42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Lauro v. Honolulu City and County Prosecutor's Office, State of Hawaii · filed 2020-01-28

Plaintiff’s claims here, if successful, would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal proceedings and present incarceration in Russo.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Visner v. Stewart · filed 2020-01-29

Here, “success in [this] action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity” of Visner’s underlying state-court criminal conviction. ... And those convictions have not been overturned on appeal or otherwise expunged. Therefore, Visner cannot proceed with his civil claims against the Defendants unless and until he “can show that the state criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Lauro v. State of Hawaii · filed 2020-02-07

These claims, if successful, would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his parole revocation and present incarceration.

A Section 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence requires the plaintiff to show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Vidal v. Lindsey · filed 2020-02-19

If a § 1983 case seeking damages alleges constitutional violations that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the prisoner must establish that the underlying conviction or sentence has been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through a similar proceeding.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction require the plaintiff to show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Friedman v. Luzaich · filed 2020-02-19

If a § 1983 case seeking damages alleges constitutional violations that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the prisoner must establish that the underlying conviction or sentence has been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through a similar proceeding.

A § 1983 claim that would invalidate a conviction or sentence cannot proceed unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

RAMBERT v. KRASNER · filed 2020-02-21

As Rambert’s convictions and sentence have not been reversed or otherwise invalidated, these claims are not currently cognizable in a civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily undermine a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Cousar v. Lynch · filed 2020-02-24

Because Plaintiff’s guilty plea has not been overturned or otherwise called into question, he cannot proceed with § 1983 claims for damages that would necessarily be inconsistent with his conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate an outstanding disciplinary decision affecting good time credits.

Watson v. Dodd · filed 2020-02-28

Furthermore, if the Court were to find for Watson on any of his claims, it would necessarily imply the invalidity of each of the disciplinary charges against Watson as well as the factual findings of the Committee. Any argument by Watson that the disciplinary proceedings did not comport with due process or were not fair are barred by Heck because any judgment from this Court finding that the disciplinary hearings were unconstitutional would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary decision resulting from that proceeding.

Section 1983’s favorable termination requirement does not apply to a challenge to parole conditions that does not contest the conviction or sentence.

Moss v. Woolf · filed 2020-03-02

Heck, however, does not apply here. ... Petitioner, however, is not challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence. Instead, he seeks to challenge the constitutionality of certain conditions of his parole.

Section 1983 claims challenging a conviction are barred by Heck’s favorable-termination rule unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Garcia v. Superior Court of California, County of Orange · filed 2020-03-04

This action is dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey; ... The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

Section 1983 does not permit relief that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has been overturned.

Ferebee v. Stapleton · filed 2020-03-09

Further, prisoners may not bring suit under § 1983 for relief that, if granted, would imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s disciplinary offense conviction, unless the conviction has been overturned.

A § 1983 damages claim for allegedly illegal incarceration is barred under Heck until the underlying conviction has been invalidated.

(PC) Lewis v. Clark · filed 2020-03-20

The findings and recommendations explained that if plaintiff wished to obtain an award of damages in a §1983 action for his allegedly illegal incarceration, he must first show that the underlying criminal conviction has been invalidated. ... Having carefully reviewed the entire file, including plaintiffs objections, the court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Evariste v. Boston Police Department · filed 2020-03-23

Under Heck, all of plaintiff’s claims are barred on the basis that they necessarily imply the invalidity of his prior conviction.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Woodward v. White · filed 2020-03-23

Because success on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and it is clear that his guilty plea has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated, Heck’s favorable termination rule bars the § 1983 claims for money damages.

Section 1983 fair trial claims based on fabricated evidence require a favorable termination; an unexplained dismissal that does not indicate innocence does not satisfy that requirement.

Gondola v. City of New York · filed 2020-03-24

For the same reason, it makes sense to adopt the same favorable termination definition for fair trial claims based on fabricated evidence and malicious prosecution claims.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Jones v. The City of New York · filed 2020-03-27

Because success on Plaintiff’s false arrest claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction, and his conviction has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated, Heck’s favorable termination rule bars the § 1983 claims for money damages.

Section 1983 bars monetary damages for alleged improprieties in criminal proceedings unless the plaintiff shows that those proceedings have been invalidated.

Miller v. Loughry · filed 2020-03-30

Finally, plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that plaintiff still has a potential remedy to challenge her state court conviction and that she is barred from seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 resulting from alleged improprieties during her criminal prosecution, post-conviction proceedings, and appeal because she has not demonstrated that her criminal proceedings have been invalidated. ... 2. The magistrate judge’s PF&R entered January 30, 2020 be, and it hereby is, adopted and incorporated in full.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim challenging a conviction or sentence unless the judgment has been overturned or set aside.

Phillips v. Chafin · filed 2020-04-13

Claims of this nature, challenging the fact or the duration of the plaintiff’s confinement, are not actionable under § 1983 unless the judgment imposing the term of confinement has been overturned or set aside.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging the fact or duration of confinement are not actionable unless the judgment imposing confinement has been overturned or set aside.

Hall v. Sanner · filed 2020-04-16

Claims of this nature, challenging the fact or the duration of the plaintiff’s confinement, are not actionable under § 1983 unless the judgment imposing the term of confinement has been overturned or set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction affecting good conduct time unless that conviction has been overturned or set aside.

