42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 relief is barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Ollie v. Brown · filed 2014-05-02

Here, the complaint seeks the sort of relief that is plainly barred by Heck because he sought § 1983 relief that would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction in the pending criminal action, but he had not demonstrated that his conviction has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for release from state confinement when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Carbajal v. Warner · filed 2014-05-21

As for the second option, to the extent Mr. Carbajal is seeking to be released from state confinement in this § 1983 action, he has no likelihood of success on the merits because his claim is barred by the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A § 1983 action is not barred under Heck when the plaintiff has not alleged an outstanding criminal conviction.

Serrano v. City of Long Beach · filed 2014-07-02

However, the action was not Heck-barred because Serrano did not allege that he had been convicted, and it was not clear from the allegations in the complaint whether his criminal proceedings were ongoing or had concluded.

A § 1983 claim must be dismissed if success on it would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Robinson v. Lamarque · filed 2014-07-02

The district court properly dismissed as Heck-barred Robinson’s excessive force claims stemming from the January 5, 2000 incident because success on Robinson’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state conviction for misdemeanor battery by a prisoner on a peace officer. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (section 1983 action that necessarily implies the invalidity of plaintiff’s conviction must be dismissed unless the conviction has been invalidated).

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when the plaintiff alleges that the underlying conviction has been reversed.

Ritter v. Marshowski · filed 2014-08-01

The district court erred in dismissing Ritter’s action under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), because Ritter’s action did not “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction[,]” as Ritter alleged facts showing that his conviction had been reversed.

Section 1983 permits a selective enforcement claim after a juvenile consent decree when there is no conviction to invalidate and the claim does not contest probable cause.

Muhammad ex rel. J.S. v. Abington Township Police Department · filed 2014-08-01

In sum: The Supreme Court has clearly held that Heck bars only those claims that would invalidate an existing conviction, and there is no conviction here. Furthermore, the reasoning of Gilíes (to the extent it remains good law) is limited to § 1983 claims that contest probable cause for an underlying criminal charge, which J.S.’ claim does not. For these reasons, I conclude that Heck does not bar J. S.’ selective enforcement claim.

A Section 1983 claim challenging a conviction may proceed under Heck when that conviction has been invalidated, even if the plaintiff was later convicted of a different offense.

McCain v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-10-06

In sum, the record is sufficient to raise a claim that Plaintiff's DWI charge was dismissed because the District lacked competent breath test evidence, and that such conviction has therefore been "invalidated" within the meaning of Heck.

Section 1983 bars a claim challenging the validity of a restitution fine unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Shaun Garland v. Cate · filed 2014-10-09

The district court properly dismissed as Heck-barred Garland’s claim challenging the validity of his restitution fine.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction.

Blumberg v. Hewitt · filed 2014-10-21

The district court properly dismissed Blumberg’s malicious prosecution claims as Heck-barred because a favorable judgment on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his guilty plea conviction for attempted murder.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when success would not undermine the validity of a guilty plea or conviction.

Rollins v. Willett · filed 2014-10-21

A finding that the defendant was illegally seized — the finding he seeks in this suit — would therefore have no relevance to the validity of his guilty plea and ensuing conviction.

A section 1983 damages claim is barred if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction, unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Williams v. County of San Bernardino CA4/2 · filed 2014-10-22

If a judgment for plaintiff on his section 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, Heck bars a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action until his conviction is overturned. ... Although plaintiff pled guilty to a lesser offense, a judgment in his favor on the civil rights claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction, which flowed from the arrest. The action was barred, and the court properly granted judgment on the pleadings as to the first cause of action.

A § 1983 damages claim is barred under Heck when success would implicitly call into question the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Lavergne v. Public Defender · filed 2014-10-24

It is disingenuous of Lavergne to attempt to carve out portions of the attorneys’ representation as exempt from the Heck bar. If the district court were to award him damages as to any of his claims, it would implicitly call into question the validity of his murder convictions.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would implicitly call into question the validity of the plaintiff’s convictions under Heck.

Lavergne v. Public Defender 15th Judicial District Court · filed 2014-10-24

If the district court were to award him damages as to any of these claims, it would implicitly call into question the validity of his convictions. ... The district court did not err in dismissing Lavergne’s Heck-barred claims with prejudice.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when success would not invalidate a conviction, sentence, or sanction affecting the length of confinement.

Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler · filed 2014-11-18

We have also held that application of Heck “turns solely on whether a successful § 1983 action would necessarily render invalid a conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction that affected the length of the prisoner’s confinement.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003). ... We conclude that Heck v. Humphrey did not require the challenged jury instruction.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Barren v. Kohn · filed 2014-12-04

The district court properly dismissed Counts I through VIII of Barren’s complaint as Heck-barred because success on the merits of his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, and Barren failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when granting relief would implicitly call into question the validity of a conviction.

Lavergne v. Bajat · filed 2015-01-26

Lavergne’s claims arise out of the Shunick and Pate murder prosecutions and guilty plea convictions, and they reflect Lavergne’s view that the prosecutions and his resulting guilty pleas were tainted. If the district court were to grant Lavergne relief as to any of these claims, it would implicitly call into question the validity of his convictions.

A § 1983 claim challenging an unlawful search is not barred by Heck when success would not necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction.

Covey v. Assessor of Ohio County · filed 2015-01-26

We have imposed two requirements for Heck to bar a § 1983 or Bivens claim. ... To the extent Mr. Covey’s claims challenge the defendants’ searches of his home and curtilage, we conclude that they do not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and thus are not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim when success would call the validity of the plaintiff’s convictions into question.

