42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 procedural-due-process plaintiff must allege deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

Grossman v. School Board of I.S.D. 640 · filed 1986-06-24

However a plaintiff must allege a liberty or property interest.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on loss of public employment requires a protected property interest in continued employment.

Wright v. John Will Holbrook, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Morehead, Kent · filed 1986-07-11

Plaintiff appeals following the dismissal of his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in which he claimed that he had been deprived of his property interest in continued employment without due process of law. ... Since plaintiff did not have a property interest in continued employment, the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on loss of public employment requires a protected property interest in continued employment.

Wright v. Holbrook · filed 1986-07-11

Plaintiff appeals following the dismissal of his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he claimed that he had been deprived of his property interest in continued employment without due process of law. ... Since plaintiff did not have a property interest in continued employment, the district court did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

A § 1983 due-process claim based on discharge from public employment requires a legitimate expectation of continued employment or another protected liberty or property interest.

Bragg v. Trupo · filed 1986-07-14

It is clear that the Plaintiffs had no legitimate expectation of continued employment and, therefore, were not denied a property interest without due process of law.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on public employment depends on a constitutionally protected property right in continued employment.

Averitt v. Cloon · filed 1986-07-22

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s § 1983 federal constitutional claim depended on the existence of a property right in his continued employment by the Gogebic Court.

A probationary California public employee has no property right in continued employment supporting a § 1983 due-process claim.

Dorr v. County of Butte Butte County Sheriff's Department Mick Grey, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff of Butte · filed 1986-07-30

He brought suit against the defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of his property and liberty rights. ... In California, a probationary public employee does not have a property right in continued employment.

An Ohio prisoner has no § 1983 due-process claim based on parole-release procedures because Ohio law gives parole officials complete discretion and creates no protected liberty interest in parole release.

Mapson v. Seiter · filed 1986-08-13

In past decisions, this Court has held that parole decisions in Ohio lie completely within the discretion of state parole officials and that an Ohio inmate has no cognizable due process rights in parole proceedings. ... The plaintiff having no due process rights in the parole proceedings, he has no cause of action for alleged deprivation of such rights.

A prisoner's classification status supports no § 1983 due-process claim when neither federal law nor discretionary state prison law creates a protected liberty interest in that classification.

Vanaarsten v. Brown · filed 1986-08-13

Because there is no right to a particular classification status under federal law, Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976), such a right, if it exists, can arise only under state law. ... Given this grant of discretion, there arises under state law no liberty interest necessary for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A Section 1983 due-process claim must identify a deprivation of a distinct property or liberty interest; the alleged due-process violation cannot itself be repackaged as the protected liberty interest.

Rudow v. City of New York · filed 1986-09-03

Plaintiff tries to evade this problem by urging that not only does the conduct cited above deny him due process, but also it deprives him of a liberty interest in being free from this type of conduct. This argument strikes us as impermissible bootstrapping. It would enable plaintiff to escape the section 1983 requirement that he be deprived of a liberty or property interest by allowing him to substitute in their place the alleged due process violation itself.

A public employee asserting a Section 1983 due-process claim must show a property or liberty interest in employment before Fourteenth Amendment protections are triggered.

Downum v. City of Wichita, Kan. · filed 1986-10-03

When bringing a § 1983 action, a public employee has the burden to show that she possesses a property or liberty interest in her employment in order to trigger the due process protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.

A prisoner's expectation of retaining a particular work assignment is not a liberty or property interest supporting a § 1983 due-process claim, and removal requires no factfinding hearing.

Stewart v. Barry Mintzes, Elton Scott, and Ed Burns · filed 1987-02-04

Classifications and work assignments of prisoners in state prisons are matters of prison administration, within the discretion of the prison administrators and do not require fact finding hearings as a prerequisite of the exercise of such discretion.

A § 1983 due-process claim fails without a constitutionally protected property interest, including when an applicant has not satisfied the prerequisites for the requested government certificate.

Carolan v. City Of Kansas City, Missouri · filed 1987-03-06

We hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment on appellants' substantive due process claim because appellants did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the occupancy certificate. ... Appellants' procedural due process claim was properly dismissed for the same reason.

A § 1983 due-process claim requires deprivation of life, liberty, or property; denial of process by itself is not actionable.

Illinois Psychological Association, Dr. Jean J. Rossi, and Dr. John R. Day v. Falk · filed 1987-05-12

Even if all this is wrong we don’t think the plaintiffs have shown a deprivation of either liberty or property, and such a showing is a prerequisite to maintaining a suit under the due process clause. The clause does not make the denial of due process actionable; it only makes the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, actionable.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming a due process violation from loss of employment to allege deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest and conduct under color of state law.

Simpkins v. Sandwich Community Hospital · filed 1988-08-02

To make out a Sec. 1983 claim here, Simpkins must allege that the defendants deprived her of a liberty or property right secured by the Constitution and that their conduct arose under color of state law. ... We affirm the district court's dismissal of Simpkins's cause that the defendants deprived her of due process in suspending and then firing her precisely because she has failed to allege a cognizable liberty or property interest of which she has been deprived.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on defamation, reputational injury, or inability to enlist research assistance without deprivation of a recognized liberty or property interest.

Fong v. Purdue University · filed 1988-08-10

In the interest of crystallizing the legal issues here, this court pointed out at the outset of the proceedings, that allegations of defamation, damage to reputation, and inability to enlist research assistance, will not, without deprivation of a recognized liberty or property interest, support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming deprivation of a protected property interest to establish that the interest was entitled to constitutional protection when the deprivation occurred.

Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. Dunn · filed 2003-05-12

To state a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, the plaintiff was required to first establish that it had a valid property interest in a benefit that was entitled to constitutional protection at the time the plaintiff was deprived of that benefit (see Reed’s of Armonk Bldg. Supply v Curry, 246 AD2d 587 [1998]; RRI Realty Corp. v Incorporated Vil. of Southampton, 870 F2d 911, 918 [1989], cert denied 493 US 893 [1989]).

