42 U.S.C. § 1983

States and their agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983, nor are state officers sued in their official capacities.

Franklin v. KS Dept. Corrections · filed 2005-12-23

Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that neither states nor state officers sued in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... For these reasons, Franklin’s § 1983 claims against Kansas and its agencies or arms, his claims for money damages from Kansas employees in their official capacities, and his claims for injunctive relief were properly dismissed.

A local school board is a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Ripellino v. N.C. School Boards Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2006-03-07

Accordingly, we hold that a local school board is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a local school board as a person subject to suit.

Ripellino v. North Carolina School Boards Ass'n · filed 2006-03-07

Accordingly, we hold that a local school board is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles because the Board is not a person subject to suit.

Worley v. Georgia Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 1996-01-22

Additionally, plaintiffs concede that the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles is not a "person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and would be dismissed as a defendant regardless.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state agencies or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Hull v. State of New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department's Motor Vehicle Division · filed 2006-04-25

It is well established that arms of the state, or state officials acting in their official capacities, are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and therefore are immune from § 1983 damages suits.

Section 1983 permits recovery only from defendants who are “persons” within its meaning.

Veale v. USA, et al. · filed 1999-09-01

To the extent rambling references are made to past specific complaints ... or improperly seek to recover from defendants who are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... or are simply not coherent to the degree required for serious consideration in that they fail to make it reasonably clear just what facts are being alleged against what defendants to support what legal theory of recovery (indeed it is nearly impossible to determine even the identity of all the defendants plaintiffs apparently intend to s u e ) .

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state supreme court or board of bar examiners because neither is a person under the statute.

Onyiuke v. NEW JERSEY STATE SUPREME COURT · filed 2006-06-27

Because neither the New Jersey Supreme Court nor the New Jersey Board of Bar Examiners is a “person” under § 1983, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983 against either Defendant.

Section 1983 treats school boards and school officials as persons for purposes of equitable relief.

Boyd v. Smith · filed 1973-01-24

It is well established in this circuit that municipalities, including school boards and school officials, are “persons” for purposes of equitable relief under § 1983.

Township zoning commissions with governmental powers are persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Wedgewood Ltd. Partnership I. v. Township of Liberty · filed 2006-10-12

Chapter 519 of the Ohio Revised Code makes a township zoning commission responsible for zoning matters in a township; accordingly, Defendants have powers and duties of government, and are therefore “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a Court of Common Pleas because it is not a “person” subject to suit under the statute.

Shallow v. Rogers · filed 2006-10-27

First, the District Court dismissed the claims against the Court of Common Pleas because it is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a person acting under color of state law; the IBCC, QRT1, QRT2, and Delaware Center for Justice are not persons subject to suit under it.

Dickens v. Taylor · filed 2006-11-03

Plaintiff raises claims against the IBCC, QRT1, QRT2, and the Delaware Center for Justice. ... These Defendants are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or their departments because they are not persons under the statute.

Cash, Elmo v. Marion County Jail · filed 2006-11-29

States and their departments are not “persons” that may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against the University of Delaware but does not make its officers vicariously liable for employees’ wrongful acts.

Scott v. University of Delaware · filed 1974-11-20

Accordingly, the Court holds that the University may be sued pursuant to sections 1981 and 1983 and that the named officers of the University may not be vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of University employees.

Section 1983 permits suit against a pension fund board that functions as statutory trustees rather than as a municipality.

Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio · filed 1975-10-08

With this analysis we agree, and conclude that this Board of Trustees is not “like a municipality” and is thus not immune from suit as a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its chancery court as a person subject to suit.

Brooks-McCollum v. State of Delaware · filed 2007-01-11

She meets another obstacle through this avenue, as neither the State of Delaware nor its chancery court may be considered “persons” under the statute.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983 for deprivation of rights.

Markowitz v. State · filed 2007-02-02

In any event, defendant is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 USC § 1983 and thus is not subject to a claim alleging cruel and unusual punishment in a civil action asserted under that statute based on the deprivation of rights (see Ferrick v State of New York, 198 AD2d 822, 823 [1993]; see also Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 185 [1996]).

