42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federally protected rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Ysasi v. Brown · filed 2014-02-28

Section 1983 creates only the right of action; it does not create any substantive rights; substantive rights must come from the Constitution or federal statute.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Kirola v. City of San Francisco · filed 2014-11-26

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce federal rights but does not create substantive rights itself.

Alvarez v. County of Orange · filed 2015-03-25

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff merely alleges a violation of § 1983, “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Section 1983 provides a procedural mechanism for enforcing federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Lillian Roberts Dir. of Dist. Council 37, Afscme ex rel. Situated v. Cuomo · filed 2018-09-24

Having already found that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claim and because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is but a procedural mechanism that itself creates no substantive rights, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a means to enforce federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Lee v. James · filed 2020-07-09

“Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; instead it is a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.”

Section 1983 provides a method for enforcing federal rights conferred elsewhere; it does not itself create substantive rights.

Holmes v. Grant County · filed 2020-09-15

Plaintiff’s argument fails because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Section 1983 damages claims are not dismissed solely because of equitable-restraint concerns and may remain for further consideration, while equitable-relief claims are dismissed.

Danish News Co. v. City of Ann Arbor · filed 1981-05-01

The damages claims brought in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not themselves compete with concerns of comity and federalism, particularly when the interest of the federal court in vindication of federal rights is brought into focus. ... The damages issues are retained subject to further consideration upon renewed motion and full briefing by the parties.

When Younger abstention applies, a federal court must stay rather than dismiss accompanying § 1983 damages and attorney-fee claims that cannot be resolved in the ongoing state proceeding.

Monaghan v. Deakins · filed 1986-09-04

It is settled in this circuit that a district court, when abstaining from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief, should stay and not dismiss accompanying claims for damages and attorney fees when such relief is not available from the ongoing state proceedings.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for police misconduct that caused a constitutional injury without requiring the plaintiff to attack the validity of a resulting state conviction.

Smith v. Jerry Springer, Richard O'connell, and Daniel Chilla · filed 1988-08-31

Smith need not legally attack the validity of his conviction to prevail on his section 1983 claim if he can prove that the defendants’ misconduct injured him.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim challenging prison disciplinary procedures while restoration of lost good-time credits is pursued through other proceedings.

Buchanan v. George W. Wilson, And/or, John T. Wigginton, Secretary Corrections Cabinet · filed 1989-05-05

Preiser expressly contemplated that claims properly brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 could go forward while actual restoration of good-time credits is sought in state proceedings. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974). Buchanan's damages claim was properly before the district court and requires determination of the validity of the procedures employed for imposing sanctions including loss of good time for flagrant or serious misconduct.

Section 1983 permits a class member to pursue an individual damages claim despite related class litigation unless the member waived that right.

Holley v. Bishop Robinson, Mason Waters, Mr. Herndon · filed 1990-07-26

Therefore the Johnson litigation does not prevent Holley from bringing a suit for damages under Sec. 1983 unless he has waived that right as a member of the plaintiff class.

A § 1983 damages claim for denied good-time credits may yield nominal damages if the prisoner prevails in a pending habeas action, and consideration of the damages claim should be stayed until the habeas petition is resolved.

Clay v. Smith · filed 1991-12-12

In the event that Clay prevails on his good time credit claim in his pending habeas action he might be entitled to nominal damages on the present claim. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of this claim and remand it to the district court. The district court should then stay consideration of the damages claim until it has resolved the habeas petition.

A § 1983 damages claim based on the length of a state prison sentence must be stayed pending disposition of habeas proceedings.

Qawi v. Joel Fort Paul Popper James H. Anderson · filed 1993-05-26

This procedure was proper because a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim seeking damages based on the length of a state prison sentence must be stayed pending disposition of habeas proceedings.

A court applying Younger abstention retains a § 1983 damages claim when the pending state proceedings cannot provide monetary relief.

Bongiorno v. Lalomia · filed 1994-05-03

Because such monetary relief is not available to plaintiffs in the state court proceedings, the Court will retain jurisdiction over the claim for monetary damages against defendant Zanzuccki.

A § 1983 claim for declaratory or injunctive relief that is properly treated as habeas requires exhaustion of state remedies, and a damages claim controlled by Heck v. Humphrey must be dismissed.

Spaulding v. Anthony Thompson Mary Dial Bobby Deese Glen Branch · filed 1994-08-16

We agree that, to the extent Appellant seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, this action is properly construed as a habeas corpus action which requires Appellant to exhaust state court remedies. With respect to Appellant's damages claim, Heck v. Humphrey, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594 (U.S.1994), controls and requires dismissal of that claim.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim that would invalidate a conviction or sentence only after the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Marian v. Scott · filed 1994-11-22

In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the conviction has been invalidated in order to state a cognizable Sec. 1983 claim.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Channer v. Clyde Mitchell, Detective, I/o, James Howard, Detective, I/o, James F. Looby, Inspector, I/o, City · filed 1994-12-29

Channer offered no proof that his conviction had been independently invalidated. His complaint against Mitchell and Howard was therefore properly dismissed.

Section 1983 damages for parole decisions based on allegedly false records are unavailable until the challenged information has been invalidated by the state or through habeas corpus.

Mosley v. Gilbert · filed 1995-01-11

Here, Mosley may not seek damages under section 1983 for parole decisions that were based on allegedly false and inaccurate information in his records until he proves that such information has been invalidated by the state or by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

A damages claim under Section 1983 must be dismissed when Heck v. Humphrey controls.

Johnson v. B.J. Roberts State Legislature, Commonwealth of Virginia James S. Gilmore, Iii, Attorney General · filed 1995-01-18

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint. ... With respect to Appellant's damages claim, Heck v. Humphrey, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594 (U.S.1994), controls and requires dismissal of that claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim concerning a conviction until the conviction has been overturned or called into question by the appropriate court.

Parker v. Woodburn · filed 1995-01-19

An action for damages concerning a conviction is not cognizable until the underlying conviction has been overturned or called into question by the appropriate court.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s continued confinement unless that confinement has first been invalidated.

Schafer v. Moore · filed 1995-01-27

Since the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), held that, if a judgment in favor of a prisoner in a section 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, continued imprisonment, or sentence, then no claim for damages lies unless the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. The plain language of the complaint demonstrates Schafer is challenging the duration of his confinement, i.e., if he were to prevail in his section 1983 suit, the result would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement. Therefore, in light of Heck, the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that necessarily calls a conviction into question until the conviction has been invalidated.

