42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation acting under color of state law liable for its employees’ acts under respondeat superior.

BARKER v. TALBOT · filed 2020-12-18

As Wexford notes, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that private corporations acting under color of state law are not liable under respondeat superior in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. ... And under that precedent, Barker's claim based on respondeat superior liability must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make a private medical contractor liable solely because it employs staff who allegedly violated a detainee’s rights.

Huffman v. St Joseph County Jail · filed 2020-12-21

Huffman attempts to hold the company liable because it employs the Jail’s medical staff. However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable for an employee’s actions without wrongdoing by the employer.

Bray - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO FILINGS v. LaPorte County of Indiana · filed 2021-01-06

Moreover, even if they were, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability, which holds an employer liable for the actions of its employees without any wrongdoing on the part of the employer.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely for an employee’s conduct.

Best v. Baltimore County · filed 2021-01-14

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability against a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

THE ESTATE OF JERMAINE COLE v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF · filed 2021-01-22

In light of the current state of the law in the Seventh Circuit, which has been acknowledged by the Estate, the Court grants Wellpath's Motion on the Section 1983 claim because such a claim is not available on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue a claim alleging that prison officials delayed or deprived him of incoming mail in violation of constitutional rights.

Taylor v. Leidig · filed 1980-02-29

Taylor’s third claim for relief states a claim that at least is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and thus should not be dismissed.

Isolated two- or three-day delays in prisoner mail on only two or three occasions do not amount to a constitutional deprivation cognizable under Section 1983.

Tracy v. Sheriff Philip Heffron · filed 1987-07-06

Plaintiff thereby admitted that his complaint was limited to delays of no more than two or three days on no more than two or three occasions. Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court that plaintiff has not asserted a constitutional deprivation cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an inadvertent violation of a prisoner’s mail rights without explicit proof of damages.

Pickett v. Schaefer · filed 1980-08-11

Without explicit proof of damages, an inadvertent violation of a prisoner’s mail rights does not state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 constitutional claims for which a jury trial is demanded cannot be resolved through a non-jury hearing.

Lucy SANFORD, Shirley Black, Mari Pritchard, Patricia Sullivan, Carolyn Carter, Brenda Williams and Ernestine… · filed 1980-03-06

Moreover, another compelling reason for vacating the summary judgment here is that the plaintiffs demanded a jury for trial of their constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The February 27, 1979 hearing, since it was conducted without a jury, could not properly resolve the parties' contentions. The district court never considered in its opinion the relationship between the plaintiffs' § 1983 and Title VII claims or the need for a jury trial.

Section 1983 creates legal rights and remedies enforceable in damages actions, so a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial when the issues are sufficiently substantial to warrant a trial.

Dolence v. Dennis Flynn, Sheriff of Laramie County and Jerry Enos, Individually and in Their Official Capacit · filed 1980-08-26

We agree that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 meets these prerequisites, thereby entitling appellant to a jury trial.

A § 1983 suit seeking actual damages entitles the defendant to a jury trial, and monetary damages cannot be awarded without notice that damages are sought.

Segarra v. M.J. McDade Ralph Edwards · filed 1983-04-26

Further, in a § 1983 suit that seeks actual damages, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial. ... If a plaintiff was allowed to receive monetary damages without requesting them, a defendant could be deprived of his right to trial by jury because of a defect in notice; to allow this result can hardly be just.

Parties have a jury-trial right on legal issues in a Section 1983 action, but a plaintiff seeking only equitable federal relief such as an injunction and back pay is not entitled to a jury.

Fleming v. Department of Public Safety · filed 1985-04-11

In conclusion, while parties are entitled to a jury trial of legal issues raised in a § 1983 complaint, Fleming raises only equitable issues in the federal component of this action disallowing him his jury demand.

Section 1983 issues must be tried to a jury if the plaintiff properly demanded a jury trial.

Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea · filed 1990-07-10

First, the district court should determine if the plaintiff properly demanded a jury trial, and, if so, grant a jury trial on the § 1983 issues.

When a legal § 1983 claim and an equitable Title VII claim are tried together, the § 1983 jury verdict binds the judge’s factfinding on the Title VII claim.

Bruno v. City Of Crown Point · filed 1992-01-31

However, when, as in this case, a "legal" § 1983 claim and an "equitable" Title VII claim are tried together, the jury's verdict binds the judge and he is not required to make separate factual findings.

A litigant seeking legal relief in a § 1983 action has a right to a jury trial on those issues.

Hohman v. Dunning · filed 1993-04-15

A litigant involved in a § 1983 action seeking legal relief has a right to a jury trial on those issues.

A debtor’s § 1983 claim for damages is a legal claim triable by jury when it does not arise from claims allowance or the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations.

Walton v. Ag Credit, ACA (In re Walton) · filed 1993-06-02

Additionally, this Court finds that Debtors are entitled to a jury trial because Debtors’ adversary proceeding represents a legal action which does not involve the adjudication of public rights. Debtors have not submitted themselves to this Court’s equity jurisdiction for determining their legal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a jury trial and compensatory damages for legal claims alleging discrimination by state actors.

Richardson v. Leeds Police Department · filed 1995-12-15

The distinction between the Title VII and § 1983 causes in the present case was in the availability of a jury trial and compensatory damages under § 1983, but not with respect to the Title VII equitable claims, which were tried to the court.

Section 1983 gives plaintiffs who bring an action at law the right to a jury trial.

Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., and Monterey-Del Monte Dunes C · filed 1996-09-13

Logically then, plaintiffs who bring an action at law under section 1983 have the right to a jury trial.

Prisoner relief under § 1983 does not carry a right to a jury trial.

Martin v. State of Oklahoma · filed 1998-08-28

The right to a jury trial does not apply to applications for habeas corpus nor for prisoner relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and referral of these matters to a magistrate judge is proper within the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Section 1983 does not itself confer a right to a jury trial by authorizing an “action at law.”

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. · filed 1999-05-24

We decline, accordingly, to find a statutory jury right under § 1983 based solely on the authorization of “an action at law.”

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking compensatory or punitive damages ordinarily has a right to a jury trial; a claim seeking only injunctive relief or back pay does not.

Hildebrand v. Board Of Trustees Of Michigan State University · filed 1979-09-17

If the remedy sought is injunctive relief and/or back pay, no jury trial right attaches. In the ordinary case, if the relief sought includes compensatory and/or punitive damages, then there does exist a right to trial by jury.

