42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a remedy for foster parents to enforce their federal right to foster care maintenance payments covering the costs listed in the Child Welfare Act.

CALIFORNIA STATE FOSTER PARENT ASS'N v. Wagner · filed 2010-08-30

We therefore hold that Foster Parents have access to a remedy under § 1983 to enforce their federal right.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid claimants to enforce the fair hearing right created by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3).

Fishman v. Daines · filed 2010-10-15

In short, plaintiffs may enforce § 1396a(a)(3) through § 1983.

Section 1983 permits foster children to enforce AACWA rights to individualized case plans and foster care maintenance payments.

Connor B. Ex Rel. Vigurs v. Patrick · filed 2011-01-04

The Supreme Court has laid out a three-part test to determine whether a provision creates a “right” that is enforceable under § 1983. ... In sum, application of the Gonzaga factors makes it clear that Congress intended to create privately enforceable rights to individualized case plans and foster care maintenance payments under the AACWA.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of Medicaid provisions that confer individual rights, including the screening and treatment requirements in § 1396a(a)(43)(B) and (C).

John B. v. Emkes · filed 2012-02-14

Application of the Blessing test confirms that these subsections are likewise individually enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of Medicaid provisions that create individual rights when Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Geston v. Olson · filed 2012-04-24

Because the Blessing test is met and Congress has not foreclosed Section 1983 enforcement under the Medicaid Act, the Gestons have a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff enforce a federal statute unless the plaintiff belongs to the class the statute was intended to benefit.

Crowley v. NEVADA EX REL. NEVADA SECRETARY · filed 2012-04-26

Assuming arguendo that § 301 confers a federal right, Crowley is not a member of the class intended to benefit from the enactment of HAVA § 301. Therefore, he cannot enforce violations of HAVA § 301 through a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 allows foster children to enforce the CWA’s case plan requirements.

HENRY A. v. Willden · filed 2012-05-04

We conclude that the case plan provisions of the CWA, codified at §§ 671(a)(16) and 675(1), are enforceable through § 1983.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce the individual right to choose qualified providers under § 1396a(a)(23).

Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Betlach · filed 2012-10-19

Therefore, the Court finds that § 1396a(a)(23) unambiguously evinces Congress’s intent to create individual rights that can be enforced under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of a federal statute only when Congress unambiguously confers an individual right; the CWA’s foster care payment provisions confer no such right on providers.

Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n v. Kincade · filed 2013-04-08

However, § 1983 holds out a mechanism to vindicate only “the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). ... Our job is to determine whether Congress, in enacting the CWA, evinced a clear intent to grant foster care providers an individually enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments sufficiently large to cover the cost of each item enumerated in § 675(4)(A). We hold that Congress did not unambiguously confer such a right and, therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Providers’ complaint for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 allows participants in the Housing Choice Voucher Program’s Homeownership Option to enforce their statutory right to a properly calculated monthly subsidy.

Daniels v. Housing Authority · filed 2013-04-17

Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under Counts IV, V, and VI are properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid beneficiaries to sue to enforce the Medicaid Act’s free-choice-of-provider requirement.

Planned Parenthood Arizona Inc v. Betlach · filed 2013-08-22

First, joining the only two other circuits that have decided the issue, we hold that the Medicaid Act’s free-choice-of-provider requirement confers a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a right of action to enforce federal law when it confers an enforceable individual right and Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Smith v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2013-12-20

42 USC § 1983, however, provides an alternative congressional authorization for a right of action to enforce federal law.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act because that Act’s comprehensive enforcement scheme forecloses a separate remedy.

Rasmusson v. Chisago County · filed 2014-01-10

Even if Plaintiff were able to demonstrate that the DPPA constitutes a protectable “right” under the relevant three-prong test and, therefore, that it is presumptively enforceable under § 1983, that presumption is rebutted because Congress has explicitly foreclosed a remedy under § 1983 by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the DPPA because the DPPA provides a more restrictive private remedy.

Potocnik v. Carlson · filed 2014-03-24

Because the private remedy available under the DPPA is more restrictive than the remedy available under § 1983, the Court concludes that the DPPA may not be enforced through § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce DPPA rights because the DPPA’s comprehensive remedial scheme forecloses that remedy.

Kennedy v. City of Braham · filed 2014-12-12

As noted above, the Court finds that these considerations, along with the comprehensive nature of the DPPA’s remedial scheme, demonstrate Congress’ intent to foreclose a remedy under § 1983. Therefore, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims, as stated in Counts II, III, and IV of the Complaint, fail to the extent that they are based on underlying DPPA violations.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act because that Act’s enforcement scheme forecloses a separate remedy.

Rollins v. City of Albert Lea · filed 2014-12-17

Accordingly, the DPPA cannot be enforced through § 1983.

Section 1983 allows food stamp applicants to sue to enforce the statutory deadlines for receiving benefits.

Briggs v. Bremby · filed 2015-07-06

And we therefore hold that the time limits for allocating food stamps provided in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (9) are privately enforceable through lawsuits brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits categorically needy individuals to enforce the Medicaid Act’s Availability Requirement because it confers an individual right to the medical services it describes.

Cruz v. Zucker · filed 2015-07-29

In particular, the Court concludes that the Availability Requirement unambiguously confers on categorically needy individuals an individual right to the medical services described in the statute and its implementing regulations.

Section 1983 provides a mechanism to enforce rights protected by 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b).

City of Cowan v. City of Winchester · filed 2015-08-03

Accordingly, in light of the foregoing analysis the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to its § 1983 claim for violation of rights protected by § 1926(b).

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to enforce rights protected by Title II of the ADA.

Williams v. City of New York · filed 2015-08-05

Accordingly, a plaintiff can bring a cause of action under § 1983 to enforce rights protected by Title II of the ADA.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of the Medicaid Act’s fair hearing right under § 1396a(a)(3).

Fishman ex rel. Fishman v. Paolucci · filed 2015-10-15

Armstrong, however, addressed neither the private enforceability of federal rights under § 1983 nor the § 1396a(a)(3) fair hearing right. We have held that § 1396a(a)(3) is enforceable through § 1983, see Shakhnes, 689 F.3d at 251, and that precedent still controls, see Briggs v. Bremby, 792 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir.2015) (approving of § 1983 enforceability of § 1396a(a)(3) post-Armstrong).