McCullar Jr. v. Milwaukee County Crime Victim Witness Support · filed 1995-03-07

It follows that McCullar has no cause of action under Sec. 1983 until he first proves that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily invalidate an outstanding conviction are barred until the conviction is overturned, and dismissal without prejudice is appropriate.

Perez v. Sifel · filed 1995-05-09

Most of appellant’s claims, if proven, would necessarily invalidate his conviction. As appellant has not yet successfully challenged his conviction, these claims are barred by Heck. However, because appellant could renew these claims if he ever succeeds in overturning his conviction, dismissal without prejudice is appropriate.

Section 1983 damages claims that call a conviction into question are not cognizable until the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Wilson v. Winston-Salem Police Department · filed 1995-06-22

To the extent his action requests damages, the claims are not cognizable, as he has not demonstrated that his conviction was reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1988) writ.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey.

Haburn v. Vicks · filed 1995-06-29

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint. ... We agree that, with respect to Appellant's damages claim, the district court properly dismissed that claim. See Heck v. Humphrey, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594 (U.S.1994).

A § 1983 damages claim that challenges a conviction is subject to dismissal, without prejudice to refiling if the conviction is overturned or called into question by the appropriate court.

James D. Haburn, Sr. v. Joel Brewer, District Attorney Detective Ragan Detective Perkins · filed 1996-01-02

We agree that, with respect to Appellant's damages claim, the district court properly dismissed that claim. See Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594, 4597 (U.S. June 24, 1994) (No. 93-6188). ... Because Appellant may refile his action if his conviction ever is overturned or called into question by the appropriate court or upon the exhaustion of state remedies, we modify the judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Ladd v. Mitchell · filed 1996-07-30

We agree with the district court that, under the requirements of Heck, Ladd's suit is not actionable. Ladd's suit challenges the duration of his confinement because his damages claim is based on the premise that, due to defendants' actions regarding the revocation of his parole, the length of his Missouri sentence has not been reduced by the amount of time he spent incarcerated in Kansas.

Section 1983 does not permit damages premised on the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Wood v. Rogers · filed 1996-12-18

Such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983, unless “a . . . plaintiff . . . prove[s] that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by excessive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, —, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994).

Section 1983 damages claims challenging prison disciplinary actions that cost liberty do not accrue until the disciplinary outcome is set aside.

Jones v. Farley · filed 1997-01-31

Heck and Miller disable Jones from seeking damages on the basis of administrative disciplinary actions that have not been set aside.

A § 1983 damages claim whose success would invalidate continued confinement is not cognizable until the confinement has been remedied through another process.

Phillips v. Don Sundquist Charles Burson Donal Campbell · filed 1997-02-04

However, the district court did err by considering the merits of Phillips's civil rights action for damages at this time. This claim which, if successful, would render Phillips's continued confinement invalid, must be dismissed because it is simply not cognizable until the challenged confinement has been remedied by some other process.

A prisoner cannot pursue § 1983 damages on a claim that would invalidate continued confinement until that confinement has been remedied through another process.

Carney v. Sundquist · filed 1997-03-24

Nor may the district court consider the merits of Carney's civil rights action for damages at this time. Carney's due process claim which, if successful, would render his continued confinement invalid, it is not cognizable until the challenged confinement has been remedied by some other process.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would call a conviction into question unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Olivier-Ward v. Glenette Blackwell, Judge Michael A. Tynan, Judge Terry Bork, Deputy Dist. Atty. P. Harrill · filed 1997-10-27

The district court properly dismissed Olivier-Ward's damage claims because his conviction has not yet been declared invalid. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (damage claims, which if successful would call into question the validity of a conviction, are not cognizable prior to invalidation of the conviction).

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has first been invalidated.

Fred Nance, Jr. v. Swagmeyer · filed 1997-12-01

Nance's damages claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because his primary claim, that the disciplinary charges against him were false, if accepted, necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Hanley v. Stewart · filed 1998-09-30

A claim for damages could only be asserted if the prisoner could demonstrate that his conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for a claim that is noncognizable under Edwards v. Balisok.

Meadows v. Thomas · filed 1998-12-11

Meadows claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits application of Arizona’s survival statute barring damages for a decedent’s pain and suffering when the alleged constitutional violation did not cause the death.

Badia v. City of Casa Grande · filed 1999-03-16

Because the alleged constitutional violation here did not result in Perez’s death or, for that matter, any known physical injury, the foregoing cases upon which plaintiff relies are inapplicable. Similarly, § 14-3110 does not undermine the deterrent purposes of § 1983.

A § 1983 damages claim presented to New Jersey's education agencies must be decided in the Law Division because those agencies cannot award damages.

Ja v. Bd. of Educ. for S. Orange · filed 1999-04-09

J.A.'s amended petition to the Commissioner of Education seeks damages and also attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 for vindicating a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. ... However, the Commissioner and State Board of Education are not authorized to award damages or attorneys' fees. We hold, therefore, that Maisonet applies. Whether damages or attorneys' fees should be awarded and, if they are, in what amount, are therefore matters that will have to be decided in the Law Division after remand.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim for an extradition procedure violation when proving the claimed loss of liberty would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding parole revocation.

Knowlin v. Pat Thompson and Ed Michalek · filed 2000-03-23

So too, here, to establish a § 1983 claim for monetary relief, including a showing of damages, Knowlin will have to prove that he suffered some deprivation of liberty greater than that which he would have suffered through extradition in full compliance with the UCEA. That showing, in turn, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his Wisconsin parole revocation, which Heck instructs cannot be shown through a § 1983 suit. Heck therefore bars the instant suit.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned.

Nichols v. Simpson · filed 2000-07-12

Any claim that the complained-of conduct resulted in his incarceration, however, is Heck-barred. See id. at 486-87 (in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render conviction or sentence invalid, § 1983 plaintiff must prove that conviction or sentence has been overturned).

A court applying Younger abstention to a § 1983 damages claim must stay the proceedings rather than dismiss the claim with prejudice.

Adam v. Hawaii · filed 2000-12-20

Assuming, without deciding, that the elements of Younger abstention were met in this case, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing with prejudice Adam’s complaint' seeking money damages under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In sum, even if the Younger elements had been satisfied, the district court was required to stay the proceedings.

Section 1983 provides a claim for money damages to vindicate IDEA rights when compensatory damages are unavailable under the IDEA itself.