Lavergne v. Sheriff's Office Acadia Parish · filed 2015-01-26

Even if his claims were not time barred, Lavergne cannot overcome the Heck bar. Lavergne’s claims arise out of the Shunick and Pate murder prosecutions, and they reflect his view that the prosecutions and his resulting guilty pleas were tainted. If the district court were to award Lavergne damages as to any of these claims, it would implicitly call into question the validity of his convictions.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging parole decisions or otherwise necessarily demonstrating the invalidity of the duration of confinement.

Sanchez v. Baker · filed 2015-01-30

To the extent that Sanchez’s action challenges prior parole suitability decisions or would otherwise necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of his confinement, it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s conviction or sentence.

Conkleton v. Raemisch · filed 2015-02-26

Under Heck, a prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred “if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would imply the invalidity of an uninvalidated conviction.

Payton v. Normand · filed 2015-04-08

For the reasons explained by the district court, we hold that her § 1983 claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck when success on them would call into question the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Chande v. Moore · filed 2015-06-09

Because a showing that there was no probable cause for the challenged entry, search, seizure, and arrest would call into question the validity of Chande’s resulting conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone, the district court correctly determined that Chande’s claims were barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction until the conviction has been reversed or otherwise called into question.

Ryals v. Attorney General of Texas · filed 2015-06-26

Thus, his claims are barred by Heck and are not cognizable in a § 1983 action until the Heck condition is satisfied.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily invalidate a disciplinary conviction and lost time credits unless they have already been invalidated.

Thompson v. Hernandez · filed 2015-06-30

The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success in Thompson’s action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction and loss of time credits, and Thompson failed to allege facts sufficient to show their invalidation.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Dermendziev v. State of Washington · filed 2015-07-30

The district court properly dismissed as Heck-barred Counts 1 and 2 of Dermendziev’s complaint because success on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Dermendziev failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Middleton v. Vasquez · filed 2015-09-04

The district court properly dismissed as Heck-barred Middleton’s claims against the Santa Barbara County defendants because success on his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Middleton failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Lopez v. City of Phoenix · filed 2015-09-28

The district court properly dismissed Lopez’s action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Success on the merits of his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, and Lopez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that either has been invalidated.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole revocation when the requested relief would imply its invalidity and the revocation has not been invalidated.

Williams v. Barkley · filed 2015-09-30

Accordingly, he is precluded from attacking that decision through § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim is not barred by Heck v. Humphrey when the underlying conviction resulted only in a fine.

McCloud v. Jackson · filed 2015-09-30

We note, however, that this claim was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because the conviction only resulted in a fine.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim when success would imply that an outstanding conviction or sentence is invalid.

Lyall v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2015-12-04

We next consider Cortez’s argument that the district court erred in concluding that Heck v. Humphrey bars him from challenging his unreasonable seizure by the police under § 1983. We agree with the district court that the Heck bar applies.

Section 1983 does not allow claims for damages or declaratory relief that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or invalidated.

Rodriguez v. Salus · filed 2015-12-15

After considering the record below, we agree that Rodriguez’s claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action. ... To the extent that Rodriguez seeks damages and declaratory relief based on alleged constitutional violations related to his conviction, his claims are barred by Heck. Success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, which has not been overturned or invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been overturned.

Herrera v. Perry · filed 2015-12-16

The district court properly dismissed Herrera’s action for damages as Heck- barred because if successful, his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Herrera has not demonstrated that his conviction has been overturned.

A § 1983 action seeking access to postconviction DNA testing is not barred by Heck merely because the results might undermine the conviction.

Muhammad v. Green · filed 2016-02-10

Application of Skinner demonstrates that the dismissal of Muhammad’s § 1983 action on the basis of Heck was error.

A § 1983 action filed while criminal charges are pending may be dismissed after a conviction if the claims would call that conviction’s validity into question.

Wyatt v. Richwood Correctional Center · filed 2016-02-12

Where a plaintiff files a § 1983 action when a criminal proceeding is pending against him, the district court may dismiss the § 1983 action if he is later convicted and his claims call into question the validity of that conviction.

A § 1983 claim for unlawful detention can survive Heck when the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that a successful habeas petition invalidated the challenged imprisonment.

Jones v. Beasley · filed 2016-03-08

Because we accept the well-pleaded facts as true, and view them in the light most favorable to Mr. Jones, we find that the complaint sufficiently alleges that his term of imprisonment was invalidated with the successful granting of a habeas corpus petition by Judge Russell. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Therefore, even if Mr. Jones’ claim is decided in his favor, his allegations do not improperly call into question the validity of his conviction or sentence.

A § 1983 action is barred if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction that has not been invalidated.

Rodriguez v. City of Stockton · filed 2016-03-21

The district court properly dismissed Rodriguez’s action as Heck-barred because success in the action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction, and Rodriguez has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 permits civilly committed people to seek structural changes to their treatment and confinement when the requested relief would not invalidate their commitment.

Willis v. Palmer · filed 2016-03-30

Structural changes at CCUSO, which would provide better treatment or less punitive measures, would not invalidate the state court’s finding that these individuals were, at the time they were committed, dangerous sexpal offenders, or, at the time of their annual review(s), that they continued to pose a danger to society. ... For the reasons cited by Judge Frank, along with those discussed above, the plaintiffs’ claims are not Heck barred.

A § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck when the plaintiff could not practicably seek habeas relief because the criminal sentence imposed only a monetary fine.

Moravitz v. Anderson · filed 2016-04-11

Thus, irrespective of whether success necessarily implies the invalidity of Moravitz’s conviction or whether Moravitz demonstrates that his conviction has been invalidated, we conclude that Heck does not bar his § 1983 claim because Moravitz “could [not] have practicably sought habeas relief.” Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty., 777 F.3d 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2015); see Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999).

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner to maintain an action whose direct or indirect effect would invalidate the state sentence being served.

Curtis v. United States · filed 2010-04-27

Finally, Curtis’s claims are not Heck-barred. Heck bars monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting “that a state prisoner may not maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the direct or indirect effect of granting relief would be to invalidate the state sentence he is serving.”). Here, Curtis does not seek money damages and did not file a civil rights action. Thus, Heck is inapplicable.

Section 1983 does not permit a Brady damages claim unless the challenged conviction has been invalidated.

Johnson v. New York City Police Department · filed 2016-06-08

Thus, a Brady claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the challenged conviction has been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Glasgow v. Smith · filed 2016-06-22

Summary judgment on Glasgow’s action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) was proper because success on Glasgow’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Glasgow’s conviction or sentence, and Glasgow failed to show that either has been invalidated.

A § 1983 damages claim is not barred by Heck when success would not invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction.

Shultz v. Buchanan · filed 2016-07-19

Heck held that if judgment in a plaintiff’s favor in a § 1983 action for damages would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, then the claim is not cognizable unless the conviction or sentence previously has been set aside in another forum. Id. at 486-87. Success on Shultz’s Fourth Amendment claim, however, would not demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction for public intoxication. All of the conduct relating to the public intoxication offense necessarily occurred in public and before Buchanan’s entry into Shultz’s home. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-212. Shultz’s claim is thus not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to civil commitment when success would necessarily demonstrate that the commitment is invalid, unless the commitment has already been invalidated.

Ronje v. King · filed 2016-08-04

The district court properly dismissed Ronje’s action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success in Ronje’s action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his SVPA civil commitment, and Ronje failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his commitment under the 2009 protocol had been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim based on withheld or false trial evidence when the claim would call an outstanding conviction into question.

Villar v. FBI, et al. · filed 2016-08-15

Claims based on allowing false evidence to be used at trial and refusing to turn over exculpatory evidence would call the validity of Villar’s conviction into question, and are therefore barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would necessarily imply that a conviction is invalid, unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Geiger v. City of Chino · filed 2016-08-24

The district court properly concluded that Geiger’s action is Heck-barred because success on her claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of her infraction conviction, and she failed to allege that her conviction had been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Graves-Bey v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2016-09-21

The district court properly dismissed Graves-Bey’s claims for damages as Heck-barred because success on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence and Graves-Bey failed to allege facts demonstrating that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim is barred if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Whitmore v. Dort · filed 2016-11-21

To the extent that success on Whitmore’s due process claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, the district court properly concluded that Whitmore’s action is Heck-barred because Whitmore failed to allege facts demonstrating that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages that would call a conviction or sentence into question must show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Lovejoy v. Lewis · filed 2017-01-06

Because Lovejoy’s allegations — that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict, see United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 815 (3d Cir. 1996), and was therefore erroneously sentenced — necessarily challenge the legality of his conviction and sentence, he must demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated to proceed with this suit. He has failed to do so. Thus, the District Court properly dismissed his complaint under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Starr v. Oakland Police Department · filed 2017-01-26

The district court properly dismissed Starr’s action as Heck-barred because success on Starr’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, and Starr failed to allege that his conviction had been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a prison disciplinary due process claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction unless the disciplinary sentence has been invalidated.

Medina v. Morris · filed 2017-01-26

To the extent that success on Medina’s due process claim stemming from his 2008 disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction, Medina’s claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) because Medina failed to allege facts demonstrating that his disciplinary sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims seeking prospective injunctive relief are not barred by Heck when they do not seek to invalidate prior convictions.

Hendrick v. Caldwell · filed 2017-02-08

They do not seek to invalidate their previous state court convictions or interdiction proceedings. Instead, they seek prospective injunctive relief requiring the defendants to comply with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Such claims are not subject to dismissal under the Heck line of cases.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily call a conviction into question unless the conviction has been reversed or expunged.

Ennis Brown v. Hicks · filed 2017-02-22

But the district court correctly found his case Heck-barred. Brown seeks damages for constitutional violations—Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments—the success of which necessarily would call the validity of his conviction into question.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Rubino v. Hayes · filed 2017-03-01

The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Rubino’s action is Heck-barred because success on Rubino’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by Heck only when success would necessarily imply that an outstanding conviction or sentence is invalid.

Harvey v. USA · filed 2017-03-08

Thus, a § 1983 damages suit is due to be dismissed if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 excessive force claims are barred by Heck when the plaintiff’s allegations would necessarily imply that an outstanding conviction is invalid, until that conviction is reversed or invalidated.

Hall v. Abilene's Task Force · filed 2017-03-16

Thus, his excessive force claims are barred by Heck and subject to dismissal with prejudice until his conviction has been reversed or invalidated.

