42 U.S.C. § 1983

A claim barred by Heck v. Humphry fails to state a claim for § 1983 relief.

Ayers v. Pines · filed 2020-12-11

In its June 17, 2020 Opinion, the Court concluded that, because the allegations of the Complaint fail to state a claim for relief against either Pines or MDC, and because all of Ayers claims are barred by Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), the Complaint is factually insufficient and fails to state any claim for § 1983 relief.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence.

Beltran v. Superior Court of California · filed 2020-12-14

Plaintiff's amended complaint, construed as objections to the findings and recommendations, does not address the numerous pleading failures identified by the magistrate judge, which include violations of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 18, and 20; the fact that plaintiffs efforts to challenge an underlying state court criminal conviction are not cognizable in acivil rights action such as this filed in federal court; and the related fact that claims for damages that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence are barred by the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned.

Sisk v. Holden · filed 2020-12-29

As such, because Plaintiff’s conviction has not been overturned, his § 1983 claim for excessive force against Holden is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims must be dismissed under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction that has not been invalidated.

LeFors v. Elliot · filed 2021-01-11

Under these circumstances, LeFors’s claims in connection with the rental car are barred by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims that would invalidate a conviction are barred while that conviction remains valid.

HART v. O.F. OBERLANDER · filed 2021-01-11

Heck bars Hart’s malicious prosecution and unconstitutional conviction claims since he was convicted of the charges stemming from the allegedly illegal arrest, that conviction has not been overturned, and his success on the claim would render that conviction invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit an excessive-force claim barred by Heck while the underlying conviction remains valid.

Mallory v. Mims · filed 2021-01-11

Even if that were true, and setting aside any confusion regarding the proper name of the Defendant, the substance of Plaintiff’s claims would remain barred by the Heck doctrine which Plaintiff contends is “unfair and bias [sic] and it [the Heck rule] prejudices the Plaintiff because Plaintiff is being blamed for an act Plaintiff never committed” (Dkt. #36 at 3).

A § 1983 damages claim that would invalidate a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Tamrat v. Rhodes · filed 2021-01-12

In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... Plaintiff’s allegations that defendant Rhodes improperly took a statement regarding the altercation with the security guard are dismissed without prejudice due to Heck and plaintiff’s conviction on those charges.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim is barred by Heck when success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Cook v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2021-01-13

As to Cook’s false arrest claim, we agree that his conviction necessarily arose from the conduct which led to his arrest (and could not have been distinct from that conduct) and therefore, Heck bars this claim.

Section 1983 claims challenging parole conditions or parole revocation are subject to the Heck v. Humphrey bar.

Smurphat v. Hobb · filed 2021-01-14

Fourth, contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the bar created by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does indeed apply to (among other things) challenges to the terms and conditions of his parole, and his parole revocation.

A challenge to the legality of pretrial detention is barred from proceeding under § 1983 when Heck applies.

Driver v. Houston Police Dept. · filed 2021-01-22

Regardless, Plaintiff’s claim challenging the legality of his pretrial detention is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as it is presently barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed when success would necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s outstanding conviction is invalid.

Yates v. Bates · filed 2021-01-26

Both of these requirements are met here. If the court were to rule in Yates’s favor, it would be determining that Yates was entitled to immunity for his actions and never should have been prosecuted or convicted. A judgment in his favor then, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would collaterally attack a state conviction that has not been overturned.

Bailey v. Easley · filed 2021-01-26

Because Mr. Bailey’s conviction has never been overturned, his claims are barred by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which prevents a collateral attack on a state-court conviction through a civil suit.

In a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption that the prosecutor exercised independent judgment solely by giving an account that conflicts with the officers’ account.

Newman v. County of Orange · filed 2006-08-07

To rebut the presumption of independent judgment and to survive summary judgment on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must provide more than an account of the incident in question that conflicts with the account of the officers involved.

Section 1983 permits a self-defense defense when an officer’s reasonable use of force accidentally injures a bystander.

Grisom v. Logan · filed 1971-10-20

We think the self-defense standard was the appropriate one to apply in this action. ... The fact that the claim is brought as a civil rights violation rather than as a simple tort does not change the defense standard. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed. 2d 492 (1961), the Supreme Court said that actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be looked at in the light of their tort background, and courts have done so by applying tort defenses to claims brought under the statute.

Section 1983 permits a state official to assert a complete defense when the official reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to protect themselves or another from imminent death or great bodily harm.

Clark v. Ziedonis · filed 1975-03-26

The law has traditionally recognized that a person may employ deadly force against another, if such person reasonably believes such force necessary to protect a third person or oneself from imminent death or great bodily harm, without incurring civil liability for injury to the other. ... This Court accepts the traditional principle noted above as a complete defense to an action against a state official under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not create a claim against a public school board for refusing to bargain collectively with a teachers’ union absent a constitutional violation.

Hanover Township Federation of Teachers Local 1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp. · filed 1972-01-12

Since the coverage of the relevant parts of the Civil Rights Act is no broader than the constitutional protection, those statutes are not equivalent to the Labor-Management Relations Act in the field of public employment. ... We therefore, agree with Judge Beamer’s conclusion that the specific allegations made by the 22 individual appellants in their Third Amended Complaint did not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for parents' physical and emotional distress arising from the alleged mistreatment of their son.

ROBINSON v. McCORKLE · filed 1972-06-12

Philip Robinson's parents' claims of physical and emotional distress are not actionable under Secs. 1983 or 1985(3).

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to seek evidence for postconviction DNA testing when the requested relief does not challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Nelson v. Preleski · filed 2020-08-24

It is well established that “a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement[ ]’” and must seek relief by filing a “federal habeas corpus ... or appropriate state relief instead” after exhausting available state remedies. ... Nelson’s complaint, however, does not fall within the scope of a habeas action because he seeks release of biological evidence for DNA testing rather than release from confinement.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for postconviction DNA testing when successful testing would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Stratton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections · filed 2020-04-07

To the extent Stratton requests DNA testing, such a claim is properly brought in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this is so because successful DNA testing would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Stratton’s conviction.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek access to evidence for postconviction DNA testing through a due process claim.

Neal v. Prater · filed 2019-11-15

The Court disagrees because if Plaintiff could succeed on his due process challenge to the requirements of § 1373.4(A), the Court would have authority to grant Plaintiff access to the Samsung phone notwithstanding Plaintiff’s inability to meet the requirement in § 1373.4(A)(5). See Skinner, 562 U.S. at 525 (“[A] postconviction claim for DNA testing is properly pursued in a § 1983 action. Success in the suit gains for the prisoner only access to the DNA evidence, which may prove exculpatory, inculpatory, or inconclusive.”).