Walker v. District of Columbia · filed 2001-06-29

Compensatory damages, on the other hand, are not available under the IDEA. As this Court has held, a plaintiff seeking money damages must bring a Section 1983 claim for damages to vindicate his or her rights under the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a parole denial unless the underlying decision has been invalidated.

Waeckerle v. Oklahoma · filed 2002-04-12

Mr. Waeckerle’s § 1983 claim necessarily implies the invalidity of his parole denial. ... Because Heck does not allow Mr. Waeckerle’s § 1983 suit to proceed, his sole recourse is through habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a claim for monetary relief challenging an unlawful sentence once that sentence has been declared invalid.

Vanderburg v. Johnson · filed 2002-07-02

Vanderburg’s claim for monetary relief distinguished his civil rights complaint from an action for habeas relief. The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint was properly before the district court since Vanderburg demonstrated ... that his alleged unlawful sentence had been declared invalid.

Section 1983 claims for monetary relief must be brought in a separate civil action rather than in a habeas petition.

Carpenter v. Reynolds · filed 2002-07-27

To the extent that Carpenter seeks a monetary judgment for violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, those claims are not properly brought in a habeas corpus petition, which does not permit remuneration for constitutional violations. ... Accordingly, Carpenter’s claims pursuant to Sections 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 are dismissed without prejudice. If it is money Carpenter seeks, he must file a separate Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 damages claims can be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Radford v. Moka · filed 2003-03-12

We also conclude his damages claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for procedures used during detention on an alleged parole violation when success would not invalidate an outstanding criminal judgment.

French v. Adams County Detention Center · filed 2004-08-12

We fail to see how success by Plaintiff on his claims that he was denied counsel and a court appearance would “demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. ... The district court therefore erred in applying Heck to dismiss the complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for allegedly unconstitutional civil commitment until the commitment is invalidated by a state court or the plaintiff obtains habeas relief.

Ring, John D. v. Knecht, James A. · filed 2005-04-27

But this case was properly dismissed because, as we explained in his previous appeal, Ring may not sue for damages arising out of allegedly unconstitutional confinement until either his commitment is invalidated by a state court or he successfully petitions the district court for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply that the claimant’s civil commitment is invalid unless the commitment has first been invalidated.

Banda v. New Jersey Department of Mental Health Services · filed 2006-01-04

With respect to his claim for damages, the District Court held that the claim was not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a favorable outcome would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1247-48 (2005); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). We agree.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging a prison disciplinary conviction that cost the prisoner good-time credits cannot proceed under Heck.

Graham v. Ray · filed 2006-03-07

The district court dismissed the action, finding that, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the suit for damages could not proceed. ... Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 1983 damages claims based on prosecutors' pretrial publicity are premature until the plaintiff's injury manifests at trial.

Matheney v. Hansel Foley, St. Joseph County Police, Michael Barnes, John D. Krisor, and James E. Aiken · filed 1996-04-17

Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Michael Barnes and John D. Krisor brought in their personal capacity as premature rather than on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that implies a conviction or sentence is invalid unless it has already been invalidated.

Mitschell v. Donald · filed 2007-01-12

Because Mitschell’s claim necessarily implies that his imprisonment is invalid, Mitschell has failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim under Heck.

Section 1983 damages are available only for violations of a plaintiff’s own constitutional rights, so a plaintiff cannot recover them through an overbreadth challenge based on third parties’ rights.

Hunt v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2009-01-14

On the Court’s reading of the jurisprudence, however, an overbreadth challenge on behalf of third parties is unavailable to Plaintiffs here. ... As a result, because § 1983 damages “ ‘are available only for violations of a party’s own constitutional rights,’ ” the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff could not state a claim for damages under § 1983 when making a challenge to a statute on the basis of the third-party standing exception provided by the overbreadth doctrine. ... Because the overbreadth exception to prudential standing is unavailable here, Plaintiffs must bring their challenge to vindicate their own constitutional rights.

A § 1983 damages claim may be dismissed under Pullman abstention when recovery requires a declaration that the challenged state procedure is unconstitutional.

Rapid Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Ripley · filed 1997-12-03

A declaratory judgment concerning the constitutionality of the certification procedure must be issued for the damages claim to survive. Like Moran, this case is one in which a § 1983 damages claim exists, but the relief sought is in fact equitable and discretionary. Dismissal is therefore justified.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for detention until the detention has been declared invalid through the proper channels.

Thomas v. Van Hollen · filed 2010-04-16

Thomas cannot sue for damages under § 1983 unless and until his detention has been declared invalid through the proper channels, and, on that basis, his complaint was properly dismissed.

A § 1983 damages claim must be dismissed when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Smith v. City of Tulsa · filed 2010-06-15

A judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, but his conviction has not been ... invalidated. Dismissal of the complaint was appropriate.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Baldwin v. O'Connor · filed 2012-03-09

The district court’s opinion properly applied Heck. It recognized that Heck bars any claim for damages if the claim’s success “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the] conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate a conviction unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Whoie v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-08-22

The Court presumes that the plaintiff intends to sue the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the police officers under Bivens v. Sz`x Unknown Named Agents of Fea'eral Bureau of Narcotz`cs, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Because the success of the plaintiff s claims necessarily would void his conviction, the plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages without first showing that the conviction has been invalidated either by "revers[al] on direct appeal, expunge[ment] by executive order, . . . or . . . a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction has been invalidated, and, therefore, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner to obtain habeas relief before seeking damages when the requested relief would necessarily call into question the duration of confinement.

Rueb v. Brown · filed 2012-12-04

However, providing the requested relief would necessarily call into question the duration of Plaintiff’s confinement and the legality of the manner in which his sentences are being executed, and Plaintiff must thus obtain habeas relief before he can seek damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Lee v. Covington County Sheriff's Department · filed 2014-02-25

ln this case, the Court "must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. If the plaintiff s allegations were proved true, the ruling would undermine the validity of his criminal conviction. Because he has not shown that his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated, this civil rights action for damages must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits damages claims challenging release conditions when success would not imply the invalidity of current confinement.