Section 1983 does not itself confer a right to a jury trial.

Mr. Darryl J. Simmons v. Sheriff Hal Turner · filed 2004-11-17

As stated above, the Supreme Court has determined that the availability of a jury trial in § 1983 claims stems, not from the text of that legislation, but from the Seventh Amendment, a portion of the Bill of Rights not made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause.

Section 1983 does not itself provide a statutory right to a jury trial.

Simmons v. Turner · filed 2004-11-17

Neither does the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [4] provide a statutory right to a jury under that statute.

Plaintiffs seeking compensatory and punitive damages under § 1983 are entitled to a jury trial when their claims are legal in nature.

Richards v. Smoltich · filed 1973-01-16

Therefore, the issue is whether an action under Section 1983 is “in the nature of a suit at common law.” ... Therefore, it is apparent that this case meets all of the tests established for application of the Seventh Amendment and that plaintiffs are entitled to a trial by jury.

Section 1983 has no express jury trial provision, and civil actions under it follow customary jury trial practice.

Van Ermen v. Schmidt · filed 1974-05-02

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its predecessors contain no specific provision for jury trial. ... I find it unnecessary to delve into the legislative background since I conclude that the Act recognized that some civil actions arising under it would be tried to a jury and implied that the courts were to follow customary practice on the right to jury trial.

Section 1983 plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on their claim.

Molthan v. Temple University—of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education · filed 1979-07-23

Second, plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on their section 1983 claim, whereas “the courts have consistently held that neither party [to a Title VII action] has a right to a jury trial.” Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, - U.S. -, -, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2350, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979) (footnote omitted).

A plaintiff seeking only equitable relief under § 1983 is not entitled to a jury trial.

Susan Mills v. Garcia · filed 2016-05-31

Because Mills has sought only equitable relief under § 1983, she is not entitled to a jury trial.

A § 1983 claim seeking declaratory relief and no damages does not give defendants a right to a jury trial.

McClanahan v. Wilson · filed 2019-07-31

Here, under the above framework, regardless of whether Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief would be considered equitable or legal, Defendants are not entitled to a jury.

Section 1983 claims are triable by jury.

(PC) Camposeco v. Stamper · filed 2019-10-01

Consistent with Plaintiff’s request, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are triable by jury.

Section 1983 does not independently confer a statutory right to a jury trial.

Tellis v. LeBlanc · filed 2020-01-13

In this case, Defendants do not argue that they are statutorily entitled to a jury trial, and the statutes at issue do not grant Defendants such a right. In C2ty of Monterey, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not independently confer a statutory right to a jury trial upon actions filed under this statute.

A plaintiff in a § 1983 civil rights action has a right to a jury trial.

Hussell v. Boggs · filed 2020-02-14

However, to the extent that the court has also construed Hussell’s petition as a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is a right to a jury trial in such proceedings.

Section 1983 does not preserve a right to a jury trial on damages after default judgment.

KD v. Robeson · filed 2020-02-20

Unlike § 1874, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not specifically preserve the right to a jury trial after default.

A plaintiff seeking only equitable relief under Section 1983 has no right to a jury trial.

VAMOS, Concertacion Ciudadana Inc. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2020-09-24

Also, plaintiffs’ only claims are equitable in nature and pursuant to section 1983, they have no right to a jury trial.

A Section 1983 challenge to a prison misconduct finding cannot be dismissed as frivolous for lack of finality if prison administrators have reached a definitive position that inflicts an actual, concrete injury.

Brown v. Department of Corrections Officer Englers · filed 1989-07-28

We shall therefore remand the case to the district court for a determination as to whether the misconduct finding against plaintiff is "final," in the sense that the prison administrators have arrived at a "definitive position" that is inflicting on the plaintiff "an actual, concrete injury." We note that the dismissal of the complaint as frivolous cannot be affirmed unless the misconduct finding against the plaintiff lacks finality in this sense.

Section 1983 provides a right to sue for a deprivation of federal rights only when the challenged state action is final.

Welch v. Smith · filed 1980-03-07

Despite the Vermont Supreme Court’s statement that “[i]n the matter of examining and grading applicants . . . the members of the [B]oard are the exclusive judges,” id., we conclude that under Vermont law the Board’s adverse recommendation cannot cause a “deprivation” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only the final action of the supreme court, whatever form it may take, effects such a deprivation, if any.

Section 1983 permits only nominal damages for a procedural-due-process deprivation absent proof of an independent compensable injury.

Taliaferro v. Willett · filed 1978-12-06

In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-60 and n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), decided after the district court's judgment in this case, the Supreme Court disapproved Thomas and Burt. Carey held that, absent proof of other compensable tort injury, a plaintiff deprived of procedural due process can recover only nominal damages. ... Taliaferro's claim is essentially an action for contract damages arising from the alleged violation of a tenured professor's right to teach until reaching the age of seventy. Neither here nor in the district court has she suggested that procedural deprivations caused her independent injury. In light of Carey, therefore, the controversy over the alleged breach of contract presents no substantial federal question. ... Consequently, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss for lack of a substantial federal question.

A § 1983 plaintiff deprived of procedural due process may recover nominal damages without proving actual injury.

Takeall Ex Rel. Rubinstein v. Ambach · filed 1985-03-21

plaintiffs in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 who are deprived of procedural due process may recover nominal damages without proof of actual injury. Plaintiff has established that the actions of defendant Board of Education of the City of White Plains denied him due process. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages.

A § 1983 plaintiff denied procedural due process is entitled to nominal damages even when the underlying action was justified and no actual injury is proven.

Clarence E.. Okeson v. Tolley School District No. 25 · filed 1985-04-19

A plaintiff is therefore entitled to nominal damages because of the defendant's failure to give adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard even if the action taken is shown to be warranted.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process plaintiff may recover only nominal damages when the adverse employment action would have occurred even with adequate notice and a hearing.

Stein v. The Board Of The City Of New York · filed 1986-05-22

The district judge, therefore, should have instructed the jury to award only nominal damages if it found Stein would have been discharged by ACJ even had he received adequate notice of his disqualification proceeding from the state.

A § 1983 plaintiff whose procedural-due-process rights were violated is entitled to nominal damages without proving actual injury.

Marty O'Shea Franklin, Cross-Appellant v. Max Aycock, Cross-Appellees · filed 1986-07-15

However, even if the district court finds that the same result would have occurred, or finds that Franklin has not shown actual injury and damages, Franklin will be entitled to recover nominal damages of not more than one dollar.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process violation without proof of actual injury.

