42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a parallel remedy for a hostile work environment claim that satisfies the same prima facie elements as a Title VII claim.

Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County · filed 2015-10-21

Stating a hostile work environment claim under Title VII therefore establishes a viable claim to § 1983 relief.

Section 1983 permits hostile work environment claims governed by the Title VII standard.

Richardson-Holness v. Alexander · filed 2016-07-25

Claims of hostile work environment are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and governed by the standard developed under Title VII.

Section 1983 can provide a parallel remedy for a Title VII hostile work environment claim, with the same elements needed to establish liability.

Alamo v. Charlie Bliss · filed 2017-07-20

When a plaintiff uses § 1983 as a parallel remedy to a Title VII hostile work environment claim, the elements needed to establish liability are the same under both statutes.

Section 1983 requires a hostile work environment plaintiff to show the defendant’s personal involvement and that the defendant’s conduct was a but-for cause of the hostile work environment.

Wilson v. Hanrahan · filed 2020-03-17

Under § 1983, a plaintiff must additionally establish both the personal involvement of a defendant in creating a hostile work environment and that a defendant’s “conduct was a ‘but-for’ cause of the hostile work environment.” Naumovski, 934 F.3d at 222; see also Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 114–16 (2d Cir. 2014).

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim based on a racially hostile work environment.

Adams v. Obion County, TN · filed 2020-06-05

Based on this construction of the pleadings, the Court holds that the Amended Complaint states a § 1983 equal protection claim based on a hostile work environment theory.

Section 1983 requires a hostile work environment plaintiff to show that each defendant was personally involved and that the defendant’s conduct was a but-for cause of the hostile environment.

Sotak v. Bertoni · filed 2020-11-04

Importantly, however, a § 1983 hostile work environment claim depends on a showing that (1) one or more of the individual defendants were actually "personally involved" in the misconduct that altered the plaintiff's working environment; and (2) that the conduct at issue was a "but-for" cause of the hostile environment.

Section 1983 claims challenging racially neutral testing devices require proof that the devices were used for a racially discriminatory purpose.

Walls v. Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare · filed 1982-05-18

As to the testing challenges based on § 1981, § 1983, and the fourteenth amendment, we conclude that plaintiffs failed to establish that the racially neutral testing devices may be “traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”

Section 1983 requires purposeful discriminatory conduct rather than discriminatory effect alone, and allegations of intentional discrimination are sufficient to state a claim at the pleading stage.

Pollard v. City of Hartford · filed 1982-06-01

The plaintiffs may, through the course of this litigation, be able to prove intent to discriminate on the part of some or all of the defendants in this action. They have alleged such intent and, therefore, have stated a claim under sections 1981 and 1983.

Section 1983 discrimination claims are governed by Fourteenth Amendment principles, so discriminatory purpose—not disparate impact alone—is required.

Mescall v. Burrus · filed 1979-08-27

The relationships of §§ 1981 and 1983 to the Fourteenth Amendment are so close and they are each so strongly under its influence that we believe the use of each section must be guided by the principles announced by the Supreme Court for application of the Fourteenth Amendment to discrimination cases. ... One of the questions to be raised about classifications is whether the alleged adverse impact reflects invidious discrimination. Impact is the starting point but it is purposefulness which offends the Constitution. ... Therefore, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs’ failure to allege purposeful discrimination justified dismissal of Counts II and III.

Section 1983 requires purposeful discrimination, rather than merely unreasonable discriminatory practices, for a plaintiff to recover for race-based denial of public employment.

Monroe v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Dept. · filed 1981-09-30

The unreasonable discriminatory practices must be purposeful in order for plaintiff to recover under § 1983. Perham v. Ladd, 436 F.Supp. 1101, 1107. Such a discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the "totality of the relevant facts." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). The unreasonable discriminatory practice alleged by plaintiff in this case is the denial of employment based upon racial considerations. To recover upon his § 1983 claim, plaintiff must show that he was purposefully discriminated against on the basis of race.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for racial discrimination violating equal-protection rights only when the plaintiff proves intentional discrimination.

Howard v. Summit County Welfare Department · filed 1981-11-04

Like plaintiff’s Title VII claim, to be successful under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, the plaintiff must prove intentional racial discrimination.

Section 1983 equal-protection claims require purposeful discrimination, and the discriminatory purpose need only be a motivating factor rather than the sole purpose of the challenged action.

Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action · filed 1982-03-29

Instead, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), it has become well-established law that § 1981, § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims require proof of purposeful discrimination. ... Yet, while Reichman must demonstrate discriminatory purpose, it need only be a motivating factor, not the sole purpose, of the challenged action.

Section 1983 discrimination claims have the same proof requirements as Title VII and Section 1981 claims.

Swearnigen-El v. Cook County Sheriff's Department · filed 2010-04-22

The same requirements for proving discrimination apply to claims under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a person denied employment because of race or sex to state a claim for relief and permits a court to preliminarily enjoin racially or sexually discriminatory employment practices when the evidence warrants it.

Hunter v. Ward · filed 1979-09-07

Since the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause condemns all invidious discrimination absent some compelling state interest justifying differences in treatment, one who claims that they have been denied employment on the basis of race and sex has stated a claim for relief within the meaning of § 1983 and the court, if the evidence warrants such relief, may, consistent with its obligation to remedy deprivations of constitutional rights, preliminarily enjoin employment practices which are racially and sexually discriminatory.

Section 1983 claims used as a parallel remedy for Title VII violations have the same elements as Title VII claims.

Jones v. Birdsong · filed 1980-06-02

When §§ 1981 and 1983 are used as a parallel remedy for Title VII violations, the elements of the causes of action do not differ from the Title VII requirements.

Section 1983 permits a disability-discrimination claim to proceed under the rational-relationship standard when defendants have not explained or disproved the alleged discrimination and harassment.

Hutchings v. Erie City & County Library Board of Directors · filed 1981-06-29

We disagree. While we believe that the rational relationship test is the appropriate standard to apply to these claims, we do not feel that this standard mandates dismissal of the plaintiff’s Section 1983 cause of action at this time. We believe that the defendants have misconstrued the fundamental nature of the plaintiff’s complaint. Admittedly, the plaintiff does protest the library’s delay in providing facilities for the handicapped. However, the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint is that she has been discriminated against and harassed solely on the basis of her handicap. At present the defendants have not provided any explanation for these alleged acts of discrimination. Nor have they established that the alleged discrimination in fact did not occur. Until such proof is presented the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim cannot be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for age discrimination because the ADEA supplies the exclusive remedy.

Tranello v. Frey · filed 1991-03-13

In other words, passage of the ADEA preempted ... plaintiff’s cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for age discrimination.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for age discrimination because the ADEA’s comprehensive remedial scheme precludes it.

