42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted willfully when violating someone’s federal rights; accidental conduct does not create liability.

Bryant v. Childress County, Texas · filed 2020-07-09

Unless the evidence supports that a defendant acted willfully when violating someone’s federal rights, there is no liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest; harm to reputation and loss of clients do not suffice when the person’s legal rights or status remain unchanged.

Rogers v. Berger · filed 1988-03-21

Because the plaintiff has failed to show that the state has altered any of his rights or his legal status, his claim fails to allege the illegal deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest necessary to maintain a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not make reputational injury alone federally actionable; a stigmatization claim requires injury to an interest or status conferred by state law.

Becker v. Russek · filed 1981-07-15

It is the additional element of the alleged injury to an interest or status conferred by state law, in excess of the traditional, state law tort claim, that activates due process considerations.

Section 1983 permits a former employee to pursue a Fourteenth Amendment liberty-interest claim when a discharge foreseeably creates a public perception of culpability, even without proof that the defendants themselves publicized false statements.

Ray v. Edwards · filed 1982-09-30

... This Court agrees with the foregoing reasoning; therefore, plaintiff need not show that defendants themselves made public any false and defamatory statements about him. It is enough if defendants knew or should have known that plaintiff's termination at that particular time would result in a public perception of plaintiff's culpability for the charges that were then being investigated.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to seek relief for official defamation only when reputational harm is accompanied by injury to employment or employment opportunities and denial of procedural due process, including a name-clearing hearing.

In Re Bruce Selcraig · filed 1983-05-27

Damage to reputation alone, unaccompanied by other injury, will not, therefore, suffice for recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which protects only against “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. ... A constitutional deprivation of liberty occurs when there is some injury to employment or employment opportunities in addition to damage to reputation and a subsequent denial of procedural due process ... to redress that injury. ... Trautman may establish his § 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process by showing DISD’s publication of the charges, the injury to his employment, and the denial of a name-clearing hearing.

Defamation by state actors, without injury to a protected liberty or property interest, is not actionable under § 1983.

Lucien v. Seidenfeld · filed 1984-05-21

Reputation alone is neither liberty nor property guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law. Hence, defamation by state actors, standing alone, is not actionable under § 1983.

Injury to reputation, such as from an allegedly defamatory news article, is not actionable under section 1983 unless the plaintiff alleges state action, and reputational injury alone is not actionable under this section even when caused by a state actor.

Richards v. Giscome · filed 1984-07-31

Hays’ counsel correctly asserts that the reporter's alleged action is not actionable under § 1983 due to plaintiff’s failure to allege state action, and because injury to reputation, even . by a state actor, is not actionable under this section.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for injury to reputation alone; the alleged defamation must be connected to injury to a more tangible protected interest.

Geter v. Fortenberry · filed 1988-07-26

A plaintiff can successfully invoke Sec. 1983 only when his federal statutory or constitutional rights have been violated. Invasion of an interest in reputation alone is insufficient to establish Sec. 1983 liability because a damaged reputation, apart from injury to a more tangible interest such as loss of employment, does not implicate any "liberty" or "property" rights sufficient to invoke due process.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for reputational damage alone.

Kenneth George Morris and Judy Irving Morris v. United States of America, Kenneth George Morris and Judy Irving Morris v · filed 1996-01-18

Because the Morrises' remaining claim was not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, dismissal was justified after the court had dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 860 (9th Cir.) (reputational damage alone insufficient for § 1983 claim), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 600 (1992); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1983 does not make damage to reputation actionable unless it is accompanied by some more tangible interests.

Hussein v. Miller · filed 2012-10-01

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hussein’s First Amendment retaliation claim because Hussein failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Miller’s statements are actionable under § 1983. ... Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[D]amage to reputation is not actionable under § 1983 unless it is accompanied by ‘some more tangible interests.’” (citation omitted)).

Section 1983 is not required to bring a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Smith v. Ivey · filed 2020-11-19

However, the Plaintiff does not have to bring claims under § 1983 to assert a cause of action under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

FERPA creates an interest enforceable under § 1983 because Congress did not establish a sufficiently comprehensive enforcement system to preclude that remedy.

Fay v. South Colonie Central School District · filed 1986-09-24

The district court correctly determined that FERPA creates an interest that may be vindicated in a section 1983 action because Congress did not create so comprehensive a system of enforcing the statute as to demonstrate an intention to preclude a remedy under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit these plaintiffs to bring an employment-discrimination action based on rights allegedly secured by § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Alfred Brown, William King and Willie James Mallett, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Robe · filed 1981-07-16

Therefore, named plaintiffs cannot bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) their action alleging employment discrimination by MIB violative of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp.III 1979).

Section 1983 can remedy violations of federal statutory rights, but is unavailable when Congress forecloses private enforcement or the underlying statute creates no enforceable rights.

Dopico v. Goldschmidt · filed 1981-07-24

Thus, § 1983 is unavailable as a remedy for statutory violations if (1) Congress has foreclosed private enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself, for example by establishing comprehensive remedial devices within the substantive statute, or if (2) that statute does not create enforceable “rights.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutory law, including violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

Bush v. R. M. Muncy Superintendent P.C.C. Attorney General for the State of Maryland · filed 1981-09-04

Although the IAD is federal law for section 1983 purposes, ... state officials charged with its implementation are acting “under color of state law” in carrying out or omitting to carry out its provisions. ... Bush’s claims against the Maryland and Virginia officials charged with proper implementation of article IV of the IAD, therefore, satisfy that predicate for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a state or local actor for deprivation of rights secured by federal law.

CONSORTIUM OF COM. BASED ORGANIZATIONS v. Donovan · filed 1982-01-11

This court concludes then, that plaintiffs' statutory claims against the local defendants state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1983 which this court may hear pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of rights secured by federal statutes when the deprivation occurs under color of state law.

Consortium of Community Based Organizations v. Donovan · filed 1982-01-11

For all of the reasons stated above, it seems clear that plaintiffs have stated a valid cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 insofar as they allege a deprivation of rights secured by a federal statute (CETA) under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a private remedy for violating a federal statute when Congress has made that statute’s comprehensive administrative remedies exclusive.

