42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits money damages, while a prisoner must use habeas corpus to challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Collins v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2019-11-07

Furthermore, even if coram nobis was a valid basis for this action, Plaintiff cannot combine a request for money damages, which are permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a challenge to the fact or duration of his confinement, which is reserved for 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A pretrial detainee’s request for reduced bond and release is properly reviewed under § 2241 habeas corpus, even when filed on a § 1983 complaint form.

Bonds v. 22nd Judicial Circuit Courts · filed 2020-01-07

In the present action, petitioner filed his request for this Court’s intervention on a court- form for filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights cases. However, because petitioner does not seek money damages in this action, but rather a reduction in his bond amount and to be released while he is awaiting trial, the Court believes his action is better suited to one brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

A plaintiff cannot maintain a federal habeas claim and a § 1983 claim in the same action.

Williams v. Sanders · filed 2020-01-16

The plaintiff cannot maintain a federal habeas claim and a § 1983 claim in the same action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek restoration of revoked good conduct credits or bring a claim implying that the revocation was invalid unless the credits have been restored.

(PC) Rials v. Lozano · filed 2020-03-23

Any challenge to prisoner disciplinary proceedings which resulted in the revocation of good conduct sentence credit must be brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus and not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action unless the revoked sentence credit has been restored.

Section 1983 allows state prisoners to bring claims about confinement conditions and other civil wrongs by state officials, but a challenge to the validity or duration of confinement belongs in habeas corpus.

Husain v. Jennings · filed 2020-04-20

On the other hand, challenges to the conditions of confinement and other actions against state officials for civil wrongs may be presented in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy of immediate release from custody; a prisoner seeking only that relief must proceed through habeas corpus.

Llewellyn v. Wolcott · filed 2020-05-18

But he does not seek an order directing prison or state officials to improve or correct any alleged deficiencies in those conditions; he seeks only immediate release from physical custody. See id. Accordingly, Llewellyn’s claims fall “squarely within th[e] traditional scope of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek a shorter sentence or immediate release from custody; a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus.

MALLOY v. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY · filed 2020-05-21

As a threshold matter, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s challenge is not properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fundamentally, the relief Petitioner seeks in his state court motions and before this Court is a reduction of his sentence and immediate release on bail.

Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for a constitutional claim when success would neither alter the plaintiff’s sentence nor undo the conviction.

Appel v. Phillips · filed 2020-06-04

We disagree with the report only to the extent it suggests that Appel’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be more properly suited to a petition for habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek relief that would not imply release from custody, including reversal of removal from a treatment program.

Love v. Kemper · filed 2020-06-10

Furthermore, to the extent Love seeks relief that does not imply release from custody—for example, reversal of his allegedly improper termination from the SOTP—these are not properly the subject of a habeas petition, but an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to restore good-time credits when restoration would necessarily speed a prisoner’s release.

Marquez v. State of California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2020-07-01

Accordingly, this action should be brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a parole claim seeking earlier release; the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

Kabede v. California State Governor's Parole Board Hearing Department · filed 2020-07-21

To the extent that Plaintiff is challenging the denial of parole and seeks earlier release under either the elderly parole or medical parole programs, the appropriate avenue to obtain relief is not a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 is a proper vehicle for challenges to prison conditions, but a challenge seeking release from custody belongs in habeas corpus.

Willis 579987 v. Washington · filed 2020-07-28

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for challenges to prison conditions, but a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement belongs in habeas corpus.

Madison 503638 v. Rewerts · filed 2020-08-04

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for a conditions-of-confinement claim seeking release rather than damages; habeas is.

Carter v. Leroy Fields, Supt. · filed 2020-09-14

Here, the Court finds that because Petitioner seeks release rather than damages, a habeas petition, rather than a § 1983 action, is the appropriate vehicle for his petition.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of imprisonment; those challenges must be brought in a habeas corpus petition.

Nelson v. Payne · filed 2020-09-29

The plaintiff should be aware, however, that challenging the fact that he is in prison or how long he will be in prison is not proper in a §1983 lawsuit. Those are issues must be raised in a habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate release from confinement.

Feaster v. Watts · filed 2020-11-04

Plaintiff’s request for immediate release is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights action to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Adams 389698 v. Jackson · filed 2020-12-17

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

A prison claim that would not necessarily lead to immediate or earlier release must be brought, if at all, under Section 1983 rather than in habeas.

Coleman v. State of Nevada · filed 2020-12-18

If success on a habeas claim would not necessarily lead to a petitioner’s immediate or earlier release from custody, the claim does not fall within “the core of habeas corpus” and must be brought, “if at all,” in a civil rights action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws and does not itself create substantive rights.

Hernandez v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2004-08-31

It is well-established that Section 1983 does not create substantive rights; rather, it merely provides civil remedies for deprivations of rights established under the Constitution or federal laws.

Section 1983 is the required cause of action for claims alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Robinson v. Board of Regents of the University of Colorado · filed 2005-09-19

With regard to Mr. Robinson’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court notes that claims alleging violation of the Fourteenth Amendment must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Amendment itself does not provide a direct cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws but does not create substantive rights itself.

Cooper v. Millwood Independent School District No. 37 · filed 1994-08-02

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 can enforce individual federal rights through systemic remedies; the form of relief does not determine whether a right is enforceable.

John B. v. Goetz · filed 2010-11-30

To determine whether a statute is enforceable under § 1983, courts examine “whether Congress intended to create a federal right,” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283, not the scope of the relief sought or granted. In other words, remedies vindicating individual rights may be both systemic and nonsystemic; the form of relief says nothing about the nature of the right.

Section 1983 can support systemic remedies for individual federal rights; the form of relief does not determine whether a statute creates an enforceable right.