Ford v. City of Oakwood, Ga. · filed 1995-09-22

After careful consideration, this court concludes that age discrimination claims are not actionable under section 1983.

The ADEA forecloses actions for age discrimination under § 1983.

Fisher v. Maryland Department of Housing & Community Development · filed 1998-05-14

The Fourth Circuit has held that the ADEA forecloses actions for age discrimination under § 1983. ... Thus, Fisher’s claim will be analyzed exclusively under the ADEA.

Section 1983 racial discrimination claims use the same disparate treatment elements as Title VII claims.

Drake v. Colorado State Univ. · filed 1998-09-08

Because we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Drake’s Title VII claims against the CSU Defendants, we also necessarily conclude that the district court did not err by disposing of his § 1981 and § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII discrimination claims.

Mandavilli v. Maldonado · filed 1999-02-22

Thus, discrimination claims under §§ 1981 and 1983 are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII cases.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring an age discrimination claim because the ADEA preempts that remedy.

Keller v. Board of Education of the City of Albuquerque · filed 2001-11-20

Thus, to the extent that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is premised on age discrimination, it must be dismissed.

A Section 1983 discrimination claim must allege specific supporting facts rather than conclusory allegations.

Geiger v. Landes · filed 2002-01-31

However, to successfully allege a claim of discrimination in a section 1983 cause of action, a litigant must state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations of discrimination. ... In the present case, Geiger made conclusory allegations of discrimination with no factual basis, which the court impliedly found frivolous.

Section 1983 racial discrimination claims use the same summary judgment test as Title VII discrimination claims.

P.V. Patel, M.D. v. Midland Memorial Hospital And Medical Center · filed 2002-08-06

The summary-judgment test for discrimination claims under § 1981 and § 1983 is the same as the test for discrimination claims under Title VII.

Section 1983 racial-discrimination claims use the same prima facie elements as Title VII racial-discrimination claims.

Baca v. Sklar · filed 2005-02-16

Therefore, Baca’s §§ 1981 and 1983 racial discrimination claims fail for the same reason that his Title VII claim fails, and accordingly we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Baca’s §§ 1981 and 1983 claims.

Section 1983 age discrimination claims use the same elements of proof and analytical framework as ADEA claims.

Siler v. Hancock County Board of Education · filed 2007-03-27

Thus, when a plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim based on age discrimination, courts apply the same analysis to such a claim as they would an Al)EA claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for age discrimination claims for which the ADEA is the exclusive federal remedy.

Lightner v. City of Wilmington, North Carolina · filed 2007-03-30

The ADEA is the exclusive federal remedy for age discrimination, and therefore plaintiff cannot seek relief on such a claim under Title VII or sections 1981 or 1983.

Section 1983 discrimination claims use the same summary judgment test as Title VII discrimination claims.

Knatt v. Dist · filed 2009-05-12

The summary judgment test for discrimination claims under § 1983 is the same as the test for discrimination claims under Title VII.

Section 1983 discrimination claims use the same summary judgment test as Title VII discrimination claims.

Knatt v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of East Baton Rouge Parish · filed 2009-05-12

The summary judgment test for discrimination claims under § 1983 is the same as the test for discrimination claims under Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide an age-discrimination claim foreclosed by the ADEA.

Colon-Perez v. Department of Health of Puerto Rico · filed 2009-06-11

As an initial matter, Colon’s claim of age-based discrimination pursuant to section 1983 is foreclosed by the ADEA.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a political discrimination claim to establish opposing political affiliations, defendant awareness, an adverse employment action, and political affiliation as a motivating factor.

Mendez-Aponte v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2011-07-08

A plaintiff ... seeking to establish a political discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must establish four elements: "(1) that the plaintiff and defendant have opposing political affiliations, (2) that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's affiliation, (3) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (4) that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 racial discrimination claims are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework.

Evans v. Port Authority · filed 2011-07-21

This framework, as the District Court properly noted, also applies to claims of racial discrimination asserted under § 1983.

Section 1983 discrimination claims use the same legal framework as Title VII discrimination claims.

Jones v. International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 2015-12-11

Courts use the same legal framework to decide Title VII and Section 1981 and 1983 discrimination claims.

Section 1983 cannot be used in federal district court to collaterally attack a final state-court judgment; review must be sought from the Supreme Court.

Almon v. Thomas Harold Sandlin, H. F. Sandlin, and Carl D. Nesmith · filed 1979-09-26

If he did assert that unconstitutionality, this court lacks the authority to review the final judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court and his proper remedy for an unfavorable decision was to seek review by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, not by collaterally attacking the judgment in a federal district court under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not generally prevent collateral estoppel from barring relitigation of a federal issue already decided after a full and fair hearing in state court.

Allen v. McCurry · filed 1980-12-09

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that McCurry’s inability to obtain federal habeas corpus relief upon his Fourth Amendment claim renders the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable to his § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for collateral review of state disciplinary findings on issues actually litigated, which are subject to collateral estoppel.

Randall. v. Reynoldson · filed 1981-01-21

Randall, by filing his section 1983 remedy action against the justices of the Supreme Court of Iowa, has attempted to obtain collateral review of the findings of that court. This court has taken the position that res judicata applies to issues previously litigated in the state disciplinary procedures. Goodrich v. Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, 511 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1975). We held in Goodrich, however, that only those issues which were actually litigated would be subject to res judicata, or more precisely, collateral estoppel. Id. We therefore will not review the factual basis of Randall's Iowa state disbarment, except to the extent that we find the acts alleged were of a nature as to form a proper predicate for disbarment procedures. See Allen v. McCurry, --- U.S. ----, ----, 101 S.Ct. 411, 419-420, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).

Section 1983 does not allow a federal district court to review or modify a state-court judgment in the manner of an appellate court.

Reynolds v. State of Georgia George Busbee, Individually and as Governor of Georgia · filed 1981-03-26

... nor is it significant that she presents her claim under section 1983 as well as under the Constitution.

A state-court child-neglect judgment precludes relitigation of constitutional claims in a Section 1983 action when state law gives the judgment preclusive effect.

Lesher v. Lavrich · filed 1986-03-18

On the merits of the res judicata issue, there is no question that the law of Ohio precludes appellants from relitigating their constitutional claims. Appellants raised each of the constitutional issues in their Sec. 1983 action as a defense to the neglect proceedings in the juvenile court.

Section 1983 gives state judicial proceedings the same preclusive effect they would receive in the rendering state’s courts.

Shaw v. State Of California Department Of Alcoholic Beverage Control · filed 1986-04-28

In a section 1983 action we are required to give state “judicial proceedings” precisely the same preclusive effect they would have in the courts of California.

Federal courts must give a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect in a § 1983 action that the judgment would receive in the rendering state's courts.