Meyerson v. Arizona · filed 1983-05-09

Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for a violation of a federal statute under color of state law. ... However, the Supreme Court has identified two exceptions to the application of section 1983 to statutory violations: (1) where Congress has foreclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself, and (2) where the statute does not create “enforceable rights.” ... Thus, our independent reading of the statutes and regulations leads us to conclude that Congress intended to foreclose private actions under section 503, whether they are brought directly under section 503 or indirectly under section 1983.

A violation of a federal statute by a state actor is actionable under § 1983 only if Congress did not intend to foreclose private enforcement of the statute and the statute is of a kind that creates rights enforceable under § 1983.

Phelps v. Housing Authority · filed 1984-08-24

It is of course now established that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be invoked to redress certain violations of federal statutory law by state actors. ... It is equally clear, however, that not all violations of federal law are so actionable. Determining whether violation of a particular federal statute gives rise to § 1983 liability involves two inquiries. First, whether Congress, in enacting the statute, manifested in the statute itself an intent to foreclose its private enforcement? Second, whether the statute is of a kind aimed at creating enforceable "rights" under § 1983?

An agency's failure to make findings sufficient for judicial review, without applying a rule inconsistent with federal law, is not a § 1983 violation.

Eisenhandler v. D'Elia · filed 1985-12-02

Petitioners’ application for attorney’s fees under 42 USC § 1988 is denied because, on the instant facts, there has been no violation of 42 USC § 1983. Respondents have not applied a rule inconsistent with Federal law, but, rather, have failed to make sufficient determinations to permit our review of petitioners’ eligibility.

Federal regulations may define legal obligations enforceable under § 1983.

Vernon Howard, Cross-Appellant v. City of Burlingame, Cross-Appellee · filed 1991-06-19

As for Howard’s second argument, it is true that federal regulations do have the force of law and may define legal obligations enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 redresses violations of federal law, so a court evaluating a federal constitutional claim need not decide whether the defendants also violated state law.

Anderson v. Fiedler · filed 1992-08-18

In evaluating Mr. Anderson’s federal constitutional claim, the court need not address the issue as to whether the defendants violated state law. Tavarez v. O’Malley, 826 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir.1987) (“the function of section 1983 is to redress violations of federal, not state, law”).

Section 1983 does not authorize injunctive enforcement of the Medicaid medical care advisory committee regulation when its authorizing statute creates no corresponding individual right.

Kansas Hospital Ass'n v. Whiteman · filed 1993-11-03

In this case, however, the statute itself does not create or even imply a judicially enforceable right on the part of the individual plaintiffs, as Medicaid recipients, to participate as members of any advisory committee established by the state Medicaid agency. ... Rather, the court simply holds that any rights the plaintiffs claim by virtue of the regulation cannot be remedied by this court by granting the plaintiffs the injunctive relief they seek under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of IDEA procedural rights contained in regulations when the underlying right is already implicit in the IDEA statute.

Brantley Ex Rel. Brantley v. Independent School District No. 625 · filed 1996-08-13

The Court agrees with the Fourth Circuit that a federal regulation alone does not create a federal right for purposes of a § 1983 cause of action. However, because there is an enforceable § 1983 interest already implicit in § 1415 for procedural violations, Plaintiffs may bring suit to enforce procedural rights contained in the IDEA’S implementing regulations.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against state officials for violations of federal statutes, including the Medicaid Act.

Thomas v. Johnston · filed 1983-01-21

Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) in adopting its reimbursement rate scheme clearly falls within the ambit of Thiboutot and Rosado; it follows that Plaintiffs’ claim may properly be brought under § 1983, and that this court has jurisdiction over the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of federal statutory rights, including rights defined by federal regulations, when the law creates an enforceable right.

Rodriguez v. DeBuono · filed 1999-04-19

Federal law enforceable under § 1983 includes federal regulations.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights, but it does not apply when the governing statute provides an exclusive remedy.

Ceta Workers' Action Committee v. City of New York · filed 1981-02-27

But it is clear that § 1983 provides no vehicle for a statutory claim in this case.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state or local police officers for violating the federal extradition statute.

Draper v. Coombs · filed 1986-06-24

In light of the nature and purpose of the extradition statute, we hold that a claim alleging its violation by state or local police officers states a cause of action under section 1983.

Local governmental entities that are not arms of the state are persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Elam Const., Inc. v. Regional Transp. Dist. · filed 1997-10-28

RTD, which is not an "arm of the state," but is rather a local governmental entity, is a "person" for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against state agencies and state officials in their official capacities cannot be saved by amendment.

Duff v. Regents of the University of California University of California Police Department and Does 1 to 100 · filed 1997-10-27

Amendment was futile, however, as to Duff's §§ 1983 and 1988 claims against the state agencies and the Doe defendants in their official capacities.

For § 1983 purposes, a state-law designation does not by itself determine whether an agency is a state or city agency; the agency's status is assessed using several indicators.

Wilcher v. Curley · filed 1981-07-21

However, that declaration is not in itself determinative of whether the Department is a city or a state agency for § 1983 purposes since state and local law are only one of several indicators of an agency’s status.

A violation of a county ordinance alone does not support a § 1983 claim; the plaintiff must show a constitutional violation.

Kornblum v. St. Louis County, Missouri, and John Doe, an Unknown Person and John Doe Ii, an Unknown Person · filed 1995-02-15

To state a claim under § 1983, Mr. Kornblum must show that the County violated the Constitution, not its own ordinance.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a state or local government’s violation of its own laws unless the conduct also violates federal law.

Rector v. City & County of Denver · filed 2003-11-06

It is well established, however, that a state’s violation of its own laws does not create a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against state or local actors; claims against federal actors proceed under Bivens.

United States v. Weiler · filed 2019-10-08

Third, to the extent defendant either intends to challenge the conditions of his confinement or intends to pursue civil claims against federal actors or private individuals, he must do so by filing one or more civil actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if the alleged violators are state or local actors, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973), or under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), if the alleged violators are federal actors.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against municipal departments because they are not persons subject to suit.

