42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 by state actors.

McGovern v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2009-01-28

Congress, in promulgating § 1983 over a century ago, established that section as the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 by state actors.

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violations of § 1981 rights by state actors, including officials sued in their individual capacities.

Rehman v. State University of New York at Stony Brook · filed 2009-02-06

Accordingly, the plaintiff does not have an independent § 1981 claim against any of the defendants and the Court will construe the plaintiffs § 1981 claims as brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the cause of action when a state actor violates rights protected by § 1981.

Lorenzi v. Connecticut Judicial Branch · filed 2009-06-04

The defendants correctly point out that when a person’s rights protected by § 1981 are violated by a state actor (as opposed to a private person), the aggrieved party has a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for civil rights violations, including race discrimination, by a state agency.

Ford v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 2010-03-26

The exclusive remedy for relief from a state agency for civil rights violations, including race discrimination, is § 1983.

Section 1983 is the required means to bring a § 1981 retaliation claim against a state actor.

DELGADO-O'NEIL v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2010-09-17

Where the employer is a state ■ actor, as is the case here, a retaliation claim under § 1981 must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of Section 1981 rights by state actors.

Bermudez v. City of New York · filed 2011-03-25

When the defendant is a state actor, Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of rights guaranteed under Section 1981.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal remedy for violations of Section 1981 rights by state actors, government entities, and municipalities.

De v. City of Chicago · filed 2012-12-14

In cases in which the defendant is a state actor, government entity, or municipality, a cause of action to vindicate the rights secured by § 1981 must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of Section 1981 by state actors, including individual officials.

Hogan ex rel. J.H. v. County of Lewis · filed 2013-03-08

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims against the Lewis County Defendants under § 1981 are barred by the exclusive remedial provision of § 1983, and the Court grants the Lewis County Defendants’ Motion for summary judgement as to these claims.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for violations of state law absent a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Simon v. Taylor · filed 2013-10-29

In any event, even if the regulations did not authorize the Racing Commission to appoint multiple persons to serve as "the presiding officer” for the dispute in this case, the Racing Commission's decision to do so would not give rise to a property interest the due-process clause protects; at most, there would be a violation of state law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of Section 1981 committed by state actors.

Campbell v. Forest Preserve District · filed 2014-05-15

§ 1983 remains the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state actors.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for enforcing § 1981 rights against state actors.

Buntin v. City of Boston · filed 2016-09-16

This court agrees with the Circuit majority that § 1981(c) does not overrule the holding of Jett and that § 1983 therefore remains the exclusive remedy for civil rights violations by state actors.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for alleged violations of state law.

Harris v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't · filed 2017-04-11

Moreover § 1983 does not provide a remedy for alleged violations of state law, which is all that Harris’s § 441.265 claim alleges here.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for § 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims against state actors.

Jenkins v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-11-21

The District is correct that the Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not § 1981, provides the exclusive remedy for discrimination and retaliation claims when the alleged violation is by a state actor.

Section 1983 provides the remedy for Section 1981 violations committed by state actors.

Tomas v. State · filed 2018-03-27

“[Section] 1981 itself provides a remedy for violations committed by private actors, but an injured party must resort to § 1983 to obtain relief for violations committed by state actors.” ... She does not otherwise argue that there is a factual question as to hostile work environment, and the discrimination and retaliation claims would rise and fall as asserted under § 1983. This Court has already addressed the merits of her section 1983 claims. Thus, this Court grants summary judgment in favor of defendants on Counts III and IV.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of § 1981 rights by state actors.

Thompson v. Marcantano · filed 2019-08-28

Plaintiff alleges that a state actor violated his civil rights. Therefore, his exclusive federal damages remedy lies in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of Section 1981 by state actors.

A.J. v. LANCASTER COUNTY · filed 2019-10-11

A.J.’s § 1981 claim is precluded by the holding in McGovern. A.J.’s remedy is to pursue any allegations pursuant to § 1983, not § 1981.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of Section 1981 committed by state actors.

Washington v. Milwaukee County · filed 2020-01-14

Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is “the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state actors.” Id. at 671. Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim against Milwaukee County under § 1981, and the County is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on that claim.

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violations of § 1981 rights by state actors.

Mahoney v. Owens · filed 2020-06-16

Holt and Mahoney sued Owens under § 1981, but “§ 1981 does not provide an implicit cause of action against state actors; therefore, § 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation by state actors of the rights guaranteed under § 1981.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1288 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009). Holt and Mahoney did not plead a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state actors.

Chambers v. Puff · filed 2020-09-02

State Defendants cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 since it does not create a private right of action against state actors. ... Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is “the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state actors.” Id.

Section 1983 is the exclusive mechanism for enforcing § 1981 rights against state actors.

Daugherty v. Unknown Individuals · filed 2020-10-20

Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim against Louisville Metro and Conrad fails because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the exclusive mechanism for bringing suits against state actors for violation of rights guaranteed by § 1981.

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of Section 1981 rights by state governmental units.

WILLIAMS v. TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD · filed 2020-12-09

Therefore, because Plaintiff does not bring a claim under Section 1983, the Court will dismiss with prejudice her Section 1981 claims against Lakewood for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy against state actors for violations of rights protected by Section 1981.

Dale v. City of Paris · filed 2020-12-22

However, it has clarified that, where an action is brought “against state actors alleging violation of the rights declared in § 1981,” the exclusive remedy is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As such, the individual defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Dale’s Section 1981 claims.

Section 1983 remains available for First Amendment claims despite the Equal Access Act’s implied private cause of action.

