42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s traditional work as criminal defense counsel because that work is not performed under color of state law.

Arrington v. Levi · filed 2020-07-01

Nothing in plaintiff’s complaint indicates that Levi was acting outside the traditional functions of a defense counsel in a criminal case. That is, his allegations, such as they are, touch on matters of client visitation, plea discussions, and contacting witnesses, all of which are part of a defense attorney’s representation of a client.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s acts and omissions while performing traditional defense counsel functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

RIOS v. SNYDER · filed 2020-07-10

Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because Defendant, as his public defender, was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing a defendant in criminal proceedings because that work is not done under color of state law.

Bailey v. Denny Hyslip, Public Defender · filed 2020-07-15

They were not acting under color of state law while representing Bailey in his criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional defense functions as acting under color of state law.

Hinton v. Jones · filed 2020-08-29

In addition, public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against criminal defense attorneys, including public defenders, because they do not act under color of state law.

Brown v. Thompson · filed 2020-08-31

Criminal defense attorneys, including public defenders, cannot be sued under § 1983 because they do not act under color of state law; they are the adversary of the State.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Hampton v. City of St. Louis · filed 2020-09-09

The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

A public defender performing the traditional role of defense counsel does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Bradley v. St. Lucie County · filed 2020-10-30

Specifically, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that Plaintiff’s only allegation against the public defender involves his traditional function as defense counsel, and a public defender does not act under color of state law as required under § 1983 in that context. Id. at 4. ... This Court agrees.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a court-appointed defense attorney representing a client is not a state actor.

Hess v. Webb · filed 2020-11-06

This means that because a criminal defense lawyer’s duty and loyalty are to his client, not the state, a court-appointed attorney is not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.

Public defenders do not act under color of state law for § 1983 when representing a criminal defendant.

Jackson v. Wolcott · filed 2020-11-30

Defendants Buchanan and Barrett were not acting under color of state law while representing Plaintiff in her criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing a defendant in criminal proceedings because that work is not performed under color of state law.

Clark v. Rogers · filed 2020-12-17

Public defenders do not act under color of state law while representing an individual in his criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing a criminal defendant because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Clark v. Rogers · filed 2021-01-05

Public defenders do not act under color of state law while representing an individual in criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because that work is not under color of state law.

Kirchner v. Marshall · filed 2021-01-25

It follows that a prerequisite to any relief under Section 1983 is a defendant who is a state actor. ... “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” ... Therefore, Plaintiff does not state a plausible Section 1983 claim against these two Defendants.

Section 1983 does not support an instruction that a defendant's reliance on an attorney's advice automatically exonerates the defendant from liability.

Blessum v. HOWARD CTY. BD. OF SUP'RS · filed 1980-08-27

We do not believe that defendants' requested instruction is a proper statement of the law in the context of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Defendants do not cite, nor are we able to find, any authority that would support the requested instruction as a proper statement of the law to be applied in this case.

A § 1983 excessive-force injury need not be permanent or severe when the force was gratuitous and the other elements of the claim are satisfied.

Bowman v. Casler · filed 1985-11-22

If a plaintiff had to show permanent or severe injury, police and prison officers would be able to routinely inflict minor injuries such as breaking fingers. Officers should be held liable for such practices. This court holds that the injury inflicted in the present case is sufficient to uphold a § 1983 claim if the other elements of the claim are satisfied.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for an arresting officer's slaps that cause no injury, bleeding, need for medical attention, or fall.

Everett R. Mark A/K/A Howard Van Zandt Williams, 296711 v. Caldwell · filed 1985-03-11

Assuming the truth of his account, and however reprehensible such conduct by a policeman may be, it does not rise to such a level that redress may be had for it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations and does not impose liability when force used in a lawful arrest is reasonable under the circumstances.

Melton v. Shivers · filed 1980-08-29

The Fourteenth Amendment likewise protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and has been held to prohibit ... the use of excessive and hence “unreasonable” force in making an arrest. ... This Court will not substitute its own judgment for that of a police officer in the field under the circumstances of this case. Although the Court is concerned by the extent of force employed in this particular case, it cannot say that such force was excessive in light of the facts and as defined in the cases interpreting § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. ... Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights were not violated; therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A law enforcement officer may be liable under Section 1983 for violating constitutional rights by using excessive force while completing an arrest.

James Keith Bauer and Mary Ellen Bauer v. Mark Norris, Individually and as Deputy of the McCook County Sheriff's Office, · filed 1983-08-08

A law enforcement official’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of an individual’s constitutional rights through the use of excessive force in completing an arrest is well established.

A police officer may be liable for damages under § 1983 for using unreasonable force to make an arrest.

Sprague v. City of Burley · filed 1985-11-19

It is well-established that a police officer can be found liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the use of unreasonable force in effecting an arrest.

Section 1983 does not provide a Fourth Amendment claim for unsuccessful deadly force that neither apprehends nor seizes a fleeing suspect and does not cause his injury.

Cameron v. City of Pontiac · filed 1985-12-27

The decedent was neither apprehended nor seized as a result of Officer Roberts’ use of lethal force.

A Section 1983 excessive-force claim may reach a second shot fired at a wounded, partially down fleeing suspect when further warning or identification could have preceded the shot.

Carter v. Rogers · filed 1986-11-26

A jury might reasonably think it excessive for a law enforcement officer to keep firing until the suspect is motionless-that Carter was sufficiently immobilized from the first shot that the second shot was unnecessary to subdue him--or it might reasonably conclude that further verbal warnings, including belated identification of defendant McClain as a law enforcement officer, were due before McClain could justify a second blast.

Police may use force to stop a fleeing car when they reasonably believe it contains a dangerous person they have lawful grounds to arrest.

McNeil v. T.C. Dunn, Raleigh Police Officer Unknown Raleigh Police Officer, Defendants · filed 1987-06-04

We hold that the district court was justified in holding that the police held a genuine belief that plaintiff's brother was in the car; thus, their attempt to arrest him and their use of force to stop the fleeing car was warranted.