Section 1983 does not provide a federal district-court route for reopening a state disciplinary proceeding after the plaintiff’s constitutional claims were pursued and decided in state court.

Brunwasser v. Strassburger · filed 1980-05-29

We believe that we lack jurisdiction to reopen the case against him in the guise of a civil rights action. This holding disposes of plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 1343(3), and under the various constitutional amendments.

A Section 1983 plaintiff is not collaterally estopped from litigating excessive force when the prior criminal conviction did not necessarily determine that issue.

Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1980-08-06

The jury’s rejection of the self-defense theory does not mean that the jury necessarily made any finding about the conduct of the officers. ... If the rejection of the defense rested on either of these theories, Hernandez would not be collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of excessive force in the present action. ... The officers have not resolved this ambiguity and thus have not carried their burden of showing that the conviction necessarily involved a determination that they did not use excessive force.

Section 1983 damages may not be asserted as a counterclaim in a special statutory condemnation proceeding that does not authorize tort damages.

Brooks v. Department of Transportation · filed 1985-03-04

The counterclaim for damages under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1988 also lies outside of the trial court’s powers in a condemnation action brought under OCGA § 32-3-1 et seq.

Collateral estoppel bars a Section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating issues already decided on direct appeal of the underlying conviction.

White v. Daniel Murphy, John J. Walsh, Nancy Kutta, Sheriff Edward Havlik · filed 1986-04-24

Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of these issues in the present action.

State administrative and judicial proceedings do not preclude a federal Section 1983 claim unless the record clearly shows that the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim before a tribunal authorized to decide its merits.

Scroggins v. Kansas · filed 1986-10-07

Nevertheless, absent a clear indication from the record that either the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, ... or that the court hearing the claim had the authority to adjudicate the merits, ... we resist the imposition of res judicata to bar a federal plaintiff's Sec. 1983 suit.

A federal court must give preclusive effect to a state judgment rejecting a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff voluntarily and fully litigated that claim in state court without reserving it for a federal forum.

Gladman Humbles v. City of Paducah · filed 1987-03-20

Appellant's Sec. 1983 claim was dismissed by the state court after appellant briefed that claim and indicated reliance on the federal claim in addition to the state remedies sought in the Kentucky court. Therefore, preclusive effect must be given the state court decision under these circumstances.

A § 1983 retaliatory discharge claim may proceed despite a prior state finding of employee misconduct when the state proceedings did not resolve whether protected speech motivated the discharge.

Robert Barnes (86-6261) and Joe Thompson (87-5776) v. Charles McDowell Ed Fossett, and Sam Serraglio · filed 1988-08-04

The district court’s initial conclusion is correct. The factual determination of the state administrative proceedings, as sustained by the state courts, that Barnes was guilty of sexual harassment may not be relitigated in federal court. However, the fact that Barnes harassed females during his tenure at the Bureau does not eliminate the possibility that the real reason he was discharged from the Bureau was because he spoke out on a matter of public concern. Thus, if Barnes can establish that he spoke on a matter of public concern and that his speech was a motivating factor for his dismissal, Barnes may be able to prevail in a retaliatory discharge action under section 1983 even though he was guilty of sexual harassment.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to relitigate in federal court a constitutional issue raised and decided against him in state court.

Hanzimanolis v. Codd · filed 1975-11-12

He may not relitigate the very same issue in this court by asserting a claim under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for trivial or frivolous invasions of personal rights.

Brown v. Officer Bigger Individually and in Their Official Capacities Officer Whistler Officer Mullins Kenneth Ol · filed 1980-06-10

Trivial or frivolous invasions of personal rights are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A brief detention under a valid warrant without harsh or egregious treatment is not a deprivation of sufficient constitutional magnitude to support Section 1983 relief.

Eischen v. Minnehaha County · filed 1985-02-20

Under these circumstances, we believe that the deprivation of appellant’s liberty was not of such a substantial constitutional magnitude as to warrant a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a state to be sued in federal court.

Glaros v. Perse · filed 1980-08-12

As to the State of New Mexico, we agree with the district court that dismissal was also required because a state may not be sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state is a “person” under § 1983 and may be held liable like a municipality when it voluntarily waives Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Della Grotta v. State of Rhode Island · filed 1986-01-17

We therefore hold that a state is a “person” within section 1983 such that, where it has voluntarily waived its eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court, it may be held liable in the same respect as municipalities and local units of government.

Section 1983 permits suit against a state correctional enterprise that operates independently of state government and is not an arm of the state.

Hale v. State of Arizona · filed 1992-09-16

Under these circumstances, we conclude that ARCOR is not an "arm of the state" and is therefore amenable to suit under section 1983.

A county sheriff's department without separate legal existence cannot be sued under § 1983.

Slay v. Marion County Sheriff's Department · filed 1992-11-23

We next address the issue of whether a civil rights action can be maintained against the Marion County Sheriff's Department. ... Therefore, we must affirm the summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff's Department as to any claim against it under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize suit against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Reiff v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 1975-07-21

A state is not a “person” under § 1983 and hence not subject to suit pursuant to that section of the Civil Rights Act.

A sheriff’s office generally is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Thompson v. Black Hawk County Sheriff's Of · filed 2008-03-06

The sheriff’s office generally is not a suable entity under § 1983, and Thompson did not allege any official policy or widespread practice or custom of the sheriff’s office which deprived him of his constitutional rights.

A county detention center is not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Williams v. Pulaski County Detention Facility · filed 2008-05-19

We agree with the district court that the Pulaski County Detention Center (PCDC) is not subject to suit under section 1983.

Private prison medical contractors can be sued under § 1983 when they exercise powers traditionally reserved to the state, act closely with state officials, and are significantly entangled with state activities.

Johnson v. Horn · filed 2011-04-13

CPS and PHS, despite being private entities, are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they exercise powers that were traditionally the prerogative of the state, act in close concert with state officials, and are significantly entangled with traditional state activities.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a task force that is a subdivision of a district attorney’s office and lacks separate legal status.

