42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not allow monetary-damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Britto v. UMass Correctional Health Care · filed 2018-02-26

Furthermore, claims against individual defendants in their official capacities as state officials for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are barred as they are not “persons” for purposes of a section 1983 claim.

A § 1983 damages claim against a state officer in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the state and barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Spivey v. Norris · filed 2018-04-12

We construe Spivey’s § 1983 claim for damages against Norris in his official capacity as a suit against the state, which is barred by Eleventh Amendment Immunity.

Section 1983 bars retroactive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities but permits prospective relief for ongoing violations of federal law.

Amaro v. State of New Mexico · filed 2018-06-13

Thus, Will bars claims for retroactive relief that are brought against state officials in their official capacities, but it does not bar requests for prospective relief that fall under the Ex parte Young rule.

Section 1983 bars monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities but permits prospective injunctive relief.

Lowe v. Brian Smith, the Warden of the Putnamville Correctional Facility (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-06-29

Lowe’s lawsuit seeks relief from the correctional facility officials in their “official capacity,” Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 2-3, therefore, he is not entitled to monetary damages. City of Warsaw v. Orban, 884 N.E.2d 262, 267-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting a state official may not be sued in his or her official capacity for retrospective relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), trans. denied. Lowe may, however, seek prospective relief in the form of an injunction.

Section 1983 allows prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities for an ongoing constitutional violation, but does not allow monetary damages against them.

Citizens Allied for Integrity & Accountability, Inc. v. Schultz · filed 2018-08-13

Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment to Defendants on the issue of money damages, but will allow Plaintiffs to seek prospective declaratory and injunctive relief under the Ex parte Young doctrine.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officers sued in their official capacities.

S.B. v. Cal. Dep't of Educ. · filed 2018-08-27

State officers in their official capacities are not amenable to a suit for damages under § 1983, thus any claim for monetary damages against Torlakson in his official capacity is barred.

Section 1983 treats a suit against a municipal official in his official capacity as a suit against the municipality.

Schoenecker v. Koopman · filed 2018-11-09

But it is well-established that suing a municipal official in his or her official capacity is the same thing as suing the municipality of which he is an agent.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim against a municipal officer as a claim against the municipality, making parallel claims duplicative.

Sullivan-Knoff v. City of Chicago, The · filed 2018-11-12

Thus, Sullivan-Knoff’s official-capacity claim against Mayor Emanuel is duplicative of her claim against the City.

Section 1983 does not permit damages actions against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Ollie v. Atchison · filed 2019-02-25

First, he may not maintain a damages action under § 1983 against state officials in their official capacity.

An official-capacity claim under Section 1983 against an officer is duplicative when the government entity is also sued.

Lawrence v. Newsham · filed 2019-03-08

Because the claims against Chief Newsham are duplicative of those against the District, the Court will dismiss them.

Section 1983 does not allow official-capacity claims against the state prison officials named in this action.

Kimble v. Corpening · filed 2019-06-17

The Court also notes that none of these Defendants can be sued in their official capacities under § 1983, in any event.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state official sued in his official capacity.

Madison v. Cruz · filed 2019-06-25

Defendant Cruz, in his official capacity, is not amenable to suit for damages pursuant to Section 1983.

State officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to damages under § 1983.

Bly v. Circuit Court for Howard County, MD · filed 2019-06-26

State officials acting in their official capacities are outside the class of “persons” who can be sued for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officers in their official capacities when the state has not waived its immunity.

Hillman v. Soroye · filed 2019-06-26

Moreover, under the Eleventh Amendment, states are immune from § 1983 suits other than those for prospective injunctive relief unless they have waived their immunity—which Maryland has not done. ... Soroye is therefore immune from the damages claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against an individual are redundant when the plaintiff also sues the entity.

Molina v. Pa. Soc. Serv. Union · filed 2019-07-18

The Court agrees that an official-capacity suit against Defendant Catanese is redundant in light of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant PSSU, and, accordingly, will grant Defendants PSSU and Catanese's motions as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Catanese.

A state official sued in an official capacity for prospective injunctive relief is a person under § 1983.

Fletcher v. Idaho Department of Correction · filed 2019-08-06

When sued for prospective injunctive relief, a state official in his or her official capacity is considered a “person” for § 1983 purposes.

State employees sued in their official capacities are not “persons” under § 1983.

Cheesman v. DSHS Region 1/DCFS Childrens Administration · filed 2019-08-15

To the extent that Plaintiffs are suing the named state employees in their official capacity, these claims are dismissed, with prejudice. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1980) (holding that neither state nor its officials cited in their official capacities were “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983 for claims seeking monetary damages.

Molina v. Harry · filed 2019-08-22

First, to the extent that Molina seeks monetary damages, “state officials, sued for monetary relief in their official capacities, are [not] persons under § 1983” and are therefore not amendable to suit.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 is redundant when the plaintiff brings the same claim against the government entity.

Pearcy v. Christopher · filed 2019-08-26

Thus, where the entity is named as a defendant, as it is here, an official-capacity claim is redundant.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

MOORE v. COLON · filed 2019-08-28

To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendants in their official capacities, the Court dismisses such claims with prejudice, as “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim against a local official as a claim against the government entity, so the official-capacity claim is redundant when the entity is also sued.

