42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a local government or its officials based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Camboni v. Symington · filed 1995-09-27

The district court properly dismissed Pinal County and the members of the Board of Supervisors because a local government and its officials are not subject to liability under section 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability for constitutional injuries inflicted by subordinate employees.

McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors · filed 1996-01-11

It cannot be done on any theory of vicarious liability; principles of respondeat superior do not apply in imposing liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation providing jail medical services liable for its staff members’ conduct solely under respondeat superior.

Hickey By and Through Timalu v. County of Stanislaus · filed 1996-02-20

The district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim because CFMG cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 724 (11th Cir.1991) (private corporation providing medical services under contract with State Department of Corrections cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior ). Because the plaintiffs failed to name individual staff members as defendants, the staff members' negligence or deliberate misconduct cannot serve as a basis for CFMG's liability on the Eighth Amendment claim.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior; a plaintiff must identify the officers personally responsible for the alleged failure to protect.

Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dept. Sean McCormack Asst. D.A. Denis Thomason, Donald Urrutia · filed 1996-07-29

However, Urrutia will have a viable claim only if he identifies the police officers present following his arrest who failed to take preventive action, because respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a government entity to be held vicariously liable for its employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Lee-Patterson v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc. · filed 1997-02-20

Patterson’s claims against NJT are dismissed to the extent they are based upon a theory of vicarious liability for the actions of the Individual Defendants. A Section 1983 action cannot be predicated upon a theory of vicarious liability such as respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a district attorney’s office solely for a prosecutor’s actions under respondeat superior.

Stokes v. Ward · filed 1997-11-21

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Hemmings v. Gorczyk · filed 1998-01-16

However, respondeat superior cannot form the basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not allow respondeat superior liability for a sheriff or county based solely on an employee’s conduct.

Magill v. Lee County · filed 1998-01-20

There is, of course, no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based on respondeat superior alone.

Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc. · filed 1998-04-17

GMC cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior alone.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a police chief for subordinates’ conduct.

Davis v. Zirkelbach · filed 1998-07-09

It is enough to recall that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make institutional or non-abusing defendants strictly liable for another person's conduct under a respondeat superior theory.

Snyder v. Eno, et al. · filed 1998-08-26

It is egually well established that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the institutional and non-abusing defendants are not "strictly liable" (under a respondeat superior theory of liability) for the conduct of Eno and Adams.

Section 1983 does not permit liability for the District of Columbia or its officials based on respondeat superior.

Stein v. District of Columbia · filed 1983-01-12

With respect to plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is clear that neither the District nor Mayor Barry nor Chief Turner can be sued on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally violated the plaintiff’s civil rights; respondeat superior alone does not establish liability.

Valdez v. City of Farmington · filed 1984-01-10

One such distinction is that the concept of respondeat superior provides no basis for liability under § 1983, as it may in a common law tort action. A § 1983 defendant must be found personally to have violated the plaintiffs civil rights for § 1983 liability to exist.

Section 1983 does not allow recovery based on respondeat superior.

Vaughn v. Dickens County Corr · filed 2000-11-01

In a § 1983 claim, recovery is not available based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Abston v. Shelby County Justice Center · filed 2001-09-17

Abston’s claims against Shelby County and Sheriff Gilless are frivolous because they are based upon a respondeat superior theory of liability, which cannot provide the basis for liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not permit liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Pittman v. Kurtz · filed 2001-09-28

Although defendants did not raise the issue in their motion for summary judgment, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based on respondeat superior.

Becker v. Wilkinson · filed 2002-01-31

The theory of respondeat superior cannot provide the basis for liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not allow a county to be held liable solely for the acts of its employee under respondeat superior.

Wallis v. Warriner · filed 2002-12-05

Respondeat superior liability is not available under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal connection to the alleged deprivation; respondeat superior does not establish liability.

