42 U.S.C. § 1983

Pennsylvania § 1983 claims fall outside the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction and must be brought in a court of common pleas.

Martin v. Jeffes · filed 1985-11-20

Petitioner’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the U.C.C. will be transferred to the appropriate court of common pleas.

Section 1983 due-process claims are cognizable in Illinois state courts and require a protected entitlement to the plaintiff’s job.

Messina v. City of Chicago · filed 1986-06-30

Clearly, Federal due process claims are cognizable in Illinois courts under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. ... For procedural due process to apply, plaintiff must establish that he had an entitlement to his job.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims under sections 1983 and 1985.

Poling v. Goins · filed 1986-06-30

We are persuaded that citizens of the state should have access to state courts, if they desire, to assert claims arising under the various federal civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

State courts may not refuse to hear § 1983 claims when the same type of claim arising under state law would be enforceable there.

Willbourn v. City of Tulsa · filed 1986-07-15

If the same type of claim, if arising under state law, is enforceable in state court, state courts may not arbitrarily refuse to enforce the federal claim. ... We express no opinion on the merits of Willboum’s civil rights action, however, it was error for the trial court to refuse to hear his § 1983 claim.

State courts may hear Section 1983 actions, but a state and its agencies are not persons subject to liability absent waiver of sovereign immunity.

Adams v. Myers · filed 1986-10-31

State courts may entertain actions brought under section 1983. ... However, states and their agencies are not “persons” subject to liability under section 1983 unless there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity by the state. ... Since there has been no applicable waiver of sovereign immunity by the State of Texas, the TDC is not amenable to suit under section 1983.

A state statute barring all personal-capacity civil actions against correction officers in state court does not violate the Supremacy Clause as applied to Section 1983 when a federal forum remains available.

Cepeda v. Coughlin · filed 1987-03-19

In any event, subject matter jurisdiction of its courts is exclusively a matter for the State ... and since Correction Law § 24 prohibits ... all ... civil actions against correction officers in their personal capacities, we perceive no violation of the Supremacy Clause ...). Moreover, as defendants note in their brief, plaintiffs are free to pursue their claim in Federal court, and several apparently have done so.

A § 1983 claim is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 despite state courts’ concurrent jurisdiction because neither statute prohibits removal on that basis.

Aben v. Dallwig · filed 1987-05-12

Nothing in the civil rights statute expressly prohibits removal. ... Similarly, nothing in the removal statute suggests that the court should imply a prohibition against removal from the grant of concurrent jurisdiction.

State courts share concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983 civil-rights actions.

Seibring v. Parcell's Inc. · filed 1987-08-18

As the defendants acknowledge, Illinois courts have concurrent jurisdiction with Federal courts in adjudicating section 1983 civil rights actions.

State courts have jurisdiction concurrent with federal courts over actions brought under § 1983.

Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass'n · filed 1987-09-30

The courts of this State have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the federal courts over actions brought under 42 U.S.C., § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in circuit court despite a state law making direct appellate review the exclusive remedy for state law challenges to prison discipline when that review cannot provide the relief sought under § 1983.

Davis v. Toombs · filed 1988-08-10

With respect to plaintiffs section 1983 claims, however, the question is different, because plaintiff seeks relief that this court could not afford him on direct review under ORS 421.195. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court has jurisdiction of plaintiffs section 1983 claims and, therefore, erred in dismissing those claims for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 civil rights suits may be filed in either state or federal court.

Weber v. Willard · filed 1989-02-03

That rule means a plaintiff may file a civil rights suit either in federal court or in state court.

State courts have jurisdiction to hear actions brought under Section 1983.

Bible Truth Crusade v. City of Bloomington · filed 1989-03-29

It is well settled that state courts have jurisdiction to hear actions brought under section 1983.

State trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 actions against municipalities.

Page v. Valentine · filed 1989-09-06

A fired municipal policeman timely appeals an order that held that the state trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) actions. We reverse.

Section 1983 actions may be heard in state courts of common pleas.

Christian v. Dayton · filed 1990-05-17

The sole issue in this appeal is whether a common pleas court has jurisdiction to entertain an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. We answer this question in the affirmative.

Section 1983 claims may proceed in Ohio common pleas court without first filing in the Court of Claims for a state employee immunity determination.

Besser v. Dexter · filed 1990-07-11

While a litigant may be bound by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure if he or she chooses to utilize the state court forum in filing a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action, there can be no state requirement that a plaintiff first file in the Ohio Court of Claims under R.C. 2743.02 to determine whether the defendant employee's conduct was outside the scope of his or her employment, or was in bad faith, wanton, or reckless in nature.

State trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 actions against municipalities.

Town of Lake Clarke Shores v. Page · filed 1990-11-08

We agree with the court below that state trial courts do have subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 actions against municipalities.

Mississippi chancery courts may hear Section 1983 claims.

Hood v. Dept. of Wildlife Conservation · filed 1990-11-28

We have held that our chancery courts in particular may hear Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 suits may be brought in Arkansas state courts.

Burris v. City Of Little Rock · filed 1991-08-15

Furthermore, § 1983 suits may be brought in the Arkansas courts.

Section 1983 permits state courts to hear Commerce Clause claims alleging that a state tax violated a taxpayer’s rights.

Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. v. Meehan, No. 387601 (Sep. 19, 1991) · filed 1991-09-19

Accordingly, state courts must entertain Commerce Clause claims brought under 1983.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983.

Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Chapman (In Re Chapman) · filed 1991-09-20

The Civil Rights statute itself does not expressly indicate whether State courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases brought pursuant to it (42 U.S.C. § 1983), but authorities on the subject have generally held state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in Ohio common pleas courts even when the same conduct may fall within the state labor board’s exclusive unfair labor practice jurisdiction.

Weinfurtner v. Nelsonville-York School District Board of Education · filed 1991-09-25

We are persuaded that the Supremacy Clause as well as the applicable case law required that the court below overrule appellees’ motion to dismiss the federal civil rights action pursuant to Section 1983 and exercise its concurrent jurisdiction in hearing the matter.

A state tax court with exclusive jurisdiction over a § 1983 tax claim must exercise that jurisdiction; the Tax Injunction Act, equitable restraint, and an exclusive state remedy do not bar it.

Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue · filed 1991-12-06

The court therefore holds the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over Harlan Sprague's § 1983 claim is compulsory. The court's further finds its compulsory exercise of concurrent jurisdiction is not barred by the Tax Injunction Act's standard, the doctrine of equitable restraint, or the presence of an exclusive state remedy.

State courts have jurisdiction to hear § 1983 suits but may decline to exercise it.

Thomas v. Allen · filed 1992-01-30

State courts have jurisdiction to hear civil rights suits based on § 1983. ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to assume jurisdiction of the § 1983.

Illinois circuit courts lack original jurisdiction over Section 1983 employment-discrimination claims when the alleged discrimination is covered by the Illinois Human Rights Act.

Faulkner-King v. Wicks · filed 1992-03-31

Although circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, the legislature, by authority of the State Constitution, has restricted that jurisdiction when the claim involves a controversy covered by the Act. Courts have consistently ruled the Act is the exclusive source of a remedy for an employment-discrimination claim. Circuit courts cannot be compelled to accept such cases under the guise of Federal authority.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under Section 1983.

Administaff, Inc. v. Kaster · filed 1992-07-22

Because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over constitutional claims brought under § 1983, the state district court in which Plaintiff chose to file its complaint may hear all of Plaintiffs claims.

Section 1983 claims may be brought in state court, so a claim omitted from an earlier state action may be barred by claim preclusion.

Untracht v. West Jersey Health System · filed 1992-09-10

Because the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), Dr. Untracht could have brought his Section 1983 claim in his state court action. Accordingly, it is now barred.

Section 1983 adds a federal remedy while leaving state courts with concurrent jurisdiction over the claims.

Oliver v. Fort Wayne Education Ass'n · filed 1986-12-17

It is clear that concurrent jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims exists.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state courts, and federal courts apply the most appropriate state limitations period when no federal limitations period applies.

Dean v. Nunez · filed 1987-02-12

Federal jurisdiction of § 1983 claims is concurrent with that of the state courts rather than exclusively federal. State courts may thus hear and decide claims raised under the civil rights statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Ford v. Stone, 599 F.Supp. 693 (M.D.La.1984), affirmed at 774 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir.1985). Because no federal statute of limitations relating to civil rights actions applies to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., federal courts must apply the most appropriate period supplied by the law of the state in which the federal court sits.

An expectation of keeping a particular prison job is not a property or liberty interest cognizable under § 1983.

El-Hajj Ali Hakim Majied v. Brown · filed 1986-09-24

The district court correctly held that an "expectation of keeping a particular prison job does not amount to either a property or a liberty interest cognizable under Sec. 1983."

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for removal from a prison job when the inmate has no protected property or liberty interest in that assignment and receives any due process hearing required.

Gardner v. Johnson · filed 1977-03-30

As such, plaintiffs removal from his job assignment on the psychiatric ward is not a cognizable claim under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It should be further noted, however, that plaintiff was given the opportunity to speak with the Clinic Action Committee about his assignment as an inmate nurse in the clinic. Such a hearing fulfilled any due process requirements that may have been present when he was terminated from his work assignment.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the procedure used to assign him to a prison housing unit.

Barrett v. Belleque · filed 2006-11-15

He challenges only the procedure followed in assigning him to the IMU. Such a challenge can be brought as an action under 42 USC section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for employment discrimination on account of sex when the deprivation is committed under color of state law.

Curran v. Portland Superintending School Committee · filed 1977-07-18

The Court holds that Count III states a cause of action under Section 1983 for discrimination in employment on account of sex.

Section 1983 permits a direct claim for intentional sex discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause, including a pervasive sexual-harassment course of conduct, without requiring a Title VII claim.

Woerner v. Brzeczek · filed 1981-07-21

Upon analysis this Court has determined that though the conceptual route to be traveled under Section 1983 is different from that under Title VII, the result is the same. ... Here Woerner has alleged a long and pervasive course of conduct that clearly constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against defendants who, acting under color of state law, deprive a plaintiff of constitutional rights, including the right to be free of sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.

Scott v. City of Overland Park · filed 1984-09-11

This statute clearly provides relief when the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights. Among those rights is the right to be free of sexbased discrimination.

Section 1983 permits a sexual harassment claim against a state employer for an equal protection violation even when the employee cannot pursue that claim under Title VII for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Carter v. Sedgwick County, Kan. · filed 1988-12-02

While plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment against defendant Cameron in his official capacity under Title VII must fail, that claim is still contemplated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another person of any constitutional or federal statutory rights.

Section 1983 sex discrimination claims use the same liability standards as Title VII claims; to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find termination because of sex.

Steinhauer v. Laura Degolier and State of Wisconsin · filed 2004-02-24

To avoid summary judgment on his sex discrimination claims, Steinhauer must present facts from which a reasonable juror could find that the defendants terminated him because of his sex. ... This applies under both Title VII and Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires discriminatory intent for an equal protection claim based on sex discrimination.

Henrikson v. Town of East Greenwich ex rel. Raposa · filed 2015-03-23

Finally, Count III claims sex discrimination as a deprivation of civil rights under color of state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This contention affords Ms. Henrikson no greater relief than she gains through Count I, which claimed sex discrimination under Title VII. Section 1983 adds nothing to the equation. ... In order to prevail as a § 1983 plaintiff claiming a denial of equal protection, she must “show that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.” ... The Court has already found that no genuine issue of fact exists that would permit, in the context of a Title VII claim, an inference of discriminatory intent on the record before it. For the reasons stated above, the Court finds the Town entitled to summary judgment on Count III.

Section 1983 intentional sex discrimination claims use the same standard as Title VII claims.

Starchvill v. Cook County Sheriff's Department · filed 2018-07-18

The standard for Title VII and § 1983 intentional sex discrimination claims is the same.

Section 1983 applies in Puerto Rico and permits civil suits in the federal district court there.

United States v. Gerena · filed 1977-04-29

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico may therefore entertain civil suits for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a means for inhabitants of Puerto Rico to seek protection of constitutional rights.

Feliciano v. Barcelo · filed 1979-04-25

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has categorically stated that regardless of whether the rights of its inhabitants are afforded protection under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, such protection is available through suits filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, and jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C., Section 1343.

Section 1983 does not bar a suit seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief from judicial officers in these circumstances.