John B. v. Goetz · filed 2010-12-16

To determine whether a statute is enforceable under § 1983, courts examine “whether Congress intended to create a federal right,” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283, not the scope of the relief sought or granted. In other words, remedies vindicating individual rights may be both systemic and nonsystemic; the form of relief says nothing about the nature of the right.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights established by the Constitution or other law and does not itself create substantive rights.

James v. City of Boise · filed 2015-05-21

Indeed, the policies or guidelines adopted by the Boise Police Department do not give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A certificate of appealability is unnecessary to appeal an order denying relief in a § 1983 action.

Smith v. Catoe · filed 2004-09-21

Because a certificate of appealability is not required to appeal from the district court’s order denying relief in a § 1983 action, we deny Smith’s motion for a certificate of appealability as unnecessary.

Section 1983’s state-created danger theory provides for damages for constitutional torts, not for nullifying a statute or ordinance.

Johnston v. Township of Plumcreek · filed 2004-09-28

Most importantly, the state-created danger theory is a construct by which damages are awarded for constitutional torts. It is not used to nullify statutory law, and we will not do so here.

Section 1983 allows injured people to sue state officials who communicate that dangerous misconduct will go unpunished.

Pena v. Deprisco · filed 2005-12-09

We conclude that when, as the plaintiffs allege, state officials communicate to a private person that he or she will not be arrested, punished, or otherwise interfered with while engaging in misconduct that is likely to endanger the life, liberty or property of others, those officials can be held liable under section 1983 for injury caused by the misconduct under Dwares.

The availability of a state malpractice remedy does not determine whether a § 1983 constitutional claim exists.

Romeo v. Youngberg · filed 1981-05-18

But the implication that the existence vel non of a state remedy for example a malpractice action is relevant to the determination of whether a § 1983 claim exists, would appear to be unfounded.

Section 1983 permits a claim for an unconstitutional arrest regardless of the remedies available under state law.

Buchanan v. Sowa · filed 1984-08-13

Accordingly, this Court holds that the constitutional violations alleged in the complaint involve precisely the type of misconduct that § 1983 was enacted to prevent, and that the plaintiffs state an actionable claim no matter what remedies are available under state law.

Section 1983 allows an action for an Eighth Amendment violation regardless of the adequacy of state remedies.

Johnson v. Coop · filed 1988-01-19

A violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment--a prohibition made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment--is actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 regardless of the adequacy of state remedies.

Section 1983 injunctive relief is neither conditioned on nor barred by the availability of state-law remedies.

Bramlett v. Peterson · filed 1969-12-08

Injunctive relief under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 in federal courts is not predicated upon, nor excluded by, available relief procedures under state law.

Section 1983 remains available for a state official’s intentional deprivation of constitutional property rights even when a state tort remedy is available.

Tarkowski v. Hoogasian · filed 1982-02-19

The Court, in Parratt, certainly did not repeal section 1983 in cases in which a state official’s intentional deprivation of constitutional rights including property rights is involved simply because a state tort action may be available.

Section 1983 claims alleging substantive constitutional violations or deprivations caused by state policy, practice, or custom are not barred by available state post-deprivation remedies.

Spell v. McDaniel · filed 1984-07-12

Therefore, this court holds that Parratt does not bar a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, despite the availability of state post-deprivation remedies, where the deprivation is unconstitutional irrespective of the procedural protections accompanying it offered by the state or where the deprivation is occasioned by state procedure, practice, policy or custom and not by a random or unauthorized act.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to administrative delay despite the availability of state judicial remedies for that delay.

Winstead v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-06-03

In other words, the sufficiency of the administrative process provided by state law may be challenged in an action in federal court irrespective of any available alternative state judicial remedies to challenge delay in that administrative process.

Section 1983 claims based on federal statutory rights are not foreclosed by the availability of a state remedy.

Rios v. Town of Huntington Housing Authority · filed 2012-04-10

It is true that a Section 1983 claim is not foreclosed by the existence of a state remedy, ie., Article 78, if it alleges the violation of a right secured by a federal statute rather than by the due process clause.

A public employee may bring a § 1983 procedural due process claim for loss of an employment property interest despite the availability of a state breach-of-contract claim.

Clukey v. Town of Camden · filed 2013-05-21

In fact, there is a long history of case law in this circuit holding that public employees who have been deprived of a property interest in employment without due process may bring a § 1983 claim in federal court regardless of the availability of a state law breach-of-contract claim.

Section 1983 plaintiffs challenging a deprivation under established state procedure need not plead and prove that administrative or state court remedies are inadequate.

Rodgers v. 36th District Court · filed 2013-07-03

Because the plaintiffs challenge actions taken pursuant to established state procedure, they are not required to plead and prove the inadequacy of administrative and state court remedies in order to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of constitutional or federal rights caused by a person acting under color of state law.

M.U. ex rel. Urban v. Downingtown High School East · filed 2015-04-27

The Court finds that M.U.’s allegations as to Reed satisfy the first and third elements of a state-created danger claim. ... On the other hand, M.U. fails to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the second and fourth elements of her state-created danger claim. ... These allegations sound in negligence, and “negligence is not enough to shock the conscience under any circumstances.” ... M.U. likewise fails to satisfy the fourth element of a state-created danger claim because she does not allege facts to show that Reed engaged in any affirmative conduct. ... In sum, without more, M.U.’s allegations that Reed failed to remove her from the soccer game after she had taken a blow to the head do not state a claim under the state-created danger theory of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits a free exercise claim even when state remedies are available for the loss of property.

Priest v. Holbrook · filed 2018-10-31

Furthermore, contrary to the district court’s holding, Priest’s free exercise claim is not barred even if state remedies exist for the loss of property.

Section 1983 substantive due process claims are not barred by the availability of a state tort remedy under the Parratt-Hudson doctrine.

Felicia Dean v. McKinney · filed 2020-10-02

And according to Zinermon, the availability of a state law remedy for McKinney’s egregious conduct does not impact the plaintiff’s § 1983 suit.

