42 U.S.C. § 1983

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 excessive-force claim must prove injury caused by clearly excessive force that was objectively unreasonable; each element is necessary to establish liability.

Aguilera v. Nava · filed 2010-07-21

In order to prevail on a claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show “(1) an injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable.”

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on disparate impact alone.

INDIANAPOLIS CHAPTER OF NAACP v. Ballard · filed 2010-09-16

Even so, a disparate impact theory of liability is not available under section 1983.

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to civil claims under § 1983.

Snider v. Pekny · filed 2012-09-27

This is in part because the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which in criminal cases generally directs a court to exclude all evidence “tainted” by an illegal search or seizure, does not apply to civil claims made under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to suppress evidence gathered after a Fourth Amendment violation if the evidence was otherwise constitutionally obtained.

Willis v. Mullins · filed 2011-08-16

In the context of a Section 1983 suit, the fact that Defendants’ initial entry into the hotel room was a Fourth Amendment violation does not require the suppression of any subsequent evidence if it is otherwise constitutionally gathered.

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to civil actions under § 1983.

Hargroves v. City of New York · filed 2011-02-22

The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply to civil actions brought under § 1983, see Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 1999); therefore, we may analyze the initial stop independently of Wu’s subsequent identifications.

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to civil actions under § 1983.

Hinds v. City of New York · filed 2010-09-28

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is inapplicable to civil actions arising under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims do not apply the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained after an allegedly unlawful stop.

Ryan v. Koester · filed 2015-02-02

The Court concludes that because the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to § 1983 claims, the issue of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Plaintiff based on alleged traffic violations or to administer field sobriety tests is immaterial.

In a § 1983 malicious-prosecution suit against police officers, the exclusionary rule does not bar evidence obtained through an illegal search from establishing probable cause for an arrest warrant.

Black v. Wigington · filed 2016-01-22

The Blacks’ claim of malicious prosecution fails because Deputy Kain, Deputy Stamatellos, and Investigator Wilson are entitled to qualified immunity. The evidence from the Blacks’ trailer provided probable cause for the arrest warrants. It does not matter whether that evidence was discovered in compliance with the Fourth Amendment because the exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil suit against police officers.

The exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases.

Lia Lingo v. City of Salem · filed 2016-06-27

Accordingly, regardless whether this is an intrasovereign or an intersovereign case, that fact would not alter our conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a § 1983 case.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, evidence obtained through an unlawful stop or search may be used to establish probable cause.

Kinslow v. Duckins · filed 2016-07-20

To be sure, in the context of a criminal prosecution, the exclusionary rule may invalidate an arrest based on evidence obtained from an illegal stop or search. But courts have repeatedly held that such evidence may be used to establish probable cause in the context of § 1983 and other civil claims.

The exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases, so officers may rely on unlawfully obtained evidence to defend a false arrest claim.

Lia Lingo v. City of Salem · filed 2016-08-08

Accordingly, regardless whether this is an intrasovereign or an intersovereign case, that fact would not alter our conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a § 1983 case.

The exclusionary rule does not apply to civil suits under § 1983.

Lipford v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-03-05

Although the Defendant Officers might have illegally entered and searched Plaintiff’s home (an issue for a jury to decide), the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil suits under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose civil liability solely because an officer obtained a warrant using evidence that could be suppressed in a criminal proceeding.

Thorp v. District of Columbia · filed 2018-05-24

Put more plainly, even were a court to suppress the pills found in Plaintiff’s freezer in a criminal proceeding, Kyle would not face any additional civil liability solely because he obtained a second warrant based on that discovery.

Section 1983 does not apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, so evidence found during an unlawful search can establish probable cause for a later detention.

Mayo v. LaSalle County · filed 2019-07-15

As the defendants explain, there is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine in claims brought pursuant to § 1983.

The exclusionary rule does not prevent a court from considering a confession suppressed in a criminal case when deciding probable cause in a Section 1983 suit.

Livingston v. Luberoff · filed 2020-02-21

Therefore, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge did not err in relying on case law beyond the purview of the Fourth Circuit by including the suppressed confession and the two arrest warrants issued for Unlawful Conduct Toward a Child in determining that probable cause did exist.

The exclusionary rule does not bar evidence from an allegedly unlawful search when assessing probable cause in a § 1983 action.

BARNETT v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-10-29

Finally, to the extent that Barnett contends that we cannot consider the items found during the allegedly unlawful search, Barnett is mistaken. Although the exclusionary rule may apply in criminal cases, rendering the fruits of an allegedly illegal search inadmissible, that is not the case in a § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 liability does not require proof of maliciousness.

Repking v. Lokey · filed 2010-09-30

We note where the circuit judge looked at maliciousness as a factor for § 1983 liability. While it certainly is a factor under state immunity law, we do not find maliciousness to be a prerequisite for § 1983 liability under federal law or federal jurisprudence.

Section 1983 does not create a separate excessive-force claim when it duplicates a claim alleging the same Fourth Amendment violation.

Herr v. Peterson · filed 2010-11-16

Count III asserts the same claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is, therefore, duplicative of Count I.

Section 1983 claims against individual agency employees are duplicative when the complaint alleges no conduct separate from their actions as agents of the agency.

R.B. v. County of Westmoreland · filed 2013-05-28

We also agree with the District Court that plaintiffs‘ § 1983 action is against Westmoreland County and WCCB, not the individual WCCB employees; dismissal of the duplicative claims against the employees was therefore proper.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed as duplicative when it relies on the same facts and seeks the same relief as a Rule 80B appeal.