East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City School District · filed 1999-10-06

The court rejects defendants’ view that plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims pleaded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are preempted by the Equal Access Act, with its implied private cause of action.

Section 1983 claims based on the same acts as a Copyright Act claim are preempted by the Copyright Act.

MOLINELLI-FREYTES v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 2010-07-27

Thus, the Court finds that, when Congress enacted the Copyright Act, it intended for the Act to preempt § 1983 claims based upon the same actions underlying the Copyright Act claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims (Docket No. 186) is GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a suggestive lineup or deprivation of Miranda rights when the resulting evidence was not used to the defendant’s prejudice at trial.

Lemons v. Lewis · filed 1997-12-11

In addition, the district court correctly determined that Mr. Lemons’ allegations of a suggestive lineup and deprivation of his Miranda rights are not actionable under section 1983 where, as here, improperly obtained evidence was not used to defendant’s prejudice at trial.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action merely because officers fail to give Miranda warnings or continue questioning after a request for counsel.

Jones v. Cannon · filed 1999-05-11

We agree with the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits that failing to follow Miranda procedures triggers the prophylactic protection of the exclusion of evidence, but does not violate any substantive Fifth Amendment right such that a cause of action for money damages under § 1983 is created.

Section 1983 provides no claim based solely on a Miranda violation because exclusion of compelled testimony is the only remedy.

Cota v. Chapa · filed 2001-02-02

The district court dismissed Cota’s § 1983 claim challenging his post-arrest interrogation on the ground that “the only remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled testimony arising therefrom.” That is clearly the law of this Circuit.

Section 1983 does not provide a Fifth Amendment claim for a violation of Miranda safeguards alone; the police conduct must violate the underlying constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Cooper v. Dupnik · filed 1992-05-05

Our holding is consistent with the teaching of Michigan v. Tucker, and it does not create a Fifth Amendment cause of action under § 1983 for conduct that merely violates Miranda safeguards without also trespassing on the actual Constitutional right against self-incrimination that those safeguards are designed to protect.

Section 1983 allows damages when a confession obtained without Miranda warnings is used against a defendant in pretrial criminal proceedings.

Sornberger, Scott v. City of Knoxville · filed 2006-01-20

This use of Teresa’s confession, if the confession is indeed found to have been elicited without Miranda warnings, allows a suit for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for a violation of Miranda safeguards, even when the resulting statements were admitted at trial.

Hannon v. Sanner · filed 2006-03-28

The admission of Hannon’s statements in a criminal case did not cause a deprivation of any “right” secured by the Constitution, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An alleged violation of Miranda rights does not give rise to a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Wright v. Dodd · filed 2011-08-18

Wright’s allegation that his Miranda rights were violated does not give rise to a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for a Miranda violation; the remedy is exclusion of improperly obtained evidence at trial.

Myers v. County of Nassau · filed 2011-10-07

As to any Miranda claim, such violations are, as noted above, properly redressed by the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence at trial; and not by way of an action pursuant to Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a Miranda violation.

Dollar v. Coweta County Sheriff Office · filed 2011-11-10

Additionally, a claim for a Miranda violation is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of prophylactic Miranda procedures absent a constitutional violation.

Donnie Foster v. Carroll County · filed 2012-11-06

However, regardless of whether any officers were required to advise Foster of his Miranda rights, this claim does not amount to a cognizable constitutional violation under § 1983, because there is no allegation that Foster made a statement that implicated his constitutional right to protection against self-incrimination. ... Violations of the prophylactic Miranda procedures do not amount to violations of the Constitution itself and, as such, fail to raise a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a Miranda violation.

Cooper v. City of New Rochelle · filed 2013-02-26

Insofar as Smith’s claim for unlawful stop, detention, and search includes a claim for unlawful interrogation based on the Fifth Amendment, see Compl. ¶¶ 67-68, Miranda violations are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a Miranda violation without coerced statements.

Dowell v. Lincoln County · filed 2013-02-26

As to the alleged Miranda violations, these are insufficient to support a § 1983 claim without also showing that any statements were coerced.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights claim for a violation of Miranda rights during custodial interrogation.

Garcia v. Semple · filed 2019-10-30

To the extent that Garcia is claiming that Trooper Stebbins infringed on his right to counsel by not honoring the invocation of his right to an attorney under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),1 the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation recognized in Miranda is merely a procedural safeguard whether it arises under the Fifth or Sixth Amendment and a violation of Miranda rights does not give rise to a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim against an officer who obtained an un-Mirandized statement when officials use that statement to prove a charge at the defendant’s criminal trial.

Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2021-01-15

We hold only that where government officials introduce an un-Mirandized statement to prove a criminal charge at a criminal trial against a defendant, a § 1983 claim may lie against the officer who took the statement.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy against persons acting under color of state law, but does not create a right to money damages against the federal government.

Ganaway v. United States · filed 2014-02-10

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also does not create a right “against the federal government for money damages,” id., but is instead a damages remedy against persons acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against the federal government.

Fredyma v. IRS · filed 1998-01-06

Count IV of Fredyma’s complaint, which attempts to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, clearly does not provide a cause of action against the federal government.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the federal government.

Mitchell v. United States Department of Commerce · filed 2003-07-09

However, the district court also properly pointed out that the federal government is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the federal government.

Sullivan v. United States · filed 2004-01-30

The federal government is not subject to suit under § 1983, Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir.1987), and § 2241 is a vehicle not for challenging prison conditions, but for challenging matters concerning the execution of a sentence such as the computation of good-time credits.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against the federal government.

