42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 cannot be used by a state prisoner to seek a reduction in the duration of confinement; that relief must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Martell-Rodriguez v. Rolon-Suarez · filed 2020-09-14

A § 1983 claim must yield to a § 2254 when the relief being sought is related to the duration of the inmate’s confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Sanders 305405 v. Washington · filed 2020-09-28

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights action to challenge the validity of a criminal conviction or confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

El v. State of North Carolina Inc · filed 2020-10-13

Federal law opens two main avenues of relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a civil rights complaint under § 1983. ... To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to challenge his confinement in his criminal cases, such claims are not cognizable in this civil rights action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Sanders 305405 v. Washington · filed 2020-10-16

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate or early release from confinement; that claim must be brought in habeas corpus.

BRITT v. FORD · filed 2020-10-20

Initially, Plaintiff asserts that he is being held illegally, but any claim challenging his current incarceration and seeking immediate or early release is not proper in a § 1983 complaint and must, instead, be filed in a habeas corpus action.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily imply invalid confinement unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Snow v. Fisher · filed 2020-10-27

Because success on his claims necessarily implies invalid confinement, under the second prong of the Heck analysis, Snow must demonstrate a successful challenge to his current conviction. ... Thus, Heck and its progeny, bars all of Snow’s claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to dismiss state criminal charges when that relief would challenge the plaintiff’s continued confinement.

Taylor v. State of Tennessee · filed 2020-11-12

Plaintiff’s request for relief to have this Court dismiss his state criminal charges directly challenges his continued confinement. This request is barred by Heck and its progeny.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking release from custody; challenges to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus.

Sierra Lopez v. Doe · filed 2020-11-18

To the extent the plaintiff has made reasonable arguments about why he is wrongfully incarcerated and should be released from custody, the court cannot grant relief on those claims because “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole board’s change to a release date when success would necessarily imply that the prisoner’s detention is invalid.

Bethea v. Wetzel · filed 2020-11-19

Any award or decision in Bethea’s favor that concerns a decision made by the parole board changing his maximum date of release, would necessarily imply the invalidity of Bethea’s detention. Consequently, he cannot pursue a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the validity of a conviction and seeks immediate release.

Bonds v. Clemens · filed 2020-11-23

To the extent Bonds challenges the validity of his conviction and seeks immediate release from incarceration, his claim is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or length of confinement; that claim must be brought in a habeas corpus petition.

HATTON v. BLACK · filed 2020-11-24

A claim that challenges the fact or length of a person's confinement must be brought in a habeas corpus petition, not in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their confinement and seeking release; they must pursue habeas corpus.

Coon v. Ravensborg · filed 2020-12-01

Therefore, because Coon and Power are challenging the fact or duration of their confinement and seek to be released from prison, they have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. Their sole remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge criminal convictions or confinement before the convictions are invalidated.

Weston v. Miller · filed 2020-12-07

In other words, he cannot seek relief pursuant to § 1983 which would undermine or potentially invalidate his criminal charges, convictions, and subsequent confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Winterer v. Barr · filed 2020-12-11

As Judge Theiler concluded, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973), and his section 1983 action is barred, Heck, 512 U.S. at 489.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement are premature until the confinement is called into question through an appropriate state or federal remedy.

Shaw v. Jackson · filed 2020-12-16

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement is premature if the confinement is not first called into question by the appropriate state or federal remedy.

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to challenge the duration of confinement; that challenge must be brought through a habeas petition.

Delgado v. Concepcion · filed 2020-12-16

As a state prisoner seeking relief in federal court, Delgado cannot challenge the duration of his confinement in a section 1983 action; he can do so only by petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used by a state prisoner to challenge the duration of confinement; the prisoner must seek habeas corpus relief instead.

Moran v. Department of Corrections of Massachusetts · filed 2020-12-16

Although Moran characterizes his action as one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court cannot treat it as such. “[A] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.’ He must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.”

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek dismissal of state criminal charges when that relief would challenge continued confinement.

Dixon v. Metro Nashville Police Dept. · filed 2020-12-23

A Section 1983 claim challenging confinement must be dismissed even where a plaintiff seeks only injunctive or monetary relief. ... The plaintiff’s request to have this court dismiss his state criminal charges directly challenges his continued confinement. This request is barred by Heck and its progeny.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the fact or duration of confinement, even when habeas relief is unavailable after release.

Sartin v. Whalen · filed 2021-01-05

Sartin’s claim—one that contests the fact or duration of confinement—cannot be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge lost behavior credits that affect the duration of confinement without prior invalidation of the disciplinary action.

McCulley v. Roger D Wilson Detention Facility · filed 2021-01-08

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim challenging the duration of his confinement due to the loss of his earned behavior credits is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s damages claim when success would necessarily invalidate the duration of confinement.

Campbell v. Tennessee Department of Correction · filed 2021-01-15

Thus, if the Court granted Plaintiff the relief that he requests in his complaint for his claim against Defendant Whisman, it would automatically, rather than potentially, invalidate the duration of Plaintiff’s sentence. Accordingly, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983, id., and Defendant Whisman’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 16] will be GRANTED.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging parole revocation or confinement unless the plaintiff has first established its invalidity.

Harris, William v. Pucker, Haley · filed 2021-01-21

As a result, he cannot bring a challenge to his revocation or confinement under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the duration of a prisoner’s confinement; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Horton v. Parker · filed 2021-01-26

Plaintiff may pursue this challenge through a habeas corpus petition filed under Section 2254, but not a civil rights complaint filed under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a recipient of Section 8 housing assistance to seek a remedy when that assistance is terminated in violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

DeProfio v. Waltham Housing Authority · filed 2007-07-17

A recipient of Federal public housing assistance under the Section 8 program has a property interest in the continued availability of that assistance, and can pursue a remedy under §1983 if that assistance is terminated in violation of her Federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Section 1983 permits eligible housing tenants to sue a public housing authority for utility overbilling or rent above the Housing Act’s statutory ceiling.

Spieth v. Bucks County Housing Authority · filed 2009-01-28

Tenants eligible for housing assistance are entitled to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they allege that a PHA over-billed them for utilities and/or charged them rent above the statutory ceiling provided established in 42 U.S.C. § 1437.

California equitable tolling principles apply to § 1983 claims when consistent with federal policy.

