42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not give federal courts jurisdiction to stay an execution.

In Re: Martin · filed 2002-05-13

In the alternative, to the extent the appeal is from the dismissal of § 1983 relief, we lack jurisdiction, as held by the district court.

Section 1983 does not give federal courts jurisdiction to stay an execution.

Martin v. Cain · filed 2002-05-13

In the alternative, to the extent the appeal is from the dismissal of § 1983 relief, we lack jurisdiction, as held by the district court.

A § 1983 challenge to a method of execution does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a stay; the plaintiff must show a significant possibility of success on the merits.

Jones v. Hobbs · filed 2010-04-09

The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that “inmates seeking time to challenge the manner in which the State plans to execute them must satisfy all of the requirements for a stay, including a showing of a significant possibility of success on the merits.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). The plaintiffs in Jones have failed to show—and the district court did not find—that they have any realistic chance of prevailing on the merits, much less that they have a significant possibility of success on the merits. Under Hill, the likelihood of irreparable harm (which is present in every § 1983 action challenging a proposed method of execution) is not enough.

A cognizable § 1983 claim does not entitle an inmate to a stay of execution as a matter of right.

Cooey v. Strickland · filed 2010-05-12

“the mere fact that an inmate states a cognizable § 1983 claim does not warrant the entry of a stay as a matter of right.”

A cognizable § 1983 claim challenging an execution does not entitle an inmate to a stay as a matter of right.

Richard Cooey, II v. Strickland · filed 2010-05-12

“the mere fact that an inmate states a cognizable § 1983 claim does not warrant the entry of a stay as a matter of right.”

Section 1983 does not make prospective relief available when the facts do not support such relief.

Page v. Finnberg · filed 2008-08-01

The district court properly dismissed Page’s action seeking prospective relief for failure to state a claim, because such relief was not available under the facts of this case.

Section 1983 allows a litigant to seek prospective relief in federal court for an alleged deprivation of federal rights when a genuine threat of prosecution exists.

Wooley v. Maynard · filed 1977-04-20

Younger principles aside, a litigant is entitled to resort to a federal forum in seeking redress under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for an alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Section 1983 permits official capacity claims against state officials seeking prospective injunctive relief.

Garner v. Steger · filed 2014-10-09

Specifically, Ex parte Young allows official capacity claims under Section 1983 to be asserted against state officials where a plaintiff seeks only prospective, injunctive relief. ... Here, the official capacity claims seek only prospective injunctive relief and thus fall within the Ex parte Young exception.

Section 1983 does not allow prospective injunctive relief against officials who no longer hold the position needed to provide it.

Richardson v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-06-30

But Warden Cartledge and Warden Stephan cannot be sued in their official capacities for the prospective injunctive relief sought here because they are no longer employed at McCormick Correctional Institution.

Section 1983 does not permit prospective injunctive relief against officials in their official capacities when they no longer hold the positions needed to provide that relief.

Murray v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-07-02

But Warden Cartledge and Warden Stephan cannot be sued in their official capacities for the prospective injunctive relief sought here because they are no longer employed at McCormick Correctional Institution.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a state official for prospective reinstatement under Ex parte Young, but not for monetary relief.

GALVAN v. STATE OF INDIANA · filed 2020-06-01

For these reasons, we hold that Mr. Galvan's claims seeking the prospective relief of reinstatement fall within the Ex parte Young exception and are thus not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law for deprivation of a constitutional right.

Smith v. Martinez · filed 2015-04-28

But “§ 1983 actions do not lie against a State.”

Section 1983 requires a prisoner bringing a denial of access claim to show that the defendant caused actual injury by depriving the prisoner of an opportunity to pursue a non-frivolous claim.

Jones v. Domalakes · filed 2008-08-12

Turning to the exhausted claims, it is well established that a prisoner bringing a denial of access claim under section 1983 must demonstrate that the defendant caused him “actual injury” by depriving him of an opportunity to pursue a non-frivolous claim.

A court may abstain from deciding a § 1983 damages claim that requires determining the validity of the claimant’s custody until the claimant exhausts state or tribal challenges to that custody.

Schauer v. Burleigh County · filed 1985-09-17

Therefore, this court will abstain from deciding Plaintiffs damage claim pending her exhaustion of attacks, in the state or tribal courts, on the validity of her custody.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for constitutional rights violations by officials acting under color of state law.

Scott v. Schmidt · filed 1985-09-17

The complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim against Hooper.

Section 1983 relief is unavailable when allegations against the defendants are speculative and conclusional.

Jewell v. Bell · filed 2010-07-29

Jewell’s allegations against Bell and Livingston are speculative, conclusional, and fail to state a claim for § 1983 relief.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that a defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Arizona v. Arpaio · filed 2015-01-05

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs must plausibly claim that Defendants (1) acted under the color of state law (2) to deprive Plaintiffs of a constitutional right. ... Based on the foregoing analysis, Plaintiffs have stated a claim under § 1983. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants are enforcing a law that violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

KEMP v. GEO GROUP · filed 2020-03-10

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. ... Based on the screening standards set forth above, Mr. Kemp’s First Amendment retaliation claims against the Commissioner of the IDOC and the GEO Group shall proceed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right by a defendant acting under color of state law.

Walker v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2020-04-07

To proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the defendant was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of federal rights caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Perez v. State of Iowa · filed 2020-10-22

To state a claim under this statute, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers election fraud only when state officials willfully undermine the electoral process or impair a citizen’s right to vote.

Kozuszek, Nicole v. Brewer, Dale · filed 2008-10-08

We held that “section 1983 is implicated only when there is ‘willful conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected.’ ” Id. at 1271-72 (quoting Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975)) (emphasis in Bodine). By “willful” we meant, at a minimum, that the alleged perpetrators had acted with the intent of undermining the electoral process or impairing a citizen’s right to vote.

Section 1983 applies to election fraud claims only when officials willfully undermine the electoral process or impair a citizen’s right to vote.