Garrett v. Talladega County Drug & Violent Crime Task Force · filed 2013-11-19

Further, the section 1983 claims are also due to be dismissed because the Task Force is not a legal entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Jails and police departments are not typically subject to suit under Section 1983.

Smith v. Heath Dickson · filed 2019-05-03

These entities are not typically subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state cannot be sued in its own name under §1983 because it is not a “person” under the statute.

E.A. v. Gardner · filed 2019-07-17

Indeed, Alden cannot sue Illinois in its own name because it is not a “person” for the purpose of §1983.

A county sheriff’s office that is a municipal department cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Beasley v. State of Missouri · filed 2019-09-03

However, this entity is a municipal department of Crawford County, Missouri, and is not itself an entity that can be sued under § 1983.

A detention center is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Blake v. Lea County Correctional Facility · filed 2019-10-18

Lea County Correctional Facility is a detention center and, thus, is not a suable entity for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county sheriff’s department as a separate entity.

Taylor v. Madison County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-11-06

The Madison County Sheriff’s Department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A county sheriff’s office that is a department of the county is not a suable entity under Section 1983.

Walters v. Brooks · filed 2020-05-04

First, the Court finds that the “Claiborne County Sheriff’s Office” is not a suable entity under § 1983, and it will be DISMISSED.

A county jail is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Crass v. Sevier County Jail (PSLC1) · filed 2020-06-16

Thus, the Clerk will be DIRECTED to substitute Sevier County as a Defendant in place of the Sevier County Jail, which is not a suable entity under §1983, see Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that “the Shelby County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under §1983”), and this claim will proceed against Sevier County.

Section 1983 officer liability requires integral participation in the alleged violation.

Blankerhorn v. City of Orange · filed 2007-05-07

An officer’s liability under section 1983 is predicated on his “integral participation” in the alleged violation.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege the defendants’ personal participation in the constitutional deprivation.

Rucker v. Grider · filed 1980-08-21

In the Tenth Circuit, personal participation of defendants is an essential allegation in a § 1983 complaint.

Individual-capacity liability for damages under Section 1983 requires the defendant's own personal responsibility for causing the constitutional deprivation, not mere supervisory or official position.

Schultz v. Fred Baumgart, Chief, Waukesha Fire Department · filed 1984-07-02

Individual liability for damages under section 1983 is predicated upon personal responsibility.

Section 1983 requires proof that an official acting under color of state law caused a federal-rights deprivation for personal liability, while official-capacity liability requires a governmental policy or custom to play a role.

Medina v. Housing Authority of San Miguel County · filed 1992-09-04

To establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. Id. at 166. A plaintiff in an official capacity suit under § 1983 must prove that the entity's "policy or custom" played a role in the violation of federal law.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity liability for officials acting under color of state law without evidence of a governmental policy or custom.

BOYER-GLADDEN v. Hill · filed 2010-02-09

We conclude that the § 1983 claim against the deputy was made in his personal capacity, rather than in his official capacity. Therefore, the summary judgment granted to the deputy on the claim must be reversed because it was based upon the district court's conclusion that there was no evidence the deputy had violated a custom or policy of the county or the sheriff's office. Such evidence is not required to show a personal-capacity violation of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity liability when a defendant causes deprivation of a federal right while acting under color of state law, and official-capacity liability requires a municipal policy or custom.

McCray v. County of Suffolk · filed 2015-03-19

Official-capacity liability would have required proof of a municipal policy or custom, whereas personal liability would have required only that Dr. Geraci himself caused the deprivation of a federal right while acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner claiming inadequate medical treatment to prove deliberate indifference to serious medical needs; negligence, carelessness, or malpractice is not enough.

Campbell v. Sacred Heart Hospital · filed 1980-08-19

In order to prove a violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of lack of medical treatment, a prisoner must prove that defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” ... Neglect, carelessness or malpractice do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution but are properly the subject of a tort action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek relief for denial of medical treatment by alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Ray Thomas Woodall, Jr. v. Charles A. Foti, Jr. · filed 1981-06-16

To a state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of medical treatment, a prisoner must allege deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Section 1983 permits liability for denial of medical care when a state official is deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, but mere negligence is not enough.

Robinson v. Moreland · filed 1981-07-31

A broken hand can be considered by the jury to be a serious injury. Second, Wayne's action or lack of action can be considered "deliberate indifference" if Wayne intentionally refused to provide or arrange for treatment. We recognize that proof of mere negligence does not establish a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging officials’ failure to protect him from inmate violence to show deliberate indifference—intentional deprivation or reckless disregard of the constitutional right—not mere negligence.

Ronald Lee Roy Branchcomb v. Lou Brewer, James Menke, and Charles Wilkins · filed 1982-02-11

In order to sustain this claim, plaintiff must show something more than mere inadvertence or negligence. He must show the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights, either because they actually intended to deprive him of some right, or because they acted with reckless disregard of his right to be free from violent attacks by fellow inmates.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a medical judgment about whether additional treatment should be prescribed.

Stackhouse v. Marks · filed 1982-04-23

However, whether additional treatment should be prescribed is a medical judgment and not subject to challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights remedy for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, but not for a negligent or inadvertent failure to provide necessary treatment.

Lee v. McManus · filed 1982-07-15

The standard in a cruel and unusual punishment case based upon a claim of denial of medical treatment is whether plaintiff has shown deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. ... Moreover, if medical personnel at the prison have acted negligently or inadvertently, rather than deliberately, in not providing medical treatment which is shown to be necessary, plaintiff will have stated a claim for malpractice not redressible under the civil rights act.

Prompt treatment by prison staff followed by medical evaluation within thirty-six to forty-eight hours does not show deliberate indifference actionable under Section 1983.

Ellison v. Scheipe · filed 1983-09-15

The action taken by the defendants and other prison employees shows anything but “deliberate indifference” to plaintiff’s injuries.

Providing some medical care does not defeat a prisoner's § 1983 claim when the treatment may be so grossly inadequate or reckless as to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Weaver v. Jarvis · filed 1985-03-12

While some cases suggest that where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments, it is obvious to this court that “in some cases the medical attention rendered may be so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.”