Fair Elections Portland, Inc. v. The City of Portland · filed 2020-05-13

Similarly, Plaintiffs' 1983 claims (Counts III and IV) rely on the same factual allegations and seek the same relief as the Rule SOB appeal. ... Because these claims require the court to engage in the same legal and factual analysis necessary to decide the Rule SOB appeal, Counts III and IV are also dismissed as duplicative.

A Section 1983 official-capacity claim against an employee may be dismissed as duplicative when the employee’s governmental employer is already a defendant.

Hill v. Madison County · filed 2020-09-02

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Bufford are duplicative of her claim against Madison County because an official-capacity claim is really a claim against the official’s employer.

A § 1983 claim against a county board is duplicative when an official-capacity claim against the sheriff already names the county and no separate basis for board liability is alleged.

Banks v. Hayes · filed 2020-10-22

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the Board is simply a redundant claim against Delaware County, and plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the Board should be dismissed as duplicative.

Section 1983 does not govern claims against federal employees; those claims are brought under Bivens.

Jackson v. United States of America · filed 2020-12-28

Plaintiff claims he is bringing this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, because he is bringing this action against federal employees, the action is one brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not govern a claim against a federal employee for acts in a federal capacity; that claim arises under Bivens.

Aruanno v. Cavanaugh · filed 2012-01-31

The District Court characterized Aruanno‟s entire complaint as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Because Judge Cavanaugh is a federal employee, that claim should have been construed as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).

Section 1983 is not the cause of action for a claim against a federal employee; such a claim should be brought under Bivens.

Aruanno v. Walsh · filed 2011-08-29

Although the District Court characterized Aruanno’s complaint as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, it technically should have been brought as a Bivens action since the Defendant is a federal employee.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against federal actors alone.

United States v. Lee · filed 2010-12-10

Section 1983 is improper, however, because Lee sued only federal actors.

Section 1983 applies to state actors; constitutional claims against federal actors are construed as Bivens claims.

Lewis v. U.S. Parole Commission · filed 2012-01-20

The plaintiff’s complaint charges federal actors, not state actors, with violating the Constitution by maintaining inaccurate records. See Compl. at 2. As such, the court did not err in construing the plaintiff’s purported § 1983 claims as a Bivens action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for relief against federal actors.

Moore v. Hollingsworth · filed 2012-08-20

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not an appropriate vehicle for his claim because he seeks relief from federal, not state, actors.

Section 1983 applies to state actors acting under color of state law, not federal actors.

Smith v. Donahoe · filed 2013-01-08

Section 1983 applies only to state actors acting under the color of state law, not to federal actors. ... Therefore, whether brought under Section 1983 or Bivens, Plaintiffs claims for monetary relief against the USPS under Count I — III must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal actors such as the Social Security Administration or its employees.

Johnson v. Office of Social Security Administration · filed 2013-03-19

Section 1983 does not confer federal jurisdiction over claims against federal actors like the SSA or SSA employees.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors.

Rivera v. Department of Justice · filed 2013-03-28

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors, Settles v. U.S. ... Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and “[d]efendants argue correctly that the United States has not consented to be sued for monetary damages based on a constitutional violation or, in other words, for a “‘Bivens-type cause of action directly against a federal agency.’” Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486).

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state law and does not allow claims against federal agencies or officials acting under federal law.

Prentice v. United States · filed 2013-07-11

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state law and does not permit claims against federal agencies or federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an FBI agent acting as a federal officer.

Snyder v. United States · filed 2014-01-07

Defendant Giordano, of course, is an employee of the FBI and thus a federal actor. Therefore, he cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal actor acting under color of federal law.

Humphrey v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2014-12-30

The district court analyzed Humphrey’s claims in Counts 1 and 2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though a plaintiff may not bring a § 1983 claim against a federal actor acting under the color of federal law.

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state or territorial law; a claim against the federal Bureau of Prisons for federal action is insubstantial.

Robleto v. United States · filed 2015-12-10

There is no substantial claim here, if there ever could be, that the Bureau of Prisons was acting under color of state (or territorial) law or is a “person” doing so.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a federal agency and its officials generally cannot be sued under it.

Haines v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration · filed 2016-02-18

However, as a general matter, “[t]he federal government and its officials are not subject to suit under [§ 1983].” Conner v. Greef, 99 F. App’x 577, 580 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir.1987)). ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Haines’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal agency acting under federal law.

Ryan v. McDonald · filed 2016-06-13

As a general matter, claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may only be brought against state officials acting under color of state law, not federal actors acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for injuries caused by federal Public Health Service employees acting within the scope of their employment.

Camerano v. United States · filed 2017-04-19

And given that plaintiff has not submitted any evidence disputing that this case involves employees of the United States Public Health Service acting within the scope of their employment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a remedy for plaintiff's alleged injuries even if, as plaintiff argues, those employees violated the Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r–1396r-8.

Section 1983 applies to state actors, not federal agencies.

Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-01

42 U.S.C. § 1983 only applies to state actors and not federal agencies.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a federal contractor.

Cage v. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center · filed 2019-08-14

Section 1983, however, does not provide a cause of action against a federal contractor like Alutiiq.

Section 1983 does not govern constitutional damages claims against federal actors; those claims are governed by Bivens.