K.G. v. Woodford County Board of Education · filed 2019-09-03

Thus, to the extent the Plaintiffs allege claims against J.C.S. in his official capacity, these claims are to be treated as claims against the Board.

A § 1983 complaint that does not specify a public official’s capacity is treated as an official capacity suit and must allege facts supporting governmental liability.

Wilkins v. Hann · filed 2019-09-03

As such, the Court must presume that plaintiff is suing defendants in their official capacities only. However, he has failed to allege any facts that would support an official capacity suit.

Section 1983 claims for damages against state officials in their official capacities are barred in federal court by Eleventh Amendment immunity when the state has not waived it.

Bryant-El v. Corcoran · filed 2019-09-11

A suit against a state official for acts performed in his official capacity is equivalent to suing the State itself. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 US. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Although Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of cases brought in state courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-104(a), it has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court. “A State’s constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.” Halderman, 465 U.S. at 99 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the claims against the State Defendants will be dismissed.

An official-capacity § 1983 suit against an officer is treated as a suit against the agency the officer represents.

Paul v. Teddford · filed 2019-09-11

Official-capacity suits represent another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the officer is an agent, which in this case is the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC).

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Copeland v. Nevada Southern Detention Center · filed 2019-09-19

To the extent the complaint seeks monetary relief under Section 1983 against the individual defendants in their official capacities, this claim must be dismissed because suing the individual defendants in their official capacities for money damages is “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); (state officials sued for monetary relief in their official capacities are not “persons” under section 1983).

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 against a municipal officer is treated as a suit against the municipality.

Kellogg v. Yates (PLR1) · filed 2019-09-20

An “official capacity” claim is in all respects treated as a suit against the City of Chattanooga.

Section 1983 treats official-capacity claims against state correctional officers as claims against the state itself.

Riggins v. Stewart · filed 2019-09-26

As a practical matter, then, Riggins’ § 1983 claims against Defendants in their official capacities functionally reduce to § 1983 claims against the State itself.

Municipal officers may be sued in their official capacities under § 1983, with the suit treated as one against the municipality.

BALDWIN v. GREENFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2019-09-27

Unlike state officers, municipal officers may be sued in their official capacities—although the suit is treated as one against the municipal entity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or its officials sued in their official capacities when the state has not waived sovereign immunity.

Cole v. Wiley · filed 2019-09-27

Because the State of Missouri has not waived its sovereign immunity, “neither the State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ capable of being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” id., and plaintiff’s official capacity claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against these defendants in their official capacities.

Kimble v. Acord · filed 2019-09-30

The Court also notes that these Defendants cannot be sued in their official capacities under § 1983, in any event.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the section.

MALCOLM v. DAVIS · filed 2019-10-04

To the extent Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against Defendants Bray and Davis for damages in their official capacities, those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

A § 1983 damages claim against state officials in their official capacities is a claim against the state and is barred by sovereign immunity when the state has not waived it.

Anderson v. State of South Dakota · filed 2019-10-16

Consequently, because Anderson has sued defendants only in their official capacities, Anderson has asserted a claim for money damages against the state of South Dakota. The state of South Dakota has not waived its sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 permits an official capacity claim against a state official for injunctive relief tied to a policy or custom involved in an alleged constitutional violation.

Grauer, David v. Tegels, Lizzie · filed 2019-10-18

An official capacity claim under § 1983 is in essence a claim against an official’s office, and as such, a suit against the state itself, Will v. Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and is limited to injunctive relief from a policy or custom that played a role in the alleged constitutional violation.

State employees acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Pennix v. Dean · filed 2019-10-23

State employees acting in | their official capacities do not qualify as “persons” subject to being sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against officers sued only in their official capacities because they are not persons amenable to suit.

Searcy v. Lynch · filed 2019-10-23

Because individual defendants sued in their official capacity are not “persons” amenable to being sued under § 1983, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count I.

States and state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary relief are not persons under § 1983.

OT, LLC v. Harford County Maryland · filed 2019-10-24

However, to the extent that Plaintiffs have sued the Delegates in their official capacities as state officers, summary judgment is granted to the Delegates on counts I-V. States are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and state officials cannot be sued in their official capacity for monetary relief.

A plaintiff bringing an official-capacity claim under § 1983 need not allege facts showing each named official’s personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Barnes v. Collier · filed 2019-10-29

Barnes’s failure to allege specific facts showing precisely how each of the named defendants was personally involved in the alleged violations of his constitutional rights does not furnish a basis for the dismissal of his suit.

Section 1983 does not permit an official capacity claim against a state official because the suit is treated as one against the State, which is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Parsons v. Beaver · filed 2019-10-29

Suit against Defendant Jolley in her official capacity is essentially a suit against the State. Neither the State of North Carolina nor its agencies constitute “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Martinez v. McLane · filed 2019-11-05

Because “officials” do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Martinez may not bring an action seeking monetary damages from an official in her official capacity pursuant to that statute.

Section 1983 claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity unless the state waives immunity or the suit seeks prospective injunctive relief.

Allende v. NH Department of Corrections, Commissioner · filed 2019-11-12

Nothing suggests that New Hampshire has waived its immunity for purposes of Allende’s § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Santos v. Smith, 2016 WL 1032791, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 2016). Therefore, Allende’s claims under § 1983 against the defendants in their official capacities are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a person under the statute; the court held that the prison officials sued in their official capacities, except the warden, did not qualify.