Ephraim v. Angelone · filed 2003-03-03

Plaintiff has not provided evidence that any of Defendants acted personally to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. It is well-established that respondeat superior is not applicable in § 1983 cases. ... Since Plaintiff has not alleged any personal connection between Defendants and the purported denial of his constitutional rights with regard to his commissary purchases, his claim must fail.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Finlay v. Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas · filed 2003-11-20

Among other things, Finlay improperly proceeded on a respondeat superior theory, see Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978), and he did not name as defendants the persons discussed in his complaint, or seek leave to amend.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Hales v. City of Montgomery · filed 2004-03-31

In a case premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability may not be imposed vicariously or pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability under respondeat superior, even when state law would.

Gary Baskin and Beulah Baskin v. Eugene Parker and Curtis L. Smith · filed 1979-09-24

In other words, it rejected respondeat superior as a theory of recovery under § 1983. We interpret Monell’s ruling as uniformly applicable to § 1983 action in any state.

Section 1983 requires personal culpability for liability and does not impose liability solely through respondeat superior.

Brown v. Washington · filed 1987-06-01

That leaves no genuine issue of material fact under Complaint Counts I and II, because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 depends on personal culpability and not respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a plaintiff must show a causal link between a defendant’s conduct and the alleged deprivation of rights.

Kramer v. Village of North Fond Du Lac and Larry Wodack · filed 2004-09-27

Because § 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, and because the plaintiff has not shown any causal link between either defendants’ actions and the alleged deprivation of his rights, the Fourth Amendment claims against him and the village must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff department liable for its employees’ constitutional torts under a respondeat superior theory.

Sloane v. Kanawha County Sheriff Department · filed 2004-10-15

In this case, Plaintiffs have alleged constitutional torts against the named defendants. Under well-settled law, the Department may not be held liable for these claims under a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Dubois v. Abode · filed 2005-07-27

Dubois’ claim against MCACC lacks merit because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be solely based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely for an employee’s conduct under respondeat superior.

McCray v. First State Medical System · filed 2005-08-03

It is established that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Dubois v. Vargas · filed 2005-09-07

As the District Court explained, Dubois’s claims against C.M.S. and MCACC lack merit because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, so a public entity is not a proper defendant based solely on an employee's conduct.

Bartes v. School Board of Alachua County · filed 2005-10-26

We also note that, because there is no respondeat superior liability available under Section 1983, SBAC is not shown to be a proper defendant on this claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a school district to be held liable solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Cowan v. Strafford R-VI School District · filed 1998-04-07

The School District contends that this instruction permitted it to be held liable for Cowan’s §1983 claim under an impermissible theory of respondeat superior. See Springdale Educ. Assoc. v. Springdale School Dist., 133 F.3d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1998). The School District properly states the law with respect to respondeat superior liability in the § 1983 context, but as indicated above, the School District failed to properly state its objection on the record.

Section 1983 does not support liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Zivojinovich v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC · filed 2006-08-01

The Ritz is correct both in its claim that only respondeat superior liability is plead in the Amended Complaint and that this is legally insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability against a private prison corporation.

Olivas v. Correctional Corp. of America · filed 2007-01-30

Contrary to Olivas’s argument, CCA may not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

Jones v. Huckabee · filed 2007-02-15

With respect to Jones’s civil rights claims against the ACIC, its director, and the governor, arising out of the alleged misuse of the arrest records, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under the federal Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a company liable solely for its employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Stankowski v. Farley · filed 2007-05-17

In any case, the actions of Prime Care employees cannot give rise to liability for the company, since respondeat superior liability is not available under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold the United States liable for judges’ actions under a respondeat superior theory.

Falade v. United States · filed 2007-06-06

Among other infirmities with the pleading, Falade could not hold the United States liable under a respondeat-superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer for a security guard’s acts without the employer’s active participation.