Harrison v. Sobol · filed 1988-12-08

Under the rule of Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1053, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), plaintiffs in suits under sec. 1983 who are deprived of procedural due process may recover nominal damages without proof of actual injury.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when the plaintiff proves no actual, compensable injury, but compensatory damages require such injury.

Hardin v. John Makowski, Kenney Roberson, Dorothy Bigelow, Jonnie May Bass, Defendants · filed 1988-12-09

The court concluded that because plaintiff would have been found guilty of insolence had he been notified of the hearing, he did not suffer any actual, compensable injury. The court therefore found that he was not entitled to compensatory damages. ... However, the court did award plaintiff nominal damages of $1.00 for the violation of his due process rights. ... Having carefully reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we find that the district court's opinion correctly resolved all of the issues presented by this case. For this reason, we adopt the opinion of the district court and AFFIRM its judgment.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process violation even without proof of actual injury.

Taylor v. Jordan · filed 1991-01-02

If the district court, on remand, finds that Taylor's due process rights were violated, it may award nominal damages regardless of whether he is able to prove actual injury.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process claim even after the property has been replaced.

Pablo Jose Ramon Morales v. L. Patrick, Correctional Officer · filed 1992-06-17

The fact that the original television was replaced does not moot Morales' claim for property without procedural due process. He can at least recover nominal damages.

Section 1983 requires proof of actual injury for compensatory damages from denial of procedural due process but permits nominal damages without proof of actual harm.

Morrison v. Stepanski · filed 1993-12-03

Actual injury must be shown before a section 1983 plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for the denial of procedural due. process. ... Nominal damages are, however, recoverable for violation of the right in the absence of proof of actual harm.

Section 1983 requires nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when the plaintiff proves no actual injury.

Grounds v. Tolar Independent School District · filed 1994-04-26

Since the trial court’s judgment in July 1989, the Supreme Court has held that the award of nominal damages is mandatory when the plaintiff establishes a procedural due process violation but fails to prove actual injury. ... We thus reform that portion of the judgment of the trial court in which no damages were awarded, to award Grounds nominal damages of $1.00.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a denial of procedural due process without proof of actual injury.

Bryant v. Lanham · filed 1994-08-01

Finally, it is well established that nominal damages may be recovered for a denial of procedural due process, without a showing of injury.

Section 1983 allows only nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when the underlying decision was proper, unless the plaintiff proves harm caused by the procedural defect itself.

Fairbairn v. Board of Education · filed 1995-01-13

Moreover, it should be noted that under Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), only nominal damages can be obtained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a procedural breach if the decision itself was proper, unless the plaintiff suffered damages specifically caused by a procedural infirmity, as opposed to the loss of her job.

Section 1983 limits recovery to nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when a proper hearing would not have prevented the termination.

Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon · filed 1995-08-10

As such, although defendants’ failure to provide plaintiff with sufficient notice of termination and a pre-termination hearing violated his right to procedural due process, defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from recovering more than a nominal amount.

Section 1983 limits recovery for a procedural due process violation to nominal damages when the plaintiff proves no actual injury.

Kellas v. Peters · filed 1996-03-05

Having carefully examined the record, we agree that Kellas failed to show any actual injury flowing from the denial of procedural due process. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment in favor of Kellas, but modify the award of damages to one dollar.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages when a plaintiff’s procedural due process rights have been violated.

Laudermilk v. Fordice · filed 1996-12-12

Nominal damages are available to the plaintiffs by virtue of the mere fact that their procedural due process rights have been violated.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a deprivation of procedural due process even when the plaintiff cannot prove actual injury.

Laurido v. Simon · filed 1980-03-07

Recovery of damages under § 1983 is contemplated by the statute itself; ... and absent proof of actual injury, nominal damages are available for a deprivation of procedural due process.

Section 1983 permits a damages action against state prison officials who deprive an inmate of procedural due process by using extraneous criteria to deny work release.

WINSETT v. McGINNES · filed 1980-03-24

We can only conclude that in considering the extraneous criteria, Superintendent Anderson and Commissioner Keve violated the procedure to be accorded Winsett's work release application, and that Winsett has a cause of action against them for the alleged deprivation of procedural due process.

Section 1983 provides relief for a due process violation only to the extent the plaintiff suffered actual injury from the denial of due process.

Skomorucha v. Wilmington Housing Authority · filed 1980-12-11

A plaintiff whose due process rights were violated is entitled to relief in a § 1983 action only to the extent that he suffered actual injury as the result of the denial of due process.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action for the denial of constitutional rights, including minimum procedural due process.

Bush v. California Conservation Corps · filed 1982-09-30

We merely hold that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for denial of their constitutional rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and, upon that basis, may also seek a writ of mandate to compel defendant to comply with procedural due process and a declaration of rights.

Section 1983 may permit damages when officials deliberately defy a state-court judgment and thereby subvert state process to deprive a person of property.

Donald Roy, of Waterville, Kennebec County, State of Maine v. The City of Augusta, Maine · filed 1983-07-28

Where its result was to leave Roy without the license the Maine court said he was entitled to, and ultimately to destroy his business, we think he might be able to recover damages under section 1983.

When a deprivation was justified but the procedures were deficient, Section 1983 does not compensate the justified loss, and only nominal damages are available absent proof of a separate actual injury.

Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, Sangamon County, Cass County, and Richard Austin, Individually and in His O · filed 1985-08-07

Where there has been a justified deprivation of a protected interest through deficient procedures, the injury caused by the justified loss is not properly compensable under section 1983. ... Without proof of actual injury, the denial of procedural due process is actionable only for nominal damages.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must prove actual injury caused by a constitutional violation to recover compensatory damages; without actual injury, only nominal damages are available.

Adams v. Wolff · filed 1985-12-30

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a violation of his constitutional rights actually caused him injury before he may recover compensatory damages. ... A plaintiff who has established a violation of his rights, but not actual injury resulting therefrom, may collect only nominal damages.

A Section 1983 plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages for a justified deprivation merely because the procedures used were constitutionally deficient.

Akbar v. Fairman · filed 1986-04-22

Where there has been a justified deprivation of a protected interest though deficient procedures, the injury caused by the justified loss is not properly compensable under section 1983.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim may proceed when a state official's violation of established procedures could have occurred pursuant to municipal custom or usage rather than as a random and unauthorized act.