Section 1983 allows claims against state actors to enforce federal statutory rights, but § 253 creates no private right enforceable through it.

Spectra Communications Group v. City of Cameron, Missouri · filed 2015-11-10

Section 1983 authorizes claims against state actors to enforce rights created by federal statutes. ... We therefore conclude that § 253 does not authorize a private right of action for damages under § 1983 and that the district court did not err in dismissing Spectra's § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for enforcing individually enforceable rights secured by federal statutes unless Congress forecloses that remedy.

Colon-Marrero v. Garcia-Velez · filed 2016-02-01

Because HAVA affords plaintiffs an individually enforceable right to remain on the active voter registry absent those failures to act, and appellant has not shown that Congress intended to foreclose a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs properly sought relief for their improper removal in this federal action.

Section 1983 permits private plaintiffs to enforce the Medicaid Act’s reasonable-promptness right under § 1396a(a)(8).

Steward ex rel. Minor v. Abbott · filed 2016-05-17

The Fifth Circuit has recognized that Section 1396a(a)(8) provides a basis for Plaintiffs, through Section 1983, to pursue a claim to vindicate that interest, and Plaintiffs, have pled facts sufficient to state a claim under that statute.

Section 1983 allows individuals to enforce qualifying constitutional and statutory rights against persons acting under color of state law.

Guggenberger ex rel. Guggenberger v. State · filed 2016-07-28

Section 1983 imposes liability against any person acting under color of law who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This provision applies to deprivations of both Constitutional and statutory rights.

Section 1983 allows public housing tenants to enforce the federal rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) and (l).

Poole v. Housing Authority for the Town of Vinton · filed 2016-08-15

Thus, Poole may use § 1983 to enforce the federal rights created by § 1437d(k) and (l).

Section 1983 allows a tenant to enforce the Housing Act’s Section 8 rent ceiling against a state housing authority.

McClean v. Delaware County Housing Authority · filed 2016-12-07

Based on these cases, Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief by asserting, pursuant to Section 1983, that DCHA, as a state actor, violated the rent ceiling in the Housing Act by incorrectly calculating his annual income and thereby overcharging Plaintiff for Section 8 housing rent.

Section 1983 allows foster families to enforce their individual right to foster care maintenance payments under the Child Welfare Act.

D.O. v. Glisson · filed 2017-01-27

In sum, we hold that the Act confers foster families with an individual right to foster care maintenance payments enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits local areas to enforce their WIOA right to prompt allocation of funds on a program year basis.

Coastal Counties Workforce, Inc. v. Lepage · filed 2018-01-03

Accordingly, the Court concludes CCWI's right to the prompt allocation of funds on a program year basis is enforceable through § 1983 because Congress did not indicate an intent to foreclose that enforcement.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to compel a state to issue a LEOSA identification because LEOSA does not require states to issue one.

Henrichs v. Ill. Law Enforcement Training & Standards Bd. · filed 2018-01-26

Absent an obligation on the States to issue subsection (d) identifications, there is no enforceable right to such an identification under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a claimed right to LEOSA identification because LEOSA does not require states to issue it.

Henrichs v. Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board · filed 2018-01-26

Absent an obligation on the States to issue subsection (d) identifications, there is no enforceable right to such an identification under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action to enforce rights created by federal statutes, but a violation of federal law alone is insufficient.

Barry Farm Tenants v. D.C. Hous. Auth. · filed 2018-04-30

Section 1983 thus confers a private right of action to safeguard certain rights created by federal statutes.

Section 1983 gives homeless children a private cause of action to enforce rights under the McKinney-Vento Act.

Student Doe v. Perille · filed 2018-11-06

Homeless children, therefore, have a private cause of action pursuant to § 1983 to enforce provisions of the McKinney-Vento Act.

Section 1983 cannot compel a state to provide identification or firearms certification under LEOSA because LEOSA confers no enforceable right to either.

Cole v. Monroe County · filed 2019-01-09

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Cole has no enforceable right to subsection (d) identification, and that he therefore may not invoke § 1983 to compel defendants to issue him such identification.

Section 1983 permits foster parents to enforce their federal right to foster care maintenance payments under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, despite the Act's limited federal agency review.

N.Y.S. Citizens' Coal. for Children v. Poole · filed 2019-04-19

Our review of the Act's text and statutory structure leads us to conclude that Congress did indeed create a specific monetary entitlement aimed at assisting foster parents in meeting the needs of each foster child under their care. What is more, we find that the Act's provision of (limited) federal agency review for a state's substantial compliance is insufficient to supplant enforcement through Section 1983. We therefore hold that the Coalition can bring a Section 1983 action on behalf of its foster parent members.

Section 1983 permits a person to challenge a state policy that denies rights secured by the federal Social Security Act.

Hale v. State · filed 1981-08-06

Moreover, State of Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980) shows that the State policy denying the federally created right to medicaid assistance to all step-parents when a natural parent is living in the home was properly ... challenged by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the Rehabilitation Act.

Woods v. SC Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2020-02-10

Further, the Circuit courts that have dealt with the issue has rejected the notion a plaintiff can use Section 1983 in seeking rights under the Rehabilitation Act. ... The Court agrees with these circuit courts’ decisions, and thinks the Fourth Circuit, if faced with this precise question, would too.

Section 1983 permits a private remedy for a federal statutory violation only when the statute unambiguously confers an individual right.

Norris Carey, Jr. v. Throwe · filed 2020-04-30

Carey’s claim must fail because § 1983 is not an available remedy for purported violations of LEOSA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights created solely by the ADA or Rehabilitation Act because those laws have comprehensive enforcement schemes.

Turner v. Alpine School District · filed 2020-09-23

The ADA and Rehabilitation Act have comprehensive enforcement schemes that preclude § 1983 claims based solely on violations of those laws.

Section 1983 does not provide a private action to enforce the Shelter Plus Care Program’s supportive service requirements because those provisions do not confer individual rights.

