42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 actions may be precluded by Heck v. Humphrey.

McFadden v. Allen · filed 2006-08-04

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court on the basis that this action is precluded by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

A Section 1983 claim is not barred by Heck when success would not necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction.

Cooper v. State of Florida · filed 2006-09-05

Even with evidence of Cooper’s alleged mental state at the time of the offense, a jury would still have the option of convicting Cooper. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding the complaint Heck-barred.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims whose success would necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction; the remedy is habeas corpus.

Kehano v. Hawaii · filed 2006-09-19

Before transferring the remaining claim in this action to the District of Arizona, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii properly dismissed Kehano’s first two claims in case no. 05-00473 HG-LEK, because success on these claims would necessarily implicate the validity of Kehano’s conviction, and accordingly his only remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred under Heck when success would imply that a conviction is invalid and the conviction has not been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Simmons v. Beshouri · filed 2006-10-05

Based on this alleged conspiracy, he seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. If successful, these claims would establish that appellant’s convictions are constitutionally infirm. For this reason, and because appellant’s convictions have not been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid, his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when its success would necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s earlier conviction was invalid; deciding that requires a close examination of the conviction’s factual basis.

Riddick v. Lott · filed 2006-10-12

As the district court recognized, Heck v. Humphrey bars a § 1983 action if it is clear from the record that its successful prosecution would necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s earlier conviction was invalid. The Heck analysis requires a close factual examination of the underlying conviction.

A § 1983 action seeking access to trial DNA evidence is not barred by Heck when access would not imply that the conviction is invalid.

Thompson v. Crist · filed 2006-10-13

Because Thompson seeks access to DNA evidence used during his trial, and denies that he is challenging his conviction, we conclude that his action is not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims concerning a prison disciplinary proceeding can be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Sauceda v. Williams · filed 2006-11-27

The district court correctly determined that Sauceda’s assertions concerning his disciplinary proceeding were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005).

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a juvenile adjudication and sentence are subject to the Heck bar.

Morris v. City of Detroit · filed 2006-12-14

A finding that his confession was impermissibly coerced, as would be necessary to establish damages in a § 1983 action, would correspondingly demonstrate the invalidity of the accessory-after-the-fact adjudication and associated sentence of probation, in contravention of Heck. ... Therefore, we hold that Heck v. Humphrey is applicable to the present case.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Hawthorne v. Sheriff of Broward County · filed 2007-01-03

Under Heck, a state prisoner may not bring a claim for damages under § 1983 “if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.” ... Because Hawthorne has not demonstrated that his convictions have already been invalidated, this claim is barred under Heck.

Section 1983 permits a claim seeking access to evidence when success would not necessarily invalidate an outstanding conviction.

Linder v. Boland · filed 2007-01-03

Because Linder’s allegations, if successful, would not invalidate his conviction, Heck does not bar this action.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison discipline are not barred by Heck when a favorable judgment would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Pittman v. Ofc. Tucker · filed 2007-01-09

Accordingly, we hold that Pittman’s claims are not Heck-barred because there is no indication that a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or his sentence.

Section 1983 claims challenging the validity of a plaintiff’s incarceration are barred under Heck.

Gibson v. State of Texas · filed 2007-03-07

Gibson argues that the district court erroneously applied the Heck-bar. The thrust of Gibson’s claims is that the defendants conspired and falsified documents in his state habeas proceedings because they knew his incarceration was illegal, thereby depriving him of his liberty. Gibson’s claims challenged the validity of his incarceration, and the district court did not err. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.

Heck bars a § 1983 claim only when success would invalidate a conviction or sentence tied to the conduct challenged in that claim.

Butler v. Compton · filed 2007-04-17

The starting point for the application of Heck then is the existence of an underlying conviction or sentence that is tied to the conduct alleged in the § 1983 action.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when it would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Vidales v. Abbott · filed 2007-04-17

With the benefit of liberal construction, Vidales argues that his complaint should not have been dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). He has not shown, however, that his claims would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Therefore, the district court did not err.

Section 1983 damages claims based on extradition law violations are not barred by Heck when success would not invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Weilburg v. Shapiro · filed 2007-06-01

To the extent that the complaint in the present case alleges violations of extradition law, such allegations, if proven, would not invalidate Daro Weilburg's incarceration. Therefore, with respect to these allegations, Heck v. Humphrey does not apply.

Section 1983 claims against state actors may be barred by Heck even while related criminal charges are pending.

Young v. Trans Union · filed 2007-07-16

The district court correctly determined that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), bars Young’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against various state actors. Though Young’s prosecution was ongoing at the time the district court dismissed his case, Heck also applies to “pending criminal charges.”

A Section 1983 claim is not barred by Heck at the pleading stage unless the record establishes that success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Curry v. Baca · filed 2007-07-23

In this case, unlike in Heck, the Court cannot, based on the record before it, conclude that Plaintiffs civil rights suit would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the [plaintiffs] conviction or sentence.”

A conviction resulting only in a fine can trigger the Heck bar to a § 1983 claim.

Kelley v. Monroe County Board of Supervisors · filed 2007-07-24

Kelley wishes to argue on appeal that Heck does not bar his claims because he was only fined and not imprisoned. This contention is frivolous.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily call into question the validity of a probation revocation are barred under Heck unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Baskett v. Papini · filed 2007-08-21

The district court properly dismissed Baskett’s section 1983 action as Heck-barred because his allegations necessarily call into question the validity of the probation revocation, and Baskett failed to allege that his sentence has been invalidated.

A Section 1983 forfeiture claim barred by Heck cannot be saved by adding facts or defendants to the complaint.