Section 1983’s deterrent purpose does not prevent a state from collecting from a damages award when the state did not pay the judgment and collection does not benefit the defendant.

Moore v. Jackson · filed 2004-10-14

Accordingly, because allowing the State to collect from Moore’s judgment provides no benefit to CMS, the result reached by the district court is not inconsistent with section 1983’s goal of deterring future deprivations of federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits liability against an organization when its officials act pursuant to its policy in depriving a plaintiff of federal rights.

United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga · filed 2013-02-05

The allegations in the complaint suggest the individual defendants acting in their official capacity were acting pursuant to McKamey policy, and liability may therefore be imputed to McKamey as well.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private organization for its employees’ acts; organizational liability requires a policy or custom that caused the violation.

Kauffman v. Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals · filed 2011-02-16

As we have explained, Kauffman may not state a § 1983 claim against the PSPCA based on vicarious liability, and he alleges no custom or policy on the part of the PSPCA leading to the violations asserted in Counts II and III. We will therefore dismiss the claims against the PSPCA under Counts II and III, and consider these counts only as they relate to Sullivan and Mutch.

Section 1983 permits liability for a corporate state actor that knows of an unconstitutional custom or practice and intentionally or with deliberate indifference fails to stop it.

Pack v. Associated Marine Institutes, Inc. · filed 2004-12-20

Therefore, both corporations may be liable for violating Tracy Pack’s civil rights if the Estate can show each had knowledge of an unconstitutional custom or practice, and failed, as a matter of specific intent or deliberate indifference, to correct or stop it.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a school district liable to show that its policy or custom caused a constitutional injury.

Magwood v. French · filed 2007-02-27

Furthermore, she has not produced evidence to demonstrate that any alleged constitutional violations were the result of policies or customs of the District that proximately caused Jackson’s injuries. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a correctional medical corporation when the complaint adequately alleges that its policy or custom caused deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Carter v. Taylor · filed 2008-03-29

Liberally construing the complaint, the court finds that, on a motion to dismiss, plaintiff has adequately alleged a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need based upon the policy or custom of CMS with regard to chronic care inmates housed in SHU or MHU.

A corporation under contract with the state is directly liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Davis v. First Correctional Medical · filed 2008-12-11

Finally, in order to establish that FCM is directly liable for the alleged constitutional violations, plaintiff “must provide evidence that there was a relevant [FCM] policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation[s] [plaintiff] allege[s].”

Section 1983 requires evidence of a widespread custom or practice to support an official-capacity excessive-force claim based on that practice.

Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island County · filed 2017-03-09

The district court Concluded that Mulvania put forward insufficient evidence of such a custom or practice of using excessive force. We agree.

Section 1983 allows a claim against an institutional medical provider when evidence shows that its policy or custom caused an inmate’s injury.

Guilliams v. Helder · filed 2018-02-05

A Plaintiff “seeking to impose liability on a municipality [or an institution] under § 1983 [must] identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” ... The Court agrees with Plaintiff that there are genuine issues of fact that preclude summary judgment in KCH’s favor. Plaintiff presented evidence that the KCH had a policy of not providing inmates with narcotic pain medication without evaluating the need for such medication on an individual basis.

A private prison medical provider is liable under § 1983 for a policy or practice that causes a constitutional injury; unsupported estimates of screening time do not establish such a policy.

Tripp v. Engelson · filed 2018-10-24

Schwarz’s testimony, without more, is woefully inadequate to support plaintiff’s Monell claim. The Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Monell claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison medical contractor for its policies or customs when its providers did not violate the prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Aldridge v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2019-12-03

Dismissal of the claims against defendants Williams and Obaisi requires dismissal of the claim against Wexford as well. Mr. Aldridge cannot establish that either P.A. Williams or Dr. Obaisi violated his constitutional rights, as they did not pursue an ineffective course of treatment; it follows that Wexford’s policies, practices, or customs could not have caused Mr. Aldridge to receive an ineffective course of treatment. Accordingly, Mr. Aldridge’s § 1983 claim against Wexford also fails.

A private prison medical contractor can be liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Salazar v. New Mexico Department of Corrections · filed 2020-02-11

Corizon and Centurian can be liable under § 1983, but only if their official policy or custom caused the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation when its policy or practice causes a constitutional violation, but does not impose liability merely because it employed the person responsible.

Johnson v. Wexford Health Source Inc. · filed 2020-05-05

Although section 1983 has been interpreted to bar respondeat superior liability, a defendant like Wexford can be held liable if it has a policy or practice that causes a constitutional violation. ... The Court finds that Johnson has not done so, and that a reasonable jury could not conclude that Wexford had such a blanket policy.

Section 1983 generally requires evidence beyond a plaintiff’s own treatment to establish that a corporate policy or practice caused a constitutional violation.

Williams v. Obaisi · filed 2020-08-25

And even assuming Williams could make such a showing, an individual plaintiff’s treatment, on its own, is generally not sufficient to escape summary judgment; a plaintiff must show his experience is similar to others or provide testimony or circumstantial evidence generally showing deficiencies in treatment from which an unconstitutional policy can be inferred.

Section 1983 permits corporate liability when a corporation’s policy or custom causes an employee to deprive someone of a federally protected right.

Appleby-El v. Wexford Health Sources · filed 2021-01-05

A corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the entity's policies or customs caused one or more of its employees to deprive the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

A § 1983 civil rights complaint alleging inadequate medical care need not undergo Maine's prelitigation medical malpractice screening.

Faulkingham v. PENOBSCOT COUNTY JAIL · filed 2004-12-22

I am unaware of any case in this District that has ordered that a civil rights violation- must be submitted to a medical malpractice screening panel simply because the alleged violator of constitutional rights happens to be employed in the medical profession. If this court has concluded that an EMTALA claim — which is more closely akin to a medical malpractice action than this claim — does not require prelitigation screening, it strikes me as incongruous to hold that a civil rights complaint does. The motion to dismiss or strike the complaint is DENIED.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for unsuccessful medical treatment, negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice without deliberate indifference.

