logan v. Ogershok · filed 2005-09-12

Because Logan’s due process challenge, which attacks the parole proceedings, would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement or its duration, it is not properly raised at this time in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to parole procedures that necessarily implicates the validity of continued confinement.

Johnson v. Terhune · filed 2005-10-19

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s action because his challenge to the procedures used before the BPT necessarily implicates the validity of his continued confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge his detention when a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement.

Mimms v. Petrucelli · filed 2006-02-17

The district court properly dismissed Mimms’s action because his challenge concerns the legality of his detention, and a ...judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that necessarily challenges the fact or duration of confinement unless the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.

Ruiz-Garcia v. Danzig · filed 2001-03-19

The district court properly dismissed the case. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for damages, which necessarily challenges fact or duration of confinement, is not cognizable unless the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated).

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle to challenge the lawfulness of continued confinement.

Johnson v. Ozmint · filed 2006-06-02

After considering the evidence before him, the Magistrate Judge recommended: ... (2) that Johnson’s unlawful confinement claim be dismissed without prejudice as it is not cognizable in a § 1983 lawsuit; ... Accordingly, the R & R is adopted in full and specifically incorporated into this Order.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek restoration of good-time credits based on past procedures when success would necessarily shorten confinement.

Hornsby v. Jones · filed 2006-06-26

Because Hornsby seeks the restoration of good-time credits on the grounds of past procedure, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits challenges to conditions of confinement, but a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement must seek habeas corpus or appropriate state relief.

Byrd v. North Carolina · filed 2006-09-18

A civil rights action under § 1983 is the appropriate vehicle to challenge the conditions of confinement, but not the fact or length of the confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s challenge to the fact or duration of confinement seeking earlier release; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Campbell v. Johnson · filed 2006-12-11

Where, as here, plaintiff attacks the fact and duration of his continued confinement, the appropriate remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy when success in the action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the plaintiff’s confinement; the federal remedy is habeas corpus.

Crosby v. Woodford · filed 2007-07-16

Although Crosby seeks to cast his action as a general challenge to the constitutionality of California’s parole statutes, “success in [his] action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [his] confinement.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). Crosby’s action is therefore barred, id. at 81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, and Crosby’s sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not cover claims challenging the legality of a person's confinement.

Keselica v. Carcieri · filed 2007-09-04

Having carefully reviewed the record and appellant's submissions on appeal, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Keselica's claims challenged the legality of his confinement and therefore were not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims that necessarily call into question the legality of a plaintiff's confinement.

Keselica v. Carcieri · filed 2007-11-07

In both instances, the district court concluded that Keselica's claims necessarily called into question the legality of his confinement and, therefore, were not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985. We summarily affirmed the first dismissal, see Keselica v. Carcieri, No. 07-1195 (1st Cir. Sept. 4, 2007) (per curiam), and the same disposition is appropriate here.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s challenge to gain-time calculations that affect the duration of confinement; the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

Robinson v. McDonough · filed 2007-12-14

The allocation of gain time has a direct effect on the duration of a prisoner’s confinement. The district court correctly concluded that Robinson’s exclusive remedy is a habeas petition.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim for restored gain-time credits and work release eligibility when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment and it has not been invalidated.

Robinson v. Satz · filed 2007-12-21

Robinson’s complaint does not allege that either his 1988 murder conviction or his life sentence has been invalidated. Robinson’s argument regarding work release and gain-time credits, however, “necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of the punishment imposed” because, as in Edwards, a conclusion that Robinson’s due process rights were violated by the parole commission’s procedures would mean that he is entitled to a reinstatement of his gain-time credits and work release eligibility status. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646–48, 117 S. Ct. at 1588–89. Therefore, this claim is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s current confinement.

Jenkins v. Currier · filed 2008-01-23

To the extent that this argument is a challenge to the lawfulness of Appellant’s current confinement, it is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek injunctive relief that would speed a prisoner’s release; that claim must be brought through habeas corpus.

Frey v. Adams County Court Services · filed 2008-03-04

To the extent that he seeks injunctive relief, success on this claim would result in a speedier release from custody, so the claim cannot be pursued under § 1983 but must be pursued as a habeas claim under § 2241.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for challenging a commitment to confinement; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies.

Gabriel Wade Mills v. Anderson · filed 2008-03-31

First, Mills’s challenge to his commitment is not properly brought in this section 1983 action, cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (state prisoner’s challenge to fact or duration of confinement must be brought through habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies); and second, the medical records show that Mills received reasonable testing and medication for his medical complaints, see Logan v. Clarke, 119 F.3d 647, 649-50 (8th Cir. 1997) (prison doctors were not deliberately indifferent where they treated prisoner on numerous occasions and offered sensible medication and treatment); Kayser v. Caspari, 16 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff’s self-diagnosis alone will not suffice to establish serious medical condition); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (failure to establish “the detrimental effect of delay in treatment precludes a claim of deliberate indifference”).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a prison disciplinary conviction that affects the length of confinement until the prisoner obtains a favorable termination.