Gay v. USA · filed 2007-10-15

The proposed amendments to the complaint, however, would not have overcome the finding that any claim relating to the for- feiture is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction are barred under Heck unless that conviction has been reversed or expunged.

Arceneaux v. Leger · filed 2007-10-18

Arceneaux’s claims that he did not cause a disturbance while in his cell; he did not refuse orders given to him by prison officials; the use of chemical spray was unjustified; the cell-entry was unprovoked; and that the disciplinary reports were fabricated are barred by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648-89 (1997) (applying Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) to prison disciplinary proceedings).

Section 1983 claims that necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction are barred when the conviction has not been reversed or expunged.

Brown v. Office of the Clerk of the 10th Supreme Court of Appeals · filed 2007-10-24

However, because Brown’s claims necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction, and because Brown has not shown that his conviction has been reversed or expunged, the district court properly concluded that his claim was barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 retaliation claims based on allegedly false prison disciplinary charges may survive dismissal at an early stage despite a Heck v. Humphrey objection.

Armenta v. Pryor · filed 2007-11-15

Armenta’s allegations arguably stated claims of retaliation which are not subject to dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the retaliation claims at this stage of the proceeding.

Section 1983 bars a claim that necessarily implicates the validity of a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise called into question.

Kille v. O'Brien · filed 2007-12-28

The district court properly dismissed Kille’s section 1983 action as Heck-barred because his allegations necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction, and Kille failed to prove that his conviction was reversed, expunged, or otherwise called into question.

A § 1983 excessive force claim may proceed despite a prison disciplinary sanction when success would not necessarily invalidate that sanction.

Gilbert v. Cook · filed 2008-01-09

An argument along the lines of “The guards violated my rights by injuring me, whether or not I struck first” does not present the sort of inconsistency that doomed Okoro’s suit. To put Gilbert’s claim this way is to show that his success would not imply the invalidity of the decision revoking his good-time credits.

A § 1983 claim cannot be dismissed under Heck when the record does not establish whether success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Johnson v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement · filed 2008-02-04

The record does not tell us whether appellant’s constitutional claim necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction. At this juncture, therefore, we cannot say that Heck bars appellant’s claim.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction that caused a loss of good time credits, unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Davis v. Baughman · filed 2008-02-05

We agree with the district court that Davis’s claims against Minor were barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), because he had not successfully challenged his disciplinary conviction in state court, and a favorable decision would necessarily imply the invalidity of his resulting loss of good time credits and, hence, the length of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim of withheld exculpatory evidence when success on the claim would imply that the plaintiff’s conviction is invalid.

Wells v. District Attorney's Office · filed 2008-02-25

To succeed on such a claim under § 1983, he would have to show that Defendants deprived him of material, exculpatory evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). However, if he made such a showing, it would imply the invalidity of his conviction and bar him from relief. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when the plaintiff could not seek federal habeas relief.

Mendoza v. Meisel · filed 2008-03-19

Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim where the plaintiff is unable to challenge his conditions of confinement through a petition for federal habeas corpus.

Section 1983 bars an excessive force claim arising from events leading to a Texas aggravated assault conviction under Heck.

Hamilton v. Raven · filed 2008-03-25

An excessive force claim that relates to events leading to a conviction for aggravated assault under Texas law is barred by Heck.

A plaintiff cannot avoid the Heck bar on a § 1983 damages claim when habeas relief is unavailable because the plaintiff failed to pursue it timely.

Williams v. Waggener · filed 2008-03-25

He argues that the unavailability of habeas corpus nonetheless allows his suit. We disagree; the unavailability of habeas corpus is due to Williams’s failure timely to pursue this remedy.

A conviction for resisting arrest does not bar a § 1983 excessive force claim that would not imply the conviction is invalid.

Hardrick v. City of Bolingbrook · filed 2008-04-10

Accordingly, Har-drick’s § 1983 action is not precluded under Heck.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been set aside.

Winegarner v. City of Coppell · filed 2008-04-23

Judgment in Winegarner’s favor on his federal claims would imply the invalidity of his conviction. ... Heck bars Winegarner’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when a damages judgment would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Scott v. Fortenberry · filed 2008-05-20

Likewise, Scott’s complaint does not implicate Heck v. Humphrey, as a judgment in his favor would not “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487.

A § 1983 claim alleging a Vienna Convention consular notification violation is not barred by Heck when the plaintiff seeks civil remedies without attacking the validity of a conviction or sentence.

Gandara v. Bennett · filed 2008-05-22

Thus, in our opinion, Heck does not bar the claim being made here. Gandara is not attacking the validity of his criminal conviction or sentence, but rather pursuing a civil claim for money damages and other civil remedies. There is no legal inconsistency.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s retaliation claim based on a disciplinary report when success would not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence.

Watkins v. Kasper · filed 2008-06-06

Because the Plaintiffs claims do not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, they are not barred by Heck v. Humphrey and its progeny.

A § 1983 claim challenging the fact or duration of confinement is barred by Heck when the conviction or sentence has not been reversed or expunged.

Adi v. Management & Training Corp. · filed 2008-06-19

Because Adi’s claims clearly implicate the duration and fact of his confinement, as opposed to the procedures affecting his confinement, and because he has not alleged that his conviction or sentence has been reversed or expunged, his claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit an excessive force claim that, if successful, would undermine an outstanding conviction for resisting an officer.

Walker v. Munsell · filed 2008-06-13

This type of excessive force claim is, therefore, the type of claim that is barred by Heck in our circuit.