Rud v. Dahl · filed 1978-06-05

This is a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which plaintiff Rud attacks the facial constitutionality of the Illinois statutory scheme under which he was adjudicated incompetent and a conservator appointed to manage his person and estate. ... Although we agree with plaintiff that, because no monetary damages are sought, the defendants are not immune from suit in the circumstances of this case, Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F.2d 768, 769 (7th Cir. 1975), we affirm the district court's judgment without reaching the comity and abstention issues raised on appeal because plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim to relief.

Section 1983 permits a suit for declaratory relief against state judicial defendants.

Person v. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York · filed 1977-06-14

We hold further that this suit for declaratory relief is maintainable against defendants-appellants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Absolute judicial immunity from Section 1983 damages does not bar prospective equitable relief against a state judge when important First Amendment rights are implicated.

First Baptist Church of Glen Este v. State of Ohio · filed 1983-10-24

We decline to hold that the doctrine of absolute immunity bars plaintiffs’ claim for prospective equitable relief in the context of this case, which implicates important First Amendment rights.

A judge retains absolute § 1983 immunity when directing charges against a witness based on evidence in a pending case because the resulting arrest and detention are judicial acts within subject-matter jurisdiction.

Harris v. Deveaux · filed 1986-01-21

We hold: (1) this court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the ground of absolute judicial immunity and (2) a judge does not lose immunity by directing the entry of charges against a witness appearing before the judge in a pending case and based upon evidence before him.

A judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for acts performed in a judicial capacity.

Lassiter v. Ellis · filed 1987-10-20

A judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions.

Federal judges have judicial immunity from § 1983 damages claims based on their handling of pending cases.

Rodman v. Joseph P. Kinneary and John P. Holschuh · filed 1987-11-10

The district court, with a nonparty judge presiding, dismissed plaintiff's Sec. 1983 action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). In so doing, the district court relied on the principle of judicial immunity discussed in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1975). Based on our review of the record and appellant's arguments, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's action.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a state judge despite judicial immunity from damages.

Olson v. Gerald W. Hart, Judge · filed 1992-06-03

The appellee, as a judge, has absolute immunity, and the appellant therefore may not obtain the damages he seeks. ... However, injunctive relief against Judge Hart remains available under section 1983.

Judicial immunity ordinarily does not bar a claim for prospective injunctive relief under § 1983.

Davis v. Bayless · filed 1995-11-21

The district court's order provides no meaningful basis for review of its dismissal of the Davises' claim for preliminary injunctive relief under § 1983, which would ordinarily survive a finding of judicial immunity.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against officials entitled to absolute judicial immunity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Mitchell v. Fishbein · filed 2002-08-12

Like judicial officers, officials entitled to absolute immunity may not be sued for injunctive relief under § 1983 if the plaintiff fails to allege that either a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief despite a Heck bar to related damages claims.

Whitaker v. Garcetti · filed 2003-11-17

A Heck defense is inapplicable to Plaintiffs' § 1983 declaratory relief claim.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts taken in their judicial capacity unless they violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Kuhn v. Thompson · filed 2004-01-29

Thus, unless “declaratory relief was unavailable” Section 1983 specifically provides that injunctive relief is not available against judicial officers for acts or omissions taken in then- judicial capacity.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief for constitutional violations.

American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Robert Taft, Governor of Ohio · filed 2004-09-27

These constitutional violations entitle the ACLU to declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and to reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Huminski v. Corsones · filed 2004-10-07

We conclude in light of the foregoing that Corsones is immune 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, from Huminski’s suit insofar as it seeks injunctive relief, provided declaratory relief remains available, and she has not violated a previous declaratory judgment, and 2) under the judicially established judicial-immunity doctrine, from Huminski’s suit insofar as it seeks monetary relief with respect to her role in the issuance of the May 24 and May 27 Notices.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Huminski v. Corsones · filed 2005-01-18

We conclude in light of the foregoing that Corsones is immune 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, from Huminski's suit insofar as it seeks injunctive relief, provided declaratory relief remains available, and she has not violated a previous declaratory judgment, and 2) under the judicially established judicial-immunity doctrine, from Huminski's suit insofar as it seeks monetary relief with respect to her role in the issuance of the May 24 and May 27 Notices.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless the officer violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti · filed 2006-10-10

Plaintiff has not alleged that the Judicial Defendants violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable at any relevant time. Accordingly, his request for an order directing the Judicial Defendants to follow the law does not overcome their immunity from the present suit brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 suits for declaratory relief against public officials are not barred by absolute or qualified immunity.

Thomas v. Lehman · filed 2007-05-15

Neither absolute nor qualified immunity extends to § 1983 suits for declaratory relief such as this one.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge unless the judge violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Robinson v. Smyth · filed 2007-12-18

In addition, Robinson’s claims for injunctive relief against Judge Smyth were also barred because Robinson did not allege that the judge violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was not available in his case.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Lawrence v. Kuenhold · filed 2008-03-27

Section 309(c) of the FCIA bars injunctive relief in any § 1983 action “against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for actions taken in their judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; unfavorable rulings do not make declaratory relief unavailable.

Hoai v. Superior Court of Dist. of Columbia · filed 2008-03-28

Section 1983 immunizes judicial officers from injunctive relief for actions taken in their judicial capacity “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since plaintiffs do not contend that our local courts violated any “declaratory decree,” they are left to demonstrate that “declaratory relief was unavailable.” Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, a failure to get one’s desired decisions in our local courts does not constitute such “unavailability” and the suit must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 judicial immunity bars an injunction against a judge for acts within the judge’s judicial jurisdiction.

Town of Hopkins, SC v. Cobb · filed 1979-03-22

This Court must conclude that the Plaintiffs seek to collaterally attack the decision of the Defendant Judge by seeking to enjoin him from enforcing his judgment by way of contempt and holds that he is judicially immune from actions seeking to enjoin him from acts which will be taken within his judicial jurisdiction.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts taken in their judicial capacity in this case.