Perez v. Simpson · filed 2020-05-29

Defendants CPD and TCDC are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments are not suable under § 1983.

A municipal police department that is an administrative arm of its county cannot be sued separately under Section 1983.

Tomassi v. Suddolk County · filed 2020-06-02

However, the SCPD is not a suable entity because it is merely an administrative arm of the County of Suffolk, which is already a defendant in this case.

Section 1983 is not a jurisdictional statute.

Liberles v. County of Cook · filed 1983-05-26

Defendants also object to the jurisdiction of the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983, of course, is not a jurisdictional statute. In any case, relief was granted under Title VII upon claims over which the district court had jurisdiction, and this objection is irrelevant.

A claim under § 1983 is insufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1343(3).

Arko v. Broom · filed 1981-07-22

Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims of violations of §§ 1983 and 1985(3) are insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction under § 1343(3).

Section 1983 claims invoke federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Jaffree v. Board of School Com'rs of Mobile County · filed 1983-01-14

The subject-matter jurisdiction of a federal court over a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Arguments that private action or failure to exhaust defeats a § 1983 claim concern the claim's merits, not subject-matter jurisdiction, which 28 U.S.C. § 1343 confers over § 1983 matters.

Wagner v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1987-11-03

Defendant’s arguments, that no § 1983 claim is presented when exclusively private action is undertaken or when the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, have appeal. However, they do not present a problem to this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. This court possesses the power to adjudicate matters arising under § 1983 by application of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 which specifically confers jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not itself confer federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Davis v. Chong M. Pak Ralph G. Cantrell Diane E. France, in Their Official & Individual Capacities · filed 1988-09-13

However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not, in-and-of-itself vest this court with jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not itself confer federal subject matter jurisdiction; a plaintiff must establish a separate jurisdictional basis.

Beken v. Eaglin · filed 1989-04-20

Because § 1983, does not, in and of itself, vest this court with jurisdiction to hear this matter, plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) to establish this court’s authority to hear his complaints.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action but does not itself confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal district court.

Serrano v. Gonzalez · filed 1990-07-18

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides plaintiffs with a cause of action, it does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal district court.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of certain federal rights only when the federal district court otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction.

Wang v. NHBd Reg. in Medicine · filed 1994-07-12

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violation of certain federal rights, but only for those violations over which a federal district court otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 supplies subject matter jurisdiction for viable constitutional claims even when a statutory claim cannot proceed under it.

Office of Child Advocate v. Lindgren · filed 2004-01-08

However, this is not enough to render the judgment void as this Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the viable underlying Constitutional claims.

Testimonial immunity may bar a § 1983 claim based on a witness’s statements before a state legislative committee, even though state law privileges do not govern the federal claim.

Lunderstadt v. Colafella · filed 1989-09-11

The district court did not specifically discuss the basis for holding that the October 10, 1986 statement was privileged under the section 1983 counts. State law privileges or immunities do not govern in a case grounded on federal rights. ... Nonetheless, the district court’s implicit conclusion that the same testimonial immunity is equally applicable for federal as for state law claims was not erroneous.

Witnesses who testify in court at adversarial criminal pretrial hearings are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages liability based on that testimony, even when the testimony is allegedly perjurious.

Holt v. Castaneda · filed 1987-11-06

For the reasons discussed above, we hold that witnesses who testify in court at adversarial pretrial hearings are absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 for damages allegedly caused by their testimony.

Section 1983 provides no remedy against witnesses for testimony given in judicial proceedings.

Conley v. Office of the Public Defender, Sixth Judicial District of Arkansas, Pulaski and Perry Counties · filed 1981-07-21

Witnesses are absolutely immune from section 1983 remedy actions arising from their testimony in judicial proceedings.

Section 1983 does not impose civil liability on witnesses for testimony given in judicial proceedings because witnesses are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability.

Briscoe v. LaHue · filed 1981-10-27

We therefore conclude that Gay, Jordan, Briscoe and Hunley, as witnesses, are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability and were therefore properly dismissed from these lawsuits.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a government official for testimony given in judicial proceedings because witnesses are absolutely immune.

Crisp v. City of Alcoa · filed 1983-03-29

There can be no liability against defendant Johnson for damages allegedly caused by his testimony because of the absolute witness immunity.

Section 1983 does not abrogate common-law witness immunity from damages, and collateral estoppel applies only when a prior state criminal proceeding actually and necessarily decided the issue raised in the § 1983 action.

Owens v. Lee · filed 1983-05-09

A police officer who testifies in a criminal proceeding, like any witness in a judicial proceeding, enjoys immunity from subsequent damages liability. ... In enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Congress did not intend to abrogate this common-law witness immunity in order to provide a damages remedy against police officers. ... Accordingly, Owens’ claim relating to the defendant’s alleged perjured testimony must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ... Although the defendant is correct in asserting, as a general proposition, that collateral estoppel applies in a § 1983 action where issue preclusion is based on a prior state criminal judgment, the question arises whether issue preclusion extends to those issues which could have been raised in a prior state proceeding but were not. ... Until such time as the defendant is able to introduce a record sufficient to reveal that the issue raised by Owens in the present action was actually and necessarily decided in the prior state court criminal proceeding, the court finds it inappropriate to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude Owens from litigating that claim.

Absolute witness immunity bars Section 1983 damages claims alleging that witnesses and counsel conspired to deprive a litigant of a fair hearing by collaborating on false affidavits.

Collins v. Walden · filed 1985-04-12

The court holds, therefore, that each of the individual defendants is immune to any claim for damages under section 1983 based upon any theory that defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of a fair hearing by collaborating in the preparation of false affidavits.

Witnesses in judicial proceedings have absolute immunity from section 1983 damages caused by their testimony.

Buchanan v. Ford · filed 1986-06-19

Witnesses in judicial proceedings have absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for damage that their testimony causes.

A grand-jury witness is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for testimony given or information omitted before the grand jury.

Kompare v. Stein · filed 1986-09-04

Thus, no § 1983 action can lie against Richmond for what she said or did not say to the grand jury.

Defamation alone is not actionable under Section 1983, and a witness is absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages for statements made while testifying in court.