Section 1983 claims must be dismissed under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Lincoln Finley, Jr. v. Fischer · filed 2017-03-20

The district court properly dismissed Finley’s claims alleging a false arrest and detention without probable cause as Heck-barred because success on Finley’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, and Finley failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims are barred when a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Conlan v. King · filed 2017-03-22

In any event, and regardless of the district court’s limited application of Heck, we conclude that all of Conlan’s claims on appeal are barred by Heck.

A § 1983 damages claim is barred by Heck when it would imply that an existing criminal conviction is invalid.

Aurelio v. Mullin · filed 2017-04-04

Finally, to the extent Aurelio’s right-to-counsel claim implies the invalidity of his kidnapping and sexual-assault conviction by alleging that the “restrictions [on his confinement] adversely affected his ability to prepare a defense,” Aplt. App. at 23, the claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A Section 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary proceeding is barred unless the disciplinary sentence has been invalidated.

Holley v. Evans · filed 2017-04-19

To the extent that success on Holley’s due process claims stemming from his disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary proceeding, Holley’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Holley failed to allege facts demonstrating that his disciplinary sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest and imprisonment are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Cramer v. City of Auburn · filed 2017-04-24

The district court properly dismissed Cramer’s claims alleging false arrest and imprisonment as Heck-barred because success on Cramer’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Cramer failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of disciplinary proceedings, but a claim based on force used after the conduct underlying those proceedings may proceed.

Burgess v. Raya · filed 2017-04-26

However, to the extent that Burgess alleged that he was exposed to pepper spray for a prolonged period of time despite alerting defendants to his health issues, Heck does not bar Burgess’ claims.

Section 1983 permits a civil detainee to challenge the adequacy of mental-health treatment without invalidating the commitment; Heck does not bar that claim.

Schloss v. Wilczynski · filed 2017-05-26

Although we agree with the grant of summary judgment on this claim of deliberate indifference, we do not agree with the district court that Heck bars it. ... Schloss argues that if, as a state court has decided, he is a sexually violent person deserving mental-health treatment, the defendants are not providing him with constitutionally proper care. Heck does not bar such a claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner's challenge to continuing confinement when Heck bars the claim.

Frye v. State of California · filed 2017-05-31

The district court properly dismissed Frye’s action challenging his continuing confinement as barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 damages claims for detention before parole revocation are not barred by Heck when success would not invalidate the revocation or another judgment.

Joseph Flying Horse v. Hansen · filed 2017-06-23

However, to the extent Mr. Flying Horse sought damages for the time period from when the detainer expired, until when his parole was revoked, we conclude that Heck does not apply, because--as to that time period--a favorable judgment on his section 1983 claims would not render invalid his parole revocation or any other conviction, sentence, or judgment.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole denial when the challenge necessarily implicates the validity of the prisoner’s continuing confinement.

Rimer v. Sandoval · filed 2017-06-30

The district court properly dismissed Rimer’s claims challenging the denial of Rimer’s parole as Heck-barred. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (“[A] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We have no difficulty in concluding that a challenge to the procedures used in the denial of parole necessarily implicates the validity of the denial of parole, and, therefore, the prisoner’s continuing confinement.”).

Section 1983 bars a damages claim whose success would imply that an outstanding conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Holmes v. Pollock · filed 2017-08-10

A plaintiff in a § 1983 action may not recover damages for “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” unless he “prove[s] that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.

A Section 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Lewis v. Scully · filed 2017-08-15

The district court properly dismissed Lewis’s action as Heck-barred because success on Lewis’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Lewis failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated.

Section 1983 permits review of prison disciplinary proceedings unless that review could imply the invalidity of the inmate’s continued custody.

James v. Pfister · filed 2017-09-01

Heck and Edwards do not bar review of prison disciplinary proceedings under § 1983 unless that review could imply the invalidity of the plaintiffs continued custody.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a traffic stop or detention when success would not necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction.

Mordi v. Zeigler · filed 2017-09-05

The district court cut off this case at the screening stage, based on a finding that it could not properly proceed under section 1983. This was in error, and so we Reverse and Remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A § 1983 claim is not barred under Heck by a conviction already vacated through federal habeas review.

Blumberg v. Hewitt · filed 2017-09-06

Therefore, Blumberg’s § 1983 claims do not implicate the validity of that conviction, as it has already been “called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Heilbrun v. City of Portland · filed 2017-10-04

To the extent that Heilbrun alleged that he was wrongfully convicted of parole violations, the district court properly dismissed these claims as Heck-barred because success on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Heilbrun’s conviction and sentence.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Emanuel Finch, Sr. v. Graham · filed 2017-10-05

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Finch’s action on the basis that it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on Finch’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Finch’s conviction or sentence, and Finch failed to prove that either has been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Cunningham v. Leona Bates · filed 2017-10-30

Upon de novo review, see Montin v. Moore, 846 F.3d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 2017) (reviewing de novo a grant of a Rule 12(c) motion), we conclude that the district court properly determined that Cunningham’s claims for damages were barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (stating that if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated).

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Phillips v. Rietema · filed 2017-11-09

Dismissal of Phillips’s claims stemming from prior state criminal actions was proper because these claims are Heck-barred, as success on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Phillips has failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim challenging a conviction or sentence is barred by Heck unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Diaz v. Abbott · filed 2017-12-14

In his appellate brief, Medrano Diaz appears to argue that because his sentence in Cause Number 714137 was void and illegal, it should have been overturned on direct appeal or called into question during the habeas proceedings and he has therefore satisfied Heck. He is incorrect in that assertion. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would implicitly question the validity of a conviction or sentence.