Kozuszek v. Brewer · filed 2008-10-08

Both parties agree that the Kozuszeks’ federal constitutional claims are governed by Bodine v. Elkhart County Election Bd., 788 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir.1986), in which we laid out the requirements for election fraud claims under section 1983. We held that “section 1983 is implicated only when there is ‘willful conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected.’” ... By “willful” we meant, at a minimum, that the alleged perpetrators had acted with the intent of undermining the electoral process or impairing a citizen’s right to vote.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to comply with the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act’s administrative requirements before filing a claim.

Ohlsen v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 1986-09-29

For the foregoing reasons, a plaintiff need not comply with the administrative requirements of the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act as a precondition to the filing of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims brought in state court are subject to Indiana's tort claim notice provisions.

Werblo v. BD., HAMILTON HEIGHTS SCHOOL CORP. · filed 1988-02-16

Accordingly, § 1983 claims brought in state court are subject to the notice provisions of the ITCA.

In a § 1983 action, the course of proceedings can show that defendants received adequate notice of claims stated ambiguously in the complaint.

Zar v. Payne · filed 2011-01-12

The Court therefore concludes that the Defendants have received adequate notice of both allegations under the “course of proceedings” test applied to ambiguous § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a parent to bring a loss-of-society claim when a child is injured, even if state law bars recovery for a nonfatal injury.

Hutson Ex Rel. Hutson v. Bell · filed 1988-12-16

We believe that this case law which recognizes a liberty interest in the parent-child relationship and extends protection to this liberty interest supports a conclusion that a parent may bring an action under Section 1983 for loss of society when his or her child has been injured.

Section 1983 can provide injunctive relief for a violation of a federal statute even when the complaint did not cite it.

Thorstenn v. Barnard · filed 1989-08-22

Thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to invoke § 1983 as the basis for the injunctive relief granted once the violation was found.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between an official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Grace v. Wainwright · filed 1991-03-28

In addition, section 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires evidence connecting the plaintiff’s injuries to the defendants’ actions.

Gary v. DeKalb County Government · filed 2009-11-09

Gary failed to introduce any evidence to connect her injuries to actions by the officials.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative causal connection between an official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Joe Daniel Holt, Jr. v. Mac Glenn · filed 2010-01-14

“section 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” ... The district court correctly found that Holt’s complaint failed to show a causal connection between Glenn’s act – the alleged alteration of the order of probation – and the alleged deprivation of Holt’s liberty interest – the revocation of his probation.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a defendant’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.

Collins v. Homestead Correctional Institution · filed 2011-10-05

The evidence showed that the prison evacuation procedures were devised at the state level, and that the named defendants in this case had no control over the type or number of buses used in the evacuation. As a result, there was no causal link between the defendants’ actions and the alleged overcrowding, overheating, or deprivation of sanitation facilities presented by those buses.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the alleged deprivation of a federal right.

Velazquez-Ortiz v. Negron-Fernandez · filed 2016-03-31

Second, Plaintiff failed to show that there was a causal connection between Defendant Negron and Plaintiffs alleged federal deprivation of rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a causal link between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation.

(PC) Candler v. Palko · filed 2019-09-05

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a causal link between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation.

(PC) Felder v. Macias · filed 2020-07-24

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. ... Because plaintiff does not clearly establish Lizarraga’s relationship to the alleged constitutional violations, he fails to state a cognizable claim against Lizarraga.

Suicide does not by itself bar recovery under § 1983.

Hayes v. City of Des Plaines · filed 1998-08-26

As set forth by both the federal and Illinois state courts, suicide has not been a bar to recovery under § 1983 or Illinois statutory law.

Section 1983 requires a procedural due process plaintiff to plead and prove that available state corrective procedures are inadequate, and permits nominal damages without proof of actual injury.

Sutton v. Cleveland Board of Education · filed 1992-03-19

Under the authority of Parratt, this court held that, in a procedural due process case under section 1983, “the plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedure as well as the substantive wrong” and carries the burden of pleading and proving the inadequacy of state processes.

Section 1983 does not provide a due process remedy for random and unauthorized state employee misconduct when state courts supply adequate process.

James v. Illinois Sexually Da · filed 2010-04-27

Because James alleges that the defendants’ agencies behaved in an unauthorized manner, the principle of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), applies. State courts supply the process due for random and unauthorized misconduct by state employees.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims accrue when the underlying criminal proceedings terminate favorably for the plaintiff.

Blackmon v. Perez · filed 1992-05-05

The reasoning of the Brummett court is persuasive; therefore, as plaintiffs’ § 1983 malicious prosecution claims were filed within two years of their accrual on January 3, 1990, those claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying criminal proceeding terminates in the plaintiff’s favor.

Dunn v. The State of Tennessee · filed 1983-04-18

To require this type 1983 claim to be filed prior to the final successful disposition of the underlying criminal charge would create unwarranted federal intrusion into state affairs. Such a claim does not fully accrue until the successful termination of the state criminal proceedings.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying criminal prosecution ends in the plaintiff’s favor.

Doe v. Selsky · filed 2009-10-16

Plaintiff asserts what amounts to a § 1983 claim for denial of due process, based on his malicious prosecution in state court. Such a claim accrues when the underlying criminal prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor.

A § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim for a seizure after legal process is analogous to malicious prosecution and accrues when criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Myers v. Koopman · filed 2014-01-08

Here, the district court fixed false imprisonment as the proper analogy for Myers’ § 1983 claim—even though his complaint asserted malicious prosecution. In fact, Myers correctly styled his claim as one for malicious prosecution because he was seized after the institution of legal process. ... A claim of malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim arising from charges ended by a nolle prosequi accrues when the charges are nolled, rather than when the related records are erased.

Spak v. Phillips · filed 2015-10-13

I conclude that the statute of limitations began to run on the date that the charges were nolled, and therefore that summary judgment should enter against plaintiff on the ground that his lawsuit was not timely filed within the limitation period for a malicious prosecution claim.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the indictment is dismissed, even if prosecutors may seek a new indictment.