Section 1983’s Heck bar does not necessarily preclude an excessive force claim after a conviction for resisting arrest or assaulting officers when the conviction can coexist with a finding of excessive force.

Lora-Pena v. FBI · filed 2008-06-20

The Supreme Court has held that, if judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior criminal conviction, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. ... Similarly, Lora-Pena’s convictions for resisting arrest and assaulting officers would not be inconsistent with a holding that the officers, during a lawful arrest, used excessive (or unlawful) force in response to his own unlawful actions.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a state criminal judgment are barred under Heck.

Zapata v. Brandenburg · filed 2008-08-25

First, the court concluded that most of the claims Mr. Zapata asserted would imply that his state criminal judgment was invalid, and thus were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). ... The district court’s dismissal in each of these cases was appropriate and we affirm them.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed for failure to state a claim when Heck v. Humphrey applies.

Cooper v. Ashcroft · filed 2008-08-28

The district court correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim appellant’s complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Appellant’s attempt to argue Heck does not apply is unavailing.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for challenging the validity of an outstanding criminal conviction.

Friedman v. Fadely · filed 2008-09-09

To the extent that Friedman’s action challenged the validity of his state court convictions, the district court correctly dismissed it.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a probation revocation cannot proceed unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Cougle v. County of Desoto, Mississippi · filed 2008-11-07

The district court correctly recognized that the allegations of unlawful search and arrest in this case, if true, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation of Cougle’s probation, which was based, at least in part, on the same search and arrest. Cougle has not demonstrated that the revocation of his probation has been reversed, expunged, set aside or called into question as required by Heck as a prerequisite for this case to proceed. Summary judgment in favor of the defendants was therefore proper.

A § 1983 false arrest claim is barred when pursuing it would necessarily impugn an unfavorable disposition of prior criminal proceedings.

Agner v. City of Hermosa Beach · filed 2008-11-25

Agner’s federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Heck-barred because on the facts in this case, pursuing a claim for false arrest would necessarily impugn the unfavorable disposition of the prior criminal proceedings against him.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Greene v. Barrasse · filed 2008-12-05

We agree with the District Court that the relief Greene seeks would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Because Greene has not demonstrated a successful challenge to his conviction, his complaint is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 bars a challenge to lost good-time credits when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of the decision denying those credits, even if the plaintiff is no longer in custody and has shown no exception to the Heck bar.

Simon v. Austin · filed 2009-01-09

The district court properly dismissed the action because a judgment in Simon’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board’s (“ISRB”) decision to deny Simon good-time credits. Simon, who is out of custody, cannot seek to overturn the ISRB’s decision in a habeas proceeding and he has failed to show that any exceptions to the Heck-bar apply.

Section 1983 claims against a supervisor are barred by Heck when Heck bars the challenge to the underlying constitutional violation.

Webb v. Owens · filed 2009-01-27

If Heck bars a challenge to the underlying constitutional violation, it also bars a challenge against a supervisor based upon that underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Greene v. Barrasse · filed 2009-03-24

Because Greene has not demonstrated that he successfully challenged his conviction, his complaint is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 bars a plaintiff from recovering damages for an unconstitutional conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated through one of the specified avenues.

Abbott v. Craven · filed 2009-03-26

Abbott’s challenges to his re-sentencing in 1986 and the denial of parole are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (holding “that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus”).

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Talton v. Lewis · filed 1997-06-19

Heck precludes a section 1983 claim if "a judgment in favor of plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," unless the sentence or conviction has previously been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim must be dismissed when a judgment for the plaintiff would imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned.

Charles Alexander/Ryahim v. Monroe · filed 2009-05-13

... we conclude dismissal was proper because a judgment in Ryahim’s favor on his conspiracy claim would imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Ryahim did not allege his conviction had been overturned.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction that has not been reversed on appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding.

Powell v. Curry · filed 2009-05-15

As the district court found, however, Powell’s claims are barred by Heck, because he is seeking to re- cover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction that has not been re- versed on appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding.

Section 1983 damages claims barred by Heck are dismissed without prejudice so they may be refiled if the conviction is invalidated.

Housley v. Erwin · filed 2009-05-26

In sum, the judgment is modified to reflect that, to the extent Housley has asserted Heck-barred claims for damages, they are dismissed without prejudice, and the judgment is affirmed as modified.

Section 1983 claims premised on a challenge to the convicting court’s subject matter jurisdiction are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Soder v. Williamson · filed 2009-06-05

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Soder’s claims that are premised on his subject matter jurisdiction argument are barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey.

A complaint that fails the Heck v. Humphrey requirement is not cognizable under § 1983.

Rushing v. Leary · filed 1997-10-28

We have reviewed the record and Rushing’s brief challenging the district court’s judgment, and we conclude that Rushing’s complaint is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Graver v. Franco · filed 2009-07-07

The district court properly dismissed the action because a judgment in Craver’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and the conviction has not been invalidated.

A Section 1983 claim alleging improper denial of parole can be barred under Heck.

Witherow v. Crawford · filed 2009-07-31

The district court properly dismissed Witherow’s due process claims related to the April 4, 2000 disciplinary hearing because ... and his claim that he was improperly denied parole is Heck-barred, see Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir.1997).

A § 1983 action barred by Heck because the relevant state-court finding has not been overturned or invalidated should be dismissed without prejudice.

Newman v. Bowles · filed 2009-08-17

The district court properly dismissed the action pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), in light of the state court’s finding that the search was not based on a parole search condition, and Newman’s failure to show that the state court’s finding has been overturned or invalidated. ... However, we vacate the judgment and remand so that the district court may dismiss the action without prejudice.