Duncan v. Pope · filed 1986-10-08

A claim for defamation is clearly not cognizable under the Federal Constitution and is, therefore, not actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... To the extent the defendants' statements were made in her capacity as a witness in a court proceeding, she also enjoys absolute immunity from a suit for damages.

Witnesses are immune from § 1983 monetary liability for their testimony in a criminal trial.

Clark v. Peter Brown, Attorney Dr. V.H. Kshiragar, M.D. Dave Dickens, Officer of the Charleston Police Department, · filed 1987-03-05

Witnesses Kshiragar and Dickens are protected by witness immunity.

Grand-jury witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages based on their testimony, even when the testimony was knowingly false and malicious.

Strength v. Hubert · filed 1987-05-22

grand jury witnesses are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability based upon the substance of their testimony. ... Furthermore, the Court holds that this immunity applies even though the subject testimony might have been knowingly false and malicious.

Section 1983 affords police officers only qualified immunity for allegedly false testimony before a grand jury.

White v. Frank · filed 1988-02-29

Thus, since it is not clear that there was a universally accepted rule of absolute immunity for grand jury witnesses’ at common law, this court is not free to create one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because of the lack of procedural safeguards at the grand jury stage, as at the warrant application stage, the truthfinding purpose of the judicial process will be aided by a rule of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a witness for allegedly perjured testimony at preliminary or suppression hearings because the witness has absolute immunity.

Williams v. Hepting · filed 1988-05-24

We therefore conclude that witness Stewart is entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for his testimony at Williams' preliminary hearing and suppression hearings. The district court did not err in dismissing Williams' claims against Stewart for allegedly giving perjured testimony at these hearings.

Section 1983 provides no damages liability for conduct as a trial juror or witness because both roles carry absolute immunity.

Douglas Warren Freeze, Jr. v. George Griffith, Douglas Warren Freeze, Jr. v. Stanley Labove, Douglas Warren Freeze, Jr. · filed 1988-07-11

Whether Griffith lied, either as a petit juror or as a witness, is immaterial, for in either capacity he is absolutely immune from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 grants a witness absolute immunity from civil liability for grand jury testimony.

Strength v. W.L. Hubert, Charles Carroll, Individually, William L. Strength, Jr. v. W.L. Hubert, Charles Carro · filed 1988-10-06

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court granting Carroll absolute immunity from civil liability based on his grand jury testimony is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 damages claims based on a witness’s perjury at trial are barred by absolute witness immunity.

Parks v. Robert James Miller, Detective Craig S. Cobb, Attorney · filed 1988-10-18

The court held that the allegations of perjury against defendant Miller were barred by the absolute immunity from damages given to witnesses who testify at a trial. ... We agree with these conclusions of the district court.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against trial witnesses based on their testimony because witnesses are immune from liability.

Taylor v. Robertson · filed 1989-02-02

If the plaintiff wishes to challenge his conviction, he has a number of legal alternatives, but a § 1983 action against the witnesses who testified at his trial is not one of them.

Witnesses, whether private parties or government officials, have absolute immunity from damages liability under § 1983 for their trial testimony, even when they allegedly were coached.

Katz v. Morgenthau · filed 1989-03-17

Even if the witnesses were coached, as Katz argues in support of his contention of conspiracy, as discussed above, all witnesses, whether private parties or government officials, have absolute immunity from damage liability for their trial testimony.

Section 1983 immunity protects judges acting within their authority in a judicial function and shields witnesses from claims alleging conspiracies to give false or incomplete testimony in judicial proceedings.

Freshour v. Roger Kline, William Ammer · filed 1989-04-04

Ammer is entitled to absolute immunity because he was acting within the scope of his authority and was exercising a judicial function. ... The doctrine of immunity for witnesses in judicial proceedings also shields alleged conspiracies to give false or incomplete testimony.

Witnesses have absolute immunity from damages liability under Section 1983 for their testimony, and a plaintiff cannot evade that immunity by alleging a conspiracy.

Luther Wilkins, Jr. v. May · filed 1989-05-30

Witnesses do have absolute immunity, and Wilkins’s attempt to circumvent it by charging them with conspiracy is facile and must fail.

Witnesses whose statements led to a criminal complaint and felony warrant are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages liability when they would have testified against the plaintiff at trial.

Swift v. Steffen · filed 1989-08-24

These defendants' statements formed the basis upon which a complaint was referred to the prosecutor's office and on which a felony warrant was subsequently issued. If plaintiff had not pled guilty to the charges against him and there had been a trial, these defendants would have been called as witnesses to give testimony against plaintiff. Hence, they are entitled, as witnesses, to absolute immunity from Sec. 1983 damage liability.

Section 1983 affords absolute immunity from damages to a witness for statements in an affidavit submitted to a court in an adversarial bond revocation proceeding.

Joe Burns, Jr. v. County of King · filed 1989-08-29

We conclude that Warwick was absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 for the statements in her affidavit.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on a witness’s trial testimony, even when the witness is a police officer.

Geter v. Fortenberry · filed 1989-09-05

Hence, we apply the same maxim in favor of Fortenberry: His statements on the witness stand cannot be used to support a separate theory of liability under section 1983.

A witness has absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages liability for testimony in judicial proceedings.

Merton E. Bond v. Jane Shams, Cabinet for Human Resources · filed 1989-12-12

The social worker is absolutely immune from liability for damages for her testimony in the judicial proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a police officer for testimony given before a grand jury.

Wolf v. Napier · filed 1990-01-08

Certainly, the facts of Briscoe v. LaHue would specifically foreclose the collection of any money damages under § 1983 for testimony given by this defendant before the grand jury that returned the aforesaid criminal indictments.

Witnesses in judicial proceedings have absolute immunity from damages suits under Section 1983 for claims arising from their testimony.

Russell v. Mariani · filed 1990-01-31

Clearly, witnesses in judicial proceedings enjoy absolute immunity from suit for damages under section 1983 for claims arising from their testimony.

Section 1983 affords police officers absolute immunity from damages claims based on their trial testimony.