Section 1983 allows an excessive-force claim against officers making an arrest, and instructions describing unprovoked, unjustified, malicious, wanton, or oppressive conduct adequately identify excessive force.

Jones v. Board of Police Commissioners · filed 1988-04-01

Jones contends that the District Court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that law enforcement officers may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for using excessive force in completing an arrest. ... Using the expressions “unprovoked,” “without just cause or excuse,” “maliciously,” “wantonly,” and “oppressively,” instruction 17A correctly described the type of conduct that constitutes excessive force.

Section 1983 claims of excessive force during an arrest are assessed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.

Martin v. Gentile · filed 1988-06-17

Faithful adherence to this established fourth amendment standard of objective reasonableness when dealing with claims of the use of excessive force during arrest will not make police officers subject to Sec. 1983 liability at one end for "every push and shove" they make nor at the other end for every serious injury they inflict during an arrest.

Section 1983 requires proof of a significant injury to recover money damages for excessive force during an apprehension.

Wisniewski v. Kennard · filed 1990-05-29

In Morel, we insisted upon proof of a significant injury as a threshold for the recovery of money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where excessive force in an illegal arrest was claimed. ... The record is plain that Wisniewski’s injuries are not significant within the meaning of Morel.

Section 1983 permits a person to seek relief for a Fourth Amendment excessive-force violation by an official acting under color of state law.

Stephens v. Nick Degiovanni, individually · filed 2017-03-30

Accepting Stephens’s version of the events involved in his arrest, this is an obvious-clarity case under the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and our circuit for a § 1983 Fourth Amendment, excessive-force claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for an individual’s emotional-distress claim based on alleged violations of the individual’s spouse’s civil rights.

Buikema v. Hayes · filed 1983-05-20

The Court therefore holds that an individual’s claims of emotional distress arising from alleged violations of his or her spouse’s civil rights are not cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a claim when defendants, acting under color of state law through foreclosure proceedings, deprive borrowers of federal statutory rights.

Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane · filed 1988-06-27

These allegations present the elements of a section 1983 claim. In other words, defendants, under color of state law, have deprived the Harpers of their federal rights under the 1987 Act.

Section 1983 supports a claim based on substantive rights under the Rehabilitation Act when defendants are alleged to have established a custom, policy, and consistent practice of denying those rights.

Jacob Todd, by Father, Jim Todd, and Mother, Patsy Todd v. Elkins School District No. 10 John R. Smith Jane Vaught Marsh · filed 1997-01-10

As to the section 1983 claim, the Todds alleged that defendants "established a custom, policy, and consistent practice" of denying Jacob his rights. We find that they stated a sufficient section 1983 claim based on the substantive rights in the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for deprivation of ADEA or ADA rights, though independently supported Section 1983 claims may proceed.

Martell v. Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico · filed 1999-03-29

Accordingly, plaintiffs § 1983 claim for deprivation of his ADEA and ADA rights should be dismissed. We shall assess, therefore, whether plaintiff has alleged facts which could independently support a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate claim when the asserted rights depend entirely on the ADA.

Moates v. Hamilton County · filed 2013-09-04

Because Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is wholly dependent on the rights derived from her ADA claim, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s motion as to this claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the ADA or Section 504 when those statutes have their own enforcement mechanisms and no distinct constitutional violation is alleged.

Parent v. Pittsford Central School District · filed 2017-02-17

Furthermore, “[a] § 1983 action may not ... bé brought to vindicate rights conferred only by a statute' that contains its own structure for private enforcement.” ... In the instant case,'both Section-504 and the ADA. contain them own enforcement mechanisms, and the Amended Complaint does not allege any “distinct violation of a constitutional - right.”

Section 1983 does not allow an individual-capacity claim against a state official to vindicate rights under Title II of the ADA.

(PC) Ireland v. White · filed 2019-10-08

With respect to plaintiff’s ADA claim against White, there is no individual liability for defendants sued for Title II violations pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide an independent claim for disability discrimination based solely on rights conferred by the ADA.

Bundy v. Broome-Tioga Board of Cooperative Educational Services · filed 2020-06-19

Here, separate and apart from her rights secured under the ADA, Bundy has not identified any other constitutional basis upon which a § 1983 claim might be predicated.

Section 1983 damages claims retain the right to a jury trial; agreeing to consolidate an injunction hearing with trial on the merits alone does not waive that right.

Mary E. Bowles and Edna K. Stone v. Larry D. Bennett, Etc. · filed 1980-11-06

Even assuming that plaintiffs’ counsel had agreed to consolidate the injunction hearing with the trial on the merits, that, alone, would not be an express waiver of the right to jury trial on the § 1983 damages claim.

A § 1983 claim for compensatory or punitive damages is a legal claim carrying a right to jury trial, while a back-pay request is equitable.

Laskaris v. Thornburgh · filed 1984-04-24

Thus, although the request for back pay under section 1983 seeks only equitable relief, ... a claim for compensatory and punitive damages is a legal claim entitling the plaintiff to a jury trial.

A claim for compensatory and punitive damages under Section 1983 sounds in law rather than equity, so it carries a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.

Douglas v. Burroughs · filed 1984-09-25

In the instant § 1983 action, plaintiff seeks damages to enforce her “legal rights.” Plaintiff's request for damages sounds essentially in tort and is analagous to an action for intentional infliction of distress. ... Since the award of compensatory and ’ punitive damages is a form of relief offered by courts of law, this Court finds that defendant Burroughs does have a right to trial by jury.

A plaintiff pursuing a Section 1983 claim alongside Title VII is entitled to a jury trial on the Section 1983 claim.

Meyett v. Coleman · filed 1985-01-23

As to his cause of action under § 1983, plaintiff is entitled to try his claim to a jury.

Section 1983 does not authorize imposing a party’s attorney’s fees on that party’s counsel.