Holton v. Morales · filed 2008-04-03

A § 1983 action that would undermine the validity of a prison disciplinary conviction which directly affects the length of confinement cannot proceed until the prisoner has “achieve[d] favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.”

Section 1983 cannot be used by a state prisoner to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; the prisoner must seek habeas relief instead.

Sawyer v. Gorman · filed 2008-06-20

Because “a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement [and] must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead,” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted), we agree with the district court’s decision.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily implicate the validity of a prisoner’s confinement must be brought in a habeas petition.

Williams v. Holevinski · filed 2008-09-26

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Williams’ claims alleging that defendants interfered with his parole proceedings because the claims necessarily implicate the validity of his confinement and must be brought in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle to challenge the duration of confinement by attacking the validity of a sentence.

Badgett v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2008-11-05

The district court properly dismissed appellants’ action challenging the duration of their confinement. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (explaining that a civil tort action is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging the validity of a criminal conviction or sentence).

Section 1983 does not provide the vehicle for challenges to the fact or duration of confinement, which must be brought through habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies.

Nunnery v. Kalamazoo County · filed 1990-05-09

Upon review, we conclude that dismissal was proper because Nunnery's complaint essentially concerns the fact or duration of his confinement and may not be pursued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy when the requested relief would undermine the basis for continued civil commitment; a challenge to custody must proceed under § 2254.

Savinski v. Thornton · filed 2004-03-09

The district court denied this request-properly so, as § 1983 is not the right remedy.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement even when they also challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

United States Ex Rel. Sero v. Preiser · filed 1974-01-23

While the argument would be valid if the plaintiffs sought only to challenge the fact or duration of their confinement, it does not apply here because the amended complaint (and indeed the original complaint) clearly attacks not only the fact and duration but the very conditions of confinement. ... Accordingly, there is no doubt that plaintiffs are free to press their § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue conditions claims that are wholly derivative of a challenge to the length of confinement.

Dixon v. Lamar Alexander and Harold Bradley · filed 1984-08-21

On the instant appeal, however, we hold that appellant’s claims relating to the conditions of his confinement are simply derivative of the possibility-of-parole claim, i.e., the length of his confinement. The former claims are completely subsumed by the latter claim. Under Preiser, we are precluded from ruling on this type of § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to relitigate a habeas procedural bar through a claim that challenges the constitutionality of his confinement.

Dickerson v. Cornyn · filed 2000-10-26

The district court’s dismissal was not error because Dickerson’s complaint was an attempt to relitigate the issue of ... the procedural bar and was thus a challenge to the underlying constitutionality of his confinement; as such, it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release from confinement; habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy.

Hightower v. Rodriquez · filed 2002-05-29

When a state prisoner, such as Hightower, “is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas ... corpus.”

Section 1983 cannot be used for a claim whose success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration; that claim must be brought in a habeas corpus petition.

Walker v. Mississippi Parole Board · filed 2009-06-16

Because success in Walker’s action “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration[,]” a § 1983 action is barred, and his claims must be brought in a habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim for speedier release when success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.

SHAW v. BUNTS · filed 2009-07-06

Moreover, to the extent Shaw’s § 1983 action sought speedier release from prison, it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

A § 1983 claim challenging the fact or duration of confinement requires the claimant to show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

NDOROMO v. Holder · filed 2009-08-03

To the extent appellant challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, he must first “prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478-79, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the duration of imprisonment and seek a shorter sentence.

Hudson v. State of Kansas · filed 2009-10-06

Her § 1983 claim directly challenges the duration of confinement and seeks a shorter sentence based on her proposed re-calculation of time served.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement or its duration.

Tedder v. Butler · filed 2009-12-14

Tedder’s section 1983 claim is therefore barred, because success “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”

Section 1983 does not cover a claim challenging the duration of confinement when success would entitle the prisoner to accelerated release.

Ardell Nelson, Jr v. Pardons and Parole Chairman · filed 2010-01-04

Finally, Nelson’s claim that his mandatory supervised release date has been incorrectly computed is not cognizable in a § 1983 action because it challenges the duration of his confinement and, if granted, would entitle him to accelerated release.

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner to seek parole or good-behavior credit that would shorten confinement.

Manco v. John/Jane Does · filed 2010-01-27

Finally, in so far as Manco seeks parole and credit for good behavior, his claims are not properly brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s challenge to the terms of imprisonment seeking speedier release from custody; that challenge belongs in a § 2254 proceeding.

May v. Texas Board of Pardons & Par · filed 2010-03-25

A challenge to the terms of imprisonment is properly brought in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding and is not cognizable in § 1983 proceedings.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge to the terms of imprisonment seeking speedier release; that challenge belongs in a § 2254 proceeding.

May v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 2010-03-25

A challenge to the terms of imprisonment is properly brought in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding and is not cognizable in § 1983 proceedings.

Section 1983 does not provide injunctive relief that would shorten post-release supervision; such a challenge must proceed through habeas corpus.

Hardy v. Fischer · filed 2010-03-31

Accordingly, plaintiffs seek to curtail the duration of their confinement, and must do so through a writ of habeas corpus, rather than pursuant to section 1983.