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to seek postconviction access to biological evidence for DNA testing, but denial must deprive him of a federally protected right to state a claim.

Arthur v. King · filed 2007-09-21

A plaintiff may seek postconviction access to biological evidence for DNA testing as a § 1983 action, but must show that denial of such access “deprive[s] him of a federally protected right” in order to state a claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek postconviction access to DNA evidence.

Thompson v. Rundle · filed 2010-08-20

Accordingly, we follow Cunningham and conclude that Thompson has a viable § 1983 action in seeking the release of DNA evidence.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a state postconviction DNA testing statute on due process and access to courts grounds.

CROMARTIE v. SHEALY · filed 2019-10-28

Generally, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint is the proper vehicle for Cromartie to raise his due process and access to courts challenges to Georgia’s postconviction DNA statute, O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41(c).

Section 1983 permits a claim for post-conviction access to DNA evidence when success on that claim would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Breest v. N.H. Attorney General · filed 2007-01-03

Accordingly, I conclude that his claim is cognizable under Section 1983 for purposes of preliminary review.

Section 1983 permits a claim for post-conviction access to DNA evidence when obtaining the evidence would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Breest v. New Hampshire Attorney General · filed 2007-01-03

Nothing about this request necessarily implies anything about his underlying state court conviction. The results of the testing could be inconclusive or inculpatory. Moreover, if testing yields exculpatory results, his conviction would stand unless successfully challenged in a separate action, brought at a future date, and alleging a different constitutional violation altogether. Accordingly, I conclude that his claim is cognizable under Section 1983 for purposes of preliminary review.

Section 1983 permits a claim seeking post-conviction access to evidence for DNA testing.

McKithen v. Richard Brown, District Attorney, County of Queens, New York · filed 2007-03-13

We today join the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and district courts in the First and Third Circuits, agreeing with them that a claim seeking post-conviction access to evidence for DNA testing may properly be brought as a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits a claim for access to biological evidence for DNA testing when the testing itself would not undermine the plaintiff’s conviction.

Breest v. AG · filed 2008-01-18

But neither this suit, nor further testing, implicates the validity of Breest's criminal conviction. See Heck v. H u m p h r e y , 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to assert a due process claim for post-conviction access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence without a pending habeas petition.

Osborne v. District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District · filed 2008-04-02

Faced now with the argument that Thomas should be limited to cases with ongoing habeas petitions, we reject that view and hold that Osborne is entitled to assert in this § 1983 action the due process right to post-conviction access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence that we recognized in Thomas.

A § 1983 claim seeking post-conviction access to DNA evidence accrues when the state first denies the request for access.

Wade v. Brady · filed 2009-04-30

As explained below, the most sensible approach to the statute of limitations is to view the first denial of a request for access to evidence — whether by the prosecutor or the court — as the triggering date for accrual.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek access to evidence for postconviction DNA testing without being barred by Heck.

Grier v. Klem · filed 2010-01-12

We re-emphasize that our holding in this case is narrow and we decide only that a party can use a § 1983 claim to request access to evidence for postconviction DNA testing.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek access to evidence for DNA testing, but success on that claim does not itself justify a stay of execution.

Durr v. Cordray · filed 2010-04-18

Based on the foregoing, we hold that Durr has stated claims that are cognizable under § 1983 but conclude that even if Durr were to succeed on those claims, such success would not entitled him to a stay of his execution.

Section 1983 permits a post-conviction claim for access to evidence when success would not necessarily invalidate the conviction or sentence.

Caswell v. Green · filed 2011-06-08

Since Caswell’s suit, if successful, would not necessarily invalidate his conviction or sentence, it is not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek access to evidence for post-conviction DNA testing through a procedural due process claim.

Harris v. Lykos · filed 2013-03-27

Under Skinner, that conclusion is incorrect, and the district court should have determined whether the postconviction relief procedures as applied in Harris’s case were “fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights provided.” Osborne, 557 U.S. at 69. Because the district court erred in dismissing sua sponte Harris’s § 1983 complaint seeking DNA testing for failure ... to state a claim without first giving him an opportunity to amend his complaint to state his best case, the district court’s dismissal is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

An association lacks standing to seek compensatory damages under § 1983 for individualized harms to its members when obtaining that relief requires their participation.

White Plains Downtown District Management Ass'n v. Spano · filed 2007-02-23

The court notes that while BID did state that property values have decreased, such is an individualized harm, such that individual member participation would be required to obtain compensatory damages under 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an organization to sue on behalf of its members when the members could sue themselves, the claim relates to the organization’s purpose, and individual participation is unnecessary.

Church of Scientology of California v. Cazares · filed 1981-03-09

An association has representational standing when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.

Section 1983 permits an organization to pursue claims on behalf of its injured members.

American Civil Liberties Union v. Tarek Ibn Ziyad Academy · filed 2011-04-20

Further, under Eighth Circuit law, Plaintiff may pursue its § 1983 claims on behalf of its members.

An association may sue under § 1983 on its own behalf when it shows an injury to itself, including resources it must divert because of the challenged action.

American Federation of State County & Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Council 79 v. Scott · filed 2012-04-26

The Eleventh Circuit recognizes two theories under which an association has standing to sue under § 1983: “(1) to protect the rights of its members and (2) to protect its own rights as a corporate institution.” ... The Court is persuaded that the Union has satisfied the injury in fact requirement as expressed above in Browning and Common Cause/Georgia.

Section 1983 precludes organizations from suing on behalf of their members through associational standing.

Young Advocates for Fair Educ. v. Cuomo · filed 2019-01-16

Although organizations may also sue on behalf of their members based on a theory of 'associational standing', ... the Second Circuit has interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to preclude associational standing in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not allow an organization to assert its members’ personal rights on their behalf.

Rodriguez v. Winski · filed 2020-03-12

Accordingly, NPPA cannot assert on behalf of its members any claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an association to sue as the representative of its members.

National Rifle Association of America v. Cuomo · filed 2020-08-14

Because the law of the Second Circuit is that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an association cannot bring an action as the representative of its members, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not adequately pled associational standing.

Section 1983 permits a race discrimination claim based on unequal pay to proceed alongside an FLSA claim when it asserts an independent constitutional right.

Jeter v. Montgomery County · filed 2007-03-19

The court holds that a § 1983 claim asserting race discrimination in pay may be pursued along side an FLSA claim and thus that Jeter’s § 1983 claim is not preempted or precluded by the FLSA.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment claim even when the plaintiff also pursues claims under federal wiretapping law.