A state department of corrections is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

McDowell v. Dawson · filed 2007-03-02

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed McDowell’s claims against MDOC, because it is not a “person” under section 1983, see Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), against Barts, because McDowell failed to serve him, see Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 830-31 (8th Cir. 2003), and against Buckner, Wade, Ballinger, Hoffmeister, and Bowersox, because McDowell made only conclusory allegations that they denied his rights to due process.

Section 1983 does not treat state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Clifton v. Georgia Merit System · filed 2007-03-06

Neither GMS nor the individual defendants named in their official capacity are “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a State or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Knowlton v. Rowe · filed 2007-07-17

This Court has denied Knowlton's motion to amend his complaint; therefore, there are no persons within the meaning of section 1983 listed as defendants in this case.

Section 1983 permits a claim against SAIF because it does not share the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity and is a person under the statute.

Johnson v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2007-07-26

For the reasons set forth above, we hold that SAIF does not share the state’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and therefore is a “person” for purposes of claims under 42 USC section 1983.

States and their agencies are not persons subject to liability under Section 1983.

Demouchette v. Tdcj-Cid · filed 2007-08-28

The state and its agencies are not "persons" for purposes of liability under section 1983.

States and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suits for money damages under § 1983.

Guillory v. Bush · filed 2007-09-04

The complaint must be dismissed for the following reasons: ... (3) neither a state nor its officials acting-in their official capacities are “persons” capable of suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages, ... (habeas is exclusive remedy if success of an action “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration”).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for money damages against a state entity acting in its official capacity because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Carr v. Board of Regents · filed 2007-09-24

Because the Board is undeniably a state entity that was acting in its official capacity, we agree with the district court that the Board is not a “person” under the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Senu-Oke v. Jackson State University · filed 2007-10-12

However, as defendants correctly note, plaintiff has no valid federal claim against JSU and defendants Mason, Stevenson and Foster in their official capacities because plaintiffs only federal claims against them arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seek only monetary damages, and it is well established that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” ... Accordingly, plaintiffs federal claims against JSU and his official-capacity claims against Mason, Stevenson and Foster must be dismissed.

A state court is not a person that can be sued under § 1983.

Briggs v. Moore · filed 2007-10-16

The New Jersey Superior Court is not a “person” capable of being sued under § 1983.

A state court that is an arm of the State is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Greer v. Court of Common Pleas · filed 2007-12-20

The Court then dismissed the instant complaint, holding that the Court of Common Pleas ... is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1989) (holding that States or governmental entities considered “arms of the State” are not considered “persons” under § 1983), and that Greer had failed to state a claim against York County. ... For the reasons given by the District Court, we agree that Greer’s complaint cannot withstand scrutiny under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii).

A state and a state official in her official capacity are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983; the official may be sued in her personal capacity.

Stevenson v. Williamson · filed 2008-04-09

Under the holding of the Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), neither a state, nor a state official in her official capacity, is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, in the present case, Anne Williamson, in her personal capacity, is the only defendant subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 allows suits against persons who, under color of state law, deprive someone of federal rights, subject to its personal involvement and immunity rules.

Clark v. People of State of Mich. · filed 1980-10-17

A state may not properly be made a defendant in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Further, state agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus are not subject to suit under that statute. ... As to Warden Anderson, the plaintiff must allege and show “more than mere authority by the defendant over others who have violated plaintiff’s right.” ... He must allege “at least one specific act or omission . . . which was a causative factor in depriving plaintiff of his federal civil rights.” Further, state prison officials enjoy qualified immunity from an inmate’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit unless such official took such action with malicious intent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a municipal police department that lacks an existence independent of its municipality.

Terrell v. City of Harrisburg Police Department · filed 2008-04-30

The police department lacks existence independent of the City of Harrisburg and is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983’s person requirement bars suit against a state agency and a state official sued in his official capacity when no prospective injunctive relief is available.

Larsen v. State Employees' Retirement System · filed 2008-05-15

The AOPC and Frankforter also correctly assert that they are not "persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore, cannot be sued by Larsen under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state agency, but state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective relief are persons under the section.

