42 U.S.C. § 1983

The prison mailbox rule applies to inmates’ Section 1983 complaints, but an inmate must establish timely delivery to prison authorities to receive its benefit.

Wright v. Bowen · filed 2020-08-18

The mailbox rule has clearly been extended to inmate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filings, including the filing of a civil rights complaint.

A pro se prisoner’s Section 1983 complaint is timely filed when the prisoner gives it to prison staff for mailing by the deadline.

(PC) Hendrix v. Arce · filed 2020-09-14

Plaintiff’s amended complaint was handed to prison staff for mailing on August 27, 2020.1 Therefore, his amended complaint was timely filed, and no extension of time is necessary. ... “[T[he Houston mailbox rule applies to § 1983 complaints filed by pro se prisoners.”

A pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint is treated as filed when handed to prison staff for mailing.

(PC) Hendrix v. Foulk · filed 2020-09-14

Plaintiff’s amended complaint was handed to prison staff for mailing on August 27, 2020.1 Therefore, his amended complaint was timely filed, and no extension of time is necessary.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights claim based solely on a violation of the Ruiz remedial decree.

Colbert v. Johnson · filed 1998-06-18

Colbert’s claim that the prison officers violated the Ruiz remedial decree by allowing inmates to convey orders to other inmates on the work line, standing alone, cannot serve as a basis for a civil rights claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a violation of a remedial order.

Thomas v. Hernandez · filed 2010-09-13

Further, a remedial order, standing alone can not form the basis of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability can be imposed only on an entity capable of being sued under the law of the state where the district court sits.

Richardson v. Mobile Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-12-28

Liability under § 1983 can only be imposed against an entity that is capable of being sued, as determined by the law of the state in which the district court is located.

A sheriff’s department that is not a separate legal entity cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Clayton v. Bedford County Sheriff's Dept. · filed 2019-08-26

However, the Bedford County Sheriff’s Office is not a separate legal entity amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Nevada sheriff’s department lacks capacity to be sued in a Section 1983 action.

Schneider v. Elko County Sheriff's Department · filed 1998-08-06

Plaintiffs action against the Elko County Sheriffs Department is therefore frivolous, since under Nevada law the Sheriffs Department lacks the capacity to be sued.

A city police department that lacks separate legal existence under state law cannot be sued under § 1983.

Paredes v. City of Odessa · filed 2000-12-06

The Court finds that the Odessa Police Department is not a legal entity under Rule 17(b) and, therefore, lacks the legal existence and capacity to be sued for constitutional and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

County departments that lack separate legal capacity under state law cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Catlett v. Jefferson County · filed 2004-01-28

The Court finds no statutory authorization for the Sheriff's Department or the Medical Department to sue or be sued. Therefore these entities are mere departments of Jefferson County and are not legal entities subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a police department that lacks capacity to be sued under the law of the state where the district court sits.

Lovelace v. DeKalb Central Probation · filed 2005-08-03

The only issue before us is whether the district court was correct to conclude that the Department is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983. The “capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). Therefore, Georgia law controls here. ... Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the claims against the Department, and we AFFIRM.

A Section 1983 claim cannot proceed against an Alabama county sheriff’s department because it lacks the capacity to be sued.

Williams v. Goldsmith · filed 1995-11-28

Under Alabama law, a county sheriffs department lacks the capacity to be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against a Texas county sheriff’s department unless the county has given it separate legal capacity to be sued.

Jacobs v. Port Neches Police Department · filed 1996-01-03

In Texas, county sheriffs and police departments generally are not legal entities capable of being sued, absent express action by the superior corporation (the county, in the case of the sheriffs department) “to grant the servient agency with jural authority.”

A Section 1983 claim cannot proceed against District of Columbia agencies that are not suable as separate entities.

Doe v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-04-21

As noted above, Mr. Doe has asserted claims against two agencies of the District of Columbia government: the District of Columbia Department of Child & Family Services and the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services. According to the government defendants, Mr. Doe’s claims against these two agencies must be dismissed because they are non sui juris — that is, “not suable as separate entities.” Mot. at 7 (citing several cases explaining that agencies of the District of Columbia government are non sui juris absent specific statutory provisions to the contrary). Mr. Doe rightly concedes this point. ... The Court therefore dismisses the two agencies as defendants.

A sheriff’s department that lacks capacity to be sued in its own name is not a proper § 1983 defendant; the responsible local government is the proper entity.

Mays v. Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department · filed 2011-03-15

The Wyandotte County Sheriff’s Department lacks capacity to be sued in its own name, Wright v. Wyandotte Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 963 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (D. Kan. 1997), but “[a]s a matter of law the Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas is responsible for actionable misconduct, if any, by the Sheriff’s Department[,]” Fugate v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty./Kan. City, Kan., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266 (D. Kan. 2001).

Section 1983 does not give a city police department separate legal existence that allows it to be sued.

Johnson v. Rosenberg Police Department · filed 2019-08-19

The City of Rosenberg’s Charter does not grant Rosenberg P.D. the capacity to engage in separate litigation, nor does § 1983 confer jural existence on Rosenberg P.D., as an agent of the City.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against defendants that lack separate legal existence and capacity to be sued.

Carter v. Livingston · filed 2019-09-16

As outlined by the Magistrate Judge, these defendants are not separate legal entities having jural authority.

Section 1983 claims against non-jural entities cannot proceed unless those entities have the capacity to be sued.

Spencer v. August · filed 2019-09-23

Plaintiff offers no specific objection to the dismissal of the non-jural entities and has failed to show these entities have the capacity to be sued.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a sheriff’s office or jail that lacks separate legal existence.

