42 U.S.C. § 1983

Wage attachment for an existing child-support order satisfies due process when the obligor receives adequate notice and can promptly seek a postattachment stay.

Varner v. Bard · filed 1985-12-03

Because we find, based on undisputed facts, that Varner was afforded proper notice and an opportunity to be heard in conformity with the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, we will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Discharging an at-will public employee for alleged incompetence without public disclosure does not deprive a federally protected liberty interest supporting a § 1983 due-process claim.

Pealer v. Secretary of Agriculture · filed 1985-12-04

Accordingly, plaintiffs due process claim must fail because the state did not violate his federally protected liberty interests.

A procedural-due-process claim under Section 1983 requires deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

Economic Development Corp. v. Stierheim · filed 1986-02-20

As with the contract termination claim, the beginning point in assessing whether EDCO has stated an actionable claim under § 1983 for denial of procedural due process is the question whether it has been deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

A Section 1983 due-process claim fails when the plaintiff shows neither a protected property interest nor a protected liberty interest.

Mahfouz El Shahawy, M.D., Etc. v. William T. Harrison, Jr., Etc. · filed 1986-03-11

Shahawy’s civil rights claims were properly dismissed because his complaint did not demonstrate the existence of a protected property or liberty interest.

A Section 1983 due-process claim fails when a discretionary liquor-license scheme creates no protected property or liberty interest in receiving a license.

Ralph Scott and Henriette Scott v. Village of Kewaskum and Village Board of Kewaskum · filed 1986-03-21

Because the decision to deny a license deprived the Scotts of neither “liberty” nor “property,” the village board did not need to give an evidentiary hearing and state reasons.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim requires an actual deprivation, so an unauthorized official's mistaken statement that a permit is void cannot support liability when the permit remains legally effective.

Kerley Industries, Inc. v. Pima County · filed 1986-04-03

While plaintiff had a sufficient property interest to invoke procedural due process protections, it has suffered no deprivation. ... Kerley's mistaken belief that the Deputy Air Quality Control Officer’s letter constituted an annulment of its permit does not give that letter operative legal effect and therefore cannot constitute the basis of a claim of deprivation of property without due process.

An illegally issued building permit creates no vested property right capable of supporting a Section 1983 due-process claim.

Gunkel v. City of Emporia, Kansas · filed 1986-05-07

The court concludes that permit # 0852 did not create a vested property right, therefore plaintiff may not bring an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner cannot state a Section 1983 due-process claim over parole procedures when state law leaves parole officials with discretion and creates no liberty or property interest in parole.

Huggins v. John Isenbarger, Chairman, Indiana Parole Board · filed 1986-08-08

Under the analysis of that case, the new Indiana regime (as the Executive Branch of Indiana interprets and administers that regime) is no different from the old, and a prisoner has neither a liberty nor a property interest in his application for parole.

Procedural rules governing an internal military investigation do not themselves create a substantive property interest supporting a § 1983 due-process claim.

Sebra v. Neville · filed 1986-10-03

Procedures, such as rules governing the National Guard’s internal investigations, do not by themselves confer underlying substantive property rights. When a substantive property interest does not independently exist, rules for procedural fairness do not create such an interest.

A Section 1983 procedural due-process claim requires the plaintiff to identify an implicated life, liberty, or property interest.

Schwartz v. Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary of New York · filed 1986-10-14

To establish a denial of a federal right to due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a life, liberty, or property interest is implicated.

A Section 1983 due-process claim based on prison regulations requires a protected liberty interest.

Morgan v. District of Columbia · filed 1986-10-30

Plaintiff must first establish that he has a protected liberty interest for the due process clause to apply.

A public university may revoke a fraudulently obtained degree without violating due process when it gives the degree holder adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Crook v. Baker · filed 1987-03-05

However, we are satisfied that the Regents of the University of Michigan had the authority to revoke Crook’s degree and that, in doing so, they did not deprive him of due process of law under the federal Constitution.

A discretionary prison work-release program creates no liberty interest enforceable under § 1983 when its statutes and regulations lack mandatory language or substantive limits on officials' selection authority.

Mahfouz v. Lockhart · filed 1987-08-25

Applying these standards in the instant case, we hold that the Arkansas statutes do not create a protected liberty interest in participation in the work/study release program.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process plaintiff has a protected interest in existing rates for past services before a retroactive rate increase, but no protected interest in rates for future services.

Rr Village Association, Inc., Jay Stanleigh and Authur L. Penzel, Plaintiffs v. Denver Sewer Corporation and Town of Rox · filed 1987-08-26

Turning to the merits, we conclude that defendants were entitled to judgment insofar as plaintiffs sought relief from the increase in the rates for future sewage services, because plaintiffs had no protectable property interest in future rates. On the other hand, plaintiffs did have such an interest in the rates they had been required to pay in the past, and they were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Town could properly approve a retroactive rate increase.

A § 1983 due-process claim may proceed when a licensing official rejects credibility findings and recommends revoking a medical license without affording the licensee a meaningful hearing.

Blake v. Ambach · filed 1987-12-21

By doing so, the Commissioner may have deprived Blake of his significant right to property in the form of a medical license without affording him the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. ... Since it appears from the record currently before the Court that the Commissioner recommended the revocation of Blake’s license without affording him due process, defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim for an investigation of medical staff privileges when the investigation does not restrict those privileges.

Setliff v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County · filed 1988-07-01

Accordingly, he suffered no unconstitutional deprivation of his medical privileges simply because he was not granted a hearing during the investigation.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue an individual acting under color of state law for depriving them of rights protected by the Constitution or federal laws.

Simmonds v. TDCJ · filed 2010-02-24

For the same reason, we hold that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine does not apply and that, based on the meager record before us, Simmonds’s section 1983 claim against O’Reilly, Roddey, Simmons, and Castleberry has an arguable basis in law and in fact and should not have been dismissed as frivolous.

Section 1983 lets a person sue state actors for violating constitutional rights, including the right to procedural due process.

Assenov v. University of Utah · filed 2008-04-22

Mr. Assenov’s first claim is for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In sum, the court finds that Mr. Asse-nov’s procedural due process claim may proceed against both individual Defendants. The court’s legal analysis indicates that Mr. Assenov was constitutionally entitled to process before he was dismissed from the NEP, that Dr. Krahenbuhl and Dr. Slaughter were in a position to provide it, and that there is a genuine fact dispute about whether they did so.

