42 U.S.C. § 1983

Grand jury witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims based on their testimony and related investigation or preparation.

Harper v. Stroman · filed 2020-05-14

Moreover, as Defendants correctly point out, grand jury witnesses have absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness’ testimony, as well as related investigation or preparation for such testimony.

A witness has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim based on trial testimony.

Pullen v. Boone County Sherriff's Dept · filed 2020-06-03

If Pullen’s claim is based upon Stephens’s testimony at trial, Stephens is entitled to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a trial witness based on the witness’s testimony.

HUDDLESTONE v. WARRNER · filed 2020-08-25

As a trial witness, Defendant enjoys immunity from suit with respect to any claim based on his testimony.

Witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for testimony given in pretrial judicial proceedings.

Assa'ad-Faltas v. Richland County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-03-19

Although Lahue reserved judgment, § 1983 immunity has been extended to perjury in pretrial hearings. ... According, the Court will overrule Assa’ad’s fourth objection.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a witness for testimony in a judicial proceeding, even if the witness knowingly gives false testimony.

Murrell v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union · filed 2020-11-16

The Supreme Court of the United States has established that “§ 1983 does not allow recovery of damages against a private party for testimony in a judicial proceeding.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329 (1983). ... Even if Krause “knew the statements were false and made them with malice,” she cannot be held liable.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on witnesses for alleged perjury in trial or pretrial testimony.

Montgomery v. Verechia · filed 2020-12-17

Witnesses, however, are immune from § 1983 liability when the claim is based on allegations of perjury, either at trial or during pretrial proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a police officer based on the officer’s testimony at a criminal trial, even if the testimony was perjured.

Murrell v. Michael · filed 2021-01-26

But the law is clear that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not “authorize[] a convicted person to assert a claim for damages against a police officer for giving perjured testimony at his criminal trial.”

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process claim when the plaintiff has not alleged that defendants denied the process available under the governing collective bargaining agreement.

Brown v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1981-08-10

Plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants named in his complaint have denied him his right to proceed under this grievance procedure. Therefore, I find that plaintiff has not stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials solely for their involvement in the grievance process.

Wilson v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2019-08-09

Involvement in the grievance process is not sufficient to impose liability.

When alleged unconstitutional conduct by a local government causes death, state wrongful-death law cannot foreclose Section 1983 compensatory damages if doing so would conflict with the statute’s policies.

Weeks v. Benton · filed 1986-12-12

The wrongful death statute should not be held to foreclose the recovery of compensatory damages against the governmental entity in question, for such a result would be inconsistent with the policies underlying § 1983.

A parent’s possible Section 1983 wrongful-death claim must be considered independently of a state wrongful-death statute’s hierarchy of beneficiaries.

Eula Mae Logan, Etc. v. Hollier · filed 1983-08-11

Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND for the district court to determine whether Eula Mae Logan has a cause of action under the Constitution and § 1983 for the wrongful death of her daughter Glenda Jean Lewis, independent of the Louisiana wrongful death statute.

Section 1983 permits deterrent damages in deprivation-of-life cases when state wrongful-death law cannot fulfill the federal statute’s deterrent purpose, so state-law damage limits do not control.

Roman v. City of Richmond · filed 1983-09-01

Damages representing the deterrence of defendants in the present deprivation of life cases from future unconstitutional conduct is necessary to fulfill the purposes of section 1983. Such damages cannot be awarded under applicable state law. Therefore, state law is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, and plaintiffs are not limited to the damages provided by state law. Deterrent damages are an appropriate remedy in the present cases, and were properly awarded by the jury.

State survival and wrongful-death damages limits do not restrict a Section 1983 claim when they would undermine the statute’s compensation and deterrence goals.

White v. Talboys · filed 1983-10-04

Reliance on the Colorado wrongful death damage rules would undermine the compensation rationale underlying § 1983 since it would limit and ‘preclude recovery by survivors suing in their own interests.’ Since the allegedly unconstitutional conduct caused the decedent’s death, application of Colorado survival and wrongful death damage rules would undermine the deterrence goals of § 1983.

State wrongful-death law determines whether survivors may maintain a § 1983 claim based on a decedent's civil-rights injury.

Delesma v. City of Dallas · filed 1984-05-25

The law of the forum state, however, determines whether the wrongful death action will lie.

Section 1983 death claims are distinct from Illinois wrongful-death claims and may include loss-of-life, punitive, and intangible-loss damages unavailable under restrictive state law.

Doty v. Carey · filed 1986-01-22

Illinois tort law for wrongful death is inconsistent with the meaning and purpose of § 1983 in several key respects. In an action brought on behalf of the spouse and next of kin, it allows no recovery for loss of life and no punitive damages. For a parent’s claim for loss of society of his son, it permits no right of action independent from the wrongful death claim. A civil rights action should include all of these. Further, it awards and distributes damages on the basis of economic factors, whereas federal civil rights concerns demand compensation for intangible losses. Plaintiffs have § 1983 actions which are separate and distinct from the Illinois wrongful death claim.

Section 1983 does not require a state wrongful death measure of damages to compensate a decedent’s own constitutional injuries when federal damages principles provide compensation.

Gilmere v. City Of Atlanta · filed 1989-03-06

For the above-stated reasons, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing to award the state wrongful death measure of damages to compensate for the violation of the decedent's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 wrongful death actions use North Carolina wrongful death law to measure damages when federal law supplies no measure and the state remedy satisfies the section’s policies.

Bowling v. Oldham · filed 1990-11-29

The court finds as fact that there is no federal statutory law governing the measure of damages in wrongful death actions brought pursuant to § 1983, and, therefore, it is compelled by § 1988 to use the law of North Carolina (N.C.Gen.Stat. § 28A-18-2 (1984)).

Section 1983 permits a parent to recover for her own injuries from the wrongful death of a child whose constitutional rights were violated when state wrongful death law supplies that remedy through § 1988.

Rhyne v. Henderson County · filed 1992-09-15

Both Brazier and Grandstaff hold that § 1988 incorporates this wrongful death remedy into § 1983, allowing Rhyne to recover under § 1983 for her own injuries resulting from the deprivation of her son's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 damages for a decedent's injuries do not include a survivor's separate injuries under a state wrongful death statute.

Andrews v. Neer · filed 2001-06-07

We believe that, by allowing the measure of damages in Andrews's suit to be entirely defined by the language of the Missouri wrongful death statute, we would impermissibly broaden the types of injuries for which Congress intended recovery to be available under § 1983's authorization of liability "to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require damages for a decedent’s loss of enjoyment of life caused by death.