Gahr v. Trammel · filed 1986-07-24

Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738, federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments in section 1983 actions as the judgments would receive in the courts of the rendering state.

A litigant cannot convert an appeal of a state-court judgment into a Section 1983 damages action when the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state judgment's merits.

Tucker v. Northeast Savings, F.A. · filed 1987-12-17

Tucker attempts to cast his challenge to the outcome of the state proceedings as a § 1983 cause of action. However, his characterization of his claim does not confer jurisdiction upon a federal district court where the federal claim is “ ‘inextricably intertwined with the merits of a state-court judgment.’”

A § 1983 claim may be barred by res judicata when the plaintiff already litigated the same constitutional issues in state court.

Heitmanis v. Austin · filed 1988-02-11

Alternatively, the advanced stage of the state court litigation requires dismissal of the intervening plaintiff State Central Committee, as well as the three individual plaintiffs who sit on (and are in privity with) the committee, under traditional principles of res judicata. ... In this instance, plaintiffs claim was brought pursuant to § 1983. ... The instant case involves the identical facts presented in the state court litigation. Intervening plaintiff State Central Committee and the three individual plaintiff members of the committee raised their constitutional claims as a defense, but had summary judgment entered against them.

Section 1983 suits are subject to the preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment, including as to issues that could have been litigated there.

Hapaniewski v. City of Chicago Heights · filed 1988-04-18

This rule applies in § 1983 suits not only to issues actually litigated but also to those issues which could have been litigated in the state court proceeding.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek federal district court review of a state trial court decision; challenges to that decision belong in the state appellate courts.

Moreton Rolleston, Jr., Cross-Appellee v. Judge Frank M. Eldridge, Cross-Appellant · filed 1988-06-27

A section 1983 action is neither an alternative nor a complement to the appeal of a state trial court decision to a higher state court.

Section 1983 cannot be used to create federal jurisdiction for collateral review of a state court judgment.

Brennan v. Brennan · filed 1988-10-25

Moreover, independent of the full faith and credit clause, plaintiff improperly attempts to misuse Sec. 1983 to create federal jurisdiction by obtaining collateral review of his state court judgment.

Section 1983 does not permit relitigation in federal court of issues that a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court.

John M. Peduto and El-Ro, Inc. v. City of North Wildwood · filed 1989-06-29

Where a party has been afforded a full and fair hearing in state court, section 1983 does not allow relitigation of the same issues in federal court “simply because the state court’s decision may have been erroneous.”

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit that amounts to a collateral attack on the plaintiff’s criminal conviction.

O'DELL v. McSpadden · filed 1991-11-26

As a preliminary matter, the Court must note that § 1983 may not be used to mount a collateral attack on a plaintiff's criminal conviction. See, e.g., Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 378-79 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 956, 110 S.Ct. 371, 107 L.Ed.2d 357 (1989). Although plaintiff seeks only damages, his lawsuit amounts to an attack on his criminal conviction and is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to use a damages action to challenge a conviction collaterally before establishing the constitutional violation through a motion to vacate the conviction.

Dunn v. Smith · filed 1995-04-12

Dunn may not challenge his conviction collaterally in a civil rights action for damages, but must first establish that his constitutional rights were violated in a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255.

Section 1983 cannot be used to collaterally attack a conviction while bypassing the state-remedy exhaustion requirement of § 2254.

Boone v. Weizel · filed 1996-01-23

In addition to the fact that he is not entitled to free transcripts at this juncture, plaintiff may not use section 1983 to attack his conviction collaterally and thereby circumvent the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requirement that he exhaust his state court remedies before doing so.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal of a court of appeals decision.

Davis v. Daughtrey · filed 2002-05-15

To the extent that Davis sought non-monetary relief, his complaint was properly dismissed because a § 1983 action is not a substitute for an appeal of this court’s decision.

Section 1983 does not provide a means to collaterally attack a criminal conviction.

Smith v. Kirby · filed 2002-12-09

The district court correctly dismissed these arguments as a collateral attack on the conviction and beyond the scope of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 actions are subject to claim and issue preclusion from prior state court judgments, but a judgment does not bar a claim the plaintiff could not fairly litigate in the earlier proceedings.

Jones v. City of Alton · filed 1985-03-12

This rule applies to § 1983 actions with respect to issues actually litigated (issue preclusion), Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980), and also issues which could have been but were not litigated in the state court proceedings (claim preclusion), Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196, 198-99 (7th Cir.1982).

Section 1983 claims remain subject to ordinary preclusion by state court judgments even when filing first in federal court might have involved procedural disadvantages.

Takahashi v. Board of Trustees of Livingston Union School District · filed 1986-02-21

We similarly conclude that any procedural disadvantages which might have accrued to Takahashi had she attempted first to litigate her § 1983 claims in a federal forum are insufficient to justify an exception to the traditional doctrines of preclusion.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole revocation through a damages claim when the alleged loss is the resulting imprisonment.

Wilson v. Marrow · filed 2007-02-13

Nevertheless, after reviewing Wilson’s complaint, we agree with the trial court that Wilson’s Section 1983 claims against Appellees merely constitute an attempt to appeal the Board’s revocation decision. ... As a result, we hold the trial court properly determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Count I of Wilson’s complaint.

Section 1983 cannot be used to collaterally attack a state court judgment.

Idahosa, Robert O. v. Despines, Brian K. · filed 2008-04-29

What’s more, §1983 cannot be used to wage a collateral attack on a state court’s judgment.

Section 1983 does not permit an unexhausted collateral attack on a state sentence through a damages action.

Wright v. Baker · filed 1994-03-03

Having failed to exhaust his state court remedies, plaintiff is barred from pursuing a collateral attack under the auspices of a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not give a federal district court appellate jurisdiction to review a state court judgment through a collateral attack.

Town of Hopkins v. Cobb · filed 1979-02-14

The lack of appellate jurisdiction by the district courts is not altered (1) by allegations of the unconstitutionality of a state statute involved in the previous state action between the parties, Rooker, supra; Resolute Insurance Co., supra; Borland, supra; (2) by a collateral attack asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Atchley v. Greenhill, 517 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1975); Anderson, supra; Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Association, 431 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1970); or (3) by alleged defects in the state’s appellate procedure, Atchley, supra; Borland, supra.

Section 1983 does not provide a corporation a federal route to collaterally attack its state court criminal conviction, even when habeas relief is unavailable.

Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Fokakis · filed 1980-02-01

Absent any showing of congressional authorization for such a result, and in light of possible problems posed by the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment, we hold that the relief the Corporation seeks is beyond the scope of protection Congress intended and beyond the scope of benefits inhering in the corporate form. We therefore decline to limit Hanson and here reaffirm that habeas corpus is the exclusive federal route to collateral attack of state court convictions.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal district court to collaterally review a state court judgment when the plaintiff’s constitutional claims are inextricably intertwined with that judgment.