Taylor v. CMCF 720 Clinic · filed 2007-11-19

Taylor may have pled facts sufficient to demonstrate that he was the victim of medical malpractice or negligence and that he suffered serious harm as a result; however, unsuccessful medical treatment, negligence, neglect, and medical malpractice do not give rise to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence or medical malpractice.

Carter v. Englehart · filed 2008-08-15

We also agree with the district court that Carter’s negligence and medical malpractice claims are not cognizable under section 1983, see Alberson v. Norris, 458 F.3d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 2006); Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997), and we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law claims, see Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2004).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for negligence or medical malpractice by prison medical providers.

Delbert Rogers v. Markgraf · filed 2018-07-10

Any negligence or medical malpractice by the defendants was not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for negligence or medical malpractice.

Hanson v. Badger Medical · filed 2019-09-24

And negligence or medical malpractice is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit derivative liability against a hospital for its doctors’ conduct when the doctors have not been shown to have violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Olivier v. Robert L. Yeager Mental Health Center · filed 2005-02-09

Because we conclude that Olivier failed to establish that the defendant doctors violated his rights, the Hospital cannot be held derivatively liable for any such violation.

Section 1983 permits suits against a public hospital for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief for deprivations of constitutional or civil rights.

Osuagwu v. Gila Regional Medical Center · filed 2012-12-21

A governmental entity, like the public hospital in this case, “can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief for depriving someone of constitutional or civil rights.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional injury under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment to support a malicious prosecution claim.

Koverman v. Cantwell · filed 2005-02-28

However, as Taylor and Pierce indicate, he has not asserted the required constitutional injury under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments necessary to support a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes no liability without a constitutional injury.

Doe v. Sempervirens Mental Health Fac · filed 2017-09-08

Absent a constitutional injury, no liability ensues under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims must be brought as separate civil actions and cannot be raised within juvenile delinquency proceedings.

In re Daniel A. · filed 2005-03-15

An action under § 1983 is a civil action that must be brought separately, and cannot be raised as part of a juvenile delinquency proceeding.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a separate civil action for a deprivation of rights.

Thomas v. Carrasco · filed 2008-07-21

To the extent that the district court concluded that Thomas improperly brought a separate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the parties concede that the district court was in error. ... We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1983 claims raised during a criminal appeal must be brought in a separate civil suit.

United States v. Fillingim · filed 2017-05-11

Mr. Fillingim must raise any civil claims under § 1983 in a separate civil suit.

Section 1983 provides a separate civil action for money damages against state actors for violations of constitutional rights.

Trammell v. People of State of California · filed 2021-01-20

Accordingly, to the extent that Petitioner seeks money damages against state actors for the violation of his constitutional rights, he must file it as a separate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims receive the same standard of review in state court that they would receive in federal court; absent findings on disputed facts, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court’s implicit findings.

Jamshidnejad v. Central Curry School District · filed 2005-03-23

In Pangle, we noted that the appropriate standard of review in a section 1983 case is the same as it would be if the case were tried in federal court, and that “[w]hen a federal district court upholds a restriction on speech as constitutional, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals conducts a de novo review unless the district court has made specific findings on disputed fact issues!.]” 169 Or App at 394. The trial court in this case made no such findings. We take the mandate to conduct “a de novo review” to mean that we afford no deference to the trial court’s implicit findings.

Section 1983 does not provide a tax refund remedy when state law provides a plain, adequate and complete remedy for the challenged assessment.

Dunn v. Board of Property Assessment · filed 2005-06-01

It is equally well settled that taxpayers may not seek a refund of taxes pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the purported violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, as the Refund Act and the General County Assessment Law provide a plain, adequate and complete statutory remedy for the purportedly unlawful tax assessments.

Section 1983 does not allow a shareholder to sue individually for an injury to the corporation without a separate personal injury.

Diva's, Inc. v. Bangor, City of · filed 2005-06-09

And, although we have not yet had the opportunity to explicitly state, we join the circuits who have already addressed the issue to hold that this standing requirement also applies to actions brought to redress injuries to a corporation under Section 1983.

Section 1983 allows a corporation to seek damages on its own behalf for alleged violations of its constitutional rights.

Addiction Specialist v. Hampton · filed 2005-06-14

We note further that ASI has standing to seek damages on its own behalf under § 1983.

Section 1983 gives shareholders no individual right of action for an injury sustained by their corporation when they allege no direct, nonderivative injury.

Pagán v. Calderón · filed 2006-05-16

In such circumstances, section 1983 affords no right of action to the individual shareholders.

Section 1983 requires a corporate agent to allege a personal, nonderivative injury to bring a claim arising from harm to the corporation.

Pagan v. Calderon · filed 2006-05-16

Because the complaint contains no allegation that Pagán suffered any nonderivative injury, he lacks standing to assert any of the section 1983 claims that are at issue here.

Section 1983 permits a corporation whose business is harmed by allegedly unconstitutional police conduct to seek an injunction protecting its employees’ First Amendment rights.

Black Jack Distributors, Inc. v. Beame · filed 1977-06-22

This principle extends to suits, brought by corporations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to enjoin future police activity. ... Because plaintiffs have shown that their business has been disrupted and is suffering due to defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional actions, they have standing to pursue this lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not let shareholders sue for an injury to their corporation when they have no distinct injury of their own.

Bartel v. Kemmerer City · filed 2012-05-29

Generally, any conduct harming “a corporation confers standing on the corporation, not its shareholders.” Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Diva’s Inc. v. City of Bangor, 411 F.3d 30, 42 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing cases and holding standing requirement applies to actions brought to redress injuries to corporation under § 1983). ... Because their claims derive wholly from the claims of Tri-State, they therefore do not have standing to sue on their own behalf.

