42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a claim alongside Title VII when the defendant’s conduct also violates a separate constitutional right.

Regan v. Township of Lower Merion · filed 1999-02-12

A plaintiff may, however, pursue a remedy under Section 1983 as well as under Title VII when the defendant’s conduct violates both Title VII and a separate constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not support a retaliation claim based solely on Title VII when no independent constitutional or other federal statutory right was violated.

Price v. Delaware Department of Correction · filed 1999-03-09

A claim of retaliation cannot be the sole basis for a § 1983 claim where there is no violation of the Constitution or federal law, other than the retaliation provision of Title VII.

Section 1983 allows equal protection claims for gender discrimination and sexual harassment even when Title VII also provides a cause of action.

Wood v. City of Topeka, Kan., Topeka Housing Auth. · filed 2000-02-04

Although age discrimination is not actionable, gender discrimination and sexual harassment can violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and trigger a § 1983 cause of action, despite the existence of a Title VII cause of action.

A § 1983 employment discrimination claim must have a basis independent of a Title VII racial discrimination claim to survive.

Green v. Clovis Municipal · filed 2000-02-16

The district court was correct to dismiss plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. For the claim to survive, it must have a basis independent of plaintiff’s Title VII racial discrimination claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass Title VII’s limit of liability to employers for retaliation based on filing a Title VII complaint.

Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court John W. Black, County Judge/executive Brent Likins · filed 2000-03-03

Congress chose to limit Title VII liability to employers only, and Morris cannot use § 1983 to circumvent Congress’s intention.

When a section 1983 claim and a Title VII claim arise from the same conduct as parallel remedies, discriminatory intent must be shown in the same manner for both.

Abel v. Dubberly · filed 2000-04-27

The same analysis applies to the Plaintiff's section 1983 claim against Dennard, as discriminatory intent is an element to be shown in the same manner as in an alleged Title VII violation when the two claims arise from the same conduct and constitute parallel remedies.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional equal protection claim based on conduct also covered by Title VII, even if the plaintiff has not exhausted Title VII administrative remedies.

Bair v. City of Atlantic City · filed 2000-06-06

The fact that they originally filed their complaints solely under Title VII does not foreclose their claims under Section 1983, even if they did not exhaust their Title VII administrative remedies, as long as their amended complaints otherwise satisfy the requirements of Rule 15.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim without a companion Title VII employment discrimination claim.

Thigpen v. Bibb County, Georgia, Sheriff's Department · filed 2000-07-07

The appeal presents four distinct legal questions: (1) whether an equal protection claim alleging racial accounting in the conferral of promotions is cognizable; (2) whether an equal protection claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) is viable absent a companion racial discrimination claim brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”); (3)” whether the burden-shifting analysis familiar to employment discrimination claims is applicable to these officers’ equal protection claims; and (4) whether the several denied promotions underpinning the officers’ equal protection claims constitute a single “continuing violation” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause for statute of limitations purposes. We answer the former two questions in the affirmative and the latter two in the negative.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim without a companion Title VII employment discrimination claim.

William T. Thigpen, Jr. v. Justice · filed 2000-07-07

The appeal presents four distinct legal questions: ... (2) whether an equal protection claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") is viable absent a companion racial discrimination claim brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII"); ... We answer the former two questions in the affirmative and the latter two in the negative.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim against a public employer without a companion Title VII claim.

Thigpen v. Bibb County, Georgia · filed 2000-08-30

The appeal presents four distinct legal questions: (1) whether an equal protection claim alleging racial accounting in the conferral of promotions is cognizable; (2) whether an equal protection claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") is viable absent a companion racial discrimination claim brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII"); (3) whether the burden-shifting analysis familiar to employment discrimination claims is applicable to these officers' equal protection claims; and (4) whether the several denied promotions underpinning the officers' equal protection claims constitute a single "continuing violation" of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause for statute of limitations purposes. We answer the former two questions in the affirmative and the latter two in the negative.

Title VII does not preempt a § 1983 action for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Black v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 2000-09-01

Title VII does not preempt an action under § 1983 for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate claim based solely on a Title VII violation; a concurrent claim must rest on a distinct substantive right.

Ericson v. City of Meriden · filed 2000-09-25

Therefore, we will not consider Plaintiffs section 1983 claim to the extent it is based solely on a violation of Title VII.

Section 1983 can support an equal protection claim based on facts that also give rise to a Title VII claim.

Gonzalez v. New York State Department of Correctional Services Fishkill Correctional Facility · filed 2000-11-29

Furthermore, the Second Circuit has rejected Defendants’ argument that a § 1983 claim may not be based on facts giving rise to a Title VII claim.

When Section 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for a Title VII employment discrimination claim, the two claims have the same elements.

Mason v. City of Tampa · filed 2000-12-01

Further, when Section 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for violation of Section 702 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, the elements of the two causes of action are the same.

Section 1983 cannot support a claim alongside a Title VII claim unless another law supplies the right allegedly violated.

Reed v. Connecticut, Department of Transportation · filed 2001-03-29

The court concludes that: ... and 5) a plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concurrently with a Title VII action where the complaint does not raise some other law as the source of the right allegedly violated.

Section 1983 does not permit employment discrimination claims when the plaintiff had an opportunity to bring a Title VII action but failed to file within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice.

Brown v. Housing Authority of Calvert County · filed 2001-07-20

Just like the plaintiff in Hughes, it is undisputed that Brown failed to institute a Title VII civil action within 90 days of receiving the notice, as he was directed. He is thus precluded from bringing § 1983 racial harassment and discriminatory termination claims in this court, and summary judgment is granted as to counts II and IV.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for federal employment discrimination claims covered by Title VII’s exclusive judicial remedy.

Hogan v. Runyon · filed 2001-07-20

Contrary to Hogan’s contentions, the district court properly dismissed Hogan’s section 1983 and tort claims because Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment, and because Hogan’s claims are not of the magnitude required by this court to include beyond Title VII.

Section 1983 permits an employment discrimination claim alongside a Title VII claim.

Siaca v. Autoridad De Acueductos Y Alcantarillados De Puerto Rico · filed 2001-07-31

The Court notes that plaintiff may assert a claim for employment discrimination under both, Title VII and 42 U.S.C, § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an employee to sue a public employer alongside a Title VII claim when the Section 1983 claim rests on an alleged violation of constitutional rights.

Warren v. Ohio Department of Public Safety · filed 2001-10-03

An employee may sue a public employer under both Title VII and § 1983 when the § 1983 violation rests on a claim of infringement of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass Title VII’s procedures when the asserted right arises solely under Title VII.