Roth, Pamela v. King, Rufus · filed 2006-06-09

Therefore, because a number of the Superior Court appellants acted in a “judicial capacity” in selecting attorneys for inclusion on the panels, those appellants are immune from suits for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against officials acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Churchill v. University of Colorado at Boulder · filed 2010-11-24

Instead, we choose to follow the great weight of authority that has concluded that the term "judicial officer" found in section 1983 extends to quasi-judicial actors-thereby barring claims for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Nash · filed 2012-04-10

With respect to their claim for injunctive relief, Tamaya and Santa Ana have failed to demonstrate that “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, Judge Nash did not violate a declaratory decree, nor do Tamaya or Santa Ana contend that she did. Second, Tamaya and Santa Ana do not allege, nor does it appear, that declaratory relief was unavailable in the state proceeding. Accordingly, their claim for injunctive relief against Judge Nash is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not recognize a declaration of innocence standing alone as a cognizable form of relief.

Teichmann v. New York · filed 2014-10-20

Moreover, § 1983 — while broad in its equitable and legal remedies — does not recognize a declaration of innocence, standing alone, as a cognizable form of relief.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief against judicial officers in their official capacities.

Ward v. City of Norwalk · filed 2016-02-03

However, the plain language of § 1983 contemplates a declaratory judgment against judicial officers like Judge Ridge and Clerk Boss in their official capacities.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to seek declaratory relief against a state judge, but requires a violation, a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury, and no adequate remedy at law.

Wells v. Judge Karen Miller · filed 2016-06-17

State judges are not immune from declaratory relief in a § 1983 action. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). To warrant such relief, a plaintiff must show: (1) that there was a violation; (2) that there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if relief is not granted; and (3) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 1242. Appealing a judge’s ruling or seeking the extraordinary writ of mandamus both constitute adequate remedies at law. See id. at 1243.

Section 1983’s limit on injunctive relief against judicial officers does not protect executive officers who enforce court orders.

Moore v. Urquhart · filed 2018-08-16

Section 1983 (as amended by the FCIA) therefore provides judicial officers immunity from injunctive relief even when the common law would not. ... We conclude that the FCIA does not limit injunctive relief against an executive branch officer enforcing a court order, and that the Sheriff is not entitled to immunity from plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a parole board official for quasi-adjudicative acts unless the official violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Flores v. Stanford · filed 2019-09-20

Pursuant to Section 1983, this immunity also extends to claims for injunctive relief against a parole board official arising from the official’s quasi-adjudicative function, see id., “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable” to the plaintiff, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint does not allege any defendant violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable to plaintiffs when they commenced this action. Accordingly, insofar as plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, their claims must be dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity.

Threats and intimidation, without an actual infringement of a constitutional right, do not state a Section 1983 claim.

Hughes v. Carter · filed 1986-11-17

Although his claims of threats and intimidation are, indeed, unfortunate, they do not state an actual infringement of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not make verbal abuse or harassment, without more, actionable as a constitutional violation.

Coyle v. Hughs · filed 1977-06-28

The use of words, however violent, cannot constitute an assault actionable under § 1983. ... Allegations of verbal harassment and profanity without more simply do not show the invasion of any federally protected right.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for verbal harassment or abuse, even when the defamation is malicious and committed by a state official.

Gomez v. Hug · filed 1982-06-03

Verbal harassment or abuse is insufficient to support a § 1983 action, as in defamation. ... This is true even where the defamation is malicious and committed by a state official.

A prisoner need not suffer physical injury to state a section 1983 claim based on an unprovoked guard's racially charged death threats and retaliation for court access.

Willie Burton, Jr. v. Livingston · filed 1986-05-08

The day has passed when an inmate must show a court the scars of torture in order to make out a complaint under § 1983. We hold that a prisoner retains at least the right to be free from the terror of instant and unexpected death at the whim of his allegedly bigoted custodians.

Verbal harassment or abuse alone is not a constitutional deprivation actionable under § 1983.

Charles J. Oltarzewski, Jr. v. Ruggiero · filed 1987-10-14

“[vjerbal harassment or abuse ... is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for verbal harassment.

Harris v. C.J. Lawler · filed 1994-11-04

First, claims of verbal harassment are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for verbal threats unless the threats are premised on a protected interest.

Fontenot v. McLeod · filed 1995-06-06

As for plaintiffs concerns regarding threats, verbal threats are not cognizable under section 1983 unless premised on a protected interest.

Claims of verbal abuse are not cognizable under § 1983.

Lee v. Coleman · filed 2000-06-19

To the extent Lee asserts claims of verbal abuse, such claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than verbal abuse to support a cause of action.

Harvey v. Stalder · filed 2005-03-11

The judgment of the district court is affirmed because the precedent of this circuit requires more than verbal abuse to raise a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not provide a claim for verbal harassment or abuse alone.

White v. Bon · filed 2005-04-11

The district court properly dismissed White’s claim that Chaplain Bon spoke rudely to him because verbal harassment or abuse is generally not enough to constitute a claim under section 1983.

Verbal harassment alone is not actionable under § 1983.

Askew v. Jones · filed 2005-12-13

Although we agree with the District Court that Askew’s verbal harassment claim is not actionable under § 1983, see, e.g., Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9 th Cir. 1987), Askew’s complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for verbal abuse by a prison official alone.

Todd v. Walters · filed 2006-01-12

Finally, Todd’s verbal abuse claim against Nurse Farmarie is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a viable claim for a prisoner’s verbal harassment allegations without more.

Richardson v. Sherrer · filed 2009-09-11

The District Court correctly concluded that Richardson’s claim against Westry and Nicolai regarding their alleged verbal abuse of him was not viable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Verbal harassment of a prisoner, without more, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

A jailer’s verbal abuse alone does not support a § 1983 claim, and taunts accompanying objectively reasonable force do not overcome qualified immunity.

Dawson v. Anderson County, Texas · filed 2014-05-06

We have held previously that verbal abuse by a jailer alone does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. ... We have already held that the use of the pepperball gun in this case was objectively reasonable, and we do not find that her assertions about laughter and taunts combine to overcome defendants’ qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for verbal harassment or abuse, even when racially motivated.

Hubbard v. Johnson · filed 2019-10-29

Allegations of verbal harassment and abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This is so even if the verbal harassment is racially motivated.

Section 1983 allows a person whose constitutional rights are violated by state officials to vindicate those rights in federal court.

Show-World Center, Inc. v. Walsh · filed 1977-06-28

It was entitled under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to vindicate its constitutional claims in a federal forum.

Section 1983 claims may be removed to federal court despite state courts’ concurrent jurisdiction.