Garland v. Clarke · filed 2020-04-16

Whatever claims Garland may have against these defendants are not currently actionable under § 1983, because the disciplinary conviction has not been reversed or set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages for a disciplinary conviction affecting the duration of confinement unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Watts v. Demsa · filed 2020-04-16

Because it appears that Plaintiff seeks damages based on allegations that the proper procedures were not followed at his disciplinary hearing, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless and until his conviction which resulted from the RVR has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary conviction until that conviction has been vacated.

BUCHANAN v. PURDUE · filed 2020-04-16

To the extent Mr. Buchanan’s complaint can be read to assert challenges to his disciplinary hearing proceedings and his conviction for sexual harassment, he cannot bring a § 1983 action against the disciplinary proceeding officials until his disciplinary conviction has been vacated.

A § 1983 claim challenging a conviction does not accrue until the conviction satisfies Heck’s favorable termination requirement.

Gates v. Kathy · filed 2020-04-21

Until he receives a ruling that satisfies the favorable-termination requirement of Heck, no action will accrue under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply a parole revocation is invalid unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Perry v. Indiana Department of Correction · filed 2020-04-28

To the extent any such claim exists in the complaint, it would be precluded by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... Unless and until the parole revocation determination itself is challenged and subsequently invalidated in some way, Perry cannot proceed here.

Section 1983 requires a favorable termination before a plaintiff may pursue a claim that would invalidate an outstanding conviction or sentence.

Williams v. Winter · filed 2020-04-28

Thus, an individual alleging an unlawful conviction or term of imprisonment must first receive a favorable termination of his criminal conviction or sentence before proceeding with a Section 1983 claim. ... I find that Williams’ unlawful arrest claim is barred by Heck’s favorable termination rule.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

ALLEN v. SMITH · filed 2020-04-29

Mr. Allen’s claims are barred by Heck because success on them would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, which has not been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily invalidate a conviction or sentence unless it has first been invalidated.

French v. Harris · filed 2020-04-29

Plaintiff’s claims relate directly to the validity of his confinement under a state criminal judgment and may not be presented under Section 1983 until that confinement is found to have been unlawful in another proceeding.

The Heck termination rule bars a § 1983 claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

(PC) Frazier v. Matteson · filed 2020-04-30

However, the Heck termination rule is applicable to Plaintiff’s claims in this § 1983 action because, if Plaintiff succeeded on his claims, Plaintiff’s success “would ‘necessarily imply’ or ‘demonstrate’ the invalidity of [Plaintiff’s] conviction [and] sentence[.]” Beets v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation decision has first been invalidated.

WYATT v. DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION AND PAROLE · filed 2020-05-08

Accordingly, because the Parole Board’s decision has not been rendered invalid, Wyatt and McNeil may not attack it via a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 bars a claim for damages arising from criminal proceedings unless the plaintiff shows that those proceedings have been invalidated.

Miller v. Burton · filed 2020-05-11

Finally, plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that plaintiff still has a potential remedy to challenge her state court conviction and that she is barred from seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 resulting from alleged improprieties during her criminal prosecution, post-conviction proceedings, and appeal because she has not demonstrated that her criminal proceedings have been invalidated. ... Inasmuch as plaintiff has not shown that a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is unavailable, the court overrules this objection. ... The magistrate judge’s PF&R entered February 5, 2020 be, and it hereby is, adopted and incorporated in full.

A § 1983 claim that would invalidate a conviction must be dismissed unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Billings v. Lawrence County DHR · filed 2020-05-14

Therefore, the Court must dismiss Billings’s § 1983 claim because he has not alleged that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for damages based on an allegedly unlawful sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Mourning v. Office of the Attorney General · filed 2020-05-14

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on an allegedly unlawful sentence, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless that conviction and/or sentence has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims attacking prison disciplinary convictions are barred until the Heck conditions are met.

Bilbo v. Davis-Director TDCJ-CID · filed 2020-05-18

To any extent Plaintiff requests monetary damages, such a claim is frivolous until the Heck conditions are met.

Section 1983 claims barred by Heck cannot proceed when no contest pleas are followed by dismissal after community service, because that disposition is not a favorable termination.

Duarte v. Stockton City · filed 2020-05-22

Moreover, like Gilles, Plaintiffs here cannot plausibly argue that completing mandatory community service, after pleading no contest to a charge of resisting law enforcement, can possibly constitute a “favorable termination” of the proceedings for them.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging the validity of confinement is barred by Heck unless the sentence calculation has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside; loss of habeas access does not remove that requirement.

Ahmadi v. Lorie Davis, Director · filed 2020-05-27

Ahmadi incorrectly argues that, because he no longer has the habeas remedy available to him, his § 1983 complaint is not subject to the favorable-termination requirement in Heck. He does not establish that the calculation of his sentence has been reversed, inval- idated, or otherwise set aside. Consequently, his suit for damages based on his allegedly unlawful confinement is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a prison disciplinary decision that forfeited credits unless the decision has first been invalidated.

(PC) Escobar v. Gary · filed 2020-05-28

Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on his disciplinary hearing is barred by the favorable termination rule of Heck and Balisok, and thus shall be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a malicious prosecution claim challenging a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned.

