42 U.S.C. § 1983

A governmental unit’s violation of rights guaranteed by the federal Bankruptcy Code is actionable under § 1983.

Watts v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Co. (In Re Watts) · filed 1987-06-30

We note that the position of the Plaintiffs, which is essentially that a violation of a Bankruptcy Code provision by a governmental unit is perforce a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has been adopted in this Court by former Chief Judge Goldhaber, former Judge King, present Chief Judge Twardowski, and by one of two district judges who have considered the issue. We choose to follow this majority.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against state officials for violations of federal rights, so possible lack of standing under a separate federal statute does not make a constitutional § 1983 claim futile.

Nutritional Support Services, L.P. v. Miller · filed 1992-09-16

The Court does not find this argument persuasive as, even assuming that Plaintiffs lack standing under the Act, there is no allegation that they lack standing to raise their constitutional claims. As § 1983 merely “provides a remedy against state officials for deprivations of rights established elsewhere under federal law,” Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir.1986), the addition of a ... § 1983 count will merely provide the Court with a jurisdictional basis to hear Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.

Section 1983 does not create a right to damages for violation of a federal statute when that statute does not permit those damages.

Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association · filed 1992-11-18

Because Crocker cannot recover general damages under the EHA, he cannot recover damages under § 1983 for any violation of his rights secured by the EHA. Section 1983 merely secures the federally protected rights a plaintiff already holds. It does not expand those rights. Through § 1983 Crocker was able to bring an action that might otherwise have been foreclosed. Section 1983 did not provide a right to damages where none existed before.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against state officials for deprivations of rights established elsewhere under federal law and does not itself create substantive rights.

Silver v. Baggiano · filed 1986-11-24

By its terms, Sec. 1983 does not create substantive rights; 2 it provides a remedy against state officials for deprivations of rights established elsewhere under federal law.

Section 1983 does not provide a private right of action to enforce 47 U.S.C. § 253.

Time Warner Telecom of Oregon, LLC v. City of Portland · filed 2006-03-08

I agree with the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Santa Fe that § 253 should not be construed to create a private right of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 253.

Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego · filed 2008-09-11

We adopt the reasoning and conclusion of the three-judge panel that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims cannot be brought for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 253.

Section 1983 permits claims for federal constitutional violations, but allegations of a technically defective stop work order and building moratorium did not make out such a claim.

Greenup v. City of Cambridge · filed 2009-04-15

Plaintiffs allegations in this case that the defendant Cambridge officials issued a technically defective stop work order... and erroneously imposed the two-year building moratorium provided by a presumptively valid ordinance simply do not make out claims of federal constitutional violations that may be asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, in light of the clear precedents discouraging such claims, which are discussed above.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law and does not redress violations of state law.

D.L. Ex Rel. J.L. v. Unified School District No. 497 · filed 2010-02-23

§ 1983 affords a remedy for violations of federal law and does not “provide a basis for redressing violations of state law.”

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights conferred elsewhere rather than creating a substantive right.

Johnson v. Comfort Residential Partners · filed 2012-01-25

Finally, Johnson failed to establish that the federal statutes cited in his complaint served as a source of any substantive federal right to file a civil action. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979) (setting forth factors to determine if federal criminal statutes provide implied right to file civil claim); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not grant a substantive right, but only a way to vindicate federal rights elsewhere conferred).

Courts should be especially reluctant to dismiss a § 1983 complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, Virginia · filed 2007-01-31

The Fourth Circuit has also stated, however, that motions filed under Rule 12(b)(6) “should be granted only in very limited circumstances.” ... This is especially true for Rule 12(b)(6) motions made by plaintiffs seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as Plaintiff is here.

Section 1983 complaints may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only when, accepting material allegations as true and construing them liberally, the plaintiff could prove no facts showing action under color of state authority that deprived the plaintiff of a federally secured right.

Gorham v. Banovetz · filed 1981-06-30

In considering whether a pro se section 1983 complaint should be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, all material allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. ... Moreover, the complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. ... See also Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1980) (before a court can dismiss a section 1983 cause of action, it must be convinced "beyond doubt" that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would establish that the defendant(s) acted under color of state authority to deprive him of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the constitution or laws of the United States). ... Despite the district court's solicitation of non-conclusory pleadings, Gorham simply failed to supply facts which could state a claim under section 1983. Therefore, the district court's dismissal was proper and we summarily affirm.

A complaint invoking Section 1983 must outline facts constituting the alleged violations; naked conclusions are insufficient to avoid dismissal.

Gordon v. Crouchley · filed 1982-12-22

Jurisdiction is based on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331, 1343, plaintiff having sought compensatory and punitive damages, and injunctive relief. ... To prevent a dismissal of a complaint based upon a violation of a civil rights statute, the pleadings must do more, however, than state naked conclusions; the complaint must at least outline the facts constituting the alleged violations.

A § 1983 due-process claim based on delayed election preclearance must plead facts showing more than negligence, including that officials expected approval would not arrive before the scheduled election.

Ponterio v. Koch · filed 1984-05-22

Consequently, to allege the deprivation of due process, at least in this context, plaintiff must plead that defendants submitted the plan on June 12, 1981, expecting that it would not be approved in time for the primary election they had scheduled for September 10, 1981. ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim entitling him to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when the plaintiffs fail to state a claim for federal relief.