A state prisoner’s § 1983 claim is barred if success would necessarily show that the prisoner’s confinement or its duration is invalid, unless it has already been invalidated.

Scott v. Urlich · filed 2010-04-02

Pursuant to Heck and its progeny, a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim that challenges the fact or duration of confinement.

Campbell v. David M. Gersten, Joseph P. Farina, Katherine Fernandez Rundle, Bill McCollum · filed 2010-08-30

Campbell also failed to state a claim under section 1983 because his arguments about the denial of his post-conviction motion and constitutional violations committed by state authorities challenged the fact and duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek a speedier release from imprisonment; a prisoner seeking that relief must pursue habeas corpus.

Jones v. US Parole Commission · filed 2010-09-17

“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of the duration of confinement; that claim must be brought through habeas.

Deloria v. Ed Lightenberg · filed 2010-11-04

Upon careful de novo review, see Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A), we conclude that Deloria failed to state a claim. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (state prisoners may use only habeas remedies when they seek to invalidate duration of confinement, either directly through injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through judicial determination that necessarily implies unlawfulness of state’s custody); Figg v. Russell, 433 F.3d 593, 597-600 (8th Cir. 2006) (parole board members are absolutely immune from suit when considering and denying parole questions; extending absolute immunity to parole agent where his function was so associated with function of parole board that he was also cloaked in immunity); cf. Zar v. S.D. Bd. of Exam’rs of Psychologists, 976 F.2d 459, 464 (8th Cir. 1992) (board of examiners itself was not “person” within meaning of § 1983).

Section 1983 does not provide damages or equitable relief for a challenge to confinement when success would imply its invalidity and the confinement has not been invalidated.

McKinney v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole · filed 2010-12-23

Absent the prior invalidation of a state confinement, a § 1983 action for damages or equitable relief is unavailable if success in that action would imply the invalidity of the fact or duration of the confinement.

Section 1983 claims concerning civil commitment proceedings cannot proceed when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the commitment.

Trebas v. Knapp · filed 2010-12-27

The district court properly dismissed Trebas’s claims concerning defendants’ conduct in connection with his civil commitment and recommitment proceedings, because success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his commitment.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a parole denial when success would necessarily call into question the duration of confinement.

Stanley v. St. Paul · filed 2011-02-23

Because Plaintiff is alleging that he is entitled to be released on parole, and he is alleging the only thing standing in the way of parole is Defendant’s report, he clearly challenges the denial of parole, a claim that is presently barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 cannot be used by a convicted person to challenge the fact of confinement or the conditions of parole.

Blackmon v. Hamblin · filed 2011-08-17

A person convicted of a crime may not use § 1983 to attack the fact of his confinement or the conditions of his parole.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s claim when success would not necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or its duration.

Bradley v. Looten · filed 2012-02-08

Bradley did not seek speedier release, and success on his section 1983 First Amendment claims would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement or its duration.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s challenge to the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Jackson v. Rick Thaler, the State of Texas · filed 2012-02-29

Therefore, because Jackson challenges the validity of the fact and duration of his confinement, the proper remedy is a habeas corpus petition in the federal court.

Section 1983 does not permit claims challenging lost time credits when they necessarily challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Langston v. Finn · filed 2012-07-12

To the extent that Langston’s amended complaint contests the deprivation of time credits, the district court properly dismissed those claims as Heck-barred. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997) (challenge to loss of good-time credits not cognizable under § 1983); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (§ 1983 claims that necessarily challenge the fact or duration of confinement are barred).

Section 1983 does not cover a state prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s confinement or its duration.

Peterson v. Lampert · filed 2012-07-25

Applying these principles to this case, we conclude Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek sentence credit when success would necessarily invalidate the duration of a prisoner’s confinement.

Hernandez v. Livingston · filed 2012-10-22

As Hernandez’s claim for credit on his sentence for the time he spent on mandatory supervision, if successful, would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of his current confinement, it could not be brought in the present § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims are barred if they necessarily imply the invalidity of an inmate’s confinement, unless that confinement has already been invalidated.

Vargas v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2012-11-30

Vargas’s claims are barred by Heck if they necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement, unless Vargas demonstrates that this confinement has been previously invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for an inmate challenging the lawfulness of confinement based on the underlying judgment; that challenge must be raised in a § 2254 habeas petition.

Edwards v. Fernandez-Rundell · filed 2013-03-18

Because Edwards challenges the fact that he is being held in the custody of the Florida State Prison system, on the basis of the underlying judgment, his claim must be raised in a § 2254 habeas petition, not a § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 bars a claim that necessarily challenges the loss of good-time credits unless the disciplinary result has been invalidated.

Patkins v. Gonzales · filed 2014-02-28

The district court properly dismissed Patkins’s action as Heck-barred because Patkins failed to allege facts showing that the results of the disciplinary hearing, including the loss of good-time credits, has been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997) (challenge to loss of good-time credits not cognizable under § 1983); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (§ 1983 claims that necessarily challenge the fact or duration of confinement are barred unless the underlying conviction or sentence has been invalidated).