Thompson v. McCoy · filed 1976-10-01

In the present case there has been a finding of state action but there is no evidence or allegation to be found in the plaintiff’s pleading of any active participation in this event on the part of the defendant McKeown. Since in the absence of such participation there can be no liability on his part under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the complaint against the defendant McKeown on that cause of action should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not create respondeat superior liability.

Vera v. Bd Jdg of Nueces Cty · filed 2007-12-21

Although Vera also challenges the district court’s reasoning that Vera failed to state a claim against the Board because § 1983 does not create respondeat superior liability, that finding was proper as well.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender service based solely on respondeat superior liability for its attorney’s actions.

Rice v. District of Columbia Public Defender Service · filed 2008-01-30

Even if PDS were acting under color of District of Columbia law, PDS could not be held liable for Mr. Hayes’ actions. “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superi- or theory of liability.”

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Chilcott v. Erie County Domestic Relations · filed 2008-06-23

However, it is well-established that there is no respondeat-superior liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on an employer’s responsibility for its employees.

Cox v. Jackson · filed 2008-09-29

It is well established that liability in a § 1983 action cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability for another person’s mistreatment.

Feliz v. Kintock Group · filed 2008-10-30

The District Court properly granted the Commonwealth defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to any claims involving mistreatment Feliz allegedly suffered while housed at the Kintock Center. E.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) (no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 cases).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county through respondeat superior for its officers’ actions.

Ryan v. New Castle County · filed 1973-10-02

respondeat superior has no application in an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a mayor, city, or its people under a respondeat superior theory for a judge’s acts.

Careaga v. James · filed 1980-03-17

Any attempt to hold the mayor, city, or people of St. Louis liable is predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior which does not apply in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on board members solely because of their supervisory relationship to the official who dismissed an employee.

Fracaro v. Priddy · filed 1981-05-01

Applying the reasoning in the Monell case to the instant facts, the Court concludes that respondeat superior will not support a finding of liability on the part of the Board members.

Section 1983 does not permit liability for alleged physical abuse solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Stacey v. Ford · filed 1982-05-19

It is clear that defendant Ford cannot be held liable for any alleged physical abuse solely on the basis of a respondeat superior theory, since this has been rejected as a theory of recovery under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants solely because they supervise officers who allegedly violated civil rights.

Morgan v. District of Columbia · filed 1982-10-27

As a result, this Court must dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 and direct constitutional claims for damages as they apply to defendants whose liability rests on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely through respondeat superior.

Clark v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1982-11-03

The only way by which the latter two defendants could be held liable is upon an application of respondeat superior. This doctrine has, however, been explicitly rejected by the Sixth Circuit in the recent case of Hayes v. Jefferson County. In light of Hayes, the Court will not belabor the point. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED with respect to defendants Mintzes and Michigan Department of Corrections.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a city or supervisory officials solely under respondeat superior.

Silo v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1984-08-29

Absent proof of such a policy, Mr. Silo has alleged only that Judge Bradley, Mr. Campbell, and the City are liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Section 1983 does not impose liability on this theory.

Section 1983 does not make a local government official liable solely for employees’ acts under a theory of respondeat superior.

Todd v. Navarro · filed 1988-03-31

In this regard Plaintiffs complaint is deficient because neither of these Defendants may be held liable under § 1983 under the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 bars respondeat superior liability regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks prospective relief.

Reynolds v. DeBuono · filed 2007-10-31

We join several of our sister circuits in adopting the view that Monell's bar on respondeat superior liability under § 1983 applies regardless of the category of relief sought.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a sheriff for a deputy’s actions.

Askew v. Sheriff of Cook County, Ill. · filed 2009-05-18

Monell and a host of later cases firmly establish that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a sheriff for a deputy’s actions.