Russell v. Drabik · filed 2001-12-04

As a result, where a right arises solely out of Title VII, a Plaintiff may not use § 1983 to circumvent the procedural framework instituted by Congress.

Section 1983 employment claims parallel to Title VII claims may be analyzed under Title VII standards.

Wells v. Montgomery County · filed 2002-02-25

Generally, the standards under Title VII are applicable to parallel actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

Title VII does not preempt § 1983 claims for discriminatory discharge and discipline by state employers.

Morrow v. Farrell · filed 2002-02-25

Thus, the general rule that Title VII does not preempt § 1983 claims applies and Plaintiff is not precluded from bringing a § 1983 claim for discriminatory discharge and discipline.

Section 1983 permits an employment discrimination claim based on an equal protection right distinct from Title VII.

Lange v. Town of Monroe · filed 2002-08-02

Because Equal Protection, not Title VII, is the distinct right alleged to have been denied, plaintiff may assert her claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 ordinarily cannot be used to vindicate a claimant’s Title VII rights.

Glaser v. Fulton-Montgomery Community College · filed 2002-10-29

We also note that a Title VII claimant cannot ordinarily bring an action under Section 1983 to vindicate her Title VII rights.

A § 1983 hostile work environment claim that duplicates a Title VII claim needs no separate consideration when the Title VII claim fails.

Church v. State of Maryland · filed 2002-12-17

Additionally, because Church’s § 1983 claim was duplicative of her Title VII claims, we need not consider them further.

Section 1983 claims premised on § 1981 may proceed alongside Title VII claims without being preempted by Title VII.

Allen v. College of William & Mary · filed 2003-01-27

Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is not preempted by Title VII to the extent that it is premised upon § 1981.

Section 1983 claims alleging violation of a separate constitutional or statutory right are not preempted by Title VII, even when both claims rely on the same facts.

Mole v. University of Massachusetts · filed 2003-05-08

The great weight of authority appears to hold that a § 1983 claim is not preempted by Title VII when the § 1983 complaint alleges violation of a separate constitutional or statutory right. ... This applies even where, as here, the § 1983 and Title VII claims rely on the same factual allegations.

Title VII does not categorically bar a concurrent § 1983 action, but summary judgment is appropriate when the plaintiff offers no argument that the § 1983 claim differs in substance from the Title VII claim.

Dennis v. Nevada · filed 2003-09-11

In this circuit, however, Title VII does not necessarily in all cases preclude a concurrent action under § 1983. ... In this case, Dennis has not responded to the Defendant’s challenge to her § 1983 claim, and has not provided the Court with any argument that this claim is different in substance from her Title VII claim. ... Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate as to Dennis’ third cause of action.

Section 1983 cannot enforce rights created solely by Title VII, but remains available when the same conduct violates a separate constitutional right.

Joyner v. School District of Philadelphia · filed 2004-04-13

Defendants are partially correct: when the underlying offense for a § 1983 action is a violation of a right created by Title VII, the Sea Clam-mers rule applies, and the § 1983 claim fails. ... “A plaintiff may, however, pursue a remedy under Section 1983 as well as under Title VII when the defendant’s conduct violates both Title VII and a separate constitutional right.”

Section 1983 permits a constitutional employment discrimination claim alongside a Title VII claim based on essentially the same facts.

Zewde v. Elgin Community College · filed 1984-12-21

We disagree with Elgin, and we hold that Zewde may state a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights under § 1983, even though the facts underlying that claim are essentially the same as those supporting the Title VII claim.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim for intentional race discrimination even when the plaintiff filed no timely EEOC charge under Title VII.

Brewer v. Muscle Shoals Board Of Education · filed 1986-05-30

As a finding of intentional race discrimination supports liability under the equal protection clause and Sec. 1983, we will affirm the district court's judgment with respect to the 1981 vacancy, assuming its findings are not clearly erroneous, even though Brewer filed no timely charge with the EEOC.

Title VII’s exclusive-remedy rule does not bar a § 1983 retaliation claim by a plaintiff exempt from Title VII’s protections.

Birch v. Cnty · filed 2004-12-01

Moreover, the rationale of Day – preventing state government employees from bypassing Title VII’s administrative processes and going directly to court – simply do not apply to a plaintiff like Birch, who is exempt from Title VII’s protections. Thus, we decline to dismiss Birch’s § 1983 retaliation claim pursuant to Day.

Section 1983 permits a retaliation claim by a plaintiff exempt from Title VII despite the rule barring Section 1983 claims based solely on Title VII rights.

Wanda Birch v. Cuyahoga County Probate Court John J. Donnelly, Presiding Judge · filed 2004-12-01

Moreover, the rationale of Day— preventing ' state government employees from bypassing Title VII’s administrative processes and going directly to court— simply do not apply to a plaintiff like Birch, who is exempt from Title VII’s protections. Thus, we decline to dismiss Birch’s § 1983 retaliation claim pursuant to Day.

When § 1983 provides a parallel remedy to Title VII, the two causes of action have the same elements.

Fred E. Riley, Jr. v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed. · filed 2005-09-30

We have observed that when § 1983 is used as “a parallel remedy” to Title VII, the elements of the two causes of action are the same. ... Thus, even assuming that Baugh is a policymaker under § 1983, the Board is not liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a First Amendment claim even when the same conduct also supports Title VII allegations.

Hindman v. Thompson · filed 2008-03-04

Specifically, this aspect of Plaintiffs section 1983 claim is not predicated upon a violation of Title VII, but rather upon a violation of the First Amendment, and such claim is actionable under section 1983 even if there exists a factual overlap with Plaintiffs. Title VII allegations.

Section 1983 claims based on rights distinct from Title VII may proceed alongside Title VII claims.

Kwentoh v. Connecticut Department of Children & Families Juvenile Training School · filed 2008-12-02

A § 1983 claim, if based on substantive rights distinct from and predating Title VII, is not precluded by a concurrent Title VII claim.

Section 1983 may be pleaded alongside Title VII based on the same facts when the Section 1983 claim rests on a distinct constitutional violation.

Young v. City of Syracuse Department of Public Works · filed 2009-01-21

We note further that the District Court incorrectly instructed plaintiff that he could not allege injuries under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the same facts.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for a federal employee’s discrimination claim based on the same facts as a Title VII claim.