A shareholder has standing under § 1983 when the alleged violation concerns the shareholder’s own constitutional rights.

Mallari v. Vessigault · filed 2016-11-21

However, in the Second Amended Complaint, Mallari alleged that defendants’ conduct violated his own Fourteenth Amendment rights. ... Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of the § 1983 claim for lack of standing, and remand for further proceedings as to that claim only.

Section 1983 does not allow a shareholder to sue in his own name for an injury suffered only by the corporation, even if he is its sole shareholder.

Stanko v. Schofield · filed 2018-03-28

In Potthoff, the court concluded “the shareholder standing rule applies to civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by shareholders claiming injury to their corporations.” ... Mr. Stanko’s argument ignores the clear directive of the case law stated above. ... The court must dismiss Mr. Stanko’s claims for lack of standing to sue under Article III.

A corporate owner bringing a § 1983 claim must plead an injury direct and independent from the corporation’s injury.

Gradetech, Inc. v. City of San Jose · filed 2020-07-10

Plaintiff Sam Rivinius has not pleaded a direct and independent injury from Gradetech’s.

Section 1983 claims against public entities need not satisfy California’s claims-presentation requirement before suit is filed.

Florio v. City of Ontario · filed 2005-06-30

A section 1983 claim against a public entity need not be presented to the public entity before filing suit in state or federal court.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to state claims filing statutes such as former RCW 4.96.020.

Wright v. Terrell · filed 2007-11-08

The Court of Appeals also held that former RCW 4.96.020 applies to federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That holding directly conflicts with well established precedent.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to state claims presentation requirements.

California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Virga · filed 2010-01-15

Because a state may not impose substantive limitations on a civil rights act action, section 1983 claims are not subject to the procedural requirement in the Claims Act that a plaintiff must timely file a claim with a public entity as a prerequisite to later filing an action for damages against the entity.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and deprivation of federal rights, limits supervisory liability absent personal involvement, and provides qualified immunity unless clearly established law was violated.

Wyler v. Connecticut State Univ. Sys. · filed 2015-03-30

To survive a motion for summary judgment on her § 1983 claim for sexual harassment, plaintiff must proffer evidence that the defendants were acting “under color of state law” at the time they committed the conduct complained of, and that their conduct deprived her of “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” ... Under § 1983, a supervisor is not liable for a subordinate’s wrongful conduct in violation of another’s rights in the absence of personal involvement on the part of the supervisor. ... Under § 1983, a government official performing discretionary functions is immune from suit in his personal capacity except for conduct that violates clearly established law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging statements by government officials to plead common-law defamation and a constitutional injury caused by the statement.

Hamze v. Cummings · filed 2016-06-20

To state a claim under § 1983 based on statements by government officials, a plaintiff must first allege a common-law defamation claim and then allege a constitutional injury flowing from the defamatory statement.

Section 1983 actions may be stayed while state remedies are exhausted when dismissal could cause the statute of limitations to run.

Jones v. Smith · filed 1987-12-09

Under these circumstances, as in Offet, "[w]e believe it is appropriate to stay rather than dismiss the [section] 1983 action to avoid the possibility that dismissal would allow the statute of limitations to run before the [prisoner] exhausts his state remedies with respect to his claim for early or immediate release." Id. at 1258 n. 2.

Section 1983 does not provide an actionable substantive due process claim for conduct that falls short of sexual molestation or assault.

Gilliam v. USD 244 School District · filed 2005-10-27

Thus, conduct falling shy of sexual molestation or assault does not give rise to an actionable § 1983 substantive due process claim.

Section 1983 damages claims by a pretrial detainee are not barred by Heck while the related criminal prosecution is pending.

Scholtz v. Prummell · filed 2020-10-30

Some courts apply the Heck bar to pretrial detainees too. ... The Court holds Heck doesn’t apply.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply a sentence is invalid unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Johnson v. Chambers-Smith · filed 2020-10-20

Here, Plaintiff directly challenges the computation of his sentence. A judgment of false imprisonment would necessarily imply that his sentence as calculated is invalid. He must therefore allege that his sentence was corrected in the Ohio courts or by a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Because the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint do not suggest that the state sentences he challenges have been reversed on appeal or called into question in any of the ways articulated by Heck, Plaintiff cannot proceed with a damages action challenging his sentence.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would undermine a prisoner’s sentence, but it permits a challenge to parole procedures that would neither invalidate the conviction nor require a shorter sentence.

Rodgers v. Whitten · filed 2020-09-09

As Plaintiff’s Miller-hearing claim would undermine his sentence, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Heck preclusion would prevent Plaintiff from maintaining his Miller-hearing claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Yet Plaintiff’s other adult- matrix-rules claim would not undermine the validity of his conviction or require the shortening of his sentence, such that § 1983 is the proper vehicle for that claim.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when the underlying convictions have been vacated by a state court and no criminal judgments remain, even if the vacatur followed a settlement.

Roberts v. City of Fairbanks · filed 2020-01-22

We conclude that where all convictions underlying § 1983 claims are vacated and no outstanding criminal judgments remain, Heck does not bar plaintiffs from seeking relief under § 1983.

A § 1983 suit cannot be dismissed under Heck as premature when no conviction has occurred.

Cohen v. Shao · filed 2015-06-22

Because no conviction has yet occurred, we conclude that the district court’s dismissal under Heck is premature.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed when its factual premise would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s criminal conviction.

Helman v. Smeltzley · filed 2014-02-06

If Helman attempted to access the gun only after the officers began firing at him, then Helman would have been attempting to draw a deadly weapon in response to excessive force. Accordingly, under Heck, Helman may not pursue a § 1983 claim premised upon that factual scenario.

A § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck when success would establish only parole eligibility without changing the fact or duration of confinement.

Taylor v. Houston · filed 1996-08-23

A review of Taylor’s complaint and his appellate argument indicates that the Heck rule is not an impediment to Taylor’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action.