Hall v. Wichita Falls Police Dept · filed 2020-05-28

Because Plaintiff's conviction has not been overturned, he has no cognizable claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence require the plaintiff to show that it has been invalidated.

Jones v. Gentle · filed 2020-06-01

Jones’s Fourteenth Amendment claims were barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (where success of § 1983 damages claim would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction or sentence, plaintiff must show conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question).

Section 1983 damages claims challenging a prison disciplinary decision cannot proceed until the decision has been invalidated.

Lewis v. Velarde · filed 2020-06-03

To the extent that Plaintiff requests any monetary damages for due process violations during his disciplinary hearing, such claims are frivolous until certain conditions are met. The Supreme Court has held that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 attacking the constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has first been invalidated.

Avila v. Reynolds · filed 2020-06-10

A claim for damages that bears a relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge disciplinary sanctions affecting the duration of confinement unless the disciplinary decision has been invalidated or the prisoner permanently abandons any challenge to those sanctions.

Eckert v. Grady · filed 2020-06-12

Because Mr. Eckert has not demonstrated that the disposition of the disciplinary charge has been invalidated, Heck bars the due process claims arising from the disposition of the disciplinary charge unless Mr. Eckert “abandon[s], not just now, but also in any future proceeding, any claims he may have with respect to the duration of his confinement that arise out of the proceeding he is attacking in [this] § 1983 suit.” Id. at 104.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a probation revocation unless the revocation has been invalidated.

PAULSON v. KELLY · filed 2020-06-19

Accordingly, because the decision to revoke his probation has not been rendered invalid, Paulson may not attack it via a § 1983 action.

A Section 1983 due process claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary finding does not accrue until that finding is vacated.

Schrock v. Romero · filed 2020-06-23

In effect, such a claim would not accrue until the guilty finding is vacated.

A § 1983 action challenging the validity of a conviction is barred by Heck’s favorable termination rule unless the conviction has been invalidated.

(PC) Fairchild-Littlefield v. Shaffer · filed 2020-06-25

Plaintiff Gigi Fairchild-Littlefield (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: ... 2. This action is dismissed without prejudice as barred by Heck v. Humphrey; ... 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction affecting the duration of confinement unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Gonzalez v. Nixon · filed 2020-06-29

Therefore, he is entitled to proceed with his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if his disciplinary conviction has been reversed or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck and Balisok when success would call into question prison decisions forfeiting good time credits.

(PC) Struggs v. Pfeiffer · filed 2020-07-01

As explained in the findings and recommendations, plaintiff's claims, if successful, would call into question the validity of prison administrative decisions that resulted in the forfeiture of plaintiff's good time credits. (Doc. No. 25 at 2.) Asa result, his claims are barred by the decision in Heck and Balisok.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Dent v. Craig · filed 2020-07-01

When judgment for a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. Because Plaintiff has not made this showing, he may not include these claims in his amended complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would undermine a guilty plea that has not been overturned.

MOORE v. ALLISON · filed 2020-07-01

In other words, “a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.” ... Moore cannot make that demonstration without impugning the validity of his guilty plea in the underlying criminal proceeding. ... Consequently, Moore’s retaliatory arrest claim is barred by Heck and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages for confinement beyond a release date unless the challenged confinement has first received a favorable determination through state remedies or federal habeas corpus.

Goodwin v. APA Parole Board · filed 2020-07-02

The Plaintiff’s allegations of unlawful incarceration beyond his release date relate directly to the duration of his confinement under a state criminal judgment and may not be presented under § 1983 unless or until he achieves a favorable determination of his claim through state remedies or federal habeas corpus.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim challenging a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Black v. Thomas · filed 2020-07-13

Black’s damages claim is barred because he does not allege his conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

A § 1983 claim challenging the loss of good time credits does not accrue until the disciplinary proceedings have ended favorably, even if habeas relief is unavailable.

Whitfield v. Althoff · filed 2020-07-24

Under Savory, Plaintiff’s § 1983 action has not accrued because Plaintiff has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence to show that it has already been invalidated.

Butler v. Maxwell · filed 2020-07-24

When judgment for a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. Plaintiff has not made this showing.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would invalidate a conviction unless the conviction has first been set aside, even when habeas relief is no longer available.

BROWN v. CAPPELLI · filed 2020-07-27

Brown’s conviction has not been invalidated. Accordingly, his claims challenging the constitutionality of that conviction or seeking invalidation of that conviction are not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, even if Brown has finished serving his sentence and habeas relief is no longer available to him, he may not pursue § 1983 claims based on alleged constitutional infirmities in his prosecution or conviction.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner's claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of lost good conduct time unless the disciplinary conviction has first been invalidated.

Bowling v. Bray · filed 2020-07-28

Accordingly, his § 1983 due process claims regarding the alleged loss of good conduct time are barred under Balisokand Wilkinson, andthe courtmust dismiss them without prejudice, pursuant to §1915A(b)(1).

Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims require a favorable termination of the underlying charge; dismissal in exchange for completing a DUI education program does not satisfy that requirement.