Section 1983 protects against municipal land-use actions that violate due process when the plaintiff has a cognizable or vested property interest.

Hilburg v. New York State Department of Transportation · filed 2016-04-27

The 42 USC § 1983 cause of action was properly dismissed, but on a ground different than that relied upon by the Supreme Court. “In the land-use context, 42 USC § 1983 protects against municipal actions that violate a property owner’s rights to due process” (Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617, 626 [2004]). In order to establish a violation of due process rights in this context, a plaintiff is required to establish “a cognizable or vested property interest, not the mere hope of one” (Sonne v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Suffern, 67 AD3d 192, 201 [2009]; see Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d at 627; Leonard v Planning Bd. of Town of Union Vale, 136 AD3d 873 [2016]; Zahra v Town of Southold, 48 F3d 674, 680 [2d Cir 1995]). Here, even accepting the factual allegations asserted by the appellants as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the Village respondents and the DOT respondents correctly contended that, as a matter of law, the appellants do not have a cognizable or vested property interest in maintaining a parking prohibition on a state highway (cf. Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d 41, 52-53 [1996]). Accordingly, the appellants failed to state a cause of action to recover damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits an actionable claim when a state official fails to act despite a duty to do so.

Dimarzo v. Robert E. Cahill, Frank A. Hall, James Dimarzo v. Robert E. Cahill · filed 1978-05-19

Failure to act where there is a duty to act can give rise to an actionable claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on state officials’ failure to act when they had an affirmative duty under state law.

Walker v. Rowe · filed 1982-01-27

The consequence of state officials’ failure to act when they had an affirmative duty to do so under state law is sufficient to support a valid § 1983 claim.

An officer who is present while other officers use unnecessary force has a duty to intervene and may be liable under Section 1983 for failing to do so, even if the offending officers are superiors.

Webb v. Hiykel · filed 1983-08-08

Stanzel accompanied Webb from the lineup room to his cell. If Stanzel did not subject Webb to unnecessary force, he was nonetheless under a duty to prevent the use of such force, even if the officers beating Webb were his superiors.

An officer who is present while other officers use unnecessary force has a duty to intervene and may be liable under Section 1983 for failing to do so, even if the offending officers are superiors.

Webb v. Hiykel · filed 1983-09-09

Stanzel accompanied Webb from the lineup room to his cell. If Stanzel did not subject Webb to unnecessary force, he was nonetheless under a duty to prevent the use of such force, even if the officers beating Webb were his superiors.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 without active involvement when actual or constructive notice makes the failure to curb subordinates’ constitutional violations grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent.

Barrett v. United States · filed 1986-10-03

In order to prove the liability of a supervisor or high official under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for unconstitutional acts performed by persons under his authority, it is not necessary to prove the supervisor’s active involvement in the wrongful behavior. Instead, a supervisor or other high official may be found liable under Section 1983 if he had either actual or constructive notice of the unconstitutional behavior, such that the failure to curb the subordinates’ wrongful acts could be classified as “gross negligence,” or as “deliberate indifference” to the alleged infractions of constitutional rights.

Municipal inaction creates Section 1983 liability only when officials knew of prior police misconduct and deliberately failed to act so that the failure rose to the level of policy or custom.

Harvey v. Hankins · filed 1988-01-13

In order for a plaintiff to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must prove that city officials had notice of prior incidents of police misconduct and that they had deliberately failed to act on this knowledge. ... A municipality will be liable only if its failure to take action concerning a known problem rises to the level of a policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-act claim against an official responsible for protecting a constitutional right when the official displays deliberate indifference or gross negligence; an allegation of reckless indifference can satisfy that requirement.

Sowers v. Bradford Area School District · filed 1988-08-29

The second requirement for a § 1983 claim for a failure to act is that the official having the responsibility to act must display “deliberate indifference” or “gross negligence.” ... We therefore conclude that the plaintiff’s allegation of “reckless indifference” properly states a claim against the defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 failure-to-train liability attaches to a municipality rather than an individual defendant.

Caldwell v. Woodford County Chief Jailer, James Moore, Harry Stephen Tracy Rick Adkins Daniel E. Clark W. Kei · filed 1992-07-01

Failure to train liability, however, attaches to a municipality rather than to an individual defendant.

A municipality’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment can support § 1983 liability when the obvious risk and lack of reporting measures amount to deliberate indifference, even without actual knowledge of the harassment.

Reynolds v. Borough of Avalon · filed 1992-08-05

We hold that a reasonable jury might find that the risk of sexual harassment in the workplace is so obvious that an employer’s failure to take action to prevent or stop it from occurring — even in the absence of actual knowledge of its occurrence — constitutes deliberate indifference, where the employer has also failed to take any steps to encourage the reporting of such incidents. Therefore, we find that defendants have failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the failure of Borough officials to prevent or stop the harassment of Susan Reynolds did not constitute a policy for which the Borough can be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming that a government official without supervisory authority failed to act to identify a legal duty to act; without that duty, the omission is not under color of law.

Doe v. Claiborne County ex rel. Claiborne County Board of Education · filed 1996-12-26

We conclude that to state a claim for a failure to act when the alleged wrongdoer is not a supervisory government official, a plaintiff must separately establish the “color of law” requirement of section 1983 by identifying some cognizable duty that state or federal law imposes upon the alleged “enactor.” In the absence of a duty there is no section 1983 liability because the failure to act cannot be said to have occurred under color of law.

Section 1983 does not make an official liable for failing to prevent continued retaliation when the official has no affirmative duty to act.

Matthews v. Blumenthal · filed 2008-06-12

Because the law puts no duty on the Attorney General to publish any such report within any time period, he cannot be held liable under section 1983 for contributing to continued retaliation.

Section 1983 applies to omissions as well as affirmative acts when the conduct deprives a person of federal rights.

Wagar v. Hasenkrug · filed 1980-01-29

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is applicable whether the actions complained of are acts of commission or acts of omission.

Section 1983 permits suit against state hospital employees who fail to take steps to transfer a committed detainee when they owe the detainee a duty of care.