A prisoner’s § 1983 medical-care claim fails without deliberate indifference, an actual aggravation of injury, and a causal connection to the officials’ conduct.

Scott v. Davis · filed 1985-06-14

Absent any aggravation of plaintiff's injury caused by the alleged indifference, however, there simply was no injury or causal connection between the defendants' behavior and the plaintiff's illness.

A prison medical-care claim under § 1983 requires deliberate indifference to serious medical needs rather than mere inadvertence or negligence.

Ferola v. Moran · filed 1985-11-22

The critical factor in any such instance, however, is that the indifference be not merely inadvertent or negligent, but deliberate, for it is only such deliberate indifference “that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”

Knowingly withholding physician-prescribed treatment for a detainee's infected eye states a Section 1983 claim for unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Brosseau v. Clermont Co. Commissioners · filed 1986-02-05

Applying the rule of Estelle v. Gamble to Mr. Brosseau's pleadings, we believe that Mr. Brosseau has pleaded a good cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by knowingly withholding the hot soaks prescribed by the physician to whom the county had sent Mr. Brosseau when he brought his infections to the county's attention.

A prisoner states a Section 1983 medical-care claim by alleging acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Toombs v. Dr. Carl Bell Norvell Dixon, Nurse, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections · filed 1986-08-11

Toombs alleged that he was not treated for three weeks although he daily requested treatment, that Nurse Dixon dismissed his grievances in a disparaging manner, that Dr. Bell failed to treat him, and that his condition finally required gallbladder removal. These allegations state a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

A Section 1983 medical-care claim against a contract physician requires both action under color of state law and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Quincy West v. Samuel Atkins Rae McNamara James B. Hunt · filed 1986-09-03

To recover West must overcome two hurdles. He must establish a) that Atkins acted “under the color of state law” and b) that Atkins’ course of conduct in attending West’s injury showed deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious psychological or psychiatric needs.

Waldrop v. Evans · filed 1988-03-15

As noted above, this court finds that deliberate indifference to the serious psychological or psychiatric needs of an inmate results in the infliction of pain proscribed by the eighth amendment, and therefore, states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner cannot obtain relief under § 1983 for inadequate medical care when officials were not deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs.

Dexter Drake Coffin, III v. Edward W. Murray, Thomas R. Israel, Kurt Fox, Robert W. Fry, M.D., L. Milton Baum, D.D.S. · filed 1988-04-29

A review of the record and the district court's opinion accepting in part and rejecting in part the recommendation of the magistrate discloses that this appeal from its order refusing relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is without merit. Because the dispositive issues recently have been decided authoritatively, we dispense with oral argument and affirm the judgment below on the the district court's reasoning that defendants were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to recover for denial of medical care only when the withholding is accompanied by deliberate indifference to the prisoner's suffering.

Blair v. Cuyahoga County Sheriff · filed 1986-11-14

Generally, the denial of a prisoner's request for medical care alone will not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rather, the withholding of medical services must be accompanied by circumstances which demonstrate a deliberate indifference to the prisoner's suffering on the part of those charged with his care and custody.

Section 1983 allows recovery when government officials ignore indications that a prisoner's or pretrial detainee's initial medical treatment was inadequate and act with deliberate indifference to medical needs.

Cooper v. S. Dyke, Officer J.R. Markert, Officer C. Morseberger, Officer, Defendants- (Two Cases) · filed 1987-03-18

Defendants’ perception of their obligation accurately reflects the state of the law; government officials who ignore indications that a prisoner’s or pretrial detainee’s initial medical treatment was inadequate can be liable for deliberate indifference to medical needs.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner challenging medical treatment to allege deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Whittington v. George Wilson Michael J. O'dea, III and William L. Reynolds · filed 1986-03-05

A prisoner in an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claiming that medical treatment violates his civil rights must allege acts or omissions amounting to a deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Section 1983 requires an inmate alleging inadequate medical treatment to show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Johnson v. Winebrenner · filed 1988-02-02

In order to state a Sec. 1983 claim based on inadequate medical treatment, an inmate must show that a defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Section 1983 requires proof that officers actually knew of an urgent medical need caused by a known risk, and does not impose liability for merely negligent or reckless conduct.

Brown Ex Rel. Estate of Bell v. Middleton · filed 2010-01-15

In summary, in order to establish liability under Section 1983 based on a claim of inadequate medical care, Appellants must show the officers had actual knowledge that Bell had an urgent medical need because of a known risk. Conduct that is merely negligent, or even reckless, is insufficient.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming inadequate medical care to show a serious medical condition, deliberate indifference, and resulting injury.

Gayton v. McCoy · filed 2010-01-28

In order to sustain a § 1983 claim for violation of Taylor’s Fourteenth Amendment due process right to adequate medical care, the plaintiff must show that: (1) Taylor had an objectively serious medical condition; (2) the defendants knew of the condition and were deliberately indifferent to treating her; and (3) this indifference caused her some injury.

Section 1983 requires a claimant challenging inadequate medical care to prove deliberate indifference to a sufficiently serious medical need.

Estate of Terry Gee, Jr. v. Johnson · filed 2010-02-16

To ultimately succeed on its § 1983 claim, the Estate must show deliberate indifference to Gee’s medical needs, which involves proving both an objective component--a sufficiently serious medical need--and a subjective component--a sufficiently culpable state of mind on the part of the defendants in denying medical care.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming deliberate indifference to show that officials knew of a substantial risk of serious injury and failed to protect him.

Shields v. Dart · filed 2011-12-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim. To prove deliberate indifference, Shields needed to show that the defendants knew of a substantial risk of serious injury to him and failed to protect him from that danger.

Section 1983 permits civil liability for prison officials who are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of convicted prisoners or pretrial detainees.

Mantell v. Health Professionals Ltd. · filed 2015-05-12

Prison officials may be held civilly liable under § 1983 if they are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of convicted prisoners or pretrial detainees.