Williams v. County of Fairfax · filed 1998-09-24

Both Title VII and § 1983 are silent about who pays the fees, and we found no authority for the court's imposition of attorney's fees against coun- sel under these statutes.

Section 1983 does not have to be expressly pleaded to support an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988.

Packard v. Gordon · filed 1987-11-13

In the instant case plaintiff asked for reasonable attorney’s fees in his amended complaint. A specific mention of § 1983 is not necessary for the trial court to award plaintiff such relief.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim when officers coordinate to conceal excessive force and impede a detainee’s access to the courts.

JACOBS v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY · filed 2019-06-04

Because Jacobs has therefore pointed to facts in the record which show that Armstrong, Anderson, Velazquez, and Williams were all party to an actionable and otherwise legally viable § 1983 after-the-fact conspiracy, summary judgment is denied on Jacobs’ § 1983 and NJCRA conspiracy claims as to all four of these defendants.

A plaintiff alleging a conspiracy under § 1983 must make particularized allegations that the conspiracy exists.

Briggs v. Briggs · filed 2007-08-27

A plaintiff claiming a conspiracy under § 1983 must make particularized allegations that a conspiracy exists.

A conspiracy to violate § 1983 arises under federal law and is not an independent state-law violation.

City of Warsaw v. Orban · filed 2007-12-31

The substance of the Orbans’ claim of “conspiracy to violate § 1983” is such that the claim arises under federal law. A “conspiracy” to violate § 1983 is not a violation of a state statute independent of a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require proof that the defendants reached an understanding to deny the plaintiffs’ rights.

Hope for Families & Community Service, Inc. v. Warren · filed 2008-05-15

The statutory basis for this claim is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In addition, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants reached an understanding to deny the plaintiffs rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require more than the passage of a law later held unconstitutional, particularly when its constitutionality was a close question.

Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo · filed 1987-08-04

The actions of the Governor and the legislature in passing a law later declared unconstitutional, particularly when the question is a close one, do not, without more, support a § 1983 conspiracy claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts establishing the alleged conspiracy.

Rounds v. Fisher · filed 2009-03-06

The district court properly dismissed Rounds’s conspiracy claim because he failed to state specific facts establishing the alleged conspiracy.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an underlying denial of constitutional rights.

Bennett v. Hendrix · filed 2009-03-31

Bennett and Reid failed to show an underlying denial of their constitutional rights, as we discussed in Part III.A. Therefore, Bennett and Reid cannot sustain a conspiracy action under § 1983.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal rights.

Pankey v. Webster · filed 1993-03-02

At a minimum, a conspiracy claim under section 1983 requires a plaintiff to have suffered an actual deprivation of his or her federal rights.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an underlying violation of a federally protected right.

Whittaker v. County of Lawrence · filed 2009-12-07

A plaintiff cannot advance a conspiracy claim under § 1983 without alleging an underlying violation of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require specific facts showing a meeting of the minds among the alleged conspirators.

Ronald Murray, Jr. v. Lene · filed 2010-02-23

A conspiracy claim, however, requires allegations of specific facts tending to show a "meeting of the minds" among the alleged conspirators. ... The factual allegations in Mr. Murray's complaint do not directly or indirectly suggest such a "meeting of the minds" between Ms. Steele or the DSS director and any other alleged conspirator, and so the district court correctly decided that Mr. Murray failed to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a conspiracy involving conduct that is not unconstitutional.

Whittaker v. County of Lawrence · filed 2011-07-15

A conspiracy to engage in conduct that does not amount to a constitutional violation is not a violation of § 1983, and no immunity is necessary if there was no unconstitutional act.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires proof of both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights.

McMillan v. Wiley · filed 2011-09-14

However, in order to succeed on a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights; pleading and proof of one without the other will be insufficient.”

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim only when there has been an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Sweetman v. Borough of Norristown · filed 2014-01-28

A § 1983 conspiracy claim is viable only if there has been an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require allegations of both a conspiracy and the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

Haik v. Salt Lake City Corporation · filed 2014-06-05

Regardless, such a claim would also fail because the allegations do not set forth either a conspiracy or a constitutionally protected right.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing a conspiratorial agreement and an actual deprivation of a federally secured right.

Arroyo v. Puerto Rico Police Department · filed 2014-11-20

To make out an actionable conspiracy under Section 1983; a plaintiff has to factually plead a conspiratorial agreement as well as an actual abridgment of some federally-secured right.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims have no heightened pleading standard, but a bare allegation of conspiracy is insufficient.

Senalan v. Curran · filed 2015-02-02

Although conspiracy claims under § 1983 are not subject to a heightened pleading standard, “a bare allegation of conspiracy [is] not enough to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir.2009).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a conspiracy claim to show a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Draper v. City of Festus, Missouri · filed 2015-04-06

To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, Draper must show a deprivation of his constitutional rights. ... Draper has alleged only a due-process violation. Because Draper failed to establish such a violation, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging conspiracy to show an understanding to deprive constitutional rights and willful joint activity with the State or its agents.

Laporta v. City of Chicago · filed 2015-04-24

To state a claim for a conspiracy in violation of § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) a state official and private individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (2) those individual(s) were willful participants] in joint activity with the State or its agents.”

A section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement between a state actor and a private party to violate civil rights.

Sun v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise · filed 2015-08-03

Even when the court draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, as would be required when evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court concludes that the plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege that the Tribal defendants and Robinson were engaged in a conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs’ civil rights. The Amended Complaint does not allege that Robinson and the Tribal defendants entered into an agreement, either express or tacit.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against employees of the same agency can proceed under the personal stake exception when they allegedly pursued their own interests outside their normal duties.

Ali v. Connick · filed 2015-09-28

Because Plaintiff has alleged facts that fit the personal stakes exception, the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine will not bar Plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, the- court denies summary judgment on Plaintiffs conspiracy claims under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff asserting a conspiracy claim to show a meeting of the minds rather than relying on suspicion and speculation.