Frontier Insurance v. Blaty · filed 2006-07-24

Like the only other panel of this court to have addressed the issue, ... we hold that federal law does not require, in a section 1983 action, recovery of hedonic damages stemming from a person’s death.

Section 1983 does not specify a remedy for a decedent’s rights violation, and a Pennsylvania wrongful death claim based on that violation may proceed at the pleading stage.

Becker v. Carbon County · filed 2016-04-08

I am not persuaded that application of the wrongful death damages is inconsistent with Sections 1983 and 1988. Therefore, the Carbon County Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claims pursuant to Pennsylvania’s wrongful death statute will be denied.

Section 1983 permits wrongful-death damages when the plaintiff proves a constitutional deprivation and the causal link required by the state’s wrongful-death law.

Montano v. Orange County Texas · filed 2016-11-29

Because the constitutional deprivation is well established and the causal link was admitted at trial, satisfying Texas’ causation standard, the standard for wrongful-death damages is satisfied.

Section 1983 permits Florida’s wrongful death law to govern a claim arising from a death, including its bar on damages for the decedent’s pain and suffering.

Sharbaugh v. Beaudry · filed 2017-07-14

After an exhaustive review of the matter, the Court concludes that the FWDA, which fills a gap in § 1983 by allowing for the survival of Martin’s cause of action against Defendants but precluding a claim for decedent’s pain and suffering, is not inconsistent with the policies underlying federal law.

Section 1983 allows a decedent’s estate to seek damages for the decedent’s injuries, but not for beneficiaries’ own wrongful death losses.

Franklin v. Griffith · filed 2019-04-19

Damages for injuries suffered by individuals other than the decedent are not recoverable by the decedent’s estate for the decedent, as these claims are inconsistent with purposes of § 1983.

A § 1983 damages claim may proceed through Michigan’s Wrongful Death Act.

Gordon v. Bierenga · filed 2020-09-09

Plaintiff’s damages claim under § 1983 are properly articulated through Michigan’s Wrongful Death Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim may proceed.

Section 1983 actions remain available even when a pre-filing order limits a prisoner’s ability to proceed without paying filing fees under § 1915.

Sylvester H. Peck v. Cliff Hoff, Deputy Warden, Classification Board · filed 1981-09-30

This Order does not prevent Inmate Peck from filing actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but rather, limits his use of the cost-free privileges of filing actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Section 1983 can provide a remedy for an arguable violation of Title II of the ADA committed under color of state law.

Rewolinski v. Morgan · filed 1995-08-18

Mr. Rewolinski has brought both of his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides a remedy for constitutional violations and violations of federal statutes where the violations are under color of state law. There is authority, although not controlling, for the proposition that a litigant may premise a § 1983 action upon claims under Title II of the ADA. Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F.Supp. 476 (N.D.Ind.1993). The court's own research has not found any controlling authority to the contrary. Moreover, I find that the facts as alleged set forth an arguable violation of the plaintiff's rights under Title II of the ADA.

Section 1983 allows a constitutional claim to proceed alongside a claim under an analogous statute based on similar facts.

Haley v. Clarksville-Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Sys. · filed 2018-12-17

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allows a constitutional claim to be brought under Section 1983 even if that claim runs parallel to a claim brought under an analogous statute on similar facts.

Section 1983 claims are not bound by unreviewed state administrative factfindings when the administrative proceeding did not afford an opportunity to litigate the facts necessary to the Section 1983 claim.

Flournoy v. Akridge · filed 1990-11-26

The factfinding process in the administrative procedure was geared toward proof of the elements of the administrative cause of action and was not necessarily the same factfinding process necessary to a full and proper litigation of appellant’s Section 1983 claims. Therefore, we determine that we are not bound to accept the hearing officer’s findings of fact as undisputed, and in light of the opposing affidavit submitted by appellant, we conclude that appellees have not met their burden on the motion for summary judgment.

A section 1983 action challenging an administrative decision is an independent action in which the court may hear evidence beyond the administrative record.

Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit District No. 1 · filed 1990-02-16

Unlike a certiorari proceeding, a section 1983 action is not a review proceeding even when, as here, it challenges administrative action that has an adjudicative component (Hameetman v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. 1985), 776 F.2d 636, 640); it is an independent, original action (Hameetman, 776 F.2d at 640). Thus, with respect to Federal due process questions, the circuit court could take testimony regarding the school board’s actions and the evidence it considered, and was not limited to the board’s record.

A state administrative appeal is not a § 1983 action or proper proceeding for redress when the agency lacks authority to adjudicate and grant relief under § 1983.

Derheim v. Hennepin County Bureau of Social Services · filed 1981-11-05

The important fact that the plaintiffs overlook is that their administrative appeal of the revocation of their FFH license was not taken before a court of general jurisdiction. ... The Commissioner has no authority to consider and grant relief on a section 1983 claim.

Filing a § 1983 action in Indiana state court does not excuse the plaintiff from exhausting the State’s administrative-review procedure.

State Ex Rel. Basham v. Medical Licensing Board of Indiana · filed 1983-07-25

Basham did not except himself from the requirement of exhaustion by filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

A state civil-rights official performing adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions has absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages liability.

Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co. · filed 1983-11-07

The district court did not err in concluding that Dorothy Porter has absolute immunity. The adjudicatory and prosecutorial nature of her responsibilities is clear.

A state administrative probable-cause finding receives preclusive effect in a Section 1983 action when the agency acted judicially and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.

Zanghi v. The Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, the Old Brookville Police Department, John Kenary and Ke · filed 1985-01-04

The administrative hearing and appeal in this case fall within the dictates of ... Utah Construction ... and therefore must be given preclusive effect in this Section 1983 action.

A successful challenge to a welfare agency's mandatory fair-hearing procedures is cognizable under § 1983 and may support attorney's fees under § 1988.

Carabello v. Perales · filed 1986-02-03

As petitioner has been successful on his claim, which is cognizable under 42 USC § 1983, the case must be remitted to Special Term ... .

Findings from an unemployment-compensation hearing do not collaterally estop a later § 1983 unlawful-discharge action when the procedures, remedies, issues, and incentives to litigate differ materially.

Salida School District R-32-J v. Morrison · filed 1987-02-17

Because of the differences between the two proceedings involved in this case, we conclude that collateral estoppel does not apply. ... The remedies available and procedures followed in a section 1983 action are materially different from the remedies and procedures available in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the issues presented are not identical, and the employer has little incentive to defend a claim for unemployment benefits vigorously.

A New York administrative hearing does not bar a § 1983 action on grounds of claim preclusion.