Young v. Municipality of Bethel Park · filed 1986-10-28

In the present case, plaintiff may be able to prove a custom or usage on the part of defendants which would remove defendant Kletch’s action from the category of random and unauthorized acts. Therefore, we will deny defendants’ motion to dismiss.

A public employee with a property right to continued employment until a pretermination cause hearing may obtain reinstatement and backpay under Section 1983 until a proper hearing occurs.

Skeets v. Johnson · filed 1986-11-12

We therefore hold that because Skeets had a property right to continued employment until his “cause” hearing, the district court was correct in awarding him reinstatement and backpay until a proper hearing is held.

A short student suspension does not violate § 1983 when school officials give notice of the contemplated discipline and an opportunity to respond.

Bystrom Ex Rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High School · filed 1987-06-30

Dr. Ingvalson met with each student individually, and informed each that he was contemplating suspending them for advocating violence against the homes of teachers. Although Dr. Ingvalson asked each student if he or she had any questions or comments concerning the proposed suspension, each of the students felt nothing could be said to change the administrators’ minds. The students did assert their belief that suspension would be inappropriate.

A plaintiff whose procedural due-process violation caused no actual injury is entitled only to nominal damages under § 1983.

Rogers v. Kelly · filed 1987-10-02

It follows that under all possible versions of due process in this case, Dr. Rogers is entitled only to nominal damages.

A § 1983 plaintiff deprived of property without procedural due process may recover compensatory damages when the deprivation was unjustified, but only nominal damages when the deprivation itself was justified.

Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, Lawrence M. Loveless and Jane Doe Loveless, and the Marital Community Composed · filed 1987-11-18

A plaintiff deprived of a property interest without procedural due process can recover compensatory damages if the deprivation is determined to have been unjustified. ... However, only nominal damages are recoverable for a deprivation of property determined to be otherwise justified.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim for an unauthorized deprivation when adequate state postdeprivation remedies satisfy due process.

Utke v. City of Houston · filed 1988-04-26

Because the posttermination state law remedies available to Utke were adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process, he is precluded from bringing this section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits liability for depriving a public employee of her position without due process of law.

Harvey v. Treder · filed 1988-05-18

This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted two claims: (1) race discrimination in defendants’ having discharged plaintiff from the Suffolk County Police Academy and the position of police officer, and (2) denial of a property right without due process of law in defendants’ having refused to reinstate plaintiff as a community service aid. ... With respect to the second claim, for reasons stated on the record on May 15, 1988, this court found defendants liable for having deprived plaintiff of her position as a community service aid without affording her due process of law.

A Section 1983 procedural due process claim fails when postdeprivation reinstatement with full back pay provides meaningful relief sufficient to satisfy due process, even though additional relief could be available under the section.

Dorsey v. State of Md., Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services · filed 1988-08-02

Whatever deprivation this may have constituted, however, was cured when the Secretary of Personnel reinstated him with full back pay. Postdeprivation remedies can satisfy due process requirements. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538 (1981). Although additional relief, including attorney fees, would be available under Sec. 1983, Dorsey got meaningful relief sufficient to satisfy due process. Id. at 544. Therefore, summary judgment on his Sec. 1983 claim was appropriate.

Section 1983 permits damages for denial of procedural due process even if the plaintiff later receives a hearing.

Schall v. Joyce · filed 1989-11-24

Moreover, although a hearing is an element of the relief available in a procedural due process suit, the Supreme Court has held that denial of the process due is itself compensable by damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Thus, although Schall has received a hearing, she may still be entitled to monetary relief if due process required that she be given a hearing more timely than the one that she ultimately received.

In a § 1983 procedural due process claim, once the plaintiff proves a violation, the defendant must prove that the same termination would have occurred with due process to avoid damages for lost employment.

Hough v. Dane County · filed 1990-06-07

Once Hough established a violation of his procedural due process rights, the burden shifted to the county to prove that the board would have terminated Hough's employment if no due process violation had occurred.

In a § 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process, damages cover injury caused by the denial of process itself; absent proof of such injury, only nominal damages are available.

Royal Russell Long v. Shillinger · filed 1991-03-06

Under such circumstances, plaintiff cannot recover for any injury caused by the extradition; he can only recover for any injury, such as emotional distress, caused by the deprivation of due process itself. ... Since plaintiff did not allege, much less prove, that he suffered any injury as a result of the deprivation of due process alone, he was entitled to receive only nominal damages on his claim.

Section 1983 permits a damages suit for procedural or substantive due process violations.

Mateen v. Carl Nink Ray Polanco Sherry Burright Jim Cecil · filed 1993-04-15

A party may sue for damages under section 1983 for procedural or substantive due process violations.

Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff to at least nominal damages when a municipal policy terminates water service without constitutionally required notice.

James v. City of St. Petersburg · filed 1993-10-22

Appéllees’ policy of disconnecting water service to a property without giving prior notice of termination to actual users constitutes a denial of due process and entitles appellant to at least nominal damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging deprivation of procedural due process to show a protected life, liberty, or property interest and the absence of due process.

Farber v. City of Paterson · filed 2004-06-07

To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the individual interest of which she claims she was deprived is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “life, liberty, or property,” and (2) the procedures available to her did not provide “due process of law.”

Section 1983 permits damages for a procedural due process violation when conduct under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of life, liberty, or property without due process.

Schultz v. Egan · filed 2004-07-06

“To award damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of procedural due process, a court must find that, as the result of conduct performed under col- or of state law, the plaintiff was deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”

Section 1983 allows a person to bring a federal action for deprivation of constitutional rights when state officials fail to provide required predeprivation process.

Berlanti v. Bodman · filed 1985-12-26

As we held in Stana, "if the government entity could have, but did not, provide predeprivation procedures, a Sec. 1983 action complaining of the lack of procedural due process may be maintained in federal court, notwithstanding the availability of state judicial routes as well." Stana, 775 F.2d at 130.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state or local government actor for depriving them of a constitutional right under color of state law.

Hughes v. City of Bethlehem · filed 2008-10-02

We agree with the District Court that Hughes failed to make out a claim against the City that she was deprived of procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for deprivation of procedural due process during a prison disciplinary proceeding when the claim does not necessarily invalidate the conviction.

White v. Fox · filed 2008-10-06

A claim for damages based on a failure to receive a written statement of the evidence relied on in a prison disciplinary proceeding is cognizable under §1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for procedural due process violations when success would not necessarily invalidate good-time credits.