Shade v. Welsh · filed 2019-09-17

When the Court entered the dismissal order, it mistakenly referred to Plaintiff's claim as a “civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983” rather than a Bivens civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against federal actors; such claims are properly classified as Bivens claims.

Kornafel v. United States Postal Service · filed 2019-11-20

In his complaint, Kornafel indicated that his claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They are more properly classified as Bivens claims because they are against federal actors.

Section 1983 does not govern constitutional claims against individual federal officials acting as federal officials; those claims are considered under Bivens.

Kevin Grady, Sr. v. Kinder · filed 2020-02-11

Although Grady framed his due-process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court properly understood him to have brought the action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because he sued individual defendants who are federal actors.

Section 1983 does not provide the cause of action for individual-capacity claims against federal employees; those claims proceed under Bivens.

Abram v. Leu · filed 2020-03-02

However, to the extent he sues federal employees in their individual capacities, the Court construes such claims as being brought pursuant to Bivens, the federal analog to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal marshals acting as federal officers because they are not acting under color of state law.

Miller v. US Marshals Services · filed 2020-03-13

But § 1983 does not apply to the USMS because marshals are federal actors, not state actors.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal agency or individuals acting under color of federal law.

Quintana-Dieppa v. Department of the Army · filed 2020-03-25

However, it cannot form the basis of an action against individuals acting under color of federal law or against a federal agency. Rogers v. Vicuna, 264 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001). There is no dispute that plaintiff’s allegations hinge on defendants’ actions under color of federal law. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. As such, plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 necessarily fail.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors.

Quansah v. Justice Department · filed 2020-03-26

Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is not applicable to federal actors.

Section 1983 applies to constitutional violations by state actors, not federal actors.

Rivera v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service · filed 2020-08-12

To begin, § 1983 only applies to constitutional violations committed by state actors, not federal actors.

Section 1983 applies to state actors, not federal actors.

United States v. Dorio · filed 2020-09-02

As to the latter, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies only to state, not federal, actors.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against federal actors solely for their federal conduct.

O'Donnell v. Nedd · filed 2020-11-10

Plaintiff concedes that the § 1983 claim cannot stand against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, Stewart, and the United States. See Doc. No. 14 at 7. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, Stewart, and the United States.

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against a federal judge acting as a federal government actor; such a claim must be brought under Bivens.

Dunigan v. Simon · filed 2021-01-07

Technically, because Judge Simon is a federal government actor, a claim against him must be brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 authorizes claims against persons acting under color of state or local law; claims against federal actors may be construed under Bivens.

Ellis v. Hawk · filed 2021-01-26

Thus, the Court construes Ellis’s reference to seeking relief under “1983” as seeking relief under Bivens.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a prison official based solely on the official’s participation in the prison grievance process.

Allen v. Simon · filed 2020-12-14

However, a § 1983 plaintiff cannot proceed against a prison official based solely on the official’s participation in the prison grievance process.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official solely for reviewing an inmate grievance.

(PC) Montgomery v. Wong · filed 2020-11-12

This means that a prison official’s action in reviewing an inmate grievance cannot serve as a basis for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official solely for improperly processing an inmate’s grievance or appeal.

Salmen v. California Department of Correction Rehabilitation · filed 2020-11-02

However, a prison official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials solely for denying or failing to act on an inmate’s grievances.

Curtis v. Christian County, Kentucky · filed 2020-10-05

By the same token, a plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against a prison official based solely on his handling of the plaintiff’s grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official for processing an inmate’s grievances or appeals without more.

Valdez v. Zhang · filed 2020-09-09

However, as to Defendants Robert and Gates, a prison official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials merely for failing to investigate or respond to grievances.

Reilly v. Washington · filed 2020-06-15

Failure to investigate or respond to grievances does not establish a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison appeals coordinator merely for improperly processing a prisoner’s grievances or appeals.

Walker v. Gonzalez · filed 2020-04-30

Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim as to Inmate Appeals Coordinator Foston because an official’s allegedly improper processing of a prisoner’s grievances or appeals, without more, does not serve as a sufficient basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials merely for improperly processing an inmate’s grievance or appeal.

Battensby v. Zhang · filed 2020-01-28

A prison official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison medical officials merely for improperly processing an inmate’s grievances or health care appeals.

Powell v. Basto · filed 2019-10-24

However, a prison medical official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or health care appeals, without more, cannot serve as an independent basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a prison official merely for denying an inmate grievance.

Walker v. Hickenlooper · filed 2015-10-08

But even if his allegations are credited, the officials would not incur personal liability because we have squarely held that a prison official’s denial of a grievance cannot create liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official merely for denying an administrative grievance.

Thompson v. Stapleton · filed 2010-12-15

And Hofbauer’s denial of Thompson-Bey’s administrative grievance is otherwise not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failing to properly investigate or rectify an inmate grievance.

Lewis v. Zon · filed 2013-01-25

However, plaintiff does not oppose the portion of defendants’ summary judgment motion seeking to dismiss that claim, and in any event, failure to properly investigate or rectify inmate grievances does not provide a basis for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make prison officials liable merely for failing to process or investigate an inmate’s grievances.

King v. Houston · filed 2014-05-14

Likewise, King’s allegation that they did not adequately consider his grievances did not state a claim. See Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (prison officials’ failure to process or investigate grievances, without more, is not actionable under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials solely for responding to grievances or participating in the grievance procedure.

Kiser v. State of Ohio · filed 2019-08-30

Responding to a grievance or otherwise participating in the grievance procedure is insufficient to trigger liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on a failure to investigate a complaint or grievance.