Dukes v. State of NY · filed 1990-07-31

Trial testimony is precisely the type of testimony afforded the full protection of immunity from section 1983 action. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against police officers for allegedly false testimony at a criminal trial because witnesses are immune from damages liability for their testimony.

Batiste v. Fleming · filed 1990-10-02

This is because all witnesses at judicial proceedings are immune from any damages liability stemming from their testimony, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329, 341 (1982) (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 does not authorize a convicted state defendant to assert a claim for damages when a police officer gave perjured testimony at defendant's criminal trial).

Witness immunity bars § 1983 liability for testimony in judicial proceedings but does not protect a person who procures false testimony.

LaBoy v. Zuley · filed 1990-10-04

Although witnesses are immune from § 1983 civil liability for testimony provided in judicial proceedings, such immunity does not extend to individuals who procure others to give false testimony.

Section 1983 claims based on allegedly perjured trial testimony are barred by witness immunity.

Wheeler v. Nieves · filed 1991-04-09

In addition, to the extent Wheeler’s section 1983 action against Humphrey and Nieves is based on allegedly perjured testimony, such action must be dismissed on immunity grounds.

Alleging a conspiracy to give false testimony does not defeat absolute immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim.

McArdle v. Tronetti · filed 1991-08-01

We agree with all the authority we have located in holding that alleging a conspiracy to falsely testify does not abrogate absolute immunity.

In a § 1983 malicious prosecution suit, a complaining witness lacks absolute immunity for grand jury or preliminary hearing testimony relevant to initiating or perpetuating the prosecution, while a lay witness has absolute immunity for pretrial testimony.

Anthony v. Daniel G. Baker, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff of the County of El Paso, Colorado · filed 1992-02-05

We hold that, in the context of a § 1983 suit for malicious prosecution, a complaining witness is not absolutely immune for his testimony at either a grand jury proceeding or a preliminary hearing if that testimony is relevant to the manner in which the complaining witness initiated or perpetuated the prosecution. However, in the event that the defendant is not a complaining witness, we hold that he is absolutely immune for his pretrial testimony.

Section 1983 provides no damages remedy against a witness for testimony at a post-conviction hearing, even when the witness allegedly gave it in furtherance of a conspiracy to deny due process.

Lopez House v. Belford · filed 1992-02-12

Thus, it is evident that Davidson was entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for his testimony at the post-conviction hearing, even if, as House alleges, he presented that testimony in furtherance of a conspiracy with Robbins to deprive House of due process at his post-conviction hearing.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on witnesses for testimony given in judicial proceedings, even if the testimony is perjurious.

Mattson v. Violet Lenore Healey J.J. Kellum · filed 1992-04-30

For reasons of public policy, those who testify in the course of judicial proceedings have long enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suits based on their words, whether perjurious or not.

Witnesses have absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims based on testimony given in judicial proceedings, even if the testimony was perjured.

John Pershing Wolfe, Jr. v. State of Arizona · filed 1992-07-06

The district court also properly dismissed the detective because witnesses who testify in the course of judicial proceedings enjoy absolute immunity from civil rights suits based upon their testimony, even if the testimony was perjured.

Trial witnesses are absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983 for their testimony.

Durham v. Bendal · filed 1992-08-05

Durham's complaint was frivolous because the four defendants were witnesses at Durham's trial and therefore were absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Grand jury witnesses are absolutely immune from damages liability under § 1983, including for alleged conspiracies to give false or incomplete grand jury testimony.

Gamler v. Bulford · filed 1993-01-25

Gamler's causes of action based upon the alleged conspiracy to present false grand jury testimony fail to state a claim because grand jury witnesses are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983. See Alioto v. City of Shively, 835 F.2d 1173, 1174 (6th Cir.1987). This immunity also applies to alleged conspiracies to give false or incomplete testimony in grand jury proceedings. Id.

Witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims based on their testimony in judicial proceedings, even if the testimony is false.

Watterson v. Page · filed 1993-02-09

And even assuming Seymour testified falsely, and even assuming her false testimony might otherwise give rise to a claim of constitutional dimensions, she would still be immune from suit under § 1983 because of the absolute immunity afforded to witnesses for their testimony in the course of judicial proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a grand jury witness for alleged perjury in that testimony because the witness has absolute immunity.

Jerricks v. Bresnahan · filed 1993-03-14

Plaintiffs allegations of grand jury perjury therefore fail to state a claim against defendant Riley under section 1983.

A government official whose sworn affidavit in a court action functions as testimony has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim based on that affidavit.

Hardiman v. City of Chicago Detective Fitzsimmons · filed 1993-05-12

Because Fitzsim-mons’ affidavit under oath in the prior civil case was the functional equivalent of his providing testimony, and because for present purposes it must be assumed that Fitzsim-mons did so as a governmental official (or else this Section 1983 action could not lie to begin with), Fitzsimmons is entitled to absolute immunity.

Witnesses are immune from damages liability under section 1983 for their testimony in criminal trials and preliminary proceedings.

McDonald v. David Hatch, Detective Richard K. Good, Sr., Police Officer Charles Paine Robert Lucherini · filed 1993-07-01

Witnesses are immune from liability for damages in section 1983 actions for their testimony in criminal trials and preliminary proceedings. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-36 (1983). Thus, to the extent McDonald sought damages for the alleged false testimony of Good, Hatch, Monahan and Mattingly, these officers were immune from suit.

Witnesses are absolutely immune from damages liability under section 1983 for perjured testimony given in criminal trials.

Barker v. Bowers · filed 1993-07-08

Witnesses are absolutely immune from liability for damages under section 1983 for perjured testimony given in criminal trials.

Witness immunity under § 1983 does not require striking an allegation of false testimony when it forms part of a claim based on officers’ institution of groundless charges causing a seizure, rather than a claim based solely on their testimony.

Ellis ex rel. Ingram v. Bankhead · filed 1993-08-12

That allegation does not fail, as defendants would have it, by reason of the immunity ruling in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Once again defendants betray a basic misunderstanding of the Complaint, for plaintiffs do not seek to ground any claim of constitutional deprivation solely on the basis of Officers’ assertedly false testimony. Instead the Complaint ¶ 14 allegation, to the extent that it relates to Count II, is an integral part of that count’s claim that Officers’ institution of groundless charges caused the "seizure” of Ingram and Ellis in constitutional terms.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against police officers based on allegedly perjurious testimony at trial or during pretrial proceedings.