Walden v. City of Providence · filed 2007-07-06

But this Court does not read Adams and the cases it relies upon to stand for the broad proposition that § 1983 claims based on alleged Fourth Amendment violations are somehow preempted by Title III.

Section 1983 does not authorize a state court to entertain a challenge to a tax when taxpayers have an adequate legal remedy.

District of Columbia v. Craig · filed 2007-07-19

As already discussed, the administrative appeal/tax refund suit process established by D.C.Code §§ 47-825.01(f-l) and (j-1) afforded property owners an adequate remedy for challenging their tax year 2002 assessments. Accordingly, the Tax Division was required to refrain from entertaining the class-action petitions under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims challenging state tax systems are subject to abstention when plain, adequate, and complete state remedies are available.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. State of Arizona · filed 1983-03-18

While Fair Assessment requires this Court to abstain from considering the § 1983 and state law claims of Southern Pacific, other authority requires that this Court not abstain from hearing the 4-R Act claims because, in light of the 4-R Act and its legislative history, the state law remedies are not plain, adequate and complete.

Section 1983 claims challenging state tax collections in state court may be foreclosed when an exclusive statutory remedy is plain, speedy and efficient.

Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority · filed 1985-04-16

In a § 1983 suit seeking relief from the collection of state taxes, we may impose limitations that, like those of § 1341, inquire into whether the claimants have been afforded a statutory remedy that is “plain, speedy and efficient.”

Section 1983 challenges to state tax systems are barred in federal court when an adequate state court remedy is available.

Hill v. Carpenter · filed 2009-04-22

Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that “taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts” so long as “plain, adequate, and complete” remedies are available in state court. ... Hill’s challenge to Lycoming County’s tax reassessment thus fails for want of subject matter jurisdiction and was dismissed properly by the District Court.

Section 1983 claims challenging the validity of state tax systems are barred in federal court by comity when plain, adequate, and complete state remedies are available.

Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary · filed 1981-12-01

Therefore, despite the ready access to federal courts provided by Monroe and its progeny, we hold that taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts.

The availability of a § 1983 action in state court supports federal court abstention from a challenge to state tax administration under the comity doctrine.

Chippewa Trading Co. v. Cox · filed 2004-04-19

The availability of a § 1983 action in state court significantly supports federal court abstention under the comity doctrine.

Section 1983 generally does not provide an action challenging a state tax assessment when the state offers an adequate legal remedy.

General Motors Corp. v. City of Linden · filed 1996-02-29

As we read it, National Private Truck states that a violation of the United States Constitution arising out of an assessment of a state tax generally will not give rise to a section 1983 action when the state has provided an adequate legal remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for a challenge to state tax collection that effectively seeks a tax refund; comity bars the suit.

Wright, James A. v. Pappas, Maria · filed 2001-07-05

The suit thus is governed by Fair Assessment, and it does not fall within the possible exception for "facial challenges."

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a due process challenge to a state tax when an adequate state remedy is available.

McIlwain v. Oregon Department of Revenue · filed 2009-10-06

To the extent Mcllwain’s complaint alleged a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it too was barred by the principle of comity because Mcllwain had an adequate state remedy available to him.

Section 1983 does not permit a taxpayer to seek damages over state taxes when a plain, adequate, and complete remedy is available in state court.

Marshall v. Town of Middlefield · filed 2010-01-12

Similarly, the principle of comity prevents a taxpayer from seeking damages in a § 1983 action if a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had in state court.

Comity bars a federal § 1983 challenge to a state tax assessment when the state provides a plain, adequate, and complete remedy.

Cloverleaf Realty of New York, Inc. v. Town of Wawayanda · filed 2011-05-25

Although the TIA does not speak directly to damage actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[t]he Supreme Court has held that comity bars taxpayers from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts.” Bernard v. Village of Spring Valley, 30 F.3d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981)). ... Since New York did provide Cloverleaf with a “plain, adequate, and complete” remedy through Article 78 for challenging the special assessment, we conclude that the District Court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Cloverleaf’s action seeking to challenge the Town’s special assessment on properties owned by Cloverleaf.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim challenging a state tax in state court when an adequate state-law remedy is available.

Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. J. Ed Morgan · filed 2011-08-18

Accordingly, we find that adequate remedies under state law were available to all Appellants. Thus, the courts of this State should refrain from considering Section 1983 claims in tax cases, mooting Section 1988 claims for fees.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging state tax assessments are barred by comity when an adequate state court remedy is available.

Greenberg v. Town of Scarsdale · filed 2012-05-17

Similarly, the principle of comity prevents a taxpayer from seeking damages in a § 1983 action if a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had in state court.

Section 1983 does not permit a state court damages action challenging state tax collection when state law provides an adequate legal remedy.

J.P. Alexandre, LLC v. Egbuna · filed 2012-08-07

The defendants respond that § 12-422 provides an adequate legal remedy, and, therefore, the plaintiffs have no right to bring an action under § 1983 for these alleged injuries. We agree with the defendants.

Comity bars Section 1983 damages claims challenging state tax assessment or collection.

Pegross v. Oakland County Treasurer · filed 2014-11-18

The doctrine of comity, which is “more embracive than the TIA,” forbids suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought to remedy allegedly unconstitutional state tax assessment or collection.

Comity bars damages under Section 1983 for challenges to state taxes when state law provides an adequate remedy.

Wash. Trucking Ass'ns v. Emp't Sec. Dep't · filed 2017-04-27

The comity principle bars state courts from awarding damages under section 1983 in state tax cases when there is an adequate state law remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal court remedy for challenges to state or local tax administration when state remedies are plain, adequate, and complete.

Cosgriff v. County of Winnebago · filed 2017-12-01

Because the Cosgriffs challenge the administration of a local tax system under § 1983, their claims fall outside the scope of the statute, in accordance with Fair Assessment. The available state remedies are plain, adequate, and complete.

Section 1983 does not allow a taxpayer to seek damages contesting a state tax when state law provides an adequate and complete remedy.

Reno v. Newport Township · filed 2018-09-25

Plaintiff overlooks that a taxpayer may not contest the validity of a state tax in an action for damages pursuant to section 1983 if, as in the present case, state law offers an adequate and complete remedy.

Comity bars federal § 1983 challenges to state or local taxes when the state provides a plain, adequate, and complete remedy.

Perry v. Coles County, Illinois · filed 2018-10-11

Specifically, as relevant here, the comity doctrine bars tax- payers from asserting § 1983 claims against “the validity of state tax systems” via federal lawsuits.

Section 1983 does not provide a state-court claim challenging a state tax when an adequate remedy is available under state law.

Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. Morgan · filed 2013-04-04

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court firmly established that the constitutionality of a state tax may not be challenged under Section 1983 in state court if an adequate remedy is available under state law — as stated in Fondren and overruled in Burrell.

Section 1983 does not provide declaratory, injunctive, or monetary relief to challenge a state tax when state law provides an adequate remedy.

S. Brown III, natural person, as Joint Tenant Trustee with the right of survivorship v. PA Department of Revenue · filed 2015-12-23

Thus, both the U.S. and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts hold that neither federal nor state courts may entertain Section 1983 claims for declaratory, injunctive, or monetary relief where the state provides an adequate legal remedy.

Comity bars § 1983 actions challenging the validity of state tax systems in federal court.

Kane v. New Ipswich , et al. · filed 2016-08-04

In addition, “taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts.”

Section 1983 claims challenging state tax collection cannot proceed in federal court under principles of comity when the taxpayer has an adequate opportunity to be heard in state court.

SILVERBERG v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-01-08

Under longstanding principles of comity, we cannot consider Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and must defer to the State Case, in which Plaintiff has had and continues to have an opportunity to be heard.

Comity bars a Section 1983 damages claim challenging a municipal tax in federal court when the state provides a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.

Buckle Up Festival, LLC v. Cincinnati City of · filed 2020-01-21

In addition, the Sixth Circuit has explained that “[t]he doctrine of comity, which is ‘more embracive than the TIA,’ forbids suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought to remedy allegedly unconstitutional state tax assessment or collection.” ... Therefore, this Court cannot consider Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory judgment and the request for compensatory damages against Defendants unless the State of Ohio offers no plain, speedy and efficient remedy. ... Accordingly, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction and must remand this case to state court.

Section 1983 damages suits challenging state or local taxes are barred in federal court by comity when a plain, adequate, and complete state-court remedy is available.

Tonina v. Berlin · filed 2020-06-26

Damages suits under Section 1983 challenging state and local taxes are barred by the comity doctrine, provided that there is a “plain, adequate, and complete” state-court remedy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify each defendant by name or an individual Doe designation.

Garcia v. Scott · filed 2020-12-14

To state a Section 1983 claim against an individual or entity, Garciamust specifically identify them, by name or Doe designation.

A Section 1983 complaint must identify each defendant by name or Doe designation.

Pierce v. Youngmen · filed 2020-11-17

To state a Section 1983 claim against an individual orentity, Pierce must specifically identify them, by name or Doe designation.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed against unnamed defendants; the plaintiff must identify a named defendant.

Stroughter v. Washoe County Jail Det. Staff · filed 2020-11-06

However, Plaintiff has not provided the names of the people who committed the allegedly unconstitutional acts, so I must dismiss this claim without prejudice and with leave to amend. A complaint cannot be served on unnamed defendants and a case may not proceed unless and until Plaintiff states a claim against a named defendant.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing unnamed individuals to describe the specific actions each one took, even if their names are not yet known.

Rutledge v. City of Carlsbad · filed 2020-10-26

Although Plaintiff need not necessarily have the name of the individual officer or nurse at this stage, he must describe the actions taken by the specific unnamed individual.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify each defendant by name or Doe designation.

Daniels v. Menard Correctional Center · filed 2020-06-17

To state a § 1983 claim against an individual or entity, Plaintiff must specifically identify them, by name or Doe designation.

A Section 1983 claim must identify each defendant by name or Doe designation.

Sims v. Wexford Medical · filed 2020-06-12

To state a Section 1983 claim against an individual or entity, Plaintiff must specifically identify them, by name or Doe designation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an unidentified Doe defendant to proceed at screening, but the plaintiff must identify the responsible person to continue the suit.

(PC) Bland v. Salazar · filed 2020-05-05

Accordingly, the Court is allowing a claim against a Doe Defendant at this time, but Plaintiff must identify that person in order to go forward with his lawsuit.

A Section 1983 complaint must identify defendants by name or Doe designation and allege their individual involvement in the violation.

Henneberg v. Vandalia Officials · filed 2020-04-06

To state a Section 1983 claim against an individual or entity, Plaintiff must specifically identify them, by name or Doe designation.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must identify each defendant by name or Doe designation.

Adams v. Holle · filed 2020-04-06

To state a Section 1983 claim against an individual or entity, Plaintiff must specifically identify them, by name or Doe designation.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to litigate the proper construction of school regulations.

Hammock Ex Rel. Hammock v. Keys · filed 2000-04-11

Most importantly, § 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to litigate the proper construction of school regulations.

State-law procedural requirements do not independently create a Section 1983 claim or enlarge the minimum procedures required by the federal Due Process Clause.

Jones v. Board of Education of Township High School District No. 211 · filed 1986-12-15

Any such state procedural requirements remain only that, not independently cognizable in a Section 1983 lawsuit.

A state-law defect in a tenured public employee’s termination does not create a Section 1983 claim when the employee received the federal due-process minimum of notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Westley v. Terrebonne Parish School Board · filed 1987-03-20

Moreover, even if the notice given had not complied with the Louisiana teacher tenure law, Mr. Westley still would not have had a complaint under § 1983. All that federal due process requires is that the teacher “be given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to termination.”

A prison directive that merely establishes a procedural framework and confers no substantive rights cannot support a § 1983 claim.

Gilmore v. Jeffes · filed 1987-04-14

This court has already determined that BC-ADM 203 merely establishes a procedural framework for prison personnel and does not confer any substantive rights upon prisoners. ... Thus, BC-ADM 203 cannot support plaintiffs § 1983 action.

A failure to follow a prison grievance procedure does not support a § 1983 claim because state prisons have no constitutional obligation to provide such a procedure.

Doans v. Nathan Rice, North Carolina Department of Correction · filed 1987-10-15

However, Sec. 1983 provides a remedy only for violation of a right secured by the Constitution or by federal law. Because inmate grievance procedures are not constitutionally required in state prison systems, the failure to follow grievance procedures does not give rise to a Sec. 1983 claim.

A federal court may not use § 1983 to order state prison officials to conform prisoner-classification decisions to state standards when no federal right is implicated.

Jones v. Connell · filed 1987-11-24

This intrusion into state affairs where no federal rights were implicated was unjustifiable.

Violation of a prison regulation's disciplinary-hearing deadline, without additional facts showing a constitutional deprivation, does not state a § 1983 due-process claim.

Carter v. Fairman · filed 1987-12-29

Complaint Count I alleges no additional facts that, if coupled with the asserted violation of Section 504.80(a), would suggest a due process violation. Count I must therefore be dismissed.

A procedural-due-process § 1983 claim based on property deprivation requires pleading and proof that state postdeprivation remedies are inadequate, but separate First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment claims require independent analysis.