Norris v. Murfreesboro Leased Housing Associates · filed 2020-10-26

Here, as in Johnson, the statutes authorizing the Shelter Plus Care Program focused on the government’s goals or the entities regulated rather than individual beneficiaries. ... The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff does not have a private right of action to enforce the supportive service requirements of the Shelter Plus Care Program.

A state actor’s absolute immunity from personal liability can leave other participants in an alleged conspiracy exposed to a § 1983 claim.

Herbert W. Rounseville and Robert Rounseville v. Samuel Zahl, Treva M. Way, and Geoffrey P. Serata · filed 1994-01-11

Even if Judge Barrett was shielded by absolute immunity from personal liability, his involvement as a state actor in an alleged conspiracy might still ground a viable section 1983 claim against the other conspirators, see Polur v. Rajfe, 912 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1389, 113 L.Ed.2d 446 (1991).

Section 1983 applies the same standard for proving unlawful discrimination as Title VII.

Patterson v. UNITED FEDERATION OF TCHRS., ETC. · filed 1979-10-26

Further, the standard for establishing unlawful discrimination is the same under 42 U.S.C §§ 1981 and 1983 as under Title VII. Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722, 729 (2d Cir. 1976).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation under color of state law of a federal constitutional or statutory right, and proof of class-based discrimination is not required.

Chrisco v. Shafran · filed 1981-02-11

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivation under color of state law of any right guaranteed by the federal constitution or a federal statute. ... Proof of class-based discrimination is not an element of a cause of action under section 1983. Therefore Chrisco need neither plead nor prove that defendants acted with any discriminatory animus in order to make out a claim for relief pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 applies the same standard for establishing unlawful discrimination as Title VII.

Patterson v. United Federation of Teachers Local No. 2 · filed 1979-10-26

Further, the standard for establishing unlawful discrimination is the same under 42 U.S.C §§ 1981 and 1983 as under Title VII.

Section 1983 permits injured parties to obtain injunctive relief in class actions addressing patterns of police abuse.

United States v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1979-10-30

With particular reference to this case, it is clear that injunctive relief against patterns of police abuse can be obtained in class suits brought by the injured parties under such statutes as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in state court are not required to be class actions and are neither mutually exclusive from nor co-extensive with class actions.

Brown v. Bedford School Board · filed 1982-07-07

We note that the trial judge erred when he concluded that actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be class actions. A section 1983 claim in State court is neither mutually exclusive from, nor co-extensive with, a class action.

Section 1983 gives each plaintiff a personal claim for monetary damages and does not authorize a class action seeking those damages.

Sowders v. Atkins · filed 1983-01-18

This case is further complicated by the several alleged causes of action. With reference to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 part of the complaint, it is true that Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980), allows such actions to be brought in state court. Martinez, however, involved an individual complaint, and we have found nothing which would authorize a class action based on this cause of action where monetary damages are requested. On the contrary, Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rule 23 § 1752 states in a footnote that this Act, when monetary damages are sought, gives only a personal right to plaintiff. This is a sensible interpretation of the Act. We cannot see how monetary damages could be proven and assessed for a class.

In a § 1983 class action, each class member whose constitutional rights were violated is entitled to nominal damages.

Cummings v. Connell · filed 2005-03-29

We agree with the approach taken by the courts that have recognized that each class member whose constitutional rights were violated is entitled to nominal damages. Once a class has been certified, there is no justification for awarding nominal damages to only the named class representatives.

Section 1983 permits a wrongful-discharge claim when protected activity substantially motivates the discharge.

Goodwin v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1979-11-05

The Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of wrongful discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by showing he engaged in a protected activity and this conduct was a substantial motivating factor in his discharge.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights claim to be sustained on a showing that defendants acted with gross negligence or recklessness.

Hanson v. City of Snohomish · filed 1992-04-13

A cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be sustained on a showing that defendants acted with gross negligence or recklessness.

Section 1983 requires more than ordinary negligence to hold a medical professional liable for an involuntarily committed patient’s care or seclusion; a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment may support liability.

Hopper v. Callahan · filed 1990-11-20

We acknowledge, as do the plaintiffs, that negligence alone will not support a § 1983 claim. We must determine, as to each defendant, whether the record shows indisputably that no decision of his was such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards that that defendant did not base that decision on accepted professional judgment.

Section 1983 may support a claim based on intentionally altered police-dog training, but the claim requires evidence of that alteration.

Robinette v. Barnes · filed 1988-08-22

Although a section 1983 action might lie if Casey's training had been intentionally altered, the record is devoid of any evidence which would support such a finding in this case.

Section 1983 does not provide an action when improper training of a police dog results from simple negligence.

Robinnette v. Barnes · filed 1988-08-22

As the district court correctly states, "[i]f the improper training was the result of simple negligence, no section 1983 action will lie...."

Section 1983 imposes no culpability requirement independent of the underlying constitutional or federal right; the required state of mind comes from the particular right allegedly violated.

Simons v. County of Marin · filed 1987-11-19

Section 1983 itself imposes no standard of culpability or state of mind requirement independent of that required to make out a constitutional deprivation. ... The standard is measured not by section 1983, but by the particular constitutional provision involved.

A state mental-health professional’s failure to exercise any professional judgment or take minimal steps to protect an involuntarily committed patient can state a § 1983 claim, while mere malpractice or improper judgment does not.

Valentine v. Strange · filed 1984-11-30

Moreover, this Court does not hold that allegations of constitutional violations based only upon mere malpractice, or improper professional ... will state a § 1983 cause of action. However, a state health care professional must exercise some professional judgment, and the failure of such a professional to take even minimal steps to provide for the safety of an involuntarily committed patient does implicate constitutional concerns.

Mere allegations of malice cannot transform a routine automobile accident involving state officials into a constitutional claim under section 1983.

LeCuyer v. Weidenbach · filed 1985-04-29

Plaintiff may not, by mere allegations of malice, transform a routine auto accident involving state officials into a constitutional claim under § 1983.

Unless the constitutional provision at issue requires greater culpability, negligent deprivation of a constitutional right is actionable under section 1983 when the statute's other requirements are satisfied.