Henderson v. Bryant · filed 2015-03-30

Because a successful damages action challenging those conditions or actions would not imply the invalidity of his current confinement, Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim challenging them.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Dunbar v. Alameda Police Department · filed 2019-11-14

Plaintiff’s claims for violations of his constitutional rights at trial and in the course of his prosecution, if successful, would necessarily imply that his conviction was not valid. Consequently, this claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Bush v. Struthers Ohio Police Department · filed 2019-12-18

With respect to Plaintiff's request for money damages as a remedy for the alleged constitutional deprivations by Defendants that led to his conviction and incarceration, this action is barred by Heck. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would call a sentence into question unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Parker v. Baldwin · filed 2020-06-22

Thus, his sentence has not been discharged, overturned or reversed, and he cannot proceed with a § 1983 claim for money damages against the defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Haynes v. Richards · filed 2020-11-17

Nor can he pursue claims for money damages for wrongful conviction or malicious prosecution, because such claims rest on a presumption that his conviction is invalid.2 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). These claims cannot be brought unless and until his conviction is “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.

A Section 1983 claim may be asserted in a Colorado election proceeding under § 1-1-118.

Brown v. Davidson · filed 2006-06-29

We conclude, therefore, that nothing in the law of this state prohibits the assertion of a § 1983 claim in a proceeding commenced under § 1-1-118, and thus, the district court had jurisdiction to pass upon this claim.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action that state courts are required to enforce, including protection against unlawful restraints and unlawful state entanglements affecting free exercise of religion.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit · filed 1981-05-06

Had they resorted to a separate action in a New Jersey court, that court would have been required to enforce the same Section 1983 cause of action which they have pleaded in the federal court. ... That cause of action includes the right to be protected, pendente lite, from unlawful restraints upon and unlawful state entanglements in their free exercise of religion.

Section 1983 requires state courts to accept jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff selects a state court as the forum.

Terrell v. City of Bessemer · filed 1981-08-27

For the purpose of avoiding such uncertainty when a plaintiff selects a forum, we hold this day that henceforth, courts of this state must accept jurisdiction over claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if a § 1983 plaintiff selects a state court as his forum.

Section 1983 does not give a federal district court power to review or nullify a final state-court order, and a litigant cannot create such jurisdiction by recasting the challenge as a constitutional § 1983 claim.

Murray v. Leach · filed 1981-12-11

[a] federal district court, as a court of limited original jurisdiction, lacks power to review, modify or nullify a final order of a state court. Nor can a party, aggrieved by a judicial decision of a state’s highest court, invest a lower federal court with such jurisdiction by clothing his or her grievance in the garb of § 1983 and alleging that the decision of the state court deprived him or her of constitutionally protected rights or interests. ... Although set forth as a claim brought under § 1983, the substance of the relief requested by the Plaintiffs would require this Court to review the actions of the state trial judge and the Texas Supreme Court. ... Except in the most compelling circumstances, a litigant in state court should not be permitted to bypass that forum’s appellate processes by initiating a § 1983 action in a federal district court claiming that he or she has been denied due process.

A claim brought under § 1983 that in substance attacks the constitutionality or validity of a state-court conviction must proceed through habeas corpus, so the claimant must exhaust state remedies first.

Caldwell v. Herbert Line, Presiding Judge of Dallas County Annex Court · filed 1982-07-02

When a state prisoner attacks the fact or length of his confinement, the appropriate cause of action is a petition for habeas corpus, even though the facts of the complaint might otherwise be sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. ... Although a state prisoner may generally bring a claim for damages under § 1983 without first exhausting state remedies, “where the basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality of the state court conviction”, habeas corpus is the exclusive cause of action and the attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies controls.

Arkansas state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.

Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland · filed 1987-11-02

Arkansas courts in the past have recognized and exercised jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. ... We entertain jurisdiction of the appellant’s § 1983 claim in this instance.

Section 1983 does not provide an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate in federal court claims already litigated in state court.

Thomas v. Gloria Williams William Mallen City and County of San Francisco · filed 1993-05-26

Section 1983 does not provide Thomas with an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate these claims in federal court.

Section 1983 does not authorize federal courts to enforce state judges’ orders.

Shelton, Linda v. Knox, Thomas J. · filed 2006-11-03

Section 1983 does not designate federal courts as the enforcers of state judges’ orders.

Section 1983 permits a property owner to bring takings and equal protection claims in state district court when adjudication does not require review of a local government's quasi-judicial decision.

Zweber v. Credit River Township · filed 2016-07-27

Because the district court has jurisdiction over Zweber’s section 1983 action, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

Section 1983 cannot be used to collect payment due under a state court judgment entered before the federal action.

Violet Dock Port, Inc., L.L.C. v. Heaphy · filed 2019-11-25

Nevertheless, Knick does not convert § 1983 into a tool for collecting payment due on state court judgments that issued prior to initiation of the federal action.

A prisoner's Section 1983 claim for damages arising from conditions of confinement is not rendered moot by transfer from the jail.

Miller v. Adkins · filed 1993-06-23

However, page four of Miller's Complaint plainly seeks $15,000 plus costs from each of the five named Defendants. Therefore, his § 1983 action was not moot as to his damages claim by reason of his transfer.

State courts cannot apply their own mootness and justiciability standards to bar a Section 1983 claim that would remain viable under federal standards.

Barcik v. Kubiaczyk · filed 1995-05-25

The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that an Oregon court cannot apply state standards of mootness and justiciability to a section 1983 claim brought in state court if application of those standards would preclude a plaintiffs federal claim, but application of federal standards would not.

Ending an alleged constitutional violation does not moot a prisoner’s § 1983 claim for actual and punitive damages.

United States of America Ex Rel. Burwell L. Jones v. Alfred T. Rundle, Superintendent · filed 1971-12-28

However, we have noted that alleviation of an alleged constitutional violation does not moot a prisoner’s claim for actual and punitive damages.

Section 1983 allows money damages on individual-capacity claims, so a prisoner's transfer does not moot those claims.

Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone · filed 2010-04-02

Mr. Abdulhaseeb also asserts that he brought his § 1983 claims against defendants in their individual capacities. Because money damages are available, mootness is not an issue with regard to those claims.

Section 1983 claims may remain live through damages claims, but nominal damages preserve them from mootness only for procedural due process violations.

Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Orange County School Board · filed 2015-05-04

“Damage claims can save a § 1983 claim from mootness, but only where such claims allege compensatory damages or nominal damages for violations of procedural due process.”

Section 1983 provides no additional remedy for a federal employee’s employment claims when Title VII is the exclusive remedy for those claims.