Miller v. Dunn · filed 2020-11-05

First, as the magistrate judge explained, it is established law that Section 1983 is not a specific delegation to the federal courts that upsets how constitutional determinations are reviewed in the state courts and allows a collateral attack on a state court judgment where, like here, a plaintiff’s constitutional claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s rulings against him.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of the limited right to parental concurrence in adoption assistance payment readjustments under § 673(a)(3).

Hensley v. Koller · filed 2013-07-03

For these reasons, we conclude that, pursuant to the Blessing test, § 673(a)(3) does give rise to a limited privately enforceable federal right cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a private action to enforce Medicaid’s reasonable standards requirement in § 1396a(a)(17).

V.L. v. Wagner · filed 2009-10-23

Although Section 1396a(a)(17) is not enforceable under § 1983, Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief may be brought under the Supremacy Clause.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce § 1396a(a)(8)'s reasonable promptness requirement.

Doe v. Kidd · filed 2007-09-19

Applying the Blessing test to the reasonable promptness provision found in § 1396a(a)(8), we conclude that the provision gives rise to a right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions are not subject to state-law notice-of-claim requirements that would unlawfully limit rights granted under the federal statute.

Brandon v. BOARD OF ED. OF GUILDERLAND · filed 1980-04-16

While defendants are correct in their assertion that Section 3813(1) generally serves as a condition precedent to the commencement of non-tort claims against the school district, the law is fairly well settled, at least with regard to notice requirements in claims against municipalities, that such requirements are inapplicable to § 1983 actions. ... The result would be the same in cases falling under § 3813(1). Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs are not precluded from pursuing this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of their failure to satisfy § 3813(1).

Section 1983 reaches violations of federal statutory rights, including unreasonable administrative delay in processing applications for federally funded economic assistance.

Acevedo Díaz v. Collazo · filed 1982-03-10

En Estados Unidos, la tardanza administrativa en actuar con referencia a solicitudes de asistencia económica bajo las leyes federales constituye una violación de la Sec. 1983. ... Resolvemos que se ha invocado adecuadamente en este caso la Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek relief for deprivation of rights secured by federal statutes, as well as constitutional rights.

Tedder v. Housing Authority of Paducah · filed 1983-03-18

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities “secured by the Constitution and laws.” The Supreme Court reasons that since Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase “and laws” in drafting § 1983, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces claims against persons alleged to have violated a federal statute. ... Because the phrase “and laws” is not read as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws, the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of FERPA’s education-record privacy provision because FERPA’s funding cutoff remedy does not foreclose such suits.

Falvo v. Owasso Independent School District No. 1-011 · filed 2000-10-04

Pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, therefore, this court must conclude that the only remedy provided for in FERPA and its associated regulations— the termination of federal funding — is not sufficiently comprehensive to “raise a clear inference” of congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983 remedy.

Section 1983 provides a proper vehicle for the Medicaid trust and benefits claims presented in this action.

Ramey v. Rizzuto · filed 1999-10-01

I agree with the recommendation that plaintiffs’ • claims are properly. presented pursuant to 42 Ü.S.C. § 1983, that defendant correctly analyzed plaintiffs’ trusts under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) (repealed), that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(17)(b) and 1396c do not preempt 10 C.C.R. 2505-10, § 8,110.52; and that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar relitigation of the Shupe trust.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid providers to challenge a state’s failure to follow the Medicaid Act’s procedural requirement to make findings supporting reimbursement rates.

Volk v. STATE, DEPT. OF HUMAN RESOURCES · filed 1990-10-17

We understand the Wilder majority opinion to say that a provider may, under § 1983, challenge in court the substance of the state's findings as well as the procedural requirement for findings.

Section 1983 permits a claim challenging denial of Medicaid benefits when Medicaid’s hearing and federal funding remedies do not show congressional intent to foreclose private enforcement.

Miller v. Ibarra · filed 1990-09-05

Nothing in § 1396a(a)(3) or § 1396c indicates a Congressional intent to bar § 1983 claims. ... For these reasons, I conclude that the plaintiffs may invoke § 1983 to challenge denial of Medicaid benefits.

Section 1983 allows nursing home providers to sue over an alleged failure to comply with federal Medicaid requirements.

Anco, Inc. v. State Health & Human Services Finance Commission · filed 1989-11-06

In this case, the Providers challenged the proposed policy on the grounds that it violates the federal Medicaid Act and regulations promulgated thereunder. We find that they have the right to bring such an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give a Medicaid provider an enforceable right to return-on-equity reimbursement when the Medicaid statute, regulations, and legislative history create no such right.

Vantage Healthcare Corp. v. Virginia Board of Medical Assistance Services · filed 1988-05-11

Having found nothing in the statutory language, implementing regulations, legislative history, or controlling precedent to support Vantage’s position, this Court holds that Vantage, in the context of this action, has no enforceable rights under § 1983.

Federal foster-care funding statutes that prescribe standards of care and confer corresponding rights on foster children are privately enforceable under Section 1983.

Darr v. Massinga · filed 1988-02-01

It is true that the statutes are largely statutes relating to appropriations, but, defendants' argument to the contrary notwithstanding, they are privately enforceable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Rights created by the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act are enforceable under Section 1983 because the Act's remedial procedures do not show congressional intent to foreclose private enforcement.

Nicoletti v. Brown · filed 1987-10-29

In the present matter, this Court, following a review of all of the procedures for enforcement of the provisions of the Disabled Assistance Act created by Congress and the Secretary, and viewing them in light of the presumption that rights created under federal statutes are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, holds that the plaintiffs may bring their cause of action under the Disabled Assistance Act, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a duplicative action for an EAHCA violation when that Act includes a private remedy and comprehensive administrative proceedings.

Noe v. Ambach · filed 1982-06-30

In view of the express authorization for a private right of action in the EAHCA, as well as the comprehensive scheme of state administrative proceedings contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1415 of that Act, it is clear Congress has indicated that a violation of the EAHCA may not be the basis of an action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a right guaranteed by any federal statute.

Maya v. Philadelphia Gas Works (In Re Maya) · filed 1981-01-16

Therefore, we conclude that § 1983 may be used to redress the deprivation of a right guaranteed by any federal statute, including the Bankruptcy Code and Economic Opportunity Act.

Section 1983 permits an action for deprivation of rights secured by federal statutes, not only rights secured by the Constitution.

Maine v. Thiboutot · filed 1980-06-25

The question before us is whether the phrase “and laws,” as used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents’ claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act.