Flagner v. Arko · filed 1988-01-11

Because the plaintiff clearly failed to plead or prove the inadequacy of Ohio postdeprivation remedies, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claim for violation of his procedural due process rights. ... However, the plaintiff's substantive due process claims under the first, fourth and eighth amendments must be separately analyzed as they involve issues distinct from plaintiff's procedural due process claim.

Violating prison procedural guidelines more stringent than constitutional due process does not itself state a § 1983 claim because those procedures do not create protected interests.

Wellons v. David Garraghty, Warden Capt. Collins Sgt. Hill C.P. Hawkes · filed 1988-01-14

Prison officials may establish procedural guidelines more stringent than those required by the Due Process Clause, but such procedural guidelines do not create protected due process interests.

A § 1983 plaintiff may sue an unidentified defendant only if a good-faith investigation failed to identify the defendant and discovery is reasonably likely to reveal the identity.

Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez · filed 2013-03-22

At any rate, a plaintiff may prosecute a section 1983 claim against an unidentified party only if she can show that "a good-faith investigation has failed to reveal the identity of the relevant defendant and there is a reasonable likelihood that discovery will provide that information." Martínez-Rivera v. Sánchez Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). The plaintiffs have not alleged facts plausibly showing compliance with these prerequisites.

A Section 1983 plaintiff may initially use an unnamed defendant when discovery is likely to reveal that defendant’s identity.

Dr. Steve A. Morris v. Warden · filed 2016-01-14

Second, although Mr. Morris failed to provide the names of the various individuals working at the prison who pepper-sprayed and beat him, we have allowed the initial use of an unnamed defendant where discovery would likely uncover that defendant’s identity.

Section 1983 does not permit a liability finding or damages judgment against unidentified John Doe defendants.

Vinson v. Butcher · filed 2020-11-18

In summary, we conclude that in a claim filed pursuant to United States Code title 42, section 1983, a plaintiff cannot obtain a finding of liability or receive a judgment for damages against a John Doe defendant.

A federal court should not abstain from a Section 1983 damages action arising from a state judicial proceeding to which the state is not a party unless extraordinary circumstances exist.

Carras v. Williams · filed 1986-12-15

Accordingly, we conclude that a federal court should not abstain from a case seeking monetary relief when the suit arises from a state judicial proceeding to which the state is not a party absent extraordinary circumstances.

A § 1983 complaint that does not specify the capacity in which a public official is sued is treated as asserting only an official-capacity claim.

Cole v. Balivia · filed 2020-08-07

If a plaintiff’s complaint is silent about the capacity in which the defendant is being sued, however, the complaint is interpreted as including only official capacity claims.

A § 1983 plaintiff must specify whether each defendant is sued in an official capacity, an individual capacity, or both.

Issac v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2019-11-19

Plaintiff must specify whether he intends to sue each defendant in an official capacity, an individual capacity, or both.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to expressly plead that defendants are sued in their individual capacities; courts determine capacity from the claims, relief sought, and course of proceedings.

Edwards v. Ashley · filed 1995-11-03

Under Biggs, when a plaintiff fails to specifically allege capacity, courts "must examine the nature of the plaintiff's claims, the relief sought, and the course of proceedings to determine whether a state official is being sued in a personal capacity." Id., slip op. at 7. ... Finally, although we note that the Defendants did not assert qualified immunity as a defense to Edwards' federal constitutional claims, we find that overall the factors in this case demonstrated Edwards' intent to sue the Defendants in their individual capacities.

When a Section 1983 complaint does not specify a state official’s capacity, the court presumes the official is sued in a personal capacity.

United States Ex Rel. McVey v. Board of Regents of the University of California · filed 2001-03-14

When a Section 1983 complaint is ambiguous as to the capacity in which a state official is being sued, as is the case here, the court presumes that he is being sued in his personal capacity.

A § 1983 claim may be treated as a personal-capacity claim even when the plaintiff does not expressly identify the individual defendants’ capacity, if the course of proceedings supports that reading.

Cherry Creek Aviation, Inc. v. City of Steamboat Springs · filed 1998-04-16

We note at the outset that Cherry Creek failed to designate in which capacity the individual defendants were being sued. However, Cherry Creek has not disputed the City’s characterization that the individuals were being sued in their personal, rather than official, capacity. - Thus, consistent therewith, we conclude that Cherry Creek pursued claims against the individual defendants under § 1983 in their personal capacities.

A § 1983 claim in Colorado state court is not necessarily dismissed for failing to specify whether an official is sued personally or officially; the court determines capacity from the claims, requested relief, and course of proceedings.

Nieto v. State · filed 1998-03-23

We conclude the preferable approach, at least in actions in our state courts, is that taken by the majority of the federal circuit courts: If, as here, the complaint does not expressly identify the capacity in which a state officer is being sued, the failure to do so does not necessarily require dismissal of a § 1983 claim. Rather, in such circumstances, a court must then look to the substance of the claims, the relief sought, and the course of the proceedings to determine whether an individual defendant is sued in a personal or official capacity.

Section 1983 permits an individual capacity damages claim against a government official whose allegedly unconstitutional act was within the scope of employment when no government law, policy or custom caused the act.

Ritchie v. Donnelly · filed 1991-10-29

As no government law, policy or custom played a part in the defendant’s alleged unconstitutional acts, the § 1983 claims in this case were individual capacity claims. That the defendant was acting within the scope of her employment does not undermine the validity of the plaintiff's § 1983 claims as individual capacity claims.

A § 1983 claim against a state official does not fail merely because the complaint omits an explicit designation of personal or official capacity.

Carrillo v. State · filed 1991-09-05

We decline to hold, however, that failure to allege specifically official or personal capacity will be the death knell of a section 1983 action or that an allegation of capacity, standing alone, is determinative of this issue.

A Section 1983 plaintiff has an affirmative duty to plead the capacity in which she sues state officials.

Musick v. John T. Wigginton Betty Kassulke, Warden C.O. Stilger Ann Smith Linda L. Dewitt Rosby L. Glover D. Dolle · filed 1990-10-17

Finally, Musick cannot avoid her affirmative duty to plead the capacity in which she sues the defendants, Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d at 593-94, by arguing that the district court should be required to lead her through each step of her pleadings.

A Section 1983 complaint seeks personal-capacity liability when it requests compensatory relief for specific unconstitutional acts by named state officials, even without expressly labeling the capacity.

Johnson v. Stuart Silvers, Dr. Blumberg, Leo Brown · filed 1986-12-17

He alleges specific instances of individual, constitutionally impermissible conduct by the named defendants. The better view, we conclude, is that Johnson sued the named defendants in their individual capacities as individuals acting under color of state law. ... This is all that is required in a personal capacity case.