O'MALLEY v. Nassau County Medical Center · filed 1988-05-25

In New York, an administrative hearing will not bar, on the grounds of claim preclusion, a federal civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal forum to relitigate whether a state administrative decision was wrong or arbitrary and capricious.

Blake v. Ambach · filed 1988-07-28

Section 1983 is not a means for litigating in a federal forum whether a state or local administrative decision was wrong or even whether it was arbitrary and capricious.

An unreviewed state administrative decision does not have claim preclusive effect in a later § 1983 action arising from the same transaction or series of transactions.

Dionne v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Joyce Jefferson-Daniels · filed 1994-11-22

We therefore hold, applying federal common law preclusion principles, that the unre-viewed state administrative decision at issue here has no claim preclusive effect in the subsequent § 1983 action, despite arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when an administrative panel necessarily decided the same constitutional issues after an adequate opportunity to litigate them.

Smith v. Alabama Aviation and Technical College · filed 1995-06-16

Smith alleges that his § 1983 claims are not precluded by the panel's decision because its holding did not specifically address the issues involving the § 1983 claims. However, because the panel's purpose was to determine whether Smith's termination was "arbitrary or unjust or for political or personal reasons," we find that it was necessary for the panel to consider Smith's § 1983 claims in making its decision. ... Because all five elements of the doctrine of collateral estoppel are present in this case, we hold that Smith was estopped from bringing this action in the circuit court.

A municipal personnel board that lacks authority to grant relief on a § 1983 claim cannot bar a later district court action on that claim through claim preclusion.

Chavez v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1997-12-09

The district courts and federal courts share jurisdiction over claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (§ 1983 claims). ... Because of the personnel board’s limited statutory authority to adopt regulations and to administer the merit system ordinance and because of the broader explicit state and federal authority of district courts to entertain the OMA and constitutional claims, we conclude that the personnel board does not have jurisdiction to grant affirmative relief over the OMA and constitutional claims. ... Thus, Plaintiff must be permitted to split his claims between the grievance proceeding and the district court action even if the claims arose from the same disciplinary action.

An inverse-condemnation action against a government defendant to recover the value of property taken without formal eminent-domain proceedings is cognizable under Section 1983.

MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara · filed 1984-12-10

An action for inverse condemnation is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for negligent property deprivation when an adequate postdeprivation grievance remedy supplies due process.

Phelps v. Sgt. Anderson and Officer Langford · filed 1983-02-22

We therefore conclude that the grievance procedure afforded sufficient due process to bar Phelps’s § 1983 claim.

An adequate state mechanism for compensating a governmental taking precludes finding a federal-right violation and defeats a § 1983 takings claim.

Collier v. City of Springdale · filed 1984-05-08

We also hold that the availability of these state law mechanisms precludes finding that the taking of Collier’s property was in violation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; thus he has failed to state a claim for the taking of his property cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a takings claim when a city's adverse ownership claim merely diminishes property value without depriving the owner of traditional ownership rights.

Joseph W. Willard, Jr. v. The City of Beaumont, a Political Sub-Division of the State of Texas and Kenneth Wall, City At · filed 1985-06-03

In the context of the issue presented for decision in this case, we perceive no distinction between the interference with the economic value of property which results from the institution of condemnation proceedings and the interference which was alleged in this case when the defendants filed an adverse claim of ownership. ... Plaintiffs continue to retain all of the “property” they held prior to defendants’ assertion of a contrary claim. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to allege the deprivation of any constitutionally cognizable property interest and the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint.

A Section 1983 takings claim against a state or local government is premature until the plaintiff first uses an adequate state procedure for obtaining compensation.

JBK, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, Mo. · filed 1986-01-14

Accordingly, any assertion of a § 1983 cause of action in connection with a state “taking,” without first resorting to those state procedures, will be at least premature.

A takings claim under Section 1983 is premature until the property owner uses an adequate state compensation procedure and is denied just compensation.

Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp. · filed 1986-03-26

The United States Supreme Court noted in ... that state procedures which permit a property owner to obtain just compensation must be utilized before bringing a § 1983 claim. ... since no constitutional violation occurs under the Fifth Amendment until just compensation has been denied, state procedures that allow a property owner to obtain compensation for a taking do need to be exhausted.

A property owner cannot sustain a § 1983 takings claim merely by showing a taking under color of state law; the owner must first seek and be denied just compensation through available procedures.

Loretto v. Group W. Cable · filed 1987-12-15

The fact that a taking has occurred under color of State law is a necessary condition of plaintiff’s 42 USC § 1983 claim, but it is not in itself sufficient to sustain the claim. Until plaintiff applies for just compensation, utilizing the procedures therefor set forth in the Executive Law and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, and is denied the compensation she seeks she is not in a position to allege sufficiently, much less prove, the denial of any Federal statutory constitutional right.

Public-employment defamation does not support a Section 1983 occupational-liberty claim unless the employee is publicly identified and the stigmatizing charge is false.

Clark v. Maurer · filed 1987-07-16

Here the charges, though public, did not identify the employees; nor is it alleged that the press release, even without naming any of the plaintiffs, would somehow have conveyed their identity to readers who knew them. ... but in addition the complaint fails to allege that the charges are false.

Defamatory statements by a state officer acting under color of state law state a Section 1983 claim when they wrongfully deprive the plaintiff of a property interest such as employment.

Morfeld v. Dennis J. Kehm, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Prosecuting Attorney of Jefferson Coun · filed 1986-10-29

it is clear that if the plaintiff has been wrongfully denied a property interest, for example a right to employment, as a result of defamatory statements made by a state officer acting under color of state law, then a claim for relief under § 1983 has been stated.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to state a claim when defamatory public allegations accompany loss of employment and impair future employment opportunities.

Bartholomew v. Fischl · filed 1981-12-21

Conversely, defamatory public allegations, coupled with loss of employment, state a claim. Additionally, constitutionally protected “liberty” includes “later opportunities for ... employment.” ... Because plaintiff’s opportunities have purportedly been curtailed by the public nature of the charges which precipitated his discharge, we conclude that he has stated a claim under § 1983.

Official defamation that curtails concrete economic opportunities can state a Section 1983 claim rather than a claim based on reputation alone.

Logical Minicomputers of Erie, Inc. v. Fox · filed 1985-02-20

It has alleged the curtailment of economic opportunities caused by the defamatory nature of defendant’s statement which is a proper claim under Section 1983.

Defamation by a public official is not independently actionable under section 1983 and must result in deprivation of another federally protected liberty or property interest.