Section 1983 can protect rights secured by the FWPCA, but its use is precluded where the FWPCA's specific remedies are inconsistent with the proposed remedy, and a § 301 claim is not ripe before any discharge occurs.

Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Virginia State Water Control Board · filed 1980-10-09

At the very least, this Court holds that the section may, absent other constraints, provide protection for rights secured by the FWPCA. ... Plaintiffs’ arguments must fail, because the Act itself possesses specific administrative remedies for violation of the sections cited by plaintiffs that are inconsistent with the remedies plaintiffs have proposed. ... Regardless of that decision, this Court holds that as long as no violation of § 301 has taken place (i. e., as long as no discharges have occurred), that plaintiffs alleged cause of action under § 1983 is not yet ripe.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce substantive rights secured by Section 504 when that statute provides no exclusive remedy, without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies unavailable to private claimants.

Philipp v. Carey · filed 1981-10-03

Insofar as Section 504 confers substantive rights but provides no exclusive remedies, an action lies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Moreover, Section 1983 also imposes no exhaustion requirement in this action because the prescribed administrative remedies seem available primarily to the Secretary, and not to private, individual claimants directly.

Section 1983 requires both a constitutional deprivation and action under color of state law, with “state action” and “under color of law” expressing the same principle.

Edward Herwald, Etc. v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary, Health and Human Services · filed 1981-10-07

Two elements must be proved in order to recover under section 1983: (1) deprivation of a constitutional right by a defendant, (2) acting under color of [state] law.... Generally speaking the labels “state action” and “under color of law” are perceived as alternative ways of expressing the same legal principle.

Section 1983 is unavailable to redress violations of a federal statute when that statute provides a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Turillo v. Tyson · filed 1982-03-29

These two detailed remedies clearly indicate congressional intent to enforce the EAHCA only by the procedures detailed therein, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is therefore not available to redress violations of the EAHCA.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of constitutional and federal statutory rights.

Williams v. City of New Orleans · filed 1982-06-11

This section encompasses violations of constitutional and federal statutory law.

Section 1983 provides a remedial action for rights secured by federal law, but a federal statute’s exclusive remedy precludes enforcement through section 1983.

McCroan v. Bailey · filed 1982-06-29

The inescapable conclusion that is drawn from the foregoing is that if other modes of enforcement were available to the private litigant, the congressional scheme behind ADEA enforcement could easily be thwarted. An impatient plaintiff might unilaterally dispense with the informal negotiations contemplated by Congress, needlessly casting all concerned into costly litigation. Congress did not intend to allow a plaintiff to bypass the statutory scheme clearly embodied in the language of the ADEA. The only reasonable construction of the Act is that the statute’s remedy is exclusive. ... The determination of the remedy as exclusive removes the ADEA from the array of rights enforceable by section 1983.

Section 1983 permits foster-care beneficiaries to enforce sufficiently concrete rights created by the Social Security Act.

Lynch v. King · filed 1982-09-20

For these reasons, I conclude that plaintiffs may enforce the case review requirements of section 675(5), (A), (B), incorporated by reference in section 627(a)(2)(B), in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce rights under the EHA or Section 504.

Flavin v. Connecticut State Board of Education · filed 1982-12-27

The EHA and Section 504 will not support a right of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983 are accordingly dismissed.

Section 1983 permits suits in federal court to secure compliance with Social Security Act provisions by participating states.

Mitchell v. Johnston · filed 1983-03-14

“suits in federal court under section 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating states.” ... Having alleged a valid section 1983 action, the plaintiffs successfully invoked the district court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which provides original federal court jurisdiction in suits authorized by section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutes unless Congress has foreclosed that remedy through a sufficiently comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Meyerson v. State of Arizona · filed 1983-05-09

Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for a violation of a federal statute under color of state law. ... However, the Supreme Court has identified two exceptions to the application of section 1983 to statutory violations: (1) where Congress has foreclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself, and (2) where the statute does not create "enforceable rights." ... We hold that Congress has foreclosed private enforcement of section 503 by providing a comprehensive remedial scheme under the authority of the Department.

Section 1983 generally remedies violations of federal statutory rights unless Congress foreclosed private enforcement or the federal statute creates no enforceable right; it cannot remedy state or local officials’ violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3789g.

Polchowski v. Gorris · filed 1983-08-18

Thus, a party may proceed under Sec. 1983 to remedy a violation of a federal statutory right unless Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement of the statute or unless the statute does not create an enforceable “right” under Sec. 1983. ... Congress, by limiting the scope of Sec. 552a, has provided unequivocal and persuasive evidence that it intended “to foreclose private enforcement” of Sec. 3789g(a) against state or local officials who make unwarranted disclosures of statistical information. Thus, we hold that an action under Sec. 1983 may not be maintained to remedy violations of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3789g by state and local officials.

Section 1983 permits damages to redress violations of rights secured by Section 408 of the Social Security Act when injunctive relief would be worthless.

Wilder v. City of New York · filed 1983-08-09

It stands to reason that in an action brought under § 1983 to redress violations of § 408 of the Social Security Act the plaintiff may invoke all the remedies provided by § 1983, including an action for damages, where, as here, injunctive relief is worthless.

A creditor’s violation of the Bankruptcy Act’s automatic stay may give rise to liability under Section 1983.

Gibbs v. Housing Authority of City of New Haven · filed 1983-08-17

It follows that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in concluding that a creditor’s violation of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Act might give rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supplies a cause of action when misconduct denies a handicapped child the procedural safeguards necessary to obtain a final administrative decision under Section 1415 of the Education of the Handicapped Act.

Quackenbush v. Johnson City School District · filed 1983-08-24

After examining both statutes as well as the circumstances of this case, we believe and conclude that the better solution is to permit Sec. 1983 to supply the right of action to a plaintiff who has been denied procedural safeguards under Sec. 1415 and who, as a result thereof, has not received the findings and decision following the impartial due process administrative hearing contemplated by Sec. 1415.

Section 1983 is available to remedy a state's customary practice of depriving foster children of federal statutory rights even when state law formally requires compliance.

Lynch v. Dukakis · filed 1983-10-12

If Massachusetts’s practice is to deprive foster children of federal statutory rights, even though the state’s law on the books requires otherwise, section 1983 is available as a remedy.

Section 1983 may fill a remedial gap in the EHA when the EHA is unavailable to enforce procedural or statutory rights.

Blazejewski v. BD. OF EDUC. OF ALLEGANY CENT. SCH. · filed 1985-01-08

This is a case in which section 1983 was properly invoked to fill the gap in the EHA.

Section 1983 may fill a remedial gap in the EHA when that statute is unavailable to enforce procedural or statutory rights.

Blazejewski ex rel. Blazejewski v. Board of Education · filed 1985-01-08

This is a case in which section 1983 was properly invoked to fill the gap in the EHA.