Miles v. Office of the Sheriff Mike Williams · filed 2019-10-01

Because the Duval County Sheriff’s Office and the Duval County Jail are not legal entities amenable to suit, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against them.

A North Carolina sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued under § 1983.

Fair v. Lincoln County · filed 2020-04-29

As to Defendant Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office, under North Carolina law, a sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued under 42 ... U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a Kansas county must name its board of county commissioners because the county lacks capacity to be sued.

Brantley v. Richards · filed 2020-05-08

The court dismisses Count II’s § 1983 claim against Franklin County with prejudice because this entity lacks the capacity to be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a county jail that lacks a separate legal existence under state law.

Carter v. Harris County Jail · filed 2020-06-02

The Harris County Jail cannot be sued as Mr. Carter has attempted to do.

A North Carolina sheriff’s department lacks capacity to be sued under § 1983.

Ragland v. Judge John Doe · filed 2020-06-22

As found by the district court, the Warren County Sheriff’s Department is not an entity capable of being sued under § 1983.

A Florida sheriff’s office cannot be sued under § 1983 because it lacks the legal capacity to be sued.

Watson v. Sullivan · filed 2020-04-15

Accordingly, JSO is due to be dismissed as a Defendant from this action because it is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against a New York municipal department that lacks capacity to be sued.

George v. County of Westchester · filed 2020-04-21

Plaintiff’s claims against WCDOC must be dismissed because municipal agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law.

A North Carolina sheriff’s office cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

Fair v. Lincoln County · filed 2020-09-02

As to Defendant Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office, under North Carolina law, a sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a Florida sheriff’s office because the office lacks separate legal capacity to be sued.

Carpenter v. Putnam County Sheriff Office · filed 2020-09-28

Concerning PCSO, "Florida law has not established Sheriff's offices as separate legal entities with the capacity to be sued." Faulkner v. Monroe Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 523 F. App'x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013). Therefore, Carpenter has not stated a § 1983 claim against PCSO upon which relief can be granted.

A sheriff’s office that lacks legal capacity to be sued cannot be a defendant in a § 1983 claim.

Robinson v. City of Jacksonville · filed 2020-12-01

Because the JSO is not a legal entity amenable to suit, Robinson fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted against the JSO.

Section 1983 claims must name a defendant with legal capacity to be sued; a county may be substituted for its corrections department when the department lacks that capacity.

PERDUE v. CARNEY · filed 2020-12-22

In addition, the MontCo defendants explain in their motion to dismiss that plaintiff has incorrectly sued the Montgomery County Department of Corrections which is not a legal entity with the capacity to be sued. ... As such, this court will dismiss the Montgomery County Department of Corrections as a defendant, and the County of Montgomery will be substituted as a named defendant in its stead.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a Florida sheriff’s office because it lacks capacity to be sued.

Maldonado v. Baker County Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-01-13

In Florida, a sheriff’s office is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail that lacks the capacity to be sued.

Brooks v. Lorain County Jail · filed 2021-01-26

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the defendant Lorain County Jail is not sui juris, meaning it is not capable of suing or being sued for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are not barred under Heck by read-in charges because those charges are not criminal judgments.

Robinson v. City of West Allis · filed 2000-12-13

Because read-in charges are not criminal judgments, we conclude they do not implicate the rule of Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim challenging revocation of parole or mandatory supervision when Heck bars that challenge.

Galer v. Johnson · filed 2000-12-13

Heck bars Galer’s revocation contention.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to preindictment detention that would implicate the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Benson v. Fordice · filed 1998-12-11

His challenge to the existence of probable cause to detain him during that time until the grand jury returned an indictment would implicate the validity of his conviction.

A § 1983 claim that necessarily implies a conviction is invalid must be dismissed without prejudice unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Rankin v. County of Riverside · filed 2001-03-28

The district court properly dismissed Rankin’s action because his claims necessarily implied the invalidity of his conviction, and he failed to demonstrate that his conviction had been invalidated. ... However, the dismissal should be without prejudice so that Rankin may proceed if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction.

A § 1983 claim seeking to relitigate a conviction or obtain damages for prosecutorial misconduct may be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Brooks v. State of Texas · filed 2001-04-10

The district court concluded that Brooks’s claims against judges, prosecutors, and police officers were barred by immunity, and that Brooks’s apparent attempt to relitigate the propriety of his underlying conviction or obtain damages for prosecutorial misconduct was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994). The court therefore dismissed the complaint. This was ...not error.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights action whose resolution could imply the invalidity of a conviction until the plaintiff obtains relief from that conviction.

Stamper v. Bouldin · filed 2002-09-24

Finally, Stamper cannot maintain his civil rights action, whether brought under § 1983 or Bivens, where the resolution of the claims could imply the invalidity of his conviction, until he first seeks and obtains relief from his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when a ruling for the plaintiff would necessarily implicate the continued validity of his imprisonment.

Hessmer v. Tennessee · filed 2003-02-10

First, plaintiffs claims are not cognizable under § 1983 insofar as a ruling in plaintiffs favor in a § 1983 action would necessarily implicate the continued validity of his imprisonment.

A § 1983 claim seeking monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief is barred under Heck when success would invalidate an outstanding criminal conviction or sentence.

Poor Bear v. Nesbitt · filed 2004-01-29

Therefore, to the extent judgment in favor of Poor Bear on any of his claims would render his criminal conviction or sentence for violating the lawful order of law enforcement officers (i.e., order prohibiting marchers from entering the main street through the business district of Whiteclay) invalid, his section 1983 claims for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive or equitable relief are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because Poor Bear has not shown that his criminal conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy when success on the claim would necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction; the remedy is habeas corpus.