Joan Marie DONOGHUE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the COUNTY OF ORANGE; Dennis W. La-Ducer, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1988-05-26

The Court has also indicated that state law doctrines allowing for tolling may be applicable to section 1983 actions. ... We think it is clear that we must apply the tolling principles of California law to both the federal and state claims in this case.

Equitable tolling of the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim requires deceptive conduct by the defendant that caused the plaintiff to delay suing.

Rivera-Gomez v. De Castro · filed 1990-04-05

Appellants, quondam employees of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, sued their erstwhile agency head, the Ombudsman, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). ... In a nutshell, it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to prove, at a minimum, that defendant’s representations were so deceptive that they caused plaintiffs’ failure to sue punctually. ... Plaintiffs’ complaint was out of time, ergo, appropriately dismissed.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is not tolled while the plaintiff pursues an EEOC proceeding.

Reese v. City of Emeryville Fire Department · filed 1990-08-30

Accordingly, it is inappropriate to toll the statute of limitations governing the § 1983 claim during the pendency of the EEOC proceeding.

In California, pursuing a state court tort claim arising from the same facts does not equitably toll the limitations period for a § 1983 action.

Alfred Banks v. County of San Diego City of San Diego · filed 1991-12-30

First, under California law the section 1983 statute of limitations is not equitably tolled where a plaintiff pursues a state court tort claim arising from the same facts.

A California Section 1983 claim is not equitably tolled by earlier proceedings against a separate state agency that gave no notice to the defendants.

Crawford v. Gerald Goldberg Robert Bonnici John Akin James Stevens · filed 1994-04-13

The equitable tolling doctrine is not available to Crawford in connection with his third and fourth causes of action because the named defendants in this action could not possibly have received notice of Crawford's earlier proceedings. ... Crawford cannot provide effective notice to the employees of one state agency by naming another separate state agency in his earlier proceedings.

Section 1983 claims may be equitably tolled under California law, but an administrative claim against a county does not provide timely notice to former county officials of a later damages suit against them individually merely because they participated in the administrative hearing.

Read v. Rydingsword · filed 1997-03-21

It is well settled that equitable tolling applies in § 1983 cases. ... The district court correctly concluded that Read has not satisfied California's three-pronged test. ... It cannot be said, however, that by virtue of their participation in an administrative hearing against the county, the defendants were put on notice that they might later be sued for damages in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 claims in California use the state’s one-year personal injury limitations period and equitable tolling rules; abandoning a viable federal action to pursue the claims together in state court does not establish good faith and reasonable conduct for tolling.

Estate of Blue v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1997-07-21

California's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to the Estate's § 1983 claims, as do California's rules for equitable tolling. ... But the Estate relinquishes its opportunity to litigate in federal court at its peril; that it dismissed Blue I because it wanted to litigate all of its claims together in state court does not amount to "good faith and reasonable conduct" which would support tolling the statute of limitations to allow the Estate back in to federal court more than four years after the statute has run.

California’s equitable tolling doctrine does not extend the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff first pursues state and federal claims in state court, then pursues the federal claims in federal court.

Puerta v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1998-02-20

Because Puerta initially pursued both his state and federal claims in state court and, when unsuccessful, tried to pursue his federal claims in federal court, we conclude that California's equitable tolling doctrine does not extend the limitations period in this case.

A California § 1983 claim cannot be dismissed with prejudice as untimely when the plaintiff may be able to prove equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period.

Precious Lee-Mcduffie v. City of Artesia Paul Philips Alicia Ley Bethene Palmer · filed 1998-06-12

Because it was possible that Lee-McDuffie could prove that her action was timely, the district court erred by dismissing Lee-McDuffie's complaint with prejudice. ... Lee-McDuffie may be able to show that the one-year California statute of limitations for filing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim should be equitably tolled.

Fraudulent concealment does not toll the time to bring a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff has the information needed to sue.

Paige v. Police Department of Schenectady · filed 2001-09-05

Moreover, the alleged fraudulent concealment by the defendants in this case cannot serve to toll appellant’s assault claims under the doctrine of equitable tolling because the concealment did not deprive appellant of the information that she needed to bring a § 1983 suit charging assault.

Concealment does not equitably toll a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff already has the information needed to sue.

Paige v. Police Dept. of City of Schenectady · filed 2001-09-05

Moreover, the alleged fraudulent concealment by the defendants in this case cannot serve to toll appellant's assault claims under the doctrine of equitable tolling because the concealment did not deprive appellant of the information that she needed to bring a § 1983 suit charging assault.

When a § 1983 suit borrows a state limitations period, state law also governs equitable tolling.

Shropshear, Norman v. Corp Counsel · filed 2001-12-20

That is the statute of limitations that the federal courts "borrow" for use in section 1983 suits filed in Illinois. ... We now hold, in conformity with all the appellate cases in other circuits that have addressed the issue, that the state, rather than the federal, doctrine of equitable tolling governs cases of borrowing.

An earlier workers compensation claim can equitably toll the limitations period for § 1983 claims against a defendant who had timely notice.

Rigg v. California · filed 2002-03-20

As to Rigg’s claims against Warden Smith, and only Warden Smith, Rigg has established an exception under the doctrine of equitable tolling. Rigg’s first workers compensation claim, filed on October 21, 1994, allows the statute of limitations to toll on his § 1983 claims.

Limitations on a § 1983 action may be equitably tolled during the federal suit and additional state administrative proceedings.

Clifford v. Gibbs · filed 2002-07-10

Accordingly, we grant Collin's request to equitably toll limitations on his § 1983 action during the pendency of this action and during any additional state administrative proceedings.

Limitations on a § 1983 action may be equitably tolled while the action and state administrative proceedings are pending.

Clifford v. Gibbs · filed 2002-08-01

Accordingly, we grant Collin’s request to equitably toll limitations on his § 1983 action during the pendency of this action and during any additional state administrative proceedings.

A § 1983 limitations period is not equitably tolled merely because the plaintiff could not obtain a lawyer.

Kelly v. City of Wichita Fall · filed 2003-03-27

However, mere lack of representation will not support equitable tolling.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and applicable state equitable tolling rules.

Tene v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2003-06-16

Federal courts borrow the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions from the state in which the court having jurisdiction is located. ... In California, we apply the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to § 1983 claims. ... We also utilize state equitable tolling rules when applicable.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim may be equitably tolled when an earlier California tort claim concerns the same wrong, subject to California's three-pronged test.