Lisle v. Siddiqui · filed 2019-11-14

With the exception of Warden Lashbrook, Plaintiff may not sue any of the defendants in his or her official capacity. Individuals are not “persons” in their official capacities under Section 1983.

An official-capacity damages claim under Section 1983 is a claim against the official’s employing entity, so a parallel claim against the official is redundant.

Michelle Dotson,et al v. Bexar County · filed 2019-11-25

A Section 1983 suit for damages against a public official in his or her “official capacity” is, in reality, a suit against the governmental entity that employs the official. ... Because Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Yao was employed by Defendant UHS, any claims brought against both Defendants UHS and Yao are redundant as to Defendant Yao.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipal officer in an official capacity to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Kallos v. Kallos · filed 2019-11-25

Here, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that plausibly give rise to a claim that their injuries were caused by any policy or custom of the City of New York. Thus, their § 1983 claims against Benjamin in his official capacity as New York City Councilman must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or a state officer sued in an official capacity because neither is a person under the statute.

Lantz v. Hermanson · filed 2019-11-27

Moreover, they are barred because neither states nor state officers sued in their official capacity are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against a state official sued in an official capacity when the state has not waived sovereign immunity.

Pawneeleggins v. Jared · filed 2019-12-05

Thus, to the extent Pawneeleggins seeks to hold the defendant liable in his official capacity for money damages, this Court finds that the defendant is protected by sovereign immunity on the official capacity claim.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Violett v. King · filed 2019-12-09

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” liable under Section 1983.

McCoy v. Dale Wainwright, Chairman of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, and Kenneth Green, Disciplinary Captain · filed 2019-12-12

An official acting in his official capacity, however, is not a “person” who may be held liable under Section 1983. See, e.g., Leachman, 261 S.W.3d at 305; Esparza v. Diaz, 802 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ). McCoy’s claims against Wainwright and Green in their official capacities are thus barred by sovereign immunity and were properly dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against government employees are redundant when the plaintiff also sues their employing entities.

Stock v. Stanislaus County · filed 2020-01-14

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Harwell, Laura Rodriguez, Kimberly Rodriguez, Wilbur, Ballasch, and Maddox in their official capacity, to the extent those Defendants work for Defendants Stanislaus County, Stanislaus County Community Services Agency, and Stanislaus County Behavioral Health & Recovery Services, are redundant and therefore not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit the official-capacity claim against the state prison official in this case.

(PC) Hammler v. Kernan · filed 2020-01-29

Plaintiffs objections do not dispute the magistrate judge’s remaining findings that he has failed to state cognizable claims for violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and that he cannot bring suit against defendant Kernan in defendant Kernan’s official capacity. ... The October 17, 2019 findings and recommendations (Doc. No. 32) are adopted in full; ... IT IS SO ORDERED.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities, but permits official-capacity claims for injunctive relief.

Duart v. Mici · filed 2020-01-30

The official capacity claims for damages are DISMISSED. ... The Supreme Court has ruled that neither a state nor state officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

An official-capacity § 1983 suit is a suit against the official’s office rather than the individual.

Pulliam v. Holder · filed 2020-02-21

A § 1983 suit brought against an official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the individual official, but rather a suit against the official’s office.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Brown v. Johnson · filed 2020-03-03

Thus, because Plaintiff seeks money damages from these state officers in their official capacities, he fails to allege cognizable claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity.

DiSessa v. Ryan · filed 2020-03-10

However sovereign immunity precludes holding individual defendants liable in their official capacity for damages for alleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against a government officer is treated as a claim against the government entity.

Cooksey v. City of Gautier · filed 2020-03-12

While Chief Elbin is still a party to this suit in his official capacity, a suit against a government official in his official capacity is treated as though it is a suit against the government entity.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim as a claim against the official’s employer, and state employees sued in that capacity are not persons under the section.

Washington v. Wudel · filed 2020-03-19

Naming a government official in his or her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the official. If defendants are employees of the State of Missouri, they cannot be considered persons under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials in their official capacities.

GLENN v. SIMS · filed 2020-03-20

State officials, sued in their official capacities, are not “persons” subject to a damages suit under section 1983.

A state official sued for damages in an official capacity is not a person who can be sued under § 1983.

Dickerson v. Stirling · filed 2020-03-23

This threshold statutory reason is why Defendant cannot be sued for damages in his official capacity under § 1983, and the Court need not reach the separate issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Official-capacity Section 1983 claims against officers are functionally equivalent to claims against their government employers.

Berry v. Kight · filed 2020-03-24

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Kraus and Craven in their official capacities are functionally equivalent to his claims against Toombs County and the City of Lyons and are therefore due to be dismissed.

A state official sued for damages in an official capacity is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Esparaza, Jr. v. Kuykendall · filed 2020-03-30

Therefore, a state actor acting in his or her official capacity is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit official-capacity claims against state officials because they are not persons subject to suit in that capacity.

WILLIAMS v. NOGAN · filed 2019-10-30

In response, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the official capacities claims against them must be dismissed because they are not “persons” under § 1983; ... In light of Defendants’ arguments, and Plaintiff’s concessions, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims and his Fourteenth Amendment due process claims.