Askew v. Cook County Sheriff · filed 2009-05-18

Monell and a host of later cases firmly establish that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Tanner v. Kenney · filed 2009-07-28

The district court properly dismissed Tanner’s claims against defendants Quinn and Kollasch because “[t]here is no re-spondeat superior liability under, section 1983.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

OWENS-ALI v. Pennell · filed 2009-12-04

Respondeat superior liability is unavailable under § 1983 and, therefore, Plaintiffs claims are legally baseless.

Section 1983 does not allow liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

Jones v. Michigan · filed 2010-03-18

However, § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 liability cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Dickson v. City of Clovis · filed 2010-04-01

Section 1983 liability cannot be based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a government entity or official for another person's actions.

Gomez v. City of Fremont · filed 2010-07-21

The Court also grants summary judgment in part on claim ten because there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison health provider liable for its employees’ misconduct solely through respondeat superior.

Weigher v. Prison Health Services · filed 2010-11-23

Because a § 1983 claim cannot be grounded in a theory of respondeat superior, Weigher‟s claim against PHS fails.

Section 1983 does not permit a school board to be held liable solely for its superintendent’s actions.

McComas v. Board of Education, Rock Hill · filed 2011-05-10

To the extent that McComas attempts to hold the Board liable based on Evans’s actions, this claim also fails. See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 589 (“[T]here is no respondeat superior liability in actions under § 1983 . . . .”).

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against the Public Defender Service based solely on its attorneys’ actions under a respondeat superior theory.

Martin v. the Public Defender Service · filed 2011-05-16

"Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability." ... Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs claim against the Public Defender Service rests on a respondeat superior theory, his claims fail.

Section 1983 does not allow derivative liability based solely on an employer’s relationship with the person who allegedly violated a right.

Ramos v. Patnaude · filed 2011-05-23

Since the group had no contract with the House of Correction, and in any case because respondeat superior is not a channel of derivative liability in a § 1983 action, Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005), the trial judge could not understand why the medical practice group had been sued, and neither can we.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Afdahl v. Cancellieri · filed 2012-02-24

As the District Court explained, however, liability under § 1983 cannot be based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not allow a private company to be held liable solely for its employee’s actions under respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Savoie v. Martin · filed 2012-03-06

Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Savoie cannot pursue a claim of liability based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability against Stites & Harbison pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Royster v. Nichols · filed 2012-10-30

Even assuming that Plaza Security is a state actor for § 1983 purposes, we hold that Royster's claims against Plaza Security and the Board fail as a matter of law. First, "respondeat superior is inapplicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Bell v. Kan. City Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 346, 347 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Section 1983 does not hold a defendant liable solely because it employs people who may have violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Martin v. Johnson · filed 2013-12-11

The district court properly dismissed Martin’s claim against defendant P.N.A./C.H.C. because a defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs individuals who may have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and Martin alleged only that P.N.A./C.H.C. “allowed their staff to operate below standards.”

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on an employer’s relationship to an employee.

Carter v. Broward County Sheriff's Department Medical Department · filed 2014-03-10

However, as the district court noted, § 1983 claims cannot be based solely on theories of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Cooper v. McCollum · filed 2014-04-29

The Third Circuit has reiterated that a § 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior and, that in order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal involvement by each defendant.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a county for the actions of its officials.

Tilli v. Ford · filed 2014-05-06

The District Court further concluded that Tilli failed to state a claim against Lehigh County because it is not the “employer” of the elected individual defendants and, even if it were, there is no respondeat superior liability in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. ... There is no arguable basis to challenge the District Court’s rulings in this case for the reasons that it thoroughly and adequately explained.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a plaintiff seeking to hold a company liable must show that its policy directly caused a constitutional injury.

Pyles v. Fahim · filed 2014-11-13

Finally, with regard to Mr. Pyles’s claim against Wexford, because § 1983 does not permit liability to rest on the doctrine of respondeat superior, Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1145–46 (7th Cir. 2013), Mr. Pyles was required to show that a Wexford policy was the “direct cause” of or “moving force” behind his constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a corporation for its employees’ actions; liability requires a policy or custom causing the constitutional violation.