Smith v. United States · filed 2006-02-07

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against the federal government, and jurisdiction over section 1983 claims lies exclusively in the district courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against the federal government.

Punchard v. United States Bureau of Land Management · filed 2006-05-18

The federal government is not subject to suit under § 1983; instead, Punchard’s claim is governed by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named A gents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action against federal actors in their individual capacities for deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not apply to the federal government.

London v. Federal Bureau of Investigations · filed 2010-08-03

Donavan Amorris London, proceeding pro se, has sued the FBI under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not apply to the federal government, Affiliated Professional Home Health Care Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1999).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against the federal government or its agents.

Lubrano v. United States · filed 2010-11-17

Based on the statute’s reference to state actors, it is well-settled that Section 1983 does not provide an avenue to assert causes of action against the federal government or its agents.

Section 1983 applies to actions by state and local entities, not the United States government.

Berry v. United States · filed 2017-11-22

Mr. Berry’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law because § 1983 claims apply only to actions by state and local entities and not the United States government.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the United States, which is not a person under the statute; a claim also requires action under color of state law.

Hopkins v. Aila · filed 2019-10-16

First, the United States is not a “person” for purposes of section 1983. ... Second, Plaintiff fails to allege the United States was “acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not provide relief against the federal government.

Peterson v. United States · filed 2020-04-09

In her complaint, the plaintiff cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that provision only provides for relief against a state or its instrumentalities, and not the federal government.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against the federal government.

Thigpen v. Hemingway · filed 2020-04-13

Because the federal government is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conditions-of-confinement claims by a federal prisoner is properly brought in a civil action under Bivens.

Section 1983 does not authorize a cause of action against the federal government.

Barker v. United States Department of the Army · filed 2020-04-20

To the extent the Feres doctrine does not function to bar the § 1983 claim, that claim is barred because § 1983 does not authorize a cause of action against the federal government.

A guardian ad litem’s failure to exercise independent professional judgment does not make her a state actor under § 1983 without evidence of an actual conspiracy with state actors.

Schaffrath on Behalf of RJJ v. Thomas · filed 1998-01-28

In the absence of evidence that Trask abandoned her duty of professional loyalty to R.J.H. by engaging in an actual conspiracy with state actors to deprive him of constitutional rights, the fact that Trask may have failed her duty to exercise independent, professional judgment does not make her a state actor.

A guardian ad litem appointed to represent a child’s best interests in a custody proceeding is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Winchester v. Little · filed 1998-12-31

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the best interest of a child in a custody proceeding is not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not cover a Washington court-appointed guardian ad litem performing the statutory roles of child advocate and independent investigator because those functions are not state action.

Kirtley v. Rainey · filed 2003-04-22

We must decide whether a state-appointed guardian ad litem ("guardian") acts under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Applying the several fact-sensitive tests recognized by this Court, we conclude that the Guardian's function does not qualify as state action and therefore affirm the district court.

Section 1983 permits damages against a private store when its managers act in concert with police under a customary plan that results in detention without probable cause.

Virdie L. Smith v. Brookshire Brothers, Inc. · filed 1975-09-15

We believe that the district court was not clearly erroneous in his finding from such evidence that a plan existed which made the defendant-appellant an actor under color of law and thus liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A guardian ad litem is not a state actor under § 1983 because the guardian owes undivided loyalty to the minor rather than the state.

Bangerter v. Roach · filed 2012-03-13

As the district court noted, guardians ad litem are not state actors for purposes of § 1983 because they give their “undivided loyalty to the minor, not the state.”

Guardians ad litem are not state actors for purposes of § 1983 because their loyalty runs to the minor rather than the state.

Morkel v. Davis · filed 2013-03-15

As to Peterson, guardians ad litem are not state actors for purposes of § 1983 because they give their “undivided loyalty to the minor, not the state.” ... Consequently, Peterson is not subject to suit under § 1983, and dismissal was appropriate.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a parole board because a parole board is not a person under the statute.

Calvin v. Kansas Parole Board · filed 1998-02-05

A parole board is not a “person” for purposes of suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a school board and its members acting in their official capacity.

O'hern v. School District Of Springfield R-12 · filed 1978-07-06

In Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, --- U.S. ----, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Court held that a school board and its members acting in their official capacity were subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the judgment of the district court on Count I is vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Monell.

Section 1983 permits a county school board to be sued for alleged violations of federal rights.

Smith v. Dallas County Board of Education · filed 1979-12-10

Therefore, the Dallas County School Board is properly named as a defendant in this suit.

Section 1983 remains available for further redress after a litigant uses state certiorari review to challenge an alleged procedural due process violation.

Guerrero v. City of Kenosha Housing Authority · filed 2011-09-21

Thus, although Guerrero must avail herself of the certiorari process to challenge any violations of her procedural due process rights, she retains the right to seek further redress if necessary via a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides an independent damages remedy for alleged procedural due process violations in a rezoning process, regardless of the status of a state judicial review action.

Luck v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1990-01-18

Regardless of the status of the C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action, plaintiffs complaint sufficiently stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides an independent federal remedy for challenging rezoning actions if, as here, a plaintiff seeks money damages to vindicate alleged procedural due process violations in the rezoning process.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for unconstitutional state action even when state law also affords relief; the plaintiff need not seek the state remedy first.

Schall v. Joyce · filed 1989-09-15

And it has been established at least since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy to those injured by unconstitutional state action even if “the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.” 365 U.S. at 183, 81 S.Ct. at 482.

Limited state administrative remedies do not preclude a Section 1983 plaintiff from seeking additional compensatory damages in federal court when the agency lacked power to award them.