Porter v. SHINESKI · filed 2009-08-20

In the instant case, Porter fails to articulate any factual distinction between the basis for his Title VII claim and his claims under 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1983 and 1985, the Louisiana Constitution and Louisiana tort law. Because Porter’s allegations of “ ‘constitutional violations [and violations of state law] arise out of the same facts as his employment discrimination claims, ... they are preempted by Title VII and cannot afford an independent ground for relief.’ ” ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted as to plaintiffs non-Title VII causes of action and the claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 claims based on the same facts as Title VII claims use the same elements and analytical framework, so failure to establish a Title VII violation disposes of the section 1983 claim.

Tuner v. City of Auburn · filed 2010-01-13

Plaintiff also advanced a claim pursuant to section 1983. Because discrimination claims under section 1983 have the same elements of proof and analytical framework as those falling under Title VII, see Rioux v. City of Atlanta, GA, 520 F.3d 1269, 1275 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Title VII and section 1983 claims have the same elements where the claims are based on the ... same set of facts”), Plaintiff’s failure to establish a Title VII violation is dispositive of his section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows state and local employees to sue for violations of constitutional rights without first exhausting Title VII administrative remedies.

Hamilton v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-07-06

Because state employees are not required to proceed through Title VII, they need not exhaust those administrative remedies prior to bringing suit under §§ 1981 or 1983 when the rights asserted are, as here, not conferred by Title VII.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 rights and follows Title VII liability when a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment by a state employer.

Katrina Brown v. Ohio State University · filed 2010-07-12

Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is coterminous with liability under Title VII when a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment by a state employer. ... Section 1983 further comprises the exclusive remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

A § 1983 claim based on allegations that amount to a Title VII employment discrimination claim fails when the plaintiff alleges neither Title VII exhaustion nor a separate basis for a § 1983 claim.

Gordon-Ross v. Nuview Union School District · filed 2011-05-10

After reviewing Gordon-Ross’s original complaint, the district court correctly noted that her § 1983 claim was actually a Title VII claim for age and gender employment discrimination. ... Her amended complaint still did not allege any ... non-employment-based § 1983 claims—which would not require Title VII exhaustion—nor did it allege that she had exhausted Title VII remedies. ... Accordingly, the district court appropriately dismissed Gordon-Ross’s § 1983 claim with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits an employment discrimination plaintiff to sue for a constitutional violation without complying with Title VII's procedural requirements.

Henley v. Brown · filed 2012-07-26

To the extent that Henley's complaint asserts the violation of rights secured by the Constitution and committed by persons acting under color of state law, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing her section 1983 action for failure to comply with Title VII's procedural requirements.

When § 1983 serves as a parallel remedy to Title VII, the two claims have the same elements.

Dickey v. Crawford County School District · filed 2013-03-05

Thus, the Court will address the Title VII claims with the understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1983 claims as well.

Section 1983 claims are properly dismissed when they seek to vindicate the same rights as the plaintiff’s Title VII claims.

Davison v. Lagrange Fire Dist. · filed 2013-05-07

Davidson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seek to vindicate the same rights as her Title VII claims and were therefore properly dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a claim alongside a Title VII claim when it rests on distinct substantive rights.

Allessi v. New York State Department of Corrections & Community Supervision · filed 2014-04-22

Here, however, Plaintiff does not distinguish her § 1983 claim from her Title VII retaliation claim, therefore this cause of action must also be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a claim alongside Title VII when the asserted right comes from another law, such as Section 1981.

Barella v. Village of Freeport · filed 2014-04-26

Here, by contrast, the amended complaint can be construed as asserting a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as a basis for the Section 1983 claim.

A § 1983 employment discrimination claim against an individual must identify a substantive right distinct from Title VII protections.

Jackson v. Battaglia · filed 2014-12-03

However, Battaglia is potentially individually liable if Jackson’s § 1983 claim is “based on substantive rights distinct from Title VII.” ... However, plaintiff makes no effort to actually identify any rights that such a claim could vindicate, let alone a constitutional right distinct from the protections against unlawful termination already addressed by Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for conduct that violates only Title VII; the claim must allege an independent constitutional violation.

Siegner v. Township of Salem · filed 2016-06-22

“Title VII provides the exclusive remedy when the only § 1983 cause of action is based on a violation of Title VII.” ... But Siegner’s complaint makes only oblique references to the First Amendment, and he never alleges a constitutional violation independent of his Title VII claims.

When § 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for a Title VII violation, both claims use the same elements and standards of proof.

Cheatham v. DeKalb County, Georgia · filed 2017-03-20

When § 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for violation of Title VII, courts employ the same elements and standards of proof to analyze both claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy when a federal employee’s claim rests on the same alleged employment discrimination covered by Title VII.

Coulibaly v. Kerry · filed 2018-07-17

Here again, Title VII provides the exclusive remedy and Dr. Coulibaly appears to rely on the same set of facts to support both his Title VII and Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a federal employee’s employment discrimination claim based on the same facts as a Title VII claim when Title VII provides the exclusive remedy.

Coulibaly v. Pompeo · filed 2018-07-17

Here again, Title VII provides the exclusive remedy and Dr. Coulibaly appears to rely on the same set of facts to support both his Title VII and Section 1983 claims.

A § 1983 equal protection claim is not subsumed by a Title VI claim.

Leah Marks v. Santa Rosa City Schools · filed 2019-01-17

The district court correctly held that S.M.’s § 1983 claim is not subsumed within her Title VI claim, see Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258-59 (2009), but that both claims were insufficiently pled.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce claims based solely on Title VII.

Harper v. City of Cleveland · filed 2019-06-24

Harper cannot use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert his race-discrimination or equal-protection claims because “plaintiffs cannot use § 1983 to enforce purely statutory claims under Title VII.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy for an equal protection claim based on rights independent of Title VII, even when the same employment conduct also supports a Title VII claim.

Kabir v. Singing River Health Systems · filed 2019-12-09

Dr. Kabir’s Equal Protection claim is based on Constitutional rights that are independent of Title VII; therefore, Dr. Kabir’s equal protection claim is not subject to dismissal on this basis.

When Title VII and Section 1983 provide parallel remedies for the same employment discrimination, the claims use identical elements and methods of proof, including the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Johnson v. Miami Dade County · filed 2020-01-30

Additionally, when, as here, a plaintiff attempts to use Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as parallel remedies for the same allegedly unlawful employment discrimination, the elements of the two causes of action are identical, Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (11th Cir. 1995), and identical methods of proof, such as the McDonnell Douglas framework, are used for both causes of action, Richardson, 71 F.3d at 805.

Section 1983 permits public employees to bring Fourteenth Amendment employment discrimination claims even when Title VII also provides a remedy.