Sharp v. County of Putnam, New York · filed 2019-05-24

Here, similarly, the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff were terminated when the court dismissed the indictment, notwithstanding the possibility that the prosecution might thereafter empanel a second grand jury and seek a separate indictment against Plaintiff.

A Section 1983 claim analogous to malicious prosecution accrues when the underlying criminal proceedings end in the plaintiff’s favor.

Johnson v. Baltimore Police Department · filed 2020-03-10

Thus, as the Supreme Court has explained, a § 1983 claim that is analogous to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution accrues when the underlying criminal proceedings have been resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying criminal proceedings conclusively terminate.

Liu v. Tangney · filed 2020-06-05

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. As Plaintiff points out, the Second Circuit has previously explained that a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution begins to accrue “when the underlying criminal action is conclusively terminated”—not necessarily at the time of arrest.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying criminal proceeding ends in the plaintiff’s favor.

COELLO v. DILEO · filed 2020-10-21

Because Plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution accrued when her conviction was vacated on February 26, 2018, her current claims were timely-filed.

Section 1983 claims are barred when the plaintiff consented to the challenged injury.

Mitchell v. Skinner · filed 1992-06-08

The court concludes that Dr. Mitchell consented to the termination of his contract and that consent creates a complete bar to his § 1983 claims and to the pendent claims for tortious interference with contract.

A complaint is not construed as a Section 1983 medical care claim without allegations that specific individuals acted with deliberate indifference.

Gunnels v. Donley County · filed 2020-02-14

The Court will not interpret his claims as an attempt to seek redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent allegations against specific individuals who acted with deliberate indifference to deny Plaintiff medical care while he was incarcerated.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but a land-use challenge is unripe until local zoning authorities have made a final decision.

Taylor Investment, Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township · filed 1993-01-25

We agree that exhaustion of remedies in not a prerequisite to claims under § 1983; however—as the Supreme Court held in Williamson—-"[t]he question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually distinct ... from the question whether an administrative action must be final before it is judicially reviewable.” 473 U.S. at 192, 105 S.Ct. at 3119.

Land-use claims under § 1983 are not ripe until the municipality reaches a definitive position that causes an actual, concrete injury.

Loskot-D'Souza v. Town of Babylon · filed 2016-03-02

Such claims, however, are not justiciable until the municipality has “ ‘arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury’ ” (Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d at 50, quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 172, 193 [1985]; see generally Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v Village of Pomona, 915 F Supp 2d 574, 598 [SD NY 2013]).

Section 1983 permits school board liability when an official policy, custom, or decision causes a constitutional injury; respondeat superior alone does not suffice.

Jones v. Board of Education of School District 50 · filed 1993-05-06

A local governmental entity, such as a school board, cannot be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior. However, it may be found liable under § 1983 if an official policy, custom, or decision causes an individual to suffer a constitutional harm.

Section 1983 permits monetary and injunctive relief against a school district for constitutional deprivations resulting from official policy.

Cochran v. Chidester Sch. Dist. of Ouachita · filed 1978-08-30

The Court finds that the Chidester School District is, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and subject to both monetary damages and injunctive requirements.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school district when a constitutional violation results from the execution of its official policy.

Eugene v. Alief Independent School Dist. · filed 1995-10-05

Eugene must show that her Constitutional rights were violated through the execution of an official policy by A.I.S.D.

Section 1983 treats school boards and their members in their official capacities as persons who may be sued for damages.

Huff v. West Haven Board of Education · filed 1998-03-19

Accordingly, Defendants’ argument that the' school board and its members are not “persons” subject to liability for damages under § 1983 is without merit, and Count One will not be dismissed on that basis.

A school district cannot be liable under § 1983 for failing to address an employee’s sexual abuse when it had no notice of the misconduct.

P.H. v. K.C. School District · filed 2001-09-07

Thus, the district court correctly determined that there can be no § 1983 liability here for failure to adequately receive, investigate, or act upon complaints of sexual abuse by an employee.

Section 1983 permits a school district to be liable for constitutional violations committed under an official policy or a long-standing custom.

Smith Ex Rel. Smith v. Seligman Unified School Dist. No. 40 · filed 2009-10-08

A school district is only liable for alleged constitutional violations under Monell if the violations were committed according to an official policy or a long-standing custom. ... With respect to a long-standing custom, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege how Kissick’s actions are so persistent and widespread that they constitute a well settled district policy.

Section 1983 permits relief against a school district when its officials, acting in their official capacities, violate a student’s federal constitutional rights.

Griffith v. Butte School District No. 1 · filed 2010-11-19

Because the School District, through the actions of Uggetti and Metz, violated her First Amendment right to free speech, Griffith is entitled to relief under her § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school district for a teacher’s sexual abuse of a student when a district policy, practice, or custom played an affirmative role in the abuse and the district acted with deliberate indifference.

Dipippa v. Union School District · filed 2011-05-04

In order for a school district to be liable pursuant to § 1983 for the sexual abuse of a student by one of its teachers, a plaintiff must show that the school district: (1) had a policy, practice, or custom which played an affirmative role in bringing about the sexual abuse, and (2) that the school district acted with deliberate indifference to that abuse.

A school district is liable under § 1983 only if an employee acts under district policy, a policymaker takes the action, or an authorized official ratifies it.

Phillis v. Dist · filed 2011-06-10

Under Monell and its progeny, the School District is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if Phillis can show that a District employee “acted pursuant to a formal government policy or a standard operating procedure,” that actions were taken by an individual with “policy making authority,” or that “an official with authority has ratified the unconstitutional actions of a subordinate . . . .” McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir. 2005).

A school district may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a rights violation, or when its failure to act constitutes deliberate indifference.

Blunt v. Lower Merion School District · filed 2011-10-20

Even assuming that plaintiffs put forth evidence that their constitutional rights were violated, there is no evidence that the School District did so based on an official policy or custom or that it was deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs’ rights.