Boudette v. William Curtis Singer City of Cottonwood, Az, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1993-09-17

It is well settled that plaintiffs may not bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against police officers based on allegedly perjurious testimony at trial or during pre-trial proceedings.

Witnesses in a criminal prosecution are absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983 for their testimony.

Patterson v. Bd. of Probation and Parole · filed 1994-05-09

Witnesses in a criminal prosecution are absolutely immune from damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 gives police officers absolute immunity from civil liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings.

Rykard v. Michael R. Kinnett and Gerald Devoe · filed 1995-03-02

Police officers, however, are absolutely immune from civil liability under Sec. 1983 for their testimony in judicial proceedings.

A witness in a state prosecution has absolute immunity from a § 1983 damages claim for acts in the witness role.

Joiner v. Thomas Goodall Bill Zoto · filed 1995-04-12

Further, this defendant is entitled to absolute immunity in his capacity as witness in the state prosecution.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against a police officer based on testimony he gives at a judicial hearing, even if the testimony was reckless or perjurious.

Rock v. Lowe · filed 1995-07-14

Whether Lowe was reckless or even perjurious in stating that Spicer’s statements were “consistent” with Ellerbeck’s is immaterial, because Lowe is absolutely immune from any Section 1983 claims based on testimony he gives at a judicial hearing.

A police officer is absolutely immune from a Section 1983 damages claim based on testimony he gave to a grand jury.

Ali v. Reed · filed 1995-07-31

It appears, however, that all of Ali's allegations arose from the defendant's testimony to the grand jury. Hence, the dismissal of this case was also proper because the defendant was absolutely immune from suit for the damages that Ali sought.

Witnesses are absolutely immune from civil liability under Section 1983.

Carson Barnes, Jr. v. City of Kent Suzanne Moon · filed 1995-09-25

Furthermore, witnesses are absolutely immune from civil liability under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against police witnesses arising from their grand jury testimony because they have absolute witness immunity.

Ali v. Person · filed 1995-11-15

Following the reasoning of Briscoe, this Court sees no reason not to apply this rule to police witnesses. Accordingly, Ali may not assert a claim against Person for liability arising out of his grand jury testimony.

Section 1983 witness immunity does not protect an officer’s investigative or trial-preparation conduct merely because the officer later testifies.

Jean v. Collins · filed 1997-03-07

Jean is not suing Shingleton for his testimony and behavior on the stand, but rather for his behavior during the investigation and trial preparation for Jean’s trial; therefore, witness immunity does not protect him.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on witnesses for testimony in judicial or administrative proceedings, even when the testimony is knowingly false.

Cignetti v. Healy · filed 1997-05-22

A witness is absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 as to claims based on the testimony given at a judicial or administrative proceeding, even if the testimony is knowingly and intentionally perjurious, as is the claim here.

Witnesses who give official testimony have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for that testimony.

Cetenich v. Alden · filed 1998-07-27

The Court finds that as witnesses to Plaintiffs prosecution, Defendants Mattison and Sullivan are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 and Plaintiffs claim against these Defendants is therefore dismissed.

A witness who testifies at trial has absolute immunity from § 1983 damages liability for conspiring to present false testimony.

Franklin v. Terr · filed 2000-02-02

We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Terr on the same grounds as the district court and we hold that Terr’ has absolute immunity from damages liability in a § 1983 action for conspiring to present false testimony at a criminal trial.

A witness who testifies at trial is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for conspiring to present her own and another witness's perjured testimony there.

Franklin v. Terr · filed 2000-02-02

We also hold that Terr is absolutely immune from S 1983 liability for civil damages based on the allegation that she conspired to present her own and another witness's perjured testimony at Franklin's criminal trial.

Section 1983 generally shields grand jury witnesses from liability for their testimony, except law enforcement witnesses functioning as complaining witnesses.

Kulas v. Flores · filed 2001-06-25

Grand jury witnesses are generally immune from suit under § 1983 for their testimony. ... However, there is an exception to this immunity for law enforcement witnesses functioning as “complaining witnesses."

Government witnesses are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages claims alleging a conspiracy to give false testimony at a criminal trial.

Marshall v. Odom · filed 2001-07-18

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendants are absolutely immune to Plaintiffs claim of civil conspiracy based upon the allegedly false testimony given at the assault trial.

Section 1983 does not impose civil liability on police officers for allegedly false testimony given in judicial proceedings because they have absolute witness immunity.

Wilson v. Lyons · filed 2003-07-09

Police officers have absolute immunity from civil liability for allegedly false testimony given in judicial proceedings.

Witnesses are absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings, even if they knowingly give perjured testimony.

Macko v. Byron · filed 1985-04-15

Judge Krenzler noted that the Supreme Court had recently held, in Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), that witnesses in judicial proceedings are absolutely immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 based on their testimony, even if they knowingly gave perjured testimony. ... Judge Krenzler correctly concluded that plaintiffs' second amended complaint failed to sufficiently state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 claims based on a witness’s deposition testimony are barred by absolute witness immunity.

Nwoke v. Palmer · filed 2004-11-08

The same result obtains here. If Mr. Nwoke could sue Judge Palmer for his deposition testimony, Mr. Nwoke would be allowed to circumvent the absolute bar to suit for the same testimony given in open court.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on police witnesses for their testimony in judicial proceedings.

Johnson v. Arndt · filed 2005-02-14

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s claim that defendants provided false testimony during his criminal trial because police witnesses are immune from liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a police officer for allegedly giving perjured testimony at a criminal trial.

Shelley v. Wilson · filed 2005-10-14

As the District Court held, Shelley cannot state a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a police officer for allegedly giving perjured testimony at his criminal trial.

Police officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims based on allegedly perjured testimony at a criminal trial.

Blacknall v. Citarella · filed 2006-01-31

Moreover, it is well-settled that police officers are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages for giving allegedly perjured testimony at a criminal trial.