Zambon v. Crawford (TWP1) · filed 2019-09-09

As noted above, failure to investigate a complaint or grievance is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983. Thus, Defendant Myers is not liable under § 1983, even if he failed to investigate a complaint about Officer Crawford.

Section 1983 does not make a complaint examiner liable merely for recommending dismissal of an inmate grievance.

Pirtle v. Brooks · filed 2019-09-16

A complaint examiner is not liable under § 1983 for merely recommending that an inmate complaint be dismissed.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on prison officials solely for reviewing or denying inmate grievances.

(PC) Hunter v. Williams · filed 2020-06-03

The prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing and denying inmate appeals generally do not serve as a basis for liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official solely for improperly processing an inmate’s grievances or appeals.

Ramsey v. Zhang-MD · filed 2020-06-23

A prison official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official solely for improperly processing a prisoner’s grievances or appeals.

Smith v. Avalos · filed 2020-08-19

As an initial matter, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim as to any of the named Defendants because an official’s allegedly improper processing of a prisoner’s grievances or appeals, without more, does not serve as a sufficient basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official merely for denying or improperly processing a prisoner’s grievance or appeal.

Davies v. Heick · filed 2020-09-29

A prison official’s denial of a grievance or allegedly improper processing of a prisoner’s grievances or appeals, without more, is not a sufficient basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official solely for denying a prisoner’s grievance.

Johnson v. Thorpe · filed 2021-01-20

By the same token, a plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against a prison official based solely on his or her denial of the plaintiff’s grievance. ... In light of this jurisprudence, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state claim against Defendants Thorpe, VanMeter, or Woosley based upon their involvement in the grievance process and that the claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 permits a tribal member directly cited and convicted under state law to sue over an alleged violation of his federally secured treaty hunting right.

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF COLVILLE v. Anderson · filed 2011-01-03

Therefore, the Court finds Mr. Johnson has standing to bring his § 1983 claim based on the alleged unlawful state citation and conviction in violation of the federally-secured treaty hunting right.

Section 1983 permits family members to sue in their individual capacities only if the defendant’s conduct was aimed at the familial relationship.

Ramirez-Lluveras v. Pagan-Cruz · filed 2012-04-23

In contrast, plaintiffs have standing to bring suit in their individual capacities pursuant to section 1983 only if Pagan’s conduct was aimed at the familial relationship. ... Accordingly, here, like in Ramirez-Lluveras I, the plaintiffs’ section 1983 action brought in their personal capacities against Pagan is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Section 1983 permits surviving family members to sue for their own damages only when the alleged constitutional violation was aimed at the family relationship.

Ramirez-Lluveras v. Pagan-Cruz · filed 2012-05-21

To have standing to bring suit pursuant to section 1983, plaintiffs must avail themselves of the exception to the general bar on third party standing: that the alleged constitutional violation was aimed at the family relationship.

Section 1983 lets tribal members sue to vindicate individual rights, but a tribe cannot use it to assert sovereign rights or its members’ individual rights as parens patriae.

Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. McMahon · filed 2019-08-19

The individual plaintiffs may bring § 1983 claims against the defendants. The Tribe, however, cannot assert its sovereign rights under that statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal court remedy to enforce the Full Faith and Credit Clause against a nonjudicial state official.

Adar v. Smith · filed 2011-04-12

Section 1983 has no place in the clause’s orchestration of inter-court comity—state courts may err, but their rulings are not subject to declaratory or injunctive relief in federal courts.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against a nonjudicial state official for an alleged violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Adar v. Smith · filed 2011-04-13

The question, then, is whether this obligation gives rise to a right vindicable in a § 1983 action. We hold that it does not.

Section 1983 may remedy a Fourth Amendment violation caused by an arrest under a law that is unambiguously invalid on state law grounds.

McMullen Ex Rel. Obchinetz v. Maple Shade Township Ex Rel. New Jersey Municipal · filed 2011-06-27

Thus, in certain circumstances, an arrest pursuant to a law that is unambiguously invalid for reasons based solely on state law grounds may constitute a Fourth Amendment violation actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for alleged violations of the IDEA or Rehabilitation Act.

MG v. Caldwell-West Caldwell Board of Education · filed 2011-06-30

Therefore, plaintiffs cannot pursue a § 1983 damages action to remedy the alleged violations of the IDEA and Rehabilitation Act; they must seek relief directly under those statutes instead.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim to proceed when success would not imply that a conviction or disciplinary decision is invalid.

Elcock v. Whitecotton · filed 2011-08-02

Further, her claim of excessive force lays out a plausible basis for relief even if we assume she kicked Whitecotton, cf.Moore, 652 F.3d at 724-25, so she can proceed on this claim without running afoul of Heck and Edwards, see id.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the IDEA because the IDEA has a comprehensive enforcement scheme incompatible with individual enforcement under section 1983.

Howell v. Gray · filed 2012-02-14

This Court agrees with the district court and the majority of circuits that have found that plaintiffs may not bring suit under section 1983 to enforce the IDEA. The IDEA creates a comprehensive enforcement scheme which is incompatible with individual enforcement under section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to sue a state official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Weatherford v. Nevada Rural Housing Authority · filed 2013-05-17

To the extent that Weatherford is attempting to sue individual defendants for violations of the Rehabilitation Act, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit has held that “a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by ... section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce IDEA rights and seek available damages when the administrative process offers no reasonable relief.