Section 1983 does not provide a way for a state prisoner to challenge continuing confinement and seek release.

Patterson v. People of the State of Califor · filed 2014-04-16

The district court properly dismissed Patterson’s action challenging his continuing confinement as barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek release from confinement or a shorter sentence; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Foster v. United States Bureau of Prisons · filed 2014-07-15

Plaintiff first challenges BOP’s calculation of his sentence, styling his suit as one arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, apparently seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. ... In such a case, "a prisoner cannot bring a civil action seeking a declaratory judgment in order to obtain his release."

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Devaughn v. North Kern State Prison · filed 2014-10-07

To the extent that DeVaughn brought claims challenging the fact and duration of his confinement, those claims were properly dismissed. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (“[A] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain release from prison or a new trial that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing conviction.

Toombs v. Massingill · filed 2014-10-24

Because setting aside his conviction would result in his release from prison, and a judgment granting a new trial would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the § 1983 complaint as frivolous.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to seek relief inconsistent with a still-intact order of confinement.

Castillo v. Johnson · filed 2014-11-04

Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), Castillo may not use a § 1983 suit to seek relief that is inconsistent with a still-intact order of confinement.

A prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement unless the conviction has been overturned.

Andoe v. Reinke · filed 2014-12-04

The district court properly dismissed Andoe’s First Amendment claim asserting that the alleged failure to mail his May 12, 2011 letter was the cause of his current confinement because success on that claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the fact or duration of Andoe’s confinement, and Andoe did not allege that his conviction has been overturned.

Section 1983 permits challenges to conditions of confinement; a prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release must challenge the fact or duration of confinement through habeas.

Harvey v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2014-12-08

And although “[a] prisoner may use § 1983 to challenge the conditions of his confinement,” habeas is “the only avenue for a challenge to the ... fact or duration of confinement, at least when the remedy requested would result in the prisoner’s immediate or speedier release from that confinement.” Id. The district court properly dismissed this suit under Boutwell.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the loss of good time credits when success would necessarily call the duration of confinement into question.

Reece v. Dickenson · filed 2015-02-26

The district court properly dismissed Reece’s due process claim as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Reece challenged disciplinary proceedings and the resulting loss of good time credits.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to challenge confinement or seek release and damages when the conviction or sentence has not been invalidated.

Windsor E. Cooks v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2015-04-20

The district court did not err in dismissing Cooks’s complaint for failure to state a claim because his claims are not cognizable under § 1983. In his complaint, Cooks challenged the very fact of his physical imprisonment, and for relief, he sought a determination that he was entitled to immediate release from imprisonment as well as damages based on his unconstitutional imprisonment. Because Cooks did not assert or demonstrate that his conviction or sentence had been invalidated, he could not bring his claims under § 1983, and his sole federal remedy was to seek a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily establish the invalidity of the duration of confinement.

Taylor v. Danberg · filed 2015-05-26

Taylor’s claim is not cognizable under § 1983 because success in his action would establish the invalidity of the duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim if success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement, unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

McCoy v. O'Neill · filed 2015-07-02

To the extent that McCoy seeks a new trial or alleges that his conviction was invalid, dismissal was proper because success in this action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of McCoy’s confinement.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to seek release on parole by challenging the fact or duration of confinement.

Allen v. Warden Falk · filed 2015-08-31

We believe the district court correctly dismissed this claim because it is not cognizable in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If Allen desires to attack the “fact or duration of his confinement,” he cannot do so in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a child's detention, even when the child's parents assert their own parental rights; the challenge must proceed through habeas corpus.

D.D. Ex Rel. Dabney v. Niles · filed 2015-09-03

Regardless of how the Appellants frame the claims, both claims – D.D.’s own claim (Count Two) and his parents’ claim based on their parental rights (Count One) – are, in their essential nature, challenges to D.D.’s detention. Therefore, the appropriate method to challenge D.D.’s detention is to seek a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment unless the challenged sentence has first been invalidated.

Marshall v. Jindal · filed 2015-09-10

Before a § 1983 plaintiff can recover damages for an “allegedly unconstitutional . . . imprisonment,” he must prove that the challenged sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 claims challenging only the manner of confinement are not barred by Heck when they do not necessarily affect the fact or duration of confinement.

Brownlee v. Murphy · filed 2007-05-08

To the extent the § 1983 claim challenges only the manner of confinement, rather than its duration, Heck would not bar it from proceeding.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement or obtain accelerated release; those claims must proceed in habeas.

Terry Davis, Jr. v. Clerk of Court Acadia Parish · filed 2016-03-08

A § 1983 suit may not be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; such a claim is cognizable only in habeas, because only a habeas action may be used to secure accelerated or immediate release.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily invalidate detention under a probation violation detainer unless the detainer has first been successfully challenged.

McBride v. O'Brien · filed 2016-04-13

To the extent that McBride alleges that his confinement on the detainer violates federal law, a favorable outcome would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his detention. McBride has not successfully challenged the detainer in any state or federal proceeding. Therefore, because he may not proceed under § 1983, the District Court properly granted O’Brien’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek good time credits that would reduce the duration of a prison sentence.