Andrew Daniel Krempp, Etc. v. Gary Dobbs, Esquire · filed 1985-11-08

The district court did not err in dismissing the 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim upon which the federal court can grant relief.

Section 1983 permits suit against a state officer only when he is in some manner responsible for the alleged deprivation of rights.

Dommer v. Crawford · filed 1981-07-07

A state officer named in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be in some manner responsible for the alleged deprivation of rights. ... But since Crawford in his capacity as a prosecutor has no authority under Indiana law to order city police to detain arrestees past the statutory time limits, the complaint fails to state a cause of action against him.

Section 1983 requires a state officer sued under it to bear some responsibility for the alleged deprivation of rights.

Dommer v. Crawford · filed 1981-07-09

A state officer named in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be in some manner responsible for the alleged deprivation of rights.

Personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation is required to recover § 1983 damages from a defendant.

Williams v. Harold J. Smith, Superintendent, and W. Morgan, C.O., Attica Correctional Facility · filed 1986-01-15

Accordingly, “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires a showing that the defendant’s conduct caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Inmates, Washington County Jail v. England · filed 1980-12-01

However, in order to hold a defendant liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 it must be shown that such defendant’s conduct subjected the plaintiff to deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges or immunities.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights, so a plaintiff must identify the specific right allegedly infringed.

Adams 823706 v. Harju · filed 2020-08-10

Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights and cannot support a freestanding claim.

BENCH BILLBOARD COMPANY v. City of Toledo · filed 2010-03-03

Plaintiff concedes that § 1983 does not create substantive rights. This freestanding claim is therefore dismissed, though I recognize that plaintiffs constitutional claims are brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it provides a way to enforce federal rights conferred elsewhere.

Slawik v. State · filed 1984-07-18

Section 1983 does not itself create substantive rights. Rather, the statute provides the method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred either by the United States Constitution or the federal statutes therein described.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federally protected rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Nabozny v. NCS Pearson, Inc. · filed 2003-07-07

The essence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to authorize a court to grant relief when a party’s federally protected rights have been violated by a state or local official or other person who acted under color of state law. Section 1983 only fulfills the procedural or remedial role of authorizing the assertion of a claim for relief; the statute does not itself create or establish substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a procedure for seeking relief for violations of certain federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Claassen v. City & County of Denver · filed 2000-10-26

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create substantive rights; it provides a procedure to seek relief for violation of certain federal constitutional and statutory provisions.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it provides a remedy for deprivation of rights established elsewhere.

Stanford v. City of Manchester · filed 2000-09-26

Taken alone, § 1983 creates no substantive rights; however, it provides a remedy for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Smith v. Holtz · filed 2000-04-13

By itself, S 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but it does provide a remedy for violation of rights created by the Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to identify a protected interest.

Konrad v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream · filed 2000-03-27

However, we find that the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the plaintiffs’ cause of action to recover damages for an alleged violation of 42 USC § 1983. The plaintiffs’ claim must be dismissed because they have not identified a protected interest under that statute (see, Gagliardi v Village of Pawling, 18 F3d 188, 191-192).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights; a claim must identify the underlying right and how the defendant violated it.

Raspberry v. Johnson · filed 2000-02-18

However, as stated above, Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” rather it provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” ... In Count Four, Plaintiff, once again, fails to specify any constitutional violation or other area of law upon which his § 1983 claim is based.

Section 1983 provides a federal action to vindicate rights deprived by persons acting under color of state law.

Youngblood v. Gates · filed 1985-12-18

The present action was brought by plaintiffs under a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was enacted to vindicate federal rights against deprivation by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws, rather than creating substantive rights itself.

Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Services · filed 1982-09-21

The Court notes, as a preliminary matter, that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617-618, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1915-1916, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979) (“§ 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything”). Instead, plaintiff needed to show that he was deprived of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words, no remedy is available under § 1983 unless plaintiff also shows a violation of a constitutional provision or federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights but does not itself create a right that can be violated.

National RR Passenger Corp. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. · filed 2011-03-03

Amtrak appears to bring a freestanding claim that the gas use tax law violates 42 U.S.C. 1983. Because Section 1983 provides a mechanism for enforcing rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, an individual “cannot go into court and claim a violation of § 1983-for§ 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything.”

Section 1983 provides a damages cause of action against a state official for depriving a person of federal constitutional or statutory rights, but creates no rights itself.

Hayes v. Arredondo · filed 2011-07-18

Plaintiff has not established that these statutes establish a federal constitutional or statutory right on which a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action may be premised. See Starko, 2006-NMCA-085, ¶ 10 (“Section 1983 does not itself establish or create any rights”; instead, it “provide[s] a cause of action for money damages against a state official in his or her individual capacity for the deprivation of federal constitutional or federal statutory rights.” (emphasis added) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

Section 1983 provides a method for vindicating federal rights rather than creating substantive rights.

Nevada Restaurant Services, Inc. v. Clark County · filed 2016-01-05

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is “not itself a source of substantive rights,” but rather a “method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.”

Section 1983 supplies no substantive standard for a constitutional violation; the underlying constitutional right supplies the applicable standard.

Madison Cnty. v. Evanston Ins. Co. · filed 2018-09-28

Section 1983 does not provide the substantive standards for constitutional violations. ... Rather, courts must rely upon the underlying constitutional torts to provide the applicable standards.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

City of Dallas v. in Re: Heather Russell · filed 2018-10-26

However, title 42, section 1983, is not a source of substantive rights, but a remedial statute designed to vindicate federal rights conferred elsewhere.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to state a cognizable injury.