Gleichauf v. Ginsberg · filed 1994-08-01

No Act of Congress expressly provides that § 1983 causes of action should be treated as nonremovable.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; a claim must rest on a violation of the Constitution or another federal law.

Boody v. Township of Cherry Hill · filed 1997-12-18

Section 1983 does not itself provide any substantive rights, and a claim under the statute must be grounded on a violation of the United States Constitution or some other federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for the deprivation of an existing federal right; a claim fails when the asserted underlying right was not violated.

Jacobsen v. Tillmann · filed 1998-08-31

The plaintiff has, necessarily, premised her § 1983 claim on her asserted ADA deprivation. One cannot premise a claim of constitutional deprivation on an asserted right which one does not possess. Therefore, in light of the dismissal of her ADA claims, the plaintiffs § 1983 claim necessarily fails as well.

Section 1983 does not provide general federal review of state agency decisions affecting labor disputes; intervention requires a clear and unequivocal violation of a federal right.

Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. O'Connor · filed 1999-09-28

It is clear, however, that the violation of a federal right must be clear and unequivocal, so that the power of federal law and federal courts to override the decisions of state agencies is exercised only in extraordinary circumstances.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, and a surviving Fourth Amendment claim can support a Section 1983 claim.

Warren v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis · filed 2001-08-23

The Court has found, however, that Plaintiff's claim of a Fourth Amendment violation survives summary judgment. Thus, Plaintiff's alleged Fourth Amendment violation provides the independent constitutional right necessary to support a § 1983 claim. Defendant's motion for summary judgment on this ground therefore fails.

Section 1983 is a vehicle for asserting federal rights, so a claim under it cannot survive when the underlying causes of action are precluded.

J.S. Ex Rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District · filed 2002-02-15

Because Appellants’ underlying causes of action are precluded, their § 1983 claims are no longer viable. A § 1983 claim is not a cause of action separate from the underlying federal right, but rather, a vehicle for asserting one’s rights.

Filing the same claim before the Tennessee Claims Commission waives the right to sue a state employee under § 1983.

Talley v. Webb · filed 2002-09-13

Nonetheless, it is noted that the district court’s ruling was proper because Talley waived his right to sue this defendant state employee under § 1983 because he filed a claim before the Tennessee Claims Commission involving the same claim asserted herein.

A § 1983 claim must allege a specific federal right violated by the defendant.

Miller v. Conway · filed 2011-06-15

Second, Miller challenges the dismissal of his claim that Craig offered and then failed to advise Miller about the investigation of Land’s alleged retaliation, but Miller failed to “allege a specific federal right violated by” Craig.

A plaintiff may waive the right to sue individuals under § 1983 through a voluntary agreement that provides a personal benefit and does not adversely affect public interests.

Osuagwu v. Gila Regional Medical Center · filed 2013-02-25

Applying those principles in this case, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs waiver of his right to file suit against the individual defendants by signing the agreement to be bound by the Bylaws is enforceable. It is not a blanket provision prohibiting suit against Gila Regional; it limits suing only individual staff members and third parties who participate in physician evaluation and discipline, thus it does not adversely effect important public interests.

Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue to vindicate their own constitutional rights without guaranteeing the same outcome for every other affected citizen.

Wolf v. Walker · filed 2014-03-24

Plaintiffs have the right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring a lawsuit to vindicate their own constitutional rights. I am aware of no authority that would impose as a prerequisite to obtaining relief a guarantee that every other Wisconsin citizen obtain the same outcome.

Section 1983 allows people to sue to vindicate their own constitutional rights.

McGee v. Cole · filed 2014-11-07

Finally, Plaintiffs here “have the right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring a lawsuit to vindicate their own constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff the right to remove a state court case to federal court.

Jones v. Grantham & Properties · filed 2020-06-12

Plaintiff’s reading of the statute is not accurate. Section 1983 concerns only civil actions for deprivation of rights, while the right to remove a case remains governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Section 1983 protects the right to travel, but it does not provide a cause of action when a pension board’s statutory recall for medical reexamination imposes no unreasonable burden.

Danaher v. Michaw · filed 1977-07-25

It is clear that the right to travel does provide a right protected by the Civil Rights Act. ... However, as will be more fully discussed, plaintiff has not stated a cause of action based on a violation of the right to travel in the case at bar. ... Assuming, however, that the right to travel is at issue here, plaintiff still has failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the right to travel. ... The Pension Board’s action in calling plaintiff back was clearly sanctioned by statute and theoretically could have been taken even if plaintiff had moved to a foreign country. It is difficult for the Court to see how the exercise by the Pension Board of the right to call back a fireman who was put on disability in order to determine whether or not the disability still exists could be considered unreasonable. ... Assuming that this constitutes a burden on his right to travel, it is not an unreasonable burden on that right.

Section 1983 requires police officers to take reasonable steps to protect people exercising constitutional rights from violence, even when community hostility is involved.

Dunlap v. City of Chicago · filed 1977-07-19

Section 1983 imposes an affirmative duty upon police officers to protect speakers who are airing opinions which may be unpopular. “A police officer has the duty not to ratify and effectuate a heckler’s veto, nor may he join a moiling mob intent on suppressing ideas. Instead, he must take reasonable action to protect from violence persons exercising their constitutional rights. [Citations omitted] And, in the absence of a speaker’s exhortation to violence, in carefully defined circumstances, 'state officials are not entitled to rely on community hostility as an excuse not to protect, by inaction or affirmative conduct, the exercise of fundamental rights.’ ”

Section 1983 permits liability for law-enforcement officers who, by failing to perform a statutorily imposed duty, deny equal protection to people exercising fundamental rights.

W. J. A. Productions, Inc. v. Barnett · filed 1977-10-31

It is clear that law enforcement officers can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when by inaction they fail to perform a statutorily imposed duty to enforce the laws and thereby deny equal protection to persons legitimately exercising fundamental rights.

Section 1983 permits claims alleging unconstitutional extradition, but a claim is premature before an arrest or extradition proceedings begin.

MacGuire v. Alan Rasmussen Robert Q. Harris Gerald Baliles, Governor Robert Martinez, Governor · filed 1989-05-03

MacGuire's complaint contained no allegation or proof that he was ever arrested in Virginia, or that extradition proceedings had commenced in that state as of the complaint's date. Thus, although constitutional infirmities with extradition are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, see Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.1984); Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 33 (1978), MacGuire's suit was premature.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when state actors abuse extradition power by failing to comply with applicable law and thereby violate rights protected by federal law.