A. ex rel. A. v. Hartford Board of Education · filed 2013-10-08

The administrative procedural safeguards, such as they are alleged to have been implemented, are failing Plaintiffs, there is no reasonable relief available to them under the administrative process, and consequently Plaintiffs ought to be able to bring suit under Section 1983 to enforce these provisions of the IDEA, including any monetary and any other damages that are available under this statute, as addressed infra.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to seek remedies for violations of Indian Child Welfare Act rights that the Act’s § 1914 remedy does not cover.

Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik · filed 2014-01-28

The court finds § 1914 does not bar plaintiffs from seeking remedies under § 1983 for violations of ICWA to which § 1914 is inapplicable.

Section 1983 permits individuals to enforce these Medicaid Act assistance-payment provisions because they create enforceable rights and the Act’s enforcement scheme does not preclude individual suits.

Wheaton v. McCarthy · filed 2015-09-01

Suffice it to say that we have no reason to distinguish the provision in Harris from the provisions here, which means they presumptively create a right enforceable under § 1983. ... The plaintiffs therefore can proceed with their action under § 1983.

Section 1983 can be used in the Seventh Circuit to enforce rights under the IDEA.

Allison W. v. Oak Park & River Forest High School District 200 · filed 2016-05-27

To be sure, Stanek, id. at 644, then went on to say that its own earlier decisions “may need to be revisited in light of City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005),” ... but what controls this Court is that the availability of Section 1983 to enforce rights under IDEA remains circuit law here.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of the Medicaid Act provisions cited in Counts I, II, and IV.

Koss v. Norwood · filed 2018-03-29

The court therefore concludes that the Medicaid Act provisions cited in Counts I, II, and IV are privately enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce Rehabilitation Act rights because the Act’s remedial scheme does not preclude that remedy.

Blair v. SUNY University at Buffalo · filed 2020-02-11

This Court therefore finds that Blair’s RA claims against Street pursuant to § 1983 are not barred.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights established by the Rehabilitation Act because that Act provides an exclusive remedy.

Costabile v. NYCHHC · filed 2020-02-25

We conclude that the comprehensive remedial scheme of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that Congress did not intend that § 1983 be an available remedy.

Section 1983 does not allow an individual-capacity claim against a state official to enforce rights created by Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Craig v. CDCR · filed 2020-05-15

A due process claim under § 1983 against individual defendants for failing to comply with the ADA also is unavailing. “[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Rehabilitation Act rights because that Act’s comprehensive remedial scheme precludes the remedy.

Blair v. SUNY University at Buffalo · filed 2020-07-07

Because Blair’s Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim against Street cannot be brought under §1983, this Court finds dismissal of that claim appropriate.

Section 1983 cannot be used to sue a state official individually for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because that Act provides a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Steele v. Success Academy Charter Schools, Inc. · filed 2020-11-01

Because the Act creates a comprehensive remedial scheme that permits disabled individuals (and their representatives) to vindicate their rights, the Court agrees that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state official in her individual capacity for violations of the Act.

Section 1983 has no venue provision, so the general venue statute governs where a claim may be brought.

Azubuko v. Irish · filed 2011-10-14

Because § 1983 does not contain a venue provision, we must resort to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1983 permits liability for a public official who is an integral participant in another official's constitutional violation, even if the first official's own actions do not independently violate the Constitution.

Hernandez v. Skinner · filed 2019-05-29

A public official whose individual actions do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation may nonetheless be held liable under § 1983 if the official was an "integral participant" in the violation of someone's rights. ... Here, Justice Hernandez was an integral participant in the violation of Miguel's Fourth Amendment rights because Deputy Skinner detained and arrested Miguel based almost entirely on Justice Hernandez's words and direction.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who knowingly and actively participates in a search, even if the officer does not directly carry out the constitutional violation.

Newberry v. County of San Bernardino · filed 2018-09-18

“Integral participant” liability does not require a showing that an officer’s actions played a direct role in the occurrence of a constitutional violation. ... It is necessary only that the officer be knowingly and actively involved — for example, “privy to any discussions, briefings, or collective decisions” and party to “a collective decisionmaking process.”

Section 1983 can impose liability on officers who play an integral part in an unlawful search even if their own actions do not independently violate the Constitution.

Bravo v. City of Santa Maria · filed 2011-12-09

Section 1983 liability extends to those who perform functions “integral” to an unlawful search, even if their individual actions do not themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

An officer who actively participates in alleged excessive force may be liable under § 1983 as an integral participant even if he did not personally point a gun at the restrained plaintiff.

Green v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2014-05-12

The only reason Sergeant Kim was not pointing his weapon at Green while she was restrained is that he was the one restraining her. Even if Sergeant Kim was not one of the officers actually holding Green at gunpoint once she was restrained, he was plainly an active participant in this activity and a jury could find that he was an “integral participant” under Blankenhorn.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer whose integral participation in an alleged constitutional violation is sufficiently pleaded.

Johnson v. Shasta County · filed 2015-01-06

Construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the allegations of plaintiffs’ amended complaint with respect to their § 1983 claim are sufficient to suggest each defendant was an integral participant in the alleged violation. Accordingly, the Sutter defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against defendants Casner, Maples, and Gwinnup is DENIED.

An officer with fundamental involvement in excessive force may be liable under § 1983 as an integral participant, even if the officer did not personally apply the force.

Rosales v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2016-05-27

Other deputies who had “some fundamental involvement” in that conduct would also be liable as integral participants.

