42 U.S.C. § 1983

A plaintiff's own criminal misconduct does not categorically bar a Section 1983 claim when the claim is not founded on that misconduct.

Gerry Fleisher, and Cross-Appellee v. City of Signal Hill, Michael McCrary and Richard Diaz, and Cross-Appellants · filed 1987-10-14

Therefore, we decline to hold that Fleisher’s misconduct bars him from asserting his constitutional claims.

In a § 1983 action, disputed facts underlying probable cause generally go to the jury and can preclude summary judgment.

Barry M. Hopkins, Husband and Katie M. Hopkins, Wife v. City of Sierra Vista, Arizona, a Body Politic, and Steven Gerhar · filed 1991-05-02

Because there is a genuine dispute regarding what Gerhardt could have heard, and because the question of probable cause in a section 1983 case is usually one for the jury, ... summary judgment was not appropriate in this case.

In § 1983 deadly force cases, summary judgment is inappropriate when the officer’s credibility is genuinely in doubt.

Newmaker v. City of Fortuna · filed 2016-11-22

Summary judgment is not appropriate in § 1983 deadly force cases that turn on the officer’s credibility that is genuinely in doubt.

A Section 1983 employment claim accrues when the termination decision is made and clearly communicated, not when internal review ends or the employer's preferred termination procedures are completed.

Bates v. Board of Regents of Northern New Mexico Community College · filed 1988-01-04

The test to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run is not, therefore, when plaintiff received “official” notice, but, ... when plaintiff knew that he had been terminated. ... the pendency of a grievance, “or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the running of the limitations period.”

Section 1983 malicious prosecution and evidence fabrication claims do not accrue until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Charles Floyd, Jr. v. Attorney General Pennsylvania · filed 2018-01-08

Because Floyd’s malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence claims do not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in Floyd’s favor, and Floyd has not demonstrated as much, they are barred by Heck.

A Section 1983 damages claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction does not accrue until the conviction is invalidated, including by pardon.

Savory v. William Cannon, Sr. · filed 2019-01-07

In Savory’s case, that occurred on January 12, 2015, when the governor of Illinois pardoned him. Until that moment, his conviction was intact and he had no cause of action under section 1983.

Qualified immunity does not shield a school-board official who imposes content-based censorship at a public meeting because such censorship violated clearly established First Amendment law.

Musso v. Hourigan · filed 1988-01-05

Second, on the basis of the analysis set forth in the foregoing paragraphs, we conclude that if Millar imposed a content-based restriction, such conduct unambiguously violated clearly established first amendment law. Consequently, we must affirm the district court's order denying Millar's motion for summary judgment on the first amendment claim.

State executive officers performing discretionary functions may assert qualified immunity against § 1983 damages unless their conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Candelario v. Gonzalez Chapel · filed 1988-01-20

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defense of qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 liability requires a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Moreno v. City of Sacramento · filed 2004-05-19

To demonstrate § 1983 liability, Moreno must show not only that his constitutional rights were violated, but that those rights were clearly established at the time of the violation.

Comity bars taxpayers from bringing Section 1983 challenges to state tax administration in federal court when state remedies are plain, adequate, and complete.

In Re Gary Gillis, Secretary of Revenue of the State of Kentucky Clayton Foster, Property Valuation Administrator of Hop · filed 1988-01-05

For these reasons, we believe that the principles of comity dictate that a federal court should not intrude into the state tax system and certainly not to the degree that a claim such as respondents' would require. As long as an adequate state remedy exists, taxpayers like respondents should utilize that remedy.

Comity bars federal § 1983 damages claims challenging unequal enforcement of local tax laws when effective state remedies are available.

Stein v. Vallas · filed 1993-10-06

McNary clearly bars the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 suit; it is directly analogous to this case. The Plaintiffs here, as in McNary, seek damages for an alleged unequal enforcement of a local tax law. ... Thus, as McNary requires, the Plaintiffs enjoy effective remedies under state law and therefore may not seek relief in federal court.

Section 1983 claims challenging a city’s administration of its tax assessments cannot proceed in federal court when a plain, adequate, and complete state remedy is available.

Bernard v. Village Of Spring Valley · filed 1994-07-12

Similarly, comity precludes federal jurisdiction over Sec. 1983 challenges to a city's administration of its fiscal programs.

Section 1983 claims challenging a state tax assessment are barred from federal court by comity when the state courts provide an adequate hearing and determination.

Fox River Valley Railroad v. Department of Revenue · filed 1994-09-29

However, the Supreme Court held that “the rightful independence of state governments” and the courtesy and civility which is necessary to maintain that independence trumps section 1983. ... Fox River Rail has presented no facts which make me believe that a full hearing and a fair judicial determination of its claim will not be assured in the state courts of Wisconsin. ... Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that DOR’s motion to dismiss Fox River Rail's counts 2 through 4 is GRANTED and those counts are DISMISSED.

Section 1983 claims challenging a state tax system are barred from federal court by comity when the state provides an adequate remedy.

Darne v. State of Wisconsin · filed 1998-04-23

To the extent that Ms. Darne's complaint could be construed liberally as asserting a § 1983 claim that would not be barred under the other grounds of decision, see Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 157 (7th Cir.1994) (complaints of pro se plaintiffs are liberally construed), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150, 115 S.Ct. 1100, 130 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1995), it would be barred by the principle of comity. ... Because we have just determined that there is an adequate state remedy, we hold that Ms. Darne's claims are not properly in federal court.

Section 1983 claims challenging a state tax are barred by comity when state administrative remedies are available.

State v. Golden's Concrete Co. · filed 1998-06-22

Here, the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involved a challenge to a state tax, in circumstances where state administrative remedies were available to Golden’s. Thus, under controlling federal case law, the section 1983 claim was properly dismissed by the district court.

Principles of comity bar a federal damages claim under Section 1983 challenging state tax assessments when adequate state remedies are available.

423 South Salina Street, Inc. v. The City Of Syracuse · filed 1983-12-14

The court held that appellant's Section 1983 claim was barred by Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S.Ct. 177, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981) (principles of comity bar award of damages in federal court under Section 1983 for alleged unconstitutional administration of state tax assessments), ... We agree fully with the district court's treatment of appellant's Section 1983 claims, in particular with its analysis of McNary and of the adequacy of appellant's remedies under New York law.