Allen v. Harkins · filed 2020-07-30

Accordingly, I conclude that Allen has not alleged facts to satisfy the favorable termination requirement for a false arrest or malicious prosecution claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge disciplinary sanctions without first invalidating them when success would affect neither the underlying conviction nor the length of the sentence.

Rhodes v. Stirling · filed 2020-07-30

Given the allegations as currently pleaded by Plaintiff, if this court were to grant the relief and expunge the disciplinary convictions from his record, neither his underlying conviction nor the calculation of his time served would be impacted. As a result, this court concludes that neither Heck nor Edwards bar Plaintiff’s suit.

Section 1983 bars claims for damages or equitable relief when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned.

Santos v. Cross · filed 2020-08-05

Because success on Plaintiff’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction ‒ and he does not assert that his conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated ‒ Heck’s favorable termination rule bars the § 1983 claims for damages and equitable relief.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for lost good time credits unless the disciplinary proceeding that caused the loss has been invalidated, reversed, or otherwise overturned.

(PC) Zaragoza v. Carrillo · filed 2020-08-06

Rather, in order to seek money damages under § 1983 for any loss of good time credits, plaintiff would first have to demonstrate that the internal prison disciplinary proceeding that led to the loss of those good time credits had been invalidated, reversed, or otherwise overturned.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

GILLINS v. NOTHSTEIN · filed 2020-08-10

Accordingly, to the extent Gillins’s Complaint can be read to seek damages for his imprisonment or for alleged constitutional violations that occurred in the course of a criminal prosecution, it is clear that the prosecution did not terminate in his favor. Thus, Gillins cannot maintain such claims under § 1983 at this time.

A prisoner challenging mixed disciplinary sanctions under § 1983 must forgo any challenge to sanctions affecting the duration of confinement to pursue a claim about conditions of confinement.

Delgado v. Concepcion · filed 2020-08-21

Thus, Delgado’s procedural due process claim regarding his mixed sanctions (including the loss of his RREC) is barred by Heck because Delgado has not filed a notice indicating that he forgoes a challenge to his RREC sanction, which affects the duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily undermine a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Iverson v. Costello · filed 2020-08-21

Thus, because Iverson “has not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated in any manner,” his claims for damages allegedly arising from the search and seizure and false arrest underlying that conviction may not proceed.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would undermine a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Fleming v. The City Of New York · filed 2020-05-05

This Court previously found that Fleming pleaded guilty to the armed robbery for which he was prosecuted, that the conviction was never invalidated, and that any potential claim is thus foreclosed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for harm that would imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Ellawendy v. Monterey County Superior Court · filed 2020-09-08

Accordingly, Petitioner may only pursue a § 1983 action for damages only if he prevails in this habeas action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Helvy v. Paramo · filed 2020-09-11

Here, Plaintiff contends he was convicted based on a “false RVR” and therefore, his claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction. ... Because he has not further alleged his disciplinary conviction has already been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim for relief, and his Fourteenth Amendment claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Anger v. Whitmer · filed 2020-09-15

Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the favorable-termination requirement set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... Plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction or sentence have been invalidated.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot recover damages for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation arising from a probation violation unless the underlying violation has been successfully challenged.

Tingey v. Gardner · filed 2020-09-22

And even if we read Tingey’s complaint to allege a parallel Fourth Amendment violation, it would smack into Heck v. Humphrey’s favorable-termination rule. ... In other words, because Tingey has not successfully challenged the underlying probation violation, he cannot bring a Fourth Amendment claim.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction resulting in lost good time credits is barred unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Hamilton v. Ishee · filed 2020-09-23

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are therefore barred by Heck, and they are therefore subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been set aside.

Harris v. New York State Department of Correction & Community Services · filed 2020-09-23

In other words, if the plaintiff’s success on a claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been set aside, that claim must be dismissed.

A §1983 claim challenging the duration of confinement is subject to Heck’s favorable termination rule, but a plausible allegation of favorable termination can defeat dismissal at the pleading stage.

KING v. BENNAGE-GREGORY · filed 2020-09-24

At this early stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff’s theory is at least plausible; consequently, the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that Heck bars Plaintiff’s §1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires favorable termination of the prosecution for a fabricated-evidence fair-trial claim; an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal does not qualify.

Maradiaga v. City of New York · filed 2020-10-01

Accordingly, their decision to terminate these proceedings by ACD requires dismissal of their claims of fabricated evidence.

Section 1983 claims that would call a potential conviction into question are premature under Heck until the charges are dismissed or the conviction is set aside.

Alford v. Baylor · filed 2020-10-13

The Heck bar applies whether Plaintiffs are pretrial detainees or whether they have been convicted of the charges for which they are currently incarcerated.

A Section 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence requires the plaintiff to establish that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Collins v. State of Nevada · filed 2020-10-14

If a Section 1983 case seeking damages alleges constitutional violations that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the prisoner must establish that the underlying sentence or conviction has been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through a similar proceeding.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Jones v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-10-15

The plaintiff does not demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise invalidated, and, therefore, his claim for damages fails.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge disciplinary sanctions affecting conditions of confinement if the prisoner permanently waives challenges to sanctions affecting the duration of confinement.