A § 1983 claim against a sheriff in his official capacity is treated as a claim against the county he represents.

Lloyd v. Leeper · filed 2020-03-31

Accordingly, Lloyd’s claim against Leeper in his official capacity as Sheriff of Nassau County is actually a claim against Nassau County.

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” under Section 1983.

GUILLE v. JOHNSON · filed 2020-03-31

Guille’s claims against the Moving Defendants for monetary damages in their official capacities will be dismissed with prejudice. Indeed, a state official sued in his official capacity for monetary damages is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not permit a suit against an officer in an official capacity, except in limited circumstances.

Moore v. Corpening · filed 2020-04-02

A suit against an officer in his official capacity is not cognizable under § 1983 except in certain limited circumstances which do not apply here.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Unitt v. Bennett · filed 2020-04-03

Under the Eleventh Amendment, a State, its agencies, and agency officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore are not subject to suit for money damages in the federal courts without the State’s consent or the abrogation of State sovereignty by Congress acting under its Fourteenth Amendment powers.

Section 1983 claims against state officials acting in their official capacities must be dismissed.

DISCO v. THOMPSON · filed 2020-04-07

First, Defendants correctly assert that Section 1983 claims against the individual Defendants acting in their official, rather than individual, capacities must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Thomas v. State of Rhode Island · filed 2020-04-08

As Mr. Thomas seeks only monetary damages, the counts against the three state officials in their official capacities must be DISMISSED.

A § 1983 suit against a county sheriff in his official capacity is effectively a suit against the county.

Clark v. Wilson County · filed 2020-04-14

Although in the prior action the plaintiff did not name Wilson County as a defendant, by suing the Sheriff of Wilson County in his official capacity, he effectively sued the County itself.

State officials sued for damages in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Festa v. NDOC · filed 2020-05-04

Neither a state nor an officers in their official capacity is considered a “person” for purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a housing authority to be sued as a local government entity, but official capacity claims against its employees duplicate the claim against the authority.

Lundregan v. Housing Opportunities Commission · filed 2020-05-07

Taking official capacity first, a housing authority “as a unit of local government is a person[ ] which may be sued under § 1983 although ... not on a respondeat superior basis,” and only in an official-capacity action. ... Accordingly, suits against a!l Defendants in their official capacities other than HOC are superfluous and the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 55, is GRANTED, as to them.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Vargas v. Minor · filed 2020-05-11

In this case, plaintiff’s official capacity claims against defendants are subject to dismissal because the claims are actually against the State of Missouri itself, which is not a “person” for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for money damages.

States and entities considered arms of the state are not persons under § 1983, so state officials sued in their official capacities cannot be held liable for monetary damages.

Peck v. State of Nevada, ex rel · filed 2020-05-13

States and entities that are considered “arms of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Motto Jr v. Mullins · filed 2020-05-13

As a result, Defendants Mullins, Greer, Sanders, and Stewart, in their official capacities, are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an official-capacity claim against a local officer to identify a governmental policy or widespread custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Flesher v. Los Angeles County Jail Medical Staff · filed 2020-05-18

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Defendants in their official capacity because Plaintiff fails to identify any widespread, systematic constitutional violations that have become the force of law or formal governmental policy pursuant to which Defendants acted.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities, but monetary damages against the university and those officials in their official capacities are unavailable.

Doe v. Purdue University · filed 2020-06-01

To avoid any confusion, the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are dismissed to the extent that they seek monetary damages. However, these claims remain as to the requested injunctive relief.

Section 1983 official capacity claims against municipal officers are redundant when the municipality is also sued for the same alleged violation.

Green v. Mills · filed 2020-06-02

The Court will dismiss the official capacity § 1983 claim against Officer Mills in Count I and against Chief Banks in Count II because they are redundant of Green’s § 1983 claim against Waverly in Count III.

Section 1983 does not permit official-capacity claims against state officials who are not persons under the statute.

Parker v. Pickens · filed 2020-06-04

In turn, none of the Defendants are amenable to suit in their official capacity under § 1983, and Defendants are therefore entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief against a state officer even when the complaint lacks specific allegations of that officer’s personal involvement.

Burnett v. Herron · filed 2020-06-15

Accordingly, the Court rejects the R&R’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s failure to make specific allegations regarding Warren is fatal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, since Plaintiff does not seek money damages against Warren and sues him in his official capacity, Plaintiff’s objection is sustained and Plaintiff’s amended complaint as to Warren may proceed.

A § 1983 suit against an official in an official capacity is a suit against the official’s office rather than the individual.

Pulliam v. Holder · filed 2020-06-19

Like the original complaint, the amended complaint fails to state a viable claim against any defendant in his or her official capacity. A § 1983 suit brought against an official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the individual official, but rather a suit against the official’s office.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against state officers are treated as claims against the agency they serve.

Walker v. Lawson · filed 2020-06-24

Therefore, plaintiff’s official-capacity claims are assumed to be claims against the Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), a state agency.