Lewin v. Cooke · filed 2000-04-28

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and Virginia’s common law of civil conspiracy, plaintiff must state a cognizable injury.

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action for deprivation of rights under color of state law, but de minimis injuries are not actionable under it.

Praylor v. Fitzrandolph · filed 2005-02-23

Because his injuries were de minimis, his claim is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to suffer a legally cognizable injury to have standing.

Bryan Hole v. Texas A & M University · filed 2010-01-14

Appellants’ state court attorney’s fees and costs do not constitute sufficient injury to establish standing under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of an independent federal right but creates no substantive right of its own.

Schwartzberg v. Califano · filed 1979-10-26

It is now settled, however, that § 1983 in and of itself does not provide a substantive basis for relief. Rather, it is essentially a procedural or remedial device through which a party may seek relief for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 creates no independent substantive rights; it provides a cause of action for governmental violations of rights protected by federal law.

No. 99-1675 · filed 2000-05-02

As is well established, § 1983 creates no independent substantive rights, but rather provides a cause of action by which individuals may seek money damages for governmental violations of rights protected by federal law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Western Mohegan Tribe and Nation v. New York · filed 2000-05-25

Although § 1983 serves “to ensure that an individual [has] a cause of action for violations of the Constitution,” the statute itself “does not provide any substantive rights at all.”

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights of its own; it provides a vehicle to vindicate federal rights conferred elsewhere.

Cloverland—Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board · filed 2001-02-02

Defendants are correct that § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but rather a vehicle for vindication of “federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Section 1983 provides a procedural remedy for violations of existing rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Local 514, Transport Workers of America v. Keating · filed 2002-06-05

No substantive claims are asserted under section 1983, however, as it is merely the procedural mechanism for Plaintiffs to assert their federal constitutional claims in Counts I through VIII.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of constitutional or federal statutory rights but creates no substantive rights itself.

ESTATE OF · filed 2003-01-29

Notwithstanding its broad language section 1983 does not create substantive rights; rather it merely provides a remedy for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal rights but does not itself create those rights.

Field v. Michigan · filed 2003-03-28

However, Section 1983 does not itself create federal rights, but only provides judicial relief for the violation of rights arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it provides a civil action against state actors for alleged violations of federal rights.

Kamasinski v. Fitzgerald, et al. · filed 2003-07-16

Of course, the state court’s order cannot be “in violation of” section 1983, since that statute does not vest citizens with any substantive rights. Instead, it merely provides a vehicle by which individuals may pursue civil actions against state actors for alleged violations of their federally protected statutory or constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle to enforce existing constitutional rights but creates no independent substantive rights.

Yap v. Oceanside Union Free School District · filed 2004-02-02

Since “[i]t is fundamental that [Section] 1983 creates no independent, substantive constitutional rights but rather is a vehicle for enforcing such rights,” the Court does not reach Defendants’ policy, practice or custom arguments.

Section 1983 provides a means to protect rights secured elsewhere; it does not create substantive rights.

Latimer v. Robinson · filed 2004-05-20

Section 1983 does not create a substantive right but instead provides the means to protect those rights.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce federal or constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Dolan v. Roth · filed 2004-07-13

Thus, to the, extent plaintiff attempts to rely upon section 1983 as a basis for any substantive rights, such reliance is misplaced and the court will disregard same.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Walton Ex Rel. RW v. MONTGOMERY CY. BD. OF EDUC. · filed 2005-05-20

Section 1983 of Title 42, however, does not provide any substantive rights, but merely provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred."

Section 1983 provides a method to vindicate federal rights conferred elsewhere but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Walton ex rel. R.W. v. Montgomery County Board of Education · filed 2005-05-20

Section 1983 of Title 42, however, does not provide any substantive rights, but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of rights established elsewhere but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Gardenhire v. Schubert · filed 2000-03-02

By its terms, § 1983 creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate rights conferred elsewhere; it does not create independent substantive rights.

Allocco Recycling, Ltd. v. Doherty · filed 2005-07-15

Because § 1983 conveys no rights of its own "but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred,” Al-bright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court construes the Sixth Claim for Relief as merely a prayer for damages and an allegation that the other violations were carried out under color of state law, rather than as a separate substantive claim.

Section 1983 creates a remedy for violations of federal statutory or constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law and creates no substantive rights.

Nard v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 2005-11-09

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but rather only a remedy against those who, acting under color of law, violate rights secured by federal statutory or constitutional law.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for enforcing specific federal rights but creates no substantive federal rights itself.

Wilbesan Charter Sch. v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County · filed 2006-08-15

However, § 1983 is merely a vehicle by which to bring suit; it does not create any substantive federal rights.

Section 1983 provides a procedure to remedy violations of rights established elsewhere; it creates no substantive rights of its own.

Country View Estates @ Ridge LLC v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 2006-09-25

Section 1983, however, “itself creates no substantive rights [but] ... only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to vindicate federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Givs v. City of Eunice · filed 2007-05-21

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather is merely a procedural rule that provides a private cause of action for redressing a violation of federal law or “vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own; a plaintiff must identify the constitutional basis for the claim.

Harris v. Detroit Public Schools · filed 2007-07-13

“Because Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but only a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred, a plaintiff must set forth specific constitutional grounds for asserting a Section 1983 claim.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of independently established rights but creates no substantive rights itself.