Section 1983 supplies federal-question jurisdiction for statutory claims enforcing mandatory beneficiary protections under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act.

Boles v. Earl · filed 1985-01-24

Accordingly, I concur with the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in finding that there is federal question jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over plaintiffs’ statutory claims.

Section 1983 provides jurisdiction for public-housing tenants' statutory claims under the Brooke Amendment.

Beckham v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1985-02-19

We conclude that the district court correctly assumed jurisdiction under section 1983, but erred in granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.

Federal air-safety laws create rights enforceable through Section 1983 because the FAA's administrative enforcement scheme does not foreclose complementary private injunctive relief or damages.

National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen · filed 1985-04-12

Finally, a section 1983 remedy is not inconsistent with the FAA’s administrative enforcement scheme. Private injunctive relief would complement, not impair, the Administrator’s authority to obtain such relief. The civil and criminal penalties allowed by 49 U.S.C. §§ 1471 and 1472 have never precluded separate tort actions for damages by those injured by a violation, and are no less viable in conjunction with a section 1983 damages claim. In sum, plaintiffs may assert violations of federal air safety laws as a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supplies a private action against state officials to enforce Housing Act and relocation-assistance requirements when the regulatory scheme lacks a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for the complaint.

Pietroniro v. Borough of Oceanport · filed 1985-06-18

In the absence of a comprehensive enforcement scheme within the regulatory scheme which encompasses the plaintiff’s complaint there exists a private cause of action against state officials for violations of the Housing Act and the URA.

A plaintiff may use Section 1983 to enforce a federal statute when that statute gives the individual a substantive right and does not provide an exclusive remedy.

State Communities Aid Ass'n v. Regan · filed 1985-07-25

In order to acquire standing to bring an action under 42 USC § 1983 to enforce rights granted by a Federal statute, the statute must provide a substantive right to the individual and the statute must not contain exclusive remedies ... Plaintiff Kafer contends that his HEAP benefits would have been greater if the program was properly administered.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of mandatory federal statutory duties against state officials unless Congress affirmatively forecloses enforcement by creating no enforceable right or by supplying a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Eunice Samuels, Lorraine Warren v. District of Columbia · filed 1985-08-06

... plaintiffs can enforce all federal laws against state officials under section 1983 unless it can be shown that Congress affirmatively intended to foreclose such enforcement by failing to impose mandatory federal obligations or by creating a comprehensive remedial scheme in the statute itself.

National Guard technicians may maintain Section 1983 claims against Guard superiors who act under color of state law because the National Guard Technicians Act does not clearly make its administrative procedures exclusive.

Johnson v. Orr · filed 1986-01-13

For the reasons discussed above, we hold that appellants acted under color of state law in participating in personnel decisions resulting in the discharge of appellees. As we cannot infer congressional intent to preclude Guard technicians from bringing section 1983 actions against their superiors, we will affirm the district court’s decision that appellees may maintain a cause of action against appellants under section 1983.

An intended beneficiary may use Section 1983 to enforce a city’s obligation to comply with Federal-Aid Highway Act regulations attached to accepted federal highway funds.

Balf Co. v. Gatta · filed 1986-04-01

The actions of the City of Hartford, acting through its City Manager, violated the letter as well as the spirit of the Federal-Aid Highway Act and its regulations. Having deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed by a law of the United States, ... the City of Hartford and its City Manager, Alfred A. Gatta, are liable to the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

Food-stamp claimants may sue state officials under Section 1983 to enforce rights created by the Food Stamp Act.

Josephine Victorian and Ruth Helen Jones v. Barbara Miller, Supervisor · filed 1987-04-07

Having now reconsidered the issue en banc, we expressly overrule ... Tyler ... and hold that food stamp claimants may bring an action under section 1983 against state officials for violations of the Food Stamp Act.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for federal statutory rights only when the underlying statute uses sufficiently specific and definite language to create the asserted right and notify the governmental unit of its obligation.

Edwards v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1987-06-12

We, however, read ... together as standing for the proposition that Congress must employ “sufficiently specific and definite” statutory language in order to create rights and, at the same time, give notice to the relevant governmental unit of its obligations in relation to such rights. ... We hold that the language of § 1437p does not provide the type of right that plaintiffs seek, and that the legislative history is likewise of no help to their argument.

FERPA rights cannot be enforced through Section 1983 by a school employee who is outside the class FERPA protects.

Klein Independent School District, Rebecca J. Holt v. Jim Mattox, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General for the S · filed 1987-10-22

Additionally, because of our finding that Ms. Holt does not fall within the class for whose benefit FERPA was created, the statute does not bestow on her enforceable rights, privileges or immunities which can be enforced by 42 U.S. C. § 1983.

Parents may pursue Education of the Handicapped Act violations through Section 1983, and exhaustion may be excused when officials refuse to address alleged system-wide violations.

Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi · filed 1987-11-04

In sum, the thrust of the Congressional enactment allows parents to pursue claimed EHA violations through § 1983, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and constitutional provisions. Exhaustion of EHA administrative remedies ordinarily required under § 1415(b)(2) and (c) is excused in the instant case because the pleadings indicate that defendants refused to consider and resolve complaints of system-wide violations of the EHA.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not contain a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme to demonstrate congressional intent to foreclose enforcement through Section 1983.

Conlon v. City of Long Beach · filed 1987-12-23

Rather, the test is whether the alternative remedies are “sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent” to bar § 1983 actions. ... To prevail on this point, the defendants would need to “demonstrate[ ] by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement.” ... They have not met that burden here.

Section 1983 permits public housing tenants to enforce definite rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1437p because the Housing Act does not provide a remedy that displaces it.

Concerned Tenants of Father Panik Village v. Pierce · filed 1988-05-09

Neither section 1437p nor the remainder of the Housing Act provides a private enforcement mechanism indicating congressional intention to preempt § 1983 as a remedy. ... Moreover, the language and legislative history of § 1437p is of a sufficiently specific and definite nature to indicate congressional intent to create an enforceable right. Therefore, plaintiffs have stated a claim for which relief may be granted sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits bridge users to enforce the toll-free right created by 23 U.S.C. § 301 against state officials because Congress provided no comprehensive alternative enforcement scheme and the users are an identifiable class of intended beneficiaries.

Clallam County v. Department of Transportation · filed 1988-06-14

We conclude that plaintiffs are members of a class granted enforceable rights. Because neither of the Sea Clammers exceptions applies, plaintiffs may assert a private right of action under section 1983 to enforce section 301.

Section 1983 permits a disappointed bidder on a state Medicaid contract to sue a state official to enforce federally required procurement procedures when the bidder is harmed by noncompliance.

Connecticut Legal Services, Inc. v. Heintz · filed 1988-06-16

It is they who are harmed if the procurement process is not followed and thus they who have standing to sue to vindicate their rights under the Act and regulations. ... Plaintiff may pursue its action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal statutory rights unless the statute forecloses private enforcement or creates no enforceable right, privilege, or immunity.

Korenyi v. DEPT. OF SANITATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK · filed 1988-09-16

But where the statute by its terms forecloses private enforcement, or where it does not itself create enforceable rights, privileges or immunities, no section 1983 action can be maintained.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Title IX when Title IX supplies its own remedies and procedural scheme.

Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1989-03-14

A statute, such as Title IX, which contains its own remedies and is implemented through its own procedural scheme, does not permit bypassing what Congress has written by going directly to Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits an action to enforce the substantive rights that Section 611 of the Cable Act gives public access viewers and producers.

Mo. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. KANSAS CITY, MO. · filed 1989-06-15

The Court is of the opinion that Section 611 of the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 531, creates substantive rights cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit AFDC families to enforce Title IV-D child support provisions because those provisions create no individually enforceable right for them.

Wehunt v. Ledbetter · filed 1989-06-27

The analysis here requires a determination of whether plaintiff has a "right" under a federal statute and if so whether the federal statute precludes beneficiaries from seeking enforcement of those rights in a private cause of action. ... Title IV-D does not create any enforceable right: it was not enacted for the "especial benefit" of AFDC families.

Section 1983 lets health care providers enforce rights created by the Medicaid reimbursement provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A).

Amisub (Psl), Inc. v. State of Colorado Department of Social Services · filed 1989-08-31

Therefore, we reaffirm our previous holding that Sec. 1396a(a)(13)(A) creates enforceable rights to health care providers under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and adopt the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit as set forth in Virginia Hosp. Ass'n.

Section 1983 permits a hospital to sue state officials to enforce rights under the federal Medicaid statute when Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey · filed 1989-09-05

We conclude that WVUH can assert a cause of action against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the federal medicaid statute and that statute does not reflect a congressional intent to foreclose private enforcement.

Section 1983 permits hospitals to sue state officials to enforce Medicaid reimbursement rights when the Medicaid Act creates an enforceable right and does not foreclose private enforcement.

West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey · filed 1989-10-05

We conclude that WVUH can assert a cause of action against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for violation of the federal medicaid statute and that statute does not reflect a congressional intent to foreclose private enforcement.

Section 1983 permits a hospital to enforce the Medicaid Act’s reasonable reimbursement requirement against state officials because that requirement creates an enforceable right.

St. Michael Hospital of Franciscan Sisters, Milwaukee, Inc. v. Thompson · filed 1989-11-21

Accordingly, I conclude that § 1396a(a)(13)(A) confers a private right of action on plaintiff through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act because Congress did not preclude that remedy with a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Artist M. v. Johnson · filed 1989-11-21

It is clear, then, that AAA does create enforceable rights and that Congress has not precluded their enforcement with a comprehensive remedial scheme. Hence plaintiffs have a cause of action under Section 1983 as well as directly under AAA.

Section 1983 permits an employer to enforce NLRA rights against governmental interference with collective bargaining.

Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1989-12-05

We agree with petitioner that it is the intended beneficiary of a statutory scheme that prevents governmental interference with the collective-bargaining process and that the NLRA gives it rights enforceable against governmental interference in an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for state interference with fishing rights protected by the Magnuson Act because that Act provides no mechanism to address the interference.

Bateman v. Gardner · filed 1990-01-12

The Magnuson Act does not preclude a § 1983 remedy as it provides no mechanism to address state interference with federally protected fishing rights.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act Title I right to an individualized written rehabilitation plan.

McGuire v. Switzer · filed 1990-03-27

The right which plaintiff seeks to vindicate, the right to an individualized written rehabilitation plan, is sufficiently “specific” to be a right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act.

Norman v. Johnson · filed 1990-05-18

As previously discussed, the rights contained in the AAA are enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows private enforcement of rights that Title IV-D gives children and their families to child support enforcement services.

Behunin Ex Rel. Nesladek v. Jefferson County Department of Social Services · filed 1990-09-06

I conclude that the primary Congressional intent in enacting Title IV-D was to secure support enforcement services for children and their families. Therefore I conclude that Title IV-D created rights privately enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a nuclear licensee to enforce federal rights conferred by the Atomic Energy Act against a local government.

Kerr-Mcgee Chemical Corporation v. City of West Chicago · filed 1990-09-20

We do not need to decide today whether a private cause of action is implied in the AEA because we find that Kerr-McGee may rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the federal “rights, privileges or immunities” found in the AEA itself.

Section 1983 permits a juvenile detainee to enforce rights under the Juvenile Justice Act when Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Grenier Ex Rel. Grenier v. Kennebec County · filed 1990-09-28

Grenier may use section 1983 to seek relief from the alleged injuries he has suffered as a result of the alleged infringement of his rights under the Juvenile Justice Act.

Section 1983 permits a claim to remedy injuries under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, because that Act does not preclude the remedy.

Pendleton v. Jefferson Local School District · filed 1990-12-20

Therefore, the plaintiff can use Section 1983 to remedy injuries brought under Section 794.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal statutory rights unless Congress forecloses that remedy through a comprehensive remedial scheme or an explicit, exclusive private cause of action.

Artist M. v. Gordon Johnson and Gary T. Morgan · filed 1990-12-20

In the absence of either a comprehensive remedial scheme for violations of a statute or an explicit, exclusive private cause of action found in the statute itself, Congress cannot be said to have intended to foreclose Section 1983 as a remedial vehicle for statutory violations.

Section 1983 permits an action to enforce the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s protection against discharge based on a single wage garnishment.

Johnson v. Town of Trail Creek · filed 1991-07-22

If the defendants discharged Mr. Johnson by reason of the garnishment proceedings embodied by the LaPorte Superior Court’s order, they may be found to have deprived Mr. Johnson of his rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a). An action may be maintained for that deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits beneficiaries to enforce Title IV-D child support service rights when Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Howe v. Ellenbecker · filed 1991-09-18

The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs do have standing under § 1983 to bring this action to enforce their claims for Title IV-D child support enforcement services.

Section 1983 does not allow foster children to enforce the Child Welfare Act’s Part B § 627 or Part E § 671 provisions when those provisions give them no enforceable rights.

Del A. v. Roemer · filed 1991-10-21

The plaintiffs therefore do not have an enforceable right under § 1983 for violations of section 627 in Part B or section 671 in Part E.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under the Medicaid Act because Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Babbitt v. State of Mich. · filed 1991-10-30

Congress has not foreclosed enforcement of the Medicaid Act under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits private plaintiffs to enforce the reasonable efforts requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).