Gravitt v. Graves · filed 1985-05-30

The above-mentioned authorities stand for the proposition that unless the constitutional provision at issue adds an additional requirement, a negligent deprivation of rights is actionable under § 1983. ... For all of the above-mentioned reasons, this Court concludes that the plaintiff’s claim of negligence in this action is sufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state official's merely negligent act causing unintended injury to life, liberty, or property does not implicate due process and cannot support a § 1983 claim on that ground.

Daniels v. Williams · filed 1986-01-21

We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a ... act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.

Section 1983 has no mental-state requirement beyond what is required to establish the underlying constitutional violation.

Carhart v. Smith · filed 2001-04-18

Section 1983 “contains no state of mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right.” ... I therefore agree with the defendants that to the extent the plaintiffs first cause of action is based on allegations of negligent conduct, it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for mere negligence; this court requires an intentional violation of federally protected rights or reckless disregard of those rights.

Rivera v. Rhode Island · filed 2004-04-05

Moreover, § 1983 does not impose liability for conduct that is merely negligent. It requires proof that state or municipal officials intentionally violated the plaintiffs federally-protected rights or that they acted with reckless disregard for the likelihood that those rights would be violated.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking recovery from a sheriff to show that the sheriff had actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s complaints.

Tatum v. Houser · filed 1979-11-14

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order for a plaintiff to recover from a sheriff, he must show that the defendant sheriff had actual knowledge of the complaints which the plaintiff has. There is no such showing in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff or deputy merely for executing a valid warrant, absent negligence or other conduct depriving a person of constitutional rights.

Dickerson v. Kemp · filed 1989-02-28

The execution of a valid warrant, a purely ministerial function, absent any other negligence in connection therewith, does not in itself state a cause of action against a sheriff or deputy under Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for a sheriff’s operation of a county jail when state and local law make the sheriff the county’s final policymaker for the jail.

Dotson v. Chester · filed 1991-06-05

Realizing that the present case demonstrates the truth of Justice O’Connor’s prediction that state and local law will not always speak with perfect clarity, we conclude that both state and local law point to the Sheriff as the final policymaker for the County when operating the County Jail, and hold that the County is properly responsible for the attorney’s fees and costs apportioned to the Sheriff.

Section 1983 does not make an Indiana county or its commissioners liable for a sheriff’s wrongful jail conduct merely through their county roles when they lack authority over the sheriff or jail policies.

Broadus v. John D. Beatty, Sheriff of Howard County, Indiana · filed 1995-04-18

Under Indiana law, however, the Howard County Board of Commissioners has no authority to set policies concerning the conditions of confinement at the Howard County Jail. Under Indiana Code Sec. 36-2-13-5(a)(7), the county sheriff bears the responsibility to "take care of the county jail and the prisoners there." Indiana sheriffs are not subject to the authority or control of the county commissioners of the county where they hold office. Radcliff v. County of Harrison, 627 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (Ind.1994); Hupp v. Hill, 576 N.E.2d 1320, 1326 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). Howard County also has no authority over the county sheriff, Estate of Drayton v. Nelson, --- F.3d ----, No. 94-2217, 1994 WL 715081, at * 2 (7th Cir. Dec.27, 1994). The district court evidently understood Broadus' claim against the county and the county commissioners as a claim that these defendants were responsible for wrongful conduct of the sheriff. On that basis, the court properly dismissed those defendants.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a sheriff’s law enforcement actions when the sheriff acts as a state rather than county policymaker in that area.

McMillian v. Monroe County · filed 1997-06-02

We hold that, as to the actions at issue here, Sheriff Tate represents the State of Alabama and is therefore not a county policymaker. We thus affirm the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of petitioner’s § 1983 claims against Monroe County.

A § 1983 claim against a sheriff based on an official custom or policy requires a direct causal link between that policy and the deprivation of rights.

Doe v. Sheriff of Dupage County · filed 1997-10-27

To state a claim under § 1983 Wesley had to point to a custom or policy of the Sheriff — the only defendant here — -and show a “direct causal link” between that custom or policy and the intentional deprivation of her rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a sheriff whose alleged policies violate rights secured by federal law.

Hanson v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Department · filed 1998-01-28

Specifically, the Amended Complaint claims that Sheriff Williamson failed to provide a TDD for deaf arrestees, failed to ensure that deaf arres-tees received equal effective communication regarding arrest procedures and the right to post bond pending trial, and maintained an express policy of forbidding officers from allowing deaf arrestees to use the TDD which was stored in Officer Martha Brown’s office. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established a prima facie § 1983 case against Sheriff Williamson.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a Georgia county for its sheriff’s law enforcement conduct when the county has no meaningful control over those duties.

Fletcher v. SCREVEN COUNTY, GA. · filed 2000-02-09

In sum, although Georgia law declares sheriffs to be county officers, and directs that counties elect and pay their sheriffs, it cedes to counties no meaningful level of control over a sheriffs law enforcement activities. Since a county has no hand in the formulation or discharge of its sheriffs law enforcement duties, the sheriffs conduct in that area cannot be said to constitute county policy for § 1983 liability purposes. Therefore, Screven County cannot be held liable for Kile’s law-enforcement-related conduct.

Section 1983 does not require a sheriff to adopt a formal written policy requiring every physician recommendation for inmate follow-up care to be followed.

Henry v. Thornton · filed 2000-05-12

The essence of Henry’s argument is that the Sheriff should be liable to him under § 1983 for failure to adopt a formal written policy explicitly stating that a physician’s recommendation of follow-up care for an inmate patient must be followed in all instances. There is no such legal requirement.

Section 1983 permits claims against a California sheriff in his official capacity for county policies and in his individual capacity for his own failure to instruct, supervise, control, or discipline deputies; respondeat superior liability is unavailable.

Roe v. County of Lake · filed 2000-07-17

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims under section 1983 for damages and injunctive relief against Sheriff Mitchell in his official capacity are DENIED. In addition, the motion to dismiss the claim against Sheriff Mitchell in his individual capacity is DENIED. Although respondeat superior liability is not available under section 1983, the amended complaint alleges direct liability against Sheriff Mitchell for his failure to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline officers who were violating the civil rights of women. Accordingly, the allegations state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

A California county may face liability under § 1983 for its sheriff’s crime investigations because the sheriff acts as the county’s final policymaker in that role.