A school district is not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s unlawful search without proof that a district policy authorized it.

Hotchkiss v. Garno · filed 2012-07-12

As Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a policy authorizing the alleged unlawful searches, Merrill Schools is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school district based on a custom of racial discrimination when its board knows of the custom and is deliberately indifferent to it.

Fennell v. Marion Independent School District · filed 2013-08-02

If, as Plaintiffs allege, (1) Plaintiffs described to the Board the above-described incidents, (2) the Board had no legitimate reason to disbelieve Plaintiffs’ allegations, and (3) the Board nevertheless undertook no investigation of the teachers’ actions, the Board did have actual knowledge of the alleged custom of racial discrimination and did exhibit deliberate indifference to that custom. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have stated a claim against the Marion ISD under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a school district liable to show that its policy or custom caused a constitutional violation; unsupported assertions of a policy do not suffice.

Pagan-Negron v. Seguin Independent School District · filed 2013-09-24

This Court concludes that Ms. Pagan-Negron’s assertions, even if supported by evidence, do not demonstrate that SISD had a policy or custom of “intimidation.”

Section 1983 permits school district liability when a policy or custom plays an affirmative role in causing a constitutional injury and the district acts with deliberate indifference.

Doe v. Boyertown Area School District · filed 2014-03-28

To establish liability under Section 1983 plaintiff must show that (1) the school district’s policy, practice, or custom played an affirmative role in bringing about the sexual abuse and (2) the school district acted with deliberate indifference to that abuse.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school district when a final policymaker adopts a policy that causes a constitutional violation.

Yara v. Perryton Independent School District · filed 2014-03-31

A school district is responsible under Section 1983 if a final policymaker adopts a policy that is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a school board liable for its employees’ conduct solely through respondeat superior; the board itself must be responsible for the violation.

Napier v. Breathitt County Board of Education · filed 2014-07-08

Napier cannot base his claim against the BOE solely on the individual Defendants’ conduct, for respon-deat superior is not available as a theory of recovery under § 1983. Rather, Napier must show that the BOE itself is the wrongdoer.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school district for a constitutional violation caused by an official policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.

Lewis v. Blue Springs School District · filed 2017-11-02

Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may attach to a school if the violation resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.

A school district is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation; an official’s decision in an individual case does not necessarily establish such a policy.

Gentry v. Mountain Home School District · filed 2018-05-09

But when a policy-maker makes a decision about an individual case or set of circumstances, this is not necessarily the same as when the policy-maker establishes an official policy on behalf of the municipality.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school district for an express policy, a widespread custom, or a constitutional injury caused or ratified by a final policymaker.

M.O. v. Hononegah Community High School District 207 · filed 2019-05-15

The District can be found liable under Section 1983 for violating a plaintiff's civil rights only through (1) an express policy; (2) a widespread practice constituting custom or usage; or (3) a constitutional injury caused or ratified by a person with final policymaking authority.

A school district cannot be held liable under § 1983 for employee conduct alone; the plaintiff must allege an official policy or custom attributable to the district.

Winn v. Cleburne Independent School District · filed 2020-01-02

Winn’s amended complaint does not identify any policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision or any persistent, widespread practice of CISD officials or employees that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents CISD policy.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a school board for failure to train based on a single incident without facts showing a policy or custom.

SCIACCA v. THE DURHAM COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2020-12-18

Assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Singleton’s conduct in April 2017 violated Andrew’s substantive due process right, this singular incident is insufficient to show that the Board has a custom or policy of failing to train Singleton, as Plaintiffs have alleged no other incidents involving him.

Section 1983 does not make a school board liable for its employees’ conduct without an identified policy or custom causing a constitutional violation.

Haley v. DeSoto Parish School Board · filed 2021-01-26

Plaintiffs claim the School Board is the policymaker for the school district, but there is no identified policy that unconstitutionally violated the children’s rights. As result, the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the section 1983 claims against the DeSoto Parish School Board are GRANTED.

A pretrial evidentiary hearing on a pro se inmate's nonfrivolous Section 1983 damages claim must preserve the inmate's right to a jury trial: the court must credit the inmate's evidence and avoid credibility determinations.

Johnson v. Bi-State Justice Center · filed 1993-12-27

We have approved the use of a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine whether a pro se inmate's nonfrivolous Sec. 1983 damage claims warrant a jury trial. ... In either case, the court must apply the proper standard of proof, avoid credibility determinations, believe the inmate's evidence, and draw all justifiable inferences in the inmate's favor.

Section 1983 does not provide damages against an individual for using a statutory procedure before it was held unconstitutional.

G. H. McShane Company, Incorporated, a Corporation v. Warren A. McFadden an Individual · filed 1977-04-26

Yet it does not follow that McFadden should prevail in his request that Jonnet be applied retroactively to attachments made before that decision was rendered — specifically, to secure monetary damages from a potential creditor, who acted under a presumptively constitutional statutory scheme. Presented with a parallel situation in Kacher, this Court ruled that § 1983 does not establish a right to recover damages from an individual who followed a statutory scheme that had not yet been held unconstitutional when so utilized.

Section 1983 permits a decedent’s estate to recover for loss of life when a state damages rule would undermine the statute’s deterrent purpose.

Bell v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1984-09-04

The district court's apparent misconstruction of Wisconsin law, however, has no practical impact on plaintiffs' claims since the application and policy of this point of Wisconsin law are inconsistent with those of Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment protection of life. Therefore, Wisconsin law cannot be applied to preclude the estate's recovery for loss of life, for the reasons set out below.

In a state-court wrongful death action under § 1983, an heir’s remedy is limited to that authorized by the state’s wrongful death statute.

Alvarez v. Wiley · filed 1977-07-11

We glean from Jones v. Hildebrant, supra, the principle that when an heir sues in a state court for the wrongful death of a relative, even though the suit is brought under the federal Civil Rights Act, the heir’s remedy is limited to that authorized by the wrongful death statute of the state; i.e., in California, a claim for damages.