Section 1983 damages actions challenging a state tax system are barred from federal court by comity when the state provides a plain, adequate, and complete remedy.

Newton v. Poindexter · filed 1984-01-18

Thus, even though the defendant has not raised the issue, this Court will dismiss the present action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte on the grounds that the principle of comity bars the exercise of district court jurisdiction. ... The holding of Fair Assessment is, of course, binding on this Court and is completely dispositive of this action, provided that the California state remedies are “plain, adequate and complete.” ... Therefore, as a matter of law, California’s remedies are “plain, speedy and efficient” and this Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs’ causes of action.

Comity bars a § 1983 damages suit that effectively seeks a state tax refund by challenging tax collection.

Wright v. Maria Pappas, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Treasurer of Cook County, Illinois · filed 2001-07-05

The Supreme Court held in the Fair Assessment case that such a suit was in any event barred by the principle of comity, operating independently of the Tax Injunction Act. ... The suit thus is governed by Fair Assessment, and it does not fah within the possible exception for “facial challenges.”

Section 1983 challenges to state tax systems are generally barred in lower federal courts by comity when state courts provide a plain, adequate, and complete remedy.

Chippewa Trading Co. v. Cox · filed 2004-04-19

This principle, which stems chiefly from Fair Assessment and Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407 (1943), prohibits "taxpayers... from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in [the lower] federal courts." Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116, 102 S.Ct. 177. In such cases, a federal court should normally abstain from hearing the action as long as there is a "plain, adequate, and complete" remedy available to the plaintiff in state court.

Section 1983 damages actions challenging the administration of a state tax system are subject to abstention under principles of comity.

Northwood Apartments v. Max Lavalley, Thomas Sommerville and City of Royal Oak · filed 1982-03-16

The Court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the Tax Injunction Act presented a bar to the damage action since in any event, under principles of comity, abstention is required. It therefore appears that this court erred in holding that abstention is improper and in reversing the district court for dismissing on that basis.

A plaintiff challenging a state tax scheme under Section 1983 must show that no plain, adequate, and complete state remedy is available to avoid dismissal on comity grounds.

Robert John Winicki, and Andrew Alexander Strauss v. Mallard · filed 1986-03-13

Thus, where a Section 1983 action is grounded in an allegation of an unconstitutional tax scheme, to survive dismissal the plaintiff must demonstrate that there is no plain, adequate, and complete state remedy available. The initial burden, then, is upon the plaintiff to make such a showing. Unless he is able to do so, the federal courts may properly refuse to entertain his Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging state tax collection are barred by comity when the state provides plain, adequate, and complete remedies.

Adams v. Indiana · filed 1985-11-27

Count II seeks damages under § 1983 from Hanna only. ... Because the Supreme Court made it clear that “plain, adequate and complete” for purposes of comity meant the same as “plain, speedy, and efficient” does under the Anti-Injunction Act, 454 U.S. at 116 n. 8, 102 S.Ct. at 186 n. 8, and this court has already found that I.C. 6-6-2.1-1105 and the injunction provisions of Indiana law are “plain, speedy and efficient” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, this damage claim against Hanna must be dismissed on principles of comity.

Section 1983 damages suits challenging state tax collection are barred by comity when the state provides an adequate remedy.

Ervin Wright v. Div. of Finance · filed 1996-11-01

We conclude the district court was correct in dismissing Wright's complaint.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (federal courts lack jurisdiction over actions to enjoin assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under state law where plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy available); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 141.210- 141.810 (providing procedures for challenging assessment and collection of tax); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107, 116-17 (1981) (barring § 1983 suits for monetary damages because of principle of comity; addressing adequacy of Missouri's taxpayer-protection processes).

Section 1983 challenges to state tax systems cannot proceed in federal court under principles of comity when an adequate state-court remedy is available.

DirecTV, Inc. v. Tolson · filed 2008-01-10

Plaintiffs thus may not main- tain their challenge under § 1983 in the federal courts while the courts of North Carolina remain available to hear it.

Section 1983 allows damages claims against state actors, but comity bars federal court actions challenging the validity of the District of Columbia tax system.

District Lock and Hardware, Inc. v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-08-24

Because "Congress has made clear that it intends federal courts generally to treat the District of Columbia judicial system as if it were a state system," JMM Corp., 378 F.3d at 1125, the principle of comity bars "taxpayers . . . from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of [the District of Columbia] tax system[] in federal courts," McNary, 454 U.S. at 115.

Section 1983 damages actions challenging state tax collection are barred when an adequate state procedure exists.

Casciani v. Town of Webster · filed 2012-11-07

Actions under § 1983 seeking damages related to the collection of state taxes are barred by the principle of comity so long as there is a procedurally adequate state alternative procedure for challenging the assessment.

Section 1983 claims for damages unrelated to state tax assessments are not barred by comity when state administrative review cannot provide those damages.

Washington Trucking Ass'n v. Employment Security Department · filed 2016-02-09

We hold that WTA and the Carriers do not have an adequate state law remedy for damages that are caused by ESD’s assessments or audit procedures that are unrelated to the amount of the challenged assessment. Accordingly, we hold that the principle of comity does not bar a § 1983 claim asserting such damages.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging state tax assessments are barred by comity when state courts provide an adequate, plain, and complete remedy.

Hadnott v. Berrios · filed 2018-09-25

The comity doctrine counsels this court to dismiss Plaintiff's constitutional claims for injunctive relief, as well as Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for damages.

The comity doctrine bars federal § 1983 claims challenging a local tax system when the state provides plain, adequate, and complete remedies.

Doe v. Community Unit School District No. 428 · filed 2019-09-05

Because there are "plain, adequate, and complete" state remedies for Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, the principle of comity bars Plaintiffs from bringing them in this court.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging state tax administration are barred by comity when the taxpayer has a plain, adequate, and complete state remedy.