McManus v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-12-31

To reiterate, Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, and Plaintiffs do not identify any alleged constitutional or statutory violations (other than the due process claim discussed above) that could be pursued via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a procedure to seek redress for violations of rights established elsewhere; it creates no substantive rights of its own.

Jennejahn v. Village of Avon · filed 2008-08-22

By itself, Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; instead, it provides a “procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of constitutional or federal statutory rights but does not create an independent substantive right.

Vieth v. Pennsylvania · filed 2002-02-22

Accordingly, the court has construed Plaintiffs’ amended complaint as an action brought pursuant to § 1983 to vindicate their rights under the Constitution. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs ... seek an independent basis for recovery, Count V will be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a means to vindicate rights conferred by federal law but does not itself confer substantive rights.

Aldini v. Johnson · filed 2010-06-29

Section 1983 does not confer substantive rights but merely provides a means to vindicate rights conferred by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a damages action for violations of federal rights but creates no independent substantive rights.

Padro v. Public Building Authority · filed 2010-10-27

“[Section] 1983 creates no independent substantive rights, but rather provides a cause of action by which individuals may seek money damages for governmental violations of rights protected by federal law.” ... As such, Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims are grounded in alleged violations of his rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

Section 1983 provides a method for enforcing federal rights but does not itself create a substantive right.

Russo v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2011-05-11

While Plaintiff did not bring an action under Section 1983 in state court, Section 1983 is not the substantive claim being sued upon here. Section 1983 does not create a substantive right.

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, so a claim based solely on a violation of the section must be dismissed.

Viteritti v. Incorporated Village of Bayville · filed 2011-11-21

Thus, to the extent plaintiffs are purporting to assert a claim based solely upon a violation of Section 1983, the sixth cause of action must be dismissed.

Section 1983 creates no substantive right of its own, so invoking it does not make an otherwise identical due process claim a different cause of action for claim preclusion.

Russo v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2012-01-30

But the § 1983 nature of Russo’s federal claims does not distinguish this case from his state court action because § 1983 does not create a substantive right and it is not the substantive claim being asserted here.

Section 1983 provides a means to bring claims for constitutional violations but creates no substantive rights of its own.

State National Insurance Company v. White · filed 2012-07-12

Section 1983 is a remedial statute that “creates no substantive rights,” but merely provides a means to bring claims of constitutional violations, in this case the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Section 1983 provides a private cause of action but does not itself create substantive constitutional rights.

National Ass'n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v. Berch · filed 2013-09-19

That statute, however, merely provides a private cause of action and is not itself an independent source of substantive constitutional rights.

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action for the deprivation of federal rights under color of state law but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Folger v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2014-08-22

Section 1983 does not provide or recognize any substantive rights, but rather merely authorizes a civil action for the deprivation, by one acting under color of State law, of rights secured by federal law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce rights protected elsewhere; it does not support a standalone claim for violation of the statute itself.

Dawn Guba v. Huron County, Ohio · filed 2015-01-22

Insofar as the amended complaint seeks to assert § 1983 as a separate claim, that claim must fail.

Section 1983 provides a right of action to redress violations of other federal law, including the Constitution, rather than creating substantive rights itself.

Argote v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2016-01-08

A plaintiff brings suit under § 1983 to redress violations of other federal law, including the Constitution. In other words, § 1983 provides a right of action; it is never itself violated.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights established elsewhere; it creates no independent substantive right.

Brown v. Buhman · filed 2016-04-11

That is, § 1983 is a remedial vehicle for raising claims based on the violation of constitutional rights. There can be no “violation” of § 1983 separate and apart from the underlying constitutional violations.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights but does not create a separate substantive right.

Brown v. Buhman · filed 2016-05-13

There can be no “violation” of § 1983 separate and apart from the underlying constitutional violations.

Section 1983 provides a procedural mechanism for enforcing rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Krey ex rel. All Persons Similarly Situated Formerly Known All Persons Similarly Situated v. Cuomo · filed 2018-09-24

Having already found that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claim and because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is but a procedural mechanism that itself creates no substantive rights, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action.

Section 1983 is a procedural mechanism that creates no substantive rights of its own.

Police Benevolent Ass'n of N.Y.S., Inc. v. Cuomo · filed 2018-09-24

Having already found that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claim and because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is but a procedural mechanism that itself creates no substantive rights, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a procedural mechanism for enforcing federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

N.Y.S. Law Enforcement Officers Union Council 82 v. Cuomo · filed 2018-09-24

Having already found that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claim and because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is but a procedural mechanism that itself creates no substantive rights, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a procedural mechanism for enforcing federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Donohue v. New York · filed 2018-09-24

Having already found that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claim and because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is but a procedural mechanism that itself creates no substantive rights, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Nassau & Suffolk Cnty. Taxi Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. State · filed 2018-09-28

As such, one cannot "violate" 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor can one's "rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983" be violated, as the statute confers no substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Hightower v. Tulsa County Sheriff's Office · filed 2019-07-10

However, § 1983 merely provides a cause of action when a plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated, and § 1983 does not create any substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Hughley v. Upson County Board of Commissioners · filed 2017-05-24

Hughley’s complaints that the Board and the Judges violated “The Civil Rights Act of 1877, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” “Equal Protection under the 14th Amendment,” and the “1st Amendment of the United State[s] Constit[ution]” failed to state cognizable claims for relief. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (Section “1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007).