Lucchesi v. Bar-O Boys Ranch · filed 2003-12-22

The proper inquiry is whether the plaintiffs' first claim (the state tort claim) and the second claim (the section 1983 claim) concern the same wrong, not whether the two claims are based upon the same law, involve similar procedures, or seek the same remedies. Because the plaintiffs' state tort claim and their section 1983 claim were predicated on the same wrong, the district court should have applied California's three-pronged test to determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled to equitable tolling.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim may be equitably tolled when the defendant fraudulently conceals the cause of action.

Cotton v. Martin County, Fla. · filed 2004-02-27

Fraudulent concealment can serve to equitably toll a statute of limitations for filing a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period and may be equitably tolled.

Armbeck v. Denver Police Department · filed 2004-06-14

We review the district court’s refusal to apply equitable tolling for an abuse of discretion.” ... Having carefully considered the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we conclude that the district court correctly decided this case. We therefore AFFIRM its judgment dated August 15, 2003, for substantially the same reasons set forth in its August 8, 2003, order adopting the magistrate judge’s thorough and well-reasoned recommendation dated July 3, 2003.

Section 1983 claims use the borrowed Texas limitations period and Texas equitable tolling principles.

Gant v. Garofano · filed 2004-12-16

Because the Texas statute of limitations is borrowed in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases, this court also looks to Texas’ equitable tolling principles.

Section 1983 claims by continuously confined civil detainees who pursue their claims in good faith may receive equitable tolling under California law.

Jones v. Lou Blanas County of Sacramento · filed 2004-12-27

For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law. ... We therefore hold that California’s equitable tolling doctrine operates to toll a statute of limitations for a claim asserted by a continuously confined civil detainee who has pursued his claim in good faith.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to state equitable tolling principles when those principles are consistent with federal policy.

Joan Marie DONOGHUE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the COUNTY OF ORANGE; Dennis W. La-Ducer, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1987-12-02

We think it is clear that we must apply the tolling principles of California law to both the federal and state claims in this case.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 suit is not equitably tolled while the plaintiff pursues a state-court remedy that was not required before filing suit.

Miles v. Zeller · filed 2006-03-20

There is no Texas or federal authority to suggest that Miles could not have filed a section 1983 suit if he did not first exhaust his state court remedies. Therefore, the pendency of his Texas state lawsuit does not merit equitable tolling since it sought a remedy that he need not have pursued.

Section 1983 claims borrow Texas’s limitations period and equitable tolling principles; prior state suits seeking an unnecessary remedy do not toll that period.

Moore v. Zeller · filed 2006-10-24

Because the Texas statute of limitations is borrowed in § 1983 cases, this court also looks to Texas’s equitable tolling principles. ... However, the pendency of Moore’s state lawsuits do not entitle him to equitable tolling because they sought a remedy that he need not have pursued.

A Section 1983 claim subject to Washington’s three-year limitations period is not equitably tolled without plaintiff diligence and defendant bad faith, deception, or false assurances.

Peckham v. Lehman · filed 2006-11-27

Equitable tolling is not applicable to this case. Under Washington law, “[t]he predicates for equitable tolling are bad faith, deception, or false assurances by the defendant and the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff.” ... Peckham has not demonstrated that he diligently pursued his claim, or that Lehman engaged in bad faith or deception or made false assurances. Because Peckham filed this action outside the three-year limitations period, his claim is time barred.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is equitably tolled during the suit and any subsequent state administrative proceeding.

Fontenot v. Global Expertise in Outsourcing · filed 2007-04-26

We hold that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled during the pendency of the instant suit and any subsequent state administrative proceeding.

A § 1983 complaint dismissed as untimely on screening without leave to amend may require an opportunity to argue equitable tolling.

Sopher v. Washington · filed 2007-09-27

We remand for the district court to determine in the first instance whether equitable tolling applies to the circumstances of this case.

Section 1983 cases borrow Texas’s limitations period and apply Texas’s equitable tolling principles.

Green v. Doe · filed 2007-12-28

Finally, because the Texas statute of limitations is borrowed in § 1983 cas- es, this court also looks to Texas’s equitable tolling principles.

A plaintiff cannot equitably toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim based on an earlier action she did not diligently pursue.

Marasovic v. Contra Costa County Adult Protective Services · filed 2008-03-12

Carole Marasovic appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as time-barred. ... The district court correctly determined that Marasovic was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, because she did not diligently pursue her initial action against the defendants.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim may be equitably tolled when a defendant’s threats during that period cause the plaintiff to delay filing.

Snyder v. Eno, et al. · filed 1998-03-26

Accordingly, in light of plaintiff’s supplemental submissions and the fact that neither Adams nor Eno has contested her allegations that they threatened her during the applicable limitations period (beginning as early as 1987), and thereby caused her to refrain from filing an otherwise timely suit, the court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims may be equitably tolled under compatible state law when an earlier suit gave defendants timely notice, caused no prejudice, and was pursued in good faith.

Morcos S. Azer Doctor's Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. Kathleen Connell John Chen Steven Fujimori Joseph P. Munso Al Schade · filed 2002-09-26

Because we borrow California’s statute of limitations, “we also apply California’s tolling rules that are not inconsistent with federal law.”

Section 1983’s limitations period may be equitably tolled when an intervening change in law makes a diligent plaintiff’s previously timely claim untimely.

HARGROVES v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-04

Nonetheless, and for the reasons that follow, the Court now decides that, at least under the circumstances of this case, the change in law occasioned by Wallace is the type of extraordinary circumstance that justifies equitable tolling.

In California, equitable tolling of a § 1983 claim requires evidence that defendants had timely notice and that the plaintiff acted reasonably during the applicable period.

Kleinhammer v. City of Paso Robles · filed 2010-06-22

Richard Kleinhammer, a former California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and inverse condemnation action alleging that the defendants improperly denied sewer service to his property. ... The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants. Kleinhammer failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not defendants had notice that he intended to pursue his claims and whether or not his conduct was reasonable during the applicable period.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a statute of limitations, and a plaintiff relying on an earlier state court action must establish a basis for equitable tolling.

Shaw v. County of San Diego · filed 2010-11-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Shaw’s due process claim because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and Shaw failed to raise a triable issue as to whether he is entitled to equitable tolling based on his prior state court action.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim may be equitably tolled when the plaintiff diligently pursues his rights and an extraordinary circumstance prevents timely filing.