Estate of Martin v. United States Marshals Service Agents · filed 2016-05-10

In any event, a § 1983 conspiracy claim still requires “a ‘“meeting of the minds.”’” ... A plaintiff must rely on more than his or her own suspicion and speculation to satisfy this requirement. ... We find that there was no evidence that the numerous Defendants implicated in this appeal actually reached an agreement amongst themselves to engage in a cover-up.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy claim to plead specific facts tending to show a meeting of minds among the alleged conspirators.

Snelling v. Haynes · filed 2011-11-28

More specifically, we conclude that Mr. Snelling did not adequately allege facts stating a conspiracy claim under section 1983, see Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2010) (conspiracy claim under § 1983 alleging violation of constitutional rights requires allegations of specific facts tending to show meeting of minds among alleged conspirators); ... and that Mr. Snelling could not pursue a claim for a purported violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (providing that in all courts of United States, parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel).

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying violation of a federal right.

Bertuglia v. Schaffler · filed 2016-12-06

Finally, we agree with the district court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim. To the extent plaintiffs argue that Schaffler and Ruzow agreed to deprive plaintiffs of their liberty by maliciously prosecuting them and denying them the right to a fair trial, we have already determined that a jury could not decide in favor of plaintiffs on either claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of a federally protected right.

Archer v. York City School District · filed 2016-12-28

Without such an actual deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, there can be no premise for Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. The claim shall therefore be dismissed.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.

Darryl Riddle v. Sergeant Timothy Riepe · filed 2017-08-09

To prevail on a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff is “required to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts showing agreement and concerted action among the defendants; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Leatherwood v. Rios · filed 2017-08-16

Second, his allegations regarding the alleged conspiracy are conclusory and devoid of the requisite specific facts showing agreement and concerted action by the LCF and Keefe Defendants.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying constitutional injury.

Harris v. Ross · filed 2018-04-27

The conspiracy count only survives if there is proof of a constitutional injury in fact. ... Accordingly, Harris’ claim for false arrest (Count I) is dismissed for failure to state a claim, and her claim for conspiracy (Count II) fails too for failure to assert a constitutional injury forming the basis of the conspiracy.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts from which an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of a protected right may be inferred.

POLEON v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS · filed 2018-08-08

To adequately plead conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must present facts from which an agreement may be inferred.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific factual allegations; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Williamson v. Missouri Dept.of Corrections · filed 2018-10-26

Finally, Williamson’s conclusory allegations of “obstruction” and “cover-up” are insufficient to state a conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require facts suggesting an agreement between private and public defendants to commit an illegal act and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.

Shine v. Jones · filed 2018-11-29

To plead a conspiracy under Section 1983, a plaintiff “must allege facts that suggest: 1) an agreement between the private and public defendants to commit an illegal act, and 2) an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Shine has failed to allege any facts in his complaint that would even suggest an agreement between Jones and Hyde. Therefore, Shine has failed to plead an essential element of his claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Taylor v. United States · filed 2019-01-07

Finally, Taylor did not adequately state a claim for conspiracy against Miller under either §§ 1985(3) or 1983. As for the § 1985 claim, Taylor failed to allege that the conspiracy was motivated by some discriminatory animus, and, as for the § 1983 claim, he failed to show that he was actually deprived of a constitutional right as a result of any conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Shaw v. Karnes County, Texas · filed 2019-03-11

No deprivation, no § 1983 conspiracy. ... As pleaded, Shaw’s conspiracy-to-violate-§ 1983 allegations, unsupported by sufficient factual content, are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement involving state actors, concerted action to inflict an unconstitutional injury, and an overt act causing damages.

Ramirez v. New York City/Department of Corrections · filed 2019-06-03

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires (1) an agreement between state actors or between a state actor and a private entity, (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury, and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement; conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.

Goulette v. Kalinski · filed 2019-08-20

Plaintiff fails to state any more than conclusory allegations and naked assertions of a conspiracy, which are insufficient to plead a Section 1983 conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring conspiracy claims alongside claims for the underlying constitutional violations, even when all defendants are public employees.

Dobbey v. Baldwin · filed 2019-10-08

Plaintiffs bring their conspiracy claims not under section 1985, but under section 1983. Neither Scott nor Fairley established new restrictions on section 1983. Neither held that plaintiffs may not bring concurrent claims under section 1983 for substantive wrongs and for conspiracy to commit those wrongs.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim may proceed without naming every alleged conspirator as a defendant.

Arbelaez v. City of New York · filed 2019-10-31

Critically, however, the law does not require that a plaintiff sue all members of a conspiracy in order to maintain a suit against any of them.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying deprivation of constitutional rights; an alleged cover-up without one fails to state a claim.

Jennings v. Decker · filed 2019-01-17

Nor does Plaintiff allege that the cover-up constituted some other form of constitutional violation, such as a deprivation of his due process rights. Therefore, exercising its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to "dismiss the case at any time if ... the action ... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff attempts to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Decker, Ettinger, and Ocker, that attempt also fails.

Section 1983 provides no independent basis of liability for a common law conspiracy claim.

Robinson v. Baldwin · filed 2019-12-09

Because common law conspiracy claims provide no independent basis of liability under Section 1983, Count 8 will also be dismissed without prejudice against these defendants.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a plausibly alleged constitutional violation.

James v. Annucci · filed 2020-03-03

By failing to allege facts plausibly suggesting a constitutional violation, Plaintiffs fail to meet the “act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury” element necessary to state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an agreement to commit an illegal act; conclusory allegations do not create a fact issue at summary judgment.

Streater v. Allen · filed 2020-03-19

To establish a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Streater has to “show that the defendants agreed to commit an illegal act.” Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1982). Conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not create a fact issue on summary judgment. Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2006). Streater’s verified complaint offers only blanket allegations that the defendants “conspired.”

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require facts indicating an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights; suspicion alone is insufficient.

Proby v. Corizon Medical Services · filed 2020-04-27

Without further facts implying that Dr. Montany agreed to deprive plaintiff of any constitutional rights, plaintiff fails to state a claim for conspiracy against Dr. Montany under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim fails when no underlying Section 1983 cause of action can be established.