Brewster v. Shasta County, a Public Entity Brad McDannold an Individual D. Compomizzo, an Individual · filed 2001-12-28

In sum, we conclude that the Shasta County Sheriff acts as a final policymaker for the County when investigating crime within the County. We therefore affirm the district court’s holding that the County may be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a Georgia county liable for its sheriff’s policies concerning CJIS warrant information or related employee training and supervision because the sheriff is not a county policymaker for those functions.

Grech v. Clayton County, GA · filed 2003-07-07

Thus, we conclude today that the Clayton County Sheriff is not a county policymaker under § 1983 for his law enforcement conduct and policies regarding warrant information on the CJIS systems or the training and supervision of his employees in that regard. Accordingly, the defendant Clayton County has no § 1983 liability for the acts and policies of the sheriff and his employees in this case.

A sheriff is not liable under § 1983 for a town marshal’s conduct when there is no evidence the marshal was acting as the sheriff’s special deputy at the time.

Cockrum v. Charles E. Whitney and Philip C. Loucks · filed 1973-05-09

The trial judge also ordered the verdict against defendant Loucks set aside. Since there was no evidence that Whitney was, at the time of the incident, acting as a special deputy sheriff, that ruling was correct.

Section 1983 permits a sheriff to be held liable for deputies’ acts without personal involvement when applicable law makes the sheriff responsible for those acts.

Williams v. United States · filed 1973-02-07

The argument is based on the general proposition that in cases where monetary damages are sought under § 1983, the doctrines of respondeat superior or imputed negligence do not apply and personal involvement of the defendant is always required. This Court does not agree with that proposition.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a sheriff; conduct attributable to the sheriff as chief policy maker must cause the constitutional deprivation.

Dang v. Sheriff of Seminole County · filed 2014-08-06

There is no vicarious liability under § 1983. Thus, to hold the Sheriff liable for a violation of the Plaintiffs constitutional rights, there must be conduct attributable to the chief policy maker that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a sheriff whose alleged policies and personal conduct caused a constitutional deprivation; the county may remain in the suit to pay any judgment.

Parker v. Ringhausen · filed 2020-04-20

Therefore, Parker has stated a claim for relief under Section 1983 against Ringhausen. The Court will not dismiss Jersey County, but will limit its liability to paying any damages awarded.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff's department liable for its employees' acts solely because it employs them.

HAYNES v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF · filed 2020-10-30

The only defendant Mr. Haynes names is the Marion County Sheriff, but the Sheriff's Department cannot be liable for the acts of its employees under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to plead special damages to state a claim for relief.

Hermes v. Hein · filed 1979-11-16

Nor, contrary to defendants’ assertion, must the plaintiffs plead special damages in order to make out a claim for relief under § 1983 or § 1985.

Section 1983 does not remedy an isolated, limited disclosure of an inmate’s intimate photographs and derogatory comments by a prison officer when the conduct causes no constitutional injury.

Ezra Davis Iii, and Mary Davis v. Corrections Officer T. Bucher · filed 1988-08-02

Bucher’s indiscretions do not constitute the type of governmental abuse which demands a constitutional response. Rather, elevating them to constitutional dimension would tend to trivialize the Fourteenth Amendment by making it a magnet for all claims involving personal information, state officers, and unfortunate indignities. We heed the Supreme Court’s counsels of caution and conclude that the Davises have not alleged the type of injury remediable under section 1983 and the due process clause.

Section 1983 does not support a due-process claim based solely on the absence of a hearing for a generally applicable legislative rule affecting an individual's property.

E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve District · filed 1980-01-22

Thus, the absence of a hearing did not deprive plaintiff of due process and the district court properly concluded that plaintiff had not stated a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a hearing before a generally applicable legislative rule affects an individual's property.

E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve District Of Du Page County · filed 1980-03-03

The rule is well settled, however, that no hearing is required where it is asserted a legislative rule of conduct, which applies to more than a few people, is used to affect the property of an individual. ... Here, through its legislative authority the District passed an ordinance preventing everyone from dumping sludge or liquids at the landfill site. While plaintiff may have been particularly affected by this ordinance it is an ordinance of general application passed pursuant to proper authority and is concerned with policy matters not more specific evidentiary factors. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, the absence of a hearing did not deprive plaintiff of due process and the district court properly concluded that plaintiff had not stated a claim under section 1983.

A jail's deliberate indifference to prisoner safety supports § 1983 liability when an obvious unreasonable risk of violent harm was or should have been known and officials flagrantly failed to act.

Morgan v. District of Columbia · filed 1985-02-12

Deliberate indifference occurs if there is an obvious unreasonable risk of violent harm to a prisoner or a group of prisoners which is known to be present or should have been known, and the District through its employees who knew or should have known of the risk were outrageously insensitive or flagrantly indifferent to the situation and took no significant action to correct or avoid the risk of harm to the prisoner or prisoners who were subject to the unreasonable risk of violent harm.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner's due-process claim for failure to protect when correction officers' purposeful acts or deliberate indifference to his safety caused the deprivation, but the court left open whether negligence alone suffices.

Holmes v. Harrison Goldin, Comptroller, Theodore R. West, Warden, and Correction Officers Byred and Long, Brook · filed 1980-02-06

Whether or not negligence is enough, Holmes may be able to show purposeful acts on the part of the correction officers or deliberate indifference to his safety amounting to a violation of due process. He should be given the opportunity to do so.

A section 1983 claim based on inmate violence requires a pervasive risk of harm and failure by prison officials to exercise reasonable care against that risk, while the Eighth Amendment further requires unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Shrader v. White · filed 1985-05-09

When there is present in a prison or in an identifiable portion of it, a pervasive risk of harm to all prisoners, or to an identifiable group of them, the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials exercise reasonable care to provide reasonable protection from such unreasonable risk of harm. ... We thus decline to ignore the mandate of the United States Supreme Court that the eighth amendment prohibits punishments which "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."