Section 1983 permits a wrongful death claimant to recover only when the alleged constitutional violation caused the death; Texas’s causation requirement is consistent with the section’s purposes.

Slade v. City of Marshall Texas, et · filed 2016-02-10

Texas’s causation requirement is not inconsistent with these policies. Section 1983 seeks to deter abuses of power that have actually occurred and compensate victims who have actually been injured by such abuses.

A pro se state prisoner commences a § 1983 action when the court receives a good-faith complaint and pauper affidavit, even if pauper status is denied, if the prisoner reasonably expected approval and promptly continues the action.

Gardner v. King · filed 1979-01-26

Based on the foregoing, the court holds that receipt from a pro se state prisoner of a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and affidavit in support of in forma pauper-is status is sufficient to “commence” the action, notwithstanding the denial of in for-ma pauperis status, where the initial filing is in good faith, not interposed for dilatory purposes, based on the reasonable expectation that in forma pauperis status would be granted, and followed by reasonably prompt action to continue the prosecution of the action after in forma pauperis status is denied.

For a pro se § 1983 plaintiff seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, an action commences for limitations purposes when the court receives the complaint, even if it is filed later.

Salahuddin v. Milligan · filed 1984-09-19

However, where, as here, plaintiff acts pro se and sends his complaint to the court, and the complaint is not filed until a later date due to consideration of plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, the action is deemed commenced for purposes of the statute of limitations upon receipt by the court of plaintiff’s complaint, and not when it is filed.

A § 1983 action filed in federal court is commenced when the complaint is filed; Alabama’s requirement of a bona fide intent to proceed does not apply.

Flood v. City of Jacksonville · filed 2017-07-12

The Court holds that the Aabama rule, which requires a complaint to be filed in a manner that demonstrates a bona fide intent, at the time of filing, to proceed with the action, is not applicable in an action filed in federal court based on federal law.

A Section 1983 action filed in federal court commences for limitations purposes when the complaint is filed, rather than when the defendant is served under Oregon law.

Monical v. Winters · filed 2020-02-05

Because this is not a diversity case, the federal rules, not O.R.S. § 12.020, govern the commencement of the action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action when the suit’s primary objective is judicial review of an agency decision rather than redress for a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Martine v. BD. OF REGENTS, STATE SR. COLLEGES, ETC. · filed 1979-02-22

Appellant’s primary objective in this suit is not to secure redress for some asserted deprivation of constitutional rights per se, but rather is plainly to secure judicial review of an administrative agency decision.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a violation of her own civil rights; a student’s mother cannot rely solely on a violation of the student’s rights.

Collins v. Chandler Unified School District · filed 1979-03-29

Finally, as to plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees, defendants’ reasons for objecting to these are found to be persuasive by this Court for the reason that plaintiff in this case, a student’s mother, has not had her civil rights violated within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is, therefore, not entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1977 Supp.).

Section 1983 is not a substitute for following state court procedures or appealing an adverse state court order.

R & W Farms, Inc. v. Grand River Co-op · filed 1984-08-23

Whatever else 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be, it is not a substitute for complying with established procedures in state tribunals or for appealing an adverse order of a state court.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for constitutional deprivations, subject to comity limits when adequate state remedies are available.

Bernard v. Village of Spring Valley · filed 1994-07-12

As to damages, the principle of comity dictates a similar result to that suggested by the Tax Injunction Act. The Supreme Court has held that comity bars taxpayers from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil action against territories such as the Virgin Islands.

Lake v. V.I. Water & Power Authority · filed 1994-12-02

Section 1983 does not apply to territories such as the Virgin Islands.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a territory or its agency because neither is a person under the statute.

Reefco Services Inc. v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS · filed 2018-09-28

Significantly, a territory is not a person under Section 1983. ... Similarly, a territorial agency is not a person under Section 1983. ... As such, no Section 1983 claim is available against either the Government of the Virgin Islands or the VIBIR.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Rodriguez v. Roth · filed 1981-05-27

As Baker assumed arguendo that, in some instances, a “detention ... in the face of repeated protests of innocence,” Baker, supra, at 145,99 S.Ct. at 2695, might give rise to a § 1983 claim, it cannot be said that “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”

Section 1983 bars recovery by a plaintiff who is in pari delicto with the defendant regarding the unlawful act underlying the claim.

Dudley v. Virgil K. Stoneman and Alcohol Beverage Control Commission · filed 1981-07-10

In the same vein as the district court’s second reason, we think that, because Dudley was admittedly in pari delicto with Stoneman, he may not recover under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on official misconduct in procuring a confinement order even when a court issued the order.

Dick v. Watonwan County · filed 1983-04-11

The Court’s conclusion that Baker does not preclude a section 1983 cause of action based on official misconduct in the procurement of a confinement order is reinforced by Justice Blaekmun’s concurrence in Baker.

Section 1983 does not permit damages based solely on a conviction and imprisonment while the conviction remains valid.

AURSBY v. LOWER MERION TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2020-06-29

In his Complaint, Aursby does not allege damages other than those stemming from his conviction and imprisonment, so his claim cannot be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking release based on the duration of confinement; that claim must proceed through habeas corpus.

Blackburn v. Colorado Board of Parole · filed 2009-06-16

Because Blackburn challenges the duration of his confinement and requests discharge from state custody rather than monetary damages, his claim cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but must be brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily undermine a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Baker v. City of Hollywood · filed 2010-08-10

And Baker’s battery charge has not been invalidated; so his conspiracy claim is not cognizable under section 1983.

A § 1983 claim is not cognizable when it would call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s conviction or confinement.

Vandament v. Duncan · filed 2010-10-29

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Vandament’s claims based on arrests, searches and seizure. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (“a § 1983 action that would call into question the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction or confinement is not cognizable” under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).