Coe v. National Labor Relations Board · filed 1999-03-31

The main issue remaining to be resolved is whether Coe can maintain his ... claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 & 1985, and his state law claims for violation of section 134.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes and malicious prosecution in addition to his Title VII claims. Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and the law governing this issue, the- court concludes that the answer is “No,” because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for Coe’s claims.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a distinct constitutional violation alongside ADA and Title VII claims.

Wright v. City of Tampa · filed 1998-03-26

Plaintiff is not precluded from bringing a § 1983 claim concurrent with her Title VII and ADA claims as long as the § 1983 claim is based on a distinct violation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a higher standard for liability than Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, so a verdict under a charge applying those laws does not necessarily establish Section 1983 liability.

Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department · filed 1996-07-12

We view the jury’s verdict as a finding of liability under Title VII and the NJLAD (although not necessarily under § 1983, which imposes a higher standard for liability than that provided in the charge).

Section 1983 is unavailable for federal-employment-discrimination claims because Title VII supplies the exclusive administrative and judicial remedy.

Drayton v. Veterans Administration · filed 1987-02-25

Plaintiffs claim under § 1983 must be dismissed as well. Because plaintiff was an applicant for a federal job, only 42 U.S.C. § 2000e provides a remedy for alleged discrimination. ... The Court then ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e was intended by Congress to provide "the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.”

Section 1983 applies the same discriminatory-animus inquiry as Title VII in a disparate-treatment employment case.

Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Department · filed 1981-05-07

The inquiry then under § 1983 and Title VII becomes the same.

Section 1983 uses the same substantive elements as Title VII for employment-discrimination claims when asserted as a parallel remedy.

27 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1352, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,413 Placido Rivera, Richard Gonzales, Intervenors-Appellants v. Th · filed 1982-01-11

Neither in this instance would § 1983 appear to provide an avenue for the prosecution of discrimination claims different from that available under Title VII. This Court has held that when § 1983 is used as a parallel remedy with Title VII in a discrimination suit, the elements of the substantive cause of action are the same under both statutes.

Section 1983 cannot be used to assert a Title VII-based claim against a person who is not subject to suit directly under Title VII.

David HUEBSCHEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES and Jacquelyn Rader, Defendants-Appella · filed 1983-09-13

We need not reach this question, however, because even if Title VII does not preempt section 1983 in this area, a plaintiff cannot bring an action under section 1983 based upon Title VII against a person who could not be sued directly under Title VII.

Where a plaintiff's constitutional claims are not discrete from an employment-discrimination claim actionable under Title VII, Title VII's comprehensive remedial scheme preempts a companion claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the same conduct.

Torres v. WIS. DEPT. OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES · filed 1984-08-06

Because the Court so interprets the plaintiffs' cause of action, it will preclude them from prosecuting their section 1983 count based on either an alleged violation of Title VII or a claimed infringement of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.

A Section 1983 claim cannot be maintained where it is based solely on conduct that also violates Title VII, because Title VII's comprehensive administrative and judicial remedial scheme for employment discrimination preempts a companion Section 1983 action premised on the same discriminatory conduct.

Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services · filed 1984-08-06

Because the Court so interprets the plaintiffs' cause of action, it will preclude them from prosecuting their section 1983 count based on either an alleged violation of Title VII or a claimed infringement of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a violation of a right created by Title VII, because Title VII's own comprehensive remedial scheme is the exclusive means of enforcing rights it creates.

35 Fair empl.prac.cas. 697, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,582 Henry Irby, Cross-Appellees v. Mike Sullivan, Jr., Cross-Appell · filed 1984-08-06

Therefore, we conclude that “[unimpaired effectiveness can be given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII only by holding that deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under § [1983].”

Title VII is the exclusive remedy when asserted section 1983 constitutional claims are inseparable from the same alleged employment discrimination covered by Title VII.

Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1985-05-09

The Court concludes that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for the allegedly discriminatory actions of the defendants in this case, and therefore dismisses plaintiff’s claims for relief under § 1983 and § 1985(2).

A plaintiff may not duplicate a Title VII employment-discrimination claim under Section 1983 merely by recasting the same conduct as a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

Keller v. Prince George's County Department of Social Services · filed 1985-08-19

Allowing § 1983 actions for employment discrimination to proceed solely under the Fourteenth Amendment would effectively eclipse the detailed procedures and remedies Congress specifically enacted for employment discrimination under Title VII merely because the plaintiff can show state action.

A § 1983 claim may accompany a Title VII claim only when it asserts an independent right rather than merely repackaging rights created by Title VII.

Reiter v. Center Consolidated School District No. 26-JT. · filed 1985-10-11

Thus, plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims are not independent of her Title VII claim. Title VII, therefore, constitutes the exclusive remedy in this case. Accordingly, plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims are dismissed.

A plaintiff may pursue Section 1983 remedies for employment conduct also prohibited by Title VII when that conduct independently violates the Constitution.

Polson v. Davis · filed 1986-04-25

we conclude that a plaintiff may base a section 1983 claim on actions proscribed by Title VII where those actions also violate the United States Constitution.

A state or local employee may pursue both Title VII and § 1983 when the § 1983 claim rests on a constitutional right that predates and is independent of Title VII.

Jensen v. BD. OF COUNTY COM'RS FOR SEDGWICK COUNTY · filed 1986-05-28

In the instant case the plaintiff has alleged he was discriminated against on the basis of his sex. He seeks relief under both § 1983 — alleging violation of his right to equal protection and due process — and Title VII. Because plaintiff’s right to challenge discrimination based on gender was not created by Title VII, but in fact preexisted that act, plaintiff is free to pursue his remedies under both theories.

Title VII does not preempt a state or local employee’s Section 1983 claim for violation of preexisting constitutional rights, but Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass Title VII when the only right asserted was created by Title VII.

Johnson v. Ballard · filed 1986-09-26

Congress did not intend to deprive state and local employees the opportunity to pursue remedies available to them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for redress of employment discrimination. ... Accordingly, although this court finds that a state or local employee’s preexisting remedies are not preempted by Title VII, the employee may not maintain a § 1983 action in lieu of Title VII if the only alleged deprivation is of the employee’s rights created by Title VII.

A public employee may pursue Section 1983 remedies for an independent equal-protection sex-discrimination claim alongside Title VII remedies.

Appling v. City of Brockton · filed 1986-12-08

In this case, therefore, plaintiff's equal protection claim is independent of the Title VII claim so plaintiff may seek both Title VII and § 1983 remedies.

