42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a territorial police officer even when the officer acted within the scope of employment.

Jarvis v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 1996-03-05

Appellant's assertion that a 1983 suit cannot be sustained against a police officer in his individual capacity if he was acting within the scope of his employment is summarily rejected since "an employee of the Territory who inflicts injury while acting in his official capacity may only be sued under section 1983 in his 'individual capacity.'" Nibbs v. Roberts, 31 V.I. 196, 208 (D.V.I. APP. 1995) (emphasis added).

A § 1983 damages complaint against state employees should not be dismissed as an official-capacity suit when the complaint clearly names them in their individual capacities.

Steven Charles Brigida, Aka: Steven C. Brigida v. Otis Thurman, Warden, California State Department of Corrections D.B. · filed 1996-04-29

The second document, which Brigida appears to have attached as an addendum to question 3, contains a caption which unambiguously states that Brigida is seeking damages against the named defendants in their individual capacity. Because a pro se complaint should be liberally construed, the district court abused its discretion by dismissing appellant's complaint.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities.

Kelley v. Troy State University · filed 1996-05-02

State agents in their official capacities, however, may be properly subject to prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 because such actions are not treated as actions against the State.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a state caseworker when the complaint and course of proceedings give sufficient notice of potential personal liability, even if the complaint does not expressly name that capacity.

Lesley v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1996-08-26

Here, the complaint requests punitive damages and attorney fees and thus indicates that the plaintiffs intended to sue the caseworkers in their individual capacity. Furthermore, Maurer argued at trial and on appeal that she is entitled to qualified immunity, indicating that she had notice that she was being sued individually. Finally, the lower court’s ruling on summary judgment was based on qualified immunity, not the Eleventh Amendment. We thus construe the pleadings to permit individual suit against Maurer.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against state officials when the plaintiff’s filings indicate that they are sued in that capacity.

Hall v. Artuz · filed 1997-02-11

Thus, the Complaint and the Response to Answer together suggest that Hall is suing the officials in their individual capacities. Accordingly, I treat this action as one against the defendants in their individual capacities.

When a Section 1983 complaint is unclear about the capacity in which officials are sued, the course of proceedings can show that they are sued in both their official and individual capacities.

Matheny v. Boatright · filed 1997-03-25

Where the complaint is. unclear whether an official is sued in his individual or official capacity, or both, the Court must look to the course of the proceedings to determine the nature of the liability sought by plaintiff. ... The Court, therefore, assumes that the individually named Defendants are sued in both their official and individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials in both their individual and official capacities, so naming the government entity does not by itself require dismissal of individual-capacity claims.

Jackson v. East Hempfield Township Police Department · filed 1997-03-31

Under section 1983, a plaintiff may bring claims against a government official in both his individual and official capacity. ... In this case, given the fact that defendants state in their preliminary objections that this is an individual capacity suit as well as an official capacity suit, we decline to dismiss the individual officers at this stage of the proceedings.

In a § 1983 suit, a complaint need not expressly label officials as sued in their individual capacities if its allegations give them fair notice of potential personal liability.

Pieve-Marin v. Combas-Sancho · filed 1997-06-30

A plaintiffs allegations must still be sufficient to give the defendant notice that he is being sued in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.

Leventhal v. Vista Unified School District · filed 1997-07-01

Accordingly, the Board members are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.

In a § 1983 suit, the parties’ treatment of an ambiguous complaint can show that an official is sued in his individual capacity, and an asserted qualified immunity defense supports that reading.

Ronald E. Stevens, Individually and as Guardian of the Person and Estate of Bradley Edwin Stevens, a Disabled Person v. · filed 1997-12-16

The parties in this case have admittedly operated under the assumption that Umsted was being sued in his individual capacity. This assumption is supported by the defendant’s raising of the defense of qualified immunity, which is applicable only in individual capacity suits. ... Thus, we will honor the obvious intentions of the - parties and evaluate the issue of qualified immunity as a defense to a suit brought against a government official in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 treats officials sued in their individual capacities as persons who may be sued, even if they work for a state agency.

Pendergrass v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission · filed 1998-06-18

The district court rejected this argument and we agree. In this case, the district court correctly construed the plaintiff’s complaint as evidencing an intent to sue the two officers in their individual capacities. Thus, even if the GNOEC were a state agency, which it is not, then this suit could still proceed against these putative state officials in their individual capacities because, in such a capacity, they are “persons” within the meaning of §1983.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against officials even when the complaint does not expressly identify that capacity, if its allegations support personal liability.