A witness who is not a complaining witness has absolute immunity from § 1983 liability, even if the witness conspired with state actors.

Franklin v. Terr · filed 2006-04-05

Furthermore, we hold that even if there were sufficient evidence of a conspiracy between Franklin-Lipsker and state actors, Franklin-Lipsker cannot be held liable because she is entitled to absolute witness immunity. ... Because Franklin-Lipsker is not a complaining witness, she is entitled to absolute witness immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a police officer for testimony given as a witness because the officer has absolute immunity.

Alvarez v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2006-04-26

This claim fails because the Supreme Court has held “that § 1983 does not authorize a damages claim against private witnesses” and that absolute immunity similarly protects a police officer appearing as a witness.

Trial witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims based on their testimony.

Latta, Roger v. LaPorte County Sheri · filed 2007-02-12

Witnesses at trial likewise possess absolute immunity in actions under §1983.

A witness is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit based on testimony in a judicial proceeding.

Leitgeb v. Kelley · filed 2007-03-06

It is well-established that an individual who testifies as a witnesses in judicial proceeding is absolutely immune from suit under § 1983.

A public official is absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim based on testimony in a judicial proceeding.

Marcello v. Maine · filed 2007-04-06

To the extent the Marcellos assert violations based on Mr. Gould’s testimony relating to the contempt proceedings, they have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, because he is absolutely immune from a § 1983 action based on his testimony.

Section 1983 claims against defendants whose only involvement was testimony in state judicial proceedings are barred by witness immunity.

Loubser v. Pala · filed 2007-06-26

The question comes as to whether any of these defendants who are here solely because they gave testimony in the related state judicial proceedings are entitled to the species of immunity mentioned in Briscoe and Butz. This court thinks they are and DISMISSES all such defendants WITH PREJUDICE.

Section 1983 witness immunity does not protect a complaining witness who helps obtain a temporary restraining order merely because the county filed the petition.

Toler v. Paulson · filed 2008-03-14

This distinction is unavailing. In the criminal context, for instance, it is the government rather than the complaining witness who brings suit, but that distinction does not entitle the complaining witness to witness immunity. Similarly, here, while defendant Garza may not have been the named plaintiff, he is alleged to have participated in obtaining the temporary restraining order.

Witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 civil liability for their testimony in a prior trial.

Vasquez Arroyo v. Sebes · filed 2008-10-08

However, “all witnesses enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability under § 1983 for their testimony in a prior trial.” Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)). We therefore agree with the district court that Plaintiff’s § 1983 action did not state a claim on which relief could be granted, and we accordingly AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against public officials, including police officers, who conspire outside judicial proceedings to deprive a person of constitutional rights; witness immunity does not shield that conduct.

Taylor v. Hansen · filed 1990-02-27

Accordingly, a public official, such as a police officer, participating in a conspiracy to deprive a person of rights guaranteed under the Constitution, may be liable for damages in a Section 1983 action.

Witnesses are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits arising out of their testimony.

Nalley v. New Mexico Behavioral Health Institute · filed 2009-08-25

Witnesses are absolutely immune from suits under § 1983 arising out of their testimony.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on police officers for perjured trial testimony.

McSherry v. City of Long Beach · filed 2009-10-20

McSherry argues also that Turley is liable for his allegedly false trial testimony regarding the descriptions of the interior of the residence. This claim is foreclosed by Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding that police officers are immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perjured testimony).

A witness is absolutely immune from a § 1983 damages claim based on testimony in a judicial proceeding, even if the testimony was knowingly false or malicious.

PJ Ex Rel. Jensen v. Wagner · filed 2010-05-05

A witness is absolutely immune from civil liability based on any testimony the witness provides during a judicial proceeding “even if the witness knew the statements were false and made them with malice.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332 (1983). Thus, even if Dr. Albritton’s testimony was aimed at perpetuating the custody proceedings against the Jensens, she is protected by absolute immunity. Accordingly, Dr. Albritton is absolutely immune from any claims against her in this § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 subjects a law enforcement witness’s investigative conduct to qualified rather than absolute immunity.

Peterson v. Bernardi · filed 2010-06-15

Qualified, rather than absolute, immunity therefore governs the investigative conduct of a law enforcement official like Defendant Tighe.

Witnesses are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits based on their testimony.

Tommy Hall v. Officer Nick Elrod · filed 2010-10-28

We also agree with the district court that Hall failed to state a claim against defendants for engaging in an unlawful conspiracy, see Nelson v. City of McGehee, 876 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1989) (allegations of conspiracy must be pleaded with sufficient specificity and factual support to suggest defendants had meeting of minds directed toward unconstitutional action), for testifying falsely against him, see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-46 (1983) (witnesses are absolutely immune from § 1983 suit), and for bringing a false criminal charge against him, see State v. Murphy, 864 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Ark. 1993) (choice of which charges to file against accused is matter entirely within prosecutor’s discretion).

Section 1983 affords a police officer absolute immunity for trial testimony, even when that testimony is the only way allegedly fabricated evidence could reach the jury.

Jovanovic v. City of New York · filed 2012-06-20

Jovanovic cannot show causation--i.e., that the alleged fabrication of evidence led to a deprivation of his liberty. That is because the only avenue by which the testimony could reach the jury was through Bonilla’s testimony, for which he enjoys absolute immunity under Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-336 (1983); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1505 (2012) (extending Briscoe to grand jury proceedings).

Section 1983 does not permit claims against officers for testimony they give before a grand jury or at trial because they have absolute immunity for that testimony.

Mitchell v. Kelley · filed 2012-08-17

Second, a claim that defendants gave false testimony is not viable because the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for the testimony they provided before the grand jury and during plaintiffs criminal trial.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a law enforcement officer for allegedly perjured testimony at a criminal trial.

Cottle v. Las Vegas Metro Police Departm · filed 2013-05-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Cottle’s claims based on defendant O’Daniel’s allegedly perjured testimony at his criminal trial because O’Daniel is immune from liability.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on police officers for testimony at a pretrial judicial hearing, even if the testimony was false.