Atayde v. Napa State Hospital · filed 2017-05-25

This court thus concludes that defendants White and Matteucci owed a duty of care to decedent'for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, and are properly subject to suit under § 1983 for failing to take steps to effect decedent’s transfer to NSH.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipality’s deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional violations causes an injury through its failure to act.

J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin · filed 2020-05-15

These teachings from the Supreme Court and our court make plain that Monell liability based on a failure to act, at its core, follows from a showing of constitutional violations caused by a municipality’s deliberate indifference to the risk of such violations.

Section 1983 permits a municipal failure-to-act claim to proceed when the alleged facts could establish that a policymaker was deliberately indifferent to an obvious need to prevent constitutional violations.

HENRY v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-10-27

Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiffs have met their burden for a failure-to-act claim under Monell. The Court will DENY Defendants’ motion as it pertains to Count IX.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant for the individual acts of an alleged co-conspirator; each defendant may be held liable only for acts he personally undertook.

Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith · filed 1978-06-08

For these reasons, this Court concludes that each defendant in this case may be held liable, if at all, only for those acts that he personally undertook and not for the acts of any co-defendant.

Section 1983 gives federal courts equitable authority to shape broad, effective remedies for constitutional violations.

Bagby v. Beal · filed 1978-10-18

Under § 1983, the substantive scope of relief available is a matter relating to the equitable powers of a federal court. The Courts have generally exercised broad remedial powers in such civil rights actions.

Georgia’s municipal ante litem notice requirement does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Whipple v. City of Cordele · filed 1998-03-17

The provisions of OCGA § 36-33-5 do not apply to actions filed pursuant to 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 actions against New York municipalities are not subject to the state’s municipal notice-of-claim requirement or special municipal limitations period.

Meiselman v. Richardson · filed 1990-08-20

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, the provisions of New York General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50 — i are inapplicable to section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 actions are not barred by state procedural notice-of-claim requirements.

Perrote v. Percy · filed 1978-07-11

The defendants have cited no authority for the proposition that a state procedural statute such as § 895.45 can be invoked to bar an action brought under § 1983. Acceptance of the defendants’ position would unacceptably elevate subtleties of state procedural law above the avenue of relief created by Congress for the protection of federal constitutional rights from deprivations by persons acting with state authority.

Section 1983 provides a federal avenue for relief from violations of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law, and state procedural notice requirements cannot bar that claim.

Doe v. Ellis · filed 1981-07-17

Plaintiff was not required to comply with the notice provisions with regard to his claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. ... We agree that this state procedural statute cannot bar a congressionally created right to obtain relief for violations of federal constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order which dismissed plaintiff’s sec. 1983 claim.

A state governmental-immunity act's notice requirement cannot bar a claim for relief under Section 1983.

Deason v. Lewis · filed 1985-08-08

Although dismissal with prejudice was proper with respect to plaintiff’s claims arising under state law, we agree with plaintiff’s contention that his complaint also set forth a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which could not be barred by his failure to comply with the notice provision of the GIA.

State-law notice-of-claim requirements do not apply to § 1983 actions because they are unnecessary to fill any gap in federal law.

Burroughs v. Holiday Inn · filed 1985-10-29

I still hold my original opinion that state law notice of claim requirements are inapplicable here, regardless of whether they are “consistent” with the Civil Rights Acts, simply because they are not necessary to fill any void or deficiency in federal law.

New York’s municipal notice-of-claim requirements do not apply to federal civil-rights actions under § 1983.

Doty v. Rochester City Police Department · filed 1986-01-06

That argument must be rejected, since those provisions of the New York General Municipal Law are not applicable to a federal civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions are not governed by the limitations and claim-presentation procedures of California's Tort Claims Act.

Gamel v. City of San Francisco · filed 1986-05-02

§ 1983 actions are not subject to the limitations and procedures of the Tort Claims Act.

A Section 1983 damages action against a New York municipality is subject to the notice-of-claim requirement in General Municipal Law § 50-i.

423 South Salina Street, Inc. v. City of Syracuse · filed 1986-11-20

In light of the foregoing analysis and bearing in mind that the Supreme Court has yet to consider the question, we conclude that General Municipal Law § 50-i is applicable to this action.

Failure to serve a state-law notice of claim permits dismissal of a Section 1983 claim in state court.

Benjamin v. County of Warren · filed 1987-03-12

Finally, it was not error for Special Term to dismiss the Federal civil rights claim asserted under 42 USC § 1983 for failure to serve a notice of claim ...).

According to this decision, a plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim in Wisconsin state court had to comply with the state's municipal notice-of-claim statute.

Felder v. Casey · filed 1987-06-24

We now hold that failure to comply with sec. 893.80, Stats., bars a litigant who is pressing a federal civil rights claim from proceeding with that claim in state court. ... In sum, we hold that plaintiffs advancing federal civil rights claims in state court are required to comply with the notice of claim statute, sec. 893.80, Stats.

A state governmental-immunity notice requirement cannot be imposed as a condition precedent to a federal Section 1983 action.

Chacon v. Zahorka · filed 1987-07-01

I have held notice of a claim is not required in a federal civil rights case. ... Defendants’ assertion that Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-10-109 (Cumm.Supp.1986) bars this action is without merit.

State or local tort claims notice provisions do not apply to actions brought under § 1983.

Mueller v. Penobscot Valley Hospital · filed 1988-03-08

We therefore join the majority of federal and state courts that have, for a variety of reasons, reached the same conclusion that state or local notice provisions are inapplicable to actions brought pursuant to § 1983.

State notice-of-claim requirements that burden the § 1983 remedy and produce different outcomes in state and federal court are preempted in state-court § 1983 actions.

Felder v. Casey · filed 1988-06-22

Because the notice-of-claim statute at issue here conflicts in both its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of § 1983, and because its enforcement in such actions will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in § 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court, we conclude that the state law is pre-empted when the § 1983 action is brought in a state court.

Section 1983 claims brought in Indiana state courts are not subject to the Indiana Tort Claim Act’s notice-of-claim requirement.

George v. Hatcher · filed 1988-08-22

Although Clark and Werblo v. Hamilton Heights School Corp. (1988), Ind.App., 519 N.E.2d 185, would previously have been dispositive in barring the Employees' claim, these cases have been overruled to the extent that they held that the ITCA notice-of-claim provision applies to § 1983 suits in our courts.