Turner v. Baldwin · filed 2019-10-23

The comity doctrine bars taxpayers from bringing § 1983 claims for damages questioning the validity of the state tax systems. ... Mr. Turner has not met his burden of showing the unavailability of plain, adequate, and complete state remedies, and the order dismissing the action he first tried to bring in state court shows otherwise.

Section 1983 authorizes federal constitutional claims against state and local officials, including a claim seeking compensation for surplus property retained after a tax foreclosure sale.

Freed v. Thomas · filed 2020-09-30

Ultimately, Freed’s claims, which allege federal constitutional violations by state and local officials, are precisely the type of claims that are authorized under Section 1983. As such, this suit may proceed in federal court.

A Section 1983 plaintiff cannot establish denial of a fair trial from prejudicial pretrial publicity when the criminal trial ended in acquittal.

Schiavone Construction Co. v. Merola · filed 1988-01-29

As to the issue of whether the trial itself was fair, we agree with Judge Dalton of the Western District of Virginia that no denial of a fair trial can be shown where the plaintiff was acquitted of the crime charged.

Section 1983 permits liability for a police officer who withholds exculpatory information from a prosecutor when the withholding causes a prosecution to continue.

Goodwin v. Metts · filed 1989-09-12

A police officer who withholds exculpatory information from the prosecutor can be liable under both section 1983 and the state common law. The issue is causation.

Section 1983 permits a police cover-up claim only if the concealment caused a failure to obtain redress for the underlying violation; the claim is unripe while that lawsuit remains unresolved.

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department · filed 1988-02-16

Karim-Panahi purports to base a section 1983 claim against defendants Gates, Bradley, and Mills on their alleged cover-up of fourth amendment violations by the police officer defendants. The amended complaint charges that Gates, Bradley, and Mills falsified facts and destroyed evidence and documents, which resulted in obstruction of justice. Amended Complaint p 24. Such allegations may state a federally cognizable claim provided that defendants' actions can be causally connected to a failure to succeed in the present lawsuit. ... Because the ultimate resolution of the present suit remains in doubt, Karim-Panahi's cover-up claim is not ripe for judicial consideration.

Section 1983 permits judgments against the Government of the Virgin Islands beyond the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act's $25,000 limit.

Frett v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 1988-02-17

The presence of the section 1983 claim against the government not only effectively removes the significance of the Tort Claims Act $25,000 limit on judgments, but also introduces a further complication — the difference in the standard of care applicable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against a government entity when its policy or custom causes the injury.

Aristotle P. v. Johnson · filed 1989-09-07

An entity will be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes the injury in question.

Section 1983 applies to local governmental entities, including a public hospital authority acting under color of state law.

Todoroy v. DCH Healthcare Authority · filed 1991-01-29

DCH, as a local governmental entity, is subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages suits against county education districts and their trustees when the challenged conduct represents official policy or custom.

Smith v. Travis County Education District · filed 1992-05-01

As political subdivisions, the county education districts and their trustees may be subject to suit under § 1983 for damages if the actions by those districts in the future represents the State’s own policy or custom, whether made by the State’s lawmakers or by others whose edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy.

Section 1983 does not make a school board liable for a superintendent’s personnel decision when he lacked final policymaking authority and acted without a board policy or custom.

Adkins v. Board Of Education Of Magoffin County · filed 1993-01-05

The fact that a person who has authority only to recommend, and whose recommendations can be implemented only upon subsequent approval by a governing body, decides to make no recommendation does not convert the recommender into a final policymaker.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a government entity’s policy caused a constitutional deprivation to hold the entity liable.

Howell v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 1994-05-17

“The record is barren of any evidence of ‘implementation of an intentional policy or a constitutional deprivation resulting from an intentionally corrupt or impermissible policy’ so as to find a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983.”

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government for a constitutional injury caused by an express policy, a settled custom, or a person with final policymaking authority.

Trout v. Buie · filed 1995-07-18

A local governmental entity may be held liable under § 1983 for violating the civil rights of a person because of its policy in three instances: 1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation, 2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law, or 3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a local government; liability requires a government policy responsible for the violation of federally protected rights.

Gwinnett County v. King · filed 1995-10-04

Under the law applicable to actions under 42 USC § 1983 against local governments, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for imposing liability. To impose liability, it must be shown that some policy of Gwinnett County was responsible for the violation of King’s federally protected rights.

Section 1983 makes a governmental entity liable only when its policy or custom causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Reynolds v. Glynn County Board of Education · filed 1996-08-30

Instead, a government entity is liable under § 1983 only where plaintiffs injury results from the application of a policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits liability for a local public authority when an employee takes routine action in a capacity sanctioned by the authority, even without specific approval from its board.

Wehde v. Regional Transportation Authority · filed 1996-10-24

The clear implication of Schuster’s testimony is that, in examining the subject crossing and ordering its removal, he was acting in a capacity sanctioned by defendant. The fact that this particular action taken by Schuster was not specifically ordered by defendant is of no import. This was a routine matter that did not require specific approval of the defendant’s board.

Section 1983 permits local government liability for an employee’s constitutional violation only when an official municipal policy or custom causes the violation.

Hollingsworth v. Hill · filed 1997-04-04

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a local government may be held liable for the constitutional violation of its employees only when employee “action pursuant to official municipal policy . . . caused a constitutional tort.”

Section 1983 permits suit against a local government only when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Rucker v. State of California Santa Clara County Billie Ann Rucker · filed 1997-04-24

Under section 1983, a local government may only be sued for constitutional violations that result from an official policy or custom.

A § 1983 claim against a local government requires both a constitutional violation that caused the plaintiff’s harm and responsibility of the local government for that violation.

Wyke v. Polk County School Board · filed 1998-03-26

However, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a local government entity, a plaintiff must prove both that her harm was caused by a constitutional violation and that the government entity is responsible for that violation.

A government entity is liable under § 1983 for discrimination only when it directly results from an official policy or custom.

Harel v. Rutgers, State University · filed 1998-04-24

Thus, the Court dismisses all § 1983 claims against Rutgers because no reasonable fact finder could conclude that plaintiffs alleged discriminatory treatment was a direct result of an official anti-Israeli University policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not make a local government liable for acts of officials it has no authority to control.