Section 1983 retaliation claims may proceed despite the Heck bar, even when related claims challenging disciplinary findings cannot.

Foley v. Johnson · filed 2002-06-13

However, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Foley’s retaliation claims under Heck.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when no criminal prosecution is pending, even if dismissed charges could be refiled.

Evans v. Knodell · filed 2002-07-30

Here, there was no pending criminal prosecution against Evans, so Heck does not apply.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to obtain damages and expungement of a disciplinary conviction when that relief would require unwinding the agency’s judgment.

Muhammad v. Close · filed 2002-09-23

Thus Heck bars the plaintiffs action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when their theory would negate an outstanding conviction for resisting detention.

Statchen v. Palmer, et al. · filed 2009-09-15

Summary judgment is appropriate under Heck on Statchen’s Fourth Amendment and assault claims that are premised on the theory that he was not resisting detention.

Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim when success would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the claimant’s continuing confinement.

Beaver v. Washington · filed 2009-10-07

The conclusion that Beaver’s first claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), was improper because the claim did not necessarily imply the invalidity of Beaver’s continuing confinement.

Section 1983 cannot support a claim whose success would necessarily imply that a criminal conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Cockrell v. Bradbury · filed 2009-12-08

The district court properly dismissed the action alleging that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy leading to Cockrell’s criminal convictions because judgment in Cockrell’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of those convictions, and Cockrell has failed to demonstrate that his convictions have been invalidated.

Section 1983 may allow prospective injunctive or declaratory relief for a challenge to parole procedures even when Heck bars damages for that challenge.

Rose v. State of California · filed 2009-12-14

Although Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994), bars Rose’s request for money damages in his challenge to the procedures used during his parole hearing, it does not necessarily bar a claim for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (allowing claims challenging parole procedures to proceed under § 1983 because the injunctive and declaratory relief that plaintiffs sought would not necessarily spell speedier release).

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are dismissed under Heck without prejudice.

Turner v. Giusto · filed 2009-12-14

Because a judgment in Turner’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, the district court properly dismissed the action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). However, the dismissal under Heck should have been without prejudice. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995).

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Adamson v. Los Angeles County · filed 2009-12-29

The district court properly dismissed Claims 1-4 and 9-10 of the Second Amended Complaint because a judgment in Adamson’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and he did not allege that his conviction has been invalidated.

A Section 1983 claim cannot proceed if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Monaco v. Moberg · filed 2010-01-22

The district court properly dismissed Monaco’s action without leave to amend because judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of a previous conviction and Monaco failed to allege that the conviction had been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated by a proper tribunal.

Vafaiyan v. Target Inc. · filed 2010-01-27

Vafaiyan’s allegations in the instant proceeding would imply the invalidity of his money laundering conviction because the drug charges were incorporated in the money laundering charge. As Vafaiyan has not demonstrated that a proper tribunal has held his conviction invalid, his claims are Heck-barred.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to the Heck bar.

Smith v. State of Idaho · filed 2010-02-03

Dana Lydell Smith appeals the dismissal of his civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Of course, we cannot overrule the Supreme Court’s decision. We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling under Heck.

Section 1983 bars claims whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an unreversed, unexpunged, undeclared-invalid, or otherwise uncalled-into-question conviction or sentence.

Beyah v. New Jersey State Parole Board · filed 2010-02-03

The doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), precludes § 1983 claims whose success “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of a conviction or sentence that has not already been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims are barred when a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s sentence.

Moran v. Beale · filed 2010-03-02

Moreover, Moran’s section 1983 claims are Heck-barred.

A § 1983 complaint that appears barred under Heck can be denied in forma pauperis status.

Woodmore v. State Bar Chief Trial Counsel · filed 2010-03-29

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Woodmore’s request to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears from the face of the complaint that the action is Heck-barred.

A Section 1983 claim is barred when success would imply that a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Rasmussen v. California Department of Motor Vehicles · filed 2010-03-31

The district court properly dismissed Rasmussen’s complaint because his claims are based on actions which, if deemed unlawful, would render his conviction under California Vehicle Code section 23152 invalid, and that conviction “has not been reversed, expunged or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 claims that would call a conviction into question are barred while the conviction remains valid.

Busick v. City of Madison, Mississippi · filed 2010-05-26

As the alleged unlawfulness of the defendants’ actions would call the conviction into question and the conviction has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated, the district court correctly concluded that the claims were barred.

Heck’s restriction on § 1983 actions is not jurisdictional, so a court may resolve the claims on their merits without deciding whether Heck applies.

Gardner v. Garner · filed 2010-06-17

In any event, we have held that the application of Heck to a § 1983 action is not a matter of jurisdiction and hence need not be resolved where the § 1983 claims may be resolved on the merits. ... Particularly given the exigency of this proceeding, we follow that course here.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Vargas v. Wabakken · filed 2010-06-17

To the extent Vargas contends the misconduct report resulted in a loss of good time credits that will affect the duration of his sentence, his claim is Heck-barred. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (barring section 1983 actions when judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence not otherwise invalidated).

A § 1983 false arrest claim is not barred by Heck when the resulting charges were nolle prossed.

Simpson v. Stewart · filed 2010-07-09

As a result, Simpson’s false arrest claim is not barred by Heck, and the district court erred in dismissing the claim on this basis.

Section 1983 damages claims based on a failure to advise an arrestee of Article 36 Vienna Convention rights are not barred by Heck v. Humphrey under Sanchez-Llamas.

Taylor v. City of Farmville · filed 2010-08-12

We have reviewed the record and the district court’s order and conclude that pursuant to Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), the action was not barred by the holding in Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims that imply an outstanding conviction is invalid are barred under Heck, and dismissal on that ground is without prejudice.