Section 1983 claims that would call a conviction or sentence into question cannot proceed unless the conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Bradley v. Mason · filed 2011-06-20

A prisoner may not raise claims in a civil rights action if a judgment on the merits of those claims would affect the validity of his conviction or sentence, unless the conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Section 1983 does not provide the proper vehicle for claims essentially directed at the legality of a prisoner's confinement.

Thrower v. New Jersey State Parole Board · filed 2011-07-20

As these arguments are essentially directed to the legality of his confinement, we agree that they are not the proper subject of a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not allow claims that necessarily challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Mitchell v. C/o Gilbert · filed 2012-01-04

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mitchell’s claim for restoration of and/or proper calculation of good time credit because resolution of the claim would necessarily implicate the length of Mitchell’s confinement. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997) (challenge to loss of good-time credits not cognizable under § 1983); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (§ 1983 claims that necessarily challenge the fact or duration of confinement are barred).

Section 1983 claims challenging an uninvalidated prison conviction are precluded under Edwards v. Balisok.

Whitmore v. Hill · filed 2012-01-10

To the extent he is challenging the second prison conviction that resulted from his rehearing, that conviction has never been invalidated. Therefore, Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643, 648 (1997), precludes Whitmore’s § 1983 claims challenging that conviction.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred to the extent they imply that the plaintiff’s conviction is invalid.

Schield v. Brawner · filed 2014-05-28

To the extent that Schield’s claims for damages imply the invalidity of Schield’s conviction, they are barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A Section 1983 claim that would imply a conviction is invalid is not cognizable until the conviction has been invalidated.

Legate v. Garcia · filed 2014-09-09

Therefore, his claims are barred by Heck and are not yet cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for an inmate’s claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or its duration.

Mills v. Holmes · filed 2015-03-24

For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs claim challenges the duration of his confinement and therefore may not be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars claims that necessarily challenge the fact or duration of confinement unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Mouzon v. Ahlin · filed 2015-04-15

Dismissal of Mouzon’s claims for damages and declaratory relief was proper because a judgment in Mouzon’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his SVPA civil commitment. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (§ 1983 claims that necessarily challenge the fact or duration of confinement are barred unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated); Huftile, 410 F.3d at ... 1139-41, 1142 (applying Heck to civilly committed sex offenders and noting that a dismissal under Heck is without prejudice).

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages for the duration of confinement unless the prisoner has first obtained a favorable result challenging the conviction or sentence.

Ward v. Akpore · filed 2017-11-22

A prisoner seeking money damages for the very fact or duration of his confinement has no claim under § 1983 “unless and until the inmate obtains favorable termination of a state, or federal habeas, challenge to his conviction or sentence.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004); see Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997). Although Ward asserts that he has “exhausted” his available state remedies, he has not successfully challenged the length of his sentence through a federal writ of habeas corpus, so his damages claim is barred.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging police withholding of exculpatory evidence to show deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for the accused's rights or the truth.

Tennison v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2009-06-23

We therefore hold that a § 1983 plaintiff must show that police officers acted with deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for an accused’s rights or for the truth in withholding evidence from prosecutors.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily undermine an outstanding conviction.

Potter v. Port Jervis Police Department · filed 2020-02-03

Success on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that the search of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights would be inconsistent with his conviction for possession of stolen property, which relied on evidence from the search that was determined to be admissible at trial. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim must therefore be dismissed under Heck.

Section 1983 permits an unlawful-search damages claim despite an outstanding conviction if the evidence was not introduced at trial, its admission was harmless, or it was admissible under an exception to the exclusionary rule.

Thompson v. Link · filed 2019-06-04

Therefore, this Court holds that Heck does not bar a § 1983 or Bivens claim arising from an allegedly unlawful search if (1) the evidence obtained was not introduced at trial; (2) the evidence was erroneously admitted but the error was harmless; or (3) the evidence was admissible under an exception to the exclusionary rule.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to pursue a Fourth Amendment illegal-search claim because the claim does not necessarily imply that a valid conviction is invalid.

Easterling v. Moeller · filed 2009-06-24

Whether or not a plaintiff might be able to plead himself into a Heck bar by insisting on facts inconsistent with his guilt, see McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir.2006), in this case Easterling did not, and the district court erred in concluding that his allegation of an illegal search implicates the validity of his conviction.

Section 1983 damages actions are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Sheffield v. Bonds · filed 2010-01-29

Here, the wrongs that plaintiff alleges, if proved, would render his conviction invalid. The plaintiff has not demonstrated that his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. I Therefore, under the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, this civil rights action for damages must be dismissed.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily invalidate confinement continued after a parole board hearing.

Brown v. Hackbarth · filed 2011-10-21

Heck bars claims for damages under § 1983 that would necessarily invalidate a confinement imposed by a legal process, such as a parole board hearing. ... Heck would bar Brown’s suit, because a finding that prison officials deprived Brown of a protected liberty interest in mandatory parole would necessarily imply that the board’s decision to continue his confinement was invalid.

Section 1983 permits a properly pleaded access-to-courts claim when success would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction is invalid.

Carlous Daily v. Prosper · filed 2012-01-09

Because, properly pled, an access-to-courts claim based on these allegations would not “necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] conviction[,]” the district court erred by denying Daily’s motion to proceed IFP based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (“Heck is consistent with other cases permitting prisoners to bring § 1983 challenges to prison administrative decisions”).

Heck bars § 1983 damages claims premised on a fraudulent criminal conviction.

Sneed v. Rodriguez · filed 2013-04-30

The District Court properly dismissed the first two counts of the complaint under Heck, given that the counts requested monetary damages, and properly dismissed -- without prejudice -- the third count for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Mary Louise Richardson Dozier v. Vickers · filed 2013-08-20

If successful, Dozier’s claim for damages under § 1983 “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [her] conviction.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. Thus, to proceed on her claim, Dozier must first show that her conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. She has failed to do so.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed or declared invalid.