Walker v. Fitzpatrick · filed 2020-05-19

However, we have held that when none “of the underlying section 1983 causes of action can be established, the claim for conspiracy also fails.” ... Because, as discussed above, the district court correctly dismissed Walker’s property and liberty due process claims, the derivative conspiracy claim also fails.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim can proceed when other federal constitutional claims remain.

HUMPHREY v. CITY OF ANDERSON · filed 2020-06-08

But here, the Court has not dismissed all other federal constitu- tional claims; some of those claims remain. Therefore, the Court declines to dismiss the § 1983 conspiracy claim in Count V.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific factual allegations; conclusory statements are insufficient.

Sellner v. Carter · filed 2020-08-20

Conspiracy allegations must contain more than mere conclusory statements.

A § 1983 conspiracy claimant must plead specific facts about when the agreement was made, how long it lasted, who joined it, and its object.

Jackson v. Carter · filed 2020-05-14

To the extent that Jackson alleged a conspiracy claim against Defendant O’Brien, he failed to state a claim. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a § 1983 conspiracy claimant must plead specific facts addressing the time the agreement was made, the period of the conspiracy, the exact parties to the ... agreement, and the object of the conspiracy).

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts supporting an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an act in furtherance; conclusory assertions do not suffice.

Munt v. Schnell · filed 2020-09-02

Instead, he makes numerous conclusory statements that Defendants were engaged in a conspiracy. Munt’s reliance on these statements and general assertions of conspiracy fail to state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires a corresponding constitutional violation.

Griffin v. Zuckerberg · filed 2020-09-21

A § 1983 conspiracy claim does not stand alone without a corresponding constitutional violation; rather, it is a theory that “will enable a plaintiff to bring suit against purely private individuals” for violation of constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an actual deprivation of those rights.

Richards v. United Riverhead Terminal Inc. · filed 2020-09-28

The SAC does not allege facts sufficient to state a conspiracy claim under either § 1983 or § 1985(3).

A conspiracy claim based on rights secured by Section 1983 does not require an allegation of racial or other discriminatory animus.

Lilley v. Greene Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2020-10-22

Such allegations are required to support a claim of conspiracy to violate a party's equal protection rights under 42 USC § 1985 (3) ( see Griffin v Breckenridge , 403 US 88, 102 [1971]), but no such allegation is required where, as here, the claim is based on rights secured by 42 USC § 1983 ( see Birnbaum v Trussell , 371 F2d 672, 676-677 [2d Cir 1966]).

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action to deprive someone of federal rights, as well as an actual deprivation of those rights.

Martinez v. Ryel · filed 2020-11-06

Because the third-party complaint alleges no specific facts which, if proven, would show an agreement or concerted action to violate Ryel’s civil rights, Ryel’s conspiracy claims brought against the movants under § 1983 and §1985(3) fail under Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 conspiracy claims fail when the plaintiff does not state an underlying constitutional claim.

Lonnie Williams, Jr. v. Paramo · filed 2020-12-11

Because the district court permissibly concluded that Williams failed to state an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim, the district court properly dismissed Williams’s related conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Ruthen Weems, III v. Stroman · filed 2019-05-17

Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that the foregoing claims were barred by Heck.

A plaintiff cannot recover under § 1983 if doing so would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s criminal conviction.

Ortega v. Rodenspiel · filed 2015-09-25

Here, the district court properly accepted the jury’s finding from Ortega’s criminal trial for assault with a deadly weapon that Ortega “used his car in such a way that was . . . likely to cause death or great bodily injury.” See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (plaintiff cannot recover on § 1983 claim if doing so necessarily implies invalidity of plaintiff’s criminal conviction).

Section 1983 does not permit damages for harm that would render a conviction or sentence invalid unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

El Bey v. State of New Jersey · filed 2014-08-20

“[A] criminal defendant may not recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for ‘harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render [his] conviction or sentence invalid’ unless ‘the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” ... Plaintiff does not demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated, and therefore, his claim for damages is meritless.

A § 1983 complaint that is premature under Heck may be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.

Perkins v. Livingston · filed 2013-08-19

The district court dismissed Perkins’s complaint without prejudice; however, because the complaint, as found by the district court, is premature under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Perkins has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s decision, the dismissal should have been with prejudice. See Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1994). Although there is no cross-appeal, the dismissal of Perkins’s § 1983 complaint is MODIFIED from “without prejudice” to “with prejudice as frivolous” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

A § 1983 claim alleging that delayed notice of state charges led to an unconstitutional prosecution was premature under Heck at the time of dismissal.

Henry v. Moore · filed 2012-10-03

Finally, the District Court properly determined that, at the time of dismissal, Henry’s claim that failure to receive timely notice of his state charges led to an unconstitutional prosecution was premature.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily undermine a conviction is not cognizable until the conviction has been invalidated.

Cano-Diaz v. City of Leeds · filed 2012-08-01

Cano-Diaz’s Fourth Amendment claim is not ripe under Heck because she has not pointed to a “conviction or sentence reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Therefore, she does not have a cognizable § 1983 claim at this time for her alleged Fourth Amendment violation.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim is barred when success would necessarily invalidate an outstanding conviction arising from the same events.

Matheney v. City of Cookeville, Tennessee · filed 2012-02-07

For Heck to bar a § 1983 claim, success on the claim must necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction. Thus, both the § 1983 claim and the conviction must arise out of the same events.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for unlawful confinement unless the confinement has first been invalidated.

Love-El v. Fulwood · filed 2011-09-15

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Compi. at 1, seeking compensatory damages of $500,000 for his unlawful detention, id. at 2. Because plaintiff s claim goes to the fact of his incarceration, he cannot recover damages in a civil rights action without showing that his confinement has been invalidated by "revers[al] on direct appeal, expunge[ment] by executive order, declar[ation of invalidity] by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or ... a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,486-87 (1994); accord White v. Bowie, 194 F.3d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (table).