A § 1983 unlawful arrest claim is barred by Heck only if success would necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction is invalid.

Brown v. Sudduth · filed 2007-11-07

In short, because a valid conviction may follow an illegal arrest, a successful § 1983 unlawful arrest action does not necessarily imply the invalidity of an underlying conviction.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred under Heck when success would undermine juvenile proceedings resolved through a diversion agreement.

S.E. Ex Rel. A.E v. Grant County Board of Education · filed 2007-10-19

As stated above, this court sees no distinction for these purposes between diversion, which is anticipatory probation, and probation imposed following a conviction. ... The Heck issue requires dismissal of all the federal claims pertaining to the alleged unconstitutional seizure and confession, including Counts TV, V, VI, IX, and X.

Section 1983 damages claims for violations of extradition law are not barred by Heck when success would not invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Weilburg v. Shapiro · filed 2007-05-31

We conclude that Heck v. Humphrey is not a bar to the present action.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when success would not imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Martinez v. Martinez · filed 2006-07-27

Because M r. M artinez is bringing a claim for assault on M ay 8 and for the subsequent failure to transfer him, not for the M ay 15 incident for which he was himself convicted of assault, he does not imply the invalidity of his conviction. Heck v. Humphrey is therefore no bar to his first two claims.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck when they are intertwined with a contention that the plaintiff could not prepare and present an adequate defense.

Cardona v. USA · filed 2006-07-25

To the extent that Cardona’s § 1983 claims regarding the restrictions placed upon him are intertwined with his contention that he was unable to prepare and present an adequate defense, those claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims challenging a conviction are subject to dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey.

Robinson v. Arthur · filed 2002-06-19

Insofar as Robinson sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we conclude the district court properly dismissed his action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Section 1983 damages claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey when success would invalidate a conviction that has not been reversed.

Daubenmire v. City of Columbus · filed 2006-03-01

As Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that their convictions were reversed, the Court agrees that the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine applies in this case.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim previously barred by Heck to proceed when the underlying convictions are reversed.

Miller v. County of Butte · filed 2005-11-16

After the district court granted summary judgment, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court for the County of Butte reversed Miller’s convictions. ... Appellees concede that under these circumstances summary judgment should be vacated. See id. We therefore vacate the district court’s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed to the extent they contradict the plaintiff’s guilty plea to criminal charges.

Ojegba v. Murphy · filed 2006-04-26

After reviewing the record, reading the parties’ briefs and having the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment up until the time Ojegba was subdued by the officers under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 n.6 (1994) (courts should reject allegations in a civil suit that contradict plaintiff’s plea of guilty to criminal charges).

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily invalidate a detention must be dismissed unless the detention has been invalidated, even when the claimant can no longer seek habeas relief.

Giallorenzo v. Beaver County · filed 2007-07-20

A favorable outcome on this claim would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his detention. Further, Giallorenzo has not established that the state courts invalidated the district justice’s decision to revoke his bail or honor the detainer. And, as we have recently made clear, dismissal of a § 1983 claim is appropriate despite the fact that a litigant such as Giallorenzo is no longer in custody and can no longer seek federal habeas corpus relief.

When a § 1983 claim may proceed, Heck does not bar relevant evidence in that claim.

Simpson v. Thomas · filed 2008-06-11

We conclude that Heck does not create a rule of evidence exclusion. Therefore, if, as in this case, a party is permitted to proceed on a § 1983 claim, relevant evidence may not be barred under the rule announced in Heck.

When Younger abstention applies to a § 1983 suit during civil commitment proceedings, the damages claims are stayed until those proceedings end; Heck does not require dismissal before commitment.

Rhoden v. Mayberg · filed 2010-01-11

Lawtis Donald Rhoden appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the defendants have impermissibly detained him pending proceedings to determine whether he should be civilly committed under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”). ... However, Rhoden’s claims for money damages should have been stayed until the state court proceedings are completed. ... Heck v. ... Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not require otherwise because Rhoden has not been civilly committed.

A § 1983 excessive force claim is barred by the Heck doctrine when success would necessarily undermine the plaintiff’s criminal conviction.

Green v. City of Moss Point, MS · filed 2012-10-26

Because Green pleaded guilty to simple assault on a law enforcement officer, we hold that the district court did not err by dismissing Green’s § 1983 suit on the grounds of the Heck doctrine nor in dismissing Green’s state law claims on the grounds that Clark was entitled to qualified immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA).

Section 1983 permits a claim challenging a conviction when the plaintiff could not seek habeas relief because he was not in custody as a consequence of that conviction.

Chillemi v. Town of Southampton · filed 2013-05-04

Thus, what is dispositive is whether the Plaintiff was “in custody” as a consequence of the arrest and conviction he is now challenging. There is no question that he was not, and thus he could not pursue a habeas remedy relating to that second conviction. For this reason, the Heck doctrine’s exception is applicable and the Plaintiff is not precluded from pursuing this Section 1983 action.

The Heck doctrine does not bar a Section 1983 false arrest claim that does not call a criminal conviction into question.

Glasgow v. Beary · filed 2014-03-05

The Heck doctrine barring a Section 1983 claim does not extend to plaintiffs false arrest suit.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by the Heck doctrine when they do not challenge the validity or length of confinement.

Stewart v. Varano · filed 2015-02-09

As Stewart rightly contended in his ... brief before this Court, the Heck doctrine is inapplicable because Stewart did not question the validity or length of his confinement in this complaint.

A pending criminal prosecution without a conviction does not bar a § 1983 claim under Heck.

Ray v. Moon · filed 2015-12-21

The Heck doctrine does not bar a civil-rights claim, however, when a criminal prosecution is pending but there has been no conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply that an underlying state court conviction is invalid.

Fairbanks v. O'Hagan · filed 2017-06-09

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not cognizable if their success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an underlying state court conviction.

Section 1983 claims for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment may be dismissed without prejudice when barred by the Heck doctrine.