Bone v. City of Lafayette, Indiana and Maurice E. Callahan, Individually and as City of Lafayette Engineer · filed 1985-05-29

This conclusion of the district judge, insofar as it suggests a federal defamation action under § 1983, is erroneous. ... requires that a § 1983 action be based on some deprivation of rights other than defamation.

State-action defamation that creates a stigma foreclosing employment opportunities can deprive a person of a liberty interest actionable under § 1983.

Corbitt v. Brent Andersen, in His Official Capacity and Individually · filed 1985-12-11

In other words, Andersen not only defamed Corbitt, but created a stigma that “foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.”

Defamation combined with termination states a Section 1983 liberty-interest claim when it stigmatizes the employee and forecloses other employment opportunities.

Elliott v. Hinds · filed 1986-03-11

Defamation without more will not support a section 1983 action under the precepts of ... . However, “we have made clear that defamation together with other action (which need not itself be a deprivation of either liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment) may work to deprive a plaintiff of a liberty or property interest, so that the two things together state a § 1983 claim.”

A discharged public employee may obtain § 1983 relief for stigmatizing charges in a personnel file only by proving a likelihood that the employer will disclose the file to prospective employers.

Brandt v. Board Of Cooperative Educational Services · filed 1987-05-29

Only if he is able to prove a likelihood of future disclosure will he be entitled to relief under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on defamatory statements that cause loss of employment, but reputational harm alone is insufficient.

Roger v. County of Riverside · filed 2020-01-22

While respondents are correct that “[d]amage to reputation alone is not actionable under [section] 1983,” a plaintiff has an actionable claim if he can present “evidence that he lost his job because of the defamatory statements.” (Hart v. Parks (9th Cir. 2006) 450 F.3d 1059, 1069-1070.) This is precisely what Roger has alleged—that the false booking entry and transmission of a felony charge to the DOJ directly resulted in his loss of employment.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on investigating police officers for damages suffered after a district attorney files charges when the officers acted without malice or reckless disregard, unless the presumption that the prosecutor exercised independent judgment is rebutted.

Smiddy v. Varney · filed 1981-12-21

Thus, we hold that where police officers do not act maliciously or with reckless disregard for the rights of an arrested person, they are not liable for damages suffered by the arrested person after a district attorney files charges unless the presumption of independent judgment by the district attorney is rebutted.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on Maryland officials or private citizens for prosecution and detention based on an independently conducted Florida investigation.

McLaughlin v. Benjamin C. Bradlee (Two Cases) · filed 1986-10-21

Our conclusion that Florida authorities conducted an independent investigation of the basis for the perjury information filed against McLaughlin in Florida, see 775 F.2d at 391, prevents the Maryland officials or private citizens named in this suit from being held responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) for his prosecution and detainment under that information.

In a § 1983 employment discrimination action involving mixed motives, the plaintiff must show that discrimination substantially influenced the decision; the employer must then show it would have made the same decision without discrimination.

Leslie Berl and Frederick L. Anderson, Sr. v. County of Westchester · filed 1988-06-08

Under the “dual motivation/same decision” test, applicable in both Title VII and § 1983 actions, ... the plaintiff carries the initial burden of proving that a discriminatory motive played a substantial part in an employer’s decision not to hire or promote. ... Thereafter, the burden shifts to defendant to show that it would not have hired or promoted plaintiff even in the absence of the discriminatory conduct.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence use the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework on a directed verdict motion.

Terrance v. Pointe Coupee Parish Police Jury · filed 2006-05-02

Motions for directed verdicts on claims of employment discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII based on circumstantial evidence are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden shifting framework.

Section 1983 does not authorize partial relief merely because race was a motivating factor when the defendant would have made the same decision anyway.

Smith v. Wilson · filed 2013-01-23

For the same reasons, we cannot import the authorization of partial “motivating-factor” relief found in § 2000e-2(m) into entirely different statutes—Title VI, § 1981, or § 1983.

Section 1983 racial employment discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas framework applied in Title VII cases.

Thompson v. Bridgeton Board of Education · filed 2014-03-27

The McDonnell Douglas framework applied in Title VII cases is applicable to -allegations of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 mixed-motive discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence use the mixed-motive summary judgment framework.

Linda Jean Quigg, Ed.D. v. Thomas County School District · filed 2016-02-22

Therefore, the mixed-motive framework that we adopt from White applies to both Title VII and § 1983 circumstantial evidence-based, mixed-motive claims.

Section 1983 employment race-discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

CARMICHAEL v. THOMSON · filed 2020-01-03

Plaintiff’s § 1983 and NJLAD claims are both analyzed through the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Section 1983 mixed-motive employment discrimination claims require direct evidence that race or gender motivated the challenged decision.

TOMASZEWSKI v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-05-15

By contrast, in mixed-motive cases under § 1981 and § 1983, the plaintiff must produce only direct evidence11 that race or gender was a motivating factor in the defendant’s employment decision.

Section 1983 permits claims concerning prison officials’ failure to implement an agreed order to proceed as an independent action.

Joseph Buck, William F. Wynn William K. Harris v. James H. Rose, Warden · filed 1990-06-19

We also agree with the trial court that the claims of Wynn and Harris may proceed as an independent action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Officers of the same police department generally cannot conspire with one another under § 1983 because they are agents of a single entity.

Veney v. Ojeda · filed 2004-06-15

Plaintiffs conspiracy claim fails on two distinct grounds. First, plaintiffs claim fails under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine because Officers Ojeda and Jones are agents of a single entity, namely the Leesburg Police Department, and thus cannot legally conspire with one another. ... While the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine arose in antitrust actions, the Fourth Circuit has consistently applied it in other contexts, including actions brought under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims are subject to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when the alleged conspirators are employees of one entity acting within the scope of their employment.

Anemone v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2006-03-13

In the absence of controlling contrary authority, this court will continue to apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to Section 1983 claims because the doctrine’s logic is sound. A civil rights conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more actors to inflict an unconstitutional injury. ... This “two or more actors” requirement cannot be satisfied where all of the alleged conspirators are employees of a single entity and acting within the scope of their employment as agents of that entity.

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars a § 1983 conspiracy claim against officers in the same police department when the alleged acts fall within their job duties and no outsiders are involved.

Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala. · filed 2010-09-07

Both Defendants Carver and Crook are law enforcement officers with the APD. No outsiders are involved. ... Our inquiry is not whether Officer Crook had the authority to prosecute in an unconstitutional manner and with malicious intent, but instead whether engaging in prosecutions is part of Crook’s job-related powers and responsibilities. And, of course, law enforcement officers are empowered precisely to prosecute violations of law. Therefore, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ § 1983 conspiracy claims against APD Officers Carver and Crook.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim cannot proceed against officials of the same municipality who act within the scope of their duties.