Wei Tang Chen v. Washington · filed 2006-03-29

The district court properly dismissed Chen’s action, because, if successful, it would necessarily implicate the validity of ... his conviction, and accordingly his only remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction are barred under Heck.

Wayne v. Barowsky · filed 2006-03-29

The district court properly dismissed Wayne’s claims relating to his underlying criminal prosecution because success on these claims would necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for a claim that would implicitly question the validity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Penley v. Collin County Texas · filed 2006-04-12

Heck bars all of Penley’s claims. To the extent that the district court were to award Penley damages on his claim regarding the destruction of evidence and the loss of the opportunity for DNA testing, the validity of his conviction would be implicitly questioned.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.

Rogers v. Wooldridge · filed 2007-11-21

Because his claims implicate the validity of his criminal conviction and the conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged, or invalidated in a habeas corpus proceeding, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Rogers’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims that would implicate the validity of a conviction.

Jones v. Buckley · filed 2008-02-19

If proven, Jones’s claim would implicate the validity of his conviction. Such claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would collaterally attack a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

West v. The People of Colorado · filed 2011-07-19

Having reviewed the record, West’s appellate brief, and the applicable law, we conclude the dismissal of West’s § 1983 complaint without prejudice was proper. Accordingly, finding no reversible error, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of West’s complaint for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s order dated March 28, 2011, with the following amplification. To the extent West seeks expungement of his conviction or otherwise attempts to collaterally attack that conviction, his claims must be brought in a habeas proceeding.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that judgment has been invalidated.

Adkins v. Johnson · filed 2012-05-14

Second, the district court correctly ruled that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars a suit for damages based on the allegations that implicate the validity of the five juvenile judgments. See id. at 486–87 (holding that a claim for harm or damages, caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, is not cognizable under § 1983 if the underlying conviction or sentence has not been invalidated).

A § 1983 claim whose success would necessarily imply that a criminal conviction is invalid is not cognizable unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Cooper v. Ramos · filed 2012-12-27

Successfully litigating Cooper’s claims of an evidence tampering conspiracy would necessarily implicate the validity of his state criminal conviction. These claims are not cognizable unless Cooper’s conviction is vacated, overturned, or invalidated.

A § 1983 unlawful arrest or detention claim is barred by Heck when proving it would necessarily implicate a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Snarke v. Barkley · filed 2013-12-13

Because Snarke concedes that he pleaded guilty to the charge of Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity arising out of the same arrest and did not contest that the proof required to establish his unlawful arrest and detention claims necessarily implicates his conviction for Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity, he has failed to show the district court erred in ... concluding that his claims are barred by Heck.

A § 1983 claim is barred by Heck when success would necessarily call into question a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Chapman v. Lawson · filed 2015-02-24

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a cause of action under § 1983 attacking the validity of the searches and seizures of the electronic information leading to his arrest under the Fourth Amendment or the constitutionality of his conviction generally, his § 1983 claim is barred by Heck.

A warrant does not shield a defendant from Section 1983 liability if it is executed unreasonably.

Galluccio v. Holmes · filed 1983-12-13

Appellees are not shielded by the warrant from liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 if the warrant was executed in an unreasonable manner.

A search warrant does not shield officers from § 1983 liability if they execute it unreasonably.

Galluccio v. Holmes · filed 1983-12-13

Appellees are not shielded by the warrant from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the warrant was executed in an unreasonable manner.

Section 1983 permits liability under Malley for a non-affiant officer who prepares a warrant application knowing the warrant will rest solely on that document.

Michalik v. Hermann · filed 2005-08-18

Our analysis of Bennett convinces us that, according to this precedent, liability under Malley may lie not only against the affiant, but also against an officer who is in the position of the detective in Bennett, that is, an officer who actually prepares the warrant application with knowledge that a warrant would be based solely on the document prepared.

Officers who rely on a facially valid search warrant are generally insulated from § 1983 liability for Fourth Amendment violations.

Gunnels v. Kenny · filed 2017-07-20

If a search warrant that indicates there is probable cause for a search is issued by a neutral and detached magistrate or judge, officers who rely on that facially ... valid warrant are generally insulated from liability under § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations.

Section 1983 requires state action; actions of a tribal government or its employees do not satisfy that requirement.

Bethel v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority · filed 1998-12-14

The plaintiff cannot make the requisite allegations to properly allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because under well established law, actions of a tribal government or its employees, do not constitute state action.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.

Kit Locklear v. Mendoza · filed 2014-10-10

Although the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction over Locklear’s constitutional claims, dismissal was proper because Locklear failed to state claims and because the tribe was immune from suit. See R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[N]o action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be maintained in federal court for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law. Indian tribes are separate and distinct sovereignties and are not constrained by the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.” (internal citations omitted)).

A guardian ad litem appointed to represent a child’s best interests in a custody proceeding has absolute immunity from liability under § 1983.

Winchester v. Little · filed 1998-12-31

This Court holds that under current federal law, a guardian ad litem, appointed to represent the best interests of a child in a custody proceeding, is entitled to absolute immunity from liability under §1983.

Section 1983 affords a guardian ad litem absolute immunity from damages suits for acts performed within the scope of the appointment.

Marr v. Maine Department of Human Services · filed 2002-07-09

A GAL is entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983 from any suit for damages based on the performance of his duties within the scope of his appointment.