Davis v. Pollock · filed 2011-03-23

Davis is likewise not entitled to equitable tolling. ... A person seeking the benefit of equitable tolling “must show (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way ... and prevented timely filing.” ... Davis has not made such a showing.

In a § 1983 action, the court resolves factual questions about a plaintiff’s mental state when deciding whether to equitably toll the limitations period.

Montin v. Estate of Johnson · filed 2011-04-11

We adopt the view of the First Circuit and make explicit what previously we may merely have implied: the court rather than the jury is to resolve the factual questions surrounding a plaintiff's mental state as relevant to the equitable tolling of a statute of limitations.

Temporary loss of legal materials and library access does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim when those impediments end before the period expires.

Andrade v. Odessa Police Department · filed 2012-07-09

Even if Andrade’s claims accrued on the date that he alleges, his claims are still untimely absent equitable tolling. ... In addition, Andrade’s claim that he was entitled to equitable tolling because he was separated from his legal materials and denied access to a law library during two prison transfers is unavailing because these impediments were removed before the end of the limitations period.

Equitable tolling of a § 1983 claim requires diligence and good faith when filing suit after a prior related action is dismissed.

Easley v. County of El Dorado Probation Department · filed 2012-07-13

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the statute of limitations was not equitably tolled on Easley’s § 1983 claims because Easley failed to establish that he acted with diligence and good faith in filing suit after his prior, factually related action was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Federal equitable tolling of the limitations period for a § 1983 claim applies only in extraordinary circumstances.

Frasier-Kane v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2013-03-29

While we are skeptical that Pennsylvania tolling principles frustrate the policies underlying § 1983, we need not consider the issue because, like the district court, we find even our federal equitable tolling principles would not toll the statute of limitations for plaintiff.

Section 1983 claims may be equitably tolled under applicable state law while a plaintiff diligently pursues a reasonable remedy, if the defendants had timely notice and suffered no prejudice.

Aikens v. William Ingram, Jr. · filed 2013-05-02

Because of the manifest presence here of each of the relevant conditions for equitable tolling — notice, lack of prejudice, and diligent and reasonable action — we conclude that equitable tolling was operational during the period that Aikens’s Rule 60(b) motion was being considered by the district court and our Court.

A plaintiff seeking equitable tolling of a delayed § 1983 claim must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances.

Williams v. 120 PCT Undercover · filed 2013-05-22

Williams presents no justification for the delay in filing his § 1983 claim. Regardless of whether the district court properly considered a letter submitted by the City in determining whether to apply equitable tolling, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), we conclude that, even in the absence of that letter, Williams did not demonstrate the ... existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify application of equitable tolling in his case, see Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 82–83, 85 (2d Cir. 2002).

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim may be equitably tolled when extraordinary circumstances prevent timely filing and the plaintiff acts with reasonable diligence.

Moses v. Westchester County Department of Corrections · filed 2013-06-12

Plaintiff and the deceased’s family acted with reasonable diligence throughout the time sought to be tolled, given the difficulties and delays they encountered in attempting to find and coordinate effective representation across three countries and with a language barrier. This court accepts Magistrate Judge Ellis’s recommendation and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss with respect to the section 1983 claims.

A § 1983 complaint may receive equitable tolling under Utah law when a change in controlling law renders it untimely after filing.

Garza v. Burnett · filed 2013-12-11

Pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court’s response to the certified question, Garza is entitled to equitable tolling and the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is hereby REVERSED.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois use Illinois’s equitable tolling principles, which can extend the filing deadline when a plaintiff diligently seeks information needed to identify defendants.

Bryant v. City of Chicago · filed 2014-02-28

The district court should have equitably tolled the statute of limitations because Mr. Bryant acted with reasonable diligence to obtain the missing information.

Section 1983 claims brought in Kansas are subject to Kansas’s two-year limitations period and its equitable tolling law.

Gorman v. City of Olathe · filed 2014-06-17

Because Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations applies to Mr. Gorman’s suit, Kansas’s law concerning equitable tolling also applies.

Equitable tolling may extend the time to bring a § 1983 claim when a diligent plaintiff cannot obtain information vital to the claim.

Rosa v. Doe · filed 2015-11-06

We agree with the district court that counsel’s actions do not warrant tolling. Equitable tolling “permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim.” ... Rosa has not explained why he believes that the only existing copy of his medical records was exclusively within his lawyer’s control.

Equitable tolling of an untimely Section 1983 claim requires a basis for that relief.

Williams v. A Sergeant for Riverdale Police · filed 2015-12-18

None of the things said in his current Motion provide any predicate for equitable tolling or, other relief from the result inexorably reached by this Court.

A Section 1983 claim in Nevada is untimely if filed more than two years after accrual and equitable tolling does not apply.

Brown v. Torsky · filed 2016-07-18

The parties agree on appeal that Brown’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims and his claim for malicious prosecution under Nevada state law are all subject to two-year statutes of limitations. ... Brown’s claims are untimely because he first filed them on February 1, 2012, more than two years after the accrual date, and the factors primarily relied on by Nevada courts weigh against the application of ... equitable tolling.

Section 1983 claims may receive equitable tolling when an earlier dismissal rather than severance causes timely claims to become time-barred.

Baldhosky v. v. Sanchez · filed 2016-08-04

We agree that the prior district court’s decision to dismiss, rather ... than sever, Baldhosky’s catheter-related claims effectively rendered the claims in the instant action time-barred, and therefore provides a basis for the application of equitable tolling.

A § 1983 claim may be equitably tolled under Washington law when tolling is consistent with the section’s purposes and the plaintiff diligently pursues the action.

Hahn v. Waddington · filed 2017-06-05

Under the particular circumstances of this case, equitable tolling is consistent with the policies underlying § 1983, and it is not inconsistent with those served by Washington’s statute of limitations. ... Thus, Hahn is entitled to equitable tolling under Washington law only if he was diligent' in pursuing this action in the Western District of Washington after dismissal.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking equitable tolling based on mental illness must give specific facts showing how the condition prevented timely pursuit of the claim.

Ganley v. City of New York · filed 2018-05-25

Mental illness can justify equitable tolling in some circumstances, but the litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of demonstrating that it is appropriate in his specific case. ... Here, the district court properly concluded that Ganley’s allegations about his condition were conclusory because he did not provide details about the onset of his condition or how it prevented him from pursuing his claims.