Bartels v. INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF LLOYD · filed 2010-09-22

Accordingly, the Section 1983 conspiracy claims against the Individual Defendants are barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims are barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when the alleged conspiracy is between an entity and its employees.

Donahoe v. Arpaio · filed 2012-04-09

The Court need not decide whether Plaintiffs have alleged specific facts to support the existence of an agreement between Defendants to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights because Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims are appropriately dismissed under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which bars a claim for conspiracy where the allegation is that an entity conspired with its employees to violate an individual’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims among employees of the same municipality are barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine unless the employees pursue personal interests separate from the municipality.

Watrous v. Town of Preston · filed 2012-09-29

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine has been held to apply to section 1983 claims. ... Because of these reasons, and because Mr. Congdon cannot have conspired with himself, the Intra-corporate Conspiracy Doctrine bars Mr. Watrous’ conspiracy claim.

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars a § 1983 conspiracy claim against employees of the same public entity when they acted within the scope of their employment.

Tillman v. Orange County · filed 2013-05-17

The intracoi'porate conspiracy doctrine, under which “a corporation cannot conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting in the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among themselves,” applies to § 1983 conspiracy claims.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims against employees of the same agency may proceed when the employees acted outside the scope of their employment.

Randle v. Alexander · filed 2013-05-30

Nevertheless, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine contains an important caveat: namely, that the actors involved be engaged in activities within the scope of their employment. ... Here, there is no fair interpretation of Randle’s allegations that suggests that Defendants were acting within the scope of their responsibilities as prison guards when they forced Randle and Johnson to fight each other in the mantrap area. Accordingly, Randle’s conspiracy claim may proceed as a matter of law, so long as he states a claim.

Section 1983 does not support a conspiracy claim against employees of the same entity who acted within the scope of their employment.

Watson v. Edelen · filed 2015-01-05

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine prohibits a § 1983 claim against law enforcement officers in their individual capacities, ... Therefore, Watson's complaint fails to state a plausible claim against Defendant Hawkins for his allegedly planning the use of chemical agents with Edelen.

Municipal officials accused of conspiring outside the scope of their employment cannot invoke the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine against a § 1983 claim.

DiLuzio v. Village of Yorkville Ohio · filed 2015-08-06

Thus, as the court held in Briner, 2010 WL 3982755 at *14, even if the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to municipal government officials in a § 1983 action (and we do not here hold that it necessarily does), the doctrine does not apply in this case because the defendants are accused of conspiring to wrongfully divest DiLuzio of his property, which would fall outside the scope of their employment. These defendants cannot invoke this defense.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims are subject to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which bars claims that employees of the same entity conspired with one another unless a personal stake exception applies.

Hicks v. City of New York · filed 2017-02-08

This Court agrees that the in-tracorporate conspiracy theory applies to Section 1983 claims. Hicks has failed to plead sufficient facts showing an agreement between, or “collective desire” of, specific defendants to deprive him of his rights, thus precluding any application of the personal stake exception.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims against municipal employees may be barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine unless the complaint plausibly alleges personal bias or a broader discriminatory pattern.

Freelain v. Village Of Oak Park · filed 2018-04-05

The court assumes the doctrine also applies to Section 1983 claims. See id. There are, however, “two recognized exceptions to the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine: (1) where corporate employees are shown to have been motivated solely by personal bias; and (2) where the conspiracy was part of some broader discriminatory pattern or permeated the ranks of the organization’s employees.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). ... Accordingly, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies, and plaintiff’s conspiracy claim in Count V fails.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims against officers of the same department are barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine unless the officers pursue personal interests wholly separate from the department.

Dowd v. DeMarco · filed 2018-06-12

Count V is also barred entirely independently by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which provides that "officers, agents and employees of a single corporate entity"-here, the New York Police Department-"are legally incapable of conspiring together."

Section 1983 conspiracy liability is barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when employees of the same entity make a routine hiring decision within their official duties.

Gress v. Regional Transportation Authority · filed 2018-08-15

Accordingly, the doctrine bars Gress from claiming that the collaborative decision to not hire him was a conspiracy under §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a conspiracy claim based on an alleged agreement among employees of the same entity acting within the scope of their employment.

Jackson v. City of Cleveland · filed 2019-03-28

We join the Eleventh Circuit and hold that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies in § 1983 suits to bar conspiracy claims where two or more employees of the same entity are alleged to have been acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly conspired together to deprive the plaintiff of his rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims are barred when the alleged conspirators are employees of the same entity acting within the scope of their employment.

Ajamu v. City of Cleveland · filed 2019-03-28

We join the Eleventh Circuit and hold that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies in § 1983 suits to bar conspiracy claims where two or more employees of the same entity are alleged to have been acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly conspired together to deprive the plaintiff of his rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims against employees of the same agency are barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when the employees acted within the scope of their employment.

Peterson 318935 v. Clouse · filed 2019-08-16

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims under both § 1983 and § 1985 therefore are barred under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against employees of the same entity is barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine unless they act outside the scope of their employment.

Lewis 324269 v. Kienert · filed 2019-10-30

As a consequence, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim under § 1983 is barred under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim can proceed past the pleading stage despite an intracorporate conspiracy defense.

Faulk v. City of Saint Louis, Missouri · filed 2019-10-31

Here, too, the Court finds that it is inappropriate to apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine at this stage. As such, this portion of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy claim will be denied.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against members of the same collective entity is barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine unless they act outside the scope of their employment.

Green 189440 v. Beaudry · filed 2020-05-18

As a consequence, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim under § 1983 is barred under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims may proceed at the pleading stage despite an intracorporate conspiracy defense.

Hall v. The City of St. Louis, Missouri · filed 2020-06-03

The Court therefore finds that it is inappropriate to apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine at this stage. Plaintiff’s claims for Conspiracy pursuant to §1983 will remain.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims against public employees may proceed when their alleged conduct falls outside their employer’s lawful business.

Lovelace v. Gibson · filed 2020-10-13

Whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to § 1983 cases is unclear. ... Regardless, the purpose of the doctrine would not be furthered when applied in this case. ... The Court declines to apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in this case.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot rest on an alleged agreement between a municipality and its employees acting within the scope of their employment.