Jones v. St. Tammany Parish Jail · filed 1998-05-08

Local governments can never be liable under section 1983 for the acts of those whom the local government has no authority to control.

Section 1983 does not make a school administrative unit liable for a superintendent's alleged constitutional violations when he lacks final policymaking authority over the matter.

Noyes v. Moccia, et al. · filed 1999-06-24

Accordingly, SAU #51 cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendant Moccia's alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local governing body for constitutional deprivations caused by its custom, but not on a theory of vicarious liability.

Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama · filed 2000-09-07

A local governing body may also be held liable for "constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels," but may not be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional injury caused by an official policy to hold a local governing body liable.

Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama · filed 2000-09-07

In order to state a claim under Section 1983 against a local governing body, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a constitutional injury, and that his injury was caused by "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed when factual disputes remain over the municipality’s deliberate indifference and whether it caused the alleged injury.

Paz v. Weir · filed 2001-04-06

In this case, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the County and Kellar, specifically, displayed deliberate indifference to reports of Weir’s sexual activities with female inmates and the potential for future abuses. There is sufficient evidence from which it could be inferred that Kellar chose not to enforce applicable policies against Weir and that he disregarded an excessive risk of harm to female detainees when he failed to curtail Weir’s access to female inmates. A fact issue also arises on the issue of causation, ie., whether the County’s alleged deliberate indifference to Weir’s purported sexual activities was the “moving force” behind his reported sexual contacts with Paz.

Section 1983 permits suits against school districts and school boards as local government units.

McCachren v. Blacklick Valley School District · filed 2002-07-16

Thus, local government units like the school district and school board, as well as their officers, are treated differently than the States and State officials, which are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a local government liable for an employee’s unconstitutional conduct to show that the conduct followed an official policy or custom.

Harvey v. Alameda County Medical Center · filed 2003-08-25

Rather, the plaintiff must show that the employee’s unconstitutional activity was “undertaken pursuant to official policy or custom.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a local government liable to allege that its policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Mladek v. Day · filed 2003-11-20

To establish local government liability, Plaintiffs must establish that the constitutional violation resulted from a policy or custom of the local government. In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must initially determine whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that their constitutional rights were violated because of the local government’s policy or custom. In this case, Plaintiffs have made such allegations in their Complaint.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a government entity to allege that an unconstitutional official policy or decision caused the injury.

Carrion v. Wilkinson · filed 2004-03-10

To state a § 1983 claim against a government entity, a plaintiff must allege that his injury was caused by an unconstitutional policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the entity’s officers.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a government entity to show that its employees acted under an official custom, policy, or practice that violated civil rights or permitted deliberate indifference to them.

Beauregard v. Lewis County · filed 2009-05-07

In order to state a § 1983 claim against a government entity, a plaintiff must show that the government’s employees acted under an official custom, policy, or practice that violates or permits deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs civil rights.

Section 1983 permits liability against a government entity for an employee’s termination only when the termination arose from the entity’s unconstitutional policy or custom.

Abrams v. Port Authority Trans Hudson Co · filed 2011-09-20

As a state agency, PATH can only be held liable under § 1983 for Abrams‘s termination if the termination arose from an unconstitutional policy or custom of PATH.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a local government liable to allege that an official policy or custom caused the deprivation of rights.

Jordan v. Gwinnett County · filed 2011-10-03

Furthermore, although Jordan alleged in his complaint that the Gwinnett County Merit Board deprived him of due process, he failed to state a claim under § 1983 because he did not allege that the deprivation of his due process rights was caused by an official policy or custom.

A Section 1983 claim against a school district requires evidence that its policy caused a deprivation of rights.

Hupp v. Switzerland of Ohio Local School District · filed 2012-12-11

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether the School District violated Section 1983 with a policy of arbitrary, “who you know” educational decision-making.

Section 1983 requires evidence that an official policy caused a deprivation of constitutional rights to hold a government entity liable.

Yan v. Penn State University · filed 2013-06-18

We agree with the District Court’s determination that the claims against PSU fail because there was no evidence of an “official policy” that resulted in the deprivation of Yan’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits liability against a government agency when its workers act pursuant to agency policy and violate constitutional rights.

Bower v. Lawrence County Children & Youth Services · filed 2013-08-12

A government agency is subject to § 1983 liability for the actions of its workers which occur pursuant to agency policy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a local government to allege a policy or custom attributable to that government that caused the constitutional injury.

Searcy v. Ben Hill County School District · filed 2014-05-16

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have failed to allege an officially promulgated policy or unofficial custom or practice of BHCSD, Plaintiffs have further failed to allege any conduct that would state a claim for section 1983 liability against BHCSD, even if the facts of Plaintiffs’ SAC stated a claim for a violation of Searcy’s substantive due process rights. For this reason as well, Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against BHCSD is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make local governing bodies liable solely for their employees’ actions, but permits liability when official action causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Zoll v. Eastern Allamakee Community School District · filed 1978-12-07

Monell held that local governing bodies cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) on a respondeat superior theory but may be held liable where official action “is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution.” 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. ... While leaving undisturbed the reinstatement directive and back pay award up to trial, we remand the issue of post-trial back pay against the school district to the district court for reconsideration in light of Monell.

Section 1983 permits liability against a government entity only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Johnson v. Ohio · filed 2016-02-18

Instead, government entities are only liable under § 1983 when a constitutional injury results from “execution of a government’s policy or custom[.]”

Section 1983 permits liability against a government organization when an employee acts under its official policy or custom, even if the employee is not a final policymaker.

Winger v. Meade District Hospital · filed 2016-05-12

Under § 1983, a government organization is liable for its own actions, but not for unauthorized actions by its employees. ... Even if the CEO was not a final policymaker, there appears to be no genuine dispute that he followed the official policy or custom of the Hospital, rendering it liable for his potential violations.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a county to proceed when the plaintiff may be able to prove that a county policy or custom, attributable to a final policymaker, caused the alleged constitutional violation.