Section 1983 requires proof of intentional wrongdoing or deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Cobige v. City of Chicago, Ill. · filed 2011-07-12

The federal-law claim, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, requires proof of intentional wrongdoing or deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), but defendants do not contend that the evidence on that issue was deficient.

Section 1983 requires a sufficiently culpable state of mind for a prisoner's deliberate-indifference claim.

Lor v. Kelley · filed 2011-12-21

To do so, Lor must show not only that his conditions were serious (which the defendants do not contest), but also that the “prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Feliciano v. Penzone · filed 2018-12-13

This deliberate indifference can form the basis for a § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 claim alleging that inadequate prison medical treatment caused death from a sophisticated medical condition requires expert testimony to prove causation.

Alberson Ex Rel. Estate of Alberson v. Norris · filed 2006-08-15

Where the complaint involves treatment of a prisoner’s sophisticated medical condition, expert testimony is required to show proof of causation. ... Therefore, Ms. Alberson’s failure to produce expert testimony to prove that a lack of proper medical treatment caused Mr. Alberson’s death is “fatal to [her] deliberate indifference claim as a matter of law.”

A § 1983 claim alleging inadequate treatment of a prisoner's sophisticated medical condition requires expert testimony to prove causation.

Albersson v. Norris · filed 2006-08-15

Where the complaint involves treatment of a prisoner's sophisticated medical condition, expert testimony is required to show proof of causation.

A prisoner bringing a Section 1983 claim for denial of adequate medical care need not present expert medical testimony when the facts support a finding of deliberate indifference.

Hathaway v. Coughlin · filed 1994-09-29

We have never required plaintiffs alleging a denial of adequate medical care in a Section 1983 action to produce expert medical testimony. The inquiry remains whether the treating physician or other prison official was deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs, not whether the doctor's conduct is actionable under state malpractice law. Expert testimony certainly could have bolstered Hathaway's case at trial, but the absence of such expert proof does not mandate dismissal of his action where the facts support a finding of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires an inmate alleging a prison medical claim to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Jackson v. Wharton · filed 1988-06-20

Estelle v. Gamble, supra, sets forth two basic requirements which a plaintiff must meet in alleging a claim under § 1983. First of all, the defendants must have been “deliberately indifferent.” Secondly, they must have been deliberately indifferent to his “serious” medical needs.

In a § 1983 claim alleging delayed medical care, expert testimony on causation is unnecessary when a jury can determine from other evidence whether the delay caused additional harm.

King v. Patt · filed 2013-05-10

We agree with the authorities cited above holding that expert testimony is not required in cases where the jury can determine from the non-expert evidence presented whether the delay caused additional harm.

Claims concerning medical care received in federal prison are governed by Bivens rather than § 1983.

Gessa v. Robert LeGrand, Jr. · filed 2015-08-17

As the magistrate judge determined, because Gessa raised claims pertaining to the medical care received while in federal prison, his claims did not arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but were governed by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

A public defender or court-appointed defense counsel acting in that capacity is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Undiandeye v. Jackson · filed 2019-10-22

A public defender or a court-appointed defense counsel, while acting in that capacity, is not a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a court-appointed lawyer’s acts in furtherance of representation because those acts are not performed under color of state law.

Jordan-Bey v. Musich · filed 1983-04-08

It has been held repeatedly that the acts of court appointed counsel in furtherance of his duties are not performed under the color of state law. ... Therefore, it must be concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not treat private defense attorneys or public-defender investigators as acting under color of state law, but it reaches private participants in a conspiracy with a state official and public defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within their professional duties are absolutely immune.

BLACK, Lloyd, Appellant, No. 81-1646 v. BAYER · filed 1982-02-08

We hold that the reasoning of Polk County applies a fortiori and thus reaffirm a long line of decisions of this court recognizing that private attorneys do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. ... We therefore hold, guided by Polk County, that an investigator acting at the instance of a public defender does not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983. ... We therefore hold that the complaint was not subject to dismissal under the reasoning of Polk County, because it averred a conspiracy with a state official, the state prosecutor. ... We therefore reaffirm, based on our re-examination of prior decisions in this and other courts in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Polk County and Ferri v. Ackerman, the longstanding rule in this circuit: public defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within the scope of their professional duties are absolutely immune from civil liability under § 1983.

Court-appointed public defenders do not act under color of state law under Section 1983 when exercising independent professional judgment in their traditional role as counsel.

Harris v. Beynon · filed 1983-09-14

All those actions were taken in their traditional role as counsel exercising independent professional judgment. ... such conduct is not “under color of ... [state] law,” the essential ingredient for Section 1983 cognizance.

Public defenders performing traditional defense functions do not act under color of governmental authority for purposes of § 1983.

Bruce v. Fletcher · filed 1984-04-25

Public defenders, performing the traditional functions of defense attorneys, are not acting under color of governmental authority within the meaning of Section 1983, as plaintiff alleges.

State public defenders are not immune from § 1983 liability for intentional misconduct under color of state law through conspiracy with state officials that deprives clients of federal rights.

Tower v. Glover · filed 1984-06-25

We conclude that state public defenders are not immune from liability under § 1983 for intentional misconduct, “under color of” state law, by virtue of alleged conspiratorial action with state officials that deprives their clients of federal rights.

A public defender’s refusal, in the course of representing indigent clients, to provide them free transcript copies does not state a Section 1983 claim.

Eling v. C. Paul Jones, Minnesota Public Defender · filed 1986-08-08

We hold only that the refusal of the public defender’s office to furnish free copies of transcripts to indigents does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public defender ordinarily does not act under color of state law while representing a client; a conspiracy with state officials can support Section 1983 liability only if pleaded with specific facts suggesting a meeting of the minds.

Sutton v. Calhoun · filed 1986-09-09

Although a public defender generally does not act “under color of” state law in exercising his function as a lawyer, an allegation that a public defender conspired with state officials to deprive an inmate of federal rights may state a claim under Sec. 1983, ... but it must be pleaded with sufficient specificity and factual support to suggest a “meeting of the minds.” ... He made no particularized showing that a conspiracy existed, and as a result, he failed to make an adequate allegation of conduct “under color of” state law to support a Sec. 1983 action against Calhoun.