Section 1983 claims brought in state court do not require service of a state-law notice of claim as a condition precedent.

Zurat v. Town of Stockport · filed 1988-11-10

The foregoing eliminates service of a notice of claim as a condition precedent to prosecution of petitioners’ Federal civil rights claim and thus renders this appeal moot.

State notice of claim requirements do not apply to section 1983 actions brought in federal court.

Joshua v. Newell · filed 1989-04-03

We hold that the Washington notice of claims statute does not apply to section 1983 claims brought in federal court.

Section 1983 preempts state tort claims act notice requirements for § 1983 actions brought in state court.

Werblo v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF HAMILTON HEIGHTS SCHOOL CORP. · filed 1989-05-04

Wisconsin had notice provisions in its tort claims act similar to those involved in the instant case and the United States Supreme Court held that under the principles of federalism and the supremacy clause (Art. 6, cl. 2) of the Federal Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 preempted the application of Wisconsin’s notice of claim statute to a § 1983 action brought in Wisconsin state court. ... The holding in Felder is dispositive of the issue in the instant case.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to a state notice-of-claim requirement.

Brown v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 1989-07-31

It is well established that for actions commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a notice of claim cannot be required.

Section 1983 civil rights claims do not require compliance with the notice of claim requirements of New York General Municipal Law § 50-e.

Rattner v. Planning Commission of Village of Pleasantville · filed 1989-12-13

We recognize that compliance with the notice of claim requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e is not necessary to recover for alleged violations of a party’s civil rights under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Felder v Casey, 487 US 131), or where an action is brought in equity to restrain a continuing act and the demand for money damages is merely incidental to the requested injunctive relief (Rand v City of New York, 47 AD2d 937).

Section 1983 claims are not subject to the District of Columbia’s notice requirement in D.C. Code § 12-309.

Johnson-El v. District of Columbia · filed 1990-07-31

As an Eighth Amendment claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Johnson-El’s complaint is not subject to the notice provisions of D.C. Code § 12-309.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by failure to serve notice within the Indiana Tort Claims Act’s deadline.

Vukadinovich v. Board of School Trustees of Michigan City Area Schools · filed 1991-09-23

Mr. Vukadinovich responds by clarifying the basis on which he seeks relief for the alleged slander and defamation: he does not rely on state common law, but only on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, his failure to serve timely notice does not bar his claims against the defendants for slander and defamation.

Section 1983 claims filed in state court are not subject to state notice-of-claim requirements.

Lawless v. City of Buffalo · filed 1991-11-15

Supreme Court erred by denying plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint to add a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with the notice of claim requirements of General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i.

Section 1983 does not require a notice of claim before suing a municipality for a civil rights violation.

Omni Group Farms, Inc. v. County of Cayuga · filed 1991-12-26

We agree with plaintiffs that an action against a municipality for a violation of civil rights under 42 USC § 1983 does not require the filing of a notice of claim (see, Felder v Casey, 487 US 131).

Section 1983 suits brought in federal court are not subject to New York municipal notice-of-claim requirements.

Day v. Moscow · filed 1992-01-24

The flaw in this argument is that, though New York's notice-of-claim requirements were, prior to Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, applicable to § 1983 suits brought in state court, they were not applicable to § 1983 suits brought in federal court.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to Florida's notice-of-claim requirement when it effectively shortens the four-year limitations period to three years.

BROOKS BY AND THROUGH McCOOK v. Elliott · filed 1992-02-21

Thus, federal law preempts Florida from imposing a notice-of-claim requirement on appellant that effectively shortens to three years the four-year statute of limitations.

A plaintiff need not comply with state notice of claim requirements to recover under § 1983.

Wanczowski v. City of New York · filed 1992-10-08

We reinstate however, the second cause of action for violation of civil rights based on 42 USC § 1983 because compliance with notice of claim requirements is not prerequisite to a recovery on that theory (Felder v Casey, 487 US 131; Matter of Rattner v Planning Commn., 156 AD2d 521, 525, lv dismissed 75 NY2d 897).

Section 1983 suits are not barred by a state notice-of-claim requirement for claims against a municipality.

Lanmar Corp. v. Rendine · filed 1993-01-11

Thus, § 45-15-5 is not a bar to this § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 suits in federal court to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment are not subject to state or local notice-of-claim prerequisites.

Crist v. Town Court · filed 1994-07-20

Under this doctrine, state or local notieeof-claim prerequisites to suit are inapplicable in federal cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the purpose of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 claims are not defeated by failure to comply with Nebraska’s municipal notice-of-claim requirement.

Calabro v. City of Omaha · filed 1995-05-12

The plaintiffs’ failure to file a notice of claim under § 14-804 also cannot defeat the plaintiffs’ § 1983 civil rights claim.

A § 1983 claim requires a federal constitutional basis and an allegation that state remedies are inadequate.

Menick v. City of Menasha · filed 1996-03-06

A claim under this section must include a federal constitutional basis for the claim. ... It must also assert that there is an inadequate state remedy for the claim.

State notice-of-injury requirements do not bar a § 1983 cause of action.

Wolff v. Secretary of the South Dakota Game, Fish & Parks Department · filed 1996-03-06

Thus, the notice of injury provisions have no effect whatsoever on the viability of Wolffs’ § 1983 cause of action.

State notice-of-claim requirements cannot bar § 1983 claims filed in state court against government employees.

McGehee v. DePoyster · filed 1996-09-04

Therefore, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) cannot be used to bar McGehee's § 1983 claims against DePoyster merely because they were brought in state court rather in federal court.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 action need not file a municipal notice of claim before commencing the action.

Feuer v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 1996-09-23

Since it is a Federal civil rights action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, a notice of claim is not a condition precedent to commencement of an action.

A § 1983 civil rights action is not subject to Indiana Tort Claims Act notice requirements, and filing one does not by itself give notice of an intended state tort claim.

Bienz v. Bloom · filed 1996-12-23

As was stated above, the notice requirement of the Act does not apply to claims based upon civil rights. By commencing a civil rights action against Bloom and the Board, Bienz informed the appellees of her intent to assert a “non” tort claim action. Bienz’ civil rights action was nothing more than a notice she intended to bring a § 1983 action against Bloom and the Board. The federal action did not amount to substantial compliance with -the Act.