Healy v. Town of Pembroke Park · filed 1987-11-05

Therefore, the court finds that given the intent of broad constructions and expansive use of Sec. 1983 and its attendant remedies, it must be concluded that the limited state administrative remedies which were made available to the plaintiffs as a result of the unfair labor practice charge filed by their union, does not restrict or preclude their attempt to become whole by seeking additional damages in the federal forum.

The availability of a state-law remedy does not negate a Section 1983 remedy when the plaintiff alleges and proves deprivation under color of state law of a federally protected right.

Findeisen v. North East Independent School District · filed 1984-12-26

Accordingly, the fact that a state actor’s acts may be remedied by recourse to state law does not negate the availability of the § 1983 remedy, provided the victim alleges and proves a violation, under color of state law, of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 provides a federal damages remedy for injuries caused by deprivation of constitutional rights, not for tortious conduct alone, and it supplements state-law remedies.

Wells v. County of Valencia · filed 1982-04-13

The federal remedy for damages arising out of a constitutional violation by a person acting under color of state law is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Section 1983 is only intended to compensate for injuries caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978); it is not intended to be a remedy for tortious conduct, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). ... It is beyond dispute that the federal remedy under Section 1983 for deprivation of constitutional rights is supplementary to a state remedy. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975); Lopez v. Williams, 372 F.Supp. 1279 (S.D.Ohio 1973), aff’d, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975).

Section 1983 may provide a supplementary ground for relief alongside the Railway Labor Act in this case, where no union is involved and no administrative procedure under that Act is circumvented.

Hodges v. Tomberlin · filed 1980-12-12

While the Court certainly does not hold that § 1983 is available with respect to all claims cognizable under the Railway Labor Act, I find no firm basis for concluding that it cannot be applied to the present case where no union is now involved and no administrative procedure under the Act circumvented. Instead, the Court concludes that the proper approach is to proceed with resolution of both claims, while attempting to resolve any conflicts which may develop in light of the Congressional intent behind each measure.

Section 1983 permits federal courts to hear constitutional challenges to institutional treatment even when similar remedies may be available in state forums.

McRedmond v. Wilson · filed 1976-02-02

Indeed, § 1983 challenges to the constitutionality of institutional treatment of inmates, including juveniles and mental patients, are now routinely heard by federal courts, see ... even though, as here, similar challenges might have been asserted in state forums by relying upon state due process provisions or statutes promising in general terms “care,” “treatment,” and the like.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal remedy in addition to pertinent state remedies, but its existence does not require federal courts to hear every suit alleging an unconstitutional deprivation.

Billie K. FREEMAN, Guardian of Terry Freeman et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Almon FLAKE et al. · filed 1971-09-28

The remedy provided by Sec. 1983 is supplementary to any pertinent state remedy. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492. The proliferation of litigation resulting from the expanded use of Sec. 1983 is apparent to anyone familiar with the reported decisions of the courts of the United States. The existence of the Sec. 1983 remedy does not require that federal courts entertain all suits in which unconstitutional deprivations are asserted. A federal constitutional question must exist "not in mere form, but in substance, and not in mere assertion, but in essence and effect." Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 252 U.S. 388, 397, 40 S.Ct. 404, 408, 64 L.Ed. 626. ... Complaints which are based on nothing more than school regulations of the length of a male student's hair do not "directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values" and are not cognizable in federal courts under the principles stated in Epperson v. Arkansas.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy supplementary to state remedies, so a plaintiff need not first pursue and have a state remedy denied before invoking the federal remedy.

Lucia v. Duggan · filed 1969-08-26

“The federal remedy (42 U.S.C. § 1983) is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal remedy and does not require a plaintiff to pursue the same claim in state court first, but separate state-law claims may support abstention.

Reid v. Board of Education of New York · filed 1971-12-14

In holding that appellants must resort to the New York courts for initial resolution of available state claims, we have fully considered Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 and McNeese v. Board of Education, supra, which held that § 1983 provides a supplementary remedy and that “assertion of a federal claim in a federal court [need not] await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state court.” 373 U.S. at 6.72, 83 S.Ct. at 1436. But, the state law claims of appellants here are separate and distinct from the rights asserted as a basis for their federal claims. This is not a case where the state claims, although not based upon a state remedy for a federally-provided right, are grounded upon state constitutional rights which are merely counterparts for the federal rights asserted. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971).

Section 1983 creates a federal claim that is unaffected by the availability of state-court remedies for testing a constitutional right.

Norman Strung and Priscilla A. Strung v. L. D. W. Anderson · filed 1971-12-15

The argument is unsound because the federal claim created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is unaffected by the availability of remedies in a state court to test a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a federal action to litigate constitutional issues that were neither litigated nor decided in prior state proceedings.

Alsager v. DISTRICT COURT OF POLK CTY., IOWA,(JD) · filed 1974-11-12

Because the constitutional issues presently urged before this Court were neither litigated nor decided on the state level, there is no barrier to their litigation here in an action under Section 1983.

A plaintiff may invoke § 1983 without first pursuing an available state remedy when the challenged conduct infringes federal constitutional rights.

Child v. Beame · filed 1976-02-20

It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked (under the Civil Rights Act).

A federal plaintiff may commence a § 1983 action without first seeking relief in state court because exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite.

Redhail v. Zablocki · filed 1976-08-31

Nor is there any requirement that a federal plaintiff in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such as Redhail, first apply to state courts for relief.

A state workers' compensation exclusive-remedy provision cannot limit Section 1983 liability for injuries caused by an equal-protection violation.