Cox v. Clark · filed 2009-04-08

However, Cox’s claim for damages based on the failure to provide advance notice of the claimed disciplinary violation is not barred by Edwards, because a decision in Cox’s favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of the good-time credits.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when a proper hearing would have produced the same result, but does not permit compensatory damages without resulting injury.

Parks v. Goff · filed 1980-01-08

The Court finds that plaintiff has not sustained any actual damages attributable to the lack of procedural due process, for the reason that a proper hearing would have resulted in the same disposition. Under such circumstances, reinstatement and backpay are not proper remedies, and an award of compensatory damages is not justified. ... Judgment will, therefore, be entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of one dollar, representing nominal damages for such deprivation of procedure.

Section 1983 permits actual damages for a procedural due process violation if injury is proved, and nominal damages if no actual damages are shown.

Russell v. Dr. Robert Harrison, President of the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning · filed 1984-07-16

Thus, if upon remand, the district court finds a denial of procedural due process, actual damages ... may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... and nominal damages are appropriate in the event that no actual damages are shown.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, but a public employee cannot use it to challenge a transfer that changes job functions without terminating employment.

Ayala-Sepulveda v. Municipality of San German · filed 2009-09-30

Since the plaintiffs allegations in this case do not involve the termination of his employment, but merely a change in his functions, i.e. a transfer from one division of the municipal government to another, the plaintiff cannot obtain redress for a due process violation, even if the defendants’ alleged actions would constitute adverse employment actions. ... Therefore, the court must GRANT the defendants’ motion on this ground and dismiss the plaintiffs section 1983 due process claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of law deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or laws, and a procedural due process claim requires denial of available state process.

Copper ex rel. Copper v. Denlinger · filed 2010-01-29

As such, even assuming arguendo that the 6 October meeting was constitutionally deficient and deprived the student of his right to procedural due process, the complaint fails to make the additional requisite allegation that the injury was completed when Ms. Denlinger, acting under color of law, refused to provide or somehow denied the student due process following the initial alleged deprivation. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 114. The sole relevant allegation as to Ms. Denlinger, that she “purposefully postdated her letter... to cut off Todd’s right to appeal,” even when taken as true, is insufficient to establish that he was denied his right to appeal. Simply put, the student can show no claim under § 1983 for violation of procedural due process when his own allegations reveal that he and his mother failed to avail themselves of the due process offered under state law.

Section 1983 permits a procedural due process claim when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation.

mark East v. Clayton Coumty, GA · filed 2011-08-01

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of procedural due process, an individual must show “the state refuse[d] to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation.”

Section 1983 permits procedural due process relief only when the plaintiff shows deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest and a lack of process.

Fellowship v. County of San Diego · filed 2011-12-23

To obtain relief on § 1983 claims based upon procedural due process, the plaintiff must establish the existence of “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] ... (3) lack of process.” ... Without such a deprivation, procedural due process claims are moot.

Section 1983 permits a procedural due process claim when the plaintiff proves deprivation of a protected interest, state action, and constitutionally inadequate process.

KTK Mining of Virginia, LLC v. City of Selma · filed 2013-10-31

In this circuit, a § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a protected property interest and deprivation by state actors without constitutionally adequate process, subject to adequate post-deprivation remedies.

Williams v. City of Brockton · filed 2015-11-13

“In order to establish a procedural due process claim under § 1983, ‘a plaintiff must allege first that [he] has a property interest as defined by state law and, second, that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived [him] of that property interest without constitutionally adequate process.’ ” Bolduc, 629 F.Supp.2d at 147 (quoting SFW Arecibo, Ltd, v. Rodriguez, 415 F.3d 135, 139 (1st Cir.2005)) (alterations in original).

Section 1983 provides no damages cause of action for a government employee whose procedural due process rights have adequate state remedies resulting in reinstatement and back pay.

Boatright v. Glynn County School District · filed 2012-03-22

Notwithstanding, we have held that a government employee had no § 1983 cause of action for damages for violation of her procedural due process rights when available state remedies were adequate, resulting in reinstatement and back pay.

A § 1983 claim requires factual allegations showing that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

United States Ex Rel. Smith v. Robinson · filed 1980-07-31

A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim requires a factual averment that shows some personal involvement by the defendants.

Section 1983 requires a showing that the defendant was personally responsible for the conduct complained of before liability may be imposed.

Howard v. Cronk · filed 1980-03-20

In order for liability to be imposed under section 1983, there must be some showing that the defendant is personally responsible for the conduct complained of.

Section 1983 makes the decision-maker accountable when the official acts for legally impermissible reasons.

Ollman v. Toll · filed 1981-07-27

As discussed previously, it is the decision-maker who is accountable in a suit such as this one brought under § 1983, if he or it acts for legally impermissible reasons.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations attributing the alleged constitutional deprivation to the defendant through direct action or inaction, participation, or acquiescence; bare conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk · filed 1981-11-24

Nothing in the record before us discloses a single allegation of direct, personal action on the part of Rodriguez in regard to the alleged deprivations, either by participation or acquiescence. ... Here, the complaint dismissed as to former warden Felix Rodriguez fails utterly to contain any factual allegations of wrongdoing attributable to Rodriguez, either by direct action or inaction. Thus, the complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for an arrest and reincarceration that cannot be attributed to any dereliction by the defendant jail officials.

Harris v. Elrod · filed 1985-01-17

Llewellyn Harris (“Harris”) brings this pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages and other relief against Cook County Sheriff Richard J. Elrod (“Elrod”). ... Thus, the arrest and reincarceration of Harris cannot be attributed to any dereliction of duty on the part of jail officials.

Section 1983 does not reach a property deprivation caused only indirectly by state officers when an independent private party directly caused the alleged harm.

Sullivan v. New Jersey, Division of Gaming Enforcement · filed 1985-02-14

To adopt the plaintiffs’ contentions and to allow them to pursue their § 1983 claim in a case where their alleged deprivation of property resulted only indirectly, if at all, from the conduct of state officers would be to engage in an unwarranted expansion of the reach of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a private prison medical contractor’s direct involvement or its policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation.

Howell v. Evans · filed 1991-01-28

If she fails to show causation, no action can stand under section 1983, and we would not reach the issue of qualified immunity or other subsequent issues in the section 1983 analysis. ... Mrs. Howell can allege causation by showing either that CMS was directly involved in the violation, or that a policy or custom of CMS led to the violation.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison medical contractor liable for its medical director’s policies when the director lacked final authority over the challenged staffing and equipment decisions.