State police officers sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

MILLS v. GOLDEN NUGGET ATLANTIC CITY, LLC · filed 2020-06-24

Plaintiffs now concede that defendants in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we will grant the motion of defendants to dismiss Counts XXII through XXIX to the extent that plaintiffs bring these claims against them in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Williams v. Ferguson · filed 2020-06-29

when a state official is sued in his official capacity for monetary damages, he is not a “person” subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

MCCRIMMON v. JOHNSON · filed 2020-06-30

A state official sued in his official capacity for monetary damages is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against the Moving Defendants in their official capacity are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 damages claims against state employees in their official capacities are suits against the state and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Exline v. William Joseph, et al. · filed 2020-07-06

To the extent Exline intended to sue the defendants in their official capacities, that would constitute a suit against the State of New Hampshire, and the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the state for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state employees acting in their official capacities.

(PC) Muhammad v. Kesterson · filed 2020-07-13

States, state entities, and state employees acting in their official capacities are not “persons” who can be sued for damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued only in their official capacities.

(PC) Muhammad v. Seibel · filed 2020-07-13

Because plaintiff sues defendants only in official capacities, section 1983 claims necessarily fail.

State officials sued in their official capacities for damages are not “persons” under § 1983.

Shreeve v. Ducey · filed 2020-07-16

These defendants are not “persons” under § 1983, and the action against them in their official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary or punitive damages claims against these officers in their official capacities.

Wilson v. Detweiler · filed 2020-07-20

However, with respect to Counts One and Two (the § 1983 claims), the Officer Defendants are not subject to suit for monetary or punitive damages, in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Hall v. Pruitt · filed 2020-07-22

It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An official-capacity claim under Section 1983 against a county official is treated as a claim against the county itself.

Woods v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Bernalillo · filed 2020-07-22

The court will grant the motion and dismiss claims that run against Ms. Valdez in her official capacity as Housing Director for BCHD. These claims are no different than claims against the county itself.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against a public official may be dismissed with prejudice when they duplicate claims against the government entity the official serves.

Sonnick v. Budlong · filed 2020-07-29

Courts within the Second Circuit regularly dismiss with prejudice official-capacity claims against a public official when the claims are duplicative of the claims against the governmental entity for which the official works.

Section 1983 permits dismissal of an official-capacity claim against an officer when the local government is also sued.

Botello v. City of Salem · filed 2020-07-31

Plaintiff’s allegations, however, indicate that he is suing Mr. Gandolfi in his official capacity. ... To the extent that Plaintiff is suing Mr. Gandolfi in his official capacity, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed.

State officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Doe 5 v. Southern Illinois University · filed 2020-08-13

Renzaglia, acting in her official capacity, is not a “person” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state agency, but permits claims against state employees in their individual capacities and official-capacity claims for prospective relief.

Yanga v. Eastman · filed 2020-08-18

In sum, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims cannot proceed against NDCS, and can only proceed against the NDCS employees insofar as Plaintiff (1) is suing the employee in his or her individual capacity to obtain monetary or declaratory relief with respect to past constitutional violations, or (2) is suing the employee in his or her official capacity to enjoin ongoing constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits a claim for monetary damages against a state official in an individual capacity, but not an official capacity.

Hoskins v. Swisher · filed 2020-08-24

When a plaintiff seeks monetary damages against a state official, he must bring the suit against the official in his or her individual capacity.

Section 1983 claims against local officials in their official capacities are redundant when the local government entity is also sued.

Bush v. Bowling · filed 2020-06-17

Consistent with that guidance, this court has held that, when a local governmental entity is sued along with an official of that entity in his or her official capacity, the official capacity claims against the official are properly dismissed as redundant.

A § 1983 claim against a municipal officer in an official capacity is a claim against the municipality.

Emmett v. Armstrong · filed 2020-09-01

Under Monell, a § 1983 claim against a municipal officer in his or her official capacity is a claim against the city itself.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Fowler v. Paul · filed 2020-09-03

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims against Defendants Hutchinson, Smith, and Paul, are dismissed to the extent Plaintiffs seek compensatory and/or punitive damages because § 1983 does not provide a cause of action to seek damages against a state official in his or her official capacity.

A § 1983 claim against a public employee sued only in an official capacity is treated as a claim against the public employer.

McGuire v. Voss · filed 2020-09-09

Also, because Plaintiff does not specify that Defendants Voss and Miller are being sued in their individual capacities, the court must presume they are being sued only in their official capacities. Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2007). “A suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Thus, as a practical matter, this action is brought against the City of Omaha.

A state official sued in an official capacity is not a person subject to money damages under Section 1983.

Johnson 753595 v. Wilkinson · filed 2020-09-11

The Magistrate Judge properly stated that an official-capacity suit is “no different than a suit against the state itself” and that “a state official sued in his official capacity is not a ‘person’ subject to suit for money damages under Section 1983”(R&R, ECF No. 44 at PageID.246-247, citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989)).

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against officers are treated as claims against the government entity they represent and may be dismissed when that entity is already a defendant.

Glaze v. Cuyahoga County · filed 2020-09-11

“Official capacity suits ‘represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” ... Glaze has named and served Cuyahoga County as a Defendant in this action. Accordingly, his official capacity claims against Officers Bodeker and Brown are hereby dismissed.

Section 1983 claims against SUNY employees in their official capacities are barred by state sovereign immunity.