A section 1983 inmate-safety claim may arise when officials know that unsecured scrap metal creates a pervasive risk of weapons and fail to take reasonable preventive action.

Shrader v. White · filed 1985-05-09

This would indicate a pervasive risk of harm from use of the knives, and a possible inadequate official response would appear to make out a claim if prison officials ignore the problem, after they become aware of it, and fail to take action to prevent the manufacture and possession of weapons which can be used to harm other inmates.

Prison officials are not entitled to summary judgment on a Section 1983 failure-to-protect claim merely through brief affidavits that fail to address the corrective measures within their control.

Guillermina Cortes Quinones and Alberto Almodovar Medina v. Nettleship · filed 1985-09-13

The only point we make now is that defendants’ perfunctory nine or ten sentence affidavits were insufficient conclusively so to establish and hence summary judgment for defendants was not warranted on the basis of the affidavits they filed.

A prisoner's § 1983 failure-to-protect claim presents triable issues when a guard allegedly knew of, encouraged, or recklessly disregarded a specific threat of inmate violence.

Ayers v. Thomas A. Coughlin, Iii, Commissioner, Harold J. Smith, Superintendent of Attica, S. Kerbein, Correction · filed 1985-12-26

The failure of custodial officers to employ reasonable measures to protect an inmate from violence by other prison residents has been considered cruel and unusual punishment. ... Whether the defendant Ker-bein acted intentionally or with reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s right to be free from the risk of harm from Alves presents triable issues of fact that concern the Eighth Amendment.

A jailer is liable under § 1983 for an inmate-on-inmate attack only when the jailer knew or should have known of the risk and failed to prevent the attack.

Hayes v. Wimberly · filed 1986-01-15

Liability exists only if the warden or jailer knew of the risk of such injury or should have known of it and with actual or constructive knowledge, failed to prevent such an attack.

A prisoner states a § 1983 failure-to-protect claim when prison officials act with deliberate indifference to a serious threat of harm from another prisoner.

Berg v. Kincheloe · filed 1986-07-14

A prisoner may state a section 1983 claim under the eighth and fourteenth amendments against prison officials where the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious harm or injury by another prisoner.

Prison officials violate Section 1983 when deliberate or callous indifference to a specific known risk allows fellow inmates to inflict physical harm; mere negligence is insufficient.

Pressly v. Hutto · filed 1987-04-28

The eighth amendment protects a convicted inmate from physical harm at the hands of fellow inmates resulting from the deliberate or callous indifference of prison officials to specific known risks of such harm ... just as it protects against harm resulting from deliberate indifference of prison officials to serious medical needs.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for ordinary torts.

Johnson v. Peterson · filed 1990-10-04

Ordinary tort claims are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mark v. Caldwell, 754 F.2d 1260, 1261 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 945, 106 S.Ct. 310, 88 L.Ed.2d 287 (1985), and an allegation of excessive force was not made.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violations of state tort law.

Justice v. Marian Reda the City of Columbus, Ohio · filed 1989-12-08

Plaintiff's complaint was grounded on a state law claim of defamation, but § 1983 does not impose liability for violations of state tort law.

Section 1983 does not make every tort a constitutional claim; the alleged conduct must rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Bates v. Westervelt · filed 1980-08-26

Not every tort creates a § 1983 claim for remedy. While an assault by a law enforcement officer upon an inmate may be a serious deprivation of that inmate’s rights, it is necessary to determine if there was a need for the use of force, the amount of force used, and the extent of injury.

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of constitutional rights, not for violations of state-law duties of care arising in tort.

Seldon v. Goodman · filed 1980-02-06

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles.

Section 1983 supports an action for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights under color of state law, including discriminatory student voter-registration requirements.

Auerbach v. Kinley · filed 1980-10-09

In any event, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve that issue at this time since, as noted above, the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote in state and federal elections, and action under color of state law which allegedly subjects students to discriminatory registration requirements will support a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not turn a violation of state employment law, by itself, into a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Jackson v. Harold Stinchcomb, Etc. · filed 1981-01-27

But termination of Jackson’s employment in violation of state law does not by itself rise to the level of deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a constitutional deprivation of liberty committed under color of state law.

Martin v. COVINGTON, KY. · filed 1982-06-29

Such violation may be redressed, if proven, by an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make every state-law tort by a state official a federal civil-rights violation; the claim must involve deprivation of a constitutional or federal right.

Holmes v. Wampler · filed 1982-09-07

Clearly not all wrongs for which state officials may be liable under applicable state tort law are also wrongs cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Section 1983 does not automatically convert potential tort liability under state law into tort liability under federal law whenever the alleged tortfeasor is a state official.

Section 1983 does not convert an automobile-collision tort into a constitutional claim merely because a party is a state official or acts under color of state law.

Ellsworth v. Mockler · filed 1983-06-16

At the risk of being accused of engaging in result oriented jurisprudence, this court declines to extend § 1983 to automobile collision cases wherein one of the parties is a state official or acting under color of state law. To do otherwise would, in this court’s opinion, make § 1983 a “font” of federal tort law and lead inexorably down a brambled rabbit trail: twisted, uncomfortable, and ultimately circuitous.

An arrest supported by probable cause does not violate the Constitution for § 1983 purposes merely because it may have exceeded the officers' authority under state law.

McKinney v. George · filed 1984-04-17

If police officers have probable cause to make an arrest, as they did here, it is immaterial to the constitutionality of their conduct that the arrest may have violated state law.

A § 1983 action for deprivation of a federal constitutional right under color of state law is distinct from state common-law tort claims arising from the same conduct.

Massengill v. Scott · filed 1987-10-13

One purpose of that statute is to afford a right of action for damages to one who has been deprived of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by one acting under color of state law. A cause of action thus asserted is quite different from a cause of action based upon state law for damages resulting from such common law torts as false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, assault and battery and outrageous conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a violation of a duty arising under state tort law.

Rembert v. Charles P. Littlehales Patrick Flaherty Vincent Deguc Dennis Wine Merle Wine · filed 1994-04-12

Moreover, even assuming that Wine and Chisman violated a duty arising under state tort law, section 1983 does not impose liability for such a violation.

Section 1983 imposes liability for constitutional rights violations, but not for breaches of tort-law duties of care.

Jordan v. Fournier · filed 2004-07-02

At most, then, Jordan has generated a genuine dispute of fact that the officers were negligent when they arrested him on August 9, 2002. However, as the Supreme Court made clear in Baker: “Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” 448 U.S. at 146-47, 99 S.Ct. 2689.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

De Tore v. Local 245 of Jersey City Public Employees Union · filed 1980-02-28

We have held that liability may not be imposed in § 1983 suits on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant under a respondeat superior theory.

Tore v. Local 245 of the Jersey City Public Employees Union · filed 1980-02-28

We have held that liability may not be imposed in § 1983 suits on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private corporation solely under respondeat superior for an employee's constitutional violation.

Powell v. Shopco Laurel Company and Robert K. Skeen · filed 1982-05-18

We see this holding as equally applicable to the liability of private corporations.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on an entity for the conduct of its employees absent the entity's own participation, policy, or custom.

Granet v. Wallich Lumber · filed 1983-04-26

The Sixth Circuit has held unequivocally that respondeat superior liability is not actionable under section 1983.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor.

Wilkinson v. School Bd. of County of Henrico · filed 1983-06-28

Thus, the defendants cannot be liable merely for employing Bosher, who allegedly suspended plaintiff without affording her due process.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a prison director for misconduct by subordinate officials.

Beard v. A.L. Lockhart Sgt. Robinson Major Reed Employees, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1983-09-13

Beard’s claim against him appears to be based on vicarious liability which is not applicable in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability on a private employer based solely on its employment relationship with the alleged wrongdoer.

Ibarra v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 1983-09-27

In addition to the fact that the interpretation suggested by the plaintiffs is inconsistent with the language of the statute, imposition of liability on a private defendant based solely on the existence of an employer-employee relationship would as a practical matter tend to eliminate the “under color of state law” requirement of § 1983 with respect to this type of defendant.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials liable on a respondeat superior theory, because officials and their subordinates are both merely employees of the government unit rather than the officials being the subordinates' employer.

Woods v. Marks · filed 1984-08-29

In section 1983 suits, respondeat superior is not applicable in its traditional sense because the defendant officials are not employers. Both subordinates and officials are employees of the government unit.

A sheriff cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory for civil-rights violations committed by a deputy.

Miller v. Anderson · filed 1984-10-02

The law is clear that a sheriff cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for civil rights violations committed by his deputy.

A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 solely because it employs the tortfeasor.

Honeywell v. Village of Lakeside · filed 1985-02-15

a municipal corporation cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor; a municipal corporation cannot be vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

A plaintiff may not use pendent state-law respondeat-superior claims to impose vicarious liability on a municipality that Section 1983 itself excludes.

Christensen v. Phelan · filed 1985-04-15

The assertion of a state law claim of vicarious liability in conjunction with a § 1983 claim has the effect of expanding the scope and coverage of federal law beyond that intended by Congress. The Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that a municipality cannot be sued under § 1983 on a claim of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 liability may not be imposed on a respondeat superior theory.

Bishop v. M. C. Hamby, Warden Officer Binkley, Correctional Officer and Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 1985-10-25

The law is clear that liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 will not lie on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior alone.

Wilkerson v. Ernest Pellegrin, Commissioner Howard Cook, Warden Ricky J. Bell, Captain Richbard Wire Donelson, C · filed 1986-08-15

The claim against Pellegrin, Cook, and Bell was premised solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Case law is explicit that a section 1983 action cannot be maintained on this basis alone. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). The district court's holding to this effect is correct.

A governmental board cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of a separate executive committee.

Roy P. Boucvalt, M.D., Cross-Appellant v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital Service District No. 1, Iberia Parish, Cros · filed 1986-08-27

The Executive Committee is not a party to this lawsuit. As Boucvalt concedes, the Board cannot be held vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of the Executive Committee.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious or respondeat-superior liability on public officials for another person's conduct.

Magill v. Appalachia Intermediate Unit 08 · filed 1986-09-24

However, A.J. Peliccioni is not a defendant in this action, and a § 1983 action cannot be based on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat-superior theory; the plaintiff must allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Dorsey v. City of Baltimore, and Richard Phillips, a Baltimore City Police Officer · filed 1987-11-06

Dorsey has made no allegations in the papers he has filed in district court or on appeal suggesting that his constitutional rights were violated due to a municipal policy or custom. Contrary to Dorsey's assertion, a city may not be held liable under Sec. 1983 based on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely because it employs a person who committed a constitutional violation.

Scutieri v. Estate of Revitz · filed 1988-04-12

As such, the court holds that, as a matter of law, a private corporation cannot be liable strictly on the basis of a respondeat superior theory under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely under respondeat superior.

Gravitt v. Johnson · filed 1988-05-05

The district court dismissed the matter as frivolous under Sec. 1915(d) because the plaintiff cited no facts which, if true, entitled him to relief, see Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th Cir.1983), and because the named defendant could not be held liable under Sec. 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat superior. ... On review of the plaintiff's complaint, we conclude the district court properly dismissed this action for the reasons stated in its July 23, 1987 order.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a jail director for subordinates’ alleged misconduct solely under respondeat superior.

Powell v. James L. Kelley, Benjamin Taylor · filed 1988-06-10

Likewise, the evidence adduced at trial clearly establishes that plaintiff's claims against defendant for the denial of medical care and the interference with his mail are grounded upon the theory of respondeat superior. As a result, they may not serve as the basis of the imposition of liability upon defendant.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Soncrant v. Joe Parker, Carroll County Sheriff's Department, and Ronnie Webb, Defendants · filed 1988-07-29

As to the defendant Carroll County Sheriff's Department, the district court properly granted it summary judgment because Sec. 1983 liability cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Donnie Lair v. Dr. Walter Oglesby, Psychiatrist, Maximum Security Unit · filed 1988-10-20

Such a claim is predicated upon a respondeat superior theory which is inapplicable in section 1983 suits.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a county.