Muniz v. Cook · filed 2020-10-21

If the plaintiff intends to pursue this action, he must file a notice stating that he waives for all time all claims challenging the disciplinary sanctions affecting the duration of his confinement.

A Section 1983 damages claim is barred when success would imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Crocker v. Bedford Hills Correctional Facility · filed 2020-10-23

Because success on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction, and because Plaintiff has not alleged that her conviction was overturned or otherwise invalidated, Heck’s favorable termination rule bars her claim for money damages.

Section 1983 permits a fabricated-evidence due process claim after the conviction is invalidated under Heck without requiring the plaintiff to plead that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor.

Caldwell v. City of San Francisco · filed 2020-10-26

Accordingly, Caldwell does not have to plead that the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in his favor in order to proceed with his section 1983 due process claim against Crenshaw.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Kirkland v. Minihan · filed 2020-11-13

Because success on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and because Plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction was overturned or otherwise invalidated, Heck’s favorable termination rule bars his claim for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a malicious prosecution claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

BROWN v. FELKER · filed 2020-11-17

Brown’s conviction has not been invalidated. As success on Brown’s malicious prosecution claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction, this claim is not cognizable in a civil rights action.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily implicate a conviction that has not been set aside or called into question.

West v. Rankin · filed 2020-11-25

A finding by this Court in Plaintiff’s favor would therefore necessarily implicate Plaintiff’s underlying conviction, which Plaintiff has failed to allege has been set aside or called into question by any federal court.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for conduct that would invalidate a conviction must show that the conviction has already been invalidated.

Loggins v. Pilshaw · filed 2020-12-01

Rather than creating an affirmative defense, Heck adds an element to the claim. ... Since all the damages sought by Loggins are based on actions by defendants that allegedly caused his convictions or prevented the convictions from being set aside, the district court properly applied Heck to dismiss his claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

BOYER v. LAMAS · filed 2020-12-01

Therefore, to the extent Boyer seeks damages in the instant case for his imprisonment or for alleged constitutional violations that occurred in the course of a criminal prosecution, it is clear that the prosecution did not terminate in his favor. Thus, Boyer cannot maintain such claims under § 1983 at this time.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Fittro v. Arnott · filed 2020-12-02

Because Plaintiff’s state court convictions have not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, his § 1983 claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction do not accrue until the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.

Quintero 339148 v. Armstrong · filed 2020-12-03

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are barred as not yet having accrued by Heck to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner facing sanctions that affect both confinement conditions and duration to pursue a due process claim if the prisoner permanently gives up challenges to the sanctions affecting duration.

Muniz v. Cook · filed 2020-12-03

However, the Second Circuit has held that a prisoner subject to mixed sanctions can proceed under section 1983 if he foregoes, for all time, any challenges to the sanctions affecting the duration of his confinement. Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2006). The plaintiff has filed a notice expressing his willingness to forego such a challenge. ECF No. 9. Thus, the Court may review his claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

TOMPKINS v. HACKETT · filed 2020-12-03

Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s claims for damages relate to a conviction and sentence that have not been invalidated, his current suit is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a sentence unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Rogers v. MDOC · filed 2020-12-09

Having considered the pleadings and applicable law, the Court dismisses this § 1983 civil action as frivolous because Rogers’ claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

BROWN v. FELKER · filed 2020-12-10

However, as previously explained to Brown, this Court may not intervene in his state post-conviction proceeding and any challenges to his conviction are not cognizable in a § 1983 action while his conviction is intact.

Section 1983 does not provide an actionable damages claim challenging a prison disciplinary conviction that affects the length of confinement unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Daigle v. Perez · filed 2020-12-10

Because a ruling in plaintiff’s favor would affect the duration of his confinement, plaintiff does not have an actionable claim under § 1983 unless, and until, the disciplinary conviction is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed until the conviction has been invalidated.

Hanna v. State of Texas · filed 2020-12-15

Consequently, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed with prejudice to their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge confinement when success would undermine a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Jiles v. Pace · filed 2020-12-30

However, unless and until Jiles’s conviction has been overturned, this Court cannot declare that his confinement was unlawful, and he has no cause of action under § 1983.

A § 1983 damages claim that would undermine a conviction requires the conviction to have been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

JACKSON v. MEMEGER · filed 2021-01-07

Finally, the claim lacks merit because Jackson’s criminal conviction has not been reversed or otherwise called into question.

A § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction does not accrue until the conviction is invalidated.

Vasquez v. Bunin · filed 2021-01-08

Until Vasquez receives a ruling declaring his sentences invalid, no action will accrue under § 1983.

Section 1983 knock-and-announce claims are not categorically barred by Heck; whether a claim would undermine a conviction requires a fact-specific inquiry.

Murphy v. Grochowski · filed 2021-01-14

Here, such a fact intensive inquiry would take us beyond the pleadings. Thus, we cannot say that amendment would be futile based on the favorable-termination rule of Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the plaintiff has obtained a favorable termination of a challenge to it.

Ezebuiroh v. Benzing · filed 2021-01-19

His claim for money damages in Count 1 arising from the same conviction is barred by the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... Having failed to obtain a favorable termination of any challenge to his conviction, Plaintiff’s claim in Count 1 is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily call a conviction or sentence into question unless the plaintiff has first successfully challenged that conviction or sentence.