Qualified immunity is available only in personal-capacity § 1983 suits, not official-capacity actions.

Lundgren v. Mcdaniel · filed 1987-04-13

Qualified immunity--the objective "good faith" defense--is available only in a personal capacity lawsuit, not in an official capacity action. ... Thus, the award of damages on the section 1983 count was against the deputies solely in their individual capacities and is not barred by the eleventh amendment.

Section 1983 permits a personal-capacity suit against a state official for a constitutional violation even when the official acted in accordance with state policy.

Malik v. Tanner · filed 1988-10-07

This Court does not read that language to mean that a state official acting in accordance with state policy can never be sued in his personal capacity under § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights.

A § 1983 damages claim against state officials must clearly state that they are sued in their personal capacities.

Gibbs v. Silas Norman, Dr. D. Rao, Dr. · filed 1990-03-12

Accordingly, Gibbs' request for counsel is hereby denied, and the dismissal of his claim for damages is affirmed because he did not state that he was suing the defendants in their personal capacities, rather than in their official capacities.

A § 1983 complaint seeking only monetary damages against state employees must allege that they are sued in their personal capacities.

Person v. Steve Norris Faye Barnes, Nurse Harper Mullins, Nurse Captain Saunders Cpl. Scott · filed 1990-06-06

Therefore, dismissal would also have been appropriate because Person failed to allege that the defendants were being sued personally rather than in their official capacities as state employees.

A § 1983 complaint against state officials need not expressly say they are sued personally; the course of proceedings can show the capacity in which they are sued.

Oliver Schools, Inc. v. Foley · filed 1991-04-12

The complaint's failure to specify that claims against state officials are asserted against them in their individual capacities does not justify an outright dismissal, for, as the Supreme Court has observed, "[i]n many cases," a complaint against public officials "will not clearly specify whether officials are sued personally, in their official capacity, or both," and only " '[t]he course of proceedings' ... will indicate the nature of the liability to be imposed." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469, 105 S.Ct. 873, 876, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985)).

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 against a state official must clearly plead that the official is sued in an individual capacity; failure to do so deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

Kirk v. Herbert Negendank, Dr., Health Services, Adrian Temporary Facility · filed 1992-04-01

As this court stated in Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591 (6th Cir.1989), "plaintiffs seeking damages under § 1983 [must] set forth clearly in their pleading that they are suing the state defendants in their individual capacity for damages, not simply in their capacity as state officials." 891 F.2d at 592. Because Kirk's pleadings do not satisfy this requirement, in that he did not specifically plead that he was suing Negendank in his individual capacity, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 acts with the Eleventh Amendment to deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits claims for injunctive relief and damages against officials in their personal capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Committee For The First Amendment v. Campbell · filed 1992-05-06

Claims for injunctive relief and damages against defendants in their personal capacities may proceed under § 1983; such claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Refusing to allow amendment of a § 1983 claim to sue correctional officers individually would be an abuse of discretion where the claims were already considered against them individually.

Cupples v. State · filed 1993-10-22

It would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have refused to allow Cupples to amend her petition to make her claim against the correctional officers individually, and it is apparent the claims were considered as against the three officers individually in the court’s ruling.

In the Sixth Circuit, state officials sued without a specified capacity are treated as official-capacity defendants and are not subject to monetary damages under § 1983.

Hitchcock v. Fowler · filed 1993-11-18

Furthermore, because Hitchcock did not specifically name the state defendants in their individual capacities, they are not subject to suit under Sec. 1983 for monetary damages.

In the Sixth Circuit, state officials sued without a specified capacity are treated as official-capacity defendants and are not subject to monetary damages under § 1983.

Grote v. Kenneth McGinnis John Prelesnik Lodain Hopkins the Resident Benefit Council · filed 1993-11-19

Because Grote did not state in what capacity he was suing the individual state defendants, the state defendants are considered as being sued in their official capacities. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989). Therefore, they are not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

In the Sixth Circuit, a § 1983 complaint that fails to specify individual-capacity claims against state prison officials does not permit recovery of monetary damages.

Howell v. Robert Brown, Jr. David Haskell, Warden · filed 1993-12-08

Howell did not state in what capacity he was suing the defendants nor did he state how the defendants were personally responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivations. ... Upon review, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted for the defendants. Howell is not entitled to monetary damages. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 & n. 10 (1989).

In a § 1983 damages action, a later pleading can give state officials sufficient notice that they are sued in their individual capacities even if the complaint does not specify capacity.

Pelfrey v. Sean Chambers Larry Closser, Correction Officers, Individually and in Their Official Capacities · filed 1995-01-05

Although Mr. Pelfrey’s complaint did not specify whether the defendants were being sued in their individual or official capacities, one month after the complaint was filed, Mr. Pelfrey filed a motion to bar the Ohio Attorney General from representing the defendants. In his motion, Mr. Pelfrey specifically stated that the defendants acted outside the scope of their employment and in bad faith when they cut his hair. Based on this pleading, we believe that defendants were given sufficient notice of the fact that they were being sued in their individual capacity.

Section 1983 claims against government officials in their individual capacities must plead specific, nonconclusory facts identifying the actions of each official.

Harris v. District Board of Trustees of Polk Community College · filed 1997-11-13

In sum, Plaintiffs do not identify the specific actions taken by specific individuals. These facts are vital to Plaintiffs’ claims and must be specifically alleged in a nonconelusory fashion. ... Since the heightened pleading standard is not met, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted as to the section 1983 claims against Defendants Shattler and Buckley.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege whether officials are sued in their individual capacities for damages or as representatives of a government entity.

Dean v. Campbell · filed 1998-09-02

Indeed to come within the purview of a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must allege, among other things, whether it is suing the defendants in their individual capacity for damages or as representatives of the governmental entity, keeping in mind the governmental immunity contemplated in our statutes.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must expressly state that a public official is sued in an individual capacity; otherwise, the suit is treated as an official-capacity suit.

Lawrence Johnson etc v. Outboard Marine · filed 1999-03-26

Because section 1983 liability exposes public servants to civil liability and damages, we have held that only an express statement that they are being sued in their individual capacity will suffice to give proper notice to the defendants.

In a § 1983 claim against a local official, whether the official implemented municipal policy or acted independently determines the available immunity, punitive damages, and ultimate liability.