Babiak v. Nevada Ex Rel. Department of Taxation · filed 2008-05-22

Accordingly, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against the State of Nevada, ex rel. Department of Taxation fails as a matter of law. ... Because Plaintiff seeks only prospective relief against the individual Defendants, they are persons within the scope of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat states or their political subdivisions as persons who may be sued.

Anderson v. Phelps · filed 1985-03-29

Additionally, states and their political subdivisions are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the U.S. Parole Commission because it is not a person under the statute.

Epps v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-09-08

The Parole Commission is not a "person” for purposes of Section 1983 and, therefore, cannot be sued thereunder.

Section 1983 permits suit against the Baltimore City Police Department and the police defendants because the department is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Munyiri v. Haduch · filed 2008-11-02

Thus, the police defendants are fully subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state or its agencies because they are not “persons” under the statute, even when the suit is filed in state court.

Gay v. State · filed 1987-04-28

We must conclude, therefore, that appellee, the State of Texas, is not a “person” within the purview of section 1983 et seq., and a suit based upon that statute could not be maintained even in the state courts.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of state law; a county sheriff’s department is not a proper defendant.

Whitaker v. Pima County · filed 2009-02-17

42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability extends to any “person” who violates an individual’s federal rights while acting under the color of state law. Plaintiff has not provided any authority that the Pima County Sheriffs Department is a person. Rather, the Pima County Sheriffs Department is not a proper party defendant.

A city department is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Waltenberg v. New York City Department of Correction · filed 1974-05-06

Insofar as the defendant Department of Corrections is concerned, it is merely one of several departments and agencies that comprise the municipality of the City of New York and as such is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 ... U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 treats a school superintendent sued in an individual capacity as a person who may be sued.

Eloise Ingraham, as Next Friend, Etc. v. Willie J. Wright, I, Individually, Etc. · filed 1974-07-29

It is clear that the school superintendent, sued as an individual, is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state university that is an integral part of state government because it is not a person under the statute.

Roseman v. Hassler · filed 1974-09-24

The court adheres to its decision of February 13, 1974, that we have no jurisdiction over Indiana University of ... Pennsylvania, it not being a person under the Civil Rights Act and being a branch of the State government of Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 treats the University of Delaware as a person subject to suit because it is not a state agency.

Aumiller v. University of Delaware · filed 1977-06-21

After carefully examining the specific relationship between the University of Delaware and the State of Delaware, Judge Stapleton concluded that the University did not qualify as a state agency in the context of Section 1983, and consequently could be treated as a person for purposes of actions brought pursuant to that section. Defendants’ invitation to revisit that holding is declined.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Pennsylvania State Board of Law Examiners because the Board is not a person under the statute, but its individual members are persons.

Delgado v. McTighe · filed 1977-12-01

In view of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), and the cases hereinafter cited, the conclusion appears inescapable that the Board is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nevertheless, the individual members of the Board are “persons” under the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state parole board because the board is not a person under the Civil Rights Act.

Gahagan v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole · filed 1978-02-13

The Parole Board itself cannot be sued because it is not a “person” under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 treats state officials as persons who may be liable for actions violating the section.

White v. Beal · filed 1978-03-10

However, defendants’ reliance upon that principle as the gravamen for their argument that Congress misconstrued the decision in Bitzer fails to take into account that state officials are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and are, therefore, subject to liability for actions in violation of that section.

Section 1983 does not treat the University of Tennessee as a person subject to suit.

Gross v. University of Tennessee · filed 1978-04-12

The Court sustains defendant’s contention that the University of Tennessee is not a person within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a county library board as a person that may be sued.

Layton v. Swapp · filed 1979-12-03

Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) teaches otherwise and the Court finds that the Library Board is a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a New York City administrative agency as a person acting under color of state law.

Campo v. The New York City Employees' Retirement System and the City of New York · filed 1988-03-31

NYCERS is a New York City administrative agency which qualifies as a “person” acting “under color” of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a “person” under the section.

Buck v. Industrial Commission · filed 2002-11-13

The Eleventh Amendment bars Mr. Buck’s claim under § 1983 ... because the State is not a “person” against whom § 1983 claim can be brought.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state agencies or official-capacity damages claims against state officials, but permits prospective injunctive relief against officials in their official capacities and damages against them individually.