Doherty v. Bice · filed 2020-09-16

Therefore, under the Eleventh Amendment, SUNY employees sued in their official capacities are immune from suit for § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 damages claim against an official in an official capacity is a claim against the employing government entity, so naming both is redundant.

Ule v. Bexar County Hospital District · filed 2020-09-22

A § 1983 suit for damages against a public official in his or her “official capacity” is, in reality, a suit against the governmental entity that employs the official. ... Because Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Salazar was employed by Bexar County, claims brought against both Defendants Sheriff Salazar and Bexar County are redundant as to Sheriff Salazar. Therefore, to the extent this claim is construed as a claim against Sheriff Salazar in his official capacity, it is dismissed.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against officers are treated as claims against the governmental entity and may be dismissed when the entity is also sued.

Lerette v. City and County of Hawaii · filed 2020-09-24

“It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” Id. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the claims against Watkins, Isotani, and Takenishi in their official capacities with ... prejudice.

An official-capacity suit against a sheriff under § 1983 is treated as a suit against the governmental entity he represents.

DYER v. PENOBSCOT COUNTY · filed 2020-09-28

Penobscot County and the Penobscot County Sheriff’s Office are named defendants in the state court proceedings, see Exh. 4 (ECF No. 10-4) to Motion at 1, and it is well-established that “[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent” and should “be treated as a suit against the entity[,]” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, practically speaking, all the defendants in this matter are involved in the state court proceedings.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek prospective injunctive relief against prison officials in their official capacities.

Dayan v. Bowser · filed 2020-10-05

In any event, individuals in custody may state a claim against prison officials in their official capacities where, as here, Dayan seeks prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief from violations of federal law.

VAN DUYNE v. KESSELMAN · filed 2020-10-20

Thus, a claim brought against an employee of an entity that is an arm of the state in his official capacity pursuant to § 1983 for violations of federal law seeking solely prospective injunctive relief is actionable.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim against an officer as a claim against the governmental entity that employs the officer.

O'Brien v. Murphy · filed 2020-10-23

The complaint’s claims against Deputy Robinette and Deputy Murphy are also deficient. Plaintiff has sued Robinette and Murphy in their official capacities only. In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually against the governmental entity that employs the individual.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officers in their official capacities for injunctive relief.

DOE v. TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY · filed 2020-10-26

But official-capacity suits against state officers for injunctive relief are permitted under § 1983 and are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in an official capacity when the official can implement the requested relief.

(PC) Eleson v. Covello · filed 2020-11-02

A claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his or her official capacity is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment if the official has authority to implement the requested relief, as both defendants would have in the instant case.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against county officials are treated as claims against the county, so duplicate official-capacity claims may be dismissed.

Hicks v. Williams · filed 2020-11-03

Because the official-capacity claims are actually brought against the county, the official-capacity claims against Defendants Williams and Wilson will be dismissed as redundant to the continuing claims against Defendant Elliott in her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner seeking injunctive relief for alleged First Amendment violations to proceed against a prison warden in his official capacity.

BECKMAN v. VANIHEL · filed 2020-12-16

Mr. Beckman's First Amendment claims shall proceed as submitted against Warden Vanihel in his official capacity.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against a police chief fail when the police department she represents has no separate legal existence.

Rodriguez v. Quinones · filed 2020-12-20

Defendants are correct that the Section 1983 claims brought against Chief Quiñones in her official capacity as the Chief of the Hallandale Beach Police Department must be dismissed because the Department is not a legal entity subject to suit.

A state official sued in her official capacity is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

McClary v. Downey · filed 2020-12-28

It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against a municipal employee in his official capacity are treated as claims against the municipality.

Yoshikawa v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 2021-01-06

Seguirant correctly contends that any claims against him in his official capacity should be dismissed because he was acting as a building inspector within the course of his official duties, and the City is therefore the proper party.

Section 1983 claims against public officials are treated as official-capacity claims unless the complaint expressly names them in their individual capacities.

Puckett v. Saint Louis County, Missouri · filed 2021-01-08

Because Plaintiffs have not expressly named Dickerson or Brevik in their individual capacities, the Court construes the complaint as suing the officers in their official capacities only.

Section 1983 does not govern a federal prisoner’s claim about medical care in a federal prison; the claim arises under Bivens.

Thompson v. Hayes · filed 2013-10-23

Jerry Thompson, federal prisoner # 22869-077, moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to appeal from the dismissal as frivolous of his civil complaint based on the medical care he received in prison, which the district court construed as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As to the sole substantive constitutional claim sufficiently briefed for appeal, because Thompson is a federal prisoner suing over his medical care in a federal prison, we construe the ... claim as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

A constitutional claim against a federal agent is more properly brought under Bivens than under § 1983.

Miller v. USA; Wysocki · filed 1998-01-12

Miller brought this case against Wysocki under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, since Wysocki is a federal agent, plaintiff’s case is more properly brought under Bivens v . Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 398 (1971).

A complaint styled under § 1983 that asserts a Bivens claim should be construed as a Bivens action.

Messer v. Kelly · filed 1997-11-17

Appellant appeals from the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. ... We note that Appellant's complaint should have been construed as an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

A federal prisoner’s civil rights claim concerning federal prison conditions is construed under Bivens rather than § 1983.