A purely private act does not become action under color of state law under Section 1983 merely because the actor is a public official.

Santine v. Roberts · filed 1987-06-16

It is well established that an act purely private in nature cannot be made the basis of a section 1983 action simply because it is carried out by one who happens to be a public official.

Defense counsel do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under § 1983 for their representation of a criminal defendant.

Bostic v. Stephens · filed 1987-09-17

If the attorneys were serving as defense counsel, they would not act under color of state law and so would not be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against court-appointed defenders for their work as defenders because they do not act under color of state law.

Hayes v. David Cooper Mark Beveridge Joy Sims · filed 1988-04-28

Furthermore, court appointed defenders do not act under the color of state law so as to give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a public employee’s alleged constitutional torts arising from dismissal by an arm of the state.

Vega v. Martinez · filed 1988-07-01

The fact that plaintiff’s former employer, the Sugar Corporation, is an arm of the State and that he has sufficiently alleged constitutional torts brings this case fully within the ambit of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 which states in pertinent part as follows.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions is not a state actor.

Borsello v. Leach · filed 1990-05-23

The Supreme Court has held that a public defender acting in his official capacity is not a state actor pursuant to § 1983. ... Thus, plaintiff has not stated a claim which may be maintained against this defendant in either his official or individual capacities.

Section 1983 requires a public defender to act under color of state law; absent allegations of conspiracy with state officials, the claim lacks that prerequisite.

Tyler v. Kuglitsch · filed 1991-10-24

Mr. Tyler fails to present an arguable claim for relief against attorney Kuglitsch under § 1983 because he has not alleged that attorney Kuglitsch was engaged in any conspiracy with state officials to deprive him of his federal rights. Absent such allegations, Mr. Tyler’s complaint lacks a necessary prerequisite of § 1983 liability — that attorney Kuglitsch acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders acting as counsel to criminal defendants because they do not act under color of state law in that role.

Allen v. Josephine County Defense Lawyers · filed 1992-08-28

Public defenders are private individuals for purposes of section 1983, and do not act under color of state law when acting as counsel to defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender as a state actor for a claim that the defender refused to file an appeal.

Rector v. Garland County, Ark. · filed 1993-04-14

Rector's claim that defendants refused to file an appeal may be dismissed because a public defender is not a state actor within the meaning of section 1983.

Appointed defense counsel does not act under color of state law in the normal course of defending a criminal case; a Section 1983 claim on that basis requires an allegation of conspiracy with state officials.

Ewing v. Public Defender Office, Olathe, Kansas · filed 1993-05-06

In reaching that conclusion, the district court's reliance on Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984), was appropriate. The Court has held that "appointed counsel in a state criminal prosecution, though paid and ultimately supervised by the State, does not act 'under color of' state law in the normal course of conducting the defense." Id. at 920 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)). Thus, Plaintiff failed to allege "a conspiracy with state officials to deprive [him] of federal rights." Id.

Under § 1983, judges are immune from damages claims arising from their judicial rulings, and a private landlord who is not a state actor cannot be liable.

Scott v. Johnny Morrison S. Lee Morris Salvage Delacy Stith · filed 1993-06-18

"To the extent that Scott requested money damages, the judges are immune from suit under § 1983, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and Stith is not a state actor, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), so these claims were properly dismissed"

Under Section 1983, factual allegations that a public defender conspired with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of civil rights require further proceedings to determine whether the action may proceed.

Butler v. Leen · filed 1993-09-07

If the complaint sets forth facts showing that the public defender conspired with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of his or her civil rights, a further proceeding would be necessary to determine whether the case could proceed.

A public defender or court-appointed defense counsel acting in that capacity is not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.

Zurla v. Thomas · filed 1993-10-05

Zurla's complaint fails to satisfy the second requirement. It is well-settled that a public defender or a court-appointed defense counsel, while acting in that capacity, is not a state actor for purposes of Sec. 1983.

A public defender performing traditional defense functions does not act under color of state law, but may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state officials where facts show an agreement to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Hogan v. Karen Brazier, Deputy State Public Defender · filed 1993-12-06

A public defender "performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a state criminal proceeding" does not act under color of state law and cannot be liable under section 1983. ... A public defender who conspires with state officials does act under color of state law and may be liable under section 1983. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984). To prove conspiracy under section 1983, an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights must be shown. ... He failed to allege any facts showing an agreement to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed his conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 treats public defenders as state actors when they conspire with state officials to deprive a person of protected rights.

Bieros v. Nicola · filed 1993-12-09

It is clear that public defenders do not constitute state actors, however, if they conspire with state officials to deprive a person of his rights, they are constructively deemed to be state actors for purposes of section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against public defenders requires specific facts showing that they conspired with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of rights.

Bieros v. Nicola · filed 1994-04-28

It is clear that public defenders do not constitute state actors, however, if they conspire with state officials to deprive a person of his rights, they are constructively deemed to be state actors for purposes of section 1983. ... In this case, plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to show how defendants specifically conspired with the District Attorney's Office and/or Probation Department. As such, plaintiff's section 1983 claim against defendants is dismissed.

Court-appointed counsel ordinarily does not act under color of state law while conducting a defense, but a public defender may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state officials.

Zichko v. Idaho Department of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1994-05-17

Court-appointed counsel does not generally act under color of state law when engaged in the ordinary course of conducting the defense. ... However, a cause of action exists for the purposes of Sec. 1983 if the plaintiff can plead and prove that the public defender actually conspired with state officials. ... Because Jones represented Zichko as a public defender by handling post-conviction relief proceedings from January to May 1989, and because Zichko failed to present any specific evidence that Jones engaged in a conspiracy with state officials, Zichko's Sec. 1983 claim against Jones is deficient.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a judge entitled to absolute judicial immunity or private parties who did not act under color of state law.