GASPERS v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services · filed 2009-06-08

In accordance with the governing law, all of plaintiffs claims brought against DYS and ORVJCF, both state agencies, under § 1983 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual defendants in their official capacity for money damages are similarly barred. However, to the extent plaintiffs seek only prospective injunctive relief against the individual defendants in their official capacity or monetary damages against the defendants in their individual capacity, the individual defendants are persons who may be sued under § 1983.

A state agency is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Brown v. Camden Cty Counsel · filed 2010-05-13

The complaint was dismissed against the N.J. Bureau of Risk Management, a state agency, because it is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and because the Eleventh Amendment bars an action for damages against the States. ... These threshold determinations by the District Court were correct and do not require additional discussion.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Davis v. State of Missouri · filed 2010-08-11

We agree with the district court that the State of Missouri is not a person for purposes of section 1983, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-71 (1989), and that St. Louis County Justice Services and St. Louis County Justice Services Medical Department are subdivisions of St. Louis County and thus are not separately suable, see Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Guam Police Department because it is not a person within the statute.

Adkins v. Limtiaco · filed 2010-08-24

The court Adopts the recommendation that the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint against GPD be granted since Defendant GPD is not a person withing the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a regional jail authority that is a local government unit rather than an arm of the state.

Newbrough v. Piedmont Regional Jail Authority · filed 2011-09-28

Because the PRJA is not an arm of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes, it cannot claim, under Monell, that it does not constitute a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

A county detention facility is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Wiley v. Buncombe County · filed 2012-03-02

The Buncombe County Detention Facility is not a person under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state university, its board of trustees, or a state agency because they are not persons under the statute.

Campbell v. University of Louisville · filed 2012-03-02

Thus, U of L, its Board of Trustees, and the Kentucky Council on Postsecondary Education are not subject to suit under § 1983, since none of them are “persons” under that law.

State agencies and state officers acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages claims under § 1983.

Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue, I v. West · filed 2012-04-23

Specifically, the District Court dismissed (i) Sixth Angel’s claims against the Dog Bureau because Pennsylvania has not waived its sovereign immunity, (ii) Sixth Angel’s damages claims against West and Loughlin in their official capacities, and (iii) Sixth Angel’s federal damages claims against the Dog Law Defendants because state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. The District Court’s reasoning is sound.

Section 1983 does not allow suits against a state corrections department or the prison it administers because they are not persons.

Pettaway v. Albion · filed 2012-05-22

Moreover, as a state agency and the prison it administers, the Department of Corrections and SCI-Albion are not “persons” and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state agencies or state employees sued in their official capacities.

Bearden v. Coker · filed 2012-06-22

Accordingly, because the board is a state agency and the board members are state employees, the board and the board members in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to a § 1983 claim seeking damages.

An entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Le Clair v. TX Board of Criminal Justice · filed 2012-08-03

Further, “an entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990). Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Le Clair’s suit.

State agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Delta Fuel Company, Inc. v. Maxwell · filed 2012-08-10

In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge found: ... (5) that the Louisiana Department of Justice, a state agency, was not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and that it was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity;6 ... The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations in full and entered judgment for the defendants. We find no error in the magistrate judge’s recommendations, as adopted by the district court.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because the agency is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Douglas v. New York State Adirondack Park Agency · filed 2012-09-11

Furthermore, after carefully considering the matter, the Court accepts the APA Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the Adirondack Park Agency must be dismissed because that agency is not a “person” amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state, its agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Payne v. State of Tennessee Department of Human Services · filed 2012-12-10

However, even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Payne makes out a cognizable claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we agree with the State that neither the State, the Department of Human Services, nor Mr. Adams are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency or an individual acting in an official capacity as a person subject to suit.

Buechler v. Wenatchee Valley College · filed 2013-03-19

A state agency or individual acting in his or her official capacity is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. ... Ms. Buechler can assert a civil rights claim against Dean Capelo and Mr. Azurdia only in their individual capacities.