Title VII and § 1983 claims are not mutually exclusive and may be maintained together.

Bollenbach v. Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury Central School District · filed 1987-05-08

The District defendants assert that plaintiffs cannot maintain actions under both Title VII and section 1983. This Court disagrees, finding the two statutory claims are not mutually exclusive.

A Section 1983 claim may proceed alongside a Title VII claim based on the same facts when the Section 1983 claim rests on an independent constitutional right.

Young v. Sedgwick County, Kan. · filed 1987-05-27

At a minimum, a § 1983 claim may be brought in tandem with a Title VII claim based on the same operative facts if the § 1983 claim is premised on an independent constitutional basis.

Title VII is the exclusive federal remedy for a federal employee’s employment-discrimination claim and precludes parallel § 1983 and constitutional claims.

Owens v. United States · filed 1987-06-30

Because we find that Title VII provides Owens's exclusive federal remedy, we affirm the district court's ruling to the extent it dismissed the federal constitutional and Sec. 1983 claims as to all defendants-appellants.

Title VII is not the exclusive remedy when a § 1983 employment-discrimination claim rests on independently protected constitutional rights.

Fuchilla v. Prockop · filed 1987-10-13

This argument need not detain me long because this court and others have held that relief under § 1983 is available notwithstanding the assertion of claims under Title VII in a case in which the § 1983 claim is based upon alleged violations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for retaliation based solely on conduct supporting a Title VII retaliation claim.

Long v. Laramie County Community College District Rodney Southworth Richard Williams Robert Schliske Harlan H · filed 1988-02-23

Nor does such a theory of liability for retaliatory conduct come within § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim alongside a Title VII claim arising from the same conduct.

Russell v. Moore · filed 1989-01-06

The Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because such claims may be brought with Title VII actions if rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment.

A § 1983 claim enforcing constitutional or other federal rights may proceed independently of Title VII even when the same conduct also violates Title VII.

Montoya v. City of Colorado Springs · filed 1989-05-04

Here, Montoya’s first claim alleged racial discrimination in violation both of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause and of § 1981. Therefore, even if the facts alleged by Montoya would also constitute a violation of Title VII, that statute does not preclude Montoya from prosecuting an action pursuant to § 1981 or § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to seek a remedy alongside Title VII when the employer’s conduct also violates a separate constitutional or statutory right.

Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control District · filed 1989-05-22

But when a public employer’s conduct violates both Title VII and a separate constitutional or statutory right, the injured employee may pursue a remedy under § 1983 as well as under Title VII.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a claim premised solely on a Title VII violation because Title VII supplies the exclusive remedy for that claim.

Polson v. Davis · filed 1990-02-06

Her Title VII-based claim was rejected by the district court on the ground that the enforcement provisions expressly created in Title VII provide the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination suits premised solely on its violation. We agree. The precisely drawn, detailed enforcement structure of the later statute must be deemed to preempt the earlier general remedial statute.

Section 1983 claims based on constitutional rights independent of Title VII are not preempted by Title VII, even when they could also be pursued under Title VII.

Patel v. Thomas · filed 1990-04-05

Thus, in determining whether a claim brought under § 1983 that could also be pursued under Title VII should be dismissed on the ground of preemption, our inquiry focuses on whether the claim has a substantive federal basis other than Title VII. If it does, dismissal is improper.

Section 1983 allows constitutional race discrimination claims even when Title VII also provides a remedy.

Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of Education · filed 1990-09-05

We have previously held that the comprehensive scheme provided in Title VII does not preempt section 1983, and that discrimination claims may be brought under either statute, or both.

Section 1983 does not provide an independent claim for retaliation prohibited by Title VII; Title VII provides the remedy for that conduct.

Nelms v. Montgomery County Combined Health District, Richard A. Parsells, and Melanie Cutlip · filed 1990-10-12

This proscription of retaliation cannot support an independent claim under section 1983; Title VII provides the only method for obtaining redress for such retaliatory conduct.

A § 1983 claim brought alongside a Title VII claim must reveal a legal basis independent of Title VII to avoid preclusion.

Smith v. Denver Public School Board · filed 1991-03-12

However, the possibility that the § 1983 claim may be precluded by the Title VII claim requires that the plaintiff reveal her § 1983 claim’s independent legal basis.

Section 1983 permits a claim alongside Title VII when it rests on an independent constitutional right.

Drake v. City of Fort Collins · filed 1991-03-13

Plaintiff argues that Title VII is not an exclusive remedy for his claims, and, based on recent case law, we agree. ... But a plaintiff must have an independent basis for claims outside of Title VII, "lest Congress' prescribed remedies under Title VII be undermined." Starrett, 876 F.2d at 813. ... Plaintiff, in his original complaint, alleges that his due process and equal protection rights were violated, and requests remedies for those alleged violations under Secs. 1981 and 1983. Therefore, he has alleged an independent basis for those claims. To the extent his factual allegations state a claim under these statutes, the district court erred in dismissing them.

Section 1983 cannot be used to assert violations of rights created only by Title VII.

Allen v. Denver Public School Board · filed 1991-03-26

The district court correctly held that section 1983 cannot be used to assert the violation of rights created only by Title VII.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Title VII rights against a local government employer, but it remains available for an independent Fourteenth Amendment claim.

Fauser v. Memphis Housing Authority · filed 1991-09-17

Plaintiffs claim under section 1983 for a violation of Title VII rights is precluded; Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for a violation of Title VII, but plaintiffs claim, to the extent based on the fourteenth amendment, is viable.

Section 1983 permits state or local employees to pursue intentional gender discrimination claims based on equal protection independently of Title VII, but does not remedy retaliation based solely on Title VII rights.

Moche v. City University of New York · filed 1992-01-02

Therefore, the plaintiff’s retaliation claims cannot be brought under § 1983 because they could have been remedied here exclusively through Title VII. ... These claims of intentional discrimination are actionable under § 1983 as violations of the Equal Protection Clause and stand independently of Title VII.

Section 1983 claims based on rights independent of Title VII may proceed alongside Title VII claims even when both arise from the same facts.

Notari v. Denver Water Department · filed 1992-07-29

We emphasize that the basis of a § 1983 claim may be independent of Title VII even if the claims arise from the same factual allegations and even if the conduct alleged in the § 1983 claim also violates Title VII.

Title VII does not preempt a Section 1983 constitutional claim based on the same incident.