Section 1983 claims are not equitably tolled when the plaintiff does not allege that the defendants induced it through fraud, misrepresentation, or deception to delay filing against them.

Vested Business Brokers v. County of Suffolk · filed 2018-11-05

Even now, VBB does not claim that the SCPD did anything to prevent VBB from filing a § 1983 claim against the county defendants. Because VBB does not identify allegations in the complaint suggesting that the county defendants induced VBB by fraud, misrepresentation, or deception to refrain from filing a timely action against them, the district court did not err in dismissing VBB’s equitable tolling argument.

State law governs equitable tolling of a § 1983 claim.

Jenkins v. Chance · filed 2019-01-29

State law governs equitable tolling in a § 1983 action.

The limitations period for a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is equitably tolled while the prisoner exhausts required administrative remedies.

Henderson v. Harmon · filed 2019-02-06

And the district court did not have the benefit of our recent holding that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is equitably tolled for the time during which prisoners, as mandated by the PLRA, exhaust administrative remedies. ... In light of Battle, which issued after the district court’s ruling, the district court erred when it dismissed Henderson’s claim based solely on the accrual and filing dates.

Section 1983 claims in California use a two-year limitations period; an earlier suit does not equitably toll that period when it fails to give the later defendants timely notice.

Neil v. Modesto City Schools District · filed 2019-08-30

Because the requirements for equitable tolling have not been met, the doctrine does not apply here. The statute of limitations thus bars the suit against Defendants Park, Galas, Baum, and Chilles.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period that may be equitably tolled while an incarcerated plaintiff’s motion for counsel is pending.

Gaines v. Cook County DOC · filed 2019-09-09

“A two year statute of limitations applies to section 1983 claims in Illinois.” ... Pursuant to Donald and related authorities, the statute of limitations was tolled during that period.

Equitable tolling does not save a § 1983 claim when the alleged failure to answer grievances is contradicted by the record and the plaintiff does not explain how the response constituted fraud.

Trejo v. Janssen Phrmctl Products, L.P., e · filed 2019-10-08

As for equitable tolling, Trejo’s contention that prison officials failed to answer his grievances is belied by the record. Moreover, he fails to explain how the answering of his grievances constitutes fraud.

Prior filings concerning the same claims can defeat a request for equitable tolling of the time to file a § 1983 action based on the plaintiff’s mental health.

(PC) Ward v. Summers · filed 2019-12-13

The Court notes in particular that the earliest action was filed on August 21, 2013, well within the applicable statute of limitations for the filing of a section 1983 complaint. ... It is apparent to the Court that Plaintiff clearly understood his situation prior to filing the instant action, despite any mental health treatment he was receiving at the time, and has repeatedly filed suit in this Court in an attempt to recover on the same claims that have already been dismissed on multiple occasions. Plaintiff has otherwise presented no allegations to demonstrate that any equitable tolling should apply to this action.

Section 1983 claims borrow Texas limitations and equitable tolling rules, and equitable tolling requires diligent pursuit of the claim.

Dillard v. Burns · filed 2020-03-12

“Because the Texas statute of limitations is borrowed in § 1983 cases, Texas’ equitable tolling principles also control.” ... Plaintiff waited over two years before seeking a motion for extension of time to re-file his complaint. This does not demonstrate plaintiff has been diligently pursuing his rights. ... These circumstances do not justify equitable tolling.

Section 1983’s limitations period is equitably tolled during mandatory prison grievance procedures when state tolling law does not allow for that period.

Johnson v. Garrison · filed 2020-03-24

Thus, we conclude that Oklahoma’s lack of a tolling provision to allow for the exhaustion of mandatory prison grievances is contrary to § 1983’s goals. ... Applying this holding to Johnson’s situation, the statute of limitations was tolled during the mandatory grievance process and his claim is therefore timely.

Equitable tolling of the limitations period for a § 1983 claim requires the plaintiff to pursue judicial remedies diligently.

Lott v. Oseguera · filed 2020-04-08

Lott does not challenge the applicability of a two-year limitations period; nor does he deny that the alleged false arrest occurred in May 2008 and that his § 1983 complaint was filed in January 2019. Instead, he maintains that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period because he did not know of the existence of the cause of action until his attorney produced the State’s file in November 2017. Lott, however, has failed to establish that he actively pursued his judicial remedies or otherwise acted diligently.

Federal courts apply state equitable tolling rules in § 1983 actions; tolling does not apply when the plaintiff had time to file and gives no reason for the delay.

Taylor v. Witham · filed 2020-09-08

In § 1983 actions, federal courts must apply state equitable tolling provisions. ... Upon review, the court concludes that Mr. Taylor is not entitled to equitable tolling, as he has not demonstrated that anyone lulled him into inaction or that anything prevented him from filing his lawsuit within the two year statute of limitations.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim may be equitably tolled, but the plaintiff must show diligent pursuit of his rights and an extraordinary circumstance that prevented timely filing.

Alfano v. Skinner · filed 2020-09-18

Because Plaintiff has not shown he is entitled to equitable tolling on his § 1983 claims, such claims are time-barred and should be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims may receive equitable tolling when rare and exceptional circumstances prevent timely filing and the plaintiff acts diligently throughout the period to be tolled.

Orlando v. N.Y.S.D.O.C.C.S. · filed 2020-12-17

Equitable tolling in Section 1983 cases is limited to where "'rare and exceptional circumstances'" prevented the plaintiff from timely performing a required act and the party acted with diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll. ... Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to present any facts that would meet this high bar.

A § 1983 claim filed outside the limitations period is barred when the plaintiff cannot establish equitable tolling.

Neil v. Park · filed 2021-01-15

As Cyprian’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fell outside the statute of limitations and she does not satisfy all the elements for equitable tolling, we affirm.

Section 1983 claims follow the forum state's tolling rules when determining whether the limitations period is extended.

Monical v. Marion County · filed 2021-01-22

In § 1983 claims, however, federal courts apply the tolling doctrine of the forum state. ... The Court tolls the statute of limitations from June 8, 2018, when the Original Defendants moved to stay, until December 5, 2019, when they issued their discovery responses to Monical’s 2018 discovery requests after Judge You lifted the stay.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on a feared state restriction when no injury, actual deprivation of rights, wrongdoing, or intent to violate rights is shown.