Section 1983 civil rights claims are not subject to the notice provisions of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.

Johnson v. Does · filed 1997-01-17

The notice provisions of New Jersey's Tort Claims Act do not apply to civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint that fails to explain how the defendants violated the Act may be dismissed with leave to amend.

Baradell v. BD. OF SOCIAL SERVS. PITTSYLVANIA CTY. · filed 1997-02-27

The complaint, however, fails to state how defendants have violated said Act. Consequently, with respect to claims based on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, defendants’ motion shall be granted, and plaintiff shall have leave to amend the complaint.

State tort claim notice requirements do not apply to § 1983 claims.

Estate of Conner ex rel. Conner v. Ambrose · filed 1997-12-23

Notice of tort claim required under state law is not applicable to Section 1983 claims. Therefore, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims remain valid.

State notice-of-claim requirements cannot bar § 1983 actions brought in state court.

McGehee v. DePoyster · filed 1998-03-12

Therefore, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) cannot be used to bar McGehee's § 1983 claims against DePoyster merely because they were brought in state court rather in federal court.

Section 1983 federal constitutional claims cannot be barred by Wisconsin's notice of claim requirement.

Lounge Management, Ltd. v. Town of Trenton · filed 1998-06-18

Federal constitutional challenges brought under § 1983 cannot be barred by Wisconsin's notice of claim requirement.

Section 1983 preempts state laws requiring a civil rights plaintiff to notify a prospective defendant before suing.

Ellis v. City of San Diego · filed 1999-05-14

A civil rights plaintiff cannot be required by state law to give a prospective defendant “notice” of an intention to sue because § 1983, which exists to vindicate important federally created rights, preempts state notice-of-claim statutes.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act’s notice provisions.

Forcella v. City of Ocean City · filed 1999-11-17

The notice provisions of the TCA do not apply to Forcella’s claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994), the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), or the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 — 10:5-49 (West Supp.1999).

Section 1983 does not excuse compliance with a state court rule requiring notice to interested persons before declaratory relief is granted.

Tucker v. Maher · filed 1984-03-13

It is clearly beyond the reach of reason and due process for us to agree that Practice Book § 390 (d), which provides for notice to interested persons in this ease, violates the supremacy clause where a great number of persons having an interest have not been given notice. If anything, § 390 (d) is in keeping with the spirit of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 giving such persons notice and is compatible with fundamental due process.

Section 1983 claims brought in state court need not comply with Wisconsin's municipal notice statute.

Thorp v. Town of Lebanon · filed 2000-06-21

According to Felder, the federal constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not have to comply with the Wisconsin notice statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1).

Section 1983 claims against the District of Columbia are not barred by failure to comply with D.C.Code § 12-309’s notice requirement.

Powell v. District of Columbia · filed 1986-09-16

The first inquiry concerns the application of Section 12-309 to plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of constitutional rights in violation of Section 1983. ... Because of the Brown v. United States opinion, plaintiff’s federal tort claims are preserved from the notice requirements of D.C.Code § 12-309.

A § 1983 claim seeking to vindicate a public interest is not subject to a state notice-of-claim prerequisite.

Industrial Refuse Systems, Inc. v. O'Rourke · filed 1986-11-24

While it is true that the Mills case held that a suit alleging violation of Federal rights is not immune to State notice of claim requirements, there is no need to file a notice of claim where the suit seeks to vindicate a public interest. It is clear that this is such a suit. Consequently, plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988, wherein they seek attorney’s fees for violation of constitutional rights, is not subject to the notice of claim prerequisite.

Section 1983 claims against a county are not subject to Alabama’s county notice-of-claim requirements.

Ford v. Jefferson County · filed 2000-07-21

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in applying the county notice-of-claim statutes to the officers' claim arising under the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions are not subject to Georgia’s municipal ante litem notice requirement.

Dover v. City of Jackson · filed 2000-10-24

We first note that the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 36-33-5 does not apply to actions filed pursuant to 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to New York’s notice-of-claim requirement under General Municipal Law § 50-e.

Zwecker v. Clinch · filed 2001-01-22

The plaintiffs failure to file a notice of claim concerning the July 22, 1993, arrest does not require dismissal of her claims under 42 USC § 1983 against the respondents.

A complaint that does not allege a deprivation of life, liberty, or property under color of state law does not state a Section 1983 claim.

Havis v. Marshall County · filed 2001-05-25

Havis did not assert in his complaint that any of the defendants had deprived him of life, liberty, or property under color of state law, so as to state a claim arising under federal law (see 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 claims are not subject to notice of claim requirements.

Sangermano v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services · filed 2002-01-22

However, notice of claim requirements are inapplicable to claims pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see, Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 498; Zwecker v Clinch, 279 AD2d 572, 574; Lopez v Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551, 552-553; Gorman v Sachem Cent. School Dist., 232 AD2d 452).

Section 1983 claims are not barred by failure to satisfy D.C. Code § 12-309's notice requirement.

Day v. DC DEPT. OF CONSUMER · filed 2002-03-12

The court first notes that well-settled case law holds that Section 12-309 does not apply to the plaintiff's alleged deprivation of constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, applying Brown's line of reasoning, the court concludes that Section 12-309's notice requirement does not bar the plaintiff's federal claims against the defendants from proceeding.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights claim based solely on disagreement with a court’s interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay.

Castelle v. State of New York · filed 2002-07-03

The district court, after reading the pro se plaintiffs pleadings liberally, also properly determined that Castelle had failed to state a claim under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985. Plaintiff bases his civil rights claims on his disagreement with Susman and Justice Franco regarding the appropriate interpretation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. As the district court rightly stated, “[s]uch disagreement is the proper basis of an appeal, not a civil rights claim.”

Section 1983 claims are not subject to state notice-of-claim requirements.

Mompoint v. City of New York · filed 2002-11-25

The Supreme Court erred in dismissing the third cause of action pursuant to General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i. “[N]otice of claim requirements are inapplicable to claims pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” (Sangermano v Board of Coop. Educ. Serv. of Nassau County, 290 AD2d 498, 499; see Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496; Lopez v Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551).

Section 1983 claims against a municipality do not require the ante litem notice prescribed by O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5.