Whitehurst v. Bedford County School Board · filed 2020-02-03

The Fourth Circuit has held that where a state or municipal employee files suit against a public entity alleging employment discrimination on the basis of an enumerated characteristic, Title VII is not the exclusive remedy. ... Rather, such employees “may still bring Fourteenth Amendment challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to discriminatory employment decisions.”

Section 1983 disparate treatment claims follow the same analysis as Title VII claims when they rest on the same facts.

Pearson v. Georgia · filed 2020-05-11

We can analyze those claims together because “the analysis of disparate treatment claims under § 1983 is identical to the analysis under Title VII where the facts on which the claims rely are the same.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008).

When § 1983 provides a parallel remedy for a Title VII violation, the two claims have the same elements.

Smith v. Office of the Attorney General, State of Alabama · filed 2020-07-16

“[W]hen section 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for violation . . . of Title VII, the elements of the two causes of action are the same.” ... Because Smith’s Title VII pay discrimination and failure to promote claims against the OAG fail, see supra Parts IV.A.3. and IV.B., respectively, so too must her § 1983 claim against Strange.

A Section 1983 employment discrimination claim generally shares the elements of a parallel Title VII claim, so the two stand or fall together.

Sotolongo v. The New York State Department of Motor Vehicles · filed 2020-07-24

The court considers Sotolongo’s Title VII claims together with her § 1983 claim because “the elements of one are generally the same as the elements of the other and the two must stand or fall together.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004).

Section 1983 cannot support a claim alleging only a Title VII violation.

Bowie v. Hodge · filed 2020-08-17

Nevertheless, Defendants are correct that alleging a violation of Title VII alone does not serve as the basis for § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States for a cognizable claim.

Deavors v. Burnham · filed 1981-05-05

Because the Court agrees with the U.S. Magistrate’s determination that plaintiff has failed to allege a deprivation of any right secured under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and, therefore, that the plaintiff has no cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s motion for objection to the Report and Recommendation is not well taken and same is, therefore, overruled.

Section 1983 permits a federal-court suit against a person who, under color of state law, has aggrieved a constitutional right, so a constitutional violation is required.

Moldonado v. Rodriguez · filed 1981-09-09

Section 1983 permits a suit in federal court by persons whose constitutional rights have been aggrieved under color of state law. ... As a result, I am constrained to dismiss plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims fail when the plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the Constitution or a federal statute.

Oneida Indian Nation of NY v. State of NY · filed 1981-09-10

Since the Court has determined that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under either the Constitution or the Nonintercourse Act, their § 1983 claim must fail as well.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws.

Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 1981-11-12

As already indicated, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is necessary that there be a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity “secured by the Constitution and laws.”

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue state prison officials for depriving him of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.

Wakinekona v. Antone Olim, Edith M. Wilhelm, John Smythe, Winton Leong and Edwin Shimoda · filed 1981-11-27

We therefore agree with Wakinekona that in alleging that he was deprived of the independent decisionmaker required by prison regulations, he has stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court erred in dismissing his claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1983 requires actual deprivation, not mere discouragement.

MacKo v. Byron · filed 1983-11-14

A cause of action will not lie, under § 1983, merely because a person was discouraged from exercising his constitutional right. To be actionable, there must be actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 is not actionable for inadequate police protection because the statute reaches only deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution, and there is no federal constitutional right to police protection from criminal assault.

Morris v. Musser · filed 1984-07-20

Since the defendants had no federal constitutional duty to protect plaintiffs from criminal assault, the inadequate provision of police protection, services is not actionable under Section 1983 or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights of its own; a plaintiff must show a violation of a separate federal constitutional or statutory right to prevail on a § 1983 claim.

In Re Malone · filed 1984-08-28

Section 1983, of course, is dependent on a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right and therefore the analysis of plaintiffs' equal protection claim mirrors that of their § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege particularized facts showing a constitutional deprivation.

U.S. Agent Lt. Kenneth M. Peterson Cia--0018 Under Cover Agent v. Otie Jones, Warden, and Mr. Hamby, Warden of Security · filed 1985-08-30

Some particularized facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation are needed to sustain a cause of action under the civil rights act.

A state official’s negligence does not amount to the constitutional deprivation required for liability under Section 1983.

Goodwyn v. Kincheloe · filed 1986-10-14

Thus, as the district court correctly held, even if Satterwhite had acted negligently in performing his duties, his conduct did not rise to the level necessary to state a claim under Sec. 1983.

Entrapment or attempted entrapment, standing alone, is not actionable under § 1983 because there is no federal constitutional right to be free from entrapment.

Mullinax v. McElhenney · filed 1987-11-10

This court is persuaded by these courts’ findings that entrapment does not state a claim under § 1983. ... Therefore, insofar as plaintiff’s complaint alleges conspiracy and attempt to entrap plaintiff, it must fail.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish a constitutional deprivation to state an actionable civil rights claim.

Shaffer v. Jennings · filed 1970-06-23

The law is clear that an essential element of an actionable civil rights complaint is the establishment of a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 provides the proper vehicle for a prisoner's property interest claim alleging deprivation without procedural due process.

Lacy v. Rick Thaler, Director · filed 2012-11-16

With regard to Lacy’s claim that the forfeiture of $200 infringed his property interests, the district court should have entertained the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a right attributable to the defendant.

Nalls v. Lasalle · filed 2014-05-16

His Section 1983 and 1985 claims again require a deprivation of some right that Nalls cannot identify as far as Breaux is concerned.

In a Section 1983 claim for deprivation of property without procedural due process, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies are inadequate.

Dixon v. Coleman · filed 2020-01-28

Therefore, in a § 1983 suit claiming the deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process, Plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.

For claims based on action under color of District of Columbia law, § 1983 applies only when the rights-depriving conduct occurred after December 29, 1979.

Parker v. District of Columbia · filed 1981-05-19

Plaintiff is attempting to avoid the clear intent of Congress to apply § 1983 only to occurrences after December 29, 1979. The plain meaning of the statute would extend the cause of action under § 1983 only to plaintiffs whose rights were deprived by some action under color of District of Columbia law that took place after the effective date. ... Thus, § 1983 affords no basis for relief and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 is not a proper jurisdictional basis for the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint.

The 1979 amendment to § 1983 permits suits against District of Columbia officials for unlawful conduct under color of District law only when the conduct occurred after December 29, 1979.