A county court’s domestic relations division is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Johnathan Robins v. Michael F.X. Coll · filed 2013-04-09

With respect to the claims against the Delaware County Court- Domestic Relations Division, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Robins’ claims because Delaware County Court- Domestic Relations Division is not a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A county prison is not a person capable of being sued under Section 1983.

Lenhart v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2013-06-11

However, as the District Court noted, Westmoreland County Prison is not a person capable of being sued within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a prison facility because the facility is not a person under the statute.

Boomer v. Lewis · filed 2013-08-26

PCCF, itself, to the extent Boomer was suing the facility, is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state university that is an arm of the state because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Musila v. Lock Haven University · filed 2013-09-09

As an initial matter, the LHU is not a “person” for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Birla v. New Jersey Board of Nursing · filed 2013-11-19

The District Court dismissed Birla’s § 1983 claims for damages against the Board and against Herbert in his official capacity because state agencies and officials in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to liability for damages under § 1983. ... Turning to the merits, and reviewing Birla’s complaints de novo, we agree that dismissal was appropriate for the reasons summarized above and discussed more thoroughly by the District Court.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons.”

Dennis v. Board of Education · filed 2014-05-08

But state agencies and state officials acting within their official capacities cannot be sued under § 1983 because they are not “persons.”

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Nasserizafar v. Indiana Department of Transportation · filed 2014-06-16

The law is clear that states and state agencies, such as INDOT, are not “person[s]” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights suit against the Delaware State Police because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Smith v. Delaware State Police · filed 2014-07-08

The Delaware State Police does not qualify as a “person” under § 1983, and is not subject to a suit under that statute.

Section 1983 does not treat a state corrections department or state correctional institution as a person subject to suit.

Iwanicki v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2014-08-26

Furthermore, the Department and SCI-Mercer are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its arms as persons subject to suit.

Fuller v. Davis · filed 2014-12-03

And even if immunity has been waived (which we are given no basis for finding here), a state and its arms are not “persons” within the reach of the civil rights statute.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officers sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Camacho-Morales v. Caldero · filed 2014-12-18

Alternatively, Camacho’s claims against the Commonwealth and those seeking damages from the individual defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed because neither states nor state officers sued in their official capacities for damages are "persons” against whom an action may be brought under § 1983.

A prison is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Beaver v. Union County Pennsylvania · filed 2015-07-28

The prison may not be considered a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state agency is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Mikhaeil v. Santos · filed 2016-04-13

First, the District Court properly dismissed Mikhaeil’s claim against the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office. Because that Office is a state agency, not a local governmental body, it is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant who is a person; a state and its officials acting in their official capacities are not persons under the statute.

Gregor v. Com. · filed 2017-06-13

The U.S. Supreme Court holds “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under [42 U.S.C.] §1983.” Id. (citations omitted). Gregor did not name any actor in his personal or individual capacity. Flagg; see also Compl. at ¶58. Because Gregor did not name a “person” under Section 1983, he lacks an essential element for the cause of action.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its officials acting in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Stoner v. Atlantic Realty Apts., LLC · filed 2017-10-19

The proposed claim is “palpably insufficient” as a matter of law (MBIA Ins. Corp. v Grey stone & Co., Inc., 74 AD3d 499, 499 [1st Dept 2010]), since neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities, such as Pascal, are “person[s]” within the meaning of 42 USC § 1983 (see Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58 [1989]).

A state department of corrections is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Owens v. Evans · filed 2017-12-13

IDOC was properly dismissed because it is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state department of corrections because it is not a person subject to suit.

Owens v. Evans · filed 2017-12-28

IDOC was properly dismissed because it is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

A private corporation was not subject to § 1983 liability on the allegations in this case.

Holt v. West Virginia Regional Jail & Correctional Facility Authority · filed 2018-03-14

Only persons are subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court does not find that Primecare is a person subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state agency and its officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages liability under § 1983.

Li v. Hughes · filed 2018-03-23

Additionally, IDFPR and its personnel in their official capacities do not qualify as “persons” suable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or state governmental entities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Thomas v. J.E. Wetzel · filed 2018-05-18

Neither states nor state governmental entities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, the Bureau is not subject to suit here, and we affirm the trial court’s order to the extent it dismissed any claim the complaint raised under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Bureau.