Hayes v. Johnson · filed 1983-11-04

For the reasons stated below,' the court concludes that plaintiffs claim for violation of due process fails' to state a cause of action, but that the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act can not serve to limit the liability of the defendants for any injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of the alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

The availability of a state or local damages remedy neither forecloses nor detracts from a viable section 1983 claim against defendants covered by the statute.

Henderson v. District of Columbia · filed 1985-05-31

Second, the fact that Henderson could have sued for false arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, etc., under District of Columbia law does not detract from the merit of bringing an action under § 1983. In a case such as this, the fact that state or municipal law may provide a damage remedy neither forecloses nor detracts from the viability of § 1983 claims.

The existence of a state tort remedy does not preclude a section 1983 claim when an intentional tort committed under color of state law also violates the Constitution.

Borek v. Town of McLeansboro · filed 1985-05-24

Defendants’ contention that a tort committed under color of state law does not present an actionable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim under any circumstances must be rejected. The Seventh Circuit, while recognizing that not every tort committed under color of state law is actionable in federal court, has repeatedly refused to hold that the mere existence of a state tort remedy precludes a § 1983 claim for constitutional violations arising out of the same circumstances.

The availability of a state tort action does not by itself bar a federal § 1983 claim.

Cole v. Williams · filed 1985-10-04

The court does not believe that the law yet is that plaintiffs cannot sue in federal court under section 1983 for the mere reason that they could also sue the defendants in state court, and the court does not believe that the cases cited hold that.

A substantive-due-process claim under § 1983 may proceed despite the availability of a parallel state tort remedy.

Gilmere v. City Of Atlanta · filed 1985-10-15

We too conclude that, notwithstanding Parratt, the substantive due process claim established in this case may be asserted in federal court regardless of the existence of a parallel state tort remedy.

Section 1983 does not require completion of state administrative proceedings before suit is commenced.

Lenihan v. City of New York · filed 1986-07-14

Nor were they a prerequisite to commencing an action under section 1983.

The availability of a state tort remedy does not bar a § 1983 due-process claim challenging an established state procedure.

Sanders v. Kennedy · filed 1986-07-14

The availability of a state tort remedy does not bar due process claims brought under section 1983 in cases where a plaintiff is challenging an established state procedure.

Parratt's limitation on Section 1983 suits does not apply to intentional liberty deprivations rising to substantive due-process violations, so an available state tort remedy does not bar federal relief.

Mcrorie v. Shimoda · filed 1986-07-28

In sum, the Supreme Court limitations on section 1983 suits announced in Parratt do not apply to intentional deprivations of liberty interests that rise to the level of substantive due process violations.

A plaintiff challenging completed state administrative action need not exhaust available state judicial review before seeking § 1983 relief in federal court when no state proceeding is pending.

John Hall Thomas v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1987-01-08

A person who contends that his constitutional rights have been violated by a state administrative proceeding is not required to resort to an appeal to state courts before seeking relief in a federal forum.

Available state administrative remedies do not bar a § 1983 claim alleging intentional deprivation of substantive First Amendment rights under color of state law.

Labov v. Lalley · filed 1987-01-16

Fairly read, the complaints allege a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of interests in employment and employment benefits created by state law, in retaliation for the exercise of rights of association protected by the first amendment. Thus they charge intentional substantive violations of federally-protected liberty interests, not random and unauthorized deprivations of state-created property interests. ... Neither ... Parratt v. Taylor ... nor its progeny ... deal with intentional deprivations of federal substantive liberty interests protected by the first amendment.

Section 1983 supplies a federal remedy supplementary to state remedies and generally does not require prior pursuit of state relief, although federal abstention doctrines may still limit intervention.

Myers v. Garff · filed 1987-03-04

a plaintiff could seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court even if the alleged conduct was also violative of state law. The court concluded that the “federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is involved.” ... However, a plaintiffs ability to seek relief in federal rather than state court is limited by the doctrine of abstention.

The availability of replevin or another state remedy does not bar a § 1983 challenge to the constitutionality of a procedure established by law.

Ford v. Turner · filed 1987-08-05

Accordingly, to hold that the availability of replevin (or any other action) precludes Ford from challenging the constitutionality of a procedure established by law would eviscerate § 1983 as a means of redressing constitutional violations.

A § 1983 claim for deprivation of a right secured by the Bill of Rights does not depend on the absence of an adequate state remedy.

Buchanan v. County of Jefferson, Detective Jones, Lt. Col. Roemele, Lt. Spellman, Det. Tangel, Sgt. W. Howard · filed 1987-08-18

In Dugan v. Brooks, No. 86-3063 (6th Cir. May 6, 1987), this court reiterated the precept that a plaintiff may maintain a cause of action under Sec. 1983 where the claimed deprivation is secured by the Bill of Rights irrespective of whether there is an adequate state remedy.

A § 1983 plaintiff ordinarily may sue in federal court without first exhausting state judicial remedies.

Donkor v. City of New York Human Resources Administration Special Services for Children · filed 1987-10-20

The law is well-settled that a plaintiff is free to bring a § 1983 suit in federal court without any requirement that she first exhaust state judicial remedies.

The availability of a state-law remedy for an injunction or reinstatement of a building permit does not preclude a remedy under Section 1983.

Hy Kom Development Co. v. Manatee County · filed 1993-11-16

Lastly, Defendant argues that since Plaintiff has a state law remedy, seeking an injunction or reinstatement of the permit, “there is simply no § 1983 remedy”. This Court finds this argument to be without merit.

A plaintiff’s ability to recover damages under state law does not determine whether a § 1983 action may proceed in federal court.