Warner v. Linda Roberts Misty Andrae Lee Hotchkins Mills Lane · filed 1995-11-09

We agree with the district court that Warner's amended complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact or law and further amendment would not create a cognizable federal constitutional claim under section 1983 because Judge Lane is entitled to absolute judicial immunity and the remaining defendants were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages action against a court-appointed state public defender for the defender’s representation of a criminal defendant.

Peterson v. Barnes · filed 1996-08-07

In dismissing the action, the district court found Peterson could not maintain a civil rights action for damages against state public defenders. ... The rulings made by the district court on the issues presented are dictated by well-settled law. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this action, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against public defenders because they are not considered state actors.

Powell v. Stephen Harris State of Maryland Public De Fenders Office State of Maryland Prosecutors Office · filed 1996-10-10

To the extent that Appellant's claim against the Maryland Public Defender's Office was intended as a damage action rather than a habeas action, we note that public defenders are not considered state actors for § 1983 purposes; thus, no award of damages would have been proper.

Section 1983 does not treat the Legal Aid Society as acting under color of state law merely because it receives state benefits, but a public defender may be liable for conspiring with state officials to violate constitutional rights.

Ige v. United States Attorney's Office, Keith D. Krakauer, Mark A. Kirsch, Thomas J. Farrell · filed 1996-11-08

In general, the Legal Aid Society does not "act under color of state law" by virtue of the financial or other benefits it receives from the State. ... However, a public defender is not immune from liability for allegedly conspiring with state officials to deprive a criminal defendant of his federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a contract psychiatrist whose detention decisions are closely intertwined with county officials’ work, and the psychiatrist is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Jensen v. Lane County · filed 2000-08-23

On the facts of this case, we hold that Dr. Robbins was a “state actor” for the purposes of being a defendant in a § 1983 action. ... Dr. Robbins’ conduct constituted “state action,” and he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Public defenders are not state actors against whom claims can be asserted under Section 1983.

West v. Lambert · filed 2001-02-06

The defendant public defenders are not state actors against whom claims can be asserted under § 1983.

Public defenders generally do not act under color of law and can be sued under § 1983 only if the plaintiff proves they conspired with state actors.

Logan v. Laterzo · filed 2001-11-21

Public defenders do not generally act under “color of law,” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981), so they cannot be successfully sued under § 1983 unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that they conspired with state actors, Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923-24, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984), which Logan has been unable to do.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a public defender conspired with state actors to support a claim against the defender’s law firm for conduct in representing a criminal defendant.

Louis Hamilton, II v. Law · filed 2002-05-10

Hamilton could not state a § 1983 claim against the Wold Johnson Law Firm unless Wold Johnson Attorney Beauchene conspired with state actors.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender as a state actor when the defender acts as a lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant.

Gausvik v. Perez · filed 2002-07-13

Under Polk County, a public defender is not a “state actor” when he acts as a lawyer on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant.

A public defender sued for conduct during representation of a criminal defendant is not a state actor under Section 1983.

Pearson v. Horenstein · filed 2002-07-30

The district court appropriately found that the named defendant could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as he is not a state actor.

Section 1983 treats a county public defender as a state actor when acting as an administrator who allocates the office’s resources.

Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada Morgan Harris Thomas Rigsby · filed 2003-02-03

We thus conclude that Harris was acting on behalf of Clark County in determining how the overall resources of the office were to be spent, and he qualifies as a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a public defender’s defective representation while performing traditional defense functions without collusion with state prosecutors.

Hart v. Braun · filed 2004-05-04

Hart does not qualify for relief under section 1983, because Braun’s allegedly defective representation was not tainted by collusion with state prosecutors and occurred during the performance of his “traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

WMATA acts under color of state law when operating its police force and is not immune from § 1983 suits under the Eleventh Amendment.

Heffez v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1983-09-09

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that WMATA acts under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the operation of its police force. ... Thus, WMATA is not shielded by the Eleventh Amendment, or Section 80 of the Compact, from suits brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Wilson v. Nash · filed 2004-12-17

A public defender is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability “when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

A public defender appointed to represent an indigent defendant in the traditional adversarial role is not a state actor and cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Graham v. Pinal County · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment to Boyd Johnson, because a public defender, when appointed to represent an indigent defendant in the traditional adversarial role, is not a state actor and therefore not a proper party to a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits claims against defendants acting under color of state law, subject to applicable immunity limits.

Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State University · filed 2005-11-07

Defendants acted under the color of state law, and are therefore subject to liability under § 1983. They are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from such liability because the SA may not be considered an arm of the state.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against court-appointed defense counsel for performing traditional lawyer functions because counsel is not acting under color of state law.

Tommy Pearson, Sr. v. Myles · filed 2006-07-05

Because Myles was performing traditional lawyer functions in her representation of Pearson, she was not acting under color of state law. Therefore, Pearson has no § 1983 cause of action against Myles in connection with her representation of him.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for acts protected by quasi-judicial immunity or for conduct by a private attorney who does not act under color of state law.

Sutton v. Llewellyn · filed 2008-08-05

The district court properly dismissed the section 1983 claims because defendant Galdos, the court clerk of the Monterey County Superior Court, has “absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations” when performing “tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process,” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.1987), and defendant Nicora, a private attorney, did not act under color of state law, even though he was appointed by the court to represent the eonservatee, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (noting that a private attorney, even one appointed by the court, does not act under the color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing the traditional role of an attorney).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against defendants who did not act under color of state law or who are immune from liability.

Cormier v. Siegler · filed 2013-06-20

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cormier’s request to proceed IFP because it properly concluded that Cormier’s action was frivolous, failed to state a claim, and sought monetary relief from defendants who did not act under color of state law or were immune from liability.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against public defenders performing traditional lawyer functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Telepo v. Martin · filed 2009-04-22

The Court agrees. The Supreme Court has held that court appointed counsel, including public defenders, do not act “under color of state law” when performing a traditional lawyer’s function as counsel to a defendant and, therefore, are not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Boyd v. Culpepper · filed 2019-10-16

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Tyler or Rogers acted outside a lawyer’s traditional functions as public defenders. Thus, taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Defendants Tyler and Rogers were not acting under color of state law while representing him.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a criminal defense attorney for performing the functions of defense counsel.