Kelly v. Ambroski · filed 2015-03-31

For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s report and accepts his recommendation. ... Specifically, while a corporation providing prison medical services may be liable under § 1983 if it is established that the constitutional violation was the result of the corporation’s policy or custom, such a corporation may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

Grayson v. City of Aurora · filed 2016-01-17

The Court accordingly dismisses this claim on this basis and because respondeat superior is not available as a remedy under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on an agency solely for the actions of its agents.

Jimenez v. Wizel · filed 2016-02-17

Even if it is not a state agency, though, Jimenez’s claim still fails because the only allegation he raised was that DCF is liable for the actions of its agents, and “[r]espondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not allow damages based on respondeat superior liability.

Green v. Schmelzle · filed 2016-09-28

A plaintiff cannot recover damages based on a responde-at superior theory of liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior or mere negligence; the defendant’s deliberate indifference must be the moving force behind the unconstitutional deprivation.

Gentry Smith v. v. Horton · filed 2016-11-23

Liability under § 1983 may not be premised on a theory of respondeat superior or on a finding of mere negligence; rather, the defendants’ deliberate indifference must be the “moving force” behind the unconstitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for an employee’s alleged constitutional violation under respondeat superior.

Li v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-31

And just as a municipal entity cannot be held liable under respondeat superior, a private corporation cannot be held liable under respondeat superior for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of its employee.

Section 1983 does not make a county or sheriff's department liable for its officers' actions solely under a respondeat superior theory.

McGarry v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners for the Cnty. of Lincoln · filed 2018-02-28

McGarry's respondeat superior claim fails, because § 1983 does not give rise to respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison medical contractor liable solely for its employees’ acts; the complaint must allege a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Glenn v. Myers · filed 2018-06-07

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state any other ground on which MHM may be liable pursuant to § 1983, other than through the actions of its employees, and because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to identify any policy or custom creating the required causal connection between MHM and its employee(s), Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against MHM fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 generally does not allow respondeat superior liability for a subordinate's actions.

Green v. Florez · filed 2018-11-16

First, respondeat superior liability generally does not apply in the context of § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a county or a private company acting under color of state law liable solely for its employees’ acts; the entity must be liable for its own acts.

Carr v. El Paso County, Colorado · filed 2018-12-04

But El Paso County, as a governmental entity, “cannot be held liable [under § 1983] for the acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior,” Brammer-Hoelter, 602 F.3d at 1188, and neither can Correct Care Solutions, a private company acting under color of state law, see Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1216.

Section 1983 does not allow respondeat superior liability.

Jones v. Gadsden County Schools · filed 2019-03-04

Furthermore, as Jones correctly acknowledges, respondeat superior liability is not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable for its employees’ actions solely because of the employment relationship.

Mister v. Nawoor · filed 2019-05-28

Plaintiff’s claims against Wexford, based on its status as Defendants’ employer cannot proceed, however, as the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer for a subordinate’s civil rights violation solely because of their employment relationship.

Schenke v. Phelps · filed 2019-06-17

The doctrine of respondeat superior, which allows an employer to be held liable for subordinates’ actions in some types of cases, has no application to § 1983 actions for civil rights violations.

Section 1983 liability is personal and cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Gaddis v. Belk · filed 2019-06-17

Further, Defendant Payne cannot be held liable for the alleged acts of the other officers because liability under § 1983 cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely because it employs the person who allegedly violated a right.

Johnson v. TFC Scott Sears 5563 · filed 2019-07-09

To the extent that he seeks relief from Barrack V for employing Sears, his claims necessarily fail, because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely because it employs a person who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Graves v. Westford Health Service · filed 2019-07-17

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private medical company solely because it employs staff who allegedly violated a prisoner’s rights.

Solis v. West · filed 2019-08-23

However, even if he had alleged that Nurse West or Nurse Jeanine violated his rights, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely because it employed the person who allegedly violated a constitutional right.