Booker v. City of Atlanta · filed 1984-03-30

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action defendant City of Atlanta has moved to dismiss, claiming that it has not received ante litem notice of this suit as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (1982). ... Defendant City of Atlanta’s ante litem notice argument is without any merit.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Arizona’s notice-of-claims statute, A.R.S. § 12-821.

Tryon v. Avra Valley Fire District · filed 1986-09-30

Accordingly, this Court decides that Tryon’s cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not barred by A.R.S. § 12-821 and Count One may not be dismissed on that ground.

Section 1983 permits claims for deprivation of federal rights, subject to requirements such as exhaustion and immunity.

Lowe v. Warren · filed 1987-04-29

The brief and conclusory allegation contained in Lowe's complaint fails to state a viable fourth amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec.1983.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to the Indiana Tort Claims Act's notice requirements.

Irwin Mortgage Corp. v. Marion County Treasurer · filed 2004-10-18

Further, the TTCA's notice requirements are inapplicable to Irwin's § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to state notice of claim requirements.

WARY v. City of New York · filed 2004-10-18

The notice of claim requirement is not applicable to federal claims under section 1983.

Bizarre allegations that cannot be construed as actionable conduct do not state a claim under Section 1983.

Myers v. Sheriff of Sevier County · filed 1989-06-09

Plaintiff's initial action (Case No. 88-6142) was based upon allegations of bizarre actions, none of which could be construed as actionable under Sec. 1983. Likewise, plaintiff's second action (Case No. 89-5155) cannot be construed as alleging anything actionable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 actions are not subject to Wisconsin's notice of claims statute.

Medley v. City Of Milwaukee · filed 1992-07-17

Although the appellants correctly note that the notice of claims statute is inapplicable to § 1983 actions, see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2307, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988), they have failed to apprise us of how they are entitled to due process of law in HACM's establishment of the amount of rent they may charge for their apartments if they participate in the Rent Assistance Program.

A Section 1983 claim that fails to state a constitutional claim is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

Doe v. Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2006-04-25

If a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not ... state a constitutional claim, it is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1).

A § 1983 claim against the District of Columbia is not barred by failure to comply with D.C. Code § 12-309’s notice requirement.

Bowie v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-04

Thus, as failure to meet the requirements of D.C.Code § 12-309 is irrelevant to plaintiffs claim under § 1983, summary judgment on that basis must be denied.

A Section 1983 claim against local government employees for conduct within the scope of their employment is subject to Washington’s notice-of-claim requirement.

Wright v. Terrell · filed 2006-10-24

Similarly, the constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relating to a failure to maintain a reasonably safe and secure workplace, was properly dismissed for failure to comply with the notice of claim statute.

Section 1983 claims against the District of Columbia do not require notice under D.C.Code § 12-309.

Candido v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-06-22

Thus, so long as the plaintiff satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2), no further notice adherence is necessary.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to the notice of claim requirements of New York General Municipal Law § 50-e.

Pendleton v. City of New York · filed 2007-10-09

The notice of claim requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e do not apply to federal civil rights claims asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Felder v Casey, 487 US 131 [1988]; Zwecker v Clinch, 279 AD2d 572 [2001]).

Section 1983 actions are not subject to Georgia’s municipal ante litem notice requirement.

White v. City of Atlanta Police Department · filed 2008-01-24

... Whiite correctly argues that the ante litem notice provisions of OCGA § 36-33-5 do not apply to actions filed pursuant to 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a notice of claim before an action is commenced.

Burroughs v. Holiday Inn · filed 1985-04-17

Clearly, no similar conclusion can be drawn from Congress’ failure to require a notice of claim prior to commencement of an action under Section 1983.

A § 1983 complaint may be dismissed when it fails to state a claim for relief even after liberal construction.

Little v. Anderson · filed 2009-03-05

The district court properly dismissed Little’s complaint because, even when liberally construed, it failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 civil rights actions against a school district do not require compliance with New York’s three-month verified-complaint notice requirement.

Brandon v. The Board of Education of the Guilderland Central School District · filed 1980-11-17

Judge McCurn correctly held that the plaintiffs’ failure to present a written verified complaint to the school officials within three months after the accrual of their claim, required by New York Educ. Law § 3813(1) (McKinney) as a condition precedent to the commencement of non-tort suits against a school district, did not necessitate dismissal of the complaint. He found that compliance with the notice requirement is not mandatory in civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights without requiring service of a notice of claim.

Sonne v. Board of Trustees of Village of Suffern · filed 2009-09-29

A cause of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 does not require service of a notice of claim (see Rapoli v Village of Red Hook, 41 AD3d 456 [2007]).

Section 1983 claims are not subject to California’s Tort Claims Act claim presentation requirement.

Via v. City of Fairfield · filed 2011-06-13

Plaintiff's first cause of action, however, is a federal claim under § 1983 and is thus not subject to the TCA.

Section 1983 claims for damages based on violations of federal civil or constitutional rights under color of state law do not require a notice of claim.

Rowe v. NYCPD · filed 2011-06-21

However, a notice of claim is not a condition precedent to a cause of action, asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, which seeks to recover damages premised on violations of federal civil or constitutional rights under color of state law (see 42 USC § 1983; Felder v Casey, 487 US 131 [1988]; Burton v Matteliano, 81 AD3d 1272 [2011]; Montano v City of Watervliet, 47 AD3d 1106 [2008]; Pendleton v City of New York, 44 AD3d 733 [2007]).

Section 1983 claims are not subject to a state statutory notice of claim requirement.

Meyer v. County of Suffolk · filed 2011-12-13

A cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is not subject to a state statutory notice of claim requirement (see Felder v Casey, 487 US 131, 153 [1988]; Rowe v NYCPD, 85 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2011]).

Section 1983 claims are not subject to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s notice requirements.

City of Belzoni v. Johnson · filed 2012-02-16

For the above-mentioned reasons, the notice requirements of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act are not applicable to a Title VII or Section 1983 claim.

A complaint that alleges no facts supporting a Section 1983 claim fails to state a claim under the section.

Rodas v. Town of Farmington · filed 2013-01-16

Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege any facts supporting a claim under this section, and therefore, I find that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against a town or its employees do not require a New York notice of claim.