McBride v. Gary Soos and Lamar Haney, Individually and as Elkhart County Policemen · filed 1979-02-22

Under these circumstances where plaintiff has alleged violation of rights protected by federal law, and violation of rights protected by state law derived from federal law, we hold that a complaint which charges abuse of the extradiction power by noncompliance with applicable law states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of extradition safeguards derived solely from state law, but extradition conduct sufficiently shocking to the conscience to violate Fourteenth Amendment due process can support a civil-rights claim.

Raffone v. Sullivan · filed 1977-09-08

But since the safeguards derive from state rather than federal law, § 1983 does not provide a remedy for their breach. ... Conduct sufficiently “shocking to the conscience” to require invalidation of a conviction on due proces grounds also supports a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits a claim for forced extradition in violation of the Extradition Clause and federal extradition statute, but the plaintiff must identify the officers responsible for the alleged violation.

Patino v. State Of South Dakota · filed 1988-07-19

Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758 (8th Cir.1980), holds that allegations by a prisoner that he was forcibly seized and transported from a holding state to the demanding state by police officers in violation of the extradition clause and federal extradition statute state a cognizable section 1983 cause of action. ... Nonetheless, we agree with the district court that in the present case Patino did not clearly identify any of the three listed "unknown named" Lawrence County officers or officer Novak as the parties responsible for the alleged extradition violation. Thus, we affirm the district court's dismissal without prejudice of this aspect of the complaint.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the arrest and transportation of a fugitive without extradition proceedings.

Joseph v. Charlotte County Sheriff's Department Glen E. Sapp Mike Gandy H.M. Turbeville Gary Martin · filed 1993-07-06

As to the extradition hearing claims, we find that the magistrate judge and the district court failed to consider this Court's ruling in Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978), that "a complaint alleging the arrest and transportation of a fugitive without extradition proceedings does create a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order dismissing the extradition hearing claims against Turbeville and Martin and remand for further proceedings consistent with Wirth.

Section 1983 permits a claim alleging that an official arrested and transported a fugitive without extradition proceedings.

Wirth v. R. R. Surles, Officer, State Highway Patrol · filed 1977-09-22

While recognizing that failure to comply with state or federal extradition laws does not constitute a defense to a criminal prosecution, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886), we nevertheless hold that a complaint alleging the arrest and transportation of a fugitive without extradition proceedings does create a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when an official acting under color of state law denies a person the federal right to a pre-extradition habeas corpus hearing.

Crumley v. Roy Snead, Individually, and as Sheriff of Calhoun County, Alabama · filed 1980-06-30

Any denial of this right gives rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; for Section 1983 protects all rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a claim for deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest without due process when a non-tenured public employee is stigmatized in connection with a failure to rehire.

Dennis v. S & S Consolidated Rural High School District · filed 1978-07-31

We agree with the Seventh Circuit that stigma to reputation in conjunction with a failure to rehire a non-tenured employee states a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest without due process.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging racially disparate membership procedures to show both a disparate burden and a discriminatory purpose.

Walker v. Robbins Hose Co. No. 1, Inc. · filed 1979-02-08

To make out a claim under § 1983, Walker must show that the recruiting and membership procedures burden blacks more than whites and that those procedures were instituted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

Section 1983 does not permit an equal-protection violation to be established by disparate impact alone; discriminatory intent must be shown.

Sarabia v. Toledo Police Patrolman's Association · filed 1979-06-25

These decisions established the rule that violation of equal protection may not be established in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a mere showing of disparate impact of governmental action; there must be a showing of an intent to discriminate.

A § 1983 claim based on sex discrimination requires proof that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

Campbell v. Ramsay · filed 1980-02-13

Plaintiff’s disparate-treatment claim must fail. Her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 likewise must be rejected for failure to prove discriminatory intent.

Section 1983 requires discriminatory intent for a disparate-treatment claim against a state employer, and liability under Title VII on that theory corresponds to liability under § 1983.

Grano v. Department of Development · filed 1980-12-10

A plaintiff who alleges disparate treatment by a state employer is bringing essentially the same claim under Title VII as under § 1983. If there is liability under Title VII, there should be liability under § 1983. Similarly, if there was no discriminatory intent, there cannot be liability under either Title VII, on a disparate treatment theory, or § 1983.

Section 1983 requires discriminatory intent, not merely racially disproportionate impact, to support a claim that official action violates equal protection.

Schmidt v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 1981-01-20

Proof of a racially discriminatory intent is required to hold such official acts violative of the Equal Protection Clause, ... and of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof of discriminatory intent for a claim based on sex discrimination.

Gillespie v. BD. OF ED. OF N. LITTLE ROCK, ETC. · filed 1981-12-08

Nor did she establish any violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 likewise must be rejected for failure to prove discriminatory intent.

A plaintiff bringing a discrimination claim under Section 1983 must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

Gilbert v. City of Little Rock · filed 1982-08-13

The plaintiff in a § 1983 action must also prove discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant.

A Section 1983 discrimination claim fails without proof that disparate treatment was caused by race or religion.

Agarwal v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, John Q. Imholte, Gordon R. Bopp, Laird H. Barbar, Ernest D. Ke · filed 1986-04-10

In sum, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Agarwal failed to state a claim under either § 1983 or § 1985(3), because he did not establish that he was treated differently due to his race and religion.

A Section 1983 sex discrimination claim requires proof of discriminatory intent.

Parker v. The Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis · filed 1984-03-13

The plaintiff’s § 1983 claim must also fail because discriminatory intent is a prerequisite to a § 1983 prima facie ease.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims require facts supporting discriminatory intent; conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.

Stone v. Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University · filed 2014-08-05

Stone conclusorily alleges that the three extensions of time and the failure to provide an explanation for the final decision on the grievance were based on her age and/or gender, but those are not adverse employment actions and conclusory allegations are insufficient under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim based solely on improprieties in prison grievance procedures.

Glenn v. Delbalso · filed 2015-04-15

Access to prison grievance procedures is not a constitutionally-mandated right, and allegations of improprieties in the handling of grievances do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of jail grievance procedures.