Jones v. Parker · filed 2003-10-03

The ability of a plaintiff to recover under state law does not determine whether the plaintiff’s action may proceed in federal court.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for constitutional violations by state actors, including intentional police brutality despite available state tort remedies.

Frost v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 1984-04-13

For all these reasons, the court finds that the Parratt limitation is not applicable to the facts set out in the complaint. Plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for enforcing rights rather than creating substantive rights, and it cannot be used to bypass available state remedies.

Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Commission · filed 1984-05-15

Section 1983 does not provide for any substantive rights; it is remedial. ... State remedies for asserting rights may not be circumvented by invoking § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim for denial of parole consideration when the plaintiff seeks damages rather than release.

Walton v. E. B. Wright, Warden J. B. Metzger, Iii, Chairman of Parole Board B. A. Fisher, Counselor Ms. A · filed 1995-01-19

Walton's complaint alleges denial of due process because the parole board failed to provide him with an opportunity for parole consideration; such a claim is cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge discriminatory parole decision procedures without exhausting state remedies when success would not necessarily shorten confinement.

Parisie v. Morris · filed 1995-01-18

The court therefore finds that plaintiff may pursue his claims under section 1983, and that he is not required to exhaust his state remedies.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge regulations affecting parole eligibility without first seeking habeas relief or exhausting state remedies when the claim does not seek parole or challenge the fact or length of confinement.

Lewis v. Driskell · filed 1994-03-31

Since this Court adopts the reasoning of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, this Court finds that Mr. Lewis has brought a claim under § 1983 which may properly be addressed without first filing a petition for habeas corpus and exhausting state remedies.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the timing of parole reconsideration without exhausting state remedies when the prisoner does not claim entitlement to parole.

Roller v. Cavanaugh · filed 1993-01-15

The Preiser distinction is important here because Roller has not exhausted his state remedies on his ex post facto claim--a general prerequisite to federal habeas corpus relief, but not to a § 1983 suit. ... Like the inmate in Strader, Roller does not say he is entitled to parole. We follow Strader and find that Roller has stated a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner seeking recomputation of parole time; that claim is properly brought under § 2254.

Burnley v. Edward W. Murray, Lou Ann White, James E. Briggs, Clarence L. Jackson, Jr., C.D. Larcen · filed 1991-10-03

We note that Burnley's complaint presents claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To the extent that Burnley sought to have his parole time recomputed, his complaint was more properly brought under § 2254.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the parole decision process and eligibility for parole without first pursuing habeas corpus and exhausting state remedies.

C.T. Akins, Jay M. Fate, Michael Schroeder v. Wayne Snow, Jr., Chairman State Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 1991-02-07

Because Akins and Fate challenge the parole decision process, specifically their eligibility for parole, and not the denial of parole, they may properly bring a claim under § 1983 without first bringing a habeas corpus claim and exhausting their state remedies.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle to challenge the use of an uncounseled conviction in determining parole eligibility when the prisoner does not claim entitlement to parole.

Smith v. D.A. Garraghty, Warden, Attorney General of Virginia · filed 1989-05-26

Because Smith does not allege that he is entitled to parole but only that his eligibility should be determined without regard to his uncounseled conviction, this action is properly construed as one under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 is a proper vehicle for a parolee's challenge to procedures or policies governing possible conditional release, rather than the outcome of a particular parole decision.

Faheem-El v. Klincar · filed 1987-05-08

The plaintiff's challenge to Illinois' policy of denying all parolees any consideration for release pending the final revocation hearing was properly brought as a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek declaratory relief for alleged due-process violations in parole procedures.

Pope v. United States Parole Commission · filed 1981-04-27

This claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner's allegation of racial discrimination in the parole process states a cognizable Section 1983 claim.

White v. Christopher S. Bond, Joseph Teasdale, John Ashcroft, Dick Moore, Lee Roy Black and David Blackwell · filed 1983-11-18

In particular, White’s allegation of racial discrimination in the parole process appears to state a cognizable section 1983 claim.

A prisoner cannot obtain § 1983 relief over parole-eligibility calculations without alleging a constitutional deprivation.

Holland v. George Wilson, Warden Gene A. Scroggy, Betty Lou Vaughn and Marion Tompkins · filed 1987-09-01

Plaintiff has failed to allege any constitutional deprivation in the manner in which his parole eligibility is calculated by the defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for denial of parole when the inmate shows no constitutional violation.

Hudson v. B. Norris Vassar, Chairman, Virginia Parole Board · filed 1988-05-27

Rather, Hudson's claim is essentially that he deserved to have been paroled and that the parole board violated his rights by not doing so. This does not state a claim under Sec. 1983, however, because Hudson has failed to show that his constitutional rights have been violated.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge procedural irregularities in a parole denial, but a challenge to the denial itself must proceed in habeas corpus.

Hutchens v. B. Norris Vassar Virginia Parole Board and Members · filed 1988-07-18

To the extent that Hutchens attacks the decision to deny parole, his claim attacks the fact or length of confinement. The district court properly treated the claim as one that should have been brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. ... Hutchens' chief complaint, however, is that there were procedural irregularities surrounding the denial of parole. In particular, Hutchens alleges that to deny parole only because of the severity of the offense violates his constitutional rights. This is a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim, see Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 800 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978), which we find to be without merit.

A prisoner challenging the denial of parole through a motion for injunctive relief in a Section 1983 action should bring the claim in a habeas corpus petition.