Masjid Malcom Shabazz House of Worship, Inc. v. Inkster, City of · filed 2020-11-30

This latter principle is called the “intracorporate conspiracy doctrine,” and the Sixth Circuit recently applied it to § 1983 suits “to bar conspiracy claims where two or more employees of the same entity are alleged to have been acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly conspired together to deprive the plaintiff of his rights.” ... All of this activity falls squarely within Defendants’ scope of employment as municipal manager and employee building official who were tasked with issuing building permits and demolishment notices. ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims against correctional employees acting within the scope of their employment are barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

Schlosser v. Walker · filed 2020-12-11

The Second Circuit has not yet considered whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to section 1983 cases. ... As all defendants are correctional employees acting within the scope of their employment, any conspiracy claims are dismissed under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

At the pleading stage, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not bar a Section 1983 conspiracy claim in this district.

Faulk v. City of Saint Louis, Missouri · filed 2021-01-05

Here, too, the Court finds that it is inappropriate to apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine at this stage. As such, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy claim will be denied.

Bar association officials treated as state actors are immune from § 1983 damages for conduct within their prosecutorial role, or for investigative conduct that did not violate clearly established rights.

Michael Werle D/B/A Werle Consultants Family Mediation Center v. Rhode Island Bar Association · filed 1985-02-25

For all of these reasons, we hold that Margolis’ conduct and that of the other appellees fell within the scope of the immunity, whether absolute or qualified, that they must have enjoyed if they were the state actors that Dr. Werle claims they were.

A bar association that initiates unauthorized-practice proceedings to suppress a book on a public issue does not receive prosecutorial immunity from a § 1983 damages claim on those facts.

Norman F. Dacey and Norman F. Dacey, Doing Business as National Estate Planning Council v. New York County Lawyers' Asso · filed 1970-05-25

We are of the view that when the Association instituted its proceedings against Dacey, its role was analogous to that of a public prosecutor. ... For all of these reasons, we conclude that it would be unwise to grant the Association immunity in this case.

Pro se section 1983 complaints are construed liberally but must state facts sufficient to support a claim.

General Parker v. Porter · filed 2007-04-19

Upon de novo review, see Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007), we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Parker’s complaint, notwithstanding the liberal standard applied to pro se section 1983 complaints.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for alleged constitutional violations by state and county officials, and a pro se complaint may be construed as invoking it despite an incorrect caption.

Sheridan v. United States · filed 2007-01-31

The most appropriate vehicle for these claims appears to be 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and we therefore construe the complaint as invoking this statutory cause of action.

In a prisoner's pro se § 1983 action, the court must read the complaint liberally and cannot grant summary judgment if the complaint and evidence may show a dispute of material fact.

Brown v. John Newhart, Sheriff, Chesapeake City Jail · filed 1986-10-14

In construing prisoners' pro se petitions under Sec. 1983, this court has repeatedly held that "'the district court must examine the pro se complaint to see whether the facts alleged, or the set of facts which the plaintiff might be able to prove, could very well provide a basis for recovery under any of the civil rights acts or heads of jurisdiction in the federal arsenal for redress of constitutional deprivations.'" ... It follows, as we held in Gordon v. Leeke, supra, that a district court must not grant summary judgment where a liberal reading of a prisoner's complaint and other evidence might indicate a dispute concerning material facts.

In a Section 1983 action, courts must liberally interpret the pleadings, consider claims the plaintiff could raise, and assist with amendment when necessary.

Brewster v. Pike · filed 1985-05-13

In this Circuit, nothing could be more clear than the duty of the court, in a Section 1983 action, to give a liberal interpretation to the pleadings, to consider any claim that a plaintiff could raise and, if necessary, to assist the plaintiff in amending her pleadings so that she may proceed with her claim.

A Title VII complaint should not be construed as a § 1983 action when the plaintiff gives no indication of intending to bring one.

Garrett v. Diversified Industrial Concepts, Inc. · filed 2005-04-15

We have carefully reviewed the record and find no indication that Garrett intended his action to be filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or that it was appropriate to construe it as such.

Section 1983 does not completely preempt state-law claims to make them removable to federal court.

Perez v. Touchette · filed 2020-09-21

In examining whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 completely preempts Plaintiffs state-law claims, in conjunction with Defendants’ artful-pleading argument, the Magistrate Judge properly concluded § 1983 is not one of the “very narrow range of cases where Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make a specific action within a particular area removable.” Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 permits a preemption claim when the federal statute that preempts state law creates an enforceable right.

Local Union No. 12004, United Steelworkers v. Massachusetts · filed 2004-07-30

Still, a plaintiff wishing to assert a claim of preemption may nevertheless invoke § 1983 if the allegedly preempting federal statute does create such a right.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional claims even when the alleged conduct also falls under the NLRA; the NLRA does not preempt those claims.

Lagoy v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2005-02-08

Based on the above, and in light of the CMS defendants’ uncontested status as state actors, LaGoy’s section 1983 constitutional claims are not preempted by the NLRA and the court has jurisdiction over them.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based solely on federal preemption of state law.

Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester · filed 2007-08-15

Plaintiff alleges it brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Comply 31.) This is impermissible.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional-rights violations, but Title VII preempts it in this sexual-harassment context.

Marrero-Rivera v. Department of Justice · filed 1992-07-23

We DISMISS plaintiff’s claim under section 1983. Such claim is now preempted by her eventual Title VII claim after completing the administrative process.

Section 1983 can support a labor preemption claim based on Machinists preemption, but Garmon preemption does not establish the personal right needed for such a claim.

International Union of Operati v. Village of Lincolnshire · filed 2018-09-28

Garmon preemption, in contrast, addresses the problem of state regulation that would interfere with the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 138. It does not involve the kind of personal right that would support a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law and does not preempt state statutes governing state-law tort claims.

Richardson v. University of Texas Systems · filed 2019-10-18

But § 1983 is not a vehicle to sue state employees for violations of state laws such as state tort laws, nor does it preempt state statutes governing such claims.

A plaintiff who offers no substantive defense of a Section 1983 preemption claim may have that claim dismissed with prejudice.

Indiana Rail Road Company, The v. Illinois Commerce Commission · filed 2020-09-30

Invoking Section 1983 to assert a preemption claim is not a self-evident exercise, so the Court will not fashion a response for the Railroads. The Section 1983 claim is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for viable claims actionable under the section.

Staley v. South Carolina Dept · filed 2004-08-30

As Staley has stated no viable claim actionable under § 1983, we affirm the decision of the district court summarily dismissing the complaint.

Section 1983 excludes claims based only on disagreements over the type of medical care provided.

Bunton v. Corrtl Corp of Amer · filed 2008-08-12

Bunton’s allegations that the pain medication he was given was inadequate and that he should have received a bone scan to better diagnose his injury are merely disagreements over the type of care provided, which are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence or medical malpractice alone.