Garfield v. Federal Prison Industries, Inc. · filed 2001-01-26

However, because Garfield is a federal prisoner, his complaint is construed as brought under Bivens, rather than under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a court to convert a claim against federal officials into a Bivens claim.

Mitchell v. Chapman · filed 2003-09-11

There lacks any authority in support of Mitchell’s blanket proposition that a court must convert a Section 1983 claim asserted against federal officials to one asserting Bivens violations.

Section 1983 does not require a court to convert a claim against federal officials into a Bivens claim.

Mitchell v. Chapman · filed 2003-12-23

There lacks any authority in support of Mitchell’s blanket proposition that a court must convert a Section 1983 claim asserted against federal officials to one asserting Bivens violations.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction.

Schultz v. Hansen · filed 2002-02-01

Since granting Schultz his requested relief would call into question the validity of his disciplinary conviction, his Eighth Amendment claim is not cognizable under § 1983. A prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack the hearing’s validity or the conduct underlying the disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner seeking damages that would undermine a disciplinary proceeding involving lost good-conduct time to obtain invalidation of the disciplinary verdict first.

Monroe v. Ament · filed 1998-12-10

A prisoner who seeks damages in an action that would undermine the validity of a disciplinary proceeding that results ... in the loss of good-conduct time must obtain the invalidation of the verdict from the disciplinary proceeding before she has a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging a prison disciplinary conviction is premature until that conviction is invalidated.

Diaz v. Lori Ditmer, Daniel R McBride and Roger Deutcher · filed 1998-03-03

Diaz's civil rights claim did not arise until the disciplinary conviction was found invalid. ... At the point when Diaz filed his § 1983 action, it was premature.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to prison disciplinary procedures without prior habeas relief when the claim does not challenge the ultimate disciplinary determination.

Montgomery v. El Paso Co Sheriff's · filed 1998-03-10

Because it is clear that is not what Mr. Montgomery wants and because we interpret his claim as challenging only the procedures used by defendants rather than their ultimate determination that discipline was warranted, we conclude that Edwards neither bars nor otherwise affects his claim.

Section 1983 permits damages for alleged due process violations in a prison disciplinary hearing only after the underlying disciplinary result has been invalidated.

Warburton v. Goord · filed 1998-07-19

Plaintiffs claim is subject to dismissal because an inmate has grounds for an action for damages under § 1983 against those who may have violated his constitutional rights only if relief from the underlying ‘conviction’ is obtained.

A governor’s full pardon that obliterates a state conviction satisfies Heck’s invalidation requirement for a § 1983 claim challenging that conviction.

Wilson v. Lawrence Cty, MO · filed 1998-08-17

Wilson's pardon is therefore an "executive order" that "expunged," "obliterated," and "invalidated" his conviction. Heck requires nothing more.

A prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim challenging removal from a work release program is not cognizable if success would imply the removal’s invalidity and the removal has not been invalidated.

Roucchio v. Coughlin · filed 1998-09-30

Under Edwards, in order to have a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Roucchio is required to show that the decision to remove him from The TWRP was invalidated. Absent such a showing, he may not collaterally attack, through a § 1983 action, the validity of the punishment imposed on him because of his arrest and failure to report that arrest to his parole officer.

A § 1983 damages claim based on invalidated prison disciplinary sanctions may proceed even if the underlying disciplinary convictions remain valid.

Sanford v. Manternach · filed 1999-10-13

Sanford’s damages claim does not rest on the invalidity of his underlying convictions; it rests on the invalidity of the sanctions imposed. Those sanctions have been invalidated. Thus, the claim made in this § 1983 action does not exceed the scope of Sanford’s success in the postconviction relief actions. Consequently, the test of Heck, as well as the underlying rationale of that decision, have been satisfied.

Section 1983 claims that would call a conviction into question are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Luquette v. LeBlanc · filed 1999-10-20

Luquette has not secured an invalidation of that conviction, and Luquette’s § 1983 claims are thus barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge disciplinary confinement that does not affect the length of imprisonment without first obtaining invalidation of the disciplinary ruling.

Sims v. Artuz · filed 2000-10-11

Sims's complaint did not challenge the disciplinary proceedings on the basis that they affected the overall length of his confinement; he complained only of the conditions to which he was subjected without procedural due process. Accordingly, Edwards provided no basis for dismissing the complaint.

Section 1983 does not allow a monetary damages claim against an absolutely immune prison disciplinary hearing officer or a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction.

McClaine-Bey v. Spicer · filed 2001-01-31

Defendant is absolutely immune from suits for monetary damages, see Shelly v. Johnson, 849 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir.1988) (per curiam), and McClaine-Bey has otherwise failed to state a claim because a favorable ruling would imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 does not require prior invalidation of prison discipline when the claim does not challenge the conviction’s validity or affect the length of incarceration.

Murphy v. Cruz · filed 2001-08-17

In Puleio v. Commissioner of Correction, ante 302, 308-309 (2001), we declined to apply the ruling of the Edwards case to bar claims under § 1983 that do not challenge the validity of the plaintiff’s criminal conviction or affect the length of his incarceration. Here, too, none of the sanctions imposed upon the plaintiff fall within that category. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim for retaliation should not have been dismissed for this reason.