Glaser v. Raemisch · filed 2016-08-18

As the district court explained in its well-reasoned order, a prisoner cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the validity of his sentence. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). That rule bars actions like Mr. Glaser’s that seek to reduce the duration of a sentence by winning good time credits.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim if success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration, unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

McCune v. Legrand · filed 2016-09-19

To the extent McCune alleged that the prior denial of parole was improper, the district court properly dismissed McCune’s action because success in his action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement or its duration, and McCune failed to show that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 permits a civilly committed person to seek prospective relief when that relief would not necessarily imply that the commitment is invalid.

Karsjens v. Piper · filed 2017-01-03

Because the injunctive relief sought would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiffs’ commitment, this action is not barred under Heck or Preiser.

Section 1983 does not permit a civilly committed person to pursue a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the commitment unless an appropriate tribunal has invalidated the commitment order.

John Banda, Jr. v. Adams · filed 2017-01-09

Banda’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983 at this time because his civil commitment order has not been invalidated by an appropriate tribunal, and a favorable outcome in a § 1983 action would necessarily and improperly imply the invalidity of his confinement at the STU.

Section 1983 cannot be used by an inmate to challenge the duration of confinement; the inmate must seek habeas corpus relief.

Perez v. City of Fort Worth Tarrant County, Texas And J. R. Molina · filed 2017-01-11

The United States Supreme Court has held that an inmate in state custody cannot use a section 1983 action to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement.” ... In the present case, Perez essentially argued that he was denied parole and his confinement was extended as the result of racial discrimination. As such, Perez should have asserted his claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used by a state prisoner to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; the prisoner must seek habeas corpus or appropriate state court relief.

Maps v. Miami Dade Staff Attorney · filed 2017-05-11

It is well established that an inmate in state custody “cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement” and instead must seek federal habeas corpus or appropriate state court relief.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner seeking a parole hearing or release from confinement.

Ruffin v. Superintendent Retreat SCI · filed 2017-05-24

We agree with the District Court that Ruffin’s § 1983 complaint is not the proper vehicle for his request for a parole hearing or release from confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims contesting the fact or duration of confinement; those claims belong in a federal habeas proceeding.

Aaron Carter, Jr. v. Mossbarger · filed 2017-06-29

Because Carter seeks to contest the fact and duration of his confinement, his claims are not cognizable under § 1983; rather, his claims are proper for a federal habeas proceeding.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim if success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration, unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Stevenson v. Bisbee · filed 2017-08-17

The district court properly dismissed Stevenson’s First Amendment claim because success in Stevenson’s claim would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement or its duration, and Stevenson failed to allege that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a still-valid state conviction or seek release from confinement; those claims must be brought in habeas.

Tedesco v. County of Monroe · filed 2018-05-18

He must assert these claims via a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not in a § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Gilbert v. Washington State Doc · filed 2018-07-17

The district court properly dismissed Gilbert’s claims alleging unlawful incarceration because success on Gilbert’s claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement or its duration, and Gilbert failed to allege that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 cannot be used in place of habeas corpus to challenge a state conviction or confinement.

Thomas v. Napier · filed 2018-09-18

Plaintiff may not circumvent the habeas corpus rules by bringing her claim as one under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge prior parole suitability decisions or otherwise seek relief that would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of confinement.

Manny v. Kirkegard · filed 2018-09-20

To the extent that Manny’s action challenges prior parole suitability decisions or would otherwise necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of his confinement, the district court properly concluded that the action is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner’s challenge to confinement when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.

Kader v. Dooley · filed 2018-09-25

The Supreme Court held in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) that a state prisoner cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge his confinement. ... Thus, this court will not treat Kader’s § 1983 action as a habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a denial of bond that affects the fact or duration of confinement.

Jenner v. Fackler · filed 2018-11-02

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the denial of a bond, which is a decision that impacts “the very fact or duration of [a state prisoner's] physical imprisonment.”

Section 1983 claims challenging the fact of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus.

Snyder v. Rosenthal · filed 2018-12-28

Even assuming the “literal applicability,” of § 1983 to the defendants’ alleged misconduct, because Snyder is challenging the fact of her confinement, her § 1983 claims “must yield to the more specific federal habeas statute, with its attendant procedural and exhaustion requirements.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004).

Section 1983 does not permit claims challenging parole decisions when success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of confinement.

Johnson v. Lizarraga · filed 2019-04-23

To the extent that Johnson’s claims challenged prior parole suitability decisions or would otherwise necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of his confinement, the district court properly concluded that the claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Robinson v. Williams · filed 2019-07-12

That is solely a matter for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which cannot be combined into a Section 1983 lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not allow state prisoners to challenge the fact or duration of their confinement; they must seek habeas corpus relief.

(PC) Trotter v. Pfeiffer · filed 2019-08-02

However, it has long been established that state prisoners cannot challenge the fact or duration of their confinement in a § 1983 action, and that their sole remedy lies in habeas corpus relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement.