Boyce v. Fairman · filed 1998-10-29

Viewing the complaint as a whole, in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the court concludes that an individual capacity suit does plainly lie against Malek and Moore despite Plaintiffs failure to specifically state his intention to sue these Defendants in their individual capacities.

A § 1983 complaint can give officials sufficient notice of potential personal liability by identifying them as individuals in its caption.

Ngwenyama v. Board of Regents of the University of Michigan · filed 1998-12-09

The Court finds that plaintiffs complaint has sufficiently made clear that plaintiff sought to recover damages from the individual defendants directly. Plaintiff has listed defendants White and Gordon as “individuals” in the caption to the complaint filed in state court. This Court therefore concludes that defendants were sufficiently put on notice of the possibility of personal liability.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a teacher for an alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation despite the limits on individual-capacity suits under Title IX.

Kinman v. Omaha Public School District · filed 1999-03-19

Nothing in our decision in Kinman I, however, affects Kinman's ability to bring a section 1983 action against McDougall individually. Likewise, Gebser does not bar such an action, for the Court made it clear that that decision has no effect on an individual-capacity suit against a teacher brought under state law or under section 1983.

State officials sued in their personal and individual capacities are not entitled to official-capacity immunity from a § 1983 claim for an alleged constitutional violation.

Phillips v. Shamshad · filed 1999-04-28

Plaintiff’s complaint sues the Defendants in their personal and individual capacities; thus, they are not entitled to immunity from suit for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity claims for injunctive relief against state officials despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Andrus v. State of Arkansas · filed 1999-11-30

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar official-capacity claims for injunctive relief against state officials.

Section 1983 treats government officials sued in their individual capacities as persons who may be held liable.

Walker v. Connecticut · filed 2000-07-07

The claims against these Defendants in their individual capacities may, however, go forward. Any government official sued in his or her individual capacity is a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against government officials in their individual capacities for actions taken under color of state law.

Washington State Republican Party v. STATE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COMMISSION · filed 2000-07-27

Suit may be brought under § 1983, though, against government officials in their individual capacities for actions taken under color of state law, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), as the Party's complaint alleges in this case.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against a territorial tax assessor in his official capacity when he assesses and collects property taxes under color of law.

Berne Corp. v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 2000-09-21

For purposes of this prospective injunctive relief, Martin is considered a “person” under section 1983 and he acts under color of law when he assesses and collects property taxes.

Section 1983 suits for injunctive relief may proceed against state officials in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi · filed 2000-10-31

However, as Defendants correctly note, the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suit against the executive director and the members of the Mississippi State Board of Funeral Service in their official capacities for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against officials when the complaint shows that intent, even if it does not expressly name their individual capacities.

Wynn v. Southward · filed 2001-03-29

Considering these factors in light of Wynn’s pro se status, we conclude that Wynn may assert claims against Southward and Triggs in their individual capacities.

A pro se plaintiff may bring individual-capacity claims under § 1983 without expressly naming that capacity when the complaint supports that reading.

Wynn, Sylvester E. v. Southward, Donna · filed 2001-06-11

Considering these factors in light of Wynn’s pro se status, we conclude that Wynn may assert claims against Southward and Triggs in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits a suit against an official in her official capacity for injunctive relief.

Berry v. Scafe · filed 2001-08-13

An official may be sued in her official capacity for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Welker v. Cicerone · filed 2001-11-27

Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) does not necessarily abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. ... However, the Eleventh Anendment provides no shield for state officials acting in their official capacities when plaintiffs request prospective injunctive relief. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs’ suit is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

A state official sued in an official capacity for prospective injunctive relief is a person under § 1983.

Bernier-Aponte v. Izquierdo-Encarnacion · filed 2002-02-19

The Court holds that a state official in his official capacity, when sued for in-junctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity instructions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.

An individual-capacity § 1983 claim against an official is dismissed when the plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief available against that official in an official capacity.

Cimarron Alliance Foundation v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 2002-09-13

As all relief requested against Couch is available against him only in his official capacity, see Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners, 85 F.3d 489, 493 (10th Cir.1996), CAF’s complaint as to Defendant Couch in his individual capacity is DISMISSED.

Section 1983 claims against state officials may proceed in their individual capacities when a liberal reading of the complaint shows that the plaintiff intended to sue them personally.

Baskerville v. Blot · filed 2002-09-18

When Baskerville’s complaint is liberally read, the Court can infer that plaintiff intended to assert his claims against defendants in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official sued in an official capacity.

Cox v. Shelby State Community College · filed 2002-09-24

His § 1983 action, insