42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of a federal spending statute only if its plain language imposes a direct obligation on the state in favor of intended private beneficiaries.

Eric L. by and Through Schierberl v. Bird · filed 1994-03-31

In the meantime, this court necessarily concludes that Wilder has been significantly modified by Suter, such that now a federal spending statute cannot be said to confer a right privately enforceable under § 1983 unless, at a minimum, the “plain language” of the statute imposes a “direct obligation” on the state, in favor of intended private beneficiaries.

Section 1983 permits a private action to enforce rights created by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act when Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court · filed 1994-04-21

Having thus determined that the Act creates a federally secured right and that Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement, we hold that appellant was and is entitled to seek relief through a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statutory right when the provision benefits the plaintiff, imposes a mandatory duty, and is definite enough for judicial enforcement.

Sobky v. Smoley · filed 1994-06-14

First, because they have not been repudiated, Golden State and Wilder still provide the basic framework in deciding whether an enforceable federal right exists under § 1983. Thus, the provision sought to be enforced must be “intended to benefit the putative plaintiff,” must be mandatory rather than hortatory, and must not be so vague as to be “beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.”

Section 1983 permits beneficiaries to enforce the school-placement rights conferred by the McKinney Act’s section 11432(e)(3).

Brenda Lampkin, as Legal Guardian of Jessica Lampkin and Christine Lampkin, Minors v. District of Columbia, a Municipal · filed 1994-07-28

We conclude, from the foregoing, that section 11432(e)(3) of the McKinney Act confers enforceable rights on its beneficiaries and that appellants may invoke section 1983 to enforce those rights.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of federal statutory rights when agency oversight does not provide a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme to foreclose that remedy.

Randy v. Tompkins · filed 1994-08-29

Nothing in Carelli remotely suggests that mere oversight by the Secretary in and of itself constitutes a remedial scheme so comprehensive as to foreclose a private remedy pursuant to § 1983; such a suggestion would not only be implausible, but would also be contrary to the explicit holding of Wilder.

Section 1983 permits rural water service users to enforce rights conferred by 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b) because that provision creates judicially enforceable rights and Congress supplied no comprehensive enforcement mechanism.

Wayne v. Village Of Sebring · filed 1994-09-29

Thus, pursuant to Sec. 1983, Sec. 1926(b) gives rise to a private right of action on the part of rural water service users.

Section 1983 gives rural water service users a private right of action to enforce their rights under 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b).

Wayne v. Village of Sebring · filed 1994-09-29

And Congress provided no enforcement mechanism for protecting the right that § 1926(b) creates. Thus, pursuant to § 1983, § 1926(b) gives rise to a private right of action on the part of rural water service users.

Section 1983 permits noninstitutional Medicaid providers to enforce the reimbursement and equal access obligations of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) against state officials.

Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen · filed 1994-10-12

The legislative history, and the context in which that history was made, supports the conclusion that Congress created obligations directly enforceable on the states, and did so for the benefit of these providers.

Section 1983 permits ANFC and Food Stamp applicants, including those ultimately denied benefits, to enforce their federal right to a timely eligibility decision.

Robidoux v. Kitchel · filed 1995-02-13

In light of these protections afforded to applicants who are subsequently denied benefits, we conclude that these individuals have rights that may be enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights created by FERPA.

Maynard v. Greater Hoyt School District No. 61-4 · filed 1995-02-21

FERPA establishes federal statutory-rights which are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but under the facts of this case the individual defendants are not subject to suit and the undisputed facts indicate that the school board is not hable.

Section 1983 permits native Hawaiian beneficiaries to pursue claims for breach of federal trust duties under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act as incorporated by the Hawaii Admission Act.

Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Commission · filed 1995-03-14

Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that: (1) the Aged Hawaiians have asserted a viable claim under § 1983 alleging a breach of trust duties by the Appellees under the HHCA (via the Admission Act); and (2) the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment dismissing the claim.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal housing statutes through implementing regulations specific enough to create an individual right, absent congressional foreclosure of that remedy.

Simmons v. Charleston Housing Authority · filed 1995-03-22

The Hurt Court determined, and this Court concurs, the implementing regulations of the USHA and the LBPPPA are specific enough to create a § 1983 “right” in the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because that Act’s comprehensive remedial scheme precludes such actions.

Veal v. Memorial Hospital of Washington County · filed 1995-07-31

In the court’s considered judgment, the remedial scheme created by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, communicates the intention of Congress to preclude § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of an unambiguously conferred federal statutory right unless Congress expressly forecloses that remedy or implicitly forecloses it through a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Buckley v. City of Redding · filed 1995-09-13

The nature of the section 1983 remedy remains broad and may be used to remedy infringement of any unambiguously conferred right, privilege, or immunity, so long as Congress has not foreclosed use of the remedy explicitly, or implicitly by imbuing the act in question with its own comprehensive remedial scheme.

Section 1983 permits individuals to enforce a state’s direct obligations to them under Title IV-D even when the state substantially complies with the program’s audit requirements.

Davis v. McClaran · filed 1995-10-30

To summarize, we hold that a plaintiff may bring an action pursuant to § 1983 to enforce the state’s “direct obligations” to him or her under Title IV-D; and that this right is not dependent upon whether the State is in “substantial compliance” with the requirements of Title IV-D for purposes of the Secretary’s audit.

Section 1983 does not allow enforcement of the Older Americans Act’s intrastate funding-formula requirements because those requirements are too amorphous to create enforceable rights.

The City Of Chicago v. Lindley · filed 1995-11-22

Accordingly, we hold that the City does not have a right, enforceable under Sec. 1983, to challenge the particular factors that are included in or excluded from Lindley's funding formula. The OAA's requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C) are too amorphous to create rights enforceable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of the right to recreational boating access conferred by the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act.

Buckley v. City of Redding · filed 1995-11-30

Because the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act confers a right enforceable through section 1983, the district court erred in dismissing Buckley's and PWIA's suit for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 permits suit to enforce rights under the National Voter Registration Act without complying with that Act’s notice requirement.

Ass'n of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Miller · filed 1995-12-13

For these reasons, I conclude that the above plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under § 1983. Because notice is not required by this statute, the above plaintiffs’ failure to provide notice is wholly irrelevant.

Section 1983 does not permit enforcement of CAPTA’s child abuse investigation and protection requirement because it leaves the state discretion over how to investigate and protect children.

Tony'' v. Childers, II · filed 1995-12-20

Despite this quandary, we hold that Plaintiffs have no enforceable rights under this provision of CAPTA. The statute and regulations at issue are more like those in Suter (no guidelines) than those in Wilder (mandatory guidelines). Ultimately, neither CAPTA nor the relevant regulations mandate a particular means of investigation or state what type of actions must be taken to protect abused or neglected children.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a federal statutory violation unless the statute creates an enforceable right intended to benefit the plaintiff.

Lochman v. County Of Charlevoix · filed 1996-09-03

There is no § 1983 remedy for violation of a federal statute unless the statute creates "rights, privileges, or immunities"; the violation of every federal statute does not lead to the conclusion that § 1983 provides a remedy.

Section 1983 allows health care providers to enforce a statutory right to reasonable Medicaid reimbursement even when state administrative review is available.

Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer · filed 1996-12-09

4. Section 1983 protects the statutory right to reasonable reimbursement through the Medicaid program to providers of health care services, despite the availability of state administrative review procedures.

Section 1983 allows public housing tenants to enforce their federal right to an enforceable grievance procedure under the Housing Act.

Farley v. Phila Housing Auth · filed 1996-12-17

We also hold that Farley can bring a § 1983 action to enforce her federal right to implement the grievance procedure provided for in the Housing Act.

Section 1983 permits a claim for violations of the Pittman-Robertson Act because that Act creates an enforceable federal right and Congress did not foreclose this remedy.

Sportsmen's Wildlife Defense Fund v. United States Department of the Interior · filed 1996-12-26

I conclude that the PR Act creates a “federal right” that is enforceable under § 1983. ... Thus, I conclude Congress did not foreclose an action under § 1983 for violations of the P-R Act.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a rural water association to enforce rights conferred by 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b) against an encroaching municipality.

Rural Water System 1 v. City of Sioux Center · filed 1997-05-27

Second, this court holds that one means to enforce the rights created by § 1926(b) is a cause of action pursuant to, but not for “violation” of, § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a medical provider to enforce the Medicaid equal access provision when that provision creates an enforceable right for the provider and Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Moody Emergency Medical Service, Inc. v. City of Millbrook · filed 1997-06-12

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that Section 1396a(a)(30)(A) creates a private enforceable right and that Moody Emergency Medical Service as a medical provider is an intended beneficiary of that right. Therefore, Moody may pursue a claim under Section 1983 to enforce the requirement that the state plan provide reimbursement methods and procedures which ensure the participation of enough health care providers so that Medicaid recipients have access to services and care at least to the extent as the same is available to the insured population in the same geographic area.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of ADA or Rehabilitation Act rights when those statutes provide sufficiently comprehensive remedies.

Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners · filed 1997-07-03

However, it is equally clear that Congress would not have intended that plaintiffs seek redress for violations of their ADA and Rehabilitation Act rights through the vehicle of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because that Act creates substantive rights and does not foreclose § 1983 enforcement.

Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton · filed 1997-10-06

The TCA does not implicitly or explicitly foreclose § 1983 suits. More particularly, the TCA does not provide a comprehensive enforcement scheme intended to supplant a § 1983 remedy.

Section 1983 is available to enforce individual rights under Part H of the IDEA because the IDEA does not foreclose that remedy.

Marie O. v. Edgar · filed 1997-12-02

Consequently, we hold that not only did Congress not intend to foreclose resort to § 1983 in Part H, but it actually provided for its availability to enforce the IDEA.

Section 1983 allows enforcement of federal statutory rights unless the statute creates no enforceable right or Congress expressly forecloses private enforcement.

Coalition for Homeless v. Dshs · filed 1997-12-24

Section 1983 is to be broadly construed to provide coverage unless (1) the federal statute involved does not create enforceable rights, privileges or immunities, or (2) Congress has expressly foreclosed private enforcement within the terms of the statute itself.

Section 1983 lets food retailers enforce the Food Stamp Act’s prohibition on imposing the costs of a computerized food stamp system on participating retailers.

Pennsylvania Food Merchants Ass'n v. Houstoun · filed 1998-01-21

With these principles in mind, it is obvious that the plaintiffs can enforce, section 2016(g)(2) by way of section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a wireless service provider to enforce rights under § 332(c)(7) of the Telecommunications Act against a local zoning board acting under color of state law.

SMART SMR OF NY v. Zoning Com'n of Town of Stratford · filed 1998-02-17

... we find that a section 1983 elaim-is available to Nextel. As a local zoning board, the Commission acted under the color of state law. ... Also, by violating section 332(c)(7) of the Act, we find that the Commission deprived Nextel of its federally guaranteed rights.

Section 1983 permits claims for consequential damages arising from FMLA violations because the FMLA does not foreclose that remedy.

Knussman v. State of Md. · filed 1998-08-13

The Court therefore concludes that Congress did not intend to foreclose FMLA enforcement by actions under § 1983, and plaintiff may assert his claims for consequential damages resulting from violations of the FMLA under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for an enforceable federal statutory right unless Congress expressly or implicitly forecloses that remedy.

National Warranty Insurance v. Greenfield · filed 1998-08-17

Thus, NWIC may bring its claim under § 1983 unless such an action is expressly or implicitly foreclosed by Congress. Nothing in the LRRA suggests that Congress expressly intended to foreclose the § 1983 remedy. Nor has Congress impliedly foreclosed this remedy by providing a comprehensive remedial scheme within the LRRA itself.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act because the Act does not provide an exclusive means of enforcing those rights.

Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska · filed 1998-09-17

The villages’ claims based on violations of the ICWA, which provided the basis for the district court’s declaratory judgment, are within the scope of § 1983 and support an award of fees under § 1988.

Section 1983 can enforce federal statutory rights unless the statute’s remedial scheme shows congressional intent to preclude that remedy.

Members of the Bridgeport Housing Authority Police v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1983-05-31

Further, the Model Cities Act clearly lacks a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme that would evidence a congressional intent to preclude a § 1983 suit as a remedy for its violation.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of rights under §§ 251 and 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because that Act does not foreclose the remedy.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Southern New England Telephone Co. · filed 1998-09-29

The court further finds that Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement of §§ 251 and 252, either expressly in the 1996 Act itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with private enforcement under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims to enforce the federal rights identified in the Food Stamp Act and Medicaid Act provisions at issue.

Reynolds v. Giuliani · filed 1999-01-25

In light of the Court’s ruling that plaintiffs have stated claims under § 1983, the Court need not resolve the analytically distinct issue of whether the statutes and regulations on which plaintiffs rely can support private rights of action independent of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action to enforce a federal civil rights statute even if that statute provides no express or implied private right of action.

Altman v. Bedford Central School District · filed 1999-05-21

Notwithstanding this conclusion, however, a private right of action exists by reason of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of a federal civil rights statute even where the statute does not provide an express or implied private right of action.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle to enforce rights under the Nursing Home Reform Amendments when the complaint sufficiently alleges them.

Rolland v. Cellucci · filed 1999-06-04

In particular, the court finds section 1983 to be an appropriate vehicle to vindicate NHRA-based rights and Plaintiffs have made a sufficient claim for relief thereunder.

Section 1983 permits an advocacy system to enforce its federal statutory right to access records against state officials when Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Advocacy Center v. Stalder · filed 1999-07-30

Therefore this court concludes that the Advocacy Center is not precluded from bringing a § 1983 action against the defendants.

Section 1983 permits intended beneficiaries to enforce a binding federal statutory right when the right is sufficiently concrete for judicial enforcement.

National Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n v. Face · filed 1999-09-10

The plaintiff has a federally enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This test is satisfied here because (1) nonfederally chartered housing creditors belonging to NHEMA are intended beneficiaries of the Parity Act, (2) the Parity Act creates a present right to be free of state law, and (3) the judicial remedies being sought are traditional and well established.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against state officials for alleged violations of § 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act.

Dittman v. State of California State and Consumer Affairs Agency Medical Board of California Acupuncture Com · filed 1999-09-14

In summary, we conclude that a private plaintiff may not maintain an action against a state official — either in her official or her individual capacity — under § 1983 to remedy alleged violations of § 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act.

Section 1983 permits food stamp recipients to enforce their individual fair hearing rights under the Food Stamp Act.

Meachem v. Wing · filed 1999-12-09

Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs may assert claims pursuant to § 1983 based on defendants’ alleged violations of the sections of the Food Stamp Act that guarantee them fair hearings in accordance with the standards provided for by federal law.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a federal statute only when the plaintiff asserts a federal right, rather than merely a violation of federal law.

Charlie H. v. Whitman · filed 2000-01-27

However, in order to seek redress under Section 1983, Plaintiffs “must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to enforce a federal statute to allege the violation of an individually enforceable right; the cited Title IV-D service provisions do not confer such a right.

Davis v. Eubanks and DHS · filed 2000-03-31

In conclusion, we hold that the Plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief against the Director of Child Support Services under 1983 because the complaint fails to successfully allege the violation of an individually enforceable right under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, also known as the Child Support Enforcement Act.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for rights conferred by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because that Act does not exclude § 1983 actions.

AT&T Wireless PCS Inc. v. City of Atlanta · filed 2000-04-26

Because Congress did not expressly exclude § 1983 remedies from the TCA plaintiffs arsenal, § 1983 actions are not so excluded.

Section 1983 allows eligible individuals to enforce the Medicaid Act’s reasonable promptness requirement.

Boulet v. Cellucci · filed 2000-07-19

In short, I find plaintiffs meet the requirements necessary to show that § 1396a(a)(8) establishes a federal right which the plaintiffs may enforce with a § 1983 lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce the cited foster care plan provisions of the Adoption Assistance Act because their language is too imprecise for judicial enforcement.

Daniel H. Ex Rel. Hardaway H. v. City of New York · filed 2000-09-27

Accordingly, the Court holds that plaintiffs do not have an implied private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Act.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to enforce a federal statute to assert a violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.

Brian A. Ex Rel. Brooks v. Sundquist · filed 2000-10-26

In order to seek redress through Section 1983, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.

Section 1983 does not let an incumbent local exchange carrier enforce Telecommunications Act negotiation and bundling provisions that were not intended to benefit incumbent carriers.

Verizon North, Inc. v. Strand · filed 2000-12-06

No evidence has been presented that the FTA’s provisions regarding negotiation and bundling were designed to benefit the Plaintiff or incumbent LECs generally. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients, but not health care providers, to sue to enforce the equal access right in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood · filed 2000-12-11

However, we conclude that because section 30(A) did not confer upon providers an "individual entitlement" to a particular level of payment, the district court erred as a matter of law in holding that they are intended beneficiaries of the section. Furthermore, we find that section 30(A) is sufficiently definite for the judiciary to enforce and that Congress intended to impose a binding obligation on states when it enacted the section. As such, the recipient plaintiffs may maintain a suit under § 1983 to redress violations of the federal rights conferred upon them by section 30(A).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b) because Congress did not foreclose that remedy.

Rural Water District No. 1 v. City of Wilson · filed 2001-03-22

With these principles in mind, we conclude that Congress has not foreclosed a § 1983 remedy for violations of § 1926(b).

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for a city’s violation of the federal right created by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c).

Anna S. Petrey, D/B/A Magnum Towing v. City of Toledo · filed 2001-04-02

Because Petrey’s federal right under § 14501(c) not to be regulated was violated, and because § 1983 relief was available for the violation of that right, we remand this case to the district court for a determination of the amount of damages, if any, that Petrey has incurred due to the violation of her federal right, as well as whether Petrey is entitled to attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce the Medicaid Act’s equal access and quality of care requirements as federal rights.

Antrican v. Buell · filed 2001-04-17

Additionally, equal access and quality of care are sufficiently specific and detailed to create an enforceable right under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a private action to enforce the temporary appraiser licensing right created by 12 U.S.C. § 3351(a).

Groten v. California · filed 2001-06-01

We conclude that Groten may maintain a cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, the district court erred when it dismissed Groten’s § 1983 claim for a violation of § 3351(a).

Section 1983 permits claims to enforce ADA and Rehabilitation Act § 504 rights when Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Frederick L. v. Department of Public Welfare · filed 2001-07-23

Because the Defendants have not fulfilled their burden of establishing that Congress intended to foreclose relief through section 1983, I cannot make such a finding. Moreover, as the legislative history reveals, it seems that Congress in fact intended to permit redress of ADA and section 504 violations through section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for violations of federal rights under the TCA.

Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of White Plains · filed 2001-12-04

I conclude, however, that § 1983 affords plaintiff relief, in the form of damages, for any violations of the TCA committed by defendants.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a statute or regulation that creates no federal right for the plaintiff.

Lechuga v. Crosley · filed 2002-01-10

Plaintiffs have no federal right upon which to base their Section 1983 claim and this action should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow Medicaid providers to enforce the Medicaid Act’s Section 30(A) because that provision was not intended to benefit them.

Pennsylvania Pharmacists Association v. Houstoun. · filed 2002-03-13

In sum, we are convinced that Section 30(A) is not intended to benefit providers and that therefore providers may not assert a Section 30(A) claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 presumptively permits enforcement of a federal statutory right unless Congress forecloses that remedy.

Cox Communications PCS, L.P. v. City of San Marcos · filed 2002-04-18

When a statute creates a federal right, a “rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983” exists. ... The court dismisses § 1983 claim as it relates to Sprint’s constitutional claim, but denies defendants’ motion to dismiss as it relates to Sprint’s federal rights claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to sue a state official in her individual capacity to enforce rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Vinson v. Thomas · filed 2002-05-03

We therefore join the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 permits an action to enforce section 5(f) of the Admissions Act.

Arakaki v. Cayetano · filed 2002-05-08

Any action to enforce section 5(f) of the Admissions Act may instead be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Rehabilitation Act rights because the Act provides a comprehensive enforcement mechanism.

Shepard v. Irving · filed 2002-06-05

A person cannot enforce the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to Section 1983 because the Act provides a specific comprehensive internal enforcement mechanism structured to protect the rights of disabled individuals.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state officials to enforce rights protected by 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a).

Higgins v. Beyer · filed 2002-06-12

We are persuaded that S 5301(a) provides a federal right that is enforceable under S 1983.

Section 1983 permits a veteran to enforce against state officials the right to benefits protected by 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a).

Higgins v. Beyer · filed 2002-06-12

We are persuaded that § 5301(a) provides a federal right that is enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits tenants to enforce QHWRA’s duty to affirmatively further fair housing because that duty benefits them, is judicially manageable, and binds the states.

Reese v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2002-07-02

Plaintiffs attempt to enforce their QHWRA claim through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... First, any provision requiring governmental agencies to “affirmatively further fair housing” is clearly intended to benefit, among others, individuals such as the Plaintiffs in this case. Second, Plaintiffs’ right to have governmental agencies affirmatively further fair housing does not appear to be so “vague and amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. ... Finally, as the previously cited cases suggest, the Court finds that the duty to “affirmatively” further fair housing imposes a binding obligation upon the States. Accordingly, the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss count X should be denied.

Section 1983 does not allow individuals to enforce statewide Medicaid participation or performance standards that create no individual federal right.

Frazar v. Hawkins · filed 2002-07-24

Moreover, we believe that plaintiffs cannot sue under § 1983 to require a plan to meet statewide or systemwide participation or performance measures, because, under Blessing, state compliance with such standards is not an individualized right actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give Medicaid recipients a private action to divert tobacco settlement funds that Congress left states free to allocate.

Barton v. Paul G. Summers, Harshell C. Downs, Jr. Kathleen D. Downs v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2002-08-09

This is a clear-cut Congressional statement that forecloses the existence of an implied private right of action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to divert the tobacco settlement money.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for a violation of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) because that provision does not confer individual rights on motor carriers.

Henry's Wrecker Service Co. v. Prince George's County · filed 2002-08-16

Accordingly, as the text and structure of § 14501(c)(1) do not demonstrate a congressional intent to confer individual rights to motor carriers, Defendant’s alleged violations of that statute do not give rise to a cause of action for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of Medicaid’s comparability-of-services provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B).

Martin v. Taft · filed 2002-09-19

The Court concludes that the comparability of services provision is enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a private action to enforce the federal housing statute’s 75% Rule.

Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority · filed 2002-11-27

A straightforward application of Blessing to this provision recognizes that a private action under § 1983 to enforce the 75% Rule is appropriate.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce a statute that does not confer an individual federal right.

Lines v. Wargo · filed 2003-01-10

Because we discern no intent by Congress to confer a new individual right on parolees like Plaintiff, § 1983 does not supply a viable cause of action for claims premised upon a violation of the Parole Compact.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only if the statute creates an enforceable right and Congress has not foreclosed its enforcement through § 1983.

Sabree Ex Rel. Sabree v. Houston · filed 2003-01-17

It follows, therefore, that as prerequisite to proceeding under § 1983 for an alleged violation of a federal statute (1) the statute creates “enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983” and (2) that Congress has not specifically foreclosed plaintiffs ability to use § 1983 as a vehicle for enforcement of the statute within the enactment itself.

Section 1983 permits claims to enforce federal statutory rights unless the statute creates no enforceable right or Congress forecloses that enforcement.

Rolland v. Romney · filed 2003-01-28

A section 1983 claim would not be permitted where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities or where "Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself."

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Nextel Partners, Inc. v. Town of Amherst, NY · filed 2003-03-04

The Court concurs with the reasoning in the cases holding that a plaintiff has a remedy under Section 1983 for violations of the TCA.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when it unambiguously confers an individual right; the Adoption Act’s definitional provisions in § 675(5)(D) and (E) alone confer no such right.

Foster Children v. Jeb Bush, Kathleen Kearney, Chuck Bates, Robert Williams, Ester Tibbs · filed 2003-05-08

Because §§ 675(5)(D) and (E) are definitional in nature, they alone cannot and do not supply a basis for conferring rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit individuals to enforce the NCLBA’s notice, transfer, or supplemental educational services provisions because those provisions create no individual rights.

Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2003-06-20

Consequently; the plaintiffs in this case cannot maintain an action under § 1983 to enforce provisions of the NCLBA.

Section 1983 cannot vindicate a Rehabilitation Act claim against an official in an individual capacity when that Act provides no enforceable right against the individual.

Purvis v. Williams · filed 2003-07-25

Since we agree with the district court that an individual, in their individual capacity, is not a “program or activity” as that term is construed in our previous discussion, then Purvis had no enforceable right under the Rehabilitation Act to vindicate under a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits private suits to enforce rights conferred by section 7 of the Privacy Act and section 1971 of the Voting Rights Act.

Schwier v. Cox · filed 2003-08-11

Thus, the presumption that the rights conferred by section 7 of the Privacy Act may be vindicated via a suit under § 1983 stands, and we hold that the rights conferred by section 7 may be enforced under § 1983. ... Thus, we hold that the provisions of section 1971 of the Voting Rights Act may be enforced by a private right of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits foster children to enforce individual rights conferred by the Adoption Act and Medicaid’s EPSDT provisions.

Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue · filed 2003-08-18

The Court concludes that the statutes do create rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to enforce the Fair Housing Act’s duty to affirmatively further fair housing under 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5).

Wallace v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 2003-12-23

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs may sue under § 1983 to combat a violation of § 3608(e)(5) of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for rights created by 47 U.S.C. § 253 because the Telecommunications Act does not foreclose that remedy.

Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego · filed 2004-01-05

Based on all the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that defendants have failed to rebut the presumption that a right of action under § 1983 remains. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiffs may maintain a right of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an intended beneficiary to enforce a federal statute only if the statute unambiguously confers an individual right on that person.

Sanchez Ex Rel. Hoebel v. Johnson · filed 2004-01-05

Under Gonzaga, a plaintiff may bring suit under § 1983 as an intended beneficiary of a statute only if the statute unambiguously demonstrates congressional intent to confer an individual or personal right on that plaintiff.

Section 1983 cannot remedy a federal statutory violation unless the statute creates a right enforceable under § 1983.

Keup v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Family Services · filed 2004-03-04

First, § 1983 may not be used to remedy a statutory violation, if the statute in question does not create an enforceable right under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce the rights conferred by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), (10), and (17).

Mendez v. Brown · filed 2004-03-26

Accordingly, the court concludes that section 1983 provides Plaintiffs with a cause of action to pursue all three of the statutory claims they allege in Count I.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action to enforce federal statutory rights when state action is involved.

Larry P. v. Riles · filed 1979-10-16

While plaintiffs did not argue this theory, it appears also that a private right of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the . federal statutory rights, since state action is involved.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action when conduct under color of state law denies a person a right secured by a federal statute.

27 Fair empl.prac.cas. 33, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,767 · filed 1981-04-20

Whether or not the appellees' right to bring their claim for relief can be inferred directly from the Act, the Supreme Court has ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private right of action for any claim that action has been taken under color of state law to deny a plaintiff a right secured by a federal statute.

Section 1983 provides a private action for the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by a federal statute.

Members of the Bridgeport Housing Authority Police Force v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1981-04-20

Whether or not the appellees’ right to bring their claim for relief can be inferred directly from the Act, the Supreme Court has ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private right of action for any claim that action has been taken under color of state law to deny a plaintiff a right secured by a federal statute.

Section 1983 presumptively allows individuals to enforce unambiguously conferred statutory rights unless Congress expressly bars individual suits or provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that precludes them.

Sabree Ex Rel. Sabree v. Richman · filed 2004-05-11

Even where a right has been unambiguously conferred, a state may rebut the presumption of the availability of § 1983 by demonstrating that Congress, either expressly or by providing a comprehensive remedial scheme, intended to preclude individual suits.

Section 1983 permits eligible Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce their individual rights to medical assistance and reasonable promptness under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10), and 1396d(a)(15).

Sabree, Sabree v. Richman · filed 2004-05-11

This analysis, which, as will become clear, is assuredly not for the timid, compels the conclusion that the provisions invoked by plaintiffs-42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10), and 1396d(a)(15)-unambiguously confer rights vindicable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws.

Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke · filed 2004-06-01

Moreover, that advantage is a “right” within the meaning of § 1983. ... In light of these considerations, the court concludes that Congress intended to create a federal right vis á vis national banks. Nor is this right “so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.” ... Finally, section 484 is “couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.” ... This satisfies the third prong of the Blessing test.

Section 1983 makes a claim for violation of the Medicaid statute enforceable in court.

Morenz v. Wilson-Coker · filed 2004-06-10

Because this claim for violation of the Medicaid statute is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Morenzes, as a prevailing party, are entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to enforce federal statutory rights under the Social Security Act against state defendants.

Koster v. Webb · filed 1983-11-09

It is also clear that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be used by plaintiffs to enforce their purported right to emergency shelter under the Social Security Act.

Section 1983 permits public housing tenants to enforce rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1437a.

Nelson v. Greater Gadsden Housing Authority · filed 1985-03-12

Therefore, the statutory claims of the plaintiff class under 42 U.S.C. § 1437a are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutes only when private enforcement is not foreclosed and the statute creates enforceable rights.

Wright v. City Of Roanoke Redevelopment And Housing Authority · filed 1985-08-26

Not all violations of federal law, however, give rise to Sec. 1983 actions. In order to determine whether a violation of a particular federal statute constitutes a basis for Sec. 1983 liability, a court must make two inquiries: 1) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of the pertinent statute in the enactment itself, and 2) whether the statute at issue was the kind that created enforceable "rights" under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights created by mandatory federal funding conditions, including rights under the Older Americans Act.

Meek v. Martinez · filed 1989-02-21

A federal statute that requires a state to comply with certain conditions in order to qualify for federal funding creates enforceable rights under section 1983 for individuals who are deprived of the benefit of those conditions. ... Under this principle, the OAA plainly provides Plaintiffs here with "rights" that can be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a state refuses to grant benefits provided by federal law, including rights under the IDEA’s stay-put provision.

J.D. v. Manatee County School Board · filed 2004-10-08

Section 1983 is available as a remedy when a state refuses to grant benefits provided by federal law, including the right to enforce 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

Section 1983 permits enforcement of HAVA’s individual provisional voting rights because Ohio’s administrative review process does not preclude that remedy.

Sandusky County v. Blackwell · filed 2004-10-14

In view of the stringent standard which the defendant must meet to avoid being held accountable under § 1983, I cannot find Ohio’s process of administrative review to be a comprehensive enforcement scheme sufficiently strong and effective to preclude relief under § 1983. The defendant, accordingly, has failed to meet his burden of showing that the rights given to individual voters to vote provisionally in HAVA cannot be enforced in this § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of individual rights created by HAVA because HAVA’s enforcement procedures do not foreclose private suits.

Bay County Democratic Party v. Land · filed 2004-10-19

After reviewing the parties’ submissions and considering the evidence, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims, HAVA creates individual rights enforceable through Section 1983, Congress has provided a scheme under HAVA in which a voter’s right to have a provisional ballot for federal offices tabulated is determined by State law governing eligibility, and the defendants’ directives for determining eligibility on the basis of precinct-based residency are inconsistent with State and federal election law.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of HAVA’s provisional-voting right against state officials.

Florida Democratic Party v. Hood · filed 2004-10-21

In sum, under Schwier and the line of cases it interpreted, this statute clearly creates a federal right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for an individual’s right under HAVA to cast a provisional ballot upon making the required affirmation.

Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell · filed 2004-10-26

HAVA does not itself create a private right of action. Appellees contend that HAVA creates a federal right enforceable against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to the right to cast a provisional ballot under the circumstances described in HAVA § 302(a), we agree.

Section 1983 permits individuals to enforce HAVA’s right to cast a provisional ballot because HAVA does not foreclose that remedy.

Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell · filed 2004-10-26

Individual enforcement of this right under § 1983 is not precluded by either the explicit language of HAVA, or by a comprehensive enforcement scheme incompatible with individual enforcement.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle to enforce rights under the Communications Act when the Act lacks a comprehensive enforcement scheme, but it does not automatically make attorney’s fees available.

Time Warner Cable-Rochester v. City of Rochester · filed 2004-11-03

Since the Act itself lacks a comprehensive enforcement scheme, § 1983 provided a vehicle for Time-Warner to enforce its rights under the Act, but I see no basis to conclude that Congress envisioned a successful plaintiff in a case like this one recovering attorney’s fees as well.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce individual relocation assistance rights under Section 104(k) of the Housing and Community Development Act.

Price v. City Of Stockton · filed 2004-12-06

Because the City has not met its burden of proving that either Section 104(d) or Section 104(k) provides a comprehensive remedial scheme inconsistent with Section 1983 enforcement, we conclude that Plaintiffs have a cause of action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 allows federally qualified health centers to sue to enforce their federal right to Medicaid wraparound payments.

Rio Grande Community Health Center, Inc. v. Rullan · filed 2005-02-14

Not so; a § 1983 action does lie for an FQHC to enforce the Secretary's obligation to make wraparound payments under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb).

Section 1983 permits a person to enforce a federal statute only if it unambiguously confers an individual right on that person; Medicaid providers have no enforceable right under § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

OKLAHOMA CHAP. OF AMER. ACA., PEDIAT. v. Fogarty · filed 2005-03-22

Since the Court's opinion, the Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff may bring suit under § 1983 as an intended beneficiary of a statute only if the statute itself unambiguously demonstrates congressional intent to confer an individual or personal right on that plaintiff. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that OKAAP, as it represents Medicaid providers, does not have enforceable rights under § 1396a(a)(30)(A), and should be dismissed from this lawsuit.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

Chavez v. County of San Diego · filed 2005-04-07

First, insofar as Chavez seeks to enforce her rights under the ADA and RA through a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, she is clearly precluded from doing so under this court’s ruling in Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d at 1155.

Section 1983 cannot be used by Medicaid recipients or providers to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) because that provision creates no individually enforceable right.

Sanchez Ex Rel. Hoebel v. Johnson · filed 2005-08-02

Congress did not unambiguously create an individually enforceable right in § 30(A) that would be remediable under § 1983 either by recipients or providers of Medicaid services.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against individual defendants for violations of USERRA because USERRA has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Morris-Hayes v. Board Of Education · filed 2005-09-12

Instead, we hold that USERRA is not a statute for which redress is available against the Individual Defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against individual defendants for violations of USERRA because USERRA has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Morris-Hayes v. Board of Education of the Chester Union Free School District · filed 2005-09-12

Instead, we hold that USERRA is not a statute for which redress is available against the Individual Defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits adoptive parents to enforce federal rights to individualized adoption assistance payment determinations and a fair agency hearing.

ASW v. Oregon · filed 2005-09-13

Because we conclude 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(12) and 673(a)(3) create federal rights enforceable through a § 1983 cause of action, we reverse.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce § 253 of the Federal Telecommunications Act.

Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of New York · filed 2005-09-15

Although Qwest has stated a claim that the City’s regulations violate section 253 of the FTA, it is a separate question as to whether Qwest has stated a claim under section 1983 for the FTA violation; the Court concludes it has stated a viable 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action to enforce the Telecommunications Act when the plaintiff has not shown that the Act confers a federal right on it.

Level 3 Communications v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MO · filed 2005-12-19

This Court concludes Level 3 has not met its burden to demonstrate that the Act confers a federal right on it, see Arkansas Med. Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 523, and therefore holds that no cause of action under § 1983 is available.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce rights conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(e), but the cited notice regulation does not confer an enforceable right.

Beeker v. Olszewski · filed 2006-02-13

In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(e) confers rights upon the plaintiffs that are enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, 42 C.F.R. § 435.905 does not confer such a right.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to enforce a federal statutory provision only if the provision satisfies the Blessing requirements for an individual right.