Ball v. Asbury · filed 2019-08-09

When an inmate seeks to challenge the fact or duration of his detention, a civil rights complaint under § 1983 is not the proper legal remedy.

Section 1983 claims challenging a prisoner’s confinement must be dismissed even if the prisoner seeks only injunctive or monetary relief.

Johnson v. O'Neill · filed 2019-08-12

A Section 1983 claim challenging confinement must be dismissed even where a plaintiff seeks only injunctive or monetary relief.

A prisoner cannot recover damages under § 1983 for a claim that would invalidate the duration of confinement unless that period of confinement has already been invalidated.

Martinez v. State of Nevada · filed 2019-08-13

Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the duration of his confinement; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the period of confinement has already been invalidated. ... IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts I and II are barred under Heck and dismissed.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a prisoner’s confinement; that challenge belongs in habeas corpus.

Johnson v. District Attorney General · filed 2019-08-14

However, challenges to the validity of an inmate’s confinement are not properly lodged under § 1983, but are within the sole province of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply that a conviction or confinement is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Lane v. Knox Co Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-08-21

The Heck rule therefore bars claims where a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a conviction or confinement when success would necessarily show it is invalid unless it has first been invalidated.

Smith v. Unis · filed 2019-08-22

Consequently, those claims are barred by Heck and the complaint must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims challenging the fact or validity of confinement; those claims must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Battle v. Garcia · filed 2019-08-26

As to Battle’s remaining arguments, the Court finds that he is attempting to challenge the fact and validity of his confinement; however, such claims are not cognizable in § 1983 proceedings.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek sentence credits that would shorten a prisoner’s custody; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Tyson v. Baldwin · filed 2019-08-28

The claim is very clearly an attack on the duration of his sentence and therefore sounds in habeas. ...As such, Plaintiff’s claim is DISMISSED without prejudiceas improperly brought under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release from confinement; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Matuse v. Hamilton · filed 2019-09-03

... because habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 8).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of an involuntary commitment.

Kreger-Mueller, Valerie v. Shiner, Justin · filed 2019-09-09

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement when success would result in speedier release; the remedy is habeas corpus.

Jones v. Dugger · filed 2019-09-25

Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint challenges the fact of his current incarceration and the duration of his confinement. Judgment in his favor on such a claim would result in a speedier release from prison. Therefore, his federal remedy is through a petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge confinement when success would necessarily show that its duration is invalid.

Phillips v. Chappell · filed 2019-09-26

The district court properly dismissed Phillips’s claim premised on his allegedly illegal confinement in state prison as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on this claim would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner’s claim that would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction or confinement unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Melendez v. Clark County Nevada · filed 2019-10-04

Because Plaintiffs here essentially seek to demonstrate the invalidity of their convictions and confinement, their requested relief must be presented through a federal habeas corpus petition rather than claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s continued confinement.

Barnes v. Garner · filed 2019-10-08

The plaintiff’s success on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement; as a result, the relief he seeks is only available through a petition for the writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a revocation of supervised release that affects the fact of confinement; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Anderson, Charles v. Wisconsin Dept. of Human Services · filed 2019-10-10

But plaintiff's challenge to his revocation and re-confinement at Sand Ridge cannot be raised in a civil action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply a probation revocation is invalid unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Parkman v. Doe · filed 2019-10-18

Such a finding would necessarily imply the invalidity of the probation revocation proceeding. ... As Parkman does not allege facts suggesting that his probation revocation proceeding has been declared invalid under one of the criteria set forth in Heck, his claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement and seeking immediate or speedier release.

Johnson v. Stirling · filed 2019-10-21

The Magistrate correctly construed these allegations as a challenge to a factor or duration of Plaintiffs confinement, which is not an actionable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims challenging the validity of confinement are premature when that confinement has not been invalidated.

Rainer v. Criminal Justice Center · filed 2019-11-14

Plaintiff appears to seek to challenge his confinement and prosecution but does not allege that either has ended or been invalidated. His § 1983 claims are therefore premature, and his complaint must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement unless the relevant decision has first been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Clay v. Collier · filed 2019-11-19

Therefore, he is entitled to proceed with his § 1983 claim only if TDCJ officials’ decision regarding his release date has been reversed or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not provide a way for a state prisoner to challenge detention past his maximum release date; that claim must be brought in a habeas petition.

Rios-Davila v. Wetzel · filed 2019-11-20

Such a claim by a state prisoner must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and is not cognizable in a complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain release from prison or invalidate a conviction that has not been overturned.

Johnson v. O'Neill · filed 2019-12-10

These requests are barred by Heck and its progeny, whether couched as a Section 1983 claim or a Bivens claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the duration of confinement unless it has previously been invalidated.

Davis v. Owens · filed 2019-12-31

And here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state that a court previously invalidated any aspect of his incarceration. Thus, because Plaintiff’s Complaint essentially seeks to now demonstrate the improper duration of his confinement and sentence in order to secure release and monetary damages, it creates a claim that must first be presented through a federal habeas corpus petition rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to the revocation of supervised release that must be brought through a habeas petition after exhaustion of state court remedies.