Marrero v. Illinois · filed 2018-02-05

Seeking relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, appellant’s complaint asserts that the individuals who investigated and prosecuted him fabricated evidence. Because success in this “damages action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence,” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004), the district court properly dismissed these claims pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486, n.6, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); see also Skinner v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 584 F.3d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

A court may dismiss a Section 1983 unlawful arrest claim before trial when Heck v. Humphrey bars it.

Florence v. Garcia · filed 2018-02-21

Because the district court correctly dismissed Florence’s unlawful arrest claim as barred by Heck prior to trial, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion.

Section 1983 does not permit a traffic-stop claim when success would necessarily imply that an existing traffic conviction is invalid.

Thomas v. Miller · filed 2018-03-05

He has not done that, so the Court holds that the traffic-stop claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims barred by Heck remain barred when the plaintiff is not a prisoner; a motion to recuse the trial judge does not void the conviction.

Robert Clark, Jr. v. City of San Antonio · filed 2018-03-13

In his motion, Clark asserts that Heck does not apply because he is not a prisoner and because his conviction was void. He contends that his conviction was void because the state trial court judge was under a “motion for recusal.” Clark does not cite any legal authority suggesting that Heck only applies to prisoners and that a motion for recusal voids a conviction.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim despite an outstanding conviction when success on the claim would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Byrd v. Phoenix Police Department · filed 2018-03-16

Answering this question, we find that Heck does not bar Byrd’s § 1983 claims. Because Byrd’s conviction resulted from a plea agreement and Byrd alleged no facts in his complaint suggesting that the plea was not knowing and voluntary, success in the § 1983 action would not affect his conviction.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless it has been invalidated.

Riggs v. Sandie · filed 2018-03-22

The district court properly dismissed as Heck-barred Riggs’s claims based on double jeopardy, an invalid search that led to his conviction, and the invalidity of the state statute used to convict him, because success on his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence, and Riggs failed to show that his sentence has been invalidated.

A § 1983 damages claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been favorably terminated.

Bauer v. Glaser · filed 2018-03-29

Thus, because Bauer cannot show favorable termination of his underlying criminal conviction and because ruling for Bauer on his access to the courts claims would necessarily imply that his underlying state criminal conviction is invalid, Bauer’s present § 1983 claim seeking damages from Glaser is not cognizable.

A § 1983 suit is not barred by Heck when a factual allegation conflicts with an earlier punishment but is unnecessary to the suit’s success.

Dixon v. Pollock · filed 2018-04-23

When a plaintiff alleges a fact that, if true, would conflict with the earlier punishment, but that fact is not necessary to the success of his § 1983 suit, the Heck bar does not apply.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence is barred unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Espinoza v. Diaz · filed 2018-05-18

To the extent that success on Espinoza’s due process claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence, the district court properly concluded that Espinoza’s claim is Heck-barred because Espinoza failed to allege facts demonstrating that his sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims alleging errors in a state conviction may be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Blake v. Fish · filed 2018-05-21

As to the § 1983 claims, the court denied relief because the claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint to the extent it asserted § 1983 claims for the reasons stated by the district court.

A § 1983 excessive force claim is barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Immanuel Price v. Galiu · filed 2018-05-23

The district court properly dismissed as Heck-barred Price’s excessive force claim because success on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Price failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Meek v. Zopan · filed 2018-05-23

To the extent that Meek’s claims are not barred by Rooker–Feldman, the district court properly dismissed these claims as Heck-barred, as success on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Meek’s conviction, and Meek has failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated.

A court may not dismiss a § 1983 complaint on its own initiative under Heck without giving the plaintiff notice.

Topa v. Melendez · filed 2018-06-19

Whether because of lack of notice, or because the Heck-bar operates as a waivable defense, the district court erred by sua sponte dismissing Topa’s complaint.

A resisting-arrest conviction does not automatically bar Section 1983 unlawful-arrest or excessive-force claims under Heck.

Joseph Barton, Plaintiff v. Peter Favreau, Defendant · filed 2018-06-20

At his juncture - accepting the factual allegations in Barton’s complaint as true - the court cannot conclude as a matter of law, that his section 1983 unlawful arrest and excessive force claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 claims that would imply a conviction or related detention was wrongful are barred unless the conviction or detention has been invalidated.

Gaston v. Ogg · filed 2018-06-22

Because Gaston does not allege, much less show, that his detention and murder conviction have been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, Heck bars his claims.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence that has not been invalidated.

Torricellas v. Hughes · filed 2018-08-23

To the extent Torricellas contends that the disciplinary hearing resulted in a loss of good time credits that will affect the duration of her sentence, her claim is Heck-barred. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (barring § 1983 actions when judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence not otherwise invalidated).

Section 1983 damages claims that would undermine an uninvalidated conviction are barred by Heck, but claims based on dismissed citations and requests to enjoin future enforcement are not.

Martin v. City of Boise · filed 2018-09-04

Where there is no “conviction or sentence” that may be undermined by a grant of relief to the plaintiffs, the Heck doctrine has no application. ... In sum, we hold that the majority of the plaintiffs’ claims for retrospective relief are barred by Heck, but both Martin and Hawkes stated claims for damages to which Heck has no application. We further hold that Heck has no application to the plaintiffs’ requests for prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply that an outstanding conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been favorably terminated.