Cole v. Madison County District Attorney · filed 2021-01-20

If Cole were to succeed in this action, it would necessarily call into question the validity of his conviction and sentence. He therefore is barred from raising his claims under § 1983 unless and until he successfully challenges his conviction and sentence in a direct or collateral appeal.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary finding that affects the duration of confinement unless the finding has been invalidated.

Morales v. Lefebure · filed 2021-01-21

Accordingly, Morales’s section 1983 due process claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims that challenge a conviction cannot proceed until the conviction has been invalidated or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Smith v. Putman · filed 2021-01-26

Plaintiff’s claims in both consolidated cases are DISMISSED with prejudice until such time as Plaintiff can show that the conviction forming the basis of these claims has been overturned, expunged by executive order, declared invalid in a state collateral proceeding, or called into question through the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 claim challenging a criminal conviction cannot proceed until the conviction has been overturned, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Smith v. Massey · filed 2021-01-26

Accordingly, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report of the Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 6) as the opinion of the District Court. Plaintiff’s claims in both consolidated cases are DISMISSED with prejudice until such time as Plaintiff can show that the conviction forming the basis of these claims has been overturned, expunged by executive order, declared invalid in a state collateral proceeding, or called into question through the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for injury to reputation alone without deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty right.

Marner v. City of Aurora · filed 2015-12-02

Finally, Mr. Marner complains of the dismissal of his § 1983 claim based on alleged defamation when various defendants published an article incorrectly stating that he was part of a criminal enterprise. But, as pointed out by the district court, injury to reputation is not a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty right.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for slander or libel, which are matters of state law.

Waddleton v. Blalock · filed 2001-11-19

Rather, the magistrate judge correctly dismissed the claim because, under the law of this circuit, claims involving slander and libel are state law matters which are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a defamation-plus claim for statements connected to an unconstitutional arrest even when the statements follow the constitutional deprivation.

Crowe v. County of San Diego · filed 2001-06-27

However, when Stephan spoke to 48 Hours in 1998-1999, it was clearly established that defamatory statements made “in connection” with an unconstitutional arrest was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even if the statements were made after the constitutional deprivation.

Defamation alone does not state a Section 1983 claim unless it also prevents the plaintiff from enjoying or exercising a constitutionally protected right or interest.

Burden v. Counselor Pollack · filed 1987-06-23

Unless coupled with an averment that the purportedly defamatory communication also prevented plaintiff's enjoyment or exercise of a right or interest of a constitutional magnitude, it is insufficient to give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation by a state official, even when the defamation is malicious.

Cook v. Brockway · filed 1977-01-17

it is well established that libel or slander by a state official — even if malicious— does not generate a cause of action under the federal civil rights statutes, for the right to be free of defamation and to secure the redress for its infliction is within the province of state law and is not an incident of federal citizenship.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federally secured right, and harm to reputation alone is insufficient to state a claim.

Reilly v. Leonard · filed 1978-10-23

The plaintiff’s allegation of harm to his reputation is insufficient by itself to allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for defamation standing alone without more tangible harm.

Hall v. United States · filed 1983-03-25

Although the appellant raises the issue that Powers defamed her by saying to her friends and associates that she had been selling narcotics, we note that the claim of defamation, standing alone, is not subject to redress under § 1983, absent more tangible harm.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for defamation standing alone absent more tangible harm.

Hall v. United States of America · filed 1983-04-29

Although the appellant raises the issue that Powers defamed her by saying to her friends and associates that she had been selling narcotics, we note that the claim of defamation, standing alone, is not subject to redress under Sec. 1983, absent more tangible harm.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation alone.

Barlau v. City of Northfield · filed 1983-06-22

This claim states a cause of action in defamation, if anything, and claims sounding in defamation are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defamation is not cognizable under § 1983.

Anthony Miner and Eric Simmons v. Rick Brackney · filed 1983-10-28

Miner’s contention that Brackney’s report falsely labeled him an informant among his peers is not actionable; claims for defamation and slander are not cognizable under § 1983.

Defamatory statements by state officials do not state a § 1983 claim unless accompanied by deprivation of another constitutionally protected interest.

Stephens v. James E. Word, Michael T. Brunner, Wayne K. Scharber, Joe A. Covington, Earl C. Leming, and Jame · filed 1985-12-10

Mere defamatory statements by state officials, absent the deprivation of other constitutionally protected interests, will not state a claim under Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 claim for deprivation of a liberty interest through reputational stigma must allege that the stigmatizing or defamatory statement was false.

Rice v. Vigil · filed 1986-07-16

“In order to state a claim for a deprivation of a liberty interest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the stigmatizing or defamatory statement is false.”

A municipal official's allegedly libelous or slanderous statements, without an accompanying federal-right deprivation, do not create a § 1983 claim.

LaBate v. Butts · filed 1987-10-30

Thus, plaintiff has no cause of action under § 1983 against Mayor Young for his statements.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation that harms reputation alone without depriving the plaintiff of a protected liberty or property interest.

Thomas v. Kippermann · filed 1988-06-09

Such allegations merely implicate Thomas’s reputation and are insufficient to establish a cause of action under § 1983. Damage to one’s reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interest such as employment, does not implicate any “property” or “liberty” interest sufficient to invoke the due process clause. More must be involved than defamation to establish a § 1983 claim under the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone by a state official.