Vladimir Zatko, Dr. v. James K. Rowland Bernie Aispuro, Warden · filed 1992-06-29

Two of Zatko's motions challenged the Board of Prison Terms' denial of parole. The district court did not abuse its discretion by informing Zatko that he should bring his claims in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures, but a claim seeking release on parole must proceed through habeas corpus.

Barksdale v. McGinnis · filed 1993-05-04

A claim by a prisoner that he is entitled to be released on parole is properly characterized as a petition for habeas corpus, id. at 381, while a mere challenge to the procedures the state has employed in considering his application for parole may be brought under § 1983. Clark, 960 F.2d at 664-655.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge procedural due process in parole consideration rather than the right to parole itself.

Miller v. Jackson · filed 1994-09-23

However, because Miller's claims challenged not the right to parole, but the right to procedural due process in the consideration of parole, his complaint was properly brought in a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a parole board’s future consideration of voided convictions when the prisoner does not contest a particular hearing’s result or request a new hearing at a specified time.

Cook v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Department · filed 1994-10-24

We follow our sister circuit in holding that a prisoner's challenge to parole board consideration of voided prior convictions is cognizable under § 1983, when the prisoner does not challenge the result of the hearing or request a new hearing at a specified time.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge parole procedures when their claims do not require a determination that their continuing confinement is constitutionally invalid.

Douglas T. Russell Daniel J. Swanson Joshua Lark v. John Gillis California Board of Prison Terms · filed 1996-03-29

The appellants' challenges to the parole process are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because these claims do not require the district court "to determine the constitutional validity of [the appellants'] continuing confinement."

Section 1983 plaintiffs may litigate constitutional claims in federal court when those claims were not actually litigated and determined in a prior state proceeding.

Gargiul v. Tompkins · filed 1983-03-29

Thus, while a Sec. 1983 plaintiff may not relitigate constitutional claims actually determined in a prior state court proceeding, Allen v. McCurry, supra; Winters v. Lavine, supra, we have held that a prior state court proceeding does not bar federal court consideration of constitutional claims not actually litigated and determined in that proceeding. ... Accordingly, we hold that Gargiul is not precluded from challenging her suspension without pay on substantive due process grounds.

Section 1983 does not allow a disappointed election participant to recover campaign expenses as damages when it knew of the alleged constitutional defect before the election but, without adequate explanation, chose to campaign instead of seeking preelection relief.

Soules v. Kauaians For Nukolii Campaign Committee · filed 1988-06-14

We simply hold that a party who is disappointed with the outcome of an election may not recover damages under Section 1983 when that party, with full knowledge of the alleged constitutional infirmity, made no attempt to seek equitable relief to correct that infirmity, but rather without adequate explanation chose to participate in a lengthy and sustained election campaign thereby incurring the damages which it later seeks to recover in a post-election Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a basis for a constitutional tort claim alleging that law enforcement officers conspired to conduct an illegal search and arrest.

Thomas v. Taylor · filed 1991-08-06

Thomas’ characterization of his action as a claim for conspiracy and “civil tort injury” has a basis as a constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

Section 1983 permits a claim for a violation of the constitutional right to confidentiality in personal information.

Rosann C. Scheetz Kenneth L. Scheetz, Jr. v. The Morning Call, Inc. Terry L. Mutchler John Doe And/or Jane Doe · filed 1991-10-31

Concluding that violations of the confidentiality right of privacy may be actionable under § 1983 does not, however, end our inquiry.

Section 1983 generally provides the vehicle for pleading federal constitutional violations, so duplicative claims pleaded directly under the Constitution add nothing.

Carpenter v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1992-08-31

Second, all constitutional violations in federal court must be pled as § 1983 cases, with very few exceptions (not applicable here).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against municipalities and municipal employees whose availability precludes direct constitutional claims.

Allen v. City of Chicago · filed 1993-07-02

To the extent that Count IV seeks to assert claims directly under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, they are dismissed. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against municipalities and municipal employees, and the availability of this statutory remedy precludes direct claims under the Constitution.

A plaintiff with a remedy under Section 1983 may not pursue direct constitutional claims against a state defendant.

The Arlington Group, a California Limited Partnership v. City of Riverside, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1993-08-10

Direct constitutional claims may not be pursued against a state defendant by a plaintiff who has a Sec. 1983 remedy.

Section 1983 provides the required cause of action for claims alleging violations of the First or Fourteenth Amendment.

Henderson v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 1996-01-29

A plaintiff must allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in order to bring a claim of a constitutional violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 sufficiently vindicates meritorious constitutional claims, allowing duplicative claims brought directly under the Constitution to be stricken.

Reynolds v. Wagner · filed 1996-08-13

If plaintiffs are making claims directly under the Constitution, these claims are deemed stricken because if they do have merit, they can be sufficiently vindicated by an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the required vehicle for pleading an equal protection claim against a state actor in the Ninth Circuit.

Jacobsen v. Marin General Hospital · filed 1997-04-16

In response to this claim, defendant Coroner argues that plaintiffs have not properly pleaded an equal protection claim because they do not allege any claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 as required in this Circuit. Coroner is correct.

Section 1983 permits claims based on independent constitutional violations even when another statute provides a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Swartz v. Beach · filed 2002-10-07

Moreover, the National Sea Clammers doctrine does not preclude a litigant from bringing § 1983 based on independent constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits a claim challenging a state AFDC eligibility policy on equal protection and due process grounds.

Majchszak v. Schmidt · filed 1973-05-07

I believe the plaintiffs’ equal protection and due process arguments, based on total denial of eligibility, sex discrimination and the use of a conclusive presumption, are not insubstantial and do state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with jurisdiction conferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for constitutional claims, and a complaint listing the statute and constitutional rights separately may be read to assert claims under it.