Blank v. Anuligo · filed 2020-03-09

However, “[a]lleged violations of jail grievance procedures state no claim under § 1983.”

Section 1983 generally does not impose personal liability on a prison official merely for denying an inmate’s grievance about an alleged constitutional violation.

Anderson v. California Department of Correction · filed 2020-09-28

Therefore, a prison official’s denial of an inmate’s grievance generally does not constitute significant participation in an alleged constitutional violation sufficient to give rise to personal liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a prison official liable solely for denying a grievance or failing to follow grievance procedures after another official’s alleged misconduct.

Lloyd v. Pettit · filed 2020-10-08

Inspector Free’s alleged failure to follow proper grievance procedures and his denial of plaintiff’s grievance are not sufficient to render him liable under §1983.

Section 1983 does not redress a Contracts Clause violation or reputational injury unless the plaintiff also alleges a plausible state-law property interest or Bill of Rights liberty interest.

Poirier v. Hodges · filed 1978-02-02

Consequently, the Court holds that the prohibition in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, against impairing legitimate contractual obligations, is not a right redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Unless a plaintiff alleges the infringement of a property interest under state law, or a liberty interest under the Bill of Rights, in conjunction with injury to his reputation, he will not state a claim for stigmatization under § 1983, but at most a state-law claim for defamation, libel or slander. ... The Court, therefore, concludes that plaintiff has not stated a remediable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim when intentional retaliatory advice to prospective employers directly interferes with employment opportunities, even though defamation alone would not suffice.

Reussow v. Eddington · filed 1980-01-29

Such “advice” standing alone would support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a due process claim for reputational harm alone without deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest.

Wade v. Tommy Goodwin, Director of Arkansas State Police · filed 1988-05-18

These allegations do not state a § 1983 claim. One’s reputation alone is neither a “liberty” nor a “property” interest proteetible by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 permits damages for reputational injury when an unlawful arrest violates a protected liberty interest, although reputational injury alone does not establish liability.

Charlesworth R. Martin v. Theodore Thomas, Milo K. Shepard, Robert L. Prater and L.L. Clarkson · filed 1992-09-30

The Court held that injury to reputation alone is not enough to establish a claim under § 1983. The present case is substantially different because Dr. Martin is suing because his liberty interest to be free from an illegal arrest was violated. As damages for this violation, the jury granted monetary relief due to injury to reputation. Officer Shepard’s contention confuses the issue of damages with the issue of liability for loss of a protected liberty.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights protected by the Contracts Clause.

Lipscomb v. Columbus Muninicipal Separate School District · filed 2003-05-01

In so asserting, the Defendants ignore both United States Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent holding that Contracts Clause rights fall within the protection of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a protected right; reputational harm alone does not state a claim.

Partington v. Gedan · filed 1992-07-02

Partington, on the other hand, has not indicated that the Hawaii Supreme Court's statement in State v. Clarke deprived him of any constitutionally protected property or liberty interests or caused him any harm other than that allegedly done to his reputation. That allegation is not enough to sustain a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for reputational injury unless the injury is connected to a federally protected right or causes its denial.

Kanahele v. Gawlik · filed 2021-01-07

To the extent Plaintiff intends to claim Defendant Gawlik defamed him by making “false accusations,” this claim is not actionable under § 1983. ... Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that any injury to his reputation was inflicted in connection with a federally protected right or that it caused the denial of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process claim unless state action deprives the plaintiff of a protected liberty or property interest; procedural fairness alone does not establish a property interest.

Maloney v. Sheehan · filed 1978-06-27

Plaintiff bases his claim of a property interest on the CETA regulation which required written notice and an opportunity to respond to charges before termination. ... But the CETA regulation allowed an employer to discharge an employee for any reason or for no reason at all. A guarantee of procedural fairness does not establish a property interest. ... The allegations of the complaint do not establish a deprivation of a liberty or property interest to which the due process clause may apply. Plaintiff has thus failed to state a claim under the Constitution.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for a public-employee termination claim only when the plaintiff has a property or liberty interest in the employment status.

Northrop v. Kirby · filed 1978-06-30

It is well established that, in the context of terminations of employment of public employees, there is no constitutional requirement of a hearing and there is no federal right of action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the plaintiff had a “property” or “liberty” interest in his employment status.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when state officials terminate a tenured public employee without the pre-termination hearing required by due process.

Busche v. Bosman · filed 1979-08-15

The August 12, 1974, termination of plaintiff was in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that it was accomplished without a pre-termination hearing and constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a due process claim when the plaintiff lacks a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc. · filed 1980-02-26

We hold that, under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, Rodic had no liberty or property interest in attending races at Thistledown on which to base a due process claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not warrant remand of a public employee’s due-process claim when factual findings show that the dismissal was justified and not arbitrary, even if the employer did not follow its usual procedures.

Delores TEAGUE, Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Missouri, Appellee · filed 1980-03-21

In this case the findings of fact of the trial judge preclude the possibility that he would find plaintiff’s dismissal was arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, he found that plaintiff could not be found in her assigned area on at least four occasions, and that she was docked several times for unexcused absence. He found she refused to work alone at least twice, even though it was defendant’s policy that exterior inspectors should work alone. In addition, on one occasion she refused to work in the field, claiming it was too dangerous for a woman to work without a car. Based on these findings, defendant clearly was justified in firing her. No matter what its usual procedures were, defendant is not required to keep employees who skip work and refuse to perform the normal duties of the job. This is especially true in a job such as this one, where employees evidently remain unsupervised most of the time. ... Since we find the district judge correctly decided the Title VII claim, and since we can find no purpose for a remand under § 1983, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking relief for a due-process violation to show that a state actor deprived it of a property interest without the procedural protection required by due process.

J. P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol · filed 1980-10-06

In order to secure the relief it seeks under § 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate that the Township deprived it of property without according it the procedural protection required by the due process clause.

Section 1983 does not provide a procedural-due-process claim for denial of a permit when the applicant has no constitutionally protected property interest in the permit.

CONTRA COSTA THEATRE, INC. v. City of Concord · filed 1980-11-26

Under California law, plaintiff had no protected property rights in its application for a use permit. Therefore, it cannot state a claim under Section 1983 for denial of such a permit without due process.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process claim for a random, unauthorized deprivation of property when state law provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy.