Pflaum v. Town of Stuyvesant · filed 2013-03-28

As indicated above in Part II.F.l. of this Decision and Order, the filing of a notice of claim is not a condition precedent to the commencement of an action against the Town or its employees for the filing of federal civil rights claims. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to file a notice of claim is denied regarding Plaintiffs § 1983 claims for violations of his rights under the United States Constitution in Counts I and IV of his complaint.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to New York State notice of claim requirements.

Eberle v. Town of Southampton · filed 2013-11-27

However, “New York State notice of claim requirements do not apply to claims brought pursuant to Section 1983.” ... Thus, given the absence of undue prejudice to the Defendant, Court finds that the Plaintiffs federal claims against Stabile may proceed forward.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to give tort claim notice before bringing a claim.

Voth v. Smith · filed 2003-06-05

We accept defendants’ concession that plaintiff need not give tort claim notice for his section 1983 claim, as well as their concession that the sufficiency of his notice allegation should be tested by a motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 claims do not require a notice of claim before they may be brought.

Chenkin v. City of New York · filed 2013-02-26

While a notice of claim is not a prerequisite for such a claim (see Wanczowski v City of New York, 186 AD2d 397 [1st Dept 1992]), the allegations failed to state a viable section 1983 claim.

A plaintiff seeking to recover for a civil rights violation under § 1983 need not comply with New York’s notice of claim requirement.

Onadia v. City of New York · filed 2017-01-09

Notwithstanding the above, “compliance with the notice of claim requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e is not necessary to recover for alleged violations of a party’s civil rights under 42 USC § 1983” (Matter of Rattner v Planning Commn. of Vil. of Pleasantville, 156 AD2d 521, 525 [2d Dept 1989]).

Section 1983 does not require a notice of claim before a plaintiff may sue individual municipal employees.

Blake v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-29

Blake’s failure to name Hanrahan, O’Hara, and Miltenberg in his notice of claim did not warrant dismissal of his ninth and tenth causes of action, alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, insofar as asserted against them, since a notice of claim is not a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Vargas v City of New York, 105 AD3d at 836).

Section 1983 claims are not subject to Washington's notice of claim statutes.

Y. Kim v. Best Buy And City Of Federal Way · filed 2017-10-02

However, Washington's notice of claim statutes do not apply to federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A notice of claim is not a condition precedent to a Section 1983 action.

Rodriguez v. County of Suffolk · filed 2017-11-15

The Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint on the ground that the two new proposed causes of action to recover damages for civil rights violations were not delineated in the notice of claim, as. “a notice of claim is not a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” (Blake v City of New York, 148 AD3d 1101, 1105 [2017]).

A plaintiff need not serve a state law notice of claim before bringing a § 1983 claim.

Kassapian v. City of New York · filed 2017-11-15

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for leave to amend the complaint to assert an alternative First Amendment retaliation cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, for which a notice of claim is not required (see Felder v Casey, 487 US 131, 153 [1988]; Blake v City of New York, 148 AD3d 1101, 1105 [2017]).

A plaintiff need not serve a notice of claim before bringing a Section 1983 claim.

Mirro v. City of New York · filed 2018-03-28

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to assert an alternative First Amendment retaliation cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, for which a notice of claim is not required ( see Felder v Casey, 487 US 131, 153; Blake v City of New York, 148 AD3d 1101, 1105).

Section 1983 claims are not subject to state statutory notice of claim requirements.

Matter of Nicholson v. City of New York · filed 2018-11-28

Such a claim is not subject to the State statutory notice of claim requirement ( see Felder v Casey , 487 US 131, 153; Meyer v County of Suffolk , 90 AD3d 720, 722).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a federal right committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Sanders v. Itawamba County · filed 2019-07-09

“To establish a claim under § 1983, [Sanders] must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Pratt v. Harris Cty., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is no error in the ruling that Sanders’ claims against his public defender and the four Itawamba County defendants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 requires allegations that state a claim; references to negligence and procedural rules alone do not suffice.

Dinkins v. Region Ten CSB · filed 2019-07-29

The amended complaint references 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in two paragraphs. First, the complaint cites § 1983 for the proposition that tort causes of action with “Negligence manipulated to secure the collection of payment,” provide original federal jurisdiction. (Dkt. 7 ¶ 11). The amended complaint references § 1983 “usage” but in the context of allegations regarding “real parties in interest” and Rules 17 and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 7 ¶ 19). In neither case does Plaintiff state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Vigil v. Doe · filed 2019-07-31

Vigil does not allege any facts showing that Google LLC deprived him of a federal right. Consequently, Vigil has not stated a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to the Indiana Tort Claims Act’s tort claim notice requirement.

Convention Headquarters Hotels, LLC v. Marion County Assessor · filed 2019-08-16

Nonetheless, it is well-established that the ITCA does not apply to claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim requires facts showing that a defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Garcia v. Cole · filed 2019-09-20

Garcia does not allege any facts showing that Erich Cole, Trudy Red-Chase, Barry Sharer, Bradford Dalley, Scott Sandefer, Kyle Davis, A. Sanchez, M. Chapman, Sandra Fields, or State of New Mexico, Inc., deprived him of a federal right. Consequently, Garcia has not stated a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to New York’s statutory notice of claim requirement.

Matter of Nunez v. Village of Rockville Ctr. · filed 2019-10-30

Here, that branch of the petition which was for leave to serve a late notice of claim to assert, pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, violations of the petitioner's federal civil and constitutional rights should have been denied as unnecessary ( see Matter of Nicholson v City of New York , 166 AD3d 979, 979; Matter of Royes v City of New York , 136 AD3d 1042, 1044). Such a claim is not subject to the New York State statutory notice of claim requirement ( see Felder v Casey , 487 US 131, 153; Matter of Nicholson v City of New York , 166 AD3d at 979; Meyer v County of Suffolk , 90 AD3d 720, 722).

Section 1983 civil rights claims are exempt from California Government Claims Act claim presentation requirements.

Castro v. Clovis Unified School District · filed 2019-11-15

Civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are also exempt from CGCA requirements. ... Thus, plaintiff’s First and Fifth Amendment claims, which appear to be brought pursuant to § 1983, are exempt from the CGCA’s requirements.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a statutory or constitutional right that was violated to state a viable claim.