SCHROEDER v. DeKALB COUNTY Et Al. · filed 2017-06-14

“[W]e cannot say at this early pleading stage of the litigation that [Schroeder] will be unable to present evidence demonstrating that” the allegedly wrongful suspension of his driver’s license and violation of his liberty interest were caused by a county policy or custom, as shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the county.

Section 1983 does not make local government entities vicariously liable for their employees’ conduct; a plaintiff must identify a policy or custom that caused the harm.

Santoro v. County of Collin, Texas · filed 2019-09-26

Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to section 1983 should be dismissed because Defendants Plano ISD and Collin College cannot be held vicariously liable for the conduct of their employees and Plaintiff fails to identify any specific policy or custom adopted by Plano ISD or Collin College that caused harm to Plaintiff (Dkt. #98 at pp. 19–21); ... Having considered Plaintiff’s Objections (Dkt. #104), all other relevant filings, and having conducted a de novo review, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s reports (Dkt. #95; #96; #97; #98) as the findings and conclusions of the Court.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government entity only when an official policy causes a constitutional deprivation; employing the wrongdoer is insufficient.

Gonzalez v. East Los Angeles Sheriffs · filed 2019-10-07

The Complaint – which identifies the Department, in its official capacity as the sole defendant – fails to state a viable Section 1983 claim against such entity. A local government entity – like the Department – cannot be held liable under Section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. ... The entity may be held liable only where actions taken pursuant to an official government “policy” caused an alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal link between a government entity’s policy or custom and an alleged constitutional violation to hold the entity liable.

Lyons v. Tennessee Department of Correction · filed 2019-12-12

First, as to Defendant TDOC, nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint allows the Court to plausibly infer that a custom or policy of TDOC caused the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. ... As such, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 as to Defendant TDOC.

Section 1983 makes a local government liable when an official policy made by its policymaker is the moving force behind a violation of federal rights.

Harris County, Texas and Kevin Vailes v. Barbara Coats, Individually, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jamail · filed 2020-02-06

To establish local government liability under section 1983, a claimant must prove three critical elements: an official policy, promulgated by the local government unit’s policymaker, that was the “moving force” behind the violation.

A § 1983 claim based on a local government's custom, supervision, or training must allege facts supporting liability; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Ford v. City of Point Pleasant · filed 2020-04-29

As relevant here, Plaintiff alleges in Count Two that Sgt. Reynolds and Deputy Cavender violated his civil rights and that violation was “caused by implementation of a custom, policy, or official act of the City of Point Pleasant and the Mason County Sheriff’s Department, including but not limited to, the custom of utilizing excessive force in the arrest of individuals.” Id. at Ct. 2, ¶4. ... However, the Court finds these allegations are mere threadbare recitals and conclusory statements that are insufficient to state a plausible claim.

A local government unit may be liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the alleged injury.

Vela v. County of Tulare Superior Court · filed 2020-08-25

Rather, a local government unit may only be held liable if it inflicts the injury complained of through a policy or custom. ... Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that a custom or policy exists that has violated her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a government contractor to allege a custom or policy that caused a constitutional violation.

SIMMONS v.KELSEY · filed 2020-09-28

In order for Aramark, a government contractor, to be liable, Plaintiff must allege facts supporting an inference that it had a custom or policy that caused the constitution violation.

Section 1983 permits a student to pursue a substantive due process claim against a public school teacher when a jury could find that disciplinary force exceeded what was needed and was intended to cause harm.

Metzger v. Osbeck · filed 1988-03-11

Even if physical reinforcement of a teacher's verbal admonitions is pedagogically appropriate and condoned by school disciplinary policy, we believe a reasonable jury could find that the restraints employed by Osbeck, if responsible for the student's loss of consciousness, exceeded the degree of force needed to correct Metzger's alleged breach of discipline and that the substantial injuries sustained by Metzger served no legitimate disciplinary purpose. If the jury is persuaded that Osbeck employed those restraints with the intent to cause harm, Osbeck will be subject to liability for crossing the "constitutional line" separating a common law tort from a deprivation of a substantive due process.

Section 1983 permits a substantive due process claim when a teacher disciplines a student with excessive force and appreciable physical pain.

Metzger ex rel. Metzger v. Osbeck · filed 1988-03-11

A decision to discipline a student, if accomplished through excessive force and appreciable physical pain, may constitute an invasion of the child’s Fifth Amendment liberty interest in his personal security and a violation of substantive due process prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit federal courts to correct errors in school disciplinary decisions unless those errors violate a specific constitutional guarantee.

Fuller v. DECATUR PUBLIC SCHOOL BD. OF EDUC. · filed 2000-01-11

But § 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees.

Section 1983 makes excessive force actionable when the force exceeds what is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.

Giles v. Kearney · filed 2007-09-28

Use of force is actionable under § 1983 when it exceeds “that which is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.”

Section 1983 permits a person whose constitutional rights are violated by excessive police force to seek damages from the responsible officer, but ordinary negligence alone is insufficient.

Coon v. Ledbetter · filed 1986-01-16

It is equally plain, however, that a police officer using excessive force to make an arrest deprives a citizen of a constitutional right and may be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for police conduct violating constitutional rights when the conduct causes meaningful injury, is grossly disproportionate to the need, and is motivated by malice.

Hinojosa v. The City of Terrell, Texas, Ron Jones, Etc. · filed 1988-01-06

In recognition of this need to distinguish potential constitutional violations from mere breaches of state tort law, Shillingford limits redress under section 1983 to police conduct that (1) caused at least meaningful injury, (2) was grossly disproportionate to the need presented, and (3) was motivated by malice.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a person acting under color of state law for depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc. · filed 2014-10-16

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must aver that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a constitutional right or a right conferred by a law of the United States. ... Viewed under this analysis, the Court concludes that the Deputies’ conduct, at least as alleged, could be found to have constituted an unreasonable use of force.

Section 1983 permits a claim alleging that state employees used excessive force during detention.

Wilkerson v. State of Georgia · filed 2015-07-16

In short, Wilkerson’s complaint facially alleged that two state employees used excessive force against her, either to detain her or while she was already detained. Such a claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a Section 1983 excessive force claim, the eggshell skull rule allows a plaintiff to establish causation despite preexisting medical conditions.

Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas · filed 2018-01-24

The eggshell skull rule is applicable in § 1983 excessive force cases. ... Accordingly, the plaintiff can show that the use of force was the direct and only cause of Darden’s death.

Section 1983 liability for deficient notices requires proof that the public agency had a custom or usage of sending them; a precise percentage of deficient notices is unnecessary when the evidence establishes that custom.

Cosby v. Ward · filed 1988-03-14

In order to establish the state's liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the plaintiffs had to show that IDES had a "custom or usage" of sending deficient notices. ... It was not necessary for the district court to determine a precise percentage of deficient notices. The plaintiffs needed only to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the state had a custom of sending inadequate notices.

Section 1983 does not allow a school board policy of tolerating excessive force to be inferred from one incident when the board was alleged to know only of a bus driver’s discipline problems.

Anderson v. Everett Area School Board · filed 1989-10-05

Plaintiffs allege only that the School Board was aware that this bus driver had a problem maintaining discipline on his bus routes, but nevertheless failed to take corrective action. Plaintiffs do not allege that the School Board was aware of any repeated use of excessive force by the bus driver, or even that he was guilty of repeated uses of excessive force. Given such deficiencies in the allegata, the plaintiff is in effect asking us to infer a policy of tolerating the use of excessive force from a single incident. This we cannot do.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations that defendants instituted a policy or custom permitting officers to use excessive force.

Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah · filed 1990-01-25

Secondly, Harms’ Second Affidavit consists entirely of conclusory allegations that Defendants instituted policy and custom permitting officers to use excessive force in the apprehension of suspects. Such conclusory allegations alone are insufficient to state a claim for violation of Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on a widespread, well-settled custom, and factual allegations of repeated conduct can raise a genuine issue about whether such a custom exists.

Walter v. City and County of Denver · filed 1998-12-10

Here, the parties agree that, in order to succeed on her 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim, plaintiff must show the existence of a widespread practice so pervasive and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage having the force of law. Thus, the issue presented is whether plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to give rise to a genuine issue as to whether such a custom or usage existed. We determine she has presented such allegations.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a permanent, well-settled custom or usage; a single day’s denial of records does not establish one.

The Putnam Pit, Inc. Geoffrey Davidian v. City of Cookeville, Tennessee Jim Shipley · filed 2000-07-19

The denial of access to records on one day does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (requiring that a practice “be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law” for purposes of § 1983 liability). Accordingly, we reject Davidian’s argument.

A Section 1983 claim based on an IDEA violation requires proof that a government custom or practice was the moving force behind the violation.

Shelton v. Maya Angelou Public Charter School · filed 2008-09-26

Under either test, Plaintiff altogether fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to summary judgment on his Section 1983 claim. Most egregious is Plaintiffs failure to establish “that the District of Columbia has a custom or practice that is the moving force behind the alleged IDEA violations,” which is required under any interpretation of the Walker test.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show a personal constitutional injury before evidence of a government practice or custom becomes relevant.

Smith v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2017-06-09

We have held, absent a showing of constitutional injury, the inquiry into practice or custom is irrelevant.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a widespread unconstitutional custom to hold a private prison medical contractor liable on a custom theory; three prescription delays involving one inmate over nineteen months are insufficient.

Hildreth v. Butler · filed 2020-05-19

Three instances of prescription delays over nineteen months involving solely one inmate fail to qualify as a wide- spread unconstitutional practice so well-settled that it consti- tutes a custom or usage with the force of law.

Section 1983 permits a suit against a county because the county is a person under the statute.

Elder v. Highlands County Board of County Commissioners · filed 1986-11-26

Accordingly, the County is a “person” subject to a section 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 permits a suit against the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands because the Commonwealth is a person under the statute and lacks sovereign immunity from federal suit.

Fleming v. Department of Public Safety, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands · filed 1988-04-08

Thus, because the Commonwealth is a person under section 1983, because it lacks eleventh amendment immunity and because in the Covenant it waived any common law sovereign immunity from federal suit it might otherwise have possessed, Fleming may bring a section 1983 suit against the Department.

A local government entity that is not an arm of the state is a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Elam Construction, Inc. v. Regional Transportation District · filed 1997-10-16

I have concluded RTD is not an arm of state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Following Will, I find RTD is a person under Monell for the purposes of a § 1983 claim.

A governmental entity’s immunity from state tort suits does not determine whether it can be sued under § 1983; the court must decide whether it is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.

Brooks v. Center for Healthcare Services · filed 1998-06-30

But an entity’s § 1983 liability does not hinge on the extent of its sovereign immunity from state tort suits; § 1983 liability hinges instead on whether the entity may be characterized as an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit a monetary damages suit against LSU because it is an arm of the state, not a person subject to suit.

Richard v. BD. OF SUPER. OF LA. STATE UNIV. · filed 2007-03-28

As such, LSU is correct in its assertion that it is not a person vulnerable to suit pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state entities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Cuzze v. University & Community College System · filed 2007-12-13

Even so, the district court properly concluded that respondents are not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state community college that is an arm of the state, because it is not a statutory person.

Stevenson v. Owens State Community College · filed 2008-06-25

The issue here is whether Owens is an entity of the state because the Supreme Court has held that state entities are not “person[s]” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Owens meets the Hall factors and is properly considered an arm of the state.

Governmental units may be persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park District of Peoria, Illinois, Defendants · filed 1978-09-11

An appellate court must decide the cases before it on the basis of the law currently applicable, see Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974), and Mo-nell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 611 (1978), establishes that governmental units may be “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state university or its board of trustees when they are arms of the state, because they are not persons under the section.

McKenna v. Bowling Green State Univ. · filed 2014-06-13

Therefore, having sued only the University and its Board of Trustees, rather than the individual trustees, McKenna has failed to state a claim against a person covered by § 1983.

Section 1983’s definition of “person” does not bar claims for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against the Racing Commission and the Boards.

Carrillo v. Penn National Gaming, Inc. · filed 2016-03-23

To the extent that Plaintiffs seek prospective relief such as declaratory or injunctive relief, those claims are not precluded by § 1983’s definition of “person” and are not subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against governmental subunits that are not separate suable entities.