Winston ex rel. Winston v. Children & Youth Services of Delaware County · filed 1991-11-07

We therefore conclude that subsection 671(a)(15) creates rights enforceable by private plaintiffs.

Section 1983 permits claims based on FERPA violations without requiring exhaustion of FERPA administrative remedies.

Krebs v. Rutgers · filed 1992-07-22

As an initial matter, defendants contend that plaintiffs do not have a likelihood of success of the merits of their FERPA claims because (1) FERPA does not provide a private cause of action; and (2) plaintiffs are not entitled to bring a section 1983 claim since they have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under FER-PA. The court rejects both of these arguments.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claimed violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s Class III gaming provision because that provision creates no enforceable federal right.

Forest County Potawatomi Community v. Doyle · filed 1993-01-26

Because plaintiffs have not shown that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act creates enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983 it is not necessary to reach the second question of whether Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits public housing tenants to enforce procedural requirements of HUD utility allowance regulations implementing the Brooke Amendment when challenging the reasonableness of allowances.

Dorsey v. Housing Authority Of Baltimore City · filed 1993-01-26

We thus reverse the district court's determination that Tenants have no enforceable rights to challenge procedural violations of the regulations promulgated under the Brooke Amendment.

Section 1983 permits beneficiaries to enforce the Medicaid Waiver Program’s mandatory requirements, including reasonable per capita expenditure estimates.

Wood v. Wallace · filed 1993-03-30

The Waiver Program provisions therefore, create a right, the violation of which is actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients and providers to enforce rights under the Medicaid Equal Access provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

Arkansas Medical Society, Inc. v. Reynolds · filed 1993-04-20

For the reasons set forth in the Court's Orders dated August 18, 1992 and November 5, 1992, the Court finds that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (Supp.1992) (the "Equal Access” provision), plaintiffs have enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that each of the plaintiffs has standing.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of a federal statutory right only when the underlying statute unambiguously confers that right.

Evelyn v. v. Kings County Hospital Center · filed 1993-04-21

A few principles are discerned: (1) the two-prong test first articulated in Golden State, and not expressly repudiated by Suter, remains a useful tool in considering whether a private plaintiff can sue under § 1983 to enforce statutory rights; but (2) in applying this test, courts must look carefully at the precise language of any statute relied on by plaintiffs as the source of the right they seek to enforce; and (3) the right at issue must be unambiguously conferred by the statute.

Section 1983 allows enforcement of a federal statute only if that statute creates a federal right for the plaintiff.

McMaster v. State of Minn. · filed 1993-04-29

However, a mere violation of federal law will not support a section 1983 claim: section 1983 can be used to enforce a federal statute only if the statute creates a federal right.

Section 1983 does not allow health care providers to enforce Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision because that provision creates no federal right in providers.

Nutritional Support Services, L.P. v. Miller · filed 1993-06-30

Because the Court concludes that the freedom of choice provision was not intended to benefit Plaintiffs, the Court also concludes that § 1396a(a)(23) does not create a federal right that they may enforce under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal prevailing-wage rights under § 5310, and allegations that municipal contract restrictions effectively compelled a private contractor to underpay wages satisfy its state-action requirement.

Chan v. City of New York · filed 1993-07-26

In sum, we conclude that Sec. 1983 is available as a remedy for state action that violated Sec. 5310. ... In sum, the facts alleged would suffice to permit a finding that HPD effectively required CPC to pay less than the minimum wages required by Sec. 5310, that the actions of CPC in paying those subminimum wages were the responsibility of the municipal defendants, and that CPC's conduct was therefore state action.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of § 5310's prevailing-wage rights against state actors despite the absence of an implied private action under § 5310, because Congress has not affirmatively withdrawn the § 1983 remedy.

Chan v. City of New York · filed 1993-07-26

Though there can be no implied direct private right of action unless Congress demonstrably intended to create one, the § 1983 remedy is presumptively available unless Congress has affirmatively withdrawn it. ... In sum, we conclude that § 1983 is available as a remedy for state action that violated § 5310.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of the right to a substantially compliant Title IV-D child-support program because a funding-reduction remedy is insufficient to establish congressional intent to foreclose such suits.

King v. Bradley · filed 1993-08-09

The only remedial measure provided under Title IV-D is a reduction in funding. This is insufficient evidence of Congressional intent to foreclose private enforcement of the right under § 1983.

A requirement to submit a satisfactory emergency-assistance state plan does not establish a sufficient likelihood of rights enforceable under Section 1983 to support a mandatory preliminary injunction.

Fountain v. Kelly · filed 1993-08-23

The State’s only obligation under the Social Security Act, however, is to submit a satisfactory plan, and Suter establishes that this is insufficient to create a private right of action. ... It is not for this court, however, to question the Supreme Court’s adherence to its own precedents; we hold only that the prospects of distinguishing Suter are too bleak to entitle appellants to reversal here.

Section 1983 permits beneficiaries of the public trust created by the Hawaii Admission Act to sue trustees for breach of trust because the Act creates federally enforceable rights.

Price v. Akaka · filed 1993-08-23

Congress enacted the Admission Act, a federal public trust, which by its nature creates a federally enforceable right for its beneficiaries to maintain an action against the trustee in breach of the trust. As a beneficiary, Price may therefore bring a § 1983 action under the Hawaii Admission Act against the trustees.

Section 1983 permits AFDC families to enforce Title IV-D's mandatory child support service requirements because its fiscal sanctions do not constitute a comprehensive remedial scheme foreclosing private enforcement.

Howe v. Ellenbecker · filed 1993-10-13

Title IV-D does contain an enforcement scheme in the form of fiscal sanctions the federal government may assert against the State, but these remedial measures are neither comprehensive nor available to the class. The federal government's authority to audit and impose monetary sanctions does not constitute "comprehensive" remedies. ... Our analysis under Wilder and Suter leads us to the conclusion that the Howe class may assert their claims under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits AFDC families to enforce Title IV-D child support services rights because its specific, mandatory obligations create enforceable rights and its fiscal sanctions do not foreclose private remedies.

Howe v. Ellenbecker · filed 1993-10-13

As a general rule, plaintiffs may bring private causes of action under section 1983 for violations of federal statutes. ... The mandates of Title IV-D are particular and specific enough to impose binding obligations on South Dakota, and accordingly, create substantive enforceable rights in the class. ... We see no enforcement provisions in Title IV-D that show a congressional intent to foreclose these Indian women and children from asserting private remedies.

Section 1983 may provide a remedy for a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act because that Act does not preclude a section 1983 action.

Independent Housing Services v. Fillmore Center Associates · filed 1993-12-28

The court adopts Judge Norris’s reasoning and holds that the ADA does not preclude an action under section 1983.