Robert Gautreaux, Sr. v. Sheriff Larry Sanders · filed 2010-10-06

All of his claims implied the invalidity of his conviction, and he did not show that his conviction had been reversed or set aside. ... We note, however, that the dismissal should have been without prejudice.

Section 1983 claims challenging a denial of parole are barred by Heck when they implicate the validity of continued confinement.

Howard v. Doria Selling · filed 2010-10-06

The district court properly dismissed the action because Howard’s claim that he was denied institutional parole is Heck-barred.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence unless that sentence has already been invalidated.

Theron Lynch v. Alameda County · filed 2010-10-06

The district court properly dismissed the action as Heck-barred because a judgment in Lynch’s favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his . . . sentence,” and Lynch has not demonstrated that his sentence has already been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim challenging parole revocation cannot be dismissed under Heck without considering the Nonnette exception.

McClellan v. Mountain · filed 2010-10-06

However, we vacate the dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), of McClellan’s claim challenging parole revocation. The district court did not expressly consider the Heck exception set forth in Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further proceedings on this claim.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck when they challenge prior parole suitability decisions or would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of confinement.

Williams v. Schwarzenegger · filed 2010-10-13

Moreover, to the extent Williams’ § 1983 action challenges prior parole suitability decisions or would otherwise necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of his confinement, it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A Section 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction may proceed once that conviction has been invalidated.

Pearlman v. City of Fort Worth, Texas · filed 2010-11-08

Specifically, the district court held—correctly at the time—that Pearlman was barred from bringing a Section 1983 claim for her allegedly unlawful arrest, since that same arrest was the basis for criminal charges of resisting arrest to which Pearlman pleaded guilty. Because a ruling in Pearlman’s favor on her unlawful arrest claim would necessarily imply that her criminal conviction was invalid, the district court was barred from considering her claim unless the conviction was first invalidated on direct appeal, by writ of habeas corpus, or through a similar proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2000). The day after the district court issued its judgment, however, a Texas state court granted McClesky’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea and the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the case, and thus the Heck bar no longer applies.

Section 1983 does not permit damages or declaratory relief challenging prison disciplinary procedures when success would necessarily invalidate a disciplinary conviction that has not been overturned.

Martinez v. Horsley · filed 2010-11-12

A prisoner may not seek monetary damages or declaratory relief under § 1983 based on the procedures used in a disciplinary conviction until that disciplinary conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid if a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s excessive force claim to proceed despite a disciplinary conviction when success would not affect the validity of the underlying conviction or the duration of the sentence.

Mosley v. Leamon White · filed 2010-12-13

The district court sua sponte determined that, because Mosley received a disciplinary case and was found guilty, his § 1983 excessive force claim should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heck and Edwards. We disagree. ... Success in the instant action would not affect the validity of Mosley’s underlying conviction or the duration of his sentence. ... Therefore, the district court erred in determining that his excessive force claim was barred by Heck and Edwards.

Section 1983 relief is unavailable when success on a claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been negated.

Walker v. Clearfield County District Attorney · filed 2011-01-24

If that allegation were proven, it would plainly imply the invalidity of Walker’s conviction, and thus Walker’s § 1983 suit runs afoul of Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implies a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Turner v. Dumanis · filed 2011-02-24

The district court properly dismissed Turner’s claims that defendants destroyed materially exculpatory evidence in bad faith because Turner’s conviction has not been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a constitutional claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction cannot be brought under § 1983 unless the conviction has already been invalidated).

Section 1983 due process claims challenging a prison disciplinary conviction are barred by Heck when the prisoner has not shown that the conviction was invalidated or expunged.

Flores v. Cary Cook · filed 2011-04-08

The magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing Flores’s ... claims that he was denied due process during his disciplinary proceeding as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), in as much as Flores failed to show that the disciplinary conviction had been invalidated or expunged.

A § 1983 complaint that is not cognizable under Heck v. Humphrey may be dismissed without prejudice.

Roseby v. Budlow · filed 2011-05-03

Douglas M. Roseby appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint, without prejudice, as not cognizable under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an uninvalidated sentence or parole revocation.

Easterling v. Siarnicki · filed 2011-05-06

Easterling’s claim is foreclosed by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck bars a plaintiff’s suit under § 1983 where “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

A prisoner may pursue a § 1983 action challenging a disciplinary conviction without first setting it aside when the conviction did not affect the length of confinement.

Richardson v. Yates · filed 2011-06-01

As the State conceded at argument, because Richardson’s misconduct conviction did not affect the length of his confinement, he may pursue a § 1983 action without first complying with the rule in Heck. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 858. We agree, and conclude that Richardson is not barred from pursuing his § 1983 action noted above.

Section 1983 claims barred under Heck are dismissed without prejudice.

Kassab v. San Diego Police Department · filed 2011-07-01

The district court properly concluded that Kassab’s § 1983 claims were Heck-barred. ... We construe the judgment to be without prejudice.

Section 1983 damages claims must be dismissed when success would necessarily imply an uninvalidated criminal conviction or sentence.

Blackden v. NH State Police, et al. · filed 2011-07-08

A plaintiff's § 1983 damages claim must be dismissed if "judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of [a criminal] conviction or sentence" and if plaintiff cannot "demonstrate that the ... conviction or sentence has already been invalidated."

Section 1983 does not permit a claim attacking parole revocation proceedings when success would imply the invalidity of a sentence that has not been invalidated.