Section 1983 bars a civil claim that would undermine an uninvalidated criminal conviction.

North Carolina ex rel. Bishop v. County of Macon · filed 2011-08-22

Since there was no favorable termination of that charge within the meaning of Heck, Donna is barred from civilly claiming (at least in a § 1983 action) that she was, in fact, the owner of that property. That § 1983 claim was waived by Donna’s failure to seek and obtain full vindication on the possession of stolen property charge.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to pursue a claim that would directly or implicitly call into question a conviction unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated through specified state or federal proceedings.

Washam v. Stesis · filed 2009-04-10

Under Heck, a plaintiff may not pursue a claim under § 1983 for actions that would directly or implicitly call into question the validity of his conviction unless he demonstrates that the “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87. Because Washam’s § 1983 complaint seeks relief for conduct that he alleges resulted in an improper conviction due to a Batson violation, and because that conviction still stands, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging a conviction or sentence require the plaintiff to show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated through direct appeal, executive order, a state tribunal, or federal habeas relief.

Hawkins v. California · filed 2009-03-09

In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff “must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by federal court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Appellant has not asserted, either in this court or before the district court, that he would be able to meet this requirement. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Section 1983 bars a state prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Davis v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 2007-11-19

Wilkinson is not applicable here because success on Davis’ claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 1991 sentence or spell speedier release on his 1997 sentence. Thus, Davis’ § 1983 claim falls squarely within the Heck holding and is barred.

Section 1983 generally bars damages actions that would require invalidating a prior conviction or sentence based on the same facts.

Southall v. Frasier · filed 2007-12-03

The Heck doctrine, a facet of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, prevents persons, in most situations, from bringing a § 1983 action for damages where recovery would require the invalidation of a prior conviction or sentence based on the same facts.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for imprisonment that would imply an invalid sentence unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Ceasar v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2008-01-28

Absent a showing that plaintiffs conviction or sentence has been invalidated, he cannot recover damages in this action.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply that a probation revocation is invalid unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Cobb v. State of Florida · filed 2008-09-11

A plaintiff cannot win relief under § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” ... The district court correctly dismissed Cobb’s complaint because the necessary implication of a grant of relief would be that Cobb’s probation revocation is invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily call into question an unreversed conviction or guilty plea.

Salas v. Pierce · filed 2008-10-23

Here, we conclude from the record that the district court properly found that Heck barred Salas’s claim against the Assistant District Attorney for conspiring with his counsel to coerce him into pleading guilty because Salas has not alleged that his sentence or conviction has been reversed on appeal, and a judgment in favor of Salas would necessarily call into question the validity of his guilty plea and his underlying conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a state sentence when success would necessarily establish its invalidity unless the sentence has first been invalidated.

Felgar v. Burkett · filed 2009-05-27

Accordingly, because the state sentence has not been overturned or otherwise rendered invalid, Felgar may not attack it via a § 1983 action, and the District Court’s dismissal of his claims was proper.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue a Heck-barred challenge to the sentence imposed on him.

Smith v. State of California · filed 2010-08-30

The district court properly concluded that Smith’s claims may not be pursued as part of a § 1983 action.

An invalidated prison rule-violation conviction does not bar a related § 1983 excessive force claim under Edwards.

Jeffery v. Bennge · filed 2012-05-17

Because it appears that Jeffery’s rule violation conviction in connection with the 2003 incident has been invalidated, we vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Jeffery’s excessive force claim and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would undermine a conviction or parole revocation when the plaintiff could have sought habeas relief but did not obtain a ruling invalidating it.

Hadley v. Quinn · filed 2013-04-25

Under Heck a plaintiff may not pursue a suit for damages under § 1983 that would undermine the validity of a conviction unless he demonstrates that the conviction “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” ... Thus, his claims for damages resulting from these events are barred, and we will not delve further into the merits.

A prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim is not cognizable if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Damond v. LeBlanc · filed 2014-01-16

A prisoner’s claim seeking monetary damages under § 1983 is not cognizable whenever a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 does not permit claims implying an invalid conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned or invalidated.

Wilmer Gay v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2015-05-01

We add that, to the extent that Gay’s claims arise out of his prosecution for murder and imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence, they are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent a showing that the conviction or sentence has been overturned or invalidated, which he frankly admits is not the case.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to maintain claims whose success would imply an invalid conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Kates v. Christie · filed 2015-11-18

As the District Court concluded, “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff [on these claims] would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” and because Kates has not established that his sentence has already been invalidated, he cannot maintain these claims in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages for conduct that would imply the invalidity of a conviction to show that the conviction has been rendered invalid.

Christy v. Sheriff of Palm Beach · filed 2008-08-05

However, and despite his assertion to the contrary, the court was correct to dismiss these claims under Heck because if Christy prevailed on these two claims, it would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 1985 conviction. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that his criminal conviction had been rendered invalid in order to recover damages for harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction).

A § 1983 excessive force claim may proceed despite an assault conviction when success on the claim would not necessarily invalidate that conviction.

Church v. Anderson · filed 2017-04-17

It is clear that a decision in Church’s favor would not create two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same incident. Such a result is possible if, even though Church assaulted Anderson, Church suffered unnecessary injuries because Anderson’s response to the assault was not objectively reasonable. ... Accordingly, I conclude that Church’s excessive force claim is not barred by the Heck doctrine.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the duration of confinement when success would imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Poupart v. Landry · filed 2019-11-14

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s findings. Although Plaintiff asserts that he is not directly challenging his conviction, only the duration of his confinement, Plaintiffs claims still imply the invalidity of his conviction, which has not been challenged.

A Section 1983 claim for damages based on wrongful parole revocation cannot proceed while the underlying conviction remains valid.

Miles v. Grant County Commissioners · filed 2020-08-13

Nor can he pursue a claim for money damages for wrongful revocation of his parole or wrongful incarceration, because they rest on a presumption that his conviction is invalid.