Williams v. Weber County · filed 2014-04-15

In sum, because Plaintiffs seek damages for § 1983 claims that necessarily implicate the validity of their convictions, and their convictions have not been reversed or declared invalid, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants.

A third party’s § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck based on someone else’s conviction.

Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found. · filed 2014-07-21

Because such a concern does not extend to the civil rights claims of third parties, the district court erred in applying Heck to bar Plaintiffs Annie and Essex Hayward’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not bar a damages claim for an unlawful arrest when success would not call the validity of a later conviction into question.

Corey A. McDowell Bey v. Vega · filed 2014-10-17

If a successful § 1983 suit for damages necessarily would implicate the validity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated ... before the commencement of the § 1983 suit, the suit must be dismissed. ... We conclude McDowell Bey’s claim is not barred by Heck. If McDowell Bey were to succeed in his claim that his arrest was unlawful when it occurred, nothing in the record suggests the validity of his subsequent trafficking convictions would be called into question.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for redress when someone acting under state law deprives them of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Muhammad v. Garrett · filed 2014-12-11

Because the jury found Messick acted within his lawful authority to make the arresf/detention and did not use excessive force, Plaintiffs § 1983 action is barred.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to bring a damages claim challenging unconstitutional disciplinary procedures without first invalidating the disciplinary proceeding.

Richardson v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2015-03-20

It appears that Richardson’s claim includes a challenge to an unconstitutional procedure – namely, the denial of an investigator – and is based in part on an alleged failure to issue Rules Violation Reports to other inmates involved in the incident underlying Richardson’s disciplinary proceedings and, therefore, is not Heck-barred.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would imply the invalidity of an uninvalidated parole revocation and may be pursued after the Heck requirements are met.

Harris v. Fulwood · filed 2015-04-21

Appellant’s section 1983 and Bivens claims are not cognizable unless and until he meets the requirements of Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364.

Section 1983 does not permit a Fourth Amendment wrongful-arrest claim based on an officer's subjective motivations when probable cause supports the arrest.

Bradley v. Jack Reno, Jr. · filed 2015-12-03

This court does not entertain a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim “based on the actual motivations of individual officers” because “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”

Section 1983 does not provide damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Miles v. State of Kansas · filed 2019-05-16

In Heck v. Humphrey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment are not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has been ... undermined by a federal court’s grant of habeas relief. ... Heck thus bars Mr. Miles’s damages action, rendering the appeal frivolous.

Heck does not bar an unconvicted person’s Section 1983 claim merely because success could undermine another person’s conviction.

Waller v. Smith · filed 2019-08-20

A plain reading of Heck suggests that courts are only required to consider whether a successful Section 1983 action brought by a convicted plaintiff would imply the invalidity of the convicted plaintiff’s conviction. ... Plaintiff Kham’s claim is not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that call into question a conviction or confinement unless the underlying conviction or sentence has been invalidated; this rule also applies to parole revocations.

Thompson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probatio · filed 2019-09-23

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it calls into question the lawfulness of her conviction or confinement, unless she can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. ... Thompson has not alleged that the convictions or revocations underlying the detention she challenges have been invalidated. As a result, her claims are barred by Heck, and the District Court did not err in dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by Heck when they would undermine a prison disciplinary finding that cost the prisoner earned time.

Matthews v. Koechle · filed 2019-12-23

Specifically, we agree that Matthews’s claim for damages arising from an alleged search was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); given that, in disciplinary proceedings, his allegations regarding the search were found to be false, and he was sanctioned with the loss of earned time.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for imprisonment under a challenged sentence unless that sentence has been reversed or otherwise called into question as required by Heck.

Johnson v. Bowers · filed 2020-01-31

As in his prior action, the allegations in the Complaint (ECF No. 1) do not suggest that the state sentences he challenges have been reversed on direct appeal or called into question in any of the ways articulated in Heck. Accordingly, this Complaint (ECF No. 1) fails to allege any plausible damages claim upon which Plaintiff may be granted relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction involving lost good-time credits.

RASUL v. VEREEN · filed 2020-02-27

However, this is not permitted under the line of cases arising from Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that “a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’”

Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims arising from an arrest that led to a conviction require the plaintiff to show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Bland v. Lyle · filed 2020-04-01

To succeed on her § 1983 unreasonable seizure claims, Plaintiff must show that her state conviction was rendered invalid.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim challenging imprisonment after probation or parole revocation until the revocation and related sentence have been invalidated.

GARVIN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-07-30

As Garvin appears to be seeking money damages from the City of Philadelphia based on allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment, the Court construes the Complaint as one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As the decision to revoke Garvin’s probation or parole and his related sentence have not been invalidated, Garvin’s claims for damages based on his imprisonment are not cognizable at this time.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Strepka v. Thompson · filed 2020-10-16

We agree with the district court that claim one is barred by Heck, which holds that a state prisoner may not sue for damages under § 1983 if a favorable judgment “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” unless the prisoner shows “that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for a claim that would necessarily show that a prisoner’s confinement lasted too long, even when the claim challenges the procedure used to calculate credits.

Kilman v. Williams · filed 2020-10-19

That would necessarily demonstrate that the duration of Kilman’s confinement was invalid, even if his claim is viewed purely as a due process challenge to CDOC’s allegedly wrongful procedure for computing credits.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine an outstanding conviction unless the conviction has been favorably terminated.

Murphy v. Butler · filed 2020-12-02

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Butler are barred by the Heck doctrine.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an involuntary commitment when success on the claim would necessarily imply that the commitment is invalid, unless the commitment has first been invalidated.

Ardaneh v. U.S. Government · filed 2020-12-11

To the extent Plaintiff challenges the fact of his confinement, such claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on those claims would necessarily imply that his commitment is invalid.

Section 1983 requires a defendant invoking the Mount Healthy defense to show that the adverse action would have occurred for legitimate reasons even if an improper motive played a part.