PARKER v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. · filed 2019-09-03

As discussed above, respondeat superior liability will not support a claim pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely through an agency relationship with the person who allegedly violated a constitutional right.

Ridgley v. Wexford Health Sources Inc. · filed 2019-09-13

However, liability through a mere agency relationship is not available for § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on an employer for its employees’ conduct.

Cleveland v. Warden · filed 2019-09-24

Even if Cleveland had sued the company that employs the medical staff, he could not proceed here because there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on employers for their employees’ actions.

Cleveland v. DOC · filed 2019-09-25

In some cases, an employer can be liable for the actions of employees, but there is no such general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private prison medical contractor or a warden solely for employees’ acts under respondeat superior.

Stedman v. Pierce · filed 2019-09-30

Wexford and Warden Bishop cannot be held liable for the acts of Wexford employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Thus, Stedman has not stated a viable § 1983 claim against Wexford or the Warden.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant employs someone who violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Rodriguez v. Newsom · filed 2019-10-10

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is liable simply because he employs a person who has violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant employs someone who violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Hopkins v. Ahern · filed 2019-10-10

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is liable simply because he employs a person who has violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Brown v. Wine · filed 2019-10-23

Brown has also sued Wexford Medical Services, but there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because Brown’s allegations against Wexford appears to be based only on the poor decisions that its staff made in connection with his care, he cannot proceed against Wexford.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Banks v. Ivy · filed 2019-10-25

Further, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit an imposition of liability solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation liable solely for its employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Johnson v. Daugherty · filed 2019-11-04

The corporation cannot be liable on this basis alone because respondeat superior liability is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a government entity solely because it employed the alleged wrongdoer.

Hudson v. People of the State of California · filed 2019-11-08

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another, such as an employee.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant employs or supervises an alleged wrongdoer.

Morris v. State of California · filed 2019-11-26

First, there is no respondeat superior liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability.

Stanley v. Wexford Medical Services · filed 2019-12-02

Stanley has sued only Wexford Medical Services, but there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on an employer for its employees’ conduct.

Neisser v. Wexford Health Services, Inc. · filed 2019-12-10

Additionally, plaintiff makes no direct allegations against Wexford. Instead, he seeks to hold Wexford liable for the actions of its employees. As noted, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison contractor liable for an employee’s conduct solely because it employs that person.

Bason v. Stover · filed 2019-12-27

But Core Civic cannot be liable under § 1983 for the conduct of its employee Stover solely upon the basis of respondeat superior.

Respondeat superior does not apply to a § 1983 claim against an individual defendant when the plaintiff has sued no employer or other entity.

Banks 504504 v. Torrey · filed 2020-01-10

As the Magistrate Judge observed, respondeat superior in inapplicable because “Plaintiff has not asserted a claim against Defendant’s employer or any other entity (ECF No. 47 at PageID.476). This objection is denied.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an entity merely because it employs someone who violated a person’s rights.

Craig v. CDCR · filed 2020-01-17

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another, such as an employee.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a department solely for the actions of its employees.

Lacy v. Jones · filed 2020-01-27

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow vicarious liability for another person’s misconduct.

Robison v. Department of Insurance, Finanical Institutions and Professional Registration · filed 2020-02-04

Robison’s claim for respondeat superior liability against DIFP also fails. See Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (no vicarious liability under § 1983 because government officials are liable for only their own misconduct).

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on a private prison medical company for its employees’ conduct.

Creer v. Livers · filed 2020-02-11

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on private prison contractors for their employees’ acts.

Gunn v. Management Training Corp · filed 2020-02-27

This attempt cannot succeed, as there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a private corporation to be held liable solely for its employees’ conduct under respondeat superior.

Lee v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC · filed 2020-02-27

Rather, courts in this Circuit consistently conclude that “Monell extends to private corporations and thus they cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for their employees’ conduct.” ... Thus, plaintiff’s claim for respondeat superior liability under § 1983 must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on an employer for its employees’ conduct.