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights, but does not create independent substantive rights.

Flynn v. Park · filed 2020-01-21

“Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but only a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Adair v. Charter Cty. of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2006). Because Count Seven of the Complaint does not assert any independent right that is not raised by another count, summary judgment in favor of the City is warranted on that claim.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it provides a procedure to remedy deprivations of rights established elsewhere.

Xu v. City of New York · filed 2020-04-30

Plaintiff brings this claim under § 1983, but “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.”

Section 1983 provides a means to enforce federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Alfonzo-Zamot v. Municipality of Utuado · filed 2020-08-06

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights.

In an action under § 1983, the existence of probable cause is a factual question for the jury.

Shay v. Rossi · filed 2000-05-03

We note that, although in the context of a criminal case, whether probable cause exists for official action presents a question of law; ... in the context of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the basis for at least one of the plaintiffs’ claims in the present case, the existence of probable cause presents a factual question for the jury.

Probable cause is an absolute defense to § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.

Maron v. County of Albany · filed 2006-02-13

Because a person of reasonable caution would believe that criminal activity was afoot, and the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to causes of action for false arrest and malicious prosecution, we affirm.

Section 1983 actions do not apply the common law presumption of probable cause arising from a magistrate’s prior finding.

Merkle v. Upper Dublin School District Upper Dublin Township Police Department Margaret Thomas Clair Brown, Jr., · filed 2000-05-09

Moreover, the common law presumption raised by a magistrate’s prior finding that probable cause exists does not apply to section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff who waived a state preliminary probable cause hearing to litigate probable cause in a later false arrest suit.

Terrell Diamond v. Howd · filed 2002-05-07

In light of the above, we find that the district court erred in determining that Diamond’s waiver of a preliminary probable cause hearing precluded her from litigating the probable cause issue in her section 1983 lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not allow an individual-capacity claim based on an alleged ADA violation.

(PC) Quezada v. Akabike · filed 2020-12-29

Having carefully reviewed the file, including plaintiff’s objections, ... the court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and proper ... analysis. ... However, the findings and recommendations noted that plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable in part because he does sue defendants in their individual capacities. (See Doc. No. 30 at 10); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff could “not pursue a section 1983 claim against [defendant] in her individual ... capacity for her alleged violation of either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act”).

Section 1983 permits an independent constitutional disability-discrimination claim even when the same allegations also support an ADA claim.

Grillo v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago · filed 2019-04-16

So, Grillo can bring a § 1983 claim for a violation of his constitutional rights, but not his statutory rights. For example, his allegations regarding retaliation for asserting his rights under the ADA do not state a constitutional claim. But the complaint also alleges that defendants violated Grillo’s constitutional rights by discriminating against him based on his disabilities, and those allegations state an independent constitutional claim that the ADA does not preclude.

Section 1983 adds no distinct claim when it merely duplicates ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and alleges no equal protection violation.

McFadden v. Grasmick · filed 2007-05-12

It is clear that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is simply redundant of her other two claims. She does not assert an equal protection violation.

Section 1983 permits equal protection claims based on the same facts as ADA claims; the ADA does not preempt those constitutional claims.

Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, MD · filed 2002-08-09

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims brought under § 1983 are not preempted by the ADA even though based on the same facts and circumstances as the ADA claims.

Section 1983 cannot provide additional remedies for an ADA claim when the ADA’s enforcement scheme and inconsistent remedies preclude them.

Kagan v. State of Nevada · filed 1999-02-22

Furthermore, there is a limitation on damages under the ADA that does not apply to § 1983 claims. These inconsistencies require that Plaintiff seek her remedies under the ADA, and the Nevada version of ADA, and preclude the quest for additional remedies under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to pursue ADA or Rehabilitation Act violations when those statutory rights are the only alleged deprivation.

Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta · filed 1997-05-22

We conclude that a plaintiff may not maintain a section 1983 action in lieu of—or in addition to—a Rehabilitation Act or ADA cause of action if the only alleged deprivation is of the employee's rights created by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce ADA rights because the ADA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Krocka v. Bransfield · filed 1997-06-24

The Seventh Circuit has held that claims based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act may not be brought under § 1983. Title VII, on which the ADA’s remedial scheme is based, provides a comprehensive enforcement procedure that plaintiffs could avoid simply by easting their claims as those under § 1983. ... This analysis is equally applicable to claims brought to enforce rights protected by the ADA.

Section 1983 does not provide additional relief when a disability-based termination claim duplicates the injuries and rights asserted under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

Coffey v. County of Hennepin · filed 1998-09-10

The Court is not persuaded by this argument. ... Plaintiffs claims under § 1983 are based upon the same alleged injuries as her ERA and ADA claims and do not ... appear to add anything to Plaintiffs substantive rights under the statutes. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against state officials in their individual capacities for alleged ADA violations.

Alsbrook v. AR Commission on Law · filed 1998-09-11

We agree with that conclusion and now hold that Alsbrook may not maintain a § 1983 action against the commissioners in their individual capacities for allegedly violating his rights under the ADA.

Section 1983 cannot be used alongside or instead of a Rehabilitation Act claim when the only alleged deprivation is of rights created by that Act.

Walthall v. Fulton County School District · filed 1998-09-23

However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action in lieu of, or in addition to, a cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act "if the only alleged deprivation is of the employee’s rights created by the Rehabilitation Act.” ... Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the Rehabilitation Act because that Act provides comprehensive enforcement and remedies.