Boykin v. The District of Columbia · filed 1982-09-10

Although, as the district judge noted, Congress amended § 1983 in 1979 to provide for suits against District of Columbia officials based on unlawful behavior committed under color of District law, that amendment had only-prospective effect and thus applied only to incidents occurring after December 29, 1979.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation of a federal constitutional or legal right resulting from an abuse of governmental power beyond an ordinary tort; negligence and nuisance allegations alone do not suffice.

Harvey York and Sara Joan York v. City of Cedartown · filed 1981-06-15

However, appellants have failed to allege facts suggesting an “abuse of governmental power sufficient ‘to raise an ordinary tort by a government agent to the stature of a violation of the Constitution.’ ” ... We conclude that appellants can prove no set of facts in support of their claims of negligence and maintenance of a nuisance by appellee which would entitle them to relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits recovery when a plaintiff proves deprivation of a federal constitutional or legal right caused by the kind of governmental abuse that elevates an ordinary tort by a government agent into a constitutional violation.

James R. Foley and G. Larry Morgan v. The Alabama State Bar Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar · filed 1981-06-19

Appellants would be entitled to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) if they proved a “deprivation of a federal constitutional or legal right which ... resulted from ‘the sort of abuse of government power that is necessary to raise an ordinary tort by a government agent to the stature of a violation of the Constitution’.”

Section 1983 creates a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or laws.

Collins v. The City of Harker Heights, Texas · filed 1990-11-02

There was no abuse of government power. ... Accordingly, this action cannot lie under § 1983.

An administrative enforcement scheme generally does not foreclose a § 1983 action because agency action alone does not show Congress intended to limit available remedies.

MO Child Care Assoc. v. Cross · filed 2002-06-28

Moreover, administratively created schemes are generally not sufficient to foreclose private actions, such as an action under Ex parte Young or § 1983, because an administrative act is not sufficiently indicative of Congress's true intent to limit the available remedies.

An administrative enforcement scheme generally does not foreclose a § 1983 action because it does not establish Congress’s intent to limit that remedy.

Missouri Child Care Association v. Cross · filed 2002-06-28

Moreover, administratively created schemes are generally not sufficient to foreclose private actions, such as an action under Ex parte Young or § 1983, because an administrative act is not sufficiently indicative of Congress's true intent to limit the available remedies.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a violation of the Telecommunications Act’s wireless facility siting provision because that Act’s enforcement scheme impliedly forecloses it.

Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Ogunquit · filed 2001-12-12

For these reasons, I conclude that the TCA affords Sprint no remedy pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a claim under the ADA.

Porter v. Ellis · filed 2000-10-26

Even if Plaintiff had a colorable claim under the ADA, he could not use section 1983 as a conduit for that claim.

A defendant seeking dismissal of a § 1983 claim based on a federal statutory right bears the burden of showing that Congress foreclosed the remedy.

Cedarhurst Air Charter, Inc. v. Waukesha County · filed 2000-03-30

The burden of proving this is on the defendant, and a court should not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude a § 1983 remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the EHA because the EHA supplies the exclusive remedy.

Williams v. Overturf · filed 1984-02-24

This decision conclusively shows that no claim can be stated under § 1983 for violations of the EHA.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate claim for disability discrimination covered by the ADA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Meara v. Bennett · filed 1998-12-02

Given the specific and comprehensive provisions of the ADA, which do not permit individual liability, it would be unfair to allow the plaintiff to dress up a claim for disability discrimination as a count under § 1983 merely to expose this defendant to individual liability.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights created by Title VII or the ADEA because those statutes provide comprehensive remedies.

Porter v. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services · filed 1998-11-23

However, because Title VII and the ADEA provide their own comprehensive remedial schemes. Porter cannot employ Section 1983 to enforce rights created by those statutes ... A claim of intentional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause is subject to the same methods of proof as an analogous claim under Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to enforce FLSA rights when FLSA's remedial scheme affords comprehensive relief for the same injury.

Randy Cunningham and Clarence Reynolds v. Gibson County, Tennessee, and Ronnie A. Riley · filed 1997-03-18

A suit under § 1983 that alleges a violation of a federal statute cannot be maintained if the statute demonstrates that Congress intended to foreclose enforcement of the statute via § 1983. ... The claim for which plaintiffs seek a remedy under § 1983 asserts the same rights, and finds its source in the same facts, as the claim seeking a remedy through FLSA's remedial provisions. As a result of their FLSA claim, plaintiffs have been reinstated to their jobs and have received both back pay and attorney's fees. This is a comprehensive remedy for the wrong they have suffered. A claim under § 1983 does not allow for some deserved remedy that FLSA denies the plaintiffs. Rather, it would simply allow them a second helping of the recovery they have already received. For that reason, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act because its comprehensive remedial scheme shows Congress intended to preclude that remedy.

Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation v. Lowry · filed 1996-12-19

This remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot replace the administrative enforcement scheme for housing authorities’ tenant-participation duties under HUD regulations.

Mungiovi v. Chicago Housing Authority, Essie Smith, and William Bradley · filed 1996-11-19

Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass these remedies, or to replace an administrative enforcement scheme with a judicial one.

Section 1983 does not supply an additional remedy for claims governed by the Veterans’ Act because Congress intended its comprehensive enforcement provisions to be exclusive.

Rumsey v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1994-03-14

Even were we to conclude that plaintiffs stated a substantial equal protection claim, Congress planned to supplant a § 1983 claim with the enforcement provisions of the Veterans’ Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for Safe Drinking Water Act violations because that Act has a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield · filed 1992-11-20

As the SDWA enforcement scheme is closely analogous to other enforcement schemes found sufficiently comprehensive to evince a clear congressional intent to preempt relief under section 1983, we hold that appellants’ section 1983 claims are preempted by the SDWA.

Section 1983 claims based on First Amendment rights unrelated to handicap discrimination are not precluded by the Rehabilitation Act.

Glenda Smith and Ray Martin v. Howard Barton, Larry Barnes, Jack Ugaki, and Brian Wardle · filed 1990-09-19

While there is disagreement over whether Congress intended to foreclose section 1983 claims that could have been brought under the Rehabilitation Act, there is no indication that Congress intended to foreclose section 1983 claims that are unrelated to handicap discrimination.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for employment age discrimination covered by the ADEA, even when the claim is framed as an equal protection violation.

Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department Bishop L. Robinson, Commissioner, Baltimore City Police Department · filed 1989-04-20

The provisions of the ADEA, we thus conclude, evidence congressional intent to foreclose actions for age discrimination under § 1983.

Section 1983 may not be used to enforce Federal Aviation Act provisions because that Act's comprehensive enforcement scheme demonstrates congressional intent to foreclose a Section 1983 action.

Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope · filed 1986-02-14

The comprehensive enforcement scheme provided in the Federal Aviation Act manifests congressional intent to foreclose an action under Sec. 1983.

The Atomic Energy Act's comprehensive scheme and absence of a private cause of action prevent a Section 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of that Act.

Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. County of Suffolk · filed 1985-03-18

The AEA is a complex, comprehensive piece of legislation which does not provide for private causes of action. LIL-CO’s § 1983 claim, therefore, may not be based on an alleged violation of the AEA.

The Clean Water Act's express enforcement provisions preclude using § 1983 to enforce that Act.

City of Las Vegas, Nevada v. Clark County, Nevada · filed 1985-03-11

The Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2627, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981), concluded that Congress intended to limit access to federal court to enforce the CWA to the express enforcement provisions of the Act. This precludes suits brought under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

The Food Stamp Act's comprehensive enforcement mechanisms show congressional intent to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under Section 1983.

Tyler v. Mmes. Pasqua & Toloso · filed 1984-12-10

We cannot find an intention by Congress to preserve a right of action under § 1983 when it required the state to create specific remedies in addition to those provided by the Act. The existence of these express statutory remedies demonstrates that Congress intended not only to foreclose implied private actions but to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under § 1983.

The Clean Water Act's express enforcement provisions preclude using Section 1983 or general federal-question jurisdiction to enforce the Act.

City of Las Vegas v. Clark County · filed 1984-12-11

This precludes suits brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Internal Revenue Code's specific refund and enforcement remedies demonstrate congressional intent to displace any remedy that otherwise would be available under Section 1983.

Michigan State Employees Ass'n v. Marlan · filed 1984-11-28

I am satisfied that Congress did not intend to preserve a section 1983 right of action when it created such specific statutory remedies to vindicate rights provided by the IRC. I, therefore, conclude that the existence of these express remedies demonstrates that Congress intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under section 1983.

Section 1983 is unavailable to redress a violation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act because that statute provides an exclusive remedy.

Max M. v. Thompson · filed 1983-07-01

This argument has been clearly and unequivocally rejected by the Seventh Circuit which reasoned that, because the EAHCA provides an exclusive remedy, § 1983 is inapplicable. ... As a result, plaintiffs’ statutory § 1983 claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violating a federal statute when that statute's comprehensive express remedies demonstrate congressional intent to supplant section 1983.

Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn. · filed 1981-06-25

We therefore conclude that the existence of these express remedies demonstrates not only that Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to assert rights created by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when Section 504's remedial scheme is exclusive and limited to equitable relief.

Longoria v. Harris · filed 1982-12-15

The Court has determined the remedy implied under Section 504 to be limited to equitable relief. Section 1983 is not similarly limited in the scope of the relief it provides, and the Court has found that the supplemental damage remedy afforded by Section 1983 would threaten to eviscerate the congressional objectives underlying Section 504. Therefore, the Court holds the rights created by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act cannot be asserted within the remedial framework of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot provide district-court relief when a comprehensive federal statutory review scheme makes the requested remedies available only through appellate review of the agency’s orders.

MUNICIPAL ELEC. UTIL. ASS'N OF NEW YORK v. Conable · filed 1983-09-02

In recognition of these precedents, and in a further effort to maintain at least part of this suit in the district court, plaintiff amended its complaint to add a claim for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The addition of this cause of action does not keep the plaintiffs here, however. ... It is thus clear that the remedies plaintiff seeks from this Court are only available to it via appeal from the Commission’s orders to the United States Court of Appeals pursuant to the Federal Power Act.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Education for All Handicapped Children Act because doing so without administrative exhaustion would undermine that Act’s comprehensive administrative process.

Marvin H., Kaye H. And Bryan H. v. Austin Independent School District · filed 1983-09-22

The requirement that conflicts first be resolved through the state administrative process would be utterly undermined if a plaintiff could resort to section 1983 for an EAHCA violation since section 1983 does not require administrative exhaustion.

A § 1983 action is precluded when Congress created a comprehensive enforcement scheme in the substantive federal statute and gave no indication that additional remedies were intended.

Allegheny County Sanitary Authority v. United States Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1984-05-20

Because ALCOSAN cannot direct us to any indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that the action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is precluded.

Section 1983 is a statutory remedy that Congress may foreclose or displace by enacting a comprehensive alternative remedial scheme it intends to be the exclusive avenue for a given claim.

Smith v. Robinson · filed 1984-07-05

We conclude, therefore, that where the EHA is available to a handicapped child asserting a right to a free appropriate public education, based either on the EHA or on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the EHA is the exclusive avenue through which the child and his parents or guardian can pursue their claim.

Section 1983 is unavailable when an EHA plaintiff's civil-rights claims add no substantive rights beyond those the EHA provides.

Diamond v. McKenzie · filed 1985-01-22

The Court concludes therefore that these plaintiffs may not assert claims under any statute other than the EHA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass the Rehabilitation Act's administrative-exhaustion requirement when the alleged injury is remediable under that Act.

Tyus v. Ohio Department of Youth Services · filed 1985-03-04

In light of the broad remedial scope of 29 U.S.C. § 794, its clear applicability to the alleged injury in this case, and to the extent 42 U.S.C. § 1983 otherwise would allow a plaintiff to circumvent the Rehabilitation Act’s exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, the Court believes that Congress did not intend to permit 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based upon alleged injuries remediable under 29 U.S.C. § 794.

A section 1983 action and fee award are available when a due-process challenge seeks to compel an agency to provide constitutionally required process despite a comprehensive special-education remedial scheme.

Stock v. Massachusetts Hospital School · filed 1985-04-08

This discussion ... while dicta, strongly implies that a § 1983 action and a fee award are proper when a plaintiff claims that he is being denied due process, and the purpose of the due process challenge is to compel the agency to afford the process that is constitutionally due.

After the Handicapped Children's Protection Act restored parallel federal remedies, a § 1983 compensatory-damages claim for denial of a free appropriate education may proceed beyond dismissal if the pleaded facts could establish a constitutional or federal-law violation.

Board Of Education Of The East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond · filed 1986-12-19

The Diamonds allege that their son has been damaged by the adamant failure of the School District to provide him with a free appropriate education. They rely upon 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Applying the pleading standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), we cannot say that they could not prove a set of facts upon which compensatory damage relief could be granted for violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. We hold no more at this stage of the case.

Section 1983 damages were unavailable for pre-1986 special-education claims when the Education of the Handicapped Act supplied the exclusive remedy and the Handicapped Children's Protection Act's restoration of parallel remedies did not apply retroactively.