Howell v. Evans · filed 1991-01-28

We therefore conclude that as Robinson was not the final authority on the matters of equipment and staff procurement at ACMI, CMS could not be found liable, as a matter of law, for Robinson’s actions and policies even though he was CMS’s authority at the institution.

A private employer is liable under § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional arrest only if the plaintiff proves that the employer’s policy caused the violation.

Rojas v. Alexander's Department Store, Inc. · filed 1990-11-29

Thus, to recover under § 1983, it is not enough for Rojas to show that his arrest by Luck was without probable cause. He must show that Alexander’s had a policy of arresting shoplifting suspects on less than probable cause.

Under the circuit's then-governing rule, agents of a private corporation contracting to provide prison medical services are independent contractors who do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Crawford v. Doe · filed 1986-09-25

The district court dismissed Crawford's complaint because as independent contractors, agents of Frank Basil, Inc. were not acting under color of state law, a requirement in any Sec. 1983 action. This conclusion is entirely consistent with this Court's holding in Calvert v. Sharpe, 748 F.2d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 53 U.S.L.W. 3838 (May 28, 1985).

Section 1983 permits suit against a private corporation performing duties traditionally within the State's province and receiving substantial state funds when its relationship with the State is sufficient.

Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Conn · filed 1980-03-21

We observe that Excepticon’s argument that it is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is without merit. Where a private corporation undertakes to perform duties which have been largely within the province of the State, and wherein it receives substantial sums of money from the State for the performance of such duties, there exists a sufficient relationship between it and the State to make it a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Indirect government involvement does not establish state action for Section 1983, and an activity is not a public function merely because it serves society generally.

Community Medical Center v. Emergency Medical Services of Northeastern Pennsylvania, Inc. · filed 1983-07-15

Even “indirect involvement” in the challenged decisions is not enough. ... We decline to muddy any further public function analysis by concluding that activities, not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state, become public merely because they serve society in general rather than specific individuals.

A private entity’s status as a state actor does not alone establish Section 1983 liability; the alleged deprivation must also result from a right, privilege, or rule of conduct sourced in state authority.

Thompson v. Community Action of Greater Wilmington, Inc. · filed 1983-07-08

This holding, however, does not end the inquiry and does not, in and of itself, render CAGW and the defendants liable for actions cognizable under section 1983. Also to be satisfied is the second aspect of the... test: whether the alleged deprivation of rights resulted from the exercise of a right, privilege, or rule of conduct having its source in state authority.

Section 1983 does not reach a private rescue squad's membership decision when government funding, regulation, and the squad's possible public function do not make that decision state action.

Eggleston v. Prince Edward Volunteer Rescue Squad, Inc. · filed 1983-08-08

Because plaintiff has failed, even taking into consideration the funding, regulation, and possible public function of defendant Rescue Squad, to establish sufficient indicia of State action to support a § 1983 action, the Court will grant summary judgment to defendants as to Counts I through V, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private physician does not act under color of state law merely by executing a statutory application for a patient’s involuntary commitment.

Willacy v. Lewis · filed 1984-06-20

The Court concludes, therefore, that in executing an application for plaintiff’s involuntary commitment no state action is involved.

A Section 1983 complaint sufficiently alleges state action when it says a parole board delegated its judgment over a parolee’s conduct to a private treatment provider.

Jones v. Eagleville Hospital & Rehabilitation Center · filed 1984-06-20

Plaintiff has alleged such a system permitting private parties to substitute their judgment for that of a state official or body.

A private organization so entangled with a city through funding, payroll, and supervisory control can be a state actor for purposes of section 1983, making its employee a de facto government employee for the state-action requirement.

Casias v. City Of Raton · filed 1984-07-06

However, the relationship between the Council and the City of Raton was such that Casias may well have been a "de facto" City employee for purposes of the state action requirement of section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

A private party who performs a function delegated to it by the state, such as administering a court-ordered driver alcohol assessment and treatment program, acts under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983 while carrying out that function.

Granberg v. Ashland County · filed 1984-07-25

Whenever a state, formally or informally, delegates to private persons functions that have traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of the state, those persons become state actors for the limited purpose of performing those functions.

A private hospital’s termination of staff privileges is not actionable under section 1983 when the state neither participated in nor influenced that decision.

Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp. · filed 1985-07-09

The Court’s conclusion of no state action in defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s staff privileges ends the § 1983 inquiry, ... and likewise bars plaintiff’s federal procedural due process argument. Private conduct, no matter how wrongful or arbitrary raises no Fourteenth Amendment concern.

A private physician acts under color of state law when state law delegates to physicians the sovereign public function of certifying an individual’s involuntary confinement.

Plain v. Flicker · filed 1986-10-21

Here, the state has statutorily delegated to physicians its power to deprive an individual of his liberty where the individual suffers from a dangerous mental illness. ... Clearly, physicians, certifying a commitment have assumed a public function.

A private entity’s extensive government regulation and public funding do not establish Section 1983 state action without a sufficiently close nexus between the government and the challenged decision.

Nail v. Community Action Agency of Calhoun County · filed 1986-12-16

A private party may be so closely connected to the state that its activities may be attributed to the state. However, extensive regulation by the state is not enough to establish state action. The complaining party must show "a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself."

Public funding of a private organization does not make its employment decision state action under § 1983 unless the challenged decision stems from a policymaking function assumed by the state.

Young v. Cedar County Work Activity Center, Inc. · filed 1987-11-25

The record fails to indicate that the decision to discharge the plaintiff was compelled or even influenced by any recognized state policy. In order for a public entity to be liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, there must be some basis for concluding that the challenged action stems from a policy-making function assumed by the state.

Section 1983 permits suit against a private entity only when its relationship with state or local government makes its acts attributable to the state.

Signore v. City of McKeesport, Pa. · filed 1988-03-03

Middle Department is a private entity which may not be sued under Section 1983 unless it was so significantly and substantially interwoven with state and local governments that a symbiotic relationship existed between the two and the acts of the entity can be reasonably said to be the acts of the political state.

In an employment-discrimination action under § 1983, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case through direct proof of open intentional discrimination without satisfying the mechanical McDonnell Douglas criteria.

Mauro RAMIREZ, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SLOSS · filed 1980-04-07

These same principles are applicable in employment discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Appellant established that the city had a written personnel policy favoring United States citizens and that city officials told him and others that the city had a citizen preference policy. Proof of these evidential facts established a prima facie case. We think it abundantly clear that under this proof it was more likely than not that the rejection of Ramirez was "based on a discriminatory criterion." Id. It was not necessary or proper to require proof of the McDonnell Douglas criteria.