Almendarez v. Huddleston · filed 2011-07-28

Almendarez’s suit is not cognizable under § 1983. ... To the extent that Almendarez’s parole was revoked as a result of the warrant, the holding in Heck is applicable to claims attacking the validity of the parole proceedings.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply that an underlying conviction is invalid and the conviction has not already been invalidated.

Brown v. Renfroe · filed 2011-08-26

A judgment in favor of Brown on his § 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his underlying conviction for aggravated child molestation. Because Brown has not provided any evidence that this conviction has already been invalidated, the district court did not err in finding his claims barred by Heck.

A § 1983 claim challenging a search is not barred by Heck when the related conviction rests on a plea rather than evidence from the search.

Lockett v. Ericson · filed 2011-08-31

Lockett pled nolo contendere after the superior court denied his California Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression motion. He was not tried, and no evidence was introduced against him. ... We therefore hold that Heck does not bar Lockett’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 bars an excessive force claim when a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of convictions that have not been invalidated.

Hays v. Officer Shane Anderson · filed 2011-10-07

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants Hanley and Huber on Hays’s § 1983 excessive force claim because a judgment in Hays’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions for assaulting and obstructing a police officer, and Hays has not shown that his convictions have been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Kassab v. San Diego Police Department · filed 2011-10-13

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Kassab’s § 1983 claims concerning the searches of his store, his arrest, and his prosecution because these claims are Heck-barred.

A § 1983 action barred by Heck v. Humphrey must be dismissed without prejudice.

Scott v. State of Iowa · filed 2011-10-19

Iowa inmate Scottie Scott appeals the district court’s1 dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... Accordingly, we modify the dismissal to be without prejudice, and we affirm the judgment as modified.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Wilson v. Bossier City Police Department, Et · filed 2011-11-02

Although “a claim of unlawful arrest, standing alone, does not necessarily implicate the validity of a criminal prosecution following the arrest”, Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original), the crux of Wilson’s § 1983 claim is that testimony rejected by the jury is, in fact, true. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Wilson’s claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 permits a civil action to proceed despite the Heck bar when the plaintiff was never convicted or sentenced and had no habeas remedy.

Magana v. County of San Diego · filed 2011-12-19

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Heck does not apply. Magana was never convicted of anything or sentenced by the juvenile court. He never pleaded guilty to the criminal charges leveled against him, and, upon his successful completion of the informal supervision, those charges were dismissed in their entirety. Moreover, Magana had no recourse to the habeas corpus statute to challenge his informal supervision. Accordingly, Heck does not apply to bar his § 1983 suit. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364; Nonnette, 316 F.3d at 877.

Section 1983 bars a claim that necessarily implies a conviction is invalid until the conviction is overturned, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.

Lenoir v. Howard · filed 2012-01-18

Accordingl1y, until Lenoir’s conviction is overturned, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, his claims challenging the validity of his criminal trial are barred by Heck.

The Heck bar can prevent a deceased person’s successors from bringing a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a surviving accomplice’s conviction necessarily found the force lawful and their interests on that issue were aligned.

Kristy Beets v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2012-02-10

We conclude that under the particular facts of this case, plaintiffs should reasonably have expected to be bound by the jury’s decision in Morales’ criminal proceeding and because a favorable decision in plaintiffs’ civil action would undermine her conviction, the civil action is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims barred by Heck must be dismissed without prejudice.

Rowell v. Ewing Bros. Towing Co. · filed 2012-03-06

However, because claims barred by Heck should be dismissed without prejudice, we vacate the judgment as to these claims, and remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss these claims without prejudice.

A § 1983 challenge to sex offender registration is not barred by Heck when it does not call the plaintiff’s conviction into question.

Doe v. Jindal · filed 2012-03-29

This argument is wholly without merit, as is the reliance on Heck. Unlike Heck v. Humphrey, the plaintiffs do not ask the Court to upset their convictions. They do not claim innocence. In Heck, an inmate claimed his conviction was invalid because of an unlawful investigation and destruction of evidence. Neither Heck’s facts or doctrine apply here.

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence does not accrue until that conviction or sentence is overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Lewis v. City of Waxahachie · filed 2012-03-30

Pursuant to Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, if a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit for alleged constitutional violations and a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction or sentence, the suit must be dismissed, and the cause of action will not accrue until the conviction or sentence is overturned or otherwise invalidated. ... There is no evidence that Lewis’s conviction for contempt has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise invalidated; thus, her claims have not yet accrued and are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 bars a state prisoner’s damages claim when success would logically contradict the basis for the prisoner’s incarceration.

Henerson v. Davis · filed 2012-04-17

A state prisoner may not bring a damages claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein success would logically contradict the underlying reason for his incarceration.

Section 1983 actions that necessarily challenge the validity of an outstanding conviction are barred under Heck and may be dismissed without prejudice.

Daniel Borden, Sr. v. Gautier · filed 2012-04-27

California state prisoner Daniel F. Borden, Sr., appeals pro se from the ... district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging malicious prosecution and other claims related to his conviction. ... The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Borden’s action because it appears from the face of the complaint that the action is Heck-barred.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that would undermine a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Noel v. Abraham · filed 2012-05-01

Because Noel intended to use § 1983 to collaterally attack the validity of his convictions, his civil rights claim may not proceed until his criminal convictions are overturned.

Section 1983 claims that would invalidate a criminal conviction are barred by Heck; a Louisiana Article 894 set-aside does not lift that bar.

Rose Walter v. Horseshoe Casino & Hotel · filed 2012-06-06

A § 1983 claim that would invalidate a conviction is barred by Heck.

A Section 1983 claim barred by Heck v. Humphrey can be rejected without deciding whether the defendant acted under color of state law.