Silano v. Tirozzi · filed 1987-01-05

Damages are equally unavailable under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Section 1983 relief was not formerly available where a governing statute provided an exclusive remedy for violation of its terms. ... The motion to dismiss under Sections 504 and 1983 is accordingly GRANTED, since plaintiffs could look only to the EHA for relief prior to the passage of Section 3 of the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, which this court finds does not have retroactive application under the facts of this case.

Section 1983 cannot privately enforce the federal wage-garnishment limit because Congress entrusted enforcement of that statutory scheme to the Secretary of Labor.

Follette v. Vitanza · filed 1987-03-27

The available evidence suggests that by entrusting the enforcement of the provisions of Subchapter II to the Secretary of Labor, Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement of 15 U.S.C. § 1673 through a civil suit instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, that part of plaintiffs’ complaint seeking redress for violations of § 1673 under § 1983 is dismissed.

Section 1983 is unavailable to enforce a federal statute whose comprehensive administrative and private judicial remedies show Congress intended to make that statutory scheme exclusive.

Lile v. University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics · filed 1987-11-16

The Court believes that the remedial devices provided by Hill-Burton are sufficiently comprehensive. The statute provides for administrative review by the Secretary, as well as subsequent private actions, with applicable rules promulgated thereunder.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of the Federal Communications Act’s equal time provision because its comprehensive administrative enforcement scheme forecloses that remedy.

Deyoung v. Larry G. Patten, Executive Director John C. White, Program Director Iowa Public Television Dean Borg Io · filed 1990-03-14

However, the existence of a comprehensive administrative mechanism to enforce candidates’ rights to equal time convinces us that a § 1983 remedy for violation of the equal time provision would be inconsistent with the overall legislative scheme.

A comprehensive federal enforcement scheme can foreclose a § 1983 remedy for a federal right that would otherwise be enforceable under § 1983.

Associated General Contractors, San Diego Chapter, Inc. v. Smith · filed 1996-01-22

Further, even when a party requesting attorney fees shows a federal right that would otherwise be enforceable under § 1983, the opposing party may show that “Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983 by providing a comprehensive enforcement mechanis[m] for protection of a federal right.”

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce an ADEA age-discrimination claim because the ADEA provides the exclusive remedy for enforcing that Act.

Joyce Brooks Janes v. Bardstown City Schools Board of Education · filed 1996-09-20

Mrs. Janes may not bring her ADEA claim under § 1983. The detailed statutory remedy created by the ADEA constitutes the exclusive means for enforcement of the Act.

Section 1983 remains available to enforce any individual rights conferred by Title IV-D because the Secretary’s oversight powers do not displace that remedy.

Blessing v. Freestone · filed 1997-04-21

To the extent that Title IV-D may give rise to individual rights, therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Secretary’s oversight powers are not comprehensive enough to close the door on § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for FMLA violations because the FMLA’s enforcement scheme supplies the exclusive remedy.

O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Board of Education · filed 1998-08-26

This Court concludes that the enforcement scheme of the FMLA, like that of the FLSA, and Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for a violation of the Act, and that plaintiffs cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a Title II ADA violation because Title II has its own comprehensive remedies.

Pona v. Whittaker's · filed 1998-09-18

While that provision, of course, can, in proper circumstances, be used to vindicate the denial of rights secured by statutes of the United States, we must be mindful of the principle that if the statutory right that a plaintiff seeks to vindicate comes outfitted with its own comprehensive remedial apparatus, a § 1983 action based on a violation of that statutory right will not lie.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Title II of the ADA because Title II has a detailed remedial scheme.

Alsbrook v. AR Commission on Law · filed 1999-07-23

We agree with the conclusions reached in these cases and hold that Title II's detailed remedial scheme bars Alsbrook from maintaining a section 1983 action against the commissioners in their individual capacities for alleged violations of the ADA.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy when a comprehensive statutory enforcement scheme, such as the ESA’s citizen suit provision, displaces it.

Shields v. Babbitt · filed 2000-07-12

The existence of this express remedy demonstrates not only that Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a right under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 when that Act provides a sufficiently comprehensive remedy for the right.

Verizon Maryland Inc. v. RCN Telecom Services, Inc. · filed 2002-11-19

The 1996 Act provides ample — and sufficiently comprehensive — means for vindicating the right at issue here. Therefore, Congress cannot have intended to allow enforcement under § 1983 as well.

Section 1983 permits a civil action by a handicapped person for disparate treatment, subject to the rational-relationship test, and a claim alleging discrimination solely on the basis of handicap cannot be dismissed without proof defeating those allegations.

Hutchings v. ERIE CITY AND COUNTY, ETC. · filed 1981-06-29

While we believe that the rational relationship test is the appropriate standard to apply to these claims, we do not feel that this standard mandates dismissal of the plaintiff's Section 1983 cause of action at this time. ... At present the defendants have not provided any explanation for these alleged acts of discrimination. Nor have they established that the alleged discrimination in fact did not occur. Until such proof is presented the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim cannot be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a general damages remedy for handicapped children who claim that state officials unequally treated their right to an education under the Equal Protection Clause.

William S. v. Gill · filed 1982-03-31

This Court therefore concludes that Congress did not intend, by passing EAHCA, to do away with the general damage remedy under the Equal Protection Clause and Section 1983 for handicapped children who claim unequal treatment of their right to an education.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for workplace disability discrimination when the asserted right is created solely by statute.

Scott v. Estes · filed 1999-08-04

However, because the right to be free from discrimination based on a disability is created solely by statute, Scott’s claim of discrimination based on her disability is not actionable under § 1983 and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not support a disability discrimination claim framed as an equal protection violation.

Abbott v. New York State Division of State Police · filed 2020-09-29

The Court agrees that, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting a disability discrimination claim in the Second Cause of Action in the proposed amended complaint, the claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a right of action for Clean Water Act violations because the Act’s comprehensive remedies foreclose it.

Abdur-Rahman v. Walker · filed 2009-05-11

We first discuss why section 1983 does not provide a private right of action for violations of the Clean Water Act. ... We affirm the judgment against the inspectors’ claim about the whistleblower provision of the Clean Water Act.

Section 1983 does not support systemwide injunctive oversight of Title IV-D child-support enforcement where the requested relief duplicates the Secretary’s ongoing audit and corrective process.

Carelli v. Howser · filed 1991-01-18

We conclude that the nature of the relief sought by plaintiffs here would cause a federal court to carry out an oversight function beyond that intended by Congress, given the comprehensiveness of the remedial scheme provided in the statute. We find it unnecessary to decide whether section 1983 can ever be used as a means of securing relief for an alleged statutory violation of Title IV-D.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutory rights, including injunctive relief when a violation is found.