Nogbou v. Mayrose · filed 2010-11-30

Here, the district court properly determined that an amendment would be futile on the ground that negligence and medical malpractice claims are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an action for violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.

Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Jim's Motorcycle, Inc. · filed 2005-08-09

Considering that Gonzaga does not overrule Higgins and that the Fourth Circuit has applied Higgins in reaching the same result, Smit acknowledges that this Court cannot sustain his argument. ... Hence, neither of these preliminary points are supportable under current law. Accordingly, they are rejected.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state regulations or policies without an identified federal or constitutional right.

Victory v. Pataki · filed 2016-02-01

Although he asserts that the Department of Parole violated New York regulations or its own policies, such conduct is not actionable under Section 1983. ... Similarly, while Victory alleges a conspiracy between McCarthy and the Syracuse Defendants, he does not identify a federal or constitutional right that these individuals conspired to violate. See Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995).

A § 1983 claim for denial of medical care must be filed in a complaint separate from a habeas corpus petition.

Hunter v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-31

The Petitioner also raised a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for denial of medical care—a claim that must be raised in a separate complaint from the habeas corpus petition at issue.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for an excessive bail claim that seeks habeas relief.

Belcher v. State of Nevada · filed 2020-11-16

Finally, Judge Baldwin determined that Plaintiff’s allegation of excessive bail requests habeas relief, and that a § 1983 action is not the correct procedural mechanism for Plaintiff’s claim. (Id. at 5.) Accordingly, Judge Baldwin recommends that Plaintiff’s excessive bail claim be dismissed, without prejudice, and without leave to amend. (Id.) The Court agrees with Judge Baldwin. Having reviewed the R&R and the record in this case, the Court will adopt the R&R in full.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for a state prisoner’s claim that would not necessarily lead to earlier release.

Scott v. Johnson · filed 2020-10-29

Accordingly, based on the relief sought, the claims in the Petition are not cognizable on habeas review and must be brought, if at all, under Section 1983.

A habeas petition is not amenable to conversion into a § 1983 complaint when it names only a defendant against whom it makes no specific allegations.

Carroll v. Diaz · filed 2020-08-25

Although his place of confinement has been changed since he filed the prior action from R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility in this District to Mule Creek State Prison in the Eastern District of California, even to the extent he has new or additional allegations regarding the conditions of confinement at his new institution, his Petition is not amenable to conversion because Petitioner has named the Warden of his new institution as the only Respondent but does not make any specific allegations against the Warden.

Section 1983 covers a prisoner's claims of assault and inadequate medical care that do not challenge the prisoner's conviction or custody.

Robinson v. Brown · filed 2020-08-25

Although filed as a habeas action, the Report indicates that Plaintiff’s pleadings were liberally construed as a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they do not challenge a conviction or Plaintiff’s custody. They, instead, allege that Plaintiff was assaulted while in custody and received inadequate medical care. ... Having reviewed the pleadings, file, record in this case, and Report, the court determines that the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge are correct, and accepts them as those of the ... court.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a request challenging the fact of a plaintiff’s custody; that request belongs in habeas.

Lakey v. State of Washington · filed 2020-08-06

Plaintiff’s requested relief, which challenges the fact of his custody, is properly raised in a habeas petition, not in a civil rights action under § 1983 and is not related to the facts alleged in the underlying complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide release from prison as a remedy.

MOORE v. WHITE · filed 2020-07-21

Instead, he seeks release from prison; a remedy which is not available in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Parmeley v. Trump · filed 2020-04-27

Plaintiffs request release, a remedy that is not available under Section 1983 or Bivens.

Section 1983 claims may not be joined with habeas claims in the same lawsuit.

Gillaspie v. CGO · filed 2020-03-05

Because plaintiff may not join habeas claims with his section 1983 claims, and because he has not alleged any cognizable habeas claims under Wolff, the Court declines to construe this lawsuit as raising claims for habeas relief under section 2254 as to the disciplinary convictions.

Section 1983 does not provide relief from a criminal sentence; a prisoner seeking that relief must pursue habeas corpus.

McElwee v. Truelove · filed 2020-02-26

The Court notes that Plaintiff cannot receive relief from his criminal sentences in this civil rights complaint. Instead, he would need to pursue those claims through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek a new parole revocation hearing when the parole board retains discretion to deny release after that hearing.

Dimmick v. Bourdon · filed 2019-04-25

But even if he seeks a new parole revocation hearing in the hope of eventually being returned to parole, Wilkinson indicates he may pursue a claim under § 1983 so long as the Board retains discretion to grant or deny release as a result of any such hearing (and there is no indication that it does not).

Section 1983 cannot be used to exclude interrogation evidence from a criminal proceeding; that relief belongs in a motion to suppress or a habeas application.

Garman v. Garaychochea · filed 2016-11-22

To the extent, meanwhile, that Mr. Garman suggests that evidence of his interrogation should be excluded from use in criminal proceedings against him, that is the province of a motion to suppress or a habeas application, not a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits a state parolee to challenge parole conditions when success would neither speed release nor imply the invalidity of the underlying conviction or sentence.

Thornton v. Edmund G. Brown, Jr · filed 2014-02-18

Because his success in this action would not necessarily imply the invalidity of either his conviction or sentence, Plaintiff may proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide immediate release from civil commitment; a writ of habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy for that relief.

Wertz v. County of Blair · filed 2012-03-13

To the extent that Wertz states in his complaint that he seeks immediate release from civil commitment, we note that his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits civil detainees to seek due process procedures and declaratory relief when success would not necessarily result in their immediate release.

Gipson v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Office · filed 2010-08-04

Under Wilkinson, there is no question that Plaintiffs’ claims for due process and declaratory relief in this case were properly asserted under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a route for a prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily invalidate the loss of gain-time credits; that claim belongs in habeas.

Adamson v. McNeil · filed 2009-11-17

Adamson’s retaliation claim was properly brought in a § 2254 petition rather than as a § 1983 claim because his challenge necessarily implied the invalidity of the loss of gain time credits.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim is not barred by the habeas exception when success would only potentially shorten confinement.

Thomas v. Unknown Eby · filed 2007-03-30

This passage and the statute’s text demonstrate that, as in Dotson, success in Thomas’s § 1983 claim would not necessarily affect the duration of his sentence because prison officials would retain discretion regarding whether to grant him parole. Accordingly, the habeas exception does not bar Thomas’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides the civil rights action for a state prisoner’s constitutional challenge to confinement conditions, but not to the fact or length of incarceration.