Peace v. Baker · filed 1988-06-21

Nevertheless, even assuming that Defendants Baker and Hurta would be liable for Green’s statements, the Supreme Court has held that defamation alone is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for conduct that amounts at most to defamation.

Parate v. Isibor · filed 1989-03-16

As the district court correctly noted, the defendants' actions on October 4, 1985, rise at most to the level of a tort of defamation which is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for libel or slander absent further injury.

Ernest Ralph Ellis, Sr., Jean Ellen Ellis v. Jeffersonian Newspaper · filed 1989-11-13

Torts such as libel and slander do not give rise to a cause of action under the civil rights act absent further injury.

A defamation-plus claim under § 1983 requires a cognizable constitutional wrong in addition to defamation.

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1992-07-01

To state a defamation-plus claim, Buckey must join a defamation claim to a recognizable section 1983 wrong such as the denial of equal protection and substantive due process here hypothesized.

Section 1983 cannot be used to assert a claim of defamation.

Wildauer v. Frederick County · filed 1993-05-05

However, § 1983 cannot be used as a vehicle for asserting a claim of defamation.

Section 1983 does not make defamation alone actionable; reputational injury must be accompanied by injury to another interest.

Malmin v. Kay Manweiler, Boise State Bar, Individuals: Does I - X, Inclusive, Roes I - X, Inclusive · filed 1995-08-15

Defamation by itself is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 may cover a defamation claim that alleges injury to a constitutionally protected right.

Goodall v. Hodges · filed 1996-12-19

We write separately only to note that although claims of defamation may sometimes be cognizable under § 1983 by alleging in- jury to a constitutionally protected right, Appellant's defamation claim was nonetheless properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make defamation alone actionable.

Jackson v. Caton · filed 1997-04-23

Defamation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 defamation claim requires stigma plus infringement of another interest.

Price v. Cty Ct Clk Hill Cty · filed 2003-06-25

Price cannot avoid the Heck bar by arguing that his cause of action is based solely on the dissemination of the allegedly false information because, to establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 defamation claim, Price must demonstrate “a stigma plus an infringement of some other interest.”

Section 1983 does not provide an independent action for defamation by a state official.

Schulte v. Schmetzer · filed 1985-12-24

No independent action for defamation by a state official is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone.

Muhammad v. Weikel · filed 2019-09-26

Moreover, Defendants are protected from Plaintiff’s defamation claim under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310; Wicker v. Shannon, No. 3:CV-09-1629, 2010 WL 3812351, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2010) (citing 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522), and such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone.

Harris v. The City of Texarkana, Arkansas · filed 2019-10-17

Judge Bryant recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s section 1983 defamation claim because defamation is not actionable under section 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Bryant’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s section 1983 defamation claim should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation and harm to reputation alone.

Muhammad v. Henesh · filed 2020-02-26

Plaintiff again asserts that Defendants have defamed him and caused harm to his reputation. As the Court has previously informed Plaintiff, ... such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation alone; the plaintiff must allege deprivation of a federal right.

(PC) Boddie v. Martel · filed 2020-03-09

Defamation itself does not support a cause of action under Section 1983.

An alleged defamatory act is not actionable under § 1983.

Fishbourne v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2020-05-28

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise a claim for defamation, the magistrate judge correctly found that an alleged defamatory act is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for slander or defamation alone.

Bower v. Village of Marblehead, Ohio · filed 2020-06-26

Most obviously, slander and defamation are not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a libel claim based solely on harm to reputation.

Gorawara v. Caprio · filed 2020-08-28

In addition, insofar as Gorawara seeks to assert a libel claim under Section 1983, see ECF No. at ¶ 57, such a claim is not cognizable.

In a Section 1983 political retaliation claim, once the plaintiff shows that political conduct motivated the termination, the defendants must show they would have made the same decision regardless of that conduct.

Siwek v. Farley · filed 1988-03-21

Once she has shown this, the defendants must show that the decision would have been the same irrespective of her political conduct.

A public employer violates section 1983 by refusing reappointment because employees supported and campaigned for the employer’s political opponent.

Kyle v. City of Oak Forest · filed 1986-06-20

This Court finds that Mayor Malecky’s decision not to reappoint plaintiffs was politically motivated in violation of plaintiffs’ rights granted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

An assistant prosecutor may not obtain Section 1983 relief for politically motivated dismissal when political loyalty is an appropriate requirement for effectively carrying out the prosecutor’s policies.

Livas v. Petka · filed 1983-08-05

For this reason, Petka was entitled to demand absolute loyalty from his assistants, including Livas. That Petka lost confidence in Livas, for whatever reason, is therefore sufficient justification for Livas’ dismissal.

Section 1983 reaches arbitrary, politically motivated dismissal of a public employee when carried out under color of state law and depriving the employee of First Amendment association rights.

Matta v. De Choudens · filed 1977-02-25

This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 1343. Defendants’ actions were performed under color of the Personnel Law of Puerto Rico, 3 L.P. R.A. 641 et seq. Said actions subjected plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. ... Accordingly, an employee of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not be dismissed solely on the grounds of political affiliation. ... In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that defendants José Alvarez de Choudens and José E. Soler-Zapata violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to free association under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

A newly elected sheriff may decline to reappoint deputies in a small rural office for political disloyalty when loyalty is necessary to carry out the personnel and policy change voters elected the sheriff to make.