Wilson v. Ut Health Center, Ut System Police Department, Etc. · filed 1992-10-06

This claim resembles Wilson’s Title VII claim, but Title VII does not preempt a collateral section 1983 action based on the same incident.

Section 1983 remains available to state and local employees for constitutional discrimination claims alongside Title VII remedies.

Brown v. Polk County, Iowa · filed 1992-12-22

The legislative history of the 1972 amendment illustrates Congress’ intention to provide state and local employees with remedies under both Title VII and § 1983. ... Brown makes separate claims under both Title VII and § 1983; Title VII is not his exclusive remedy.

Section 1983 may accompany a Title VII claim when it rests on an independent constitutional violation or federal statutory right; a Title VII violation alone does not support the claim.

Arvinger v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore · filed 1993-01-15

This Court reads Keller to stand for the proposition that Title VII does not bar a concurrent § 1983 claim that is grounded upon an independent constitutional violation or a federal statutory right. ... Thus, Arvinger has no independent First Amendment claim upon which his § 1983 action can be based.

Section 1983 remains available for employment discrimination claims after the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the amended Title VII does not preempt it.

Beardsley v. Isom · filed 1993-03-10

Just as the Court of Appeals found no intent for the 1972 amendments to Title VII to preempt § 1983 in Keller and Dwyer, neither the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 nor its legislative history indicate any intent by Congress or the President for the newly amended Title VII to preempt § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass Title VII’s administrative procedures when the claim lacks an independent basis apart from the Title VII employment claim.

Rivera v. Department of Justice · filed 1993-04-30

Therefore, because section 1983 may not be used to bypass the administrative measures of Title VII, which now grants plaintiff comprehensive remedies, any suit against Santiago-Martinez under section 1983 is barred by Title VII.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce employment rights created by Title VII because Title VII provides a comprehensive remedial system for those rights.

Berkowski v. St. Louis County Board of Election Commissioners · filed 1993-06-08

Foster holds that because Title VII provides a comprehensive remedial system for the enforcement of employment rights created thereunder, those employment rights cannot be enforced through § 1983. ... The trial court did not err in dismissing Count III.

Section 1983 provides a parallel remedy to Title VII for employment harassment based on national origin, applying the same elements of proof as racial or sexual hostile-work-environment claims.

Boutros v. Canton Regional Transit Authority · filed 1993-08-18

To the extent, therefore, that Rabidue and Risinger state the elements necessary to state a claim of racially or sexually hostile work environments under § 1983 as companion claims to those made under Title VII, a national origin harassment claim satisfying those same elements is equally actionable under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on rights arising under law other than Title VII despite a concurrent Title VII claim, but cannot be used to obtain advantages unavailable under Title VII for rights protected exclusively by that statute.

Jeannette Saulpaugh and Gregory M. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital · filed 1993-08-27

A plaintiff cannot use Section 1983 to gain perceived advantages not available to a Title VII claimant, see Day, 749 F.2d at 1204, but a plaintiff can assert a claim under Section 1983 if some law other than Title VII is the source of the right alleged to have been denied.

Section 1983 permits a concurrent Title VII claimant to enforce rights arising under another law, but cannot be used merely to obtain advantages unavailable under Title VII.

Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital · filed 1993-08-27

A plaintiff cannot use Section 1983 to gain perceived advantages not available to a Title VII claimant, ... but a plaintiff can assert a claim under Section 1983 if some law other than Title VII is the source of the right alleged to have been denied.

In the Fifth Circuit, § 1983 supplies an alternative employment-discrimination remedy only when the alleged violation rests on grounds different from those available under Title VII or the ADA.

Thompson v. City of Arlington, Tex. · filed 1993-11-17

As part of her first cause of action, plaintiff additionally alleges that defendants are liable under § 1983 for alleged violations of Title VII and the ADA. In the Fifth Circuit, specific consideration of such an alternate remedy for employment discrimination is appropriate only if a violation can be made out on grounds different from those available under the employment discrimination statutes. ... Because plaintiff has not asserted any such distinction, the court considers specifically only her ADA and Title VII claims. Plaintiffs conclusionary allegations that she is entitled to recovery under § 1983 for alleged violations of Title VII and the ADA are without legal merit.

Section 1983 permits an intentional sex discrimination claim arising from employment even when the same conduct also supports a Title VII claim.

Dirksen v. City of Springfield · filed 1994-02-09

Plaintiff established both that the conditions of her employment were affected on account of her sex (Title VII) and that she was intentionally discriminated against (§ 1983). Though the elements and evidence used to prove the Title VII and § 1983 action may be similar, the two causes of action are not mutually exclusive.

Section 1983 remains available to public employees for employment discrimination claims despite the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments to Title VII.

Stoner v. Department of Agriculture · filed 1994-03-17

Nothing in the purposes of the 1991 Civil Rights Act supports a finding that Congress intended to bar public employees from using 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 remains available to public employees for employment discrimination claims alongside Title VII after the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Beardsley v. Webb · filed 1994-07-26

Nothing in the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 or in its legislative history contradicts the Court's recognition that Title VII does not supplant Sec. 1983.

A public employee alleging a constitutional violation through employment discrimination may sue under § 1983 without also pleading a Title VII claim.

Annis v. County of Westchester, New York Ernest J. Colaneri and Anthony M. Mosca · filed 1994-09-22

We therefore hold that an employment discrimination plaintiff alleging the violation of a constitutional right may bring suit under § 1983 alone, and is not required to plead concurrently a violation of Title VII.

Section 1983 remedies are not precluded by later Title VII amendments for conduct that occurred before those amendments.

Lonsdorf v. Ted Seefeldt, Jim Jenkins, Roger Johnson, Jerry Pionkowski, Jack Deyong, Group Health Cooperative, · filed 1995-02-15

We observe that the Sea Clammers doctrine does not apply because the conduct in question in this case occurred prior to the amendments to Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for an alleged Fourteenth Amendment employment discrimination claim when the plaintiff could have brought a Title VII action.

Hughes v. Bedsole · filed 1995-03-15

Hughes cannot bring an action under Sec. 1983 for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights because Hughes originally could have instituted a Title VII cause of action.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to seek relief for a separate constitutional or statutory violation even when the employer’s conduct also violates Title VII.

Lightner v. CITY OF ARITON, ALABAMA · filed 1995-03-27

While Title VII provides the sole remedy for violations of its own terms, when a public employer’s conduct violates both Title VII and a separate constitutional or statutory right the injured employee may pursue a remedy under section 1983 in addition to a Title VII remedy.