Thorstenn v. Barnard · filed 1989-08-22

The complaints clearly assert statutory claims based on violations of a federal statute, i.e. 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1561. Neither the Chairman nor the Association suggests otherwise. Section 1983 provides the remedy in such a case.

A federal statute is enforceable through Section 1983 when it creates enforceable rights and Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Planned Parenthood of Billings v. State of Mont. · filed 1986-02-14

Whether § 1983 is available to enforce a particular statute depends upon two factors: (1) Congress must not have foreclosed private enforcement of the statute and (2) the statute must create enforceable rights.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action to challenge alleged violations of the Social Security Act and its regulations.

Morabito v. Blum · filed 1981-11-25

it is well settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relied on by plaintiffs here, provides such a private right of action.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce federal statutory rights even when the underlying statute lacks a private right of action, and it is not displaced merely because another federal remedy exists.

Mejia v. US DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOP. · filed 1981-06-29

The City defendants also moved to dismiss the counts against them based on four arguments: 1) violation of a federal statute for which a private right of action does not exist cannot constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) plaintiffs have suffered no injury or deprivation of rights; 3) plaintiffs' claims do not present a constitutional question; and 4) there is no reason for fashioning an independent remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the APA protects plaintiffs' rights. However, the first, third and fourth arguments are directly contrary to the teaching of Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980).

Section 1983 permits a claim for a violation of the Bankruptcy Code committed under color of state law.

Gibbs v. Housing Authority of New Haven (In Re Gibbs) · filed 1981-06-29

The Bankruptcy Code is a federal statute, and the Authority’s violation thereof subjects it to § 1983 sanctions.

Section 1983 does not provide a route around the EAHCA’s exclusive administrative-remedy scheme for claims based on the EAHCA.

Akers v. Bolton · filed 1981-11-13

The Court also concludes that plaintiff Tony Akers ought not be allowed to circumvent the scheme of administrative remedies so carefully constructed by Congress, by using the EAHCA as a path into 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to enjoin state action alleged to violate the First Amendment.

Lanner v. Wimmer · filed 1981-11-25

It is clear that § 1983 is the proper remedy to enjoin state action alleged to violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims under the FWPCA.

Love v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation · filed 1981-12-17

On its face, this claim appears to be nothing more than a reiteration of the claims under the FWPCA contained in the original complaint. As such, the proposed complaint clearly does not state a claim under Section 1983. The Supreme Court has held that Congress foreclosed a Section 1983 remedy under the FWPCA.

Section 1983 permits a handicapped individual to enforce specific rights created by Title I of the Rehabilitation Act against state officials because Title I does not foreclose that remedy, but requires exhaustion of adequate administrative remedies provided by the statute.

Ryans v. NEW JERSEY COM'N FOR THE BLIND, ETC. · filed 1982-07-06

Under the circumstances, the only tenable conclusion is that Title I creates enforceable “rights” within the meaning of § 1983. ... Viewing Title I as a whole, I find no Congressional intent to foreclose the assertion of a § 1983 action by a handicapped individual denied benefits under the program. ... Accordingly, I conclude that where a § 1983 action is brought for the vindication of rights under a federal statute which contains its own administrative remedies, exhaustion of those administrative remedies, if they are adequate, is required.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state officials who violate federal statutory rights, including rights arising under the Rehabilitation Act and the EAHCA.

DEPT. OF ED., STATE OF HAWAII v. Katherine D. · filed 1982-01-28

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state officials who violate federal statutory rights, including those arising under the Rehabilitation Act and the EAHCA.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutory provisions that are preconditions to federal funding of state migrant education programs.

Valdez Ex Rel. Valdez v. Grover · filed 1983-04-25

I find and conclude that there is a § 1983 remedy available for violations of those provisions of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 that are preconditions to federal funding of state migrant education programs.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce the substantive rights created by the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act.

Crawford v. Janklow · filed 1983-06-30

Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the plaintiffs properly maintained the present action either directly as an implied cause of action under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981 or as an express cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (Supp. V 1981).

A Section 1983 claim based on violation of a federal statute fails on the merits when no underlying statutory violation occurred, without deciding whether the statute creates enforceable rights.

Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman · filed 1983-08-30

We find it unnecessary to address these issues. We hold below that the actions of appellees in spraying South Salem did not violate FIFRA. That ruling defeats on the merits the section 1983 action against state appellees for violating rights secured by FIFRA.

Section 1983 cannot revive an unsuccessful claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, without deciding whether Section 1983 might remedy a proven Section 504 violation.

Norcross v. Sneed · filed 1983-10-21

However, because plaintiff did not prevail in her private action under section 504, it follows that section 1983 is not available to plaintiff to remedy a section 504 violation. Section 1983 cannot breathe new life into an unsuccessful section 504 claim. Thus, we need not decide whether, under appropriate facts, section 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of section 504.

A violation of a federal statute is actionable under Section 1983 only if Congress did not intend to foreclose private enforcement of the statute and the statute was intended to create enforceable individual rights.

Phelps v. Housing Authority of Woodruff · filed 1984-08-24

Determining whether violation of a particular federal statute gives rise to Sec. 1983 liability involves two inquiries. First, whether Congress, in enacting the statute, manifested in the statute itself an intent to foreclose its private enforcement? Second, whether the statute is of a kind aimed at creating enforceable "rights" under Sec. 1983?

Section 1983 provides a private action to enforce procedural rights under the Education of the Handicapped Act when a local educational agency effectively denies access to the required impartial due-process hearing.

S-1 & S-2 Ex Rel. P-1 & P-2 v. Spangler · filed 1986-12-31

“[W]here, as here, the local educational agency deprives a handicapped child of due process by effectively denying that child access to the heart of the EHA administrative machinery, the impartial due process hearing, an action may be brought under § 1983.” ... Clearly, then, Plaintiffs maintain a private right of action through which to vindicate the loss of their procedural rights guaranteed by the EAHCA.

The Legal Services Corporation Act does not create rights enforceable under § 1983.

Fultz v. Neighborhood Legal Services · filed 1987-01-26

Alternatively, were we to find that NLSA is a state actor, plaintiffs § 1983 claim would still fail because the Legal Services Corporation Act does not create rights which are enforceable under § 1983.

A federal statute supports a § 1983 claim only if the statute creates enforceable rights.

Harpole v. Arkansas Department of Human Services · filed 1987-06-03

The statute, however, must create enforceable rights.