Court-appointed guardians ad litem are absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983.

La Bri v. Finn · filed 2019-07-23

Finally, Finn, as a court-appointed GAL, is absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 claims against guardians ad litem acting in that capacity are barred by absolute immunity.

Truax v. Frawley · filed 2020-06-26

Finally, Plaintiff sues Defendants Jennifer Boerching and Kimberly Buchanan in their capacities as guardians ad litem for Plaintiff’s son. Guardians ad litem are also entitled to absolute immunity.

In § 1983 prisoner suits, a court may direct officials at the affected institution to investigate and report relevant facts, but may not rely on a report prepared by officials outside that institution to dismiss the action.

Worley v. J.D. Sharp, Oklahoma County Sheriff, Milford Wayne Edwards v. J.D. Sharp, (Sheriff) · filed 1983-12-21

At the outset we observe that our decision in Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir.1978), authorized the district courts to direct the state prison officials to conduct an investigation and prepare a report developing the pertinent facts. ... In the instant case, the district court appointed the Oklahoma Department of Health rather than the responsible authority in the jail. Therefore, to the extent that the district court relied on the “Martinez” reports in dismissing the action, the judgments of the district court must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 does not give a county taxpayer standing to challenge jail practices without an injury distinct from that suffered by the general public.

Lara v. Williams · filed 1999-02-18

Therefore, we hold that Flowers does not have standing to maintain this action with respect to the alleged violations of the United States and Texas Constitutions and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because such standing is not specifically granted by statute and because Flowers has not shown that he has been damaged or injured as a result of Sheriff Williams’ actions other than as a member of the general public.

Section 1983 does not give a citizen-taxpayer standing to challenge tax consequences shared by the public without a distinct injury.

Dillenburg v. State · filed 2005-02-04

We conclude that the court properly determined that plaintiff has standing as a citizen-taxpayer with respect to the first cause of action, alleging the violation of State Finance Law § 123-b (1), but erred in determining that he has standing as a citizen-taxpayer with respect to the second cause of action, alleging the violation of his due process rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a corporation to bring a retaliation claim based on protected activity in which it did not engage.

Levy, Charles D. v. Pappas, Maria · filed 2007-12-21

RRA points to no case allowing a corporation (or anyone) to sue under § 1983 for retaliation against protected activity when that plaintiff engaged in no protected activity.

Section 1983 permits an heir to bring a deceased person’s inherited claim, but does not give relatives standing to recover for their own pain and suffering.

CUEBAS v. Davila · filed 2009-03-31

Even though Rivera Maldonado and her daughter Devens lack standing to sue for their own pain and suffering, Rivera Maldonado has standing to bring her son’s action under Section 1983 because she inherited his cause of action.

A Section 1983 plaintiff generally must assert its own interests, although standing may extend to asserting another person’s rights in some circumstances.

A.B.C. Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Town of East Hampton · filed 1996-12-14

When making a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must generally assert its own interests as opposed to those of third parties. ... However, this requirement has been given a sufficiently broad interpretation in some circumstances to permit a litigant to assert the rights of another. ... Applying these standards the Court finds that ABC has standing to maintain this lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not give family members standing to sue for an incidental injury to familial association when the challenged state action was not directed at that relationship.

Miller v. Riley · filed 2009-10-30

Assuming, without deciding, that each of Miller’s siblings has a constitutionally protected right to reside with Miller, we nonetheless conclude that Miller’s siblings lack standing to maintain a claim in this action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff who suffers injury from political affiliation retaliation directed at another person to sue when the plaintiff satisfies standing requirements.

Montone v. City of Jersey City · filed 2013-03-08

Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning of Anjelino and Thompson in holding that a party has standing to bring an action for First Amendment political affiliation retaliation pursuant to § 1983, even where, as here, the alleged retaliation was directed towards another individual, provided the party can satisfy “[t]he irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III standing.

Actions brought under Section 1983 must satisfy the constitutional standing requirements set out in Lujan.

McQuiston v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2014-03-05

Contrary to McQuiston’s appellate arguments, Lujan applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits abortion doctors and clinics to assert their patients’ rights in this type of suit.

Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange · filed 2014-03-31

The court also rejects the State's more specific arguments that the plaintiffs lack standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim must allege a direct injury; a generalized taxpayer interest does not establish standing.

Webb v. Susquehanna Township School District · filed 2015-02-27

To have standing to assert a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that she has “sustained ... a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that [s]he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.” ... Because her pleading, as clarified in her brief, is restricted to such a generalized taxpayer status, her claim will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to assert a violation of their own rights, rather than someone else’s rights.

Stein v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife CA3 · filed 2016-08-24

The trial court correctly found Stein lacks standing to bring a section 1983 claim for injuries that allegedly occurred during the Colemans’ ownership of KTF. Section 1983 claims must be based upon a violation of Stein’s personal rights, not the rights of someone else. (§ 1983; Rose v. City of Los Angeles (C.D.Cal. 1993) 814 F.Supp. 878, 881.)

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim in Colorado state court must satisfy Colorado’s standing requirements, including an injury caused by the defendant’s conduct.

Jones v. Samora · filed 2016-12-29

Our supreme court has relied on Colorado’s standing test to evaluate standing in § 1983 cases. ... The trustee therefore cannot satisfy the injury requirement, so he does not have individual standing. ... In short, the trustee lacked standing to raise the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not let a subsequent property owner assert constitutional claims based on injuries suffered by the prior owner.