Section 1983 permits liability for an official who meaningfully participates in a collective decision that violates constitutional rights, even if the official’s own actions do not independently violate the Constitution.

Keates v. Koile · filed 2018-03-06

These defendants cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they were integral participants in the unlawful conduct. ... Accordingly, we conclude that this is sufficient—though just barely—to make a plausible allegation that Lensche and Rountree were integral participants in violating Keates’s and A.K.’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits liability when an officer integrally participates in a constitutional violation, even if the officer is not solely responsible.

Nicholson v. Gutierrez · filed 2019-08-21

A police officer need not have been the sole party responsible for a constitutional violation before liability may attach. “An officer’s liability under section 1983 is predicated on his ‘integral participation’ in the alleged violation.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be an integral participant in the alleged constitutional violation; performing preliminary tasks and handing responsibility to others does not suffice.

Keates v. Koile · filed 2020-01-22

As the Court of Appeals recognized, Rountree cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he was an integral participant in the allegedly unlawful conduct—the seizure of Amber. ... Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find Rountree was an integral participant in the seizure. Rountree is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who is an integral participant in another officer’s use of excessive force by effectively authorizing it.

Laney Sweet v. Langley · filed 2020-03-13

Because it is alleged that Langley effectively authorized his subordinates to use excessive force against Shaver, he was an integral participant in Brailsford’s ultimate decision to shoot Shaver.

An officer’s proximity to an alleged violation and provision of backup alone do not establish integral participation for § 1983 liability.

Cook v. City of Fremont, California · filed 2020-10-28

Cook’s allegations that Romley was “close by, armed, and providing back up,” Compl. ¶ 24, are insufficient to support a theory of integral participation.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring a claim based on alleged violations of workers’ compensation laws or breach of contract.

Ferrell v. Norris · filed 2011-12-12

Contrary to Ferrell’s assertions, he cannot base a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim on alleged violations of workers’ compensation laws or breach of contract.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring a claim based on an alleged violation of the IDEA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Pedraza v. Alameda Unified School Distric · filed 2017-01-26

The district court did not err in dismissing Appellants’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, because a plaintiff cannot predicate a § 1983 claim on an alleged violation of the IDEA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

Section 1983 claims arising from an IDEA violation require a factual basis beyond the IDEA violation and related allegation of discrimination.

S.B. ex rel. S.B. v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2015-06-25

The Second Circuit has likewise determined that where, as here, defendants have violated the IDEA, a “factual basis other than the alleged IDEA violations and the related allegation of discrimination” is required to support a section 1983 claim. ... Accordingly, I grant summary judgment for defendants as to the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and section 1983 claims.

Oregon’s ten-year statute of ultimate repose for negligence claims does not apply to Section 1983 actions.

Cannon v. Polk County District Attorney · filed 2012-10-23

By its express terms, Oregon Revised Statutes § 12.115(1) only applies to negligence claims and, therefore, is inapplicable to these Section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 constitutional tort claims are subject to the state’s personal injury statute of limitations, rather than South Carolina’s medical malpractice statute of repose.

Heaton v. Stirling · filed 2020-02-18

But there is no authority to support Carney’s general contention that the statute of repose also applies to claims “arising under” § 1983, nor does Carney point the Court to any such authority.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove the constitutional deprivation underlying the claim and produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment.

Hawkins v. Mitchell · filed 2012-11-15

Further, “[i]n a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, and thus must come forward with sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact to avoid summary judgment.”

A political subdivision cannot assert its own rights under § 1983, but it may sue on behalf of third parties with whom it has a close relationship.

Board of Education v. Memphis City Board of Education · filed 2012-11-27

Although a political subdivision is prohibited from asserting its own rights under § 1983, it may bring suit on behalf of third parties with whom the subdivision shares a'“close relationship.”

A municipality cannot bring a § 1983 equal protection claim against another political subdivision of its state because it cannot invoke Fourteenth Amendment protection against the state.

The City of Berkeley, Missouri v. Ferguson-Florissant School District · filed 2019-11-04

The Court finds the City of Berkeley, as a political subdivision of Missouri, may not bring a claim for violation of a right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the § 1983 action by the City of Berkeley against Defendants must be dismissed.

A party may assert § 1983 rights in an answer to a county’s certiorari petition without that pleading form barring relief.

Cheatham County, Tennessee v. Cheatham County Board of Zoning Appeals and Randall and Margaret Mooneyhan · filed 2012-11-30

Due to the unique circumstances of this case the Mooneyhans’ assertion of their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claim for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was made in their Answer to Cheatham County’s petition rather than in a complaint in which they were plaintiffs. We see no reason that this procedural anomaly should preclude them from relief.

A prisoner’s Section 1983 challenge to a disciplinary hearing may be dismissed until the Heck conditions are met.

Adams v. Davis · filed 2020-06-18

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s challenges to his prison disciplinary hearing are DISMISSED with prejudice until the Heck conditions are met.

Section 1983 permits an inmate to challenge a retaliatory disciplinary ticket when the resulting punishment was only segregation.

Antoine v. Ramos · filed 2012-12-05

Antoine’s contention that the disciplinary ticket was fabricated in retaliation for engaging in protected speech therefore is properly within the scope of a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits an inmate to challenge discipline that imposed only segregation; the Edwards and Heck bar does not apply.