A county detention center is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Vaughn v. Day · filed 2018-06-19

Finally, the Boone County Detention Center is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

States and state officers sued in their official capacities are not persons under Section 1983.

Collymore v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts · filed 2018-07-18

Under the statute, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Donovan in their official capacities are not persons pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 permits suit only against persons; detention centers are not persons under the section.

Manzanares v. Roosevelt Cnty. Adult Det. Ctr. · filed 2018-08-30

The Court will dismiss them, however, because detention centers are not persons as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires.

Section 1983 does not treat a state university board as a suable person or permit damages claims against state officers in their official capacities.

Hunt v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of New Mex. · filed 2018-09-06

As explained above, the Board of Regents is an entity, not a "person" that may be held liable under Section 1983. Similarly, state officers sued in their official capacities are not "persons" subject to suit under section 1983.

State agencies and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Knouse v. Primecare Medical of West Virginia, Inc. · filed 2018-09-24

Consequently, the plaintiff’s Counts alleging constitutional violations under § 1983 against the WVRJA and against defendants Douglas and Chandler in their official capacities fail.

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Glenn v. Wilkins · filed 2019-02-19

However, states and state agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against police departments because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Watts v. Watts · filed 2019-03-18

First, neither police department is a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a county jail or jail staff named collectively because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Philips v. Valhalla County Jail · filed 2019-04-30

Valhalla County Jail and Valhalla County Jail Staff are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

State entities that are arms of the State are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Marquez v. Harborview Medical Center · filed 2019-05-03

Harborview is an “arm of the State” and therefore not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state or its attorney’s office because neither is a person subject to suit under the section.

Walden v. Pryor · filed 2019-06-11

Because neither the Commonwealth of Kentucky nor the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, the § 1983 claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A state court is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Kapitanova v. Ameriprise Trust Company · filed 2019-07-08

As a state court, the Surrogate’s Court is also not a “person” for purposes of a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit against a state agency because the agency is not a person under the statute.

Satterfield v. TN Dept of Corrections · filed 2019-07-23

Further, Defendant Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) is an agency of the State of Tennessee and therefore not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the New Mexico Department of Corrections because the department is not a person subject to suit.

Gutierrez v. State of New Mexico Corrections · filed 2019-07-30

Regarding Gutierrez’ Complaint, the Court determines it does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, for two reasons. First, the Tenth Circuit has held that the “New Mexico Department of Corrections is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983.”

A county jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

VAZQUEZ v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL · filed 2019-07-31

The Court, however, need not address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims because she only sues the Camden County Jail, which is not a “person” amendable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against Rikers Island because it is not a person within the section’s meaning.

Winters v. NYCDOC · filed 2019-08-14

Rikers Island is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against a city, but a municipal police department is not a separate person subject to suit.

Tapp v. Onan · filed 2019-08-20

Further, the City of Henderson is a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

Buildings are not suable persons under § 1983.

ABDULLAH v. CORE CIVIC AMERICA (CCA) · filed 2019-08-21

CCA and the Jail II appear to be buildings, not “persons” that are suable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies or state prisons that are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute.

Joiner v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2019-09-05

Neither MDOC nor SMCI may be sued under Section 1983 because they are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 permits suit against a person acting under color of state law; a detention center is not a person amenable to suit.

Lockwood v. Charleston County Detention Center · filed 2019-09-09

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge ably addressed the issues and correctly concluded that the amended complaint should be dismissed because Sheriff Al Canon Detention Center is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a person; a prison CERT Team is not a person subject to suit.

El-Quadeer v. Commissioner Perry Phelps · filed 2019-09-16

The CERT Team, however, is not a person, as is required for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against governing boards of public universities because they are not persons under the statute.

Hye-Young Park v. Hudson · filed 2019-09-19

Park generally challenges the dismissal of her § 1981 and § 1983 claims against the university defendants. But governing boards of public universities are not “persons” capable of being sued under these statutes.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies or their component prisons because they are not persons under the section.