Evans v. Burnley · filed 1988-05-27

The intervening defendants, however, have not alleged that plaintiff has done anything that has resulted in injury or the actual deprivation of their federal statutory or constitutional rights. Indeed, no trucks otherwise complying with the law have been banned from 1-440 since it was opened to traffic. Further, the Court can discern no wrongdoing or intent on the part of plaintiff to violate the rights of the intervening defendants. In fact, the record indicates that plaintiff has shown good faith in attempting to determine his duties under the law and to protect the rights of trucking interests. For this reason, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s motion on this issue and DISMISSES intervening defendants’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to claim a deprivation of rights when retaliation takes the form of a demotion or transfer rather than a discharge.

Click v. Copeland · filed 1992-08-27

The law was established clearly enough in this circuit in January 1988 that a reasonable officer should have known that if he retaliated against an employee for exercising his First Amendment rights, he could not escape liability by demoting and transferring the employee rather than discharging him. The plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of a "deprivation" of rights under § 1983 to reach the jury.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right caused by conduct under color of state law; conduct that leaves a plaintiff’s rights unchanged does not support a claim.

Frillici v. Town of Westport, No. Cv87 24 17 00 (Jan. 29, 1993) · filed 1993-01-29

A Section 1983 action requires a finding that a person has suffered a deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws because of the conduct of a person acting under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory. Gorra Realty, Inc. v. Jetmore, 200 Conn. 151 (1986). The actions of the defendants in participating in the 26-195 hearing were in effect a nullity. The plaintiffs suffered no deprivation of any right or privilege because of the conduct of the defendants related to the hearing and the decision rendered thereafter. Their rights and privileges remained the same, before and after said hearing and therefore their Section 1983 claim is without merit.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; a mere threat to deprive a person of that right does not support a claim.

Morris v. Powers · filed 1993-07-01

However, § 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right and just a threat to deprive a person of a right does not meet this threshold.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a federally protected right; an attempted deprivation alone is insufficient.

Frazier v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1995-11-27

Unfortunately for Ms. Frazier, there can be no § 1983 violation absent some actual deprivation of a federally-protected right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to allege an actual deprivation of rights caused by the defendants; a speculative injury is insufficient.

Grassini v. Township · filed 1996-05-07

A plaintiff seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must allege an actual deprivation of rights resulting from the defendants’ acts; mere possibility of remote or speculative injury or invasion of rights is insufficient.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; a mere threat to deprive a person of that right does not support a claim.

Warren v. Sheriff's Office · filed 1997-09-29

However, 42 USC § 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right and a mere threat to deprive a person of a right does not meet this requirement (see, Mermer v Constantine, 131 AD2d 28; Lamar v Steele, 698 F2d 1286, cert denied 464 US 821; Macko v Byron, 760 F2d 95; Gaut v Sunn, 810 F2d 923).

A § 1983 claim premised on fraud must identify the right the alleged fraud deprived the plaintiff of.

Jones v. Albany County Civil Service Commission · filed 1997-11-17

Moreover, to the extent that plaintiffs § 1983 claim is premised upon a fraud committed by O’Connor, defendant is correct in asserting that plaintiff fails to plead what right he was deprived of by any such fraud.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on state attorneys general seeking relief in federal court.

United States v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2000-04-03

Therefore, since the conduct it complains of is the pursuit of relief in federal court, Microsoft fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an action by the defendant that deprives the plaintiff of federally secured rights; issuing advisory guidelines that cause no such deprivation does not suffice.

Washington Education Ass'n v. Pdc · filed 2003-12-11

Likewise, there is no action by the individual commissioners that deprived the WEA of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," in violation of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against officials for issuing advisory guidelines that do not deprive anyone of federal rights.

Washington Education Ass'n v. Public Disclosure Commission · filed 2003-12-11

The WEA challenges the PDC’s opinion only; thus, there is no “agency action” for the court to review pursuant to the WEA’s petition for judicial review. RCW 34.05.510. Likewise, there is no action by the individual commissioners that deprived the WEA of any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,” in violation of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of federal rights to state a claim for relief.

Murphy v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections · filed 1987-03-19

We agree that this nonrecognition claim is not yet ripe for judicial consideration. Only an actual deprivation of federal rights states a claim for § 1983 relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a bar exam board’s adverse recommendation when the state supreme court retains authority over admission.

Solomon Feldman, Jr. v. State Board of Law Examiners · filed 1971-03-03

The Board is an administrative aid to the court. It does not itself admit applicants to the bar, nor disbar attorneys, but merely makes recommendations to the court, which recommendations the court may or may not elect to follow. An adverse Board recommendation is that and nothing more and itself is not a deprivation or denial of admission.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of rights; an unsuccessful attempt to deprive someone of property is not actionable.

CONTINENTAL COAL, INC. v. Cunningham · filed 2008-05-15

To state a claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must show that the state actually deprived it of property — in this case its right to operate under the terms of the original CUP.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a protected right; a threatened infringement alone does not state a claim.

Mermer v. Constantine · filed 1987-10-15

At most, plaintiff’s allegations establish a threatened infringement of a protected interest, which we find insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Macko v Byron, 760 F2d 95; Lamar v Steele, 698 F2d 1286, cert denied 464 US 821).

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right; an unsuccessful attempt is insufficient.

Cook v. Randolph County, Ga. · filed 2009-07-07

All of Cook’s claims rest on the premise that an unsuccessful attempt to deprive him of constitutional or statutory rights is a deprivation of those rights. It is not.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a plaintiff’s right, without a separate threshold showing that the defendant violated a legal obligation.

Detgen ex rel. Detgen v. Janek · filed 2013-03-13

But HHSC cites no authority that would support this court imposing a threshold requirement in § 1983 suits of showing that a defendant’s actions can be characterized as the “violation of a [defendant’s] legal obligation.” Rather, the inquiry courts generally pursue is whether the defendant’s actions have deprived the plaintiff of a right conferred on the plaintiff by law.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; speculative future harms do not satisfy that requirement.

Griffin v. United States · filed 2020-05-13

To obtain relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must prove that he (1) was deprived of (2) a constitutional or statutory right. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff satisfies neither requirement. First, he solely speculates about future harms. Second, he asserts no cognizable deprivation of rights.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights; allegations of medical negligence and pain and suffering alone do not establish a claim under it.

WHITE v. WISHARD HOSPITAL · filed 2020-06-30

Ms. White therefore has not alleged facts showing that Wishard Hospital can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and raises claims for medical negligence and pain and suffering rather than for a deprivation of rights.