Dixon v. Tolley · filed 2013-03-25

These decisions may foreclose a civil-rights suit if a judgment in favor of the inmate necessarily would imply that he was wrongly disciplined with a loss of good-time credits, see Edwards, 520 U.S. at 647-48, 117 S.Ct. 1584; Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir.2011), but the bar imposed by Edwards and Heck does not apply to an inmate who was punished only with segregation, see Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004); Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir.2006).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction and resulting loss of time credits.

Zepeda v. Peterson · filed 2014-12-18

To the extent that Zepeda alleged a due process claim related to his disciplinary hearing and monetary sanction for the destruction of library materials, the district court properly dismissed the claim as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on this claim would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction for the destruction of state property in excess of $400 and resulting loss of time credits.

The Heck rule does not bar a section 1983 challenge to prison discipline when the inmate has not alleged that the discipline affected the duration of the sentence.

Florence v. Stephanie Cox and Cody Miller · filed 2018-11-20

Because Florence has not alleged that this disciplinary action affected the duration of his sentence, the Heck rule does not bar his claims as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary conviction that cost good conduct credit when success would imply that the duration of confinement is invalid, unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

(PC) Belmonte v. Palomares · filed 2020-10-02

Because plaintiff is challenging multiple disciplinary convictions for which he was sanctioned with the loss of good conduct credit, these claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based solely on an agency regulation because regulations cannot independently create enforceable federal rights.

Thurman v. Medical Trans Mgmt, Inc. · filed 2020-12-15

Accordingly, we join the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that Thurman cannot sue MTM under § 1983 based solely on the non-emergency medical transportation regulation.

Section 1983 does not permit private enforcement of an implementing regulation that imposes duties beyond those imposed by the controlling statute.

John B. v. Emkes · filed 2013-03-14

That a statutory provision is privately enforceable, however, does not necessarily mean that a regulation that implements the provision is privately enforceable as well. To the contrary, an implementing regulation is not privately enforceable—even if its controlling statute is—when it “imposes an obligation or prohibition that is not imposed generally by the controlling statute.” Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2004). Section 441.61(c) does precisely that: it requires that TennCare coordinate its services with other agencies, even though subsection 43(C) says nothing of the sort. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating these paragraphs.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid applicants to enforce the Medicaid Act’s reasonable-promptness and fair-hearing provisions.

Koss v. Eagleson · filed 2018-03-29

The court therefore concludes that the Medicaid Act provisions cited in Counts I, II, and IV are privately enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce an agency regulation that does not define a federal right created by statute.

Yarbrough v. Decatur Housing Authority · filed 2019-08-02

Because 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) is unmoored from any federal right, we conclude it cannot be the basis for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a California prisoner to seek injunctive relief for his own denied medical treatment when the claim does not duplicate a pending class action seeking systemic reform.

David Pride, Jr. v. Correa · filed 2013-07-16

Thus, we conclude that where a California prisoner brings an independent claim for injunctive relief solely on his own behalf for specific medical treatment denied to him, Plata does not bar the prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief.

A Section 1983 claim survives the claimant’s death if it accrued before death and state law authorizes a survival action.

George v. Morris · filed 2013-07-30

“A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survives the decedent if the claim accrued before the decedent’s death, and if state law authorizes a survival action.” ... Carol's complaint alleges that she is the personal representative of her husband’s estate in full compliance with California law. She therefore may litigate his Fourth Amendment claim.

A Section 1983 claim that accrued before the claimant’s death may be litigated by the claimant’s personal representative if state law allows the claim to survive.

George v. Morris · filed 2013-09-16

“A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survives the decedent if the claim accrued before the decedent’s death, and if state law authorizes a survival action.” Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)). Carol’s complaint alleges that she is the personal representative of her husband’s estate in full compliance with California law. She therefore may litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. See id.; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 377.30, 377.32.

State law determines who receives a decedent’s Section 1983 claim.

Estate of Cornejo Ex Rel. Solis v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2015-07-23

State law governs who receives a decedent’s § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 claim for Medicaid benefits can survive the claimant’s death under Ohio law.

Price v. Medicaid Director · filed 2015-09-01

Mrs. Hilleger’s § 1983 claims survive her death under Ohio law, and Mrs. Saunders’ claims are not mooted by her departure from an approved assisted living facility.

Section 1983 adopts the forum state’s survivorship law; under Nevada law, only an estate’s executor or administrator may bring a claim on behalf of the deceased.

Romero v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections · filed 2016-12-08

Section 1983 adopts as its law of survivorship the law of the forum state, Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978), which here is Nevada. Under Nevada law, only the “executor or administrator” of the deceased’s estate can sue on the deceased’s behalf. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.100(3). Romero has adduced no evidence that Beltran’s children have been appointed as executors or administrators of Beltran’s estate. Thus, the children may not assert § 1983 claims on Beltran’s behalf.

An estate administrator may bring a decedent’s § 1983 claims when those claims survive under applicable state law.

Haberle v. Troxell · filed 2018-03-20

Haberle has standing to bring her § 1983 claims on behalf of Nixon as the administrator of his estate.

State law determines who may bring a surviving § 1983 claim for a decedent; a personal representative’s appointment may relate back to when the suit was filed.

London v. Miller · filed 2018-07-02

In Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1991), the Supreme Court ruled that state law determines both whether a § 1983 cause of action survives the death of the party entitled to bring the claim and who is entitled to bring a surviving § 1983 claim on behalf of the decedent’s estate. ... Thus, this Court applies South Dakota law to resolve this issue.

Section 1983 permits California’s survival statute to govern claims brought on behalf of a deceased person.

Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara · filed 2018-07-03

Therefore, California’s survival statute is not inconsistent with § 1983 and applies to this action.

Section 1983 claims survive a party’s death.

DeLeon-Reyes v. Guevara · filed 2019-03-14

The parties here do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 cause of action survives. Nor could they.

Section 1983 claims survive a party’s death.

Solache v. City Of Chicago · filed 2019-03-14

The parties here do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 cause of action survives. Nor could they.

Section 1983 allows survivors to assert a deceased person’s claim when the law of the state hearing the action permits it.

(PS) G.M. v. Poole · filed 2019-09-12

In section 1983 actions, survivors can assert a claim on a deceased individual’s behalf if permitted by the law of the state in which the action is sitting.

Section 1983 claims survive a plaintiff’s death when the forum state’s applicable survivorship law preserves them.

Powell v. Oldham · filed 2019-10-22

Tennessee law applies to Powell’s § 1983 claims. Under Tennessee law, the claims survive.

A person bringing a decedent’s § 1983 claim on behalf of an estate must meet the relevant state’s survivorship requirements.

Eyre v. The City of Fairbanks · filed 2020-06-10

Accordingly, Plaintiff must meet Alaska’s survivorship requirements to maintain a § 1983 claim on behalf of the Estate.

A decedent’s § 1983 claim may be brought by a personal representative or a successor in interest authorized by state law.

Bradley-Aboyade v. Crozier · filed 2020-08-04

Therefore, because Plaintiff may only bring a claim with respect to the action she succeeds and she is not a successor-in-interest to Decedent’s community property, Plaintiff does not have standing to bring this § 1983 cause of action on behalf of Decedent.

Section 1983 claims survive a party’s death when applicable state law preserves personal injury actions.

Macklin v. Serrano · filed 2020-10-28

Even though Macklin’s claim against Flynn survives Flynn’s death, “[a]s a general rule, the substitution of parties consistent with Rule 25(a)(1) cannot be ordered ‘where the person for whom the substitution is sought died prior to being named a party.’”

Section 1983 excessive force claims survive a plaintiff’s death when Nebraska law preserves pending personal injury actions.

Cotton v. Stephens · filed 2020-12-22

Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claims are not extinguished by his death, as pending actions for personal injury do not abate by death of the plaintiff under Nebraska Law.

Section 1983 permits a stand-alone Fourteenth Amendment claim when fabricated evidence used at trial was reasonably likely to have caused the plaintiff’s conviction.

Halsey v. Pfeiffer · filed 2014-04-24

Accordingly, we hold that if a defendant has been convicted at a trial at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim under section 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the defendant would not have been convicted.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim based on fabricated evidence; such claims are not categorically limited to state malicious prosecution law.

Saunders-El v. Rohde · filed 2015-01-30

Accordingly, the district court erred in holding, categorically, that a claim of evidence fabrication cannot form the basis of a due process claim under § 1983 and must instead be brought as a state law malicious prosecu- tion claim.

Section 1983 permits a parent to pursue suppression of exculpatory evidence as part of a deliberate fabrication claim arising from a child dependency proceeding.

Patterson v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2020-04-03

Lorraine’s suppression allegations are therefore actionable, as they are within the scope of her deliberate fabrication claim.

Section 1983 permits a deliberate fabrication of evidence claim, but an inaccurate police report alone does not establish deliberate fabrication.

Winchester v. Ward · filed 2020-06-03

A plaintiff may bring a section 1983 claim on a theory that the “government violated [his] due process rights by subjecting [him] to criminal charges based on deliberately-fabricated evidence.” ... While technically inaccurate, the statement does not include quotation marks, nor does plaintiff proffer any evidence to suggest Officer Ward deliberately framed him, misrepresented his words, or otherwise fabricated evidence. Without any evidence to support this claim, plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for fabrication of evidence is dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a claim for violation of Article 36 consular rights, and qualified immunity did not bar this claim at the pleading stage.

Villars v. Kubiatowski · filed 2014-05-05

The Seventh Circuit has held that there is a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 grounded in viqlations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. ... Here, accepting Villars’s allegations as true, his consular rights clearly were violated. ... For this reason, the VRLB Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count XV is denied and their claim of qualified immunity is rejected at this time.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff whose constitutional rights were violated to seek back pay as part of equitable relief.

Voss v. City of Key West · filed 2014-10-17

Having found the City’s policy to have violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, irrespective of her status as an applicant or an employee, the Court must similarly reject the City’s argument that this distinction affects her entitlement to relief for that violation. Further, the City’s claim that Plaintiff should only be entitled to injunctive relief does not conflict with an award of back pay; the damages Plaintiff seeks in the form of back pay is “an integral part of the equitable remedy of injunctive reinstatement.” Harkless, 427 F.2d at 324. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to damages, if she can prove them.

Section 1983 provides a statutory damages remedy that may be impaired and discharged in a municipality’s chapter 9 bankruptcy without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

In re City of Detroit · filed 2014-12-31

The § 1983 remedial scheme may “emanate” or “flow from” the Fourteenth Amendment, as the § 1983 creditors argue. This does not, however, elevate that remedy to a constitutionally protected status.

A § 1983 civil rights claim is not properly disposed of as incident to an Article 78 claim.

Matter of Holistic Resources, Inc. v. Del Valle · filed 2021-01-14

However, a claim for violation of petitioners' civil rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is not properly disposed of as incident to an article 78 claim ( Raykowski at 368).