In a § 1983 action alleging racially motivated employment discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas factors may be used to establish a prima facie case whether or not Title VII is used as a parallel remedy.

Anthony T. Lee, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor v. Conecuh County Board of Education · filed 1981-01-22

Logic dictates that the McDonnell Douglas factors may be used to establish a prima facie case in cases of racially motivated employment discrimination brought under section 1983 whether or not Title VII is used as a parallel remedy.

A prima facie § 1983 claim challenging racial discrimination is established in the same manner as a prima facie Title VII racial discrimination claim.

Felton v. City of Auburn · filed 1997-01-17

In the Eleventh Circuit, a prima facie claim for a § 1983 claim challenging racial discrimination is established in the same manner as a prima facie claim of racial discrimination under Title VII.

An employment discrimination plaintiff under § 1983 can establish a prima facie case even when replaced by someone in the same protected class.

Brawner-Ahlstrom v. Husson · filed 1998-04-30

Thus, under the rule of Roadway Express, with which we agree, a prima facie case can be established notwithstanding replacement by a member of the same protected class.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims have the same elements as Title VII claims when they arise from the same facts.

Keaton v. Cobb County, Georgia · filed 2009-01-30

“Although McDonnell Douglas was a Title VII case, Title VII and section 1983 claims have the same elements where the claims are based on the same set of facts.”

Employment disparate treatment claims under § 1983 use the same analysis as Title VII claims.

Hopkins v. St. Lucie County School Board · filed 2010-10-13

The analysis of a disparate treatment claim is the same whether that claim is brought under Title VII, § 1981, or § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of constitutional rights.

Lockhart v. Willingboro High School · filed 2015-03-31

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil remedy against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the U.S. Constitution. To establish § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her constitutional rights were violated and that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. ... The Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a person acting under color of law who subjects another person, or causes that person to be subjected, to a deprivation of rights.

Whitley v. City of Portland · filed 2009-08-12

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability arises when a person, acting under color of law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to the deprivation of particular rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a federal rights violation committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law.

Johnson v. Waters · filed 2004-05-11

In order to state a valid claim under section 1983, plaintiffs must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person [or entity] acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 liability requires a violation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Hopkins v. Bell · filed 2003-02-19

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hopkins must demonstrate a violation of his rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 damages claims require a federal-law duty imposed on a person acting under color of state law, breach, causation, and actual damages.

Zehner v. Trigg · filed 1997-01-15

To maintain a cause of action for damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege each of the following elements: (1) a duty imposed by federal law on persons acting under color of state law to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the actor’s breach of duty and the plaintiffs injury; and (4) actual damages.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a federal right caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Hudgins v. DeBruyn · filed 1996-04-05

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege both action under color of state law and deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Tomkins v. Village of Tinley Park · filed 1983-04-26

To state a claim under § 1983 plaintiff must allege both that defendants acted under color of state law and that they deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A § 1983 action requires deprivation of a federal right under color of law, and local governmental units are persons subject to the statute.

Odell v. City of Eagan · filed 1984-05-08

A § 1983 action has two elements. First, a person must be deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution and laws by another person. Second, it must be done under color of law. Local governmental units are persons for purposes of § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim requires both deprivation of a federally secured right and conduct by a person acting under color of state law.

Judson Bldg. v. First Nat. Bank of Longview · filed 1984-06-04

A cause of action under Section 1983 can only be established when plaintiffs show (1) that they have been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.

A Section 1983 claim requires conduct under color of state law that deprives the claimant of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Rand v. Perales · filed 1984-06-15

First, the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law, and, second, that conduct must have deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional right.

Christenson v. Ramaeker · filed 1985-04-17

Plaintiff had the burden to prove as an element of his section 1983 case that defendant’s conduct violated his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 plaintiff must plead and prove that a defendant acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution.

Brumley v. Gene A. Scroggy and Oliver H. Barber, Jr. · filed 1987-10-13

To be entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendants, while acting under the color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the United States Constitution or statutes.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must prove that a person acting under color of law deprived the plaintiff of a federally secured right; an ordinary violation of state law is insufficient.

Schepp v. Fremont County, Wyo. · filed 1988-02-09

A party alleging a civil rights violation under section 1983 must prove that one acting under color of law deprived him of a federally secured right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Violation of a state law ordinarily is not cognizable under section 1983.

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute.

Rodriguez v. Al Chandler · filed 1996-05-29

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or federal statute.

A plaintiff need not bring a § 1983 claim in state court rather than federal court.

Carter v. Harris · filed 1999-09-03

Accordingly, the court concludes that there is no requirement that a plaintiff pursue a § 1983 claim in state, rather than federal, court.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a conventional challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance absent an alleged deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Tyler v. City of North Royalton · filed 1982-08-20

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the validity of the North Royalton zoning ordinance cannot be permitted to enter federal court disguised as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Plaintiffs have failed to allege the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law and are therefore not entitled to this forum.

Section 1983 provides a separate federal remedy and assures access to a federal forum, so duplicative litigation from a concurrent state action does not by itself justify Colorado River dismissal or a stay.

Tucker v. Callahan · filed 1987-05-26

The purpose of section 1983 was to provide a separate federal remedy for plaintiffs’ civil rights claims. Dismissal or stay under these circumstances would undermine and thwart the result intended by the passage of the legislation. This is of particular concern because res judicata could effectively preclude plaintiffs from being able to avail themselves of the federal forum section 1983 provides.

A plaintiff does not waive the right to bring a § 1983 suit in federal court under the Leaman doctrine without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.

Smith v. Terry P. Duncan Lawrence Mendel · filed 1996-10-09

Smith's § 1983 complaint is not barred under Leaman, because Smith did not "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waive his right to sue the defendants in federal court.

Section 1983 claims based on allegedly unfair civil-service selection procedures fail when the procedures do not deprive plaintiffs of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

Tumulty v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1980-05-08

The fact that the law provides procedures does not mean that they acquire constitutional dimension; the due process clause does not constitutionalize all local law.

For a § 1983 claim seeking a pretermination hearing, a plaintiff must show a property or liberty interest, and whether a property interest exists is determined by state law.

Tatter v. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 306 · filed 1980-06-13

It is well established that plaintiff must establish a property or liberty interest to be entitled to a pretermination hearing and that whether a property interest exists must be determined by reference to state law.