Arrington v. Fuller · filed 2006-02-13

In summary, when a plaintiff claims a statutory provision creates individual rights enforceable under § 1983, she must establish all three requirements set forth in Blessing.

Section 1983 allows voucher program participants to enforce their federal rights concerning utility allowances under § 1437f(o)(2).

Johnson v. Housing Authority of Jefferson Parish · filed 2006-03-06

We hold that in adopting § 1437f(o)(2), Congress intended to grant to voucher program participants like these Plaintiffs-Appellants, federal rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce the Medicaid Act’s freedom-of-choice provision.

Harris v. Olszewski · filed 2006-03-21

Gauged by this test, Medicaid’s freedom-of-choice provision creates enforceable rights that a Medicaid beneficiary may vindicate through § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes a cause of action to enforce a state’s violation of federal law, including LIHEAA.

Goodwin v. Perales · filed 1994-04-15

The complaint in this action asserts a violation of 42 USC § 1983, which authorizes the maintenance of a cause of action seeking to vindicate a State’s violation of Federal law.

Section 1983 allows CHMS recipients and providers to enforce rights conferred by the Medicaid provisions at issue.

Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Department Of Human Services · filed 2006-04-17

Moreover, even accepting ADHS's invitation to reconsider prior established precedent, we find no error in the district court's holding that these provisions of the Medicaid Act are enforceable by both CHMS recipients and providers through a § 1983 private cause of action.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when it confers an individual right; Medicaid § 1396a(a)(30) confers no such right on recipients or providers.

Westside Mothers v. Olszewski · filed 2006-07-17

After examining the text and structure of § 1396a(a)(30), we agree with the First and Ninth Circuits that § 1396a(a)(30) fails the first prong of the Blessing test and does not therefore provide Medicaid recipients or providers with a right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when Congress clearly and unambiguously intended to create individual rights; the Hawaii Admission Act creates no such rights.

Day v. Apoliona · filed 2006-08-10

Because Gonzaga University clarifies that claims for statutory violations may be brought under § 1983 only if the text or legislative history of the statute shows clear and unambiguous congressional intent to create individual rights, and because the Ninth Circuit has already concluded that neither the text nor the history of the Admission Act indicates such congressional intent, Plaintiffs may not enforce the public trust duties in the Admission Act under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits foster care providers to enforce their individual right to reimbursement of the specific costs listed in the Child Welfare Act.

California Alliance of Child & Family Services v. Allenby · filed 2006-10-27

First, plaintiff must demonstrate that Congress “unambiguously conferred [a] right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983.” ... Accordingly, the court concludes that CWA confers an individual right on plaintiffs members for enforcement of the foster care maintenance payments pursuant to section 675(4)(A).

Section 1983 can provide damages for a violation of the federal right created by 11 U.S.C. § 525(a).

Potter v. City of Hanceville (In Re Potter) · filed 2006-11-06

Given the legal requirements of both Section 525(a) and Section 1983, the court cannot find that Potter is barred from bringing a Section 1983 claim based on a 525(a) violation.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under § 604a because § 604a(i) provides an exclusive state-court remedy.

Teen Ranch, Inc., Matthew Koch, and Mitchell Koster v. Marianne Udow, Musette Michael, and Debora Buchanan · filed 2007-01-17

Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 604a does not provide a textual indication, express or implicit, that the remedy provided for in state court is complementary to the remedies available under § 1983. Teen Ranch has failed to provide, as it must, any evidence indicating that § 604a(i) was not intended to foreclose or supplant the available remedies under § 1983. Accordingly, Teen Ranch’s rights under 42 U.S.C. § 604a may be enforced only in state court; thus, a cause of action under this federal statute is not cognizable in federal court.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under § 604a because § 604a(i) provides an exclusive state-court remedy.

Teen Ranch v. Udow · filed 2007-02-14

Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 604a does not provide a textual indication, express or implicit, that the remedy provided for in state court is complementary to the remedies available under § 1983. Teen Ranch has failed to provide, as it must, any evidence indicating that § 604a(i) was not intended to foreclose or supplant the available remedies under § 1983. Accordingly, Teen Ranch’s rights under 42 U.S.C. § 604a may be enforced only in state court; thus, a cause of action under this federal statute is not cognizable in federal court.

Section 1983 requires an individual federal right, not merely a benefit under federal law; the Title IV-D provisions at issue confer no such right.

Cuvillier v. Taylor · filed 2007-10-05

Cuvillier may in some sense be a beneficiary of the Title IV-D provisions that she cites, but Congress did not intend by those provisions to give her an individual right enforceable through a section 1983 suit.

Section 1983 provides no private action to enforce the Interstate Compact because its terms confer no individual right on probationers or parolees.

Doe v. PA Bd Probation · filed 2008-01-23

We hold that Doe does not have a private right of action under Section 1983 to enforce the provisions of the Interstate Compact because one cannot be inferred from its terms.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights created by the Indian trader statutes.

Central Machinery Co. v. State · filed 1985-06-27

We conclude that the Indian trader statutes therefore establish enforceable rights and thus fit within the phrase “and laws” contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to enforce a federal statute only if Congress intended the provision to confer a right on that plaintiff.

AlohaCare v. Hawaii, Department of Human Services · filed 2008-07-02

The foregoing decisions make clear that, in determining whether AlohaCare may enforce alleged violations of the Medicaid Act under § 1983, this' court must first determine whether Congress intended to confer rights upon AlohaCare under the statutory provisions that AlohaCare alleges Defendants violated.

Section 1983 permits a disabled person under 65 to enforce the right to have Medicaid contributions calculated correctly under § 1396p(d)(4)(A).

Sai Kwan Wong Ex Rel. Wong v. Daines · filed 2008-09-29

A plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal statute will be permitted to sue under § 1983 if (1) Congress intended the provision in question to benefit plaintiff, (2) the right is not too vague and amorphous to be enforced by a judge, and (3) the statute imposes a binding obligation on the states. ... All three factors exist here: (1) Wong is a disabled person under age 65, the intended beneficiary of the § 1396p(d)(4)(A) exception; (2) Wong alleges a right that is clear and can easily be enforced, i.e., to have his NAMI calculated correctly under the statute; and (3) the statute is mandatory for those states which choose to provide Medicaid benefits.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of HAVA rights against state officials because HAVA’s enforcement provisions do not foreclose that remedy.

Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner · filed 2008-10-09

The Sixth Circuit explained that it is “[t]he state’s burden ... to demonstrate that Congress shut the door to private enforcement either expressly, through ‘specific evidence from the statute itself,’ or ‘impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.’ ” ... Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs lack standing.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statutory right when regulations define that right without adding distinct obligations.

Susan J. v. Riley · filed 2008-10-24

These regulations define that term and do not impose "distinct obligations." Therefore, they detail the federal right created by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) and remediable through § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the cited AACWA provisions because they do not unambiguously confer individual rights.

D.G. Ex Rel. Stricklin v. Henry · filed 2009-01-19

None of the statutory provisions of AACWA cited by plaintiffs indicates Congress has spoken clearly to manifest an intent to confer rights on individual plaintiffs under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal statutory rights only when the statute unambiguously confers individual rights; § 1437p does not.

Anderson v. Jackson · filed 2009-01-26

Accordingly, we hold that § 1437p does not unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable through § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a suit to enforce rights under the Cable Communications Policy Act because the Act does not foreclose that remedy.

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico · filed 1988-10-31

The Court therefore holds that there is jurisdiction to examine whether relief may be granted for alleged violations of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid beneficiaries to sue to enforce rights guaranteed by the Social Security Act.

Mitchell v. Marlin W. Johnston · filed 1983-03-14

Having alleged a valid section 1983 action, the plaintiffs successfully invoked the district court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343, which provides original federal court jurisdiction in suits authorized by section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based on a federal statute that creates no enforceable right for the plaintiff.

Monzon v. Martinez · filed 1993-08-31

However, there are two situations in which the Supreme Court has determined that a section 1983 action based upon violation of a federal statute may not be brought: (1) if the statute does not create enforceable rights in the plaintiff, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); and (2) if Congress has foreclosed private enforcement in the enactment of the statute. ... In light of all of the serious defects discussed above, I conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not give an HMO a cause of action against an employing entity for violating § 300e-9 because that provision does not confer enforceable rights on HMOs.

Travelers Health Network v. Orleans Parish School Board · filed 1994-01-07

After carefully reviewing the relevant provisions and the parties’ submissions, I conclude that an HMO has no cause of action under § 1983 against an employing entity for an alleged violation of § 300e-9 of the HMO Act.

Section 1983 permits a private person to bring an action to enforce provisions of a federal statute.

Jenkins v. Palmer · filed 1994-10-13

Defendants acknowledge that private actions can generally be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of federal statutes, but argue that there is an exception to this rule which prohibits the plaintiff from bringing suit to enforce the Social Security Act. ... However, the plaintiff has standing to bring suit for a violation of either section.

Section 1983 permits an injured intended beneficiary of a joint federal-state program to sue without showing an implied right to sue under the program’s statute.

Balf Co., Inc. v. Gaitor · filed 1982-03-17

In light of this analysis, the Court finds that a private plaintiff in a § 1983 action ... need not establish that it has an implied right to sue under a separate federal statute, but rather must demonstrate that it has suffered an injury by the administration of a joint federal-state cooperative program and was an intended beneficiary of that program.

The absence of an implied private right of action under a federal statute does not, by itself, foreclose an action under Section 1983.

Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Association v. Hawaiian Homes Commission · filed 1984-08-14

The lack of an implied private right of action under a federal act, in this case the Admission Act, does not by itself dispose of the issue of Congressional intent to foreclose private actions under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits children in public housing to enforce the lead paint requirements of the USHA and LBPPPA through a private damages action.

Parker v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 1997-02-10

Neither the USHA nor LBPPPA specifically foreclose a private right of action under section 1983 so it must be determined whether the statutes and their regulations can be said to create enforceable rights, privileges or immunities within the meaning of section 1983. Applying the three-pronged test to the statutory scheme in question, it is clear that plaintiffs have a private cause of action to enforce these statutes under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce rights under the Anti-Head Tax Act despite the Act’s lack of an implied private right of action.

Southwest Air Ambulance, Inc. v. City of Las Cruces · filed 2001-10-16

Accordingly, we reverse the § 1983 ruling of the magistrate judge and hold that Plaintiffs may assert claims under § 1983 to remedy the alleged violations of the AHTA.

Section 1983 lets eligible children enforce Medicaid mandates for specific medical services under a state waiver plan against state officials.

John B. Ex Rel. L.A. v. Goetz · filed 2009-09-18

Applying Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) and Westside Mothers II, the Court further concludes, consistent with several circuits, that Congress expressly mandated the provision of specific medical services for eligible children under a State’s waiver plan so as to create enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act because that Act does not foreclose a separate § 1983 remedy.

Arrington v. Richardson · filed 2009-10-01

Although Arrington’s § 1983 claim may be redundant, the court finds she is not barred from pursing the claim in this case.

Section 1983 allows a claim for violation of a federal statute only when the statute creates an individually enforceable right for the plaintiff.

Picano v. Borough of Emerson · filed 2009-11-27

Nor can plaintiff assert a claim under § 1983 for a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5103. “[T]o sustain a § 1983 action for the violation of a statutory right, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the federal statute creates an individually enforceable right in the class of beneficiaries to which he belongs.”

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for enforcing a federal statutory right against a state actor.

Smith Ex Rel. Smith v. Benson · filed 2010-01-28

In other words, Florida has not merely participated in determining what treatment is necessary; rather, Florida’s policy constitutes a blanket denial of a right secured by the EPSDT program of the Medicaid Act and enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 enforces federal statutory rights, but Section 926A does not create an individual right enforceable through it.

Torraco v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NY. AND NJ. · filed 2010-06-30

Given this complexity and uncertainty, we conclude that Congress did not intend to create federal rights in Section 926A actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce FMLA rights because the FMLA’s remedial scheme displaces that remedy.

Webb v. County of Trinity · filed 2010-08-10

In light of these differences, the court concludes that the FMLA supplants, rather than supplements, the remedial scheme provided by § 1983.