Anderson, Charles v. Wisconsin Dept. of Human Services · filed 2020-01-09

I concluded that plaintiff could not challenge his revocation in a civil action under §1983, and that he could challenge the revocation only through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, after exhausting his state court remedies. ... As for the challenge to his revocation, plaintiff has not shown that I erred in concluded that the challenge must be brought in a habeas petition under § 2254.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner’s challenge to the execution of his sentence; that claim must be brought under § 2254.

Rios-Davila v. Delbalso · filed 2020-01-15

Such a claim by a state prisoner must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and is not cognizable in a complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a parole board decision when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s detention.

Johnson v. Talaber, Esq. · filed 2020-01-16

Any award or decision in Johnson’s favor that concerns a decision made by the parole board, would necessarily imply the invalidity of Johnson’s detention. Consequently, he cannot pursue a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner seeking to apply additional earned good time credits to shorten a sentence must pursue habeas relief rather than a Section 1983 claim.

Tyson v. Baldwin · filed 2020-01-29

Plaintiff instead argues that he can bring his lawsuit as a Section 1983 claim rather than a habeas petition.But to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to apply additional good time credits that he has earned, that claim would sound in habeas (See Doc. 6, p. 4). Further, to the extent Plaintiff argues that the statute violates his equal protection rights, the claim also fails.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole board decision changing a prisoner’s release date when success would necessarily imply that the detention is invalid.

Martz v. Talaber, Esq. · filed 2020-01-29

Martz’s claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for an inmate’s claim contesting the length of confinement; that claim must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Robinson v. Newton · filed 2020-02-04

Because Robinson is clearly contesting the length of his confinement at the jail, his claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole board decision changing a prisoner’s maximum release date when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the detention.

COPE v. MS. BRITTAIN · filed 2020-02-21

Any award or decision in Cope’s favor that concerns a decision made by the parole board changing his maximum date of release, would necessarily imply the invalidity of Cope’s detention. Consequently, he cannot pursue a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge to the length of confinement when success would necessarily imply that the detention is invalid; that challenge must proceed through habeas corpus.

Johnson v. Mason · filed 2020-02-25

Any award or decision in Johnson’s favor that concerns a decision made by the parole board changing his maximum date of release, would necessarily imply the invalidity of Johnson’s detention. Consequently, he cannot pursue a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the validity of his confinement unless it has first been invalidated in another proceeding.

Jefferson v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County and Nashville · filed 2020-03-10

For Plaintiff to prevail on his claim that his incarceration is unconstitutional would necessarily invalidate his conviction and imprisonment. It is, therefore, not cognizable under Section 1983 unless and until Plaintiff succeeds in having his allegedly unlawful incarceration remedied via state proceedings, or a federal writ of habeas corpus after exhaustion of those remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle to challenge the validity of a guilty plea or parole revocation; those challenges must be brought in habeas.

KREILEIN v. LEMMON · filed 2020-03-12

Mr. Kreilein appears in his filings to challenge his guilty plea and the revocation of his parole, but those claims must be brought in a habeas action, not this civil rights case.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a prisoner’s confinement and seek release; that claim must be brought through habeas corpus.

Holbrook v. State of Michigan · filed 2020-04-08

A prisoner’s challenge to his confinement may only be brought as a petition for habeas corpus—not as a civil rights action pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement when success would result in a speedier release from prison.

Jones v. Hamblen Co. Sheriffs Dept. · filed 2020-04-14

Next, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot challenge the fact of his current incarceration or the duration of his confinement in a § 1983 action, as judgment in his favor on such a claim would result in a speedier release from prison.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages or injunctive relief that would call into question the validity of his sentence.

Lloyd v. Kingston · filed 2020-04-28

Plaintiff’s claims for both damages and injunctive relief are foreclosed in a § 1983 action where his relief would call into question the validity of his sentence.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact of his custody; that challenge must be brought in a habeas petition.

Carroll v. Pierce County Sheriffs Department · filed 2020-04-29

Plaintiff’s requested relief, which challenges the fact of his custody, is properly raised in a § 2254 petition, not a § 1983 complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a viable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain additional good time credits that would shorten a state prisoner's sentence.

Reiman v. Fatheree · filed 2020-05-05

Accordingly, to the extent Reiman is attacking the length of his sentence and seeks the application of additional good time credits, these claims are dismissed without prejudice as improperly brought under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to challenge the duration of confinement or seek immediate release; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Oh v. Saprano · filed 2020-05-13

As a state prisoner seeking relief in federal court, Oh cannot challenge the duration of his confinement in a section 1983 action; he can do so only by petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to seek compensation for lost sentence credits when success would imply that the duration of confinement is invalid and the relevant discipline has not been invalidated.

Fontaine v. Parker · filed 2020-05-28

Accordingly, his claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the validity of confinement before the plaintiff has obtained relief in state proceedings or through habeas corpus.