Section 1983 does not support a claim for denial of a particular public job without a legitimate property interest or entitlement to that employment.

Kaelin v. Long Island Railroad · filed 1980-12-31

Second, to the extent that plaintiff asserts a deprivation of civil rights “secured by the Constitution and laws” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his claim cannot be sustained on the undisputed facts and law. ... this court has found no authority for the proposition that employment in a particular position must be offered upon demand. On the contrary, even where public employment is available, constitutional rights are not implicated unless some “property” interest is at stake. ... That entitlement is precisely what is lacking here and requires the rejection of plaintiff’s claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not protect a person from termination for an arbitrary or capricious reason, or for no reason at all, absent a cognizable liberty or property interest.

Derrickson v. Board of Ed. of City of St. Louis · filed 1982-03-31

In the absence of a cognizable liberty or property interest, § 1983 does not protect plaintiff from being terminated for an arbitrary or capricious reason, or for no reason at all.

Section 1983 reaches a claim only when the defendant’s conduct deprives the plaintiff of a right; lacking a right to a continuing service contract, Rothfuss had no cognizable § 1983 claim.

Board of Education of Bellevue v. Rothfuss · filed 1982-08-31

It is apparent that this statute deals with a deprivation of some right. To come within the provisions of this statute, Rothfuss must either presently have a right that is being circumvented or a right that is proposed to be circumvented. Rothfuss did not have a continuing service teaching contract nor was he entitled to such a contract for the school year 1975-76. Since he had no right to a continuing service contract, he did not have a right cognizable by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a public employee's termination when the employee lacks a constitutionally protectable property or liberty interest.

Sommer v. City of Dayton, Ohio · filed 1983-01-14

Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate the existence of a constitutionally protectable “property” or “liberty” interest disposes of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a due-process claim where the plaintiff has received the process due and has no protected property or liberty interest; mere reputational damage is insufficient.

Estes v. Tuscaloosa County, Alabama · filed 1983-01-24

We hold that it does not, for the reasons stated by the district court in its dispositive memorandum opinion, Record, vol. 1 at 86, set out in the appendix and therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. ... Plaintiff’s request that her personnel file be expunged of derogatory material cannot form the basis of a § 1983 action under the circumstances of this case. It is clear that no action lies under § 1983 for mere damage to reputation.

Section 1983 permits a due-process claim when a state employer disseminates a false and defamatory impression about an employee in connection with termination, with a name-clearing hearing required if the liberty interest is implicated.

Goetz v. Windsor Central School District · filed 1983-01-24

A liberty interest is therefore implicated and a name-clearing hearing required where an employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about an employee in connection with the employee's termination. ... We are satisfied that, granting plaintiff every reasonable intendment to be derived from the allegations in his papers opposing summary judgment, he has raised factual issues regarding the deprivation of a liberty interest which may not properly be resolved without benefit of discovery. ... We hold, finally, that plaintiff's failure to take advantage of the opportunity to provide an explanation for his alleged involvement in this affair does not constitute a waiver of his right to assert a due process claim.

An abstract desire to obtain city-owned property, without a legitimate claim of entitlement, is not a property interest protected by Section 1983 due process.

Allen v. Brodie · filed 1983-10-20

Plaintiffs allegation of a due process violation is rooted in an abstract desire to own property for which he has no legitimate claim of entitlement. He admits that he is unable to afford the City owned property, and acknowledges that he is unable to meet the criteria that the City has established to qualify for a loan. Plaintiff has failed to identify, or even suggest, any individual entitlement to City owned property.

An unsuccessful public bidder does not state a Section 1983 due-process claim merely by alleging violation of local bidding rules, absent a protected entitlement such as material compliance by the plaintiff and material noncompliance by the winning bidder.

Northwest Disposal Co. v. Village of Fox Lake · filed 1983-11-10

The complaint, however, has not stated the limited due process right essential to a cause of action under section 1983. In the absence of facts alleging that H.O.D., the successful bidder, failed to meet the qualifications under the bidding procedure, no cause of action has been stated nor can be stated which would entitle plaintiff to relief under count III.

A public employee’s Section 1983 due-process claim fails when no statute, ordinance, contract, or mutual understanding creates a property interest in continued employment.

Duncan v. The City of Oneida, Tennessee, and Mack Burchfield · filed 1984-06-04

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming he had been deprived of a “property” interest in his job and that he was discharged without due process of law. ... We conclude that the district court correctly found that Duncan presented no evidence to support the contention that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his job as a police officer in Oneida, Tennessee. Tennessee law does not create such an interest; no local statute or ordinance existed; no employment contract existed; nor does the evidence indicate that any mutually explicit understanding, or implied contract, existed to create a property interest.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim fails when state law gives children no property interest in tuition-free attendance at a particular school after moving out of its district.

Daniels v. Morris · filed 1984-11-12

Two children seek damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because they were not permitted to attend a school located in a district in which they formerly resided but from which their father and they had moved, on the basis that they were not accorded procedural due process before school officials reached the conclusion they could not continue to attend the school they had been attending. ... Since the children possessed no state created property interest in attending the Arlington school at the time of their dismissal, the principal's action in ordering their withdrawal was not subject to the procedural strictures of the due process clause.

A public employee cannot recover under section 1983 for inadequate termination procedures without proving a protected property or liberty interest in the employment.

Payne v. Ballard · filed 1985-05-09

In order for Payne to demonstrate a liberty interest he must show that the reasons for discharge stigmatized him and that the defendants made the reasons public.

A procedural deficiency alone does not support a § 1983 due-process claim unless the plaintiff was deprived of a legally cognizable liberty or property interest.

Linhart v. Glatfelter · filed 1985-08-22

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Linhart was entitled to certain procedures — including a hearing — before being disciplined, that is not enough by itself to support a section 1983 action. The plaintiff must have been deprived of some legally cognizable interest.

North Dakota's discretionary parole statutes, rules, and practices create no protected liberty interest enforceable through Section 1983.

Patten v. North Dakota Parole Board · filed 1986-02-10

Accordingly, we hold that North Dakota has not created a protected liberty interest in parole, and thus Patten has no due process rights that attach to his interest in parole.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim requires a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest; losing a discretionary prison work assignment does not suffice.

Williams v. Sumner · filed 1986-06-24

Lacking a liberty interest sufficient to trigger due process protections, plaintiff fails to demonstrate a legal basis of constitutional dimension to sustain his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.