Dove v. Fletcher · filed 1983-11-09

We hold that Fletcher is in reasonable compliance with those principles when he reappointed 14 of the 31 employees of his predecessor. The interest of the voting public demands that he enjoy the privilege of replacing the employees who might be disloyal to him.

A nonpolicymaking public employee may prevail under § 1983 when political affiliation substantially motivated dismissal and party loyalty was not a legitimate job qualification.

Paradise v. O'LAUGHLIN · filed 1984-05-04

As City Clerk, Mrs. Paradise performed non-policy-making tasks. She has also demonstrated that her political affiliation was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind dismissal.

In a mixed-motive § 1983 political-discharge claim, proof that political affiliation motivated the dismissal shifts the burden to the employer to prove it would have made the same decision anyway.

Barnes v. Bosley · filed 1984-12-14

In the instant case, therefore, once the plaintiffs established that their political affiliation was a motivating factor in their dismissals, the burden shifted to the defendants to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs would have been discharged in any event.

A Section 1983 political-discharge plaintiff must prove that the impermissible motive was a but-for cause of dismissal.

Wagner v. Hawkins · filed 1986-04-28

In other words, the court must be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiffs would not have been discharged except for the operation of the impermissible motive.

Section 1983 permits an at-will public employee to seek damages for a hiring decision based solely on political belief or association without justification by a vital government interest.

Epps v. Clarendon County · filed 1991-05-06

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) allows a civil action for damages against a government official who deprives an individual of a constitutionally protected right. A public employee, even one employed at-will, may state a claim under § 1983 for violation of his First Amendment rights by alleging damages from hiring decisions that are based solely upon political belief or association and are unjustified by a vital government interest.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action to be brought in state court under concurrent jurisdiction, but a state court may decline to exercise that jurisdiction when another available forum exists.

Kish v. Wright · filed 1977-03-30

It seems obvious that the federal statute gives original, but not exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district courts; therefore, it should be concluded that there exists concurrent jurisdiction under the federal statute. ... We hold, therefore, that civil rights actions arising under Sec. 1983 of the United States Code can be properly brought within the jurisdiction of this state. ... While we find that the trial court does have concurrent jurisdiction and the power of discretion as to whether or not it will invoke that jurisdiction in a particular case, we are here confronted with a motion which was granted with prejudice. ... The court should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice to assure that the appellant’s right to seek relief in the federal court under Sec. 1983 was protected.

Actions arising under § 1983 may be brought in either state or federal court because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.

DiAntonio v. Pennsylvania State University · filed 1978-08-30

Concurrent jurisdiction over actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exists in the state and federal courts.

Section 1983 claims may be heard by Illinois state courts concurrently with federal courts.

Holmes v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1981-01-12

In this case, careful review of relevant case law reveals that the Illinois state court does indeed have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s civil rights claims concurrent with the jurisdiction of this court.

Section 1983 permits Maryland state courts to exercise jurisdiction over civil-rights actions brought under it.

De Bleecker v. Montgomery County · filed 1981-04-13

We align ourselves with the above-cited cases and hold that Maryland courts have jurisdiction to try actions based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 permits an action in state court for redress when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Santana v. Registrars of Voters of Worcester · filed 1981-09-01

Claims under § 1983 are fully cognizable in our State courts. ... Without commenting on the merits of the contention, we cannot say that the plaintiffs’ allegation of the defendants’ systematic and wilful violation of two election laws, resulting in the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ right to vote, fails to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state courts, which exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal civil-rights actions.

Cooper v. Hutchinson Police Department · filed 1981-11-13

The action is comparable to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is a well-accepted rule of law that state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal civil rights actions.

Section 1983 claims may be brought in state court, where state courts are proper forums for vindicating the civil rights those claims enforce.

Royer v. Adams · filed 1981-11-20

We continue to believe that our State courts should have the opportunity to address the crucial civil rights issues which § 1983 cases raise rather than require all of our State governmental units to have to defend their actions only in front of our two federal judges.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state as well as federal courts, and state courts may grant relief under federal standards.

Miller v. Carr · filed 1982-04-08

There is nothing which would bar that Court from resolving the § 1983 questions at issue here, and, if appropriate, granting relief under federal standards.

Section 1983 allows federal constitutional-rights suits to be brought in state court because state courts have jurisdiction over them.

Shields Ex Rel. Shields v. Gross · filed 1983-05-13

State courts have jurisdiction over suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The federal constitution is the law of the land governing the state court to the same extent as the federal court.

State courts have concurrent general subject-matter jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims.

Snuggs v. Stanly County Department of Public Health · filed 1983-07-05

It is well established that State courts have concurrent general subject matter jurisdiction to hear Section 1983 claims.

State courts adjudicating Section 1983 claims must apply federal law to determine whether the complaint sufficiently pleads a federal cause of action.

Bach v. County of Butte · filed 1983-09-29

In this case we hold that California state courts should apply federal law to determine whether a complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983, referred to hereinafter simply as “§ 1983”).