Jackson v. Maxwell · filed 2020-01-27

but was unable to state a viable claim for relief under §1983, as he has not identified a statutory or constitutional right he feels was violated.

Section 1983 claims do not require a New York notice of claim, even when a state defamation claim in the same action does.

Marom v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 2020-02-28

While Plaintiff is not required to file a notice of claim as a condition precedent for his federal claims, it is a condition precedent to his state defamation claim.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to state notice-of-claim requirements because federal law preempts them.

Moreno v. Saavedra · filed 2020-03-19

However, Moreno alleged his excessive force claim as a civil rights violation. SAC (stating claims as a violation of civil rights and referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). ... The Court finds, therefore, dismissal based on Moreno’s failure to serve a Notice of Claim is not appropriate.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a federal right and action under color of state law.

Del Campo v. Community of Hope · filed 2020-07-29

The Court also explained that the Complaint failed to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... because it does not allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States or that Defendant was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 preempts state notice-of-claim requirements, so a missed deadline under HRS § 46-72 does not bar a § 1983 claim.

Ingall v. Rabago · filed 2020-09-24

The Court holds that the § 1983 claims are not barred by HRS § 46-72.

Section 1983 claims require facts supporting a claim against each defendant.

Smith v. People of the State of California · filed 2020-12-21

Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable Section 1983 claim. To the extent Plaintiff is complaining of the conduct of defendant Tucker, the Sheriff’s Department and the Safety Branch of El Segundo, Plaintiff provides no facts to support a Section 1983 claim against any defendant.

A § 1983 claim against a named defendant fails when the complaint makes no allegations against that defendant.

Silverman v. Christian · filed 2021-01-06

Plaintiff names the Humboldt County Correctional Facility as a Defendant but makes no separate allegations against the Facility. Accordingly, this Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief.

Section 1983 cannot be used to attack the integrity of a completed state criminal conviction or to substitute for habeas corpus when there is no custody.

Cavett v. Tom Ellis, County Clerk of Dallas County, and Bill Shaw, District Clerk of Dallas County · filed 1978-08-17

We believe that the district court was also correct in dismissing the request for a declaratory judgment since under Fifth Circuit precedent an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be used to attack the integrity of a state criminal conviction. ... We do not believe that § 1983 was meant to be a substitute for habeas corpus when there is no custody.

Section 1983 may provide a civil-rights action for an inmate seeking damages or a readjustment of parole procedures.

Schuemann v. Colorado State Board of Adult Parole J. D. MacFarlane · filed 1980-06-30

On the other hand, a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be appropriate if the inmate is seeking damages or to require a readjustment of parole procedures.

Section 1983 is not the proper remedy for a prisoner seeking release from confinement; habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy.

Thibadoux v. Jones · filed 1981-01-30

It is well settled under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), that habeas corpus is plaintiff’s remedy and not this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a city's negligent maintenance of sewers and drains, including where the city had no duty to maintain the ditch.

Hursey v. City of Mobile · filed 1981-10-30

The third claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is similarly without merit. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a city's negligent maintenance of its sewers and drains does not give rise to a cause of action under § 1983. York v. City of Cedartown, 648 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1981). With the City having no duty to maintain the ditch in this case, we find the lack of a cause of action under § 1983 even more apparent here than it was in York.

Section 1983 may not be used to obtain federal supervision of a traditional land-use dispute when adequate state procedures are available to enforce the plaintiff's rights.

Park View Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Town Board of Rochester · filed 1985-12-13

I am satisfied that plaintiff must pursue whatever remedies it has in state court, and may not bring this § 1983 action based on the facts of this case. There are adequate state procedures through which the plaintiff can seek relief.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a catchall to bring a domestic-relations custody dispute traditionally within state-court jurisdiction into federal court.

Muwwakkil v. Herbert A. Adrine, Esq. John F. Lenard, Esq. Vaness Lee Elizabeth Andrea Muwwakkil · filed 1986-01-08

Section 1983 cannot be used as a catchall for suits to be brought in federal court which are traditionally within the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for constitutional deprivations under color of state law, and a state contract remedy does not necessarily bar the claim.

Ezekwo v. Nyc Health & Hospitals Corporation · filed 1991-08-01

Thus, the potential availability of a state law contract action does not bar this suit.

Section 1983 is not required to seek declaratory and injunctive relief for a Fifteenth Amendment claim.

John Davis, Jr. v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n · filed 2016-12-27

Davis was not required to use the “statutory vehicle” of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring his Fifteenth Amendment claim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

Section 1983 claims against municipalities are subject to Rule 8(a)(2)’s short and plain statement pleading standard.

Nebout v. City of Hitchcock · filed 1999-10-21

Thus § 1983 claims against municipalities are governed by the standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and Plaintiffs need only submit “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Section 1983 permits a Monell claim against a private medical provider when the complaint plausibly ties treatment delays to the provider’s policies.

Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2019-11-27

Therefore, Williams’ claims that Wexford’s cost-cutting policies, evidenced by its delays in scheduling outside consultations and following the outside recommendations in this case, suffice at the pleading stage to state a Monell claim against Wexford.

Section 1983 permits hostile work environment claims.

Querry v. Messar · filed 1999-11-01

Hostile work environment claims are also actionable pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection hostile work environment claim to include time barred conduct when a related act falls within the limitations period.

Joki v. Rogue Community College · filed 2013-10-29

Although the district court properly granted summary judgment on Joki’s Title VII and state law claims, it erred in granting summary judgment on her § 1983 equal protection claim. As the district court recognized, the limitations period for this claim stretches back further than the limitations periods for her other claims and encompasses two additional incidents, Verne Underwood’s “shunning” of Joki after a meeting on September 24, 2006 and Galyn Carlile’s hand gesture at a faculty orientation on September 25, 2006. This conduct need not be independently actionable in order for Joki to withstand summary judgment on her hostile work environment theory, because “[s]uch claims are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.”

When several defendants commit uncoordinated acts of harassment, each is individually liable under § 1983 only if his own conduct is sufficient to create a hostile work environment.

Raspardo v. Carlone · filed 2014-10-06

Thus, our prior cases have established only that when a plaintiff alleges that multiple individual defendants have engaged in uncoordinated and unplanned acts of harassment, each defendant is only liable under § 1983 when his own actions are independently sufficient to create a hostile work environment.