VR Acquisitions, LLC v. Wasatch County · filed 2017-04-10

Thus, we affirm the district court’s ruling that VRA lacks prudential standing to assert § 1983 claims based on those alleged violations and its order dismissing VRA’s federal claims with prejudice.

A decedent’s estate may bring a § 1983 claim for the violation of the decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights, but family members cannot assert those rights on their own behalf.

Longoria v. Pinal County · filed 2017-10-10

Only Longoria’s estate may bring a § 1983 for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; his family members have no standing to sue on their own behalves.

Section 1983 adds no standing requirement beyond Article III standing for the underlying claim.

N. Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Stenehjem · filed 2018-09-21

Because the Plaintiffs have demonstrated they have standing to pursue their dormant Commerce Clause and Equal Protection claims, they also have standing to pursue relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a personal, nonderivative injury; losses stemming from another entity’s lost contract do not give the plaintiff standing to sue.

Calderon v. City and County of Denver · filed 2019-09-17

Thus, the fact that defendants’ conduct in this case was allegedly motivated by animus toward plaintiff’s gender and exercise of her First Amendment rights does not, without more, establish a personal, non-derivative injury sufficient to allow plaintiff to sue on her own behalf.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim must allege a personal, direct injury rather than an injury derived from harm to someone else.

FCS Advisors, LLC v. State of Missouri · filed 2017-10-16

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim “can survive only if [it] has alleged that he personally has suffered a direct, nonderivative injury.” ... Even assuming for the purpose of this Motion that Nelson’s actions were motivated at least in part by racial animus, EngagePoint would have standing to assert that claim, not FCS or Brevet Direct Lending.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to assert a violation of the plaintiff’s own rights, rather than someone else’s rights.

Lynn (ID 64377) v. Cline · filed 2020-03-09

It is well-settled that a § 1983 claim must be based on the violation of Plaintiff’s personal rights and not the rights of someone else. ... To the extent Plaintiff raises claims on behalf of others, a review of the allegations contained in his FAC indicates he lacks standing to do so.

A plaintiff may not bring a § 1983 claim that is derivative of another person’s § 1983 claim.

I.G. v. Jefferson County School District · filed 2020-04-07

A plaintiff may not bring a § 1983 claim that is derivative of another person’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to assert a violation of his own rights, rather than the rights of other inmates.

Lynn (ID 64377) v. Cline · filed 2020-04-13

However, the Court will not include issues regarding other inmates. The Court’s M&O provided that: Plaintiff makes several claims regarding incidents involving other inmates or claims on behalf of the inmate population in general. It is well-settled that a § 1983 claim must be based on the violation of Plaintiff’s personal rights and not the rights of someone else.

Section 1983 does not itself confer standing; a plaintiff must establish standing to bring a claim under it.

Shelton v. City of Springfield, MO · filed 2020-10-28

Plaintiff must still establish standing to bring a claim under § 1983 and she has alleged the Ordinance requiring a mask does not apply to her based on her exemption.

Section 1983 does not protect a claim based on officials’ failure to exercise discretion to grant a deportation parole eligibility hearing.

Wright v. Giles · filed 2020-11-17

The failure to exercise discretion to grant a deportation parole eligibility hearing is not within the zone of interests protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not shield an official from liability solely because the official followed a superior’s orders.

Thaddeus-X and Earnest Bell, Jr. v. Blatter · filed 1999-03-08

Although the district court believed this absolved these defendants of liability, we do not agree. Reliance on a superior’s orders does not in itself dissipate all liability.

Section 1983 does not shield officials from damages liability merely because they did not create a superior’s directive or control its enforcement.

Leahy v. Conant · filed 2019-03-08

We note first that the superintendents’ lack of involvement in the directive’s implementation or say in its enforcement is not a defense to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 liability of county defendants is determined under federal law.

Doby v. DeCrescenzo · filed 1999-03-22

However, we must determine the liability of the county defendants under section 1983 according to federal law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal law, not state law alone.

Sundquist Homes Inc. v. Snohomish County · filed 2006-01-06

Of course, § 1983 provides a cause of action for violation of federal rather than state law.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal law, not state or local law.

Smith v. Hayman · filed 2012-07-25

But 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides relief for violation of federal laws, not for violation of state or local law.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against people acting under color of state law and does not impose liability on the United States.

Hover v. United States · filed 2014-06-05

Section 1983 therefore does not give rise to liability on the part of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to state expressly in the pleadings that a public official is sued individually; otherwise, the suit is treated as an official-capacity suit.

Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp. · filed 1999-03-24

This court has held that, in order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity. ... Absent such an express statement, the suit is construed as being against the defendants in their official capacity.

Section 1983 claims can proceed against individual defendants.

Gossett v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Board of Regents for Langston University · filed 2001-04-10

Given the viability of the section 1983 claim, which ... can proceed against defendants individually, we need not consider defendants’ argument that the Title IX suit cannot proceed against the individual defendants.

Section 1983 claims against individual officers may continue after the government is dismissed as a defendant.

Gordon v. Monoson · filed 2006-05-26

The Section 1983 claims against Monoson and Berry were unaffected by the dismissal of the GVI.

A § 1983 claim must identify a constitutional or statutory right the defendants violated to survive dismissal.

Karara v. United States · filed 1999-04-05

Finally, Karara’s failure to specify any constitutional or statutory right violated by defendants meant that the § 1983 claim was insufficient to withstand a dismissal motion. ... We AFFIRM the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado for substantially the same reasons stated in the recommendations of the magistrate judge dated July 10, 1997, and March 2, 1998; and the orders of the district court entered August 26, 1997, and April 24, 1998.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a federal constitutional or statutory right that was violated.