Ortiz v. New Jersey State Police · filed 2018-09-06

Ortiz’s claims that the defendants fabricated and suppressed evidence are barred by Heck because success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction.

Section 1983 bars retrospective relief under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

O'Callaghan v. City of Portland · filed 2018-09-06

O’Callaghan’s Fourth Amendment claim under section 1983, if successful, would necessarily rest on the invalidity of his March 2011 conviction. But O’Callaghan did not obtain a judgment invalidating that conviction before filing this lawsuit. His section 1983 claim for retrospective relief is therefore barred under Heck and its progeny.

Section 1983 claims challenging an arrest or prosecution are barred under Heck when success would undermine a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Parkins v. Nguyen · filed 2018-10-12

Plaintiffs § 1983 claims concerning the validity of his arrest and subsequent prosecution are barred by the Heck doctrine.

Section 1983 claims of false charges and malicious prosecution can be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Bartholomew v. Livingston · filed 2018-12-06

In addition, Bartholo- mew’s claims of false charges and malicious prosecution are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486−87 (1994).

Section 1983 claims remain subject to the Heck bar even when habeas relief is unavailable.

Donahue v. County of Dauphin · filed 2019-01-10

Whether habeas relief is available is not relevant here; Heck applies whether or not a claimant has recourse under the habeas statute.

Heck does not bar a Section 1983 claim challenging a civil contempt judgment when the plaintiff has no conviction or sentence.

Robert John White, Jr. v. Fulton County, Georgia · filed 2019-01-30

Although White is attempting to collaterally attack the Family Division’s judgements against him, without a conviction or sentence, Heck does not bar his suit against Fulton County.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s access-to-court claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s conviction or sentence.

Sampson v. Garrett · filed 2019-03-06

Heck blocks a state prisoner’s § 1983 claim if its success “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487.

Section 1983 does not permit a false arrest claim based on allegations that contradict an unvacated guilty plea.

Williams v. DuPage Metropolitan Enforcement Group · filed 2019-03-22

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Williams from proceeding with a lawsuit on a theory that contradicts his guilty plea.

A § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest cannot proceed when a ruling for the plaintiff would necessarily challenge a criminal conviction that remains valid.

Cutchin v. Dist. of Columbia · filed 2019-03-27

If this Court were to decide that Cutchin's detention and arrest were unlawful, its ruling necessarily would amount to a challenge to the legality of Cutchin's criminal conviction, which this Court cannot do.

Section 1983 generally does not permit damages claims that would undermine an existing conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated; the Heck doctrine does not bar claims based on dismissed citations or requests for prospective injunctive relief.

Martin v. City of Boise · filed 2019-04-01

In sum, we hold that the majority of the plaintiffs’ claims for retrospective relief are barred by Heck, but both Martin and Hawkes stated claims for damages to which Heck has no application. We further hold that Heck has no application to the plaintiffs’ requests for prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 excessive-force claims are not barred by Heck when success would affect neither the plaintiff’s convictions nor the duration of the sentence.

Bourne v. Gunnels · filed 2019-04-16

A ruling in Bourne’s favor on his excessive-force claims would not affect his underlying conviction, his disciplinary conviction, or the duration of his sentence. Accordingly, Heck and its progeny do not bar Bourne’s excessive-force claims.

Section 1983 does not permit claims whose success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of a prisoner’s confinement.

Starr v. United States · filed 2019-04-23

The district court properly dismissed Starr’s § 1983 claims as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on these claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, even if the plaintiff does not seek to invalidate it.

Mehdipour v. Denwalt-Hammond · filed 2019-05-14

This line of argument overlooks that Heck bars even those § 1983 claims that “necessarily imply the invalidity of [a] conviction.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). Actual invalidation is not required.

A § 1983 claim barred by an outstanding conviction must be dismissed rather than stayed while the plaintiff seeks to overturn the conviction.

Ali v. Cook County · filed 2019-05-29

The Court cannot ignore the clear command of Balisok that a Heck-barred claim “should be dismissed” because it is not cognizable.

A § 1983 damages claim is barred under Heck when success would imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Williams v. Taylor · filed 2019-06-04

Were he to receive a favorable ruling on this claim, it would implicitly invalidate his conviction under the logic of Valdez. ... And Williams has not shown that his conviction has been invalidated in any manner.

Section 1983 does not permit an unconstitutional-search claim that would undermine an outstanding conviction.

Taylor v. Russell · filed 2019-06-06

While Plaintiff does not argue that the district court erred in determining Heck v. Humphrey barred his unconstitutional search claims, we note the district court’s analysis on this issue was correct.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims that would call a conviction or sentence into question unless it has first been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Covarrubias v. The United States Distric Court for the Distric of Nebraska · filed 2019-06-10

Absent such a favorable disposition of the charges or conviction, a plaintiff may not use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to cast doubt on the legality of his conviction or confinement. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for relief are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to parole conditions when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of part of the plaintiff’s sentence, unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Toman v. Findley · filed 2019-06-28

Any successful challenge to this provision would necessarily imply the invalidity of a portion of Plaintiff’s sentence. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of the conditions of his parole is barred pursuant to Heck.

A § 1983 claim is barred by Heck when it challenges an underlying charge to which the plaintiff has pleaded guilty and for which he is serving a sentence.

Walker v. Jackson Police Department · filed 2019-07-10

Judge Ball concluded that Walker’s § 1983 claim is therefore Heck-barred and recommended that this case remain closed. ... Because the Court agrees with Judge Ball’s conclusion, it adopts the Report and Recommendation as its opinion.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim based on force used after the conduct underlying a conviction when the claim does not imply that the conviction is invalid.