Section 1983 cannot be used to circumvent Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement for an employment discrimination claim.

McCaslin v. Cornhusker State Industries · filed 1995-04-04

We agree with the district court that McCaslin may not circumvent the exhaustion requirement of Title VII by bringing the action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims based solely on rights created by Title VII.

Onan v. County of Roanoke, Va. · filed 1995-04-21

For the same reason, a Sec. 1983 action may not be based solely on a violation of rights created by Title VII.

Section 1983 provides an independent remedy for constitutional employment discrimination by state or municipal employers even when Title VII also provides relief.

Espada v. Woodroffe · filed 1995-07-17

This Court finds that the rationale of these decisions better reflects the intent of Congress that § 1983 endure as a separate remedy from Title VII employment discrimination, and that it continue to provide plaintiffs with an independent cause of action through which they can seek redress of constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 permits a separate employment discrimination claim when a law other than Title VII supplies the right allegedly violated.

Cohen v. Litt · filed 1995-12-12

She may also plead a separate claim under § 1983, since, under Second Circuit law, a plaintiff can assert a claim under § 1983, provided that some law other than Title VII is the source of the right allegedly infringed.

Section 1983 does not provide an additional remedy for employment discrimination based on the same acts alleged under Title VII when no separate constitutional or statutory right is identified.

Jackson v. City of Atlanta · filed 1996-01-24

Consequently, Sec. 1983 is not available to Jackson for either alternative or additional relief. As Jackson thus has no access to a remedy under Sec. 1983, it follows that he may not assert such a claim. Thus, Jackson's putative Sec. 1983 claims, arising as they do from precisely the same allegedly discriminatory acts as do his Title VII claims, should have been dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for intentional employment discrimination by a municipality that violates equal protection, and Title VII does not preempt that remedy after the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Carpenter v. City of Northlake · filed 1996-11-26

The § 1983 claims will not be dismissed as preempted by Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for Fourteenth Amendment employment discrimination when the plaintiff could have brought a Title VII action.

Burtnick v. McLean · filed 1997-01-29

In the footnote cited, the Fourth Circuit held, without citation to Keller, that the fact that Hughes originally could have instituted a Title VII cause of action precluded an action under Section 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, citing, inter alia, Zombro and Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979). ... Given that situation, the Court feels constrained to follow the more recent pronouncement of the Fourth Circuit in Hughes v. Bedsole. Thus, the Court will enter summary judgment against the plaintiff on all claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used for employment retaliation claims for which Title VII provides the exclusive remedy.

Gamper v. STATE OF ALABAMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS · filed 1997-02-05

To the extent the plaintiff relies on allegations of retaliation to support his § 1983 claim, such reliance is misplaced. A § 1983 claim cannot be predicated on allegations of retaliation; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for such claims.

Section 1983 permits an employment discrimination claim alongside Title VII when the same conduct violates a separate constitutional right.

Chacko v. Texas a & M University · filed 1997-04-04

Although Chacko’s amended complaint relies upon the same background facts, she is not foreclosed from proceeding under § 1983 because she relies on a recognized constitutional right separate and independent from Title VII.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to pursue a claim for sex discrimination or sexual harassment that violates the Equal Protection Clause alongside a Title VII claim based on the same conduct.

Southard v. Texas Board of Criminal Justice · filed 1997-06-13

Plaintiffs' allegations of sex discrimination and sexual misconduct assert claims under sections 1983 and 1985(3) that are not preempted by Title VII.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass Title VII’s procedural requirements for an employment discrimination claim.

Middlebrooks v. Coughlin · filed 1997-07-16

In Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979), the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1985 could not be used to redress violations of Title VII. ... This court finds that the same reasoning applies to section § 1983 as applied to section 1985 in Novotny.

The 1991 amendments to Title VII do not bar a § 1983 suit for sexual harassment.

Chapin v. University of Massachusetts at Lowell · filed 1997-09-11

The court agrees with the Espada court, and with the reasoning of the cases it cites, and holds that the 1991 amendments to Title VII do not prevent a § 1983 suit for sexual harassment.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to pursue a discrimination claim alongside a Title VII claim; Title VII is not the exclusive remedy for discrimination by state or municipal employers.

Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, FL · filed 1997-11-05

We expressly reject the district court's apparent assumption that Title VII is an exclusive remedy for discrimination by state and municipal employers. We have assumed otherwise in our prior cases. See Cross v. State of Ala., 49 F.3d 1490, 1507 (11th Cir.1995) (allowing parallel section 1983 and Title VII claims in public employment context).

Section 1983 permits an employment discrimination claim based on an independent Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation even when the Title VII charge is untimely.

Arrington v. Cobb County · filed 1998-04-24

Arrington, however, does not rest her § 1983 Fire Chief claim on any alleged violation of Title VII. Instead, Arrington satisfies the first element of § 1983 by alleging that Hightower violated her Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection.

Section 1983 claims based on alleged discrimination or retaliation in federal employment are preempted by Title VII.

Denise A.K. Dung, Plaintiff-Ppellant v. Marvin T. Runyon, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service · filed 1998-05-08

As Dung's constitutional and § 1983 claims are based upon employment actions taken by her supervisors and the Postal Service allegedly due to either discrimination or reprisal, they are preempted by Title VII.

Section 1983 equal protection actions alleging alienage discrimination are not preempted by Title VII.

Chacko v. Texas A & M · filed 1998-06-19

We find the argument that the § 1983 equal protection action is preempted by Title VII to be equally without merit.

Section 1983 permits an employment discrimination claim based on a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation even when a Title VII claim is untimely.

Arrington v. Cobb County · filed 1998-07-01

Arrington, however, does not rest her § 1983 Fire Chief claim on any alleged violation of Title VII. Instead, Arrington satisfies the first element of § 1983 by alleging that Hightower violated her Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection.

Section 1983 permits Equal Protection claims for employment discrimination even when Title VII also provides a remedy.

Vandermeer v. Douglas County · filed 1998-07-15

We note that the defendants also argued that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims should be dismissed because they are preempted by Title VII. This argument is without merit. The Ninth Circuit has held that § 1983 claims based on violations of the Equal Protection Clause are not preempted by Title VII.

Section 1983 remains available for constitutional claims of public sector employment discrimination alongside Title VII and § 1981 after the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1998-08-03

For these reasons, we conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for public sector employment discrimination, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983.