Section 1983 precludes a claim challenging a disciplinary sanction that revoked good-time credits unless the sanction has been invalidated.

Gordon v. Maycayo · filed 2002-07-29

Insofar as Gordon exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the revocation of thirty days of good-time credits as a disciplinary sanction, we agree with the district court that this claim is precluded because the disciplinary sanction has not been vitiated.

Section 1983 claims arising from a conviction require the conviction to have been invalidated.

Sansone v. Murphy · filed 2002-09-20

The district court properly dismissed the remaining claims because the complaint did not allege that Sansone’s conviction was invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a challenge to a sentence unless the sentence has first been invalidated.

Ross v. Snyder · filed 2002-10-22

Furthermore, plaintiff Ross cannot request relief under § 1983, unless he proves that the sentence he is challenging has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 claim challenging the fact or duration of confinement requires the underlying conviction to have been invalidated.

Fink v. Flynn · filed 2003-04-14

We affirm the dismissal because Fink’s claims effectively challenged the fact or duration of his confinement resulting from a conviction at a second hearing, and Fink failed to allege the conviction at the second hearing had been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief based on a disciplinary conviction that has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Crockett v. McDowell · filed 2003-08-19

As Crockett has not shown that his disciplinary conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated, he may not maintain his claims for money damages, declaratory relief, or injunctive ... relief in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

A prisoner's § 1983 excessive-force claim is barred when it challenges the same conduct underlying his disciplinary conviction.

Donnelly v. Darby · filed 2003-11-25

As Donnelly admits that he received a disciplinary conviction arising from the same action of which he complains now, his claims are barred.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner from using a civil rights action to challenge disciplinary proceedings that would invalidate an outstanding finding of guilt unless that finding has been overturned or set aside.

Nash v. Wilkinson · filed 2005-02-23

Even assuming that Nash had a protected liberty interest implicating due process concerns, his claims are barred because they implicate the validity of Nash’s disciplinary proceedings, and he has not shown that his finding of guilt has been overturned or set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit damages or declaratory relief challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding that deprived a prisoner of good-time credits unless the disciplinary result has previously been invalidated.

Hines v. Allbaugh · filed 2019-08-02

The Court disagrees. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court applied Heck to judgments in prison disciplinary proceedings; holding that a claim for damages and declaratory relief brought by a state prisoner challenging the validity of the procedures used to deprive him of good-time credits is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the prisoner can demonstrate the misconduct has previously been invalidated. Id. at 648. Therefore, Objection No. Three provides no basis for rejection or modification of the Report and Recommendation.

A prisoner cannot pursue a § 1983 claim based on a rules violation finding until that finding has been invalidated.

(PC) Mendoza v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2020-01-17

Since invalidation of the rules violation report is necessary in order for Plaintiff to proceed with a claim by way of section 1983, the Court finds a stay inappropriate.

A pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint is treated as filed when delivered to prison officials.

Walker v. Jastremski · filed 2001-12-11

Under the well-settled application of Houston to the filing of federal complaints, see Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir.1993), Walker’s § 1983 action must be treated as filed on June 8, 1994.

A pro se prisoner's Section 1983 complaint is filed when delivered to prison authorities through the official prison mailing system if the prisoner lacks control over its timely receipt by the court clerk.

Piacentini v. Levangie · filed 1998-03-26

This Court holds that where a pro se prisoner lacks control over the timely receipt of the complaint by the clerk of the district court, and uses the official prison mailing system to deliver section 1983 complaint to the clerk of the court, the complaint is filed when it is delivered to prison authorities.

The prisoner mailbox rule applies when determining whether a § 1983 suit was filed within the applicable state statute of limitations.

Aldridge v. Gill · filed 2001-12-06

The “mailbox rule” of Houston v. Lack applies to the filing of § 1983 suits under the applicable, state statute of limitations.

A pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint is filed when the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing.

Sulik v. Taney County · filed 2003-01-22

We thus join our sister circuits and hold the prison mailbox rule governs the determination of when a prisoner’s civil complaint has been filed.

A pro se inmate’s § 1983 complaint receives the benefit of the prison mailbox rule when the inmate establishes timely delivery to prison authorities for mailing.

Price v. Philpot · filed 2005-08-23

We see no reason to depart from this settled precedent, and hold that the prison mailbox rule articulated in Houston applies equally to an inmate’s filing of a civil rights complaint.

The prison mailbox rule applies to § 1983 complaints filed by prisoners acting without counsel.

Douglas v. Noelle · filed 2009-06-05

We hold that the Houston mailbox rule applies to § 1983 complaints filed by pro se prisoners.

Section 1983 complaints are subject to the prison mailbox rule, under which a prisoner's pleading is deemed filed when submitted to prison authorities for mailing.

Myers v. M. Swindle · filed 2011-12-19

Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, a prisoner’s pleading is deemed to have been filed on the date that the pro se prisoner submits the pleading to prison authorities for mailing. ... The prison mailbox rule applies to the filing of § 1983 complaints.

The prison mailbox rule determines when an incarcerated person’s § 1983 filing is complete.

GLADU v. CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS · filed 2020-01-13

Though the docket reflects that this Amended Complaint was not docketed until December 5, 2016, the prison mailbox rule controls the date of filing of incarcerated individuals’ filings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.