Musselman v. Meelhuysen · filed 2019-07-16

Heck does not bar Plaintiff’s claims to the extent that he challenges allegedly excessive force that occurred after he assaulted Herrick.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Weeks v. Camuti · filed 2019-07-17

Thus, the bar of Heck requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s §1983 claim.

A Section 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would implicitly invalidate a criminal conviction that has not been set aside.

Matusiewicz v. Florence County Sheriff's Office · filed 2019-07-29

Here, as discussed by the Magistrate Judge, a favorable determination on the merits of Timothy’s § 1983 claim would implicitly invalidate his criminal conviction; accordingly, his claim is barred under Heck.

Section 1983 permits an unreasonable-seizure claim to proceed when its factual allegations do not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction is invalid.

Pineda v. Village of Cherry Valley · filed 2019-08-05

The court does not find these assertions sufficient to “spring” the Heck bar “back into existence.”

Section 1983 permits a retaliation claim consistent with the plaintiff’s conviction; Heck also does not bar the claim when the plaintiff was never eligible for habeas review.

Sevy v. Barach · filed 2019-08-05

In addition, Sevy could not seek habeas review after he pleaded no contest and paid a fine because he was never in custody and so was precluded from challenging his conviction by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, Heck does not bar his § 1983 claim for First Amendment retaliation.

A district court should stay a pretrial detainee’s § 1983 claims that may be barred by Heck until the pending criminal case is resolved.

Hopkins v. Ogg · filed 2019-08-08

Accordingly, the district court’s Heck ruling was premature, and the court should have stayed Hopkins’s § 1983 lawsuit until his pending criminal case was resolved.

Section 1983 claims barred by Heck cannot proceed while the underlying conviction remains valid.

Brown v. Nations · filed 2019-08-08

Although Brown filed what purported to be objections to the Report (ECF No. 58), he does not object to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Heck bars his claims. ... After a careful and thorough review of the record under the appropriate standards, as set forth above, the court finds no clear error and adopts the Report (ECF No. 56), which is incorporated herein by reference.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim is not barred by Heck when the plaintiff can prevail without necessarily invalidating a conviction for resisting arrest.

Cendan v. Officer Jose Trujillo · filed 2019-08-12

Because Cendan could prevail under § 1983 by proving that Appellants used gratuitous force against him after he had stopped resisting and been subdued, the Heck bar does not apply.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Almaguer v. County of Bexar · filed 2019-08-13

Notwithstanding Almaguer’s assertions to the contrary, success on Almaguer’s constitutional claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. ... There is no evidence that Almaguer’s conviction has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. ... As such, the district court’s dismissal of Almaguer’s claims against the defendants as barred by Heck does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim based on an allegedly unlawful conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Watkins v. Revak · filed 2019-08-23

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on an allegedly unlawful sentence, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless that conviction and/or sentence has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Johnson v. Angelina County D.A. Office · filed 2019-08-25

Furthermore, and contrary to plaintiff's belief, his claims as outlined above are barred by Heck. ... Success in this action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of plaintiff's confinement.

Section 1983 claims challenging a criminal conviction are barred by Heck unless the conviction has been invalidated or called into question.

Green v. Davis Director TDCJ-CID · filed 2019-08-27

To the extent that Plaintiff continues to challenge his underlying criminal conviction, the Court notes that his claims are still barred by Heck—as Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated or called into question.

Section 1983 claims barred by Heck v. Humphrey must be dismissed.

Rogers v. Ryan · filed 2019-08-30

Specifically, Magistrate Judge Grand concludes that several of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and must be dismissed. ... The Court has carefully reviewed the R&R and concurs with the conclusions reached by Magistrate Judge Grand. The Court therefore adopts the R&R.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been set aside by appeal, collateral relief, or pardon.

Patterson v. Baker · filed 2019-09-03

Heck holds that a plaintiff in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may not pursue a claim for relief that implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction, unless the conviction has been set aside by appeal, collateral relief, or pardon. Id. at 487. Accordingly, the Court properly implemented a Heck instruction to the jury.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by Heck when success would contradict the facts supporting a prison disciplinary sanction that revoked good-time credits; such claims must be dismissed without prejudice.

Foerderer v. Mathias · filed 2019-09-11

The DHO found that Foerderer — not Perkins — was the aggressor, which directly contradicts Foerderer’s claim before this Court that Perkins initiated the attack. See Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2011). As such, Heck bars Foerderer’s failure to protect claim.

A § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction is barred under Heck unless the conviction has been invalidated.

HARRIOT v. DOJ · filed 2019-09-12

Rather, Heck applies when a Plaintiff brings a § 1983 action alleging the unconstitutionality of his conviction or imprisonment and seeks monetary damages or injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Harmon v. Dunleavy · filed 2019-09-13

Heck precludes Mr. Harmon from proceeding with this Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging lost jail credit while Heck bars the challenge to custody under a court order.

Jordan, Robert v. Tegels, Lizzie · filed 2019-09-16

The court sees no basis to reconsider its decision that Heck bars him from pursuing a § 1983 claim at this time, and thus is denying his motion.

A § 1983 claim is barred by Heck when the requested relief would necessarily undermine a conviction that has not been overturned.