DiPino v. Davis · filed 1999-05-11

For purposes of the § 1983 claim, the court must determine from the evidence whether Officer DiPino was, in fact, implementing the policy or custom of the City when she caused the arrest of Davis, or whether she was acting on her own and not in conformance with City policy or custom. That, in turn, will determine whether any immunity is available, whether punitive damages are recoverable, and who bears the ultimate liability.

A § 1983 complaint can give officers sufficient notice of individual-capacity claims through allegations that they acted for themselves and with malice, together with analogous individual-capacity state claims.

Moore v. City of Harriman · filed 2000-07-06

Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in granting the Officers' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss any claims in their individual capacities, where Plaintiff made references in his complaint as to the Officers acting "for themselves" and as well as in their official capacities; where Plaintiff made reference to the Officers acting with malice; and where the Officers were required to defend themselves individually against the analogous state law tort claims, thereby providing the Officers notice to defend on the federal § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 plaintiff may pursue an individual-capacity claim without expressly pleading that capacity if the defendants receive adequate notice of the plaintiff’s intent.

Coleman v. Parra · filed 2000-11-03

After reviewing the foregoing case law, the Court concludes that Deardurff and Price received adequate notice of Coleman’s intent to pursue an individual capacity § 1983 claim against them, despite his failure to plead such a claim expressly.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking to sue a public employee individually must state that capacity unambiguously in the complaint.

Lopez-Buric v. Notch · filed 2001-04-25

In conclusion, the extensive caselaw in this circuit on this issue is sufficiently clear to inform plaintiffs that if they wish to sue § 1983 defendants in their individual capacity, they must include unambiguous language noting that fact in their complaint.

Section 1983 plaintiffs must give defendants clear notice that they seek individual liability; when the complaint does not expressly state capacity, courts may look to the course of proceedings for that notice.

Moore v. City of Harriman · filed 2001-11-08

When a § 1983 plaintiff fails to affirmatively plead capacity in the complaint, we then look to the course of proceedings to determine whether Wells’s first concern about notice has been satisfied.

A § 1983 plaintiff must clearly notify defendants of an intent to seek individual liability; the court may examine the course of proceedings to determine whether they received notice.

Moore v. City of Harriman · filed 2001-11-08

In conclusion, we reaffirm Wells's requirement that § 1983 plaintiffs must clearly notify any defendants of their intent to seek individual liability, and we clarify that reviewing the course of proceedings is the most appropriate way to determine whether such notice has been given and received, as demonstrated by our decisions in Pelfrey and Abdur-Rahman.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not expressly state that an official is sued in an individual capacity when the pleadings clearly notify the official of potential individual liability.

Leonard v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services · filed 2002-07-29

In this case, there is no doubt but that Wagner was on notice that he was being sued in his individual capacity and the district court was on notice about the basis for its jurisdiction. Because the district court erred in refusing to read Leonard’s § 1983 claim against Wagner as one against him in his individual capacity, we must vacate this part of the court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

A § 1983 complaint can show an intent to sue officials personally through its demand for punitive damages and the relief it seeks, even if it does not expressly identify their capacity.

Mantz v. Chain · filed 2002-12-30

In the instant case, while the complaint fails to specify the capacity in which Defendants Chain and Shallcross are being sued, Mantz’s § 1983 claims have, since the filing of his original complaint, included a demand for punitive or exemplary damages — a form of relief available only in personal capacity suits. ... Thus, the complaint, when read with the sort of flexibility encouraged by the Court of Appeals, clearly evinces an intent to hold Chain and Shall-cross personally liable for their actions.

Section 1983 plaintiffs must clearly notify defendants when seeking individual-capacity liability; otherwise, the defendants are treated as sued only in their official capacities.

United States Ex Rel. Diop v. Wayne County Community College District · filed 2003-01-31

Absent a clear notification that defendants are being sued in their individual capacities, courts must assume that they are being sued in their official capacities, only. ... Reviewing the course of proceedings in the instant action, the Court finds that no clear indication has been given that Defendants here are being sued in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits suits against individuals in their personal capacities.

Hodge v. City of Long Beach · filed 2003-02-24

Finally, Defendants’ argument that the individually-named defendants possess qualified immunity is also unavailing, as individuals may be sued in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq.

Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking damages from state officials must clearly plead that they sue them in their individual capacities.

Davidson v. Quenton White · filed 2006-01-12

Plaintiffs seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must set forth clearly in their pleadings that they are suing state defendants for damages in their individual capacities and not simply in their capacity as state officials.

In a pro se § 1983 suit, identifying a defendant by official title alone does not establish that the defendant was sued only in an official capacity.

Alston v. Debruyn · filed 1994-01-05

The Indiana Attorney General suggests that the defendants were sued only in their official capacities because they were listed by name and title and were described by position. While the mere reference to a defendant by his or her official title is not dispositive of the type of suit brought by a pro se plaintiff, Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir.1991), a determination that this was an official capacity suit would not preclude Alston from obtaining relief, for the Eleventh Amendment would shield the defendants from Alston’s claim for damages but not from his claim for an injunction.

A § 1983 complaint must clearly state that a public official is sued in an individual capacity; ambiguous allegations do not suffice.

Baker v. Chisom · filed 2007-08-28

In these circumstances, we agree with the district court that Baker’s first complaint did not include the requisite clear statement that Chisom and Bruner were being sued in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits a personal-capacity suit against an official when the plaintiff seeks to hold that official personally liable.

County Board v. U.S. Department of Transportation · filed 2010-04-15

A suit under § 1983 may be brought against an official in his personal capacity where it seeks to hold the official personally liable.

Section 1983 permits a personal-capacity suit against an official when the claim seeks to hold that official personally liable.

County Board of Arlington Virginia v. United States Department of Transportation · filed 2010-04-15

A suit under § 1983 may be brought against an official in his personal capacity where it seeks to hold the official personally liable.

Section 1983 permits a personal-capacity claim against an officer when the complaint and course of proceedings adequately notify him that he faces personal liability.

Odom v. Matteo · filed 2011-01-24

Therefore, based upon the totality of the complaint and the course of the proceedings, and “mindful that ... complaints must be viewed broadly in the context of civil rights actions,” ... the Court concludes that Maffeo was adequately on notice that he was being sued in his personal as well as official capacity. Summary judgment is denied as to Odom’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Maffeo in his personal capacity.

A § 1983 claim against a school official must be analyzed as a personal-capacity claim when the complaint seeks damages from the official individually and alleges action under color of law.

Luz Al-Rifai v. Willows Unified School District · filed 2012-03-01

Plaintiffs, in the § 1983 and state law portions of the Second Amended Complaint, request damages “against all Defendants in their individual capacities.” ... Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual Defendants were “personal capacity” claims and should have been analyzed as such by the district court.