Lollar v. Baker · filed 1999-12-06

In sum, because the Rehabilitation Act by its express terms provides comprehensive enforcement and remedial measures for violations of its provisions, we hold that section 1983 cannot be used as an alternative method for the enforcement of those rights.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional claim based on the same facts as an ADA claim; the ADA does not foreclose that remedy.

Baumgardner v. County of Cook · filed 2000-08-03

For the forgoing reasons, the Court holds that the ADA does not foreclose a § 1983 claim alleging violations of the Constitution when the same set of facts gives rise to both claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim premised on alleged violations of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

Nelson v. Norris · filed 2001-01-10

We further conclude that Nelson could not premise a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim on alleged ADA and RA violations, and that he lacks standing to seek injunctive relief under the ADA.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate equal protection claim when the plaintiff alleges no supporting facts beyond those underlying ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

Grey v. Wilburn · filed 2001-11-06

Regardless of how Grey styles his claim, the fact remains he alleged no facts to support his "equal protection" claim other than those set forth in the statutory claims. See Complaint ¶¶ 22-23. Such a claim is not "separate and independent," as Grey alleges.

Section 1983 cannot be used for disability-discrimination claims when the ADA provides exclusive remedies.

Berrios-Berrios v. Com. of Puerto Rico · filed 2002-05-14

Specifically, this Court concluded that the fact that the ADA provides exclusive remedies for disability discrimination preempts Berrios’s similar claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Berrios disagrees with this Court’s legal conclusion, but fails to bring forth any legal basis in support of her position. Thus, Berrios motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 245) is DENIED.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act; those claims must be pursued under those statutes.

Battle v. Minnesota Department of Corrections · filed 2002-06-26

We agree with the District Court that Battle’s disability-based discrimination claims were either not cognizable under § 1983 or fail on their merits. As to his ADA and RA claims, his sole recourse was under the ADA and RA themselves, see Grey v. Wilburn, 270 F.3d 607, 610-11 (8th Cir. 2001), he established no protected liberty or property interest upon which to base his due process claim, see Callender v. Sioux City Residential Treatment Facility, 88 F.3d 666, 668-69 (8th Cir. 1996), he had no independent constitutional right to be assigned a MINNCOR job or to the educational program, see Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 450 (8th Cir. 1992), and he identified no similarly situated inmates who were assigned a MINNCOR job or allowed to participate in the educational program, see id. (equal protection analysis).

Section 1983 does not support a separate equal protection claim based solely on the allegations underlying ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

Grey v. Douglas F. Wilburn, State of Missouri Office of the Secretary of State and Rebecca Cook · filed 2001-11-06

Regardless of how Grey styles his claim, the fact remains he alleged no facts to support his “equal protection” claim other than those set forth in the statutory claims. ... Such a claim is not “separate and independent,” as Grey alleges.

Section 1983 may be used to bring claims arising from alleged violations of the Housing Act.

Baldwin v. Housing Authority of City of Camden, NJ · filed 2003-09-26

In addition, claims arising out of alleged violations of the Housing Act may also be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to sue for violations of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Stevenson v. Independent School District No. I-038 of Garvin County · filed 2005-05-19

The Court agrees with the circuits that have addressed this issue and holds that Plaintiffs cannot sue under § 1983 for violations of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when the only alleged deprivation is of rights created by the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

Badillo v. Thorpe · filed 2005-12-01

To the extent that Badillo seeks to hold Thorpe and Benefiel individually liable under § 1983, “a plaintiff cannot maintain a section 1983 action in lieu of - or in addition to - a Rehabilitation Act or ADA cause of action if the only alleged deprivation is the [plaintiff’s] rights created by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.”8 Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir. 1997).

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek relief when a state policy or practice conflicts with federal Title I vocational rehabilitation requirements or the state otherwise fails to comply with those requirements.

Dunion Ex Rel. Dunion v. Thomas · filed 2006-10-16

Accordingly, to the extent the plaintiff asserts that the state has a policy or practice which conflicts with Title I or the federal regulations, or otherwise has not complied with the federal requirements, her § 1983 action is proper.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on Rehabilitation Act retaliation.

Knaub v. TULLI · filed 2011-04-21

We also note that her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on the RA retaliation claim lacks merit.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce ADA rights or impose individual liability for ADA violations.

Decker v. Dunbar · filed 2008-09-29

In this case, Decker seeks to vindicate rights under the ADA through the vehicle of a Section 1983 lawsuit, which the Fifth Circuit has said is improper, and he seeks to impose individual liability upon the named defendants for violations of the ADA, which also is improper. Consequently, Decker’s ADA claims are without merit.

Section 1983 does not provide an additional equal protection claim based on the same allegations as claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

Wong v. Minnesota Department of Human Services · filed 2016-04-19

Such dismissal is proper because “the comprehensive enforcement mechanisms provided under § 504 [of the RA] and the ADA suggest Congress did not intend violations of those statutes to be also cognizable under § 1983.” ... Because Wong’s equal protection claim is predicated on the same allegations as his ADA and RA claims, we conclude that the district court did not err by dismissing this § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for alleged violations of the IDEA or Rehabilitation Act.