Reid v. Gaston County · filed 2019-09-17

Plaintiff is a current North Carolina inmate, he does not allege that his conviction has been overturned, and the relief that he seeks – damages and injunctive relief for false imprisonment – would necessarily undermine his convictions. His § 1983 claim is therefore barred by Heck and will be dismissed without prejudice as frivolous.

A Section 1983 excessive force claim is barred under Heck when a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction.

Johnson v. Cazes · filed 2019-09-20

This Court finds that a finding of liability on Johnson’s excessive force claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction for resisting arrest, and Johnson has failed to demonstrate any genuine issues of material fact on the issue of his having pled guilty to resisting. Thus, Johnson’s excessive force claim against Officers Chustz and Mims is barred as a matter of law by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate a conviction unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Zaitzeff v. City of Seattle · filed 2019-09-26

A ruling in this Court in plaintiff’s favor would necessarily invalidate his conviction. Plaintiff’s claim is therefore not cognizable under § 1983 and subject to dismissal under Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily undermine a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

BASKERVILLE v. STAPLETON · filed 2019-09-26

All of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims must therefore be dismissed without prejudice until such time as Plaintiff's conviction is overturned.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Ortiz v. Nogales, City of · filed 2019-09-27

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims cannot be cured by amendment, since the claims hinge on Ortiz’s innocence and thus are clearly Heck-barred.

A Section 1983 claim that would call into question the validity of a parole revocation or sentence is barred by Heck.

German v. Baker · filed 2005-02-23

Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing German’s complaint as barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Perry v. Holmes · filed 2005-11-02

“[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal or otherwise invalidated by official action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the validity of disciplinary cases when Heck v. Humphrey bars the claim.

Hines v. Popp · filed 2008-07-15

challenge to the validity of the disciplinary cases is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim despite a resisting-arrest conviction when the alleged force occurred after resistance ceased and success would not undermine the conviction.

Smith v. Harris · filed 2019-09-30

Smith’s conviction for resisting arrest may coexist with a finding that Cox and Harris’s actions and Boyce’s command to the K-9 were unprovoked and occurred independently of Smith’s previous resistance. Accordingly, Heck does not bar Smith’s claim against Cox, Harris, and Boyce for excessive force.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Aikens v. Putney · filed 2019-09-30

Because the Plaintiff has failed to allege that his underlying conviction has been vacated or otherwise invalidated, Heck v. Humphries, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), applies to bar Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily invalidate a conviction that has not been reversed or vacated.

Payne v. Corrigan · filed 2019-10-08

Because Plaintiff’s success on his civil rights claims in this case would necessarily invalidate the conviction, which is not alleged to have been reversed or vacated, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are not cognizable under Heck.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Green v. Hixson · filed 2019-10-09

Heck bars Plaintiff’s claims because success on them would necessarily imply the invalidity of his drug conviction and prison sentence, which have not been overturned or otherwise called into question.”

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply a revocation is invalid when the revocation has not been overturned.

Mays v. Johnson · filed 2019-10-10

Because the plaintiff does not allege that he has successfully appealed or otherwise succeeded in having his revocation overturned, his claim against Varone also is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would invalidate an outstanding conviction unless that conviction has first been invalidated.

Washington v. Oklahoma City City of · filed 2019-10-15

Under Heck, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Moving Defendants are precluded until his disturbing the peace conviction has been invalidated.

Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim when success would likely not invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction.

Rupert Stamps v. Capalupo · filed 2019-10-16

The Heck doctrine also does not bar the claim because, based on the abundance of evidence produced at trial, even if Stamps were successful in his § 1983 claim, the result likely would not render his conviction invalid.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction is barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Davis v. Suhr · filed 2019-10-16

Because his claims are barred by Heck, this case is dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to prison discipline under Heck when the sanctions do not affect the prisoner’s conviction or sentence duration.

Shaw v. Gillespie · filed 2019-10-17

Notably, Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing did not result in the loss of good-time credits or “threaten [any] consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence,” and therefore his § 1983 action is not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 bars a damages claim under Heck when success on the claim would undermine an outstanding criminal conviction; dismissal is without prejudice to refiling if the conviction is overturned.

Lewis v. Anne Arundel Police · filed 2019-10-23

If Lewis were to prevail on the civil claims raised, any judgment in his favor would be in direct conflict with the state court’s ruling that the search was lawful and did not violate his constitutional rights. This is precisely the type of claim that is barred by the holding in Heck and mandate dismissal of Lewis’s claims at this time. Dismissal of civil claims barred by Heck is without prejudice so that the civil litigation may be filed again if the underlying criminal conviction is later overturned.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when success would not imply that the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence is invalid.

Johnson v. OK-DOC Board of Corrections · filed 2019-10-23

In short, Defendants’ attempt to contort Johnson’s equal-protection claim into one that challenges the validity of his sentences wholly mischaracterizes that claim and offers no support for Defendants’ argument that Heck bars his claim.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck when the plaintiff's allegations necessarily imply that an outstanding conviction is invalid.

Merkel v. Waukesha County · filed 2019-10-28

In other words, a plaintiff can plead himself into a Heck bar by making allegations that necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. ... Merkel cannot proceed on his claims of excessive force and false arrest unless and until he successfully invalidates his conviction for assault of an officer.

Section 1983 claims challenging evidence in a criminal case are not cognizable under Heck until the case is dismissed or any resulting conviction is invalidated.

Turatiz v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dept. · filed 2019-10-30

Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are not cognizable under Heck until his criminal case is dismissed or if convicted, the conviction has been rendered invalid.