Brown v. City of Las Cruces Police Dep't · filed 2018-05-07

Doña Ana County Sheriff's Department and Doña Ana County Detention Center are governmental sub-units and, therefore, they are not persons or legally created entities capable of being sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state university board because it is not a suable “person,” even if it waives sovereign immunity by removing the case to federal court.

Cage v. Harper · filed 2018-08-30

The law is clear that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot overcome the fact that a state is not a suable “person” for purposes of § 1983. Consequently, Cage’s § 1983 claim against the Board must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not treat a state university that is an arm of the state as a person subject to suit.

Doe v. University of Alaska Board of Regents · filed 2019-09-04

As for plaintiffs’ § 1983 Monell claims against the University defendants in Count V, “‘[s]tates or governmental entities that are considered “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes’ are not ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)). ... Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for damages and equitable relief against the University of Alaska System are dismissed with prejudice.

A § 1983 action challenging traffic citations must await a determination of their illegality in state court or federal habeas proceedings.

Fields v. Pruett · filed 1988-04-11

The plaintiff filed his complaint attacking traffic citations he received in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The district court held that any civil rights action must be brought after the illegality of these citations is shown through a state court or federal habeas corpus proceeding. Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam). The court also held that the plaintiff's other arguments were frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). We agree with the conclusions of the district court for the reasons stated in the district court's order dismissing the case and in the district court's order denying motions to clarify and to amend.

Section 1983 reaches a sheriff’s interference with journalists’ First Amendment rights to gather and report news when the sheriff acts under color of law.

Wsb-Tv, Mark C. Winne and Richard Nelson v. Lee · filed 1988-04-22

After a careful review of the record, we are persuaded that a reasonable inference to be drawn from affidavits submitted by plaintiffs is that the November 6th incident was but one episode in the ongoing effort of defendant to thwart or impede plaintiffs in gathering and reporting news relating to rumors of the sheriffs use of inmate labor on his private property, an interference with plaintiffs’ first amendment rights which would violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal actors for their federal conduct.

Bruce v. Carvajal · filed 2020-12-14

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s action, if plausible, would not proceed under § 1983 because he is a federal prisoner suing federal actors, not state actors.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the United States or its federal agencies because they do not act under color of state law.

Smith v. United States Postal Service · filed 2020-10-20

Neither the United States nor its various federal agencies can be sued under § 1983 because they do not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against federal agencies because it applies only to state actors.

O'Donoghue v. U.S. Social Security Administration · filed 2020-10-05

As federal entities, SSA and CMS cannot be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against a federal agency.

Osher v. Land Clearance, etc. · filed 2018-09-06

Section 1983 does not create a remedy against a federal agency, see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1973), so Osher must demonstrate that Congress intended “to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.

Section 1983 covers unconstitutional action by state agents; claims against federal agents proceed under Bivens.

Garcia v. Lawrence · filed 2004-12-10

Although Garcia filed his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (proscribing unconstitutional action by state agent), the district court properly recharacterized it as a complaint under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (authorizing cause of action for violation of constitutional rights by federal agent) inasmuch as all named defendants are federal agents.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on federal agencies because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Elliott v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 2004-02-18

The FDIC is a federal agency, not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to actions by state and local entities, not the federal government.

Dry v. United States · filed 2000-12-19

Regardless of the validity of the other claims against the federal defendants, the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment and on § 1983 is misplaced. ... Both provisions are applicable only to actions by state and local entities, not by the federal government.

Section 1983 claims against federal agents are construed as Bivens claims because the agents are not state actors.

Roman v. Townsend · filed 2000-08-23

The district court correctly construed plaintiffs' §1983 claim as a Bivens claim because the defendants were federal, not state, agents.

Section 1983 applies to actions by state and local entities, not to actions by the federal government.

Belhomme v. Widnall · filed 1997-10-14

Second, Mr. Belhomme’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law because this section applies to actions by state and local entities, not to the federal government.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights action against a federal agency.

George Manuel Shirley Manuel v. Miami Conservancy District United States Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1988-09-23

Plaintiffs' attempt to prosecute a civil rights action under Sec. 1983 against a federal agency (the EPA) was misplaced.

Section 1983 does not authorize a claim against the FDIC because it is a federal agency acting under federal law.

Turner v. Officers of the Mid Valley Bank · filed 1988-08-24

The FDIC, as a federal agency, acts pursuant to federal law, and as such is not subject to suit under the Civil Rights Act.

A civil rights complaint filed under § 1983 against federal defendants is more properly construed as a Bivens claim.

Bedney v. Tony Hagston, Federal Correctional Institution, Alderson, West Virginia, A.J. Kress, Lieutenant Per · filed 1988-04-29

Although filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, plaintiff's complaint, against federal defendants, is more properly construed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against the United States or federal employees acting in their federal roles.

Hollett v. Browning · filed 1988-11-30

Clearly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 have no relevance to this action against the United States and federal employees.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against federal defendants.

Smith v. Moberg · filed 1988-12-21

Section 1983 suits may not be brought against federal defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide the cause of action for claims against federal defendants; those claims must be brought under Bivens.

Hinton v. Alexander Harvey, Ii, Frederic N. Smalkin, Joseph H. Howard, John R. Hargrove · filed 1989-03-01

Although Hinton brings his action pursuant to various civil rights statutes because the action is against federal defendants, it would have to be brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal defendants.

Michigan Hospital Ass'n v. Department of Social Services · filed 1990-01-08

Since it has long been settled that § 1983 does not create any cause of action against a federal defendant, ... plaintiffs may maintain their action against the federal defendants only if a cause of action may be implied directly under the Medicaid Act.

Section 1983 does not create a cause of action against federal defendants.

Illinois Hospital Ass'n v. Edgar · filed 1991-04-26

Since § 1983 does not create a cause of action against a federal defendant, Count III may stand only if a cause of action may be implied directly under the Medicaid Act.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the United States or federal agencies because it creates a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law.