Dunn v. Bethel · filed 2018-08-07

Judge Bryant recommends ... Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and false imprisonment claims against certain defendants should be dismissed because those claims are barred by the Heck doctrine.1 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1944). ... Upon review, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation in toto.

Section 1983 claims are not barred under Heck when a pretrial diversion program ends with dismissal of the charges and no conviction exists.

Tomashek v. A.S. Meadows · filed 2018-09-26

Here, the plaintiff’s criminal charges were dismissed after successful completion of the 90- day diversion program. An action cannot invalidate a conviction or sentence that does not exist.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when successful pretrial diversion ends in dismissed charges and leaves no conviction or sentence to invalidate.

Tomashek v. Raleigh Cnty. Emergency Operating Ctr. · filed 2018-09-26

Therefore, I conclude that Heck does not apply to bar the plaintiff's § 1983 claims in this case.

Section 1983 recovery is barred under Heck when the claim depends on a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Ogunsalu v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist. · filed 2019-01-11

The Heck doctrine bars recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a plaintiff cannot “prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 claims challenging pending criminal proceedings are not cognizable under Heck until the charges are dismissed or any resulting conviction is invalidated.

Anderson v. City of Las Vegas · filed 2019-10-29

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are not cognizable under Heck until his criminal case is dismissed or if convicted, the conviction has been rendered invalid.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim when success would necessarily require the plaintiff to prove that a conviction or imprisonment was unlawful.

Golson v. Detective James Anderson · filed 2018-07-06

(holding that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for monetary damages is barred if prevailing in the action would necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or imprisonment). * We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 claims challenging the duration of custody, including probation, do not accrue until that custody has been invalidated.

Huber v. Anderson · filed 2018-11-26

His claim did not accrue until the Circuit Court invali- dated his sentence.

A prisoner cannot pursue a §1983 excessive force claim that would undermine a disciplinary conviction affecting the sentence unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Santos v. White · filed 2020-01-07

Plaintiff must first have his convictions reversed, expunged, or invalidated before bringing an §1983 action on this set of facts.

A criminal conviction does not bar a Section 1983 excessive force claim under Heck unless success on the claim would necessarily invalidate the conviction.

DESABETINO v. BIAGINI · filed 2020-06-24

Thus, it is not appropriate for this court to grant summary judgment on the basis of the Heck Doctrine, as this court cannot determine with certainty “whether a finding in favor of the plaintiff in federal court necessarily implies the invalidity of his prior conviction in state court.” Weber, 2011 WL 2555358, at *3.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a conviction are premature under Heck unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Dulaney (ID 75116) v. Weeks · filed 2020-06-26

This matter is a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because Plaintiff’s claims are premature under the principles of Heck v. Humphrey, his complaint must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Section 1983 claims challenging how a parole condition is implemented are not barred by Heck merely because a challenge to the condition itself would be barred.

Frazier v. Jeffreys · filed 2020-08-04

Rather, Plaintiffs allege that IDOC’s implementation of the Contact Condition through its current policy violates their substantive and procedural due process rights—claims that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not bar.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate an outstanding criminal conviction unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Bates v. Smith · filed 2020-11-25

Here, Bates’s conviction has not been reversed, so the question is whether his § 1983 suit is an attempt to invalidate his conviction. ... Accordingly, Smith’s motion for summary judgment is granted because the relief sought by Bates would necessitate finding that the state court conviction was invalid.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim is not barred by Heck when success would not imply that the plaintiff’s criminal conviction is invalid.

Moser v. Etowah Police Department · filed 2021-01-25

Because the use of excessive force on Linda Moser was unavailable as an affirmative defense to the state crime, the Heck doctrine does not bar Linda Moser’s claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an alleged violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay; that claim must be brought before the Bankruptcy Court.

Balaber-Strauss v. Town/Village of Harrison · filed 2005-12-15

Any claimed violation of the automatic stay of enforcement proceedings provision of the Bankruptcy Code must be brought before the Bankruptcy Court, not before this Court as a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to enforce rights under Bankruptcy Code §§ 524 and 525 because the Code supplies its own remedies.

Lesniewski v. Kamin (In Re Lesniewski) · filed 2000-03-13

Since I find no action under § 1983 lies for violation of the substantive rights upon which Debtor secured her consent judgment, I find she is not entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against officers who execute a valid warrant.

Hang Cui v. City of Elmhurst · filed 2018-08-09

Section 1983 does not permit an award of damages against officers who execute a valid warrant.

Section 1983 generally does not provide a cause of action against an officer who makes an arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant.

Zane Fair v. Gerald Fulbright, Independence County Sheriff · filed 1988-05-05

An arrest executed pursuant to a facially valid warrant generally does not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the arresting officer.

A § 1983 action challenging a method of execution does not automatically stay the execution; a court may grant a stay after considering equitable factors.

Schwab v. McDonough · filed 2007-11-14

“Filing an action that can proceed under § 1983 does not entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter of course.” ... Applying these criteria to the present application, the Court concludes that a stay is warranted.

A § 1983 challenge to a lethal-injection protocol does not automatically entitle an inmate to a stay of execution; unjustified delay can create a strong presumption against a stay.

Nooner v. Norris · filed 2007-07-09

A stay of execution is an equitable remedy, and an inmate challenging a state's lethal injection protocol through a § 1983 action is not entitled to a stay of execution as a matter of course. ... Mr. Davis's delay gives rise to the equitable presumption against a stay in this case, and he has offered no basis for overcoming that strong presumption.

A late-filed § 1983 method-of-execution complaint can raise an equitable presumption of delay that weighs against a stay of execution.

Lenz v. Johnson · filed 2006-07-25

Turning to the facts before the Court, the timing of Lenz’s § 1983 Complaint — filed almost exactly one month before his scheduled execution date — gives rise to the presumption that Lenz is engaging in disruptive, dilatory tactics for the sole purpose of unjustifiably delaying the execution of his death sentence that was imposed nearly six years ago.