Springer v. Wexford Health · filed 2020-03-11

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Lyons v. Franklin County, Kentucky · filed 2020-03-16

Defendants are correct that respondeat superior principles are inapplicable in the context of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation vicariously liable for its employees’ violations of others’ civil rights.

Barker v. Ritter · filed 2020-03-23

In some fields of law, an employer is liable for things the employee does wrong, but there is no such general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a medical provider based solely on respondeat superior liability.

Blackmon v. Myers · filed 2020-04-06

This defendant is not mentioned anywhere in the statement of claim, and Plaintiff cannot pursue a claim against the medical provider based solely on a theory of respondeat superior liability because it is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on a parole board for money damages.

Swegman v. Indiana Parole District · filed 2020-04-07

Second, to the extent he seeks money damages, he cannot proceed against the Indiana Parole Board because there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability.

Nesby v. Searby · filed 2020-04-10

A respondeat superior liability claim, while not permissible under Section 1983, is allowed under IIlinois state law.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ actions.

Gebhart v. Wexford Medical · filed 2020-04-10

But, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged violation or maintain a policy that directly causes it.

Sands v. Warden Dana Metzger · filed 2020-05-12

It is well-established that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. ... There are no allegations that DeMatteis and Troxler established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused Plaintiff constitutional harm. ... Accordingly, the claims against DeMatteis and Troxler, will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for its employees’ actions solely because it employs them.

Ervin v. Corizon Health · filed 2020-05-13

As indicated, however, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims. ... The claim against Corizon is deficient because it is based solely on the theory of respondeat superior liability. Accordingly, the claim against Corizon is subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on an employer for its employees’ conduct.

DeAngelis v. Murphy · filed 2020-05-20

However, to the extent plaintiff asserts this claim against Parker’s and Dempsey’s employer, Advanced Correctional Healthcare Corp., the claim is dismissed because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Galvez v. Westchester County · filed 2020-05-26

Moreover, Section 1983 liability cannot be predicated on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on a county for an employee’s actions.

Johnston v. McGinnis · filed 2020-06-08

Even if he was the County’s agent or employee, the County would not be liable because there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Malone v. St Joseph County Jail · filed 2020-06-15

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because Mr. Malone’s complaint against Beacon Medical Group is based only on Beacon’s medical staff’s lack of treatment, he has not stated a claim against Beacon.

Section 1983 does not allow a private corporation to be held vicariously liable for its employees’ acts.

Parker v. Ritz · filed 2020-06-23

However, the law is still clear: Wexford cannot be vicariously liable in a §1983 claim for the acts of its employees.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable for a constitutional violation solely because it employs the people who committed it.

Smith v. Peoples · filed 2020-06-23

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and Aramark cannot be held liable solely because it employs the kitchen staff that prepared the meals in question.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff’s department solely because it employs the people alleged to have caused the harm.

Pinkston v. Gladieux · filed 2020-06-24

Likewise, he could not amend to add the Allen County Sheriff’s Department because he is alleging only that it is liable because it should be held accountable for its employees. “It is well established that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not make a private medical contractor liable solely because it employs someone who allegedly violated a prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Goroumi v. Wexford Health Source · filed 2020-06-26

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and Wexford cannot be held liable solely because it employs Dr. Marthakis.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private prison medical contractors solely for their employees’ conduct under respondeat superior.

Gordon v. Wexford · filed 2020-06-26

As a preliminary matter, it is well established that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Torres v. Correct Care Solution · filed 2020-06-26

Furthermore, Section 1983 liability cannot be predicated on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private corporation based solely on respondeat superior.

Langham v. Porter · filed 2020-07-01

We hold the circuit court did not err in dismissing Langham's § 1983 claim against Wal-Mart because Wal-Mart cannot be liable for a violation of § 1983 under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable solely because it employs the staff who treated the plaintiff.