Townsend v. Missouri Public Defender System · filed 2019-12-18

Plaintiff cannot maintain an action against the Missouri Public Defender’s Office or his attorney Kerina Ibarra because a criminal defense attorney is not suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court-appointed defense attorney for representing an accused person because that work is not done under color of state law.

Stoll 604135 v. France · filed 2019-12-20

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s court- appointed attorney does not act under color of state law, and no claim under § 1983 can be maintained against her.

A public defender representing a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Ward (ID 125883) v. Astrab · filed 2019-12-31

Therefore, while plaintiff may challenge his incarceration in a petition for habeas corpus, his claim against the defendant public defender under § 1983 is barred by the holding in Dodson.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender representing a client in criminal proceedings because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Gutierrez v. Unknown · filed 2020-01-15

To the extent that plaintiff purports to raise a federal civil rights claim against a public defender who has represented plaintiff in criminal proceedings, such individuals are not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against public defenders for acts performed in their traditional role as defense counsel.

Miles v. Aldredge · filed 2020-02-28

However, Miles does not address the district court’s pertinent findings that, as public defenders performing traditional legal functions, Aldredge and Gonzalez-Falla could not be sued under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), or that Miles’s claims are, in any event, barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). ... Finally, because Miles’s appeal is frivolous in light of Polk County and Heck, and because the merits of his appeal “are so intertwined with the [IFP] certification decision as to constitute the same issue,” Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24, we exercise our discretion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous, see 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a defense attorney performing the ordinary work of counsel does not meet that requirement.

Perales (ID 118983) v. Mamalis · filed 2020-03-06

Plaintiff has not shown that his state court defense attorney was acting under color of state law as required under § 1983.

Court-appointed public defenders acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors and cannot be held liable under Section 1983.

Galloway v. Wages · filed 2020-03-27

But attorneys, even court-appointed public defenders, acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors and, therefore, cannot be held liable under Section 1983.

A public defender performing the traditional duties of counsel is not a state actor subject to Section 1983 liability.

Conley v. Alexander · filed 2020-03-30

Because Mr. Conley has not asserted that Special Public Defender Kaatz acted outside the scope of his responsibilities as a special public defender appointed to represent him during his criminal cases, Special Public Defender Kaatz was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A court-appointed public defender providing legal representation does not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for alleged ineffective assistance.

Cornille, Sr. v. Popit · filed 2019-12-19

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s case fails to state a claim against Popit, thus, his complaint must be dismissed. In Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a court-appointed attorney, even if employed by the state, may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for legal malpractice, because such an attorney does not act “ander color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not treat public defenders as state actors when they perform traditional duties as counsel in criminal proceedings.

Sangster v. Clark County Public Defender · filed 2020-03-31

The defendants thus were performing the role of attorney for Sangster and communication with the client is a traditional function within that role. The defendants therefore are not state actors under these allegations.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a public defender performing traditional criminal defense work because that work is not done under color of state law.

Phillips v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2020-04-01

Thus, even though he was employed by a public agency, he was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.

A public defender performing traditional criminal defense duties does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Morris v. Canyon County Public Defenders Office · filed 2020-04-02

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiff’s claims are based entirely on the conduct of his criminal defense attorney. But “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” ... Thus, Plaintiff’s claims fail for lack of state action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel duties because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Morris v. Canyon County Courthouse · filed 2020-04-02

As a result of the foregoing precedent, Plaintiff cannot sue the public defender under § 1983.

A public defender acting as counsel in a criminal case does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Manygoat v. Heinman · filed 2020-04-07

Public defenders do not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because that work is not under color of state law.

Fletcher v. Pierce · filed 2020-04-20

Harrison was not acting under color of state law while representing Fletcher in his criminal proceedings. ... Thus, Harrison is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a public defender for conduct while representing a client because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Williams v. Stover · filed 2020-04-21

Plaintiff cannot maintain an abuse of process claim under § 1983 against his public defender because public defenders do not act under color of state law in representing their clients.

Public defenders representing clients are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Whitt v. Thornton · filed 2020-04-22

Additionally, even if Plaintiff could maintain a § 1983 claim for damages based on the fact of his current incarceration, he could not maintain suit against the allegedly responsible parties, Public Defender William Harold and/or Public Defender Dorthy Buck, as a public defender is not a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court-appointed public defender because the defender is not a state actor.

Lee v. State of Illinois, Illinois Attorney General · filed 2020-05-13

Plaintiff’s claims against Willis also must be dismissed because “a court-appointed public defender is not a state actor, and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” McDonald v. White, 465 Fed. Appx. 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2012).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for performing a criminal defense attorney’s traditional duties because that work is not under color of state law.

TAYLOR v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2020-05-26

As such, Price cannot be considered a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A public defender performing traditional duties as criminal defense counsel does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Harris v. Gentile · filed 2020-06-03

Because a public defender performing traditional functions as counsel in a criminal proceeding—as Defendant Craig is alleged to have done here—does not act under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Craig.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders for their traditional work as criminal defense counsel because they do not act under color of state law.

Granado v. State of New Mexico · filed 2020-06-09

Because Granado’s claims are all based on allegations regarding the functions of counsel in his criminal case, Defendants Worley, Shattuck, Aragon, and Kerr are not state actors and the complaint against them fails to state a § 1983 claim for relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions without facts showing a conspiracy with a state official.

Hinton v. Dewolfe · filed 2020-06-18

In addition, public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

A public defender performing traditional advocacy for a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Gomez v. Norris · filed 2020-06-26

“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law [pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983] when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Plaintiff’s claims against his public defenders all relate to their function as Plaintiff’s advocates (i.e. refusing to present certain defenses and evidence and recommending a plea bargain). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Roth and Sark fail.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Bowman v. Hass · filed 2020-06-29

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant Ondo, Plaintiff’s former public defender, are implausible because Ondo is not a state actor.