Extreme untimeliness can be sufficient to dispose of a § 1983 challenge to lethal injection.

Alley v. Little · filed 2006-06-24

Extreme untimeliness is a sufficient but not necessarily compelling factor when deciding how to dispose of a § 1983 challenge to lethal injection.

A plaintiff seeking a stay in a § 1983 method-of-execution suit must file in time to permit consideration of the merits when there is no satisfactory explanation for delay.

Reese v. Livingston · filed 2006-06-20

As we read Hill, a plaintiff cannot wait until a stay must be granted to enable him to develop facts and take the case to trial—not when there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay. We find this suit with its request for equitable relief to be untimely.

A cognizable § 1983 claim does not entitle a prisoner to a stay of execution as a matter of right.

Neville v. Johnson · filed 2006-02-08

A cognizable § 1983 claim “”does not warrant the entry of a stay as a matter of right.”” See White, 429 F.3d at 573 (quoting Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649).

A prisoner who delays filing a § 1983 challenge to an execution protocol faces a strong equitable presumption against a stay of execution.

Patton v. Jones · filed 2006-08-28

Thus, we conclude there is nothing in the record sufficient to overcome the presumption created by Patton’s late filing of his § 1983 action.

A § 1983 complaint challenging a method of execution does not automatically entitle the prisoner to a stay of execution.

Jones v. Allen · filed 2007-04-27

Thus, a petitioner’s complaint under § 1983 does not entitle him to an order staying his execution as a matter of course.

Section 1983 does not by itself entitle a complainant to a stay of execution.

Bishop v. Epps · filed 2008-07-21

Indeed, “[f]iling an action that can proceed under § 1983 does not entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter of course.”

A prisoner’s § 1983 challenge to an execution does not automatically entitle the prisoner to a stay; the court applies equitable standards.

Beaty v. Brewer · filed 2011-05-25

In the context of a capital case, the Supreme Court has emphasized that these principles apply when a condemned prisoner asks a federal court to enjoin his impending execution because “[fjiling an action that can proceed under § 1983 does not entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter of course.” ... Given the State’s “strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal courts,” and because “the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence,” the Court concludes that the balance of equities favors Defendants and that a stay of execution to resolve Plaintiffs speculative allegations is not in the public interest.

A Section 1983 challenge to a method of execution does not entitle an inmate to a stay of execution as a matter of course; equitable rules, including delay, apply.

Long v. Secretary, Department of Corrections · filed 2019-05-22

Long is not entitled to a stay of execution "as a matter of course" simply because he brought a § 1983 claim. ... Instead, a stay of execution is an equitable remedy and all of the rules of equity apply.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner seeking a copy of state trial records without seeking relief from the sentence or confinement.

Caldwell v. State of Texas · filed 2006-07-24

He did not ask for any relief from his sentence, nor did he ask that the federal court order him released from confinement or modify, in any respect, the conditions of his confinement. Accordingly, his action should have been treated as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking a copy of his state trial records.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for an action seeking a copy of state trial records when the action seeks no relief from the conviction, sentence, or confinement.

Caldwell v. Quarterman · filed 2006-07-24

Accordingly, his action should have been treated as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking a copy of his state trial records.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek access to DNA evidence for testing when success would not necessarily imply that the conviction is unlawful.

Wade v. Brady · filed 2006-10-27

Because plaintiffs action does not necessarily imply the unlawfulness of his conviction, it cannot fall within the implied habeas exception to § 1983’s coverage. Consequently, § 1983 is an entirely appropriate medium for plaintiff to raise his claim for access to DNA testing.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek access to physical evidence for DNA testing when success would not invalidate the conviction or shorten confinement.

Savory, Johnnie L. v. Lyons, Kevin W. · filed 2006-11-29

Such access would not imply the invalidity of his conviction. At most, he would have the opportunity to use the results of the DNA testing in a future proceeding. ... Savory’s suit is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek post-conviction access to physical evidence for DNA testing when success would not necessarily invalidate the conviction or shorten confinement.

Savory, II v. Lyons · filed 2006-11-29

In the instant case, Savory will not be released from prison, nor will his sentence be shortened, if he successfully gains access to physical evidence for DNA testing. Such access would not imply the invalidity of his conviction. ... Savory's suit is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a fair trial claim to proceed alongside a malicious prosecution claim even when both rely on the same evidence.

NIBBS v. City of New York · filed 2011-08-04

On the contrary, courts in this District have regularly found Ricciuti to stand for the proposition that a claim for denial of a right to a fair trial may be brought alongside one for malicious prosecution even where both are supported by the same evidence. ... Consequently, the Court finds that Nibbs’s Fair Trial Claim may proceed.

Section 1983 cannot provide dismissal of an indictment as a remedy for an alleged speedy trial violation; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus after exhausting state court remedies.

GARRETT v. MURPHY · filed 2020-05-14

The Court cannot grant this relief in a § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 bars damages for confinement based on a conviction that has not been declared invalid.

Runnels v. State of Louisiana · filed 2017-02-17

Because Runnels has not shown that the conviction has been declared invalid, he is barred from recovering monetary damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for allegedly unlawful confinement unless the confinement has first been invalidated.

Whitlow v. United States · filed 2011-11-01

Furthermore, insofar as plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and demands monetary relief for his alleged unlawful incarceration, the claim fails. Absent a showing that his confinement has been invalidated by "revers[al] on direct appeal, expunge[ment] by executive order, declar[ ation of invalidity] by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or ... a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus," Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), plaintiff is not entitled to damages.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims that would imply an invalid conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Denney v. Werholtz · filed 2009-09-29

A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck when they would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Bonner v. Castloo · filed 2006-08-04

We conclude, however, that Bonner’s claims, which are premised on the alleged breach of his plea agreement, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence and are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).