Cook v. Thurbert Baker · filed 2005-06-23

Thus, a civil rights action under § 1983 is the appropriate relief when a state prisoner constitutionally challenges the conditions of his confinement, but not the fact or length of his incarceration.

A court may decline to convert a habeas petition into a § 1983 damages action.

Turner v. Bagley · filed 2005-03-21

We expressly decline to allow Turner to convert his habeas petition to a 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional deprivations when a prisoner's challenge to a condition of confinement does not necessarily invalidate the conviction or continuing confinement.

Beebe v. Heil · filed 2004-08-30

First, I agree with Plaintiff that this action is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to seek post-conviction access to biological evidence held by the government because obtaining access does not necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s confinement.

Osborne v. District Attorney's Office of the Third Judicial District · filed 2005-09-07

We agree with Osborne, and join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that Heck does not bar a prisoner’s § 1983 action seeking post-conviction access to biological evidence in the government’s possession.

Section 1983 permits claims about conditions of confinement; challenges to the duration of a sentence must be brought through habeas corpus.

Rice v. Thurbert Baker · filed 2006-05-23

Claims challenging the fact of conviction or duration of the sentence “fall within the ‘core’ of habeas corpus,” while claims challenging the conditions of confinement may be brought in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the appropriate remedy for a prisoner’s challenge to disciplinary procedures and classification when success would not necessarily result in immediate or speedier release.

Gaskins v. Johnson · filed 2006-08-15

Accordingly, Gaskins’ pending due process claim does not meet the standard announced in Wilkinson for habeas review and should instead be asserted pursuant to a § 1983 prisoner conditions action.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights action for a claim that can be raised in a federal habeas petition.

Hutcherson v. Bob Riley · filed 2006-10-24

These avenues are mutually exclusive: if a claim can be raised in a federal habeas petition, that same claim cannot be raised in a separate § 1983 civil rights action.

Section 1983 is not the vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to the execution of a state sentence based on transfer to a private prison; that challenge arises under § 2241.

Lyons v. Zavaras · filed 2009-01-16

Given our precedent, however, such a challenge is properly construed to arise under § 2241.

A pretrial detainee’s claim that he was denied counsel after arrest belongs in habeas rather than under § 1983.

Dunn v. Prince · filed 2009-04-16

Dunn maintains that he was denied an attorney for nearly two months after his arrest. Such a claim sounds in habeas and should be raised in such a motion. See Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 223-24. Even if the claims were properly presented under § 1983, Dunn has not alleged a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek access to records allegedly available to others when success would not affect the validity of his conviction.

Qualls v. Bill Shaw, District Clerk, Dallas County, Texas · filed 1976-07-19

The district court erred in its analysis of appellant’s complaint. Preiser provides that a state inmate may not utilize the civil rights act to challenge his conviction, thus by-passing habeas corpus procedures and the requirement that he exhaust state remedies. In this case, the appellant is not challenging his conviction and he is not seeking his release from custody. He is claiming that he had been denied access to records which are made available to others and has been subjected to discriminatory treatment. Were he to prevail in this action the court’s opinion would not impinge in any manner on the validity of his criminal conviction, and therefore habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy and the district court’s reliance on Preiser is misplaced.

Section 1983 permits challenges to prison conditions without exhaustion of state judicial remedies; challenges to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed as habeas claims regardless of the relief sought.

Johnson v. Presley Hardy · filed 1979-08-07

The rule then is that any challenge to the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement is properly treated as a habeas corpus matter, whereas challenges to conditions of confinement may proceed under § 1983 without any requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies. Courts should be governed by these classifications regardless of the relief sought or the label placed by the petitioner upon such action.

Section 1983 covers a prisoner's civil rights claim seeking expungement of a disciplinary report when the prisoner does not seek immediate or speedier release.

Johnson v. CCA-Northeast Ohio Correctional Center Warden · filed 2001-09-14

We initially note that Johnson’s petition is more properly construed as a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Since this case is properly construed as brought under § 1983, and not under § 2254, Johnson does not require a certificate of appealability.

Section 1983 provides a way to seek money damages, while a challenge to the duration of incarceration belongs in habeas corpus.

Simpson v. Caruso · filed 2009-12-10

A challenge to the duration of incarceration falls within the scope of a habeas corpus petition, while a request for money damages is evaluated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a state prisoner seeking present or future release; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2011-10-07

The fact that Van Curen involved a habeas petition – not a § 1983 action – is significant. Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle when the claim seeks “core habeas corpus relief, i.e., where a state prisoner requests present or future release.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for alleged violations by jail personnel that did not affect a criminal conviction or sentence.

United States v. Donaldson · filed 2014-06-06

Donaldson does not assert, however, that these incidents had any impact on his conviction or sentence. We therefore dismiss Donaldson’s allegations without prejudice. These allegations must be asserted, if at all, in a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole denial when success would necessarily mean immediate release or a shorter incarceration; that claim must be brought in habeas.

Soto v. Garner · filed 2016-11-21

To the extent that Soto challenged the denial of parole, such a claim must be brought in a habeas petition because success on the claim would necessarily mean immediate release or a shorter duration of incarceration.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to pretrial bail procedures when the requested relief requires a hearing and individual assessment rather than automatic release.

Odonnell v. Harris Cnty. · filed 2018-06-29

The plaintiffs' challenge does not seek the same type of relief afforded by habeas. Nor does the amended preliminary injunction order grant habeas relief through the procedural vehicle of § 1983. Preiser does not bar the relief the court orders.

A claim may proceed under § 1983 when success would not necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Edward A. Behl, Sr. v. Peters · filed 2018-09-19

The district court therefore erred in dismissing Behl’s complaint as a second or successive 2254 petition and for failing to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to bail procedures when success would not necessarily require or hasten release from detention.

Booth v. Galveston Cnty. · filed 2019-01-10

In other words, Booth is not barred from bringing a Section 1983 claim simply because he "hope[s]" or "believe[s] that victory ... will lead to speedier release from prison."

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge procedures for supervised release placement when they do not directly seek release.

Murphy v. Raoul · filed 2019-03-31

The plaintiffs have been consistent since day one in not directly requesting release but asking for a constitutional application of the relevant law and policy to their situations. (Dkt. 1 at 27-29, 33-34.) Thus, the plaintiffs properly brought their claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights action for damages, but habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for challenging the fact or duration of confinement.

Mortimore v. Carter · filed 2019-06-26

A civil rights action is the appropriate vehicle to seek monetary damages, but a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to challenge the fact or duration of confinement.