Dowdy v. Lawrence · filed 2012-06-20

Because we agree that Dowdy’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), we need not consider whether the defendant acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence are barred unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Curtis v. USA · filed 2012-06-25

Under Heck, a prisoner may not bring a damages claim challenging the constitutionality of officials’ actions if a judgment in his favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless he shows that his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. ... As a result, Curtis’s remaining claims are Heck-barred.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim is barred by a prison disciplinary judgment only if success would necessarily affect the fact or duration of confinement.

Davis v. Officer C. Hodges · filed 2012-07-13

However, Heck only applies to prison disciplinary determinations if a prisoner’s § 1983 claim would necessarily affect the fact or duration of his confinement. ... We conclude that the Eighth Amendment violations Davis alleged do not necessarily imply that the disciplinary judgment revoking his good-time credits is invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s sentence.

Cozens v. Woodward County Oklahoma Ex Rel. Woodward County Commissioners · filed 2012-08-09

In this case, success on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence, and therefore the district court correctly dismissed the complaint under Heck.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Sonntag v. Nevada County · filed 2012-09-21

The district court properly dismissed Sonntag’s action as Heck-barred because Sonntag’s allegations, if proven, would imply the invalidity of his conviction which has not been otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a disciplinary punishment unless the disciplinary result has been invalidated.

Johnson v. Fong · filed 2012-09-25

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s claims relating to his disciplinary hearing and the circumstances surrounding it as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), because Johnson failed to allege that the results of the disciplinary hearing had been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (claims based on allegations that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed are not cognizable under § 1983).

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction cannot proceed unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Ticknor v. Hinsburg · filed 2012-09-25

The district court properly granted summary judgment under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because a judgment in Ticknor’s favor on his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction for resisting arrest, and Ticknor failed to allege that this conviction has been invalidated.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim is not barred by Heck when success would not necessarily invalidate a rule-violation conviction, and Heck does not bar evidence in the action.

Robert Hackworth, Jr. v. Rangel · filed 2012-09-25

However, success on the merits of Hackworth’s excessive force claim does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his of rule-violation conviction. ... Furthermore, the rule established in Heck is not an evidentiary doctrine and, therefore, cannot bar evidence in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 excessive-force claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an uninvalidated conviction for resisting arrest.

Walter Brown, Jr. v. Wolfe · filed 2012-09-26

The district court properly concluded that Brown’s excessive force claims are Heck-barred because success on Brown’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for resisting arrest, as that conviction was based on resistance in response to defendants’ allegedly excessive force.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution are barred when success would undermine an outstanding criminal conviction.

Cormier v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government · filed 2012-10-12

Allowing Cormier to proceed with his false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims against the officers under § 1983, then, risks “undermining the validity of his criminal conviction[]” because the same underlying events triggered those charges. Connors, 538 F.3d at 377. Heck thus bars those claims.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement are subject to dismissal under Heck.

Matthews v. Olivia Craven · filed 2012-10-16

The district court properly dismissed the action because Matthews’s claims are premised on his “actual innocence” and success on the merits of these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging prison discipline that cost good-time credits does not arise until the prisoner successfully challenges the discipline; a Heck-barred dismissal is without prejudice.

Scott v. Jimmy Coleman, IV · filed 2012-10-23

After careful de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we agree with the district court that Scott’s claim concerning his disciplinary proceedings was Heck-barred, see Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2002) (under Heck, § 1983 action seeking damages for prison discipline that resulted in loss of good-time credits does not arise until inmate has successfully challenged discipline through habeas or some other proceeding). We modify the dismissal, however, to be without prejudice.

A § 1983 claim is barred when a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s sentence and resulting confinement.

Ventris v. Felton · filed 2012-11-27

Dismissal of Ventris’s ex post facto claim was proper because a judgment in Ventris’s favor on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Ventris’s sentence and the duration of his resulting confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Backus v. Gissel · filed 2012-11-29

We review de novo, Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm. The district court dismissed Backus’s § 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution as Heck-barred.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Garber v. City of Los Angeles General Services Department · filed 2013-02-19

The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings on Garber’s claims alleging unlawful search and seizure, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution because those claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck while related criminal proceedings are ongoing and no outstanding conviction exists.

Grant v. Rod Hopps · filed 2013-02-19

However, the action was not Heck-barred because Grant’s underlying criminal proceedings were ongoing.

A § 1983 claim seeking access to evidence is not barred by Heck when success would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction is invalid.

McLaughlin v. Pasco County Sheriff's Office · filed 2013-02-26

Here, the district court erroneously dismissed McLaughlin’s complaint to the extent that it did so on the basis that he was “complaining about his federal criminal arrest and sentence.” In the instant complaint, McLaughlin does not attempt to overturn his conviction. Instead, he seeks access to evidence that he claims he has requested through the FOIA and state procedures, and that the defendants have refused to provide to him. Thus, as in Bradley, McLaughlin “prevails in this lawsuit once he has access to that evidence or an accounting for its absence. Nothing in that result necessarily demonstrates or even implies that his conviction is invalid.” 305 F.3d at 1290.

The Heck bar does not apply to a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff has not been convicted.

Gakuba v. O'Brien · filed 2013-03-25

But Heck does not apply absent a conviction.

Section 1983 claims that call a probation revocation into question are barred unless the revocation has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Thomas v. Jackson · filed 2013-04-03

Regarding his § 1983 claims, Thomas’s assertion of false imprisonment implicates the validity of his probation revocation. He has failed to establish that the probation revocation has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, so his claims are barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 claims that would call a probation revocation into question are barred unless the revocation has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Thomas v. Epps · filed 2013-04-03

He has failed to establish that the probation revocation has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, so his claims are barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 does not provide damages for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment unless the plaintiff shows that the sentence has been invalidated.