Doucette v. Jacobs · filed 2018-01-17

For these reasons, the Doucettes cannot maintain their Section 1983 claims based on alleged violations of the IDEA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 permits an Equal Protection claim for disability discrimination even when the same conduct could also violate the ADA.

Bullington v. Bedford Cty., Tenn. · filed 2018-09-25

Therefore, we hold that Bullington may assert an Equal Protection claim for disability discrimination under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce ADA violations because the ADA provides an exclusive remedy.

Brock v. McGough · filed 2018-09-27

However, ADA violations are not actionable under section 1983. Id. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim because it is brought pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an individual-capacity claim against a state official to vindicate rights under Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Estate of Torres v. Kennewick School District No 17 · filed 2019-08-02

“[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” ... To any extent that Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a section 1983 claim against Ms. Vasquez in her individual capacity for violating the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, the Court dismisses that claim with prejudice.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring a private action for violations of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Estate of Mary J Wobschall v. State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation · filed 2020-09-22

In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court is constrained to reject Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 does not allow an individual-capacity claim against a state official to enforce rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

(PC) Adams v. California Prison Industry Authority · filed 2020-10-09

As an initial matter,plaintiff’s individual capacity claims fail becausethere is no individual liability under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We therefore join the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”).

Section 1983 cannot be used to pursue ADA or Rehabilitation Act violations when those statutes provide their own remedies.

Dudley v. Singleton · filed 2020-12-17

Singleton did not challenge Dudley’s use of § 1983 as a vehicle for her ADA and RA claims, but the court notes at the outset that the statutory claims cannot proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights created by the ADA or Rehabilitation Act against defendants in their individual capacities.

Mitchell v. Kim · filed 2021-01-15

A plaintiff also cannot assert a claim under section 1983 against Defendants in their individual capacities to vindicate rights created by the ADA and the RA.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim that merely repeats alleged violations of rights created by the ADA.

Milner v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama · filed 2021-01-21

Because Milner’s § 1983 claim simply reiterates the ADA violations he alleges, see Complaint (doc. no. 1) at ¶ 56, it cannot proceed.

Section 1983 requires a nexus between an official’s alleged failure to check an employee’s background and the employee’s subsequent assault to support liability for that hiring decision.

Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School Dist. · filed 1997-05-27

Even in the context of resisting a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, plaintiffs have demonstrated an inability to show a nexus between any failure to check criminal background and this assault.

Section 1983 requires a nexus between a school official’s failure to check an employee’s criminal background and the employee’s assault to support liability for the hiring decision.

Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School District · filed 1997-06-16

When the district court afforded Doe the opportunity to amend his complaint, he could not even allege that the custodian who assaulted his daughter either had a prior record of violent crime or previously had been reported to the officials for sexual misbehavior towards students. Even in the context of resisting a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, plaintiffs have demonstrated an inability to show a nexus between any failure to check criminal background and this assault.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against city council members based on their decisions to indemnify police officers for punitive damages awards.

Hernandez v. Gates · filed 2000-06-20

Accordingly, Section 1983 suits against City Council members based on their decision to indemnify police officers for their punitive damages awards are not, and ought not to be, cognizable, and the Council members are thus dismissed with prejudice from this case.

Section 1983 permits claims against city council members based on alleged bad-faith decisions to indemnify police officers against punitive damages.

Blumberg v. Gates · filed 2001-06-13

Navarro plainly permits plaintiffs to assert section 1983 claims, such as those advanced by plaintiff, against the Los An-geles City Council based on the council members’ prior decisions to indemnify police officers against punitive damage awards.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a single hiring decision requires prior complaints in the applicant’s background that are nearly identical to the misconduct that caused the plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury.

Morris v. Crawford Cty. · filed 2002-08-12

In sum, to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must point to prior complaints in an applicant's background that are nearly identical to the type of misconduct that causes the constitutional deprivation allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.

For § 1983 municipal liability based on a single hiring decision, a plaintiff must identify prior complaints in the applicant’s background that are nearly identical to the misconduct that caused the alleged constitutional injury.

Morris v. Crawford County, Arkansas Bob Ross John McAlister 1 Larry G. Ruiz · filed 2002-09-19

In sum, to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must point to prior complaints in an applicant’s background that are nearly identical to the type of misconduct that causes the constitutional deprivation allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.

An elected Texas constable serving one precinct of a multi-precinct county is not a county policymaker for employment decisions, so those decisions do not impose § 1983 liability on the county.

Rivera v. Harris County · filed 2020-04-16

Thus, the court holds that Harris County cannot be held liable for Christopher Diaz’s employment decisions in this case.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against an official based on a policy that caused no injury or actionable threatened injury.

Stephen v. Correctional Officer Stevens and James H. Gomez · filed 1997-05-28

Second, the district court properly dismissed defendant Gomez, because Stephen failed to allege any injury or actionable threatened injury from Gomez's "no warning shot" policy.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Seattle House LLC v. City of Delaware, Ohio · filed 2020-12-10

Moreover, there is no heightened pleading standard applicable to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims involving qualified immunity are subject to the ordinary pleading standard, without a heightened requirement.

Arnold v. Williams · filed 2020-10-23

As explained above, § 1983 claims implicating qualified immunity are not subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Section 1983 claims against officials asserting qualified immunity are no longer subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Myers v. Jefferson County Commission · filed 2020-09-04

The court recognizes that the heightened pleading standard formerly applied by the Eleventh Circuit to section 1983 cases where a defendant could assert qualified immunity no longer applies after Iqbal.