Talley v. Brentwood Union Free School District · filed 2010-08-04

Given that § 1983 is “the vehicle by which individuals may seek redress for alleged violations of their constitutional rights,” Mayo v. Utica City School District, 1998 WL 59456 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1998) (internal quotations omitted), the complaint must be read as asserting 1983 claims for alleged violations of Plaintiff's First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 is the required vehicle for a claim alleging a violation of a federal constitutional right.

Motoyama v. Hawaii, Department of Transportation · filed 2012-03-29

Defendants are correct that there is no direct cause of action under the United States Constitution and that a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a way to sue for constitutional violations; a violation of § 1983 is not a separate cause of action.

Goldblatt v. Geiger et al · filed 2012-04-02

Rather, § 1983 is the vehicle through which an individual may bring suit for constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits claims against school administrators for alleged independent constitutional violations arising in an educational setting.

Everett H. ex rel. Havey v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District · filed 2014-03-20

Consequently, Plaintiffs Twelfth Claim for Relief survives as a § 1983 claim given the particular facts that are alleged, along with Plaintiffs’ claims of constitutional violations, and Local Defendants’ motion to dismiss the District administrator defendants from the claim fails.

Section 1983 provides a means to enforce rights conferred elsewhere but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Bublitz v. Cottey · filed 2003-04-09

Section 1983 is not itself a source of any substantive rights, but instead provides the means by which rights conferred elsewhere may be enforced.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; a claim under it depends on a violation of constitutional or federal statutory rights.

Community Treatment Centers, Inc. v. City of Westland · filed 1997-06-24

It is well-established that § 1983 does not itself provide any substantive rights, but rather, is a derivative claim based on violations of other rights provided by the Constitution or Acts of Congress.

Section 1983 provides a procedural remedy but creates no new substantive rights.

Robinson v. Pratt · filed 1980-06-24

It is clear, however, that under the cited case and Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is procedural only and does not create new substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal rights but creates no substantive rights itself.

Citizen Action Fund D/B/A Louisiana Citizen Action v. City of Morgan City · filed 1998-09-03

Section 1983 confers no substantive rights but only provides a cause of action to obtain “redress” for the violation of federal rights. In other words, one must look somewhere besides 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in order to determine whether a right protected by federal law has been violated.

Section 1983 enforces existing constitutional and federal statutory rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Ellis v. University Of Kansas Medical Center · filed 1999-01-08

Since §§ 1983 and 1985 did not create any substantive rights, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), but merely enforce existing constitutional and federal statutory rights, we hold that Seminole Tribe's "detailed remedial scheme" analysis does not apply here.

Section 1983 provides a method for vindicating federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland · filed 1999-02-24

Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but a method for vindication of federal rights elsewhere conferred.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce federal rights created elsewhere; it does not create substantive rights of its own.

Paciulan v. George · filed 1999-03-03

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.

Section 1983 does not itself create substantive rights.

Mount Elliott Cemetery Association v. City of Troy · filed 1999-03-24

Although plaintiff alleged a separate claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV), § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of rights supplied by other laws; it grants no substantive rights itself.

Arizona Civil Liberties Union v. Dunham · filed 1999-09-30

Section 1983 grants no substantive rights — it establishes a cause of action for violation of rights granted by other provisions, including federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Higdon v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1984-02-28

The statute is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method of vindicating federal rights conferred by the constitution and federal statutes.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights of its own; a claim requires a violation of an underlying right.

Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Commission · filed 2001-09-17

Based on the above analysis, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief for violation of their First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association, and therefore, they cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Section 1983 is not, in itself, a source of substantive rights.

Section 1983 does not itself create substantive rights.

O'Lear v. Miller · filed 2002-05-24

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, we do not address plaintiffs' section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not itself create substantive rights.

Hill v. Kansas Gas Service Co. · filed 2003-03-26

However, neither § 1983, nor any other federal statute cited by Plaintiffs, is the source of the substantive rights which Plaintiffs claim were violated.

Section 1983 provides remedies for deprivations of established rights but creates no substantive rights.

Eisnnicher v. Bob Evans Farms Restaurants · filed 2004-03-31

By its terms, however, § 1983 creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of established rights.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights conferred elsewhere; it does not create substantive rights of its own.

Flores v. City of Palacios · filed 2004-08-10

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Hall v. SEPTA · filed 2006-02-01

Although its language is broad, “Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (citation omitted). Therefore, we must first “determine whether [appellant] has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all.” Connecticut v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999).

Section 1983 provides a remedial cause of action for deprivation of a federal right and creates no substantive rights of its own.

Meyerson v. State of Ariz. · filed 1981-10-28

It is clear that § 1983 is purely a remedial statute; it provides no substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Kamaole Pointe Development LP v. County of Maui · filed 2008-07-03

In their fourth argument, County Defendants argue that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create any substantive rights but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. ... While County Defendants’ statement of the law is correct, it is not clear to the Court, as County Defendants propound, that Plaintiffs “seek a declaration that the ... Ordinance violates § 1983.” (County Defs.’ Motion at 16.)

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Schofield v. Clarke · filed 2011-03-10

Section 1983 “merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred” and is not itself a source of substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights established elsewhere in federal law and does not create independent substantive rights.

Reed v. Chambersburg Area School District · filed 2013-06-17

Section 1983 is not an independent source of substantive rights, but merely “provides a remedy for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.” ... Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim as duplicative of his claims set forth in Counts One through Three.