A breach of a settlement agreement cannot, by itself, support a § 1983 claim.

Walsifer v. Borough of Belmar · filed 2008-01-23

Finally, we agree with the District Court that Defendants’ apparent violation of the stipulation of settlement cannot serve as the basis of a § 1983 claim, and find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1983 allows damages claims against prison officials for conduct or conditions of confinement that violate the Eighth Amendment.

Scittarelli v. Manson · filed 1978-03-07

It is settled that prison officials may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to state prisoners for injuries resulting from conduct or conditions of confinement which violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on nonmedical prison employees who respond reasonably to medical complaints by investigating and relying on medical staff’s assessment.

Riley v. Kolitwenzew · filed 2016-03-18

Prison employees who, like Kolitwenzew, don’t provide medical care are shielded from liability if they “responded reasonably” to complaints, e.g., by investigating and relying on the medical staff’s assessment that adequate treatment is being provided.

Section 1983 permits liability of a non-medical prison official for denial of medical care when the official is personally involved, interferes with a prison physician’s care, or implicitly authorizes or is indifferent to the physician’s constitutional violations.

Marin v. Williams · filed 2020-10-27

As explained by the Magistrate Judge, the Fourth Circuit has held that in order to establish liability under § 1983 against a non-medical prison official, like these Defendants, in a case concerning the denial of medical treatment, an inmate must show that the official (1) was actually personally involved with the denial of the medical treatment, (2) deliberately interfered with a prison physician’s care of the inmate, or (3) implicitly authorized or was indifferent to the constitutional violations of the prison doctor.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Paine v. Ben L. Baker, Supervisor of Records, and the North Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 1979-03-30

We have today announced a right secured to state prison inmates by the Constitution, to have prejudicial erroneous information expunged from their prison files; but we think that, as a jurisdictional predicate to filing an action under § 1983, the inmate must allege that the prison officials have deprived him of this right. This means that application for expunction must be made in the first instance to prison authorities.

A § 1983 claim that accrued before a person’s death may survive in favor of the person’s estate.

Harvey v. Mohammed · filed 2013-06-26

After Mr. Suggs’s death, any § 1983 cause of action which had accrued to him survived in favor of his legal representative, namely, his estate.

Section 1983 does not identify who may bring a claim after the injured person dies; applicable state law determines whether an estate representative has standing.

Estate of Guled ex rel. Abdi v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2016-04-18

Indeed, § 1983 claims are regularly litigated in this Court by trustees of individuals who have passed away. That Abdi lost such status does not render Minnesota law inconsistent with federal law. Rather, it simply means he lacks standing and his claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 has no survivorship provision, so § 1988(a) governs whether a civil rights claim survives the injured person’s death.

Estate of Gilliam Ex Rel. Waldroup v. City of Prattville · filed 2011-04-26

By its terms, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for the survival of civil rights actions. Due to this “deficiency” in the statute, the survivorship of civil rights actions is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).

Section 1983 claims follow the most analogous state survival rule unless applying that rule conflicts with federal policy.

Bentz v. City of Kendallville · filed 2009-08-14

When analyzing the survivability of § 1983 claims, we therefore apply the state survival statute unless it is inconsistent with federal policy. ... Leonelli’s federal claim for unreasonable seizure would be treated under Indiana law as a false imprisonment claim; his unlawful entry Fourth Amendment claim is analogous to the Indiana tort of invasion of privacy. Because neither tort survives under Indiana law, the appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal is Granted.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Roberson v. Wood · filed 1980-11-12

Plaintiffs have not cited, nor is this Court aware of any federal statute which provides for survival of a right of action in cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). ... In a situation such as the one presented here, this Court holds that the declaratory relief sought in plaintiffs’ complaint does not survive the death of the plaintiffs and defendants’ Motion to Dismiss claims four through nine is thereby GRANTED.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim that events occurring after a person’s death deprived that person of constitutional rights.

Ida Mae Whitehurst, Etc. v. Edward L. Wright, Jr., Etc. · filed 1979-04-05

The trial court correctly ruled that the events occurring post obitum could form no part of the deceased’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985 action.

Section 1983 has no survival rule of its own, so courts use the forum state's survival law to decide whether a claim survives the plaintiff's death.

Dawn Brown v. Town of Cary · filed 2013-01-22

As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for survival of claims, we consult the law of the forum state—the North Car- olina survival statute—to determine whether the claim sur- vives.

Section 1983 creates a personal cause of action that, under Idaho law, abates when the injured person dies and cannot be pursued by the estate.

Hoagland v. Ada County · filed 2013-05-16

We hold that Munroe’s § 1983 claim abated with his death. This Court has clearly held that § 1983 is a personal cause of action.

Section 1983 creates a private action for wrongs by the state and is not a penal statute under Connecticut’s survival law.

Gothberg v. Town of Plainville · filed 2015-09-03

Unlike § 14-295, Section 1983 does not prescribe “double and treble damages,” it does not incorporate criminal statutes by reference, and quite contrary to prescribing a remedy for a wrong done to the state, it authorizes a private cause of action for a wrong done by the state. It would require the most strained reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 52-599(c)(3) to conclude that the former is a “penal statute” within the meaning of the latter.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased person for alleged violations of that person’s rights after death.

Wingate v. Byrd · filed 2016-09-30

Indeed, it is well established that section 1983 does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased for events occurring after death.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against state officials whose excessive force or failure to intervene deprives a person of constitutional liberty.

Putman v. Gerloff · filed 1981-01-28

Bell v. Wolfish supports an instruction in which the jury is told to evaluate the use of force in a manner similar to its evaluation of the overnight chaining. If Gerloff’s purpose in striking Putman was to injure, punish or discipline him, the jury should find for the plaintiff. ... Furthermore, as an affirmative defense both Gerloff and Crowe may claim qualified immunity if their official actions were taken in good faith. ... In such a case he would not be acting in good faith and would be liable. In any event we hold the issue to be one of fact under all the existing circumstances.