Brassfield v. County of Cook · filed 1988-12-28

And the potential respondeat superior liability on County’s part ... does not of course extend to Section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Wall v. Wake County Jail Nathan Rice, Warden John Baker, Sheriff, in Re Harvey C. Wall · filed 1989-01-06

Of course, respondeat superior is no basis for liability under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against cities or sheriff's departments on a respondeat superior theory.

Brownlee v. Abbeville Sheriff Dept. · filed 1989-06-23

Further, the cities of Abbeville and Due West, along with the Abbeville Sheriff's Department, cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory; therefore, they will not be parties on remand.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior alone.

Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah · filed 1989-10-31

The law is well established that an action pursuant to Section 1983 cannot be based upon the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious or respondeat superior liability for another person’s acts.

Dubose v. Oustalet · filed 1990-03-15

Furthermore, her actions cannot be attributed, as a matter of law, to defendants, as there can be no vicarious or respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police board for its officers’ conduct under respondeat superior.

Taylor v. Phelan · filed 1990-08-27

While we recognize that the principle of respondeat superior will not apply to implicate the Board in the Taylors' claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, see Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1531 (10th Cir.1988) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)), the Taylors also bring claims under the Kansas Tort Claims Act, Kan.Stat.Ann. Secs. 75-6101 through 6119, (1989).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff or jailer solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Bevins v. Charles E. "Fuzzy" Keesee, Poyster Keene, Nancy Lindsey, Dave Coleman, "Coon" Stratton, and Fred Carter · filed 1991-04-10

Sheriff Keesee and County Jailer Stratton are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Mr. Bevins' claim against them is based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is well settled that Sec. 1983 will not support such a claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on corporate defendants solely under respondeat superior for their employees’ acts.

Taliaferro v. Voth · filed 1991-10-01

Plaintiff may not base his section 1983 claim against defendant Osco or defendant DeGoler’s on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability against a county or prison medical contractor for its employees’ conduct without a policy or custom attributable to the entity.

Unterberg v. Correctional Medical Systems, Inc. · filed 1992-03-27

Because I conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist and there is no evidence of deliberate indifference, I must agree with defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s claims against Lehigh County and CMS are based on vicarious liability which is unavailable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Taylor v. Babcock · filed 1992-03-30

Because the theory of respondeat superior does not apply to section 1983 actions, Taylor's complaint against the public defender committee was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit county liability based solely on respondeat superior for a sheriff’s deputy’s conduct.

Sanders v. Miller · filed 1992-04-13

The motion to dismiss filed by defendants Jackson County and the Jackson County Commission will be granted because the claim against them is a thinly disguised effort to impose liability on a theory of respondeat superior, an improper basis for liability in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior.

McCrae v. Oldham · filed 1992-09-10

The district court properly awarded summary judgment to Flaherty and the Board on McCrae's claim concerning living conditions at the jail. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (respondeat superior may not be used as a basis for liability in § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a corporate defendant; the plaintiff must allege a practice or policy of the corporation that caused the injury.

Sandlin v. Nurse Brown, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction Jeff Rhinehart, Dr. · filed 1992-10-26

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed PHP Healthcare because Sandlin did not allege a practice or policy of PHP that injured him and because the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Thrower v. Ohio Bar Association Akron Bar Association · filed 1993-01-25

The allegations against the OSBA are based upon a respondeat superior theory, which will not support a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Robinson v. Eng · filed 1993-03-02

Liability under § 1983 cannot be premised solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable merely because it employs the person who committed the alleged violation.

Ronny J. Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, a New York Corporation Daniel J. Geiger · filed 1993-03-23

The fact that Sears employed Geiger does not make Sears liable under § 1983. We therefore affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Sears.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Moy v. County of Cook · filed 1993-03-29

We further hold that the circuit court correctly dismissed the section 1983 count, even if this court were to hold the County liable under a theory of respondeat superior. That must be so because section 1983 liability cannot be predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

Fariello v. Rodriguez · filed 1993-05-08

Even if the claim against Drewry would survive, as stated above, a Section 1983 action cannot be based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

King v. Professional Healthcare Practitioners · filed 1993-06-16

We agree with the district court that King's claim against PHP is founded only on respondeat superior and is not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a sheriff solely for a deputy's misconduct, and a state statute imposing such liability cannot be applied to a Section 1983 claim.

Palmer v. Sanderson · filed 1993-11-23

Consequently, a state statute imposing vicarious liability on a sheriff for the conduct of his or her deputies is "inconsistent with the ... laws of the United States," 42 U.S.C. § 1988, notwithstanding our earlier holding in Hesselgesser. This inconsistency, in turn, precludes the district court from applying Wash.Rev.Code §§ 36.16.070 to this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Wayne Rush Meadows v. Augusta Correctional Center Augusta Security · filed 1993-12-28

Furthermore, we find that the district court was correct in determining that since Meadow had alleged no facts to suggest that Warden Saunders had any knowledge of the alleged constitutional violations, Meadow's claim against him was based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is inapplicable to Sec. 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, so failing to serve a defendant sued solely on that basis is harmless.

Gainer v. Fife Symington Leonard J. Kirschner Jenny Bell · filed 1994-02-11

As the district court found, failure to serve Symington was at most harmless error as Gainer's claims against Symington were based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely for the conduct of its employee under respondeat superior.

John G. Holliday, Jr. v. Elahon Center · filed 1994-06-24

Because liability under section 1983 may not be premised on a theory of respondeat superior, see Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir.1984), the district court's determination was correct.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability for another person’s violation of federal rights.

Obersteller v. Flour Bluff Independent School District · filed 1994-09-30

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against a municipality or officials solely under a respondeat superior theory.

Frey v. City Of Herculaneum · filed 1994-10-12

A civil rights plaintiff cannot pursue a section 1983 action against a municipality or officials under a respondeat superior theory, and Frey's complaint intimates no other basis for liability for many of the defendants.

Section 1983 does not allow liability against a municipality or officials based solely on respondeat superior.

Frey v. City Of Herculaneum · filed 1995-01-09

A civil rights plaintiff cannot pursue a section 1983 action against a municipality or officials under a respondeat superior theory, and the Freys' complaint intimates no other basis for liability for many of the defendants.