Tetlow v. Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services · filed 2019-09-24

As state agencies or parts of state agencies, DCSCS, DOC, MCTC, and MCIJ are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and are therefore not subject to suit under that provision.

School boards are persons amenable to suit under § 1983.

Burns v. Rovaldi · filed 1979-08-28

Building on that premise, they further contend that a school board is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While that contention once had some support, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Supreme Court has recently held that its reasoning is not applicable to school boards.

A state university is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Wiley, Ed.D v. Plattsburgh · filed 2019-09-27

Wiley cannot state a Section 1983 claim against SUNY Plattsburgh because “‘the State University is not a “person” within 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’”

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the Office of Disciplinary Counsel or the Disciplinary Board because neither is a person under the statute.

MURPHY v. OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL · filed 2019-09-30

In addition, neither the ODC nor the Disciplinary Board is a “person” amenable to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Hardesty v. Miller · filed 2019-10-02

In the MOSC, the Court found that Plaintiff’s claims against the SCJ are subject to dismissal because prison and jail facilities are not proper defendants because none is a “person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983. ... The Court finds that this case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim as set forth in the Court’s MOSC.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a correctional facility’s employees named collectively as a group because the group is not a person.

Taylor v. Employee's at Sumner Co. Jail · filed 2019-10-02

First, a collection of employees at a correctional facility, considered as a group, is not a “person” for the purpose of Section 1983.

A state social services department that is an arm of the state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Davis v. Charlottesville Department of Social Services · filed 2019-10-03

First, the Charlottesville Department of Social Services, which is considered an arm of the state, is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a detention center because the facility is not a person under the statute.

Matthis v. Somerset County Detention Center · filed 2019-10-08

As a preliminary matter, SCDC is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A jail or its medical department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Ball v. Southwest Va Regional Jail-Abingdon · filed 2019-10-17

Thus, the only defendant Ball has identified cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons, and a jail is not a person subject to suit under it.

Snipes v. Duffield Regional Jail · filed 2019-10-17

Snipes cannot prevail in any claim against the jail, because it is not a person subject to being sued under § 1983.

A county jail is not a person that can be sued under Section 1983.

Torrens v. Jacks · filed 2019-10-17

The Jail is not a proper defendant under Section 1983, which creates a cause of action against “[e]very person” who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

MOORE v. BERKS COUNTY JAIL SYSTEM · filed 2019-10-18

This § 1983 claim is dismissed as frivolous because a jail is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies because they are not suable persons.

Young v. Campbell County States Attorney Office · filed 2019-10-21

Such entities are also not suable “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

WILLIAMS v. GEORGE W. HILL CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2019-10-22

The § 1983 claim against GWH must be dismissed since a jail is not a “person” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a prison because a prison is not a person within the statute’s meaning.

SAUNDERS v. GEORGE W. HILL CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2019-10-24

However, a prison is not considered a “person” subject to suit within the meaning § 1983.

A local jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Craghead v. Amherst County Adult Detention Center · filed 2019-10-28

A local jail, however, cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state correctional facility because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Dash v. Downstate Correctional Facility · filed 2019-10-29

Downstate Correctional Facility is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983’s person requirement excludes the state corrections division and its officers sued in their official capacities, while permitting claims against the officers in their personal capacities.

Salmons v. Western Regional Jail Authority · filed 2019-10-30

Neither the WVDCR nor Captains Aldridge and Savilla, acting in their official capacities, are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a municipal law enforcement department because the department is not a person under the statute.

Turner v. County of San Diego · filed 2019-10-31

The San Diego Sheriff’s Department is a department of the County of San Diego—but is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Pennsylvania judicial branch entities, including a county court’s Domestic Relations section, are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Gittens v. Kelly · filed 2019-11-04

Finally, we note that “all components of the judicial branch of the Pennsylvania government are state entities and thus are not persons for section 1983 purposes.” Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 674 (3d Cir. 2000).

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state correctional center because it is not a person subject to suit.

Tribble v. Hamilton · filed 2019-11-04

Shawnee, which is a division of IDOC, is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits only against persons, and a county jail is not a person subject to suit.