Beck v. City of Durham · filed 2000-11-23

However, the Court notes that Plaintiffs Complaint itself does not state any basis for Plaintiffs § 1983 claim. In other words, Plaintiffs Complaint does not identify any “right, privilege or immunity” secured by a provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States that has been violated.

A person invoking § 1983 must identify the federal right, privilege, or immunity allegedly denied.

People v. Ziankovich · filed 2018-06-20

Finally, Respondent has not specifically identified which "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" he believes he has been deprived of under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so we find no merit in this defense.

A § 1983 claim must identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.

Booth v. City of Roswell · filed 2018-10-31

The first step in a § 1983 claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. ... As the record reveals, the complaint failed to identify any constitutional right that was violated to support a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a violation of the Constitution or other federal law.

Cantu v. Moody · filed 2019-08-05

In a § 1983 case, the plaintiff must assert someone violated the Constitution or other federal law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the federal right allegedly violated.

Perez v. City of Chicago · filed 2019-12-27

Here, Plaintiffs do not spell out one of the elements of a § 1983 action—which civil right was violated.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a federal right allegedly deprived by a person acting under color of state law.

49Hopkins, LLC v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2020-02-28

In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show both (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. ... Plaintiff’s first cause of action is therefore DISMISSED with leave to amend to specify exactly which constitutional provision or federal right it seeks to vindicate.

A § 1983 complaint must identify a statutory or constitutional right that was allegedly violated.

Glenn v. Ron · filed 2020-04-13

Plaintiff has been given an opportunity to amend his Complaint after the Magistrate Judge identified the deficiencies therein, but was unable to state a viable claim for relief under §1983, as he has not identified a statutory or constitutional right he feels was violated and has failed to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding his Complaint.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights, so a claim must identify a federal right or law that the defendant violated.

Lucha Unida de Padres y Estudiantes v. Green · filed 2020-07-01

As Count One does not state what federal laws or rights were violated by Defendants’ alleged misconduct, it fails to state a claim.

Section 1983 claims must identify the federal constitutional or statutory right allegedly violated by state or local officials.

Thompson v. Hayward Unified School District · filed 2020-07-06

On the substantive claims, it appears plaintiff is suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the complaint leaves unanswered the critical question asking for § 1983 claims, “what federal constitutional or statutory right(s) do you claim is/are being violated by state or local officials?” Id. at ECF p. 4 (question II(B)).

Section 1983 plaintiffs must identify the constitutional or other federal right they seek to vindicate.

Geddes v. Weber County · filed 2020-08-03

Plaintiffs suing under this statute must accordingly identify the constitutional or other federal right that they seek to vindicate.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Ohio political-subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744 when that immunity statute is constitutional.

Lynch v. Dept. of Human Serv., Unpublished Decision (4-23-1999) · filed 1999-04-23

However, the § 1983 claim is barred by R.C. 2744. The previous assignment of error addressed the constitutionality of the statute. Since the statute is constitutional, no claim can lie under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a municipality or its officials acting in their official capacities to sue their parent state for a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

City of Green Bay v. Bostelmann · filed 2020-03-27

“Municipalities cannot challenge state action on federal constitutional grounds because they are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause,” and therefore, “cannot invoke the protection of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments” or bring a § 1983 claim against the State. ... In short, the City and its officials, who are suing in their official capacities, do not have standing to bring this claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Foster Township · filed 1999-04-30

Likewise, in this case, Omnipoint may not maintain a § 1983 claim for violations of the Telecommunications Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of the Telecommunications Act’s wireless zoning provisions because Congress provided expedited federal judicial review.

At & T WIRELESS PCS, INC. v. City of Atlanta · filed 1999-06-14

For these reasons the Court finds that Congress has provided personal wireless service providers a private judicial remedy — that of expedited review in federal court of zoning authorities’ decisions — and thus has implicitly foreclosed reliance on § 1983 as a means of enforcing the Telecommunications Act.

Section 1983 permits a Telecommunications Act claim against a zoning commission to proceed past a motion to dismiss when the asserted basis for dismissal is that the Act forecloses that remedy.

SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Commission of Brookfield · filed 2000-05-01

This Court considered this issue in Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of the Town of Stratford, 995 F.Supp. 52 (D.Conn.1998), holding that a plaintiff aggrieved by a zoning commission’s denial of an application for permits to construct a telecommunications tower could assert a cause of action under section 1983. ... Although other courts have concluded otherwise, ... we decline to review this issue in a motion to dismiss absent further guidance from the Second Circuit. Therefore, we DENY Defendant’s motion to dismiss this Count.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for mere violations of the Telecommunications Act.

Nextel Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Town of Randolph · filed 2002-03-20

Nextel may not recover Section 1983 damages for mere violations of the TCA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Telecommunications Act’s wireless siting provisions because that Act’s remedial scheme forecloses such a claim.

Nextel Partners Inc. v. Kingston Township · filed 2002-04-11

Applying this analysis to the TCA, we hold that the TCA implicitly precludes an action under § 1983 by creating a comprehensive remedial scheme that furnishes private judicial remedies.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act because the Act does not foreclose such suits.

Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. v. Town of Westford · filed 2002-06-17

The TCA does not implicitly or explicitly foreclose § 1983 suits. More particularly, the TCA does not provide a comprehensive enforcement scheme intended to supplant a § 1983 remedy. ... Because the Sprint Spectrum analysis is equally applicable in the present case, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III is ALLOWED, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III is DENIED.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to enforce Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act because Congress foreclosed individual enforcement through a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, New Mexico · filed 2002-08-30

The evidence of congressional intent further indicates that Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983 in this context by “creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of the Telecommunications Act because Congress foreclosed that remedy.