Claims for damages or other relief under Section 1983 must first be presented to the district court for disposition.

Holley v. John Brown, Warden · filed 1988-05-31

To the extent he seeks damages and other relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, he must first present his claims to the district court for disposition by that court.

An independent grand jury indictment can break the causal chain for a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Curtis v. Sowell · filed 2018-12-28

“It is well settled that if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.”

A guilty plea to charges arising from an arrest prevents a § 1983 false arrest plaintiff from challenging probable cause for that arrest.

White v. Martel-Moylan · filed 2008-11-19

In addition, White may not challenge the existence of probable cause for his arrest when he has pled guilty to charges stemming from that arrest.

Section 1983 does not permit a false arrest claim when the arrest was made under a warrant based on a grand jury indictment; the plaintiff must proceed under a malicious prosecution theory.

Coakley v. Jaffe · filed 1999-11-01

A warrant predicated on grand jury action bars a false arrest claim, requiring the plaintiff to proceed instead under a theory of malicious prosecution, ... even if the defendants are not police officers or prosecutors.

A grand jury indictment does not insulate arresting officers from § 1983 liability for false arrest.

George R. Arnott, Sr. v. John Mataya, Greg Connolly · filed 1993-05-28

Defendants urge this court to find that the grand jury’s indictment of Arnott insulates them from § 1983 liability for false arrest. This argument is without merit.

Section 1983 may support a claim for money damages for an illegal arrest and detention even when the arrest and detention do not invalidate a subsequent conviction.

Hughes v. John R. Southworth, Jackson County Sheriff Department · filed 1990-08-15

The complaint, as we read it, represents an attempt to recover money damages from the defendants on the theory that they arrested and held him illegally. An illegal arrest and detention would not invalidate Mr. Hughes' subsequent conviction, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975), but might support a claim for money damages.

Section 1983 requires a false arrest plaintiff to plead the state-law elements of false arrest and an intentional or egregious abuse of governmental authority that shocks the conscience or denies a substantive constitutional right.

Reynolds v. Carol Johnson Gerald T. McFaul Bob Jackson, Detective James Asaad · filed 1988-08-08

In order to state a claim for such an occurrence under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, however, plaintiff must not only plead the existence of the elements of the tort of false arrest as defined by state law, but also that defendants' acts constituted an intentional or egregious abuse of governmental authority which has shocked the conscience or resulted in the denial of a substantive constitutional right.

A Section 1983 false arrest claim accrues on the date of arrest.

Rose v. Bartle · filed 1989-03-20

In short, we reaffirm the Deary court's analysis of accrual and hold that the plaintiffs' section 1983 false arrest claims accrued on the dates they were arrested.

A plaintiff may rebut the conviction defense to a § 1983 false arrest claim by showing that the guilty plea was invalid.

Unger v. Cohen · filed 1989-07-27

This same “conviction defense” is available against section 1983 claims premised on false arrest. ... Plaintiff nonetheless has the right to rebut defendant’s proffered “conviction” defense by demonstrating to the Court, in furtherance of his civil rights claim, that the guilty plea was invalid and thus does not conclusively establish the existence of probable cause for his arrest.

A conviction of the offense for which a person was arrested is a complete defense to a § 1983 claim that the arrest lacked probable cause.

James E. Malady, Jr. v. Tom Crunk, Bob Stewart, J.C. Skaggs · filed 1990-04-27

We do not reach the collateral estoppel question and instead affirm the order of the district court because Malady’s conviction of the offense for which he was arrested is a complete defense to a § 1983 action asserting that the arrest was made without probable cause.

Section 1983 does not provide a false arrest claim for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest based solely on a violation of state arrest law when the officer had probable cause.

Fields v. City of South Houston · filed 1991-02-01

For the reasons set forth by our brothers in the Fourth Circuit, we hold “there is no cause of action for ‘false arrest’ under section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause.”

Section 1983 does not provide a false-arrest claim for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest supported by probable cause merely because the arrest violated state law.

Fields v. City of South Houston, Texas · filed 1991-03-21

For the reasons set forth by our brothers in the Fourth Circuit, we hold "there is no cause of action for 'false arrest' under section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause." Id. at 372-73. Accordingly, a federal civil rights action will not lie for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest in violation of state law.

A guilty plea, even to a lesser charge, bars a Section 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause.

Roundtree v. City of New York · filed 1991-11-20

Finally, a plea of guilty to a charge lesser than that for which plaintiff was arrested also bars a Section 1983 action for arrest without probable cause.

A conviction for the offense of arrest is a complete defense to a Section 1983 claim that the arrest lacked probable cause.

Edwards v. Blair · filed 1994-03-09

We conclude the district court did not err. See Malady v. Crunk, 902 F.2d 10, 11-12 (8th Cir. 1990) (conviction of offense for which plaintiff was arrested is complete defense to Sec. 1983 action asserting arrest was made without probable cause).

A § 1983 false arrest claim is not barred by Heck merely because the plaintiff was convicted on charges arising from the arrest; the claim is barred only if success would necessarily undermine the conviction.

Patton v. Jefferson Par Sher · filed 1996-07-09

Thus, even if Patton was ultimately convicted on charges brought pursuant to his January arrest, Patton’s § 1983 suit challenging the validity of that arrest would not necessarily implicate the invalidity of his conviction, and therefore would not be barred by Heck.

A criminal conviction does not automatically bar a § 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause.

Patterson v. Leyden · filed 1996-11-04

This reasoning is questionable as applied to actions under § 1983 as opposed to state-law torts. ... But we understand the Constitution to accord all citizens certain rights against state officers. At the time of his arrest the convict had the same right as other citizens not to be arrested without probable cause, and it is a questionable rule that would permit this right to be taken away post hoc. We therefore decline to follow the rule of Cameron.

A probable cause finding by an independent intermediary cuts off officers’ liability for false arrest under § 1983.

Smith v. Harris · filed 1997-12-11

A finding of probable cause by an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or a grand jury will cut off the peace officers’ liability for false arrest under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a false arrest claim to show that the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

White v. Wortz · filed 1999-08-31

Under Connecticut law, and under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, to establish a claim of false arrest the prosecution must have been terminated in plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 permits a false-arrest claim despite an arrest warrant when an officer knowingly or recklessly makes false statements or omissions material to probable cause.

No. 98-5283 · filed 2000-05-19

Rather, a plaintiff may succeed in a S 1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the police officer "knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant;" and (2) that "such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause."

A § 1983 false arrest claim usually accrues at the time of arrest.

Veale v. Griffin · filed 2000-06-06

A claim under § 1983 accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." ... A claim for false arrest usually begins to run at the time of arrest.

Section 1983 permits damages for physical injuries directly caused by a false arrest even when a jury rejects a separate excessive-force claim.

Martinez v. Gonzalez · filed 2001-07-17

A jury, however, found him not liable for the. use of excessive force, despite corroborated evidence from which it might have found the contrary. Despite this verdict, the preponderance, even the overwhelming, evidence is that she suffered some physical pain, leaving bruises and swelling, as a direct result of her arrest and Mr. Gonzalez’ treatment of her while she was in his custody. These are direct damages stemming from the arrest. I find that Ms. Martinez’ damage for her pain and suffering from these injuries is $3,000.

A § 1983 false arrest claim under New York law does not require favorable termination of the underlying proceedings.

Vallen v. Connelly · filed 2002-06-11

However, under New York law, the termination of the proceedings in favor of the accused is not an element of a claim for false arrest.

Section 1983 permits a false arrest claim only when the arresting officers lacked probable cause.

Tittle v. Raines · filed 2003-05-28

There is no cause of action for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the arresting officers lacked probable cause.

A Section 1983 false-arrest claim does not accrue until the conviction is reversed when success on the claim would undermine that conviction.

Gauger v. Hendle · filed 2004-01-05

For Gauger to mount an attack based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on his arrest was implicitly to challenge the legality of his conviction, which rested crucially on the statements that he made to the police when he was questioned after being arrested. ... We think that in these circumstances Gauger’s false-arrest claim did not accrue until his conviction was reversed, and so it was not untimely; therefore this part of the judgment for the defendants must be vacated and the case remanded.

A § 1983 false arrest claim that would necessarily undermine a potential conviction does not accrue until the criminal charges are dismissed.

Wiley, Reginald v. City of Chicago · filed 2004-03-22

Similarly here, if Wiley’s attack on his arrest would challenge the only evidence supporting a potential conviction, then his claim did not begin to accrue until the charges were dismissed in July 2002.

Section 1983 does not impose a blanket requirement that a false arrest plaintiff identify the charges for which they were arrested to prove the absence of probable cause.

Davis v. Rodriguez · filed 2004-04-14

The burden of proving the absence of probable cause under § 1983 should not include a blanket requirement that false arrest plaintiffs produce evidence of the charges upon which they were arrested.

A § 1983 false arrest claim does not accrue until criminal charges are dismissed when success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction.

Wiley v. City of Chicago and Broderick Jones, 17432, Chicago Police Officer · filed 2004-04-16

Therefore, any civil suit against Officer Jones for a false arrest would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction, and Heck requires that Wiley’s Fourth Amendment claim would not begin to accrue until the charges were dismissed.

A § 1983 false arrest claim that would undermine a criminal conviction does not accrue until the conviction is overturned.

Ienco, Joseph P. v. Angarone, Kenneth · filed 2005-11-14

As a result, Ienco’s potential false arrest claim would have directly called into question the propriety of his conviction and, therefore, under Gauger, was not ripe until the underlying conviction was overturned.

Section 1983 does not provide false arrest damages when probable cause supported the arrest, even if it did not support a charge the officer identified.

Robert Jaegly, Jr. v. Matthew Couch, Bernard Santandria, Paula Breen and City of Albany, Docket No. 05-2191-Cv · filed 2006-02-24

We thus hold, following Devenpeck, that a plaintiff is not entitled to damages under § 1983 for false arrest so long as the arrest itself was supported by probable cause, regardless of whether probable cause supported any individual charge identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.

A § 1983 false arrest claim generally accrues on the day of arrest, even if a resulting conviction has not been set aside.

Wallace, Andre v. Kato, Kristen · filed 2006-03-08

To the extent, therefore, that Gauger eschews a clear rule for false arrest claims in favor of an evaluation of the evidence, we disapprove its approach and instead reaffirm our holding in Booker v. Ward that a “§ 1983 unlawful arrest claim . . . accrue[s] on the day of [ ] arrest.” Id. at 1056-57.

Section 1983 false arrest claims generally accrue at the time of arrest.

Wallace v. City of Chicago, Kristen Kato and Eugene Roy · filed 2006-03-08

We reaffirm the holding of Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (7th Cir.1996), that false arrest claims accrue at the time of arrest; to the extent that it is inconsistent with Booker v. Ward and the present opinion, we overrule Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.2003).

Section 1983 allows recovery of damages flowing from a false arrest, but damages arising solely from a separate battery claim against the city are excluded.

Edman v. Marano · filed 2006-04-19

Edman’s damages claims against the officers and the City arose out of the results of a false arrest. Edman was entitled to all damages flowing from the arrest against all the defendants, aside from damages arising solely from Edman’s claim of an independent tort of battery against the City.

Section 1983 false arrest claims are analyzed under the law of the state where the arrest occurred.

Grant v. City of New York · filed 2007-02-20

We must look to the law of the state in which the arrest occurred in our analysis of the § 1983 false arrest claim.

The limitations period for a §1983 false arrest claim followed by criminal proceedings begins when the claimant is detained pursuant to legal process.

Wallace v. Kato · filed 2007-02-21

We hold that the statute of limitations upon a §1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claim ant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.

A § 1983 false arrest claim accrues when the claimant is detained pursuant to legal process, even if criminal proceedings follow.

Lepe v. Banister · filed 2007-05-23

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), did not delay the accrual of Lepe’s false arrest claim because under Wallace, a § 1983 claim for false arrest “begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process,” even “where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings,” Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1100.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a deprivation of liberty without reasonable cause under color of state law, and subjective good faith alone does not avoid liability.

Raysor v. Port Authority · filed 1985-07-15

Similarly, a deprivation of liberty without “reasonable cause” is a section 1983 violation as to which the defendant bears the burden of proving reasonableness, and a subjective good faith belief in the legality of the arrest is not enough— at least at this stage of Supreme Court decisionmaking — to escape section 1983 liability.

For a § 1983 false arrest claim followed by criminal proceedings, the limitations period begins when the claimant is detained pursuant to legal process.

Mapes v. Bishop · filed 2008-08-22

The “statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.” ... Nevertheless, we vacate and remand to the District Court to determine the date on which Mapes was detained pursuant to legal process.