COLEMAN v. CORIZON MEDICAL · filed 2019-11-05

A county jail, such as Union County Jail, is not a person amenable to suit under the statute.

Section 1983 does not allow compensatory damages against a state university or its chancellor sued in his official capacity because they are not persons under the statute.

L.M. v. Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville · filed 2019-11-06

Pembrook (sued in his official capacity) are not persons within the meaning of Section 1983, Count III is dismissed with prejudice.

A state agency is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Trower v. DOC Medical Treatment · filed 2019-11-07

In addition, dismissal is proper because DOC Medical is not a person for purposes of § 1983.

A state legislature is not a person subject to suit under §1983.

Smith v. United States Congress · filed 2019-11-14

Because the Wisconsin Legislature is comprised of “officials [of the state] acting in their official capacities,” id., it is not a person subject to suit under §1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a prison facility or prisoner transportation company as a “person” subject to suit.

Staunton v. Harrington · filed 2019-11-15

First, neither HCF nor Trans Core, the transportation company that operated the bus, are considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and Staunton’s vague claims against them are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Cason v. Hare · filed 2019-11-15

However, the Jail is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against municipal police departments because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Davis v. San Diego Police Department · filed 2019-11-18

Departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; therefore, a local law enforcement department (like the SDPD) is not a proper party.

A correctional institution’s medical department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Salois v. SCI Rockview Medical Department · filed 2019-11-27

and it being well-settled that a department within a correctional institution, such as the Medical Department at SCI-Rockview, does not qualify as a person within the meaning of § 1983, see, e.g., Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (holding that the New Jersey Prison Medical Department is a state agency that cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a person) and, thus, the SCI-Rockview Medical Department is not a suitable entity for a § 1983 claim and is entitled to dismissal from this action, ... it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. The motion (Doc. 4) to dismiss is GRANTED.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county prosecutor's office acting as a state law enforcement agency because it is not a person subject to suit.

VALDEZ v. CHOE · filed 2019-12-03

A county prosecutor's office is a state agency for § 1983 purposes, and is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state government agency because the agency is not a person under the statute.

Mohammad v. Lashbrook · filed 2019-12-05

However, IDOC is a state government agency and is not a person subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state probation and parole departments because they are not persons subject to suit.

REPOTSKI v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY PROBATION AND PAROLE DEPARTMENT · filed 2019-12-05

As previously explained, the Montgomery County Probation and Parole Department and Chester County Adult Probation and Parole Department and Pretrial Services are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983 and, as arms of the Commonwealth, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against California school districts because they are arms of the state and are not persons under the statute.

Adams v. Jefferson Union High School District · filed 2019-12-12

School districts in California are “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes, and are therefore not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit this suit against the United States or the North Carolina Department of Public Safety because neither is a person subject to suit under the section.

Wright v. United States · filed 2019-12-13

Neither the United States or NCDPS is a “person” against whom this § 1983 suit can proceed and Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county detention center because it is not a person subject to suit.

Austin v. Swain County Detention Center · filed 2019-12-13

The Swain County Detention Center is not a person under § 1983 and the claims against it will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or their agencies because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Crawford v. Abdleghafar · filed 2019-12-19

As to Defendant North Carolina Department of Public Safety, neither the State of North Carolina nor its agencies constitute “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a state department of corrections to be sued because it is not a person under the statute.

Wyres v. Zhang · filed 2019-12-30

The CDCR is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department because it is not a person subject to suit.

Rogers v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department · filed 2019-12-30

Next, Defendant Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims only against defendants who qualify as “persons”; county solicitor’s and public defender’s offices do not qualify.

Simpson v. Florence County Complex Solicitor's Office · filed 2019-12-30

A defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person” under the statute.

A state and a police department are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983 in their official capacities.

David v. Savage · filed 2020-01-02

The R. & R. accurately indicates that Plaintiff’s claims against the Edmond Police Department and the State of Oklahoma are subject to dismissal because neither entity is a “person” as required for a § 1983 suit to proceed against it in its official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail because a jail is not a person subject to liability under the section.

Baker v. Monroe County Jail · filed 2020-01-02

First, a jail is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983, and therefore, the Monroe County Jail will be DISMISSED.