Tennessee v. City of Chattanooga · filed 2005-04-07

Given the Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 cause of action for violations of the TCA, we affirm the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 does not provide an action for a violation of the Telecommunications Act because that Act supplies its own remedy.

Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, FL · filed 2005-05-06

The district court correctly concluded that a violation of the Telecommunications Act does not give rise to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of the Telecommunications Act.

Masterpage Communications, Inc. v. Town of Olive · filed 2005-09-28

Finally, Masterpage is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on its § 1983 claim because the Supreme Court has held that a violation of the TCA does not provide a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 253.

Sprint Telephony Pcs v. County of San Diego · filed 2008-09-10

We adopt the reasoning and conclusion of the three- judge panel that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims cannot be brought for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 253.

Section 1983 permits a claim alleging gross negligence that causes a deprivation of constitutional rights; the court left open whether simple negligence suffices.

Rundle v. Madigan · filed 1972-11-20

This Court need not decide the question whether simple negligence suffices under § 1983 since the complaint in this action alleges circumstances bringing the case within the gross negligence rule of Jenkins. Hence, count 5 of the amended complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 itself imposes no state of mind requirement; the required state of mind depends on the underlying constitutional right.

Lemoine Ex Rel. Est. of Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Center, Inc. · filed 1999-05-12

It is well-settled that § 1983 itself contains no state of mind requirement.

A plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 must allege that the defendant was a state actor.

Watkins v. Benson · filed 2000-06-19

Watkins does not contend that the defendant was a state actor, as is required to pursue relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983’s state actor requirement is satisfied by the University of Pittsburgh.

Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 2000-10-25

The University meets the state actor requirement for defendants in S 1983 actions.

Section 1983 is not limited to intentional deprivations of constitutional rights.

Parratt v. Taylor · filed 1981-05-18

Nothing in the language of § 1983 or its legislative history-limits the statute solely to intentional deprivations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 has no general state-of-mind requirement, though the underlying constitutional right may have one.

State Bank Of St. Charles v. Camic · filed 1983-07-13

In short, even though Section 1983 embodies no state of mind requirement, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), the Eighth Amendment does.

Section 1983’s state-of-mind requirement is controlled by the underlying constitutional right allegedly infringed.

Lovelace v. Jack Lee Gene Shinault K. Lester · filed 2006-12-29

Section 1983’s state-of-mind requirement is instead controlled by the underlying constitutional right allegedly infringed.

Section 1983 has no independent state-of-mind requirement; negligence can support liability when it suffices to establish a violation of the underlying federal right.

Pitchford v. Borough of Munhall · filed 2007-11-13

Where negligence is sufficient to establish an underlying violation of federal law, negligence is sufficient to establish liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 has no independent state of mind requirement; whether negligence supports liability depends on the constitutional right at issue.

Crawford v. Edmonson · filed 1985-06-13

Parratt therefore stands for the proposition that section 1983 imposes no independent state of mind requirement, and thus that simple negligence may be sufficient to establish liability under section 1983. Whether negligent conduct will sustain section 1983 liability in a given case depends upon the particular constitutional provision at issue.

Section 1983 imposes no independent state of mind requirement; any such requirement depends on the underlying federal violation.

Easton v. City of Boulder · filed 1985-10-28

For any such requirement to be applicable in a particular case, it must be necessitated by the character of the alleged violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States upon which § 1983 liability is to be predicated.

A general contractual limitations clause cannot bar a § 1983 claim unless it specifically refers to federal claims and clearly expresses an intent to shorten their filing period.

Van-Go Transport Co. v. New York City Board of Education · filed 1999-05-19

If the parties to a contract intend for a provision to act as a bar to’ claims brought under federal law, they must specifically refer to such federal claims, and clearly express the intent to limit the period in which a party could bring an action based upon federal claims. As the provision at issue makes no reference to federal statutory rights, much less an express waiver of such rights, it cannot bar Van-Go’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 challenges to a tax authorized by a Louisiana election are subject to the state’s sixty-day filing period when the state remedy adequately protects federal rights.

Graugnard v. Capital Area Transit System · filed 2013-12-20

While Fair Assessment and Nat’l Private Truck Council involved § 1983 actions challenging the validity of a tax in tax assessment cases, we find the underlying federal policies articulated in those cases apply with equal force to a § 1983 action challenging the validity of a tax levied by a tax election. ... Although La. R.S. 18:1294 requires challenges to the validity of a tax to be brought within sixty days of the promulgation of the election results, that time limitation period adequately protects the federal rights at issue.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the perjury alleged against a corrections employee.

Anderson v. Dept. of Corrections · filed 1999-06-14

Finally, the allegations with respect to Mr. Cozzetto’s perjury do not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not preempt New York’s collection of mental health care charges from awards recovered in Section 1983 suits.

Brown v. Stone · filed 1999-08-17

In the present case, the monies which may be realized by plaintiffs in their § 1983 litigations should rightfully be available to satisfy the costs of the mental health services and treatment provided by the State.

Section 1983 does not preempt a public-assistance lien on a Rule 68 recovery when the lien does not interfere with the statute’s purposes.