Schrock v. Wexford of Indiana LLC · filed 2020-07-06

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and Wexford cannot be held liable solely because it employs the medical staff that treated Schrock.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable solely because its employees allegedly violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Fate v. Julienno · filed 2020-07-06

However, § 1983 liability cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. See Randle v. Alexander, 960 F. Supp. 2d 457, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegation that he received inadequate medical treatment from people employed by CCS is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim against CCS.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison medical provider liable solely because it employs staff who allegedly violated a prisoner's constitutional rights.

Harvey v. Canaberry · filed 2020-07-14

However, as stated above, there is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and Wexford cannot be held liable solely because it employs Dr. Marthakis and Nurse Tiffany.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff’s office solely because it employs staff who allegedly violated someone’s rights.

Dunigan v. Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-07-15

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and the Sheriff’s Office cannot be held liable solely because it employs the mail room staff who opened the Plaintiff’s letter.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability.

Green v. Correct Care Solutions · filed 2020-07-15

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ actions.

Haymon v. Wexford Indiana LLC · filed 2020-08-04

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because Haymon’s allegations against Wexford appear to be based only on the alleged poor decisions that its staff made in connection with his care, he cannot proceed against Wexford.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely for a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Culwell v. Massac County Sheriffs Department · filed 2020-08-05

Further, the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in actions brought pursuant to Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on an employer’s relationship to the alleged wrongdoer.

Ross v. State of Florida · filed 2020-08-25

But § 1983 claims may not turn on respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Taylor Jr v. Thews · filed 2020-08-27

To the extent he is attempting to sue the company that the IDOC contracts with to provide medical care, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely for its employees’ conduct.

Adams v. Wexford Health Source · filed 2020-08-28

It is well established, however, that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Green v. Meeks · filed 2020-09-04

And here, Wexford is correct—there is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 actions against a private corporation.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable for its employees’ conduct solely because of the employment relationship.

Williams v. Corizon · filed 2020-09-09

It is well established, however, that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor or corporation solely because its employees or agents allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Poor and Minority Justice Association v. Polk County Clerk of Court · filed 2020-09-14

This is plain assertion of respondeat superior liability, which § 1983 does not allow.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on an employer or supervisor for an employee’s actions.

Rodriguez v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-09-18

It is well established, however, that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a corporate entity vicariously liable for its employees’ unconstitutional acts.

Robledo-Valdez v. Aramark Correctional Services, LLC · filed 2020-09-28

Nor can entities like Aramark be held vicariously liable for unconstitutional acts committed by their employees, as courts have made clear that no respondeat superior liability exists under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a prosecutor liable for another prosecutor’s actions under respondeat superior.

Ash v. Bryan · filed 2020-09-30

Further, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendant Munden liable for another prosecutor’s actions based on the theory of respondeat superior, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected this theory of liability in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on an employer for its employees’ acts or omissions.

Ruiz v. Botalid · filed 2020-10-14

However, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not make a company liable merely because it employs someone who violated a constitutional right.

Rackemann v. Carter · filed 2020-10-23

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and companies are not liable merely because they employ someone.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability; a plaintiff must allege that each official’s own actions violated the Constitution.

Bowell v. Nguyen · filed 2020-11-05

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for another person's actions or omissions.

Hopkins v. California Forensic Medical Group · filed 2020-11-16

There is, however, no respondeat superior liability under section 1983 solely because a defendant (such as Defendant Ahern, who is the Alameda County Sheriff) is responsible for the actions or omissions of another.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based on respondeat superior.

Pethtel v. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services (TV2) · filed 2020-11-20

Even so, Section 1983 does not support claims based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely for its employees’ actions.

Leyva v. Baldwin · filed 2020-12-07

Because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions filed under Section 1983, his claim against Wexford for the actions or inactions of its employees fails.