Section 1983 permits a personal-capacity claim against an officer acting under color of state law; the officer’s government employment alone does not make it an official-capacity claim.

Williams ex rel. Williams v. Papi · filed 2014-07-03

It would, furthermore, transform every 1983 action into an official-capacity lawsuit, given that every personal-capacity suit must necessarily be against a defendant acting under color of state law — .e. a defendant who was acting for the government at the time in question — to even be cognizable under 1983 at all.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an individual wrongdoer in his personal capacity.

Ward v. Vogel · filed 2014-08-20

A claim under § 1983 is properly brought against the individual wrongdoer in his personal capacity.

Section 1983 permits a personal-capacity suit against a public official when the complaint expressly identifies that capacity.

Richmond v. Drew Adams, Melissa Pine, and John Doe 1 (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-11-20

As observed by the Defendants, we may look to the language of the caption of the case to determine whether a defendant is being sued in his or her personal or official capacity, or both. ... Richmond’s amended complaint, filed on February 2, 2018, clearly indicates that the Defendants are being sued in their “official and personal capacity”.

A § 1983 complaint can give sufficient notice of individual-capacity claims through the course of the proceedings even if it does not expressly identify the capacity in which defendants are sued.

Reed v. Mohr · filed 2019-10-15

The court concludes that the complaint provided the defendants with sufficient notice that they were named in their official and individual capacities. This conclusion is supported by the subsequent proceedings in the case.

A court may construe a § 1983 complaint as asserting individual-capacity claims despite its official-capacity wording when the claims and litigation context support that reading.

Rinne v. City of Beatrice · filed 2019-11-05

... I construe Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as also suing Defendants in their individual capacities.

A § 1983 complaint that does not specify the capacity in which an official is sued is treated as an official-capacity suit; a response to a motion does not supply notice of a personal-capacity claim.

Keating v. University of South Dakota · filed 2013-09-30

If the complaint is silent as to the capacity in which the individual is sued, an official capacity suit is assumed. ... A statement made in response to a motion is not sufficient notice of a personal capacity lawsuit. ... For these reasons, defendants Abbott, Engstrom, Dahlin, Moen, Heaton, Keller, and Governor Rounds are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Keating’s claims for monetary damages.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff who does not expressly and unambiguously plead that a public official is sued in an individual capacity is presumed to sue the official only in an official capacity.

Clark v. State of Minnesota Department of Public Safety and Driver and Vechicles Services · filed 2020-09-01

Clark is understood to be suing Defendants Dawn Olson, Andrea Fasbender, and Leigh, Agent 2860, only in their official capacities as employees of Driver and Vehicle Services. ... Though Clark does not expressly state in his complaint the capacity in which he is suing these defendants, he lists them as parties to the case using their official titles, see Compl. at 2, and describes actions taken by these defendants in their roles as employees of Driver and Vehicle Services, id. at 4–5. See Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (explaining that in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions “it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity” when a plaintiff does not “expressly and unambiguously” state in the pleadings that a public official is being sued in his or her individual capacity).

Section 1983 liability does not arise solely from a violation of prison regulations.

Watson v. Cain · filed 1993-05-04

Nonetheless, the mere fact that the conduct in question violates IDOC Rules does not per se form the basis of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not give a state prisoner a cause of action over the prison’s disregard of mess hall seating preferences.

Birch v. Vincent · filed 1974-01-04

It does not create a cause of action which inures to the bene ... fit of state prisoners who would challenge the institution’s disregard for their mess hall seating preferences.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against state actors for violating an individual right secured by a self-executing treaty.

Jogi, Tejpaul v. Voges, Tim · filed 2007-03-12

Nothing in either the Vienna Convention or any other source of law has been presented to us that would rebut this presumption, apart from the argument we have rejected that treaties do not enjoy the same status as statutes. We therefore conclude that Jogi is entitled to pursue his claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on interpreting the tribes’ treaty fishing rights to determine which fish are included in their allocation.

United States v. Washington · filed 1989-05-01

We reversed the fee award in Phase I because the Tribes’ treaty interpretation claims do not give rise to a claim cognizable under § 1983. ... Therefore Phase II cannot be characterized as a civil rights proceeding.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for tribes seeking interpretation of treaty-based fishing rights.

United States v. State Of Washington · filed 1989-05-01

In light of our reasoning in the Phase I fee reversal, the district court's reliance on the applicable treaties as U.S. law securing civil rights is in retrospect incorrect. We reversed the fee award in Phase I because the Tribes' treaty interpretation claims do not give rise to a claim cognizable under Sec. 1983. The judgment in Phase II included hatchery-raised fish in the allocable fish population. Summary judgment on this issue resulted from treaty interpretation and the award of fees in Phase II must therefore be reversed in accordance with United States v. Washington, 813 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.1987).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for state violations of federally secured Indian treaty rights, and an Indian tribe is an “other person” entitled to sue under the statute.

LAC COURTE OREILLES BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA IND. v. State of Wis. · filed 1987-06-23

In contrast, the claims made here by plaintiffs do encompass allegations that state officials have violated treaty-based rights. Plaintiffs’ claims pose an actual conflict between state law and federally secured rights and, under the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, give rise to an action under § 1983. ... I find and conclude that the plaintiff tribes are “other persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of established Indian treaty rights against a state, supporting an attorney’s fee award under section 1988.

United States v. State Of Washington · filed 1991-06-10

The tribes are entitled to section 1988 fees to enforce such well-defined treaty rights. ... By failing to distinguish between litigation defining and enforcing the tribes' treaty rights, the district court committed a clear error of law amounting to an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim that requires interpretation of an undefined treaty right.

Cree v. Waterbury · filed 1994-11-29

Suits based on the interpretation of treaty rights are not within the scope of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow individual tribal members to enforce communal treaty fishing rights.

Indian v. Tacoma Public Utilities · filed 2005-06-03

The Tribe’s treaty-based rights do not give rise to individual actions cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of individual rights secured by a self-executing treaty when the usual requirements for a § 1983 claim are met.

Jogi v. Voges · filed 2007-03-12

To read it as excluding protection for the subset of treaties that provide individual rights would be to relegate treaties to second-class citizenship, in direct conflict with the Constitution’s command. We conclude, therefore, that the fact that Jogi is asserting rights under a treaty does not in and of itself doom his case.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for rights under the Ute Treaty’s Bad Men Clause, which must be enforced through the Treaty’s own mechanism against the United States.

Jones v. Norton · filed 2015-12-29

Even though the Treaty can be read to grant individual rights to Ute members, the text is clear that those rights only arise directly against the United States, and must be enforced through the mechanism prescribed in the Treaty, rather than the general § 1983 remedy.