Colondres v. Scoppetta · filed 2003-11-18

In the present context, plaintiffs argument that section 1983 preempts New York’s Lien Law in cases in which the losing municipal defendant attempts to reduce recovery by setting off amounts it claims it is owed by the winning plaintiffs is unconvincing. Allowing the City to assert a lien on plaintiffs Rule 68 judgment does not interfere with the purpose and objectives of section 1983.

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of Section 1981 rights by state governmental units.

WILLIAMS v. TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD · filed 2020-12-15

Therefore, because Plaintiff does not bring a claim under Section 1983, summary judgment will be granted to Lakewood regarding her Section 1981 claim.

Section 1983 provides the remedy for a § 1981 claim against a governmental entity.

AL HAFNAWI v. The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida · filed 2020-07-08

But because the Trust is a governmental entity, Dr. Al-Hafnawi’s § 1981 claim may only be brought through the remedy provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1981 claim against a municipality requires an express Section 1983 cause of action.

Payne v. New York City Police Department · filed 2012-03-28

Plaintiffs Complaint seeks to impose liability on a municipality, and it asserts the elements of a Section 1981 claim, but it fails to assert an express cause of action under Section 1983. That failure alone warrants dismissal of his Section 1981 claim.

Section 1983 is the route for bringing a § 1981 claim against a city.

Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, Minn. · filed 2009-03-13

Similarly, because Flowers may pursue a § 1981 claim against the City only through § 1983, ... and because Flowers has failed to make a submissible case that Stoll or other police officers targeted him for harassment because of his race, the district court properly dismissed Flowers’s claim against the City under § 1981.

Section 1983 provides the sole federal cause of action against governments for violations of Section 1981.

Webster Greenthumb Co. v. Fulton County, Ga. · filed 2000-09-18

Section 1983, therefore, is the sole jurisdictional vehicle for bringing Section 1981 claims against governments. This simply means that a plaintiff asserting Section 1981 violations against a government must bring them pursuant to Section 1983.

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for a state actor’s violation of rights protected by § 1981.

Anderson v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COM'RS OF MOBILE CNTY. · filed 1999-09-24

This court agrees and accordingly holds that the addition of subsection(c) to § 1981 by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not overrule the holding in Jett that § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for a state actor’s violation of rights protected by § 1981.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for § 1981 claims against state actors, so claims under both sections merge into one § 1983 cause of action.

Granger v. Williams · filed 2002-01-24

Although Plaintiffs bring their discrimination claims pursuant to both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court finds that the claims are due to be merged into a single cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for a claimed violation of § 1981 rights by a state actor, so the plaintiff must bring that claim through § 1983.

Felton v. Polles · filed 2002-12-17

Accordingly, it appears § 1983 constitutes Carter’s exclusive remedy for the claimed § 1981 violation by Thomas. ... In sum, Carter has failed to invoke the only remedy available to him for the claimed deprivation of his § 1981 rights — he has essentially failed to state a claim.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for a claimed § 1981 violation by a state actor, whether sued in an official or individual capacity.

Burbank v. OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF STATE OF CONNECTICUT · filed 2003-01-21

Accordingly, the Court concludes that § 1983 constitutes Burbank’s exclusive remedy for the claimed § 1981 violation by Blumenthal and Burbank’s § 1981 claim against Blumenthal in either his official or individual capacity must be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for § 1981 claims against state actors.

Stewart v. Board of Commissioners · filed 2003-07-14

The Court joins Judge Crow and Judge Lungstrum in finding this second line of cases to be more persuasive, and adopts the view that Jett’s holding, to the effect that § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for pursuing damages against a state actor for claims arising under § 1981, remains valid.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for a Section 1981 violation when the claim is pressed against a state actor.

Perry v. METROPOLITAN SUBURBAN BUS AUTHORITY · filed 2004-06-03

The Court agrees. In Jett, the Supreme Court held that “the express ‘action at law1 provided by § 1983 for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,’ provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.”

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal remedy for violations of § 1981 rights by state actors.

Bond v. City of Middletown · filed 2005-08-23

Under Jett, any claim of a deprivation Constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities by a state actor must be brought pursuant to § 1983, not § 1981.

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal damages remedy for § 1981 violations by state actors.

Bolden v. City of Topeka · filed 2006-03-21

We therefore conclude that even after the 1991 amendments to § 1981, damages claims against state actors for § 1981 violations must be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for enforcing § 1981 rights against a state actor.

Givens v. Chambers · filed 2008-01-29

First, when a plaintiff seeks vindication of rights secured under § 1981 against a state actor, § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for obtaining relief.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of Section 1981 rights by a state actor.

Roberson v. City of Goldsboro · filed 2008-05-15

Accordingly, section 1983 remains the exclusive remedy for federally-guaranteed rights when suit is brought against a state actor.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of Section 1981 rights by state actors.

Easton v. COLLEGE OF LAKE COUNTY · filed 2008-07-10

When making a constitutional claim against a state actor, the proper claim is under § 1983, which provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violations of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 when that claim is, as here, against a state actor.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of Section 1981 rights by state actors.

Martires v. Connecticut Dept. of Transp. · filed 2009-01-22

In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, the Supreme Court held that "the express `action at law' provided by § 1983 for the `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,' provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor." 491 U.S. 701, 735, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); see Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 176 n. 17 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Jett, 491 U.S. at 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702). The Court finds that Jett applies to Martires's § 1981 claim against the DOT.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of § 1981 rights by state actors.

Martires v. State of Connecticut Dept. of Transportation · filed 2009-01-22

In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, the Supreme Court held that “the express ‘action at law5 provided by § 1983 for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,’ provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.” ... The Court finds that Jett applies to Martires’s § 1981 claim against the DOT.