A § 1983 complaint against an official who can assert qualified immunity is subject to the ordinary pleading standard, not a heightened one.

Perry v. Bone · filed 2020-03-11

Trooper Nalls also is correct that he can raise qualified immunity as a defense in a motion to dismiss. See Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019). But he is wrong that the availability of this defense subjects a complaint to a heightened pleading standard. Heightened pleading has not been the law of the circuit for a decade.

Section 1983 claims against officials who can assert qualified immunity do not require heightened pleading.

Washington v. Albright · filed 2011-09-30

This Court is persuaded that the appropriate course is to follow the holding of Randall and reject heightened pleading.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Milton v. Turner · filed 2011-08-19

We no longer apply a heightened pleading standard to claims brought pursuant to § 1983.

Conclusory allegations do not suffice to raise a nonfrivolous appellate issue under § 1983.

Miller v. Holeman · filed 2010-07-15

Miller’s allegations are bald conclusions, and conclusory allegations do not suffice to raise a nonfrivolous appellate issue under § 1983.

Section 1983 allegations must have factual support; courts need not consider conclusory and unsupported allegations.

Barkus v. Kaiser · filed 2000-09-19

While we construe Mr. Barkus’ pro se pleadings liberally, see Durre v. Dempsey, 869 F.2d 543, 545 (10th Cir. 1989), we generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, In re Walker, 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992), or conclusory and unsupported § 1983 allegations.

A wholly conclusional allegation cannot support a § 1983 complaint.

Thompson v. McLeod · filed 1999-02-17

His claim that he was not allowed to see an imam is refuted by the record, and his claim concerning access to religious materials is wholly conclusional and, as such, cannot support his § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 claims require factual support; conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.

Jeff K. Peace v. Donna Caldwell, R.N. · filed 1990-01-09

However, conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts, are insufficient to support a cause of action under the civil rights statute.

A pro se allegation that a state law-enforcement officer committed a tort may, under an arguable construction, allege a constitutional violation cognizable under Section 1983.

Joseph Scott Ezell, Jr. v. Nc State Patrol: Jerry R. Mumford · filed 1986-10-23

In our view, however, it is arguable that the complaint, construed to allege a tort by a state law enforcement official, may allege a constitutional violation under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 claims are governed by ordinary Rule 8 pleading standards, requiring a short and plain statement of each legal element but not detailed facts.

McNair v. McMickens · filed 1987-03-20

Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff in a civil rights action, like the plaintiff in any civil case, must include in his complaint “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Claimed violations of civil rights, unlike claims of fraud, for example, are not subject to special pleading rules. ... Although a plaintiff must plead each of the legal elements necessary to his claim, that has been done here.

A § 1983 claim generally must satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) notice pleading, rather than a heightened pleading standard, although the court left open claims against individual government officials.

Loftus v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1994-02-09

Therefore, applying the rule established by Leatherman, I conclude that a § 1983 claim, with the possible exception of actions brought against individual government officials, see infra note 6 (issue expressly left open by the Supreme Court in Leatherman), must meet only the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) and is no longer subject to prior circuit law requiring the claim to be tested against a “heightened pleading standard.”

Section 1983 claims against government officials in their individual capacities are subject to heightened pleading when qualified immunity is at issue.

Ross v. State of Ala. · filed 1995-07-07

Accordingly, the court finds that as to the § 1983 claims asserted against Jones and Parsons in their individual capacities, the plaintiffs are subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to heightened pleading standards.

Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education of the Tipp City Exempted Village School District · filed 2005-11-01

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “are not subject to heightened pleading standards.”

Section 1983 claims are not subject to heightened pleading standards.

Evans-Marshall v. Board Of Education · filed 2005-11-01

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "are not subject to heightened pleading standards."

Section 1983 claims against individuals entitled to qualified immunity have no heightened pleading standard.

Springman v. City of Venice · filed 2011-08-31

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, there is no longer any heightened pleading standard for § 1983 claims against individuals entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims involving qualified immunity follow Rule 8’s ordinary pleading standard, even when the defendant raises the defense.

Arnold v. Williams · filed 2020-09-24

Section 1983 claims implicating qualified immunity are subject to the same Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal as all other claims; an assertion of qualified immunity in a defendant’s answer or motion to dismiss does not subject the complaint to a heightened pleading standard.

Section 1983 requires proof of intentional acts that deprive a person of civil rights.

Chicago Housing Authority, Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant v. Federal Security, Inc., Cross-Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-11-27

It is well established that a § 1983 claim requires proof of intentional acts to deprive the victim of her civil rights.

Section 1983 requires intentional conduct for an access-to-the-courts claim; negligent or inadvertent conduct is insufficient.

Duncan v. Johnson · filed 2009-03-10

We note as a threshold issue that an “access to the courts” claim under section 1983 requires an allegation of intentional conduct; negligent or inadvertent conduct will not suffice.

A § 1983 claim against a prison official requires intentional conduct or deliberate indifference; gross negligence is insufficient.

Bell v. Whetsel · filed 1999-02-09

Proof that a prison official “acted intentionally or with deliberate indifference” is necessary to sustain a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an intentional deprivation of a constitutional right; mere negligence is insufficient.

Johnston v. Rivers · filed 2017-10-30

The deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an intentional deprivation of a constitutional right; mere negligence is insufficient.

Johnston v. Rivers · filed 2017-12-01

The deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983.