Section 1983 requires publication of a defamatory government statement to support a government defamation claim.

Sky Harbor Air Service, Inc. v. Reams · filed 2012-07-20

Ms. Reams’s statements to the WyDOT Commission cannot support a government defamation claim because they were not published. ... Any dissemination of Ms. Reams’s statements to the WyDOT Commission was thus intra-governmental and insufficient to establish publication. Because Sky Harbor has not offered evidence of the publication of Ms. Reams’s statements outside of the WyDOT Commission’s closed doors, its § 1983 government defamation claim cannot succeed.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for defamation alone when the publication is too remote from an employment termination to implicate a liberty interest.

Duggan v. Town of Ocean City · filed 1981-06-16

The Court concludes that the point has been reached in the instant case and that the statements in question are not actionable under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim that a police officer defamed the plaintiff.

Walker v. Atlanta Police Department Public Affairs Unit · filed 2009-04-07

Although imputing criminal behavior to an individual is generally considered defamation and actionable without proof of special damages, the Supreme Court has held that a claim of being defamed by a police officer is not actionable under § 1983. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1165-66 (1976). Therefore, Walker cannot gain relief under §1983 and is not entitled to money damages.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation, which is a state law claim.

Dillard v. Tallant · filed 2019-09-04

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims of defamation fail because defamation is a state law claim that is not cognizable under section 1983.

A Section 1983 defamation claim requires a change or extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by state law or the Constitution.

Ford v. City of Harrisburg, PA · filed 2019-09-16

Defendants correctly note that as a Section 1983 defamation of character claim requires “a change or extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by state law or the Constitution,” see Kohler v. Pennsylvania, 438 F. App’x 120, 123 (3d Cir. 2011), if Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation by way of a First Amendment retaliation claim, as the Court herein finds that it does, then it also fails to allege a defamation of character claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires malicious intent to support a claim for relief.

Deavors v. Burnham · filed 1981-06-30

Moreover, by plaintiff’s own statements, he cannot prove that any of the actions taken by defendants in connection with the DiPino vehicle were motivated by malicious intent, which is necessary to support a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for recovery when the challenged conduct is merely negligent.

West v. Robinson · filed 1981-07-14

It recognizes that conduct, which is at most negligent, is not a basis for § 1983 recovery.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights claim for accidental personal injuries.

Spencer v. Fenty · filed 2010-05-13

Such accidental personal injuries may be compensated through other means, but they do not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of civil rights.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference and a substantial causal link before an agency can be liable for failing to perform affirmative duties.

Dixey v. Jewish Child Care Ass'n · filed 1981-08-20

Plaintiff must make two showings before § 1983 liability may be imposed on an agency for the non-performance of affirmative duties. First, the officials in charge of the agency must have displayed a deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. ... Second, the omission must have been a substantial factor leading to the denial of a Constitutionally protected liberty.

A succession administrator may bring a § 1983 due process claim to enforce a property right of the succession.

Spells v. New Orleans City · filed 2018-01-19

The district court erred in holding that a succession administrator lacks standing to bring a § 1983 due process claim. ... Consequently, Appellant has standing to the extent he seeks to enforce a right of the succession.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek redress when someone acting under state law deprives them of constitutional rights.

Gordon v. City of Cartersville, Georgia · filed 1981-09-25

In this case, however, § 1983 is the vehicle employed to seek redress of Constitutional violations. ... In conclusion, the plaintiffs have standing under §§ 1981, 1982 and 1983 to seek redress for the allegedly illegally motivated decisions of the defendants.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a person deprived of federal rights under color of state law.

Estate of D. Martin v. Cal Dept Va · filed 2009-03-26

We therefore hold that Mary Martin does not have standing to bring a claim under § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated her mother’s right to equal protection under the laws.

A supplier’s discrimination claim based solely on a state’s preference for one product over another falls outside § 1983’s zone of interests.

Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. State · filed 1997-03-28

We therefore hold that this claim is not within the zone of interests of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law and permits damages relief subject to equitable restraint when adjudication would interfere with a pending state proceeding.

Price v. Rust · filed 1981-10-27

In conclusion, I hold that the policy reasons supporting the exercise of equitable restraint in cases seeking injunctive or declaratory relief apply equally in a suit for damages, where the federal court would have to resolve issues which have been or continue to be capable of resolution in a pending state proceeding. The principle of comity requires that the state court be given the opportunity to resolve constitutional issues without interference from the federal courts. Restraint is appropriate where, as here, plaintiff has the opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the state proceeding, where the state is a party to the state proceeding, and where there are no exceptional circumstances to justify federal intervention. Accordingly, these proceedings will be stayed pending final resolution of plaintiff’s claims in the state proceedings.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights conferred by state or municipal ordinances or regulations.

Levine v. Town of West Hartford Police Department · filed 1982-06-23

The Town of West Hartford conflicts provision is an “ordinance” or “regulation” within the meaning of § 1983 and it was formally adopted by the defendant. Thus, any rights that are conferred under this regulation, including the right to be considered for municipal employment by an impartial appointing authority, necessarily must be guaranteed and safeguarded by § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires a jury instruction for § 1983 conspiracy rather than an instruction for a § 1985 claim.

Gantt v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2013-05-31

The court gave an instruction for a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, but Plaintiffs were prosecuting a § 1983 claim. If a new trial is to be held, the correct conspiracy instruction must be given.

Section 1983 requires state action and a deprivation of constitutional rights; conclusory allegations do not establish a conspiracy claim.

Romeu v. Housing Investment Corp. · filed 1982-09-29

We find that plaintiffs’ “conspiracy” action involving defendants Housing, Overseas, Chase, the Planning Board, ARPE and its officers, Luis A. San Miguel, Constructora and its officials, Capacete and its officials, CALP and Libby’s is a mere compilation of conclusory allegations which, standing alone or incessantly repeated, do not establish the necessary elements to spell out a Section 1983 conspiracy.