Whorley v. Karr · filed 1981-10-16

Therefore plaintiff may bring an action in the courts of Virginia to recover for defendants’ alleged negligence in losing his wristwatch. In the alternative, if plaintiff claims defendants stole his watch, then he may maintain a suit against defendants under Virginia law because sovereign immunity does not shield those who commit an intentional tort. Thus, regardless of whether defendants negligently lost or stole plaintiff’s watch, plaintiff possesses a remedy to pursue in the state courts which is able to compensate him for his loss and provides him with a “meaningful opportunity subsequent to the initial taking for a determination of rights and liabilities.” Plaintiff has not been deprived of property without due process of law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when state actors deprive a person of liberty without procedural due process.

Huff v. County of Butler · filed 1981-10-26

Although plaintiff still bears the burden of proving these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, he has at this juncture succeeded in stating a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process deprivation claim for property in which the plaintiff has no property interest.

Reimer v. John Smith, Individually and in His Capacity as an Officer of Texas Rangers · filed 1981-12-14

Because Reimer is estopped from claiming a property interest in the car crusher, he could not, as a matter of law, succeed on a § 1983 claim based on a deprivation of the ear crusher. One cannot be deprived of property without due process unless one has a property interest in the thing allegedly taken away.

Section 1983 does not provide a procedural-due-process claim for deprivation of public employment absent a constitutionally protected property interest.

Zurek v. Hasten · filed 1982-10-28

This opinion deals only with Complaint Count I, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for claimed due-proeess-violative infringements of Zurek’s alleged property interest in continued public employment. Because no such property interest existed as a matter of law, defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I is granted.

Section 1983 provides a federal claim when state officials, acting under color of state law, arbitrarily interfere with pursuing an occupation in violation of due process liberty interests.

Rose Ann Wilkerson, Ray Wilkerson and Sharon Sutton v. Harold Johnson, Fred Bush, Roy "Bud" Nail, Jr., and Lola Wooldrid · filed 1983-02-09

In the instant case the infringement caused by the defendant officials was harassment and delay in allowing plaintiffs to pursue their occupation. They brought about the delay by enforcing a costly rule known to be invalid. The jury found that they did so in order to deter plaintiffs from opening their shop next to Johnson’s barber shop. No arguments are made in defense of the rule’s enforcement. The infringement is sufficiently serious, and the reasons given in justification for the delay so lacking in substance as to constitute a due process violation of plaintiffs’ “liberty” interests. We therefore need not decide whether the delay in the licensing process also infringed plaintiffs’ “property” interests.

Section 1983 provides no procedural-due-process claim for an intentional deprivation of a prisoner's property when state law supplies an adequate remedy.

Tydings v. Department of Corrections, James River C.C. Superintendent A. Baskerville Major Melton · filed 1983-08-08

Tydings has a remedy under Virginia law in the form of a suit for conversion or detinue for any intentional deprivation of his property by prison officials. That remedy satisfies the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Property owners outside the notice perimeter established by local law have no Section 1983 due-process claim based on failure to receive mailed notice of a public hearing.

Simons v. Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency of the U.S.A. · filed 1983-08-30

Therefore, we approve the district court’s determination that appellants were not improperly denied notice of the public hearings.

For a local licensing decision, Section 1983 permits review of procedural adequacy but does not guarantee that the state or local decision was correct.

Minneapolis Auto Parts Co. v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1983-08-23

In summary, this court is of a view that the federal inquiry into the propriety of a decision of a city council to grant or deny a license or permit is limited to reviewing the procedural adequacy of the local laws and procedures under § 1983. If the state and local procedures meet procedural due process, the federal inquiry ends.

Section 1983 provides no procedural-due-process claim for confiscation of prison property when formal regulations create no entitlement and lax enforcement creates only a unilateral expectation.

McWhorter v. Jones · filed 1983-09-27

Lax enforcement by TSP employees of formal TDOC policy gave plaintiff no more than a unilateral expectation in the property confiscated. Thus, plaintiff had no legitimate entitlement to the property confiscated and was not entitled to a due process hearing prior to its confiscation.

A tax-sale scheme does not violate Section 1983 or due process when it requires actual notice to reasonably ascertainable current owners before proceedings that may conclusively affect their property rights.

White v. Lee · filed 1983-10-21

We conclude that RSA chapter 80, when read in conjunction with the notice requirements mandated herein, is not unconstitutional. The statutory scheme, as interpreted by this court, contains sufficient safeguards to insure that a current owner of property will be notified sufficiently in advance of any tax sale proceeding which may adversely and conclusively affect his rights, so as to afford him the opportunity to present his objections. Accordingly, we hold that the provisions of RSA chapter 80 do not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the due process mandates of either the Federal or New Hampshire Constitutions.

A section 1983 due process claim fails unless the challenged government action actually caused the deprivation of a protected property interest that the plaintiff alleges.

Mapama Corp. v. New York City Department of Cultural Affairs · filed 1984-08-30

Mapama can claim no Due Process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard in the certification process, therefore, because the alleged impairment of its property interests resulting from coverage by MDL Article 7-C are not triggered by certification. Mapama’s complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state-created property interest in public employment supports § 1983 due-process liability when the employee is discharged without effective notice or a hearing.

Zamore v. Dyer · filed 1984-10-01

In Count Four, the plaintiff has alleged violation of her due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming entitlement to her position by virtue of the reinstatement provisions of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7)(D). ... She was discharged without effective notice and without a hearing from a job in which she had a state-created property interest. Although plaintiff’s property interest in continued employment after her maternity leave was granted by the provisions of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7)(D), her right to minimum procedures before losing that property interest is a matter of federal law.

Municipal officials do not deprive an employee of a property interest without due process for purposes of Section 1983 when the employee receives a full and fair termination hearing.

Aldana v. City of El Paso · filed 1984-12-31

Furthermore, as previously noted, Plaintiff was afforded a hearing with respect to his termination that fully complied with the requirements of due process. Therefore, no action by Hickock. or Davis deprived the Plaintiff of a property interest without due process of law.

A contract dispute over benefits supports Section 1983 only if state law creates a legitimate entitlement amounting to Fourteenth Amendment property and the state denies adequate process.

Gendalia v. Gioffre · filed 1985-03-29

Only if the benefits alleged to have been deprived the Town Employees are property interests within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment can the Employees condition a § 1983 claim upon the alleged denial without due process.