Dunn v. Harper County · filed 2013-04-05

Under Heck, criminal defendants seeking economic damages for alleged unconstitutional imprisonment who cannot show their sentences have been invalidated are not entitled to relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would necessarily imply that an outstanding conviction or sentence is invalid, unless it has already been invalidated.

Moncrieffe v. Broward County State Attorney's Office · filed 2013-04-10

Under Heck, if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his § 1983 complaint for money damages “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” the district court must dismiss the complaint unless “the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s due process claim challenging prison disciplinary proceedings when the claim is barred by Heck.

Chappell v. Jones · filed 2013-05-17

In short, he contends that his allegations were sufficient to state a claim and that the Heck bar should not apply, but he provides no persuasive reasons as to why the district court erred in holding that his allegations were insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief or that his due process claim was barred by Heck. Therefore, for substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court, we hold that Mr. Chappell’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed.

A prisoner’s § 1983 excessive force claim is not barred by Heck merely because prison discipline established that he assaulted a guard, if he alleges that guards used excessive force after subduing him.

Navejar v. Iyiola · filed 2013-05-29

But Navejar’s assault on Iyiola is not neces- sarily inconsistent with his sworn contention that the guards answered his assault with excessive force after they subdued him.

Section 1983 claims barred under Heck should be dismissed without prejudice so they may be reinstated if the conviction is later called into question.

Stewart v. City of Chicago · filed 2013-05-30

These claims should have been dismissed without prejudice, however, so that Stewart could reinstate them if her conviction is ever called into question.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Ramirez-Salazar v. Derksen · filed 2013-06-17

The district court properly dismissed Ramirez-Salazar’s action as barred by Heck v. Humprey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because a judgment in Ramirez-Salazar’s favor on his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction for drug and firearm possession and illegal reentry, and judicially noticeable court records show that Ramirez-Salazar’s conviction has not been invalidated.

A Section 1983 complaint challenging an arrest cannot be dismissed under Heck based on an assumed conviction when the plaintiff alleges that the charges were dismissed.

Torrey Love v. Rumgay · filed 2013-07-30

However, a review of the record reveals that Love in fact alleged in his complaint that he was not convicted of the charges, but that they were dismissed by the State. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a related criminal conviction.

Rodriguez v. City of Modesto · filed 2013-08-02

Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck, a plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 suit for damages if success on the § 1983 claim would “necessarily imply” the invalidity of a related prior criminal conviction, such as by negating an element of the convicted offense.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when they would not affect the plaintiff’s conviction or the time to be served.

Charles Sanchez, Jr. v. Earls · filed 2013-10-16

We find that Heck does not bar Sanchez’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when they necessarily challenge a conviction or a disciplinary action that resulted in lost gain time.

Alsobrook v. Alvarado · filed 2013-12-03

Claims are barred under the Heck doctrine when they necessarily challenge the validity of a conviction, including disciplinary actions resulting in loss of gain time. ... Count II, therefore, is Heck-barred, and is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits a Brady claim based on a vacated conviction when success would not invalidate a later guilty plea.

Poventud v. City of New York · filed 2014-01-16

Following vacatur of his conviction, a favorable judgment in this § 1983 action would not render invalid any subsequent, plea-based judgment against Poventud.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck when success would necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s criminal conviction is invalid, and those claims must be dismissed without prejudice.

Chico Scrap Metal, Inc. v. Robinson · filed 2014-01-17

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are barred by Heck because a judgment in their favor, holding that the cleanup orders were imposed improperly and that the prosecution was unlawful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiffs’ state court convictions. ... We held in Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), that Heck-barred § 1983 claims must be dismissed without prejudice so that the plaintiff may "reassert his claims if he ever succeeds in invalidating his conviction."

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when proving it would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Snarke v. Barkley · filed 2014-01-20

Because Snarke concedes that he pleaded guilty to the charge of Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity arising out of the same arrest and did not contest that the proof required to establish his unlawful arrest and detention claims necessarily implicates his conviction for Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity, he has failed to show the district court erred in ... concluding that his claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the bar established in Heck v. Humphrey.

Coleman v. 16th Circuit Court · filed 2014-02-04

We conclude, as did magistrate judge and the district court, that Coleman’s Section 1983 claims are barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

A § 1983 damages claim for lost evidence is barred under Heck when an award would implicitly question the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Ervin v. Dallas Cty District Atty's Off, et · filed 2014-02-12

Although Ervin contends that that the district court misapplied the Heck bar because a decision in his favor would not result in his release from prison or invalidate his conviction, an award of damages on his loss-of-evidence claim would implicitly question the validity of Ervin’s conviction under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a disciplinary report that led to the loss of good time credits when the claim is barred by Heck.

Diaz v. Perez · filed 2014-03-18

To the extent that Diaz’s action was premised on the issuance of a false rules violation report, which led to his loss of good time credits, the district court properly dismissed the action as Heck-barred. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997) (challenge to loss of good-time credits not cognizable under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not allow damages for pretrial detention when the claim would undermine that detention and the plaintiff has not first obtained habeas relief.

Ippolito v. Justice Service Division · filed 2014-04-21

Thus, Heck precludes recovery of damages for Mr. Ippolito’s pretrial detention in the absence of a prior award of habeas relief.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Seys v. Doucet · filed 2014-05-01

Because Seys has not shown that his conviction has been invalidated on direct appeal or in a state or federal collateral attack, his complaint is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).