Broderick v. Evans · filed 2009-06-26

The Mount Healthy defense, applicable only to the section 1983 claims against Evans, requires the defendant to show that even if an improper motive played a part, the adverse action would have been taken for legitimate reasons.

Section 1983 does not require proof that a constitutional deprivation caused actual harm to establish a violation.

Estate Of Maria Teresa Macias · filed 2000-07-20

A plaintiff may prove a violation of S 1983 without demonstrating that the deprivation of his or her constitutional rights caused any actual harm.

Section 1983 requires proof of a policy before a public institution can be held liable for damages.

Horen v. BD. OF EDUC. OF CITY OF TOLEDO · filed 2009-09-08

Proof of such policy is a sine qua non of institutional liability in a § 1983 case.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an institutional defendant only when its policy or custom sanctions a violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Rankin v. Obaisi · filed 2019-08-05

A plaintiff can sustain a § 1983 claim against an institutional defendant like Wexford only if he can show that the entity has a policy or custom that sanctions the violation of his rights.

Section 1983 permits institutional liability when a policy reflects deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs and causes a constitutional injury.

Tuduj v. Lawrence · filed 2020-09-24

Institutional liability is possible under the Monell doctrine where a municipal or here, by extension, an institutional policy both reflects deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs and causes a constitutional injury. See e.g., Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). But Wexford’s alleged “policy” of not prescribing sunglasses did not harm Tuduj because, as just mentioned, he had no medical need for sunglasses and in any event he received post-operative sunglasses, which he does not contend were less helpful than rubber sunglasses.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold an institution liable to show that its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Bowers v. University of Delaware · filed 2020-11-30

For an institution to be liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an institutional policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to pursue a retaliatory transfer claim against an individual prison official who retaliates for filing grievances.

Williams v. Brown · filed 2009-09-10

As to Appellee Brown, however, taking the well-pleaded allegations in his complaint as true, Williams stated a chronology of events and alleged sufficient facts to state a retaliatory transfer claim against Brown in his individual capacity. ... Furthermore, we agree with the magistrate judge in the second Report & Recommendation that qualified immunity does not shield Appellee Brown from liability. ... Thus, Brown cannot claim qualified immunity as a bar to Williams’s complaint.

In a § 1983 action where nominal damages are the only remaining relief, a defendant may consent to judgment for the full amount without admitting liability.

Husain v. Springer · filed 2009-10-26

However, plaintiffs cite no authority holding that a defendant may not dispose of a case by agreeing to entry of judgment against herself for the nominal damages which are the sole relief sought by a plaintiff, simply because the lawsuit concerns constitutional rights. In fact, the Second Circuit has made it clear that, even in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant “should be afforded the choice to consent to judgment and payment of nominal damages.”

A potential award of nominal damages under § 1983 can keep a procedural due process claim live after the plaintiff receives other relief.

TRAFFORD v. City of Westbrook · filed 2009-11-12

According to mootness doctrine, as applied in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Trafford’s success in reversing the deprivation of which he complains does not render his constitutional claims moot. ... The Court therefore determines, based on Trafford’s demand for expungement and his potential recovery of nominal damages, that the arbitral panel’s June 2009 award and the City’s response to it did not moot his procedural due process claims.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state actor for a constitutional violation caused by that actor's conduct.

Crowe v. County of San Diego · filed 2010-01-14

Thus, all of the pre-trial proceedings in which plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated give rise to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a direct challenge to the validity of a sentence.

Pruett v. William Stephens, Director · filed 2015-04-24

We agree with the district court that this is a direct challenge to the validity of his sentence and, therefore, cannot be maintained under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging a warrant for misrepresentations to show a knowing or reckless false statement or material omission that was necessary to the finding of probable cause.

Palmieri v. Kammerer · filed 2010-01-27

A plaintiff suing under § 1983 and challenging a warrant on the basis of misrepresentation of material facts must make the same showing that is required at a suppression hearing under Franks v. Delaware: the plaintiff must show that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard of the truth, made false statements or material omissions in his application for a warrant, and that such statements or omissions were necessary to the finding of probable cause.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for injuries caused by employees acting pursuant to municipal policy, and joint representation requires disqualification only when an actual conflict exists.

Lieberman v. City of Rochester · filed 2010-02-04

District courts have interpreted Dunton to require disqualification of counsel representing both an individual officer and the municipal employer in Section 1983 cases only where counsel acts in a way that is actually against the officer’s interests. ... In other words, a potential conflict is insufficient to warrant disqualification; rather, the employee must show that an actual conflict exists. ... Considering these unequivocal representations, the City’s and the Officers’ interests appear aligned at this stage of the litigation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Barnes v. Hennepin County District Attorney's Office · filed 2010-02-05

We further hold the district court did not err in concluding Barnes’s claims under the First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments described no conduct by defendants that violated the rights secured by these constitutional provisions, and thus Barnes failed to state a claim as to each. See Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (explaining, for a § 1983 claim to succeed, the plaintiff must show a causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the deprivation of a constitutional right).

Section 1983 can impose liability on an officer who causes another person to deprive someone of constitutional rights, but the court found no such liability where the shooting officer was entitled to qualified immunity.

Pauly v. White · filed 2017-10-31

42 U.S.C. § 1983 not only imposes liability on those who actually deprive a person of their rights under the Constitution, but also imposes liability on those who “cause” a person to be subjected to a deprivation. ... But, as we explained above, Officer -White is entitled to qualified immunity because his alleged use of excessive force was not clearly established in the circumstances of this case. It therefore cannot serve as the basis of liability for Officers Mariscal and Trues-dale.

Section 1983 requires a legal duty to act when a claim rests on a defendant’s failure to act.

Kinsella v. Cooley · filed 2010-03-08

Kinsella’s complaint failed to show that the defendants were under a legal duty to file the abstract of judgment, as required to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action for a state’s failure to prosecute another person.

Thompson v. Grey · filed 2010-07-20

As the district court properly recognized, there is no cause of action for the state’s failure to prosecute another person under section 1983.