Derrick v. District Attorney Office · filed 2020-05-28

A Section 1983 claim challenging the validity of an inmate’s confinement is not cognizable even where a plaintiff does not expressly seek his release.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge credit calculations affecting the duration of confinement absent prior invalidation.

Igbinovia v. Dzurenda · filed 2020-06-01

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims regarding the miscalculation of statutory credit deductions from Plaintiff’s maximum sentence length are barred. By arguing that Defendants failed to correctly apply statutory credit deductions from Plaintiff’s maximum sentence, Plaintiff is attempting to challenge the duration of his overall sentence. ... As such, the Court dismisses, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims challenging the statutory deductions to his maximum sentences based on Wilkinson.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

McMurry 223416 v. Brown · filed 2020-06-12

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; a prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Calloway v. Soley · filed 2020-06-15

Any challenge to the fact or duration of confinement cannot be pursued in a section 1983 action; the prisoner must seek relief through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking release based on alleged flaws in his conviction; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

TREADWAY · filed 2020-06-17

Furthermore, to the extent Treadway seeks release based on alleged flaws in his conviction, including his actual innocence, his claims are not cognizable in a civil rights lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the validity of his conviction or confinement unless it has first been invalidated.

Vontz v. Rochowiak · filed 2020-06-23

To the extent that the plaintiff’s complaint concerns the validity of his state criminal proceedings, it is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to challenge the fact or duration of a conviction or incarceration.

Stephens v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2020-06-25

To the extent Plaintiff requested relief regarding his criminal convictions and incarceration, such claims were not proper for a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a parole decision when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s detention.

Acevedo v. Strickland · filed 2020-07-17

An award or decision in Acevedo’s favor involving a decision made by the parole board would necessarily imply the invalidity of his detention. Consequently, he cannot pursue a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits challenges to prison conditions and procedures, but a prisoner challenging the validity of a conviction and seeking release must seek habeas relief.

Adams v. Davis · filed 2020-07-20

An action under 42 USC § 1983 is generally the proper vehicle by which “to attack unconstitutional conditions of confinement and prison procedures.” ... By all this he challenges the validity of his convictions and present confinement—seeking relief available only by petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Haynes v. Phillips · filed 2020-07-21

Because, as discussed below, Plaintiff has raised claims that are improper for a § 1983 action, the Court finds this action should be dismissed instead of transferred.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of a state prisoner’s confinement; those claims must be brought through habeas corpus.

Reyes v. Superior Court of California, County of Orange · filed 2020-07-29

Plaintiff may not challenge an allegedly unlawful conviction in a federal civil rights action. Because he is attacking the fact of his conviction and duration of his sentence, plaintiff’s claims must be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; the remedy is habeas corpus.

(PC) Smith v. Cambpell · filed 2020-08-07

To the extent Plaintiff requests relief in the form of good time credits he lost as a result of the finding of guilt for the allegedly false crime report and expungement of the guilty finding from his record, it has long been established that state prisoners cannot challenge the fact or duration of their confinement in a section 1983 action and their sole remedy lies in habeas corpus relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim challenging the fact or duration of confinement.

EL v. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR · filed 2020-08-11

A challenge to the fact or duration of a prisoner's confinement — regardless of the label the petitioner places on the action — is properly treated as a habeas corpus claim, McKinnis v. Mosley, 693 F.2d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1982), and those claims simply are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits challenges to the conditions of confinement, but a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus.

Mackey v. People of the State of California · filed 2020-08-18

A civil rights lawsuit under Section 1983 is the proper way to challenge the conditions of confinement, while a habeas corpus action is the proper way to challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Section 1983 does not allow prisoners to challenge the fact or duration of their confinement; they must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Vega v. Bolan, Esquire · filed 2020-08-18

To the extent that Vega is challenging the fact or duration of his confinement, the proper avenue is a petition for writ of habeas corpus; prisoners cannot challenge the fact or duration of confinement through a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to obtain relief based on the fact of incarceration unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Clark-Bey v. City of Knoxville · filed 2020-08-20

Similarly, Plaintiff cannot obtain relief in a § 1983 action based on the fact of his incarceration without first demonstrating that his conviction and/or sentence has been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for challenging the fact or duration of confinement and seeking immediate release.

Freeze v. Secretary Department of Children and Families · filed 2020-08-21

Freeze’s primary claims for such relief against all three defendants—challenging the fact and duration of his confinement as false imprisonment and seeking his immediate release—are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; such a challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Schwab v. Unknown Party · filed 2020-08-28

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge belongs in habeas corpus.

Garrett 162243 v. Worthy · filed 2020-08-28

First, legally, Mr. Garrett’s motion challenges the fact and duration of his confinement. The Supreme Court has made clear that constitutional challenges to the fact or duration of confinement are the proper subject of a habeas corpus petition rather than a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to challenge the validity of a criminal conviction or confinement; such challenges belong in habeas corpus.

Reavis v. Stevens · filed 2020-09-01

Because Plaintiff’s request for judicial review in his criminal case appears to be a challenge his confinement, that claim is not cognizable in this civil rights action.