Williams v. City of Boston · filed 2013-09-27

For the reasons detailed herein, Kelley is entitled to summary judgment on this claim as he is entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony at the pre-trial hearing.

Section 1983 bars claims based on a witness’s grand jury testimony or a conspiracy to give false testimony, but the immunity does not cover separate misconduct outside the grand jury.

Coggins v. County of Nassau · filed 2013-12-02

In particular, the Court holds, in light of the Supreme Court decision in Rehberg, that defendants Vara and Buonora have absolute immunity with respect to any alleged perjury in the grand jury, or any alleged conspiracy to present false testimony to the grand jury, and such alleged evidence cannot be used to support any other Section 1983 claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution. ... These allegations in support of the Section 1983 and related claims are completely independent of the alleged perjury in the grand jury and are not barred under the doctrine of absolute immunity under Rehberg.

A witness who testifies under oath in an adversarial proceeding is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for that testimony.

Moffett v. Bryant · filed 2014-05-01

Accordingly, when Bryant testified, he was testifying as a witness in an adversarial proceeding and is thus absolutely immune from § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 claims based on a witness’s testimony under oath at a pretrial hearing are barred by absolute witness immunity.

McGrath v. Town of Sandwich · filed 2014-05-16

This Court will follow other courts that have extended the holding of Rehberg to testimony provided under oath at other pre-trial proceedings.

Testifying witnesses are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their testimony, even if it is perjured.

Fisher v. Miller · filed 2014-07-08

As the District Court ably noted in the context of Fisher’s claims against Sadowski, a testifying witness is absolutely immune from liability under § 1983, even if that testimony is perjured.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against witnesses for their trial testimony, even if it was false.

Glass v. Anne Arundel County · filed 2014-08-07

Even if Collier's testimony at Glass's trial was false, witnesses are absolutely immune from damages liability for trial testimony. ... Thus, Collier's testimony cannot support a claim under § 1983.

A police officer’s grand jury testimony does not confer absolute immunity from § 1983 claims that can be proved without relying on that testimony.

Coggins v. Buonora · filed 2015-01-13

When a police officer claims absolute immunity for his grand jury testimony under Rehberg, the court should determine whether the plaintiff can make out the elements of his § 1983 claim without resorting to the grand jury testimony.

A grand jury witness has absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim based on the witness’s testimony.

Kavanaugh v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government · filed 2015-08-26

Even assuming Adams had the results, Adams “has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on [her grand jury] testimony.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against detectives who fabricate evidence used to secure a wrongful conviction, even when their trial testimony is immune from damages liability.

Avery v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2017-01-30

The detectives are liable under § 1983 for this due-process violation even though their trial testimony, standing alone, would not subject them to damages liability.

A grand-jury witness has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim based on the witness’s testimony.

Tinney v. Richland County · filed 2017-02-06

A grand-jury witness has absolute immunity from § 1983 claims predicated on the witness’s testimony. ... Rehberg forecloses the claim for malicious prosecution because Tinney cabins the allegations to conduct as a grand-jury witness.

Section 1983 gives expert witnesses absolute immunity for trial testimony, but not for their investigative conduct.

Stinson v. Rawson · filed 2017-08-18

Witnesses in a § 1983 trial have absolute immunity from liability based on their testimony at trial. ... So Johnson and Rawson are not entitled to absolute immunity.

Witnesses are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for testimony in judicial proceedings.

Ortega v. Ritchie · filed 2018-01-05

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ortega’s claims against defendants Meade and Ferry because these defendants are absolutely immune from a suit for damages with regard to their testimony in another action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on police officers for their trial testimony, even when they are alleged to have committed perjury.

Sharp v. The City of Huntsville, AL. · filed 2018-04-23

Police officers, however, are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under section 1983 for their testimony during trials, even if the officer is alleged to have committed perjury.

Section 1983 claims based on a witness’s grand jury testimony are barred by absolute immunity.

DiPasquale v. Hawkins · filed 2018-10-12

The complaint before us adequately alleges only a claim based on Hawkins’s grand jury testimony, and that claim is barred by absolute immunity.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity from damages claims based on witness testimony.

Knox v. Curtis · filed 2019-06-03

Both defendants have absolute immunity from a § 1983 damages suit based on their testimony.

A grand jury witness has absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim based on the witness’s testimony.

Grady v. Gaddy · filed 2019-09-18

Because Gaddy has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on his grand jury testimony, plaintiff's allegations against Gaddy fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and will be dismissed.

Trial and grand jury witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims based on their testimony.

Engesser v. Fox · filed 2019-09-23

However, both a trial witness and a grand jury witness have absolute immunity from § 1983 actions based on their testimony.

Witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims based on their court testimony.

EDWARDS v. MORGAN · filed 2019-12-13

First, witnesses enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages based upon their proffered testimony, so Mr. Edwards may not proceed on any claims against Ms. Morgan based on her testimony against him in court.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a trial witness for giving testimony, even if the testimony is alleged to be false or damaging.

Potter v. Lineback · filed 2020-01-27

Additionally, Johnson is absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for giving testimony at trial, even if that testimony is alleged to have been false or damaging to plaintiff.

Section 1983 witnesses have absolute immunity from liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings.

Friskey v. Bracke · filed 2020-01-28

With respect to Muse’s trial testimony, Muse is correct that he is protected by absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a trial witness for testimony, even if the testimony is false or misleading.

FRAMELI v. JOYCE · filed 2020-01-29

Here, Singer’s testimony at Frameli’s trial enjoys absolute immunity from civil liability even if he made false and/or misleading statements.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a grand jury witness based on the witness’s testimony, even if the testimony is false.

Rodriguez v. Derienzo · filed 2020-02-07

Defendant DeRienzo is therefore absolutely immune from suit for a § 1983 claim based on allegations that he testified falsely to the grand jury.

Section 1983 claims against grand jury witnesses cannot rest on their testimony or related investigation or preparation.

Mitchell v. Stroman · filed 2020-04-27

Moreover, as Defendants correctly point out, grand jury witnesses have absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness’ testimony, as well as related investigation or preparation for such testimony.