Hurt v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 1992-08-27

In response, Federal Defendants point out, and plaintiffs do not contest, that § 1983 creates a cause of action against persons who act under color of state law in depriving citizens of their protected rights. Thus, regardless of the implications of Martinez, plaintiffs cannot sue the United States or HUD under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against federal officers acting pursuant to federal law.

Cardozo v. Graham · filed 1994-02-15

As defendants correctly observe, however, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not confer jurisdiction over federal defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide an action against federal defendants; a constitutional claim against them is construed under Bivens.

Delgado v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1995-06-08

Although plaintiff brought the action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the district court correctly noted that Delgado could not bring a Sec. 1983 action against federal defendants and construed that action as one under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 2 On January 21, 1993, Delgado voluntarily dismissed the FBI without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not govern civil rights claims against federal defendants; such claims are construed as Bivens actions.

Jones v. Doe · filed 1995-08-22

Although Jones filed the instant complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the action is construed as one brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because it alleges civil rights violations by federal defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights claim against federal defendants; a complaint naming them is construed as a Bivens action.

Goodley v. Reno · filed 1996-03-04

Although Goodley filed his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he alleges civil rights violations by federal defendants. We construe such an action as one brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

A complaint under Section 1983 alleging a civil rights violation by federal defendants is construed as a Bivens action.

Connor v. Marmolejo · filed 1996-11-08

Connor’s § 1983 complaint is construed as an action brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because it alleges a civil rights violation by federal defendants.

Section 1983 claims alleging constitutional violations by federal defendants are construed as Bivens claims.

Witherspoon v. White · filed 1997-05-02

However, because some of the defendants alleged to have violated Witherspoon's Eighth Amendment rights are federal defendants, we construe his complaint against them as an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

A complaint invoking § 1983 against federal defendants for alleged constitutional violations is construed as a Bivens action against them.

Witherspoon v. White · filed 1997-06-02

However, because some of the defendants alleged to have violated Witherspoon's Eighth Amendment rights are federal defendants, we construe his complaint against them as an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to federal defendants acting pursuant to federal law.

Hawai'i County Green Party v. Clinton · filed 1997-10-17

Section 1983 does not apply to federal defendants acting pursuant to federal law, as is the case here.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against federal agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Hindes v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation · filed 1998-02-19

We, therefore, hold that federal agencies are not "persons" subject to section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 is an erroneous basis for a complaint against the United States arising from alleged misconduct by federal law enforcement officials.

Callas v. United States · filed 1984-02-07

Callas’ complaint, which he has erroneously styled as a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but which the government has treated as a petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, requests, inter alia, the following relief: damages in an amount of three million dollars, vacation of the sentence imposed by this court, and immediate induction into the federal Witness Protection Program.

Section 1983 does not govern civil rights claims against federal defendants; those claims are construed as Bivens actions.

Witherspoon v. White · filed 2000-08-24

Witherspoon characterized his action as one made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). However, because Witherspoon alleged civil rights violations by federal defendants, the court construes his complaint as a Bivens action.

Claims pleaded under § 1983 against federal judges are construed as Bivens claims.

Mehdipour v. Purcell · filed 2001-11-09

Because the Oklahoma judges and the Tenth Circuit judges are federal defendants, this court will construe plaintiffs claims against them as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal defendants.

Nwaokocha v. Hagge · filed 2002-09-26

Section 1983 is not a claim available against federal defendants, and so we construe Nwaokocha’s claim liberally as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal agencies or employees.

Robinson v. United States Bureau of Prisons · filed 2003-02-07

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal agencies or employees.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against the United States Parole Commission because it applies only to actions of state officials.

Forrester v. United States Parole Commission · filed 2004-03-18

Because § 1983 is only applicable to the actions of state officials, plaintiff has not asserted a viable claim against the United States Parole Commission.

A due process claim brought under § 1983 against the EEOC and its employees is construed as a Bivens claim.

Caraveo v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2004-03-26

Caraveo’s pro se complaint sued defendants for violation of due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court properly construed the claim as one arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide the basis for a claim against federal officials or agencies; such a claim should be treated as a Bivens action.

Willis v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-04-06

Willis styled his complaint as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), and the district court retained that designation. Because the Defendants are all federal government officials or agencies, however, the complaint should have been treated as an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to federal defendants in this action.

Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams · filed 1981-10-01

Since the federal defendants are immune from attorneys fees herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and since 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 do not apply against the federal defendants, plaintiffs are only entitled to § 1988 fees as against the state defendants and are not entitled to fees for services rendered in plaintiffs' case against the federal defendants.

Section 1983 is not the vehicle for claims against federal defendants; those claims should be brought under Bivens.

Dasta v. W.I. LeBlanc, Jr. · filed 2005-05-24

Dasta’s claims against federal defendants should have been brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to claims against federal defendants.

Marsden v. Federal B.O.P. · filed 1994-06-24

Although plaintiff has used the form complaint for an action against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is inapplicable to federal defendants, I have construed these claims liberally as brought pursuant to Bivens.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federal rights by state law, but does not authorize suits against the United States or the IRS.

Segal v. Commissioner of IRS · filed 2006-04-13

But § 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of federal rights by state law: it is not a basis for a suit against the United States or the IRS.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal actor acting only in that capacity.

Acosta v. United States Marshals Service · filed 2006-04-19

Being at best a federal actor, he was not subject to suit at all under section 1983, see Soldevila v. Sec'y of Agric., 512 F.2d 427, 429 (1st Cir. 1975); but the district court treated the civil rights claim against him as a Bivens action, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 claims against a federal agency are analyzed under Bivens.

Teplitsky v. Department of Justice · filed 1997-10-24

The district court properly analyzed Teplitsky's claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because the DOJ is a federal. agency.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against federal defendants.

Wilson v. Mvm, Inc. · filed 2007-01-29

Further, we agree with the District Court that the appellants could not have recovered monetary damages under their § 1983 claim against the federal defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against federal agencies, even when they allegedly conspire with state actors.

Hindes v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 1998-02-19

Because the United States is not a proper defendant in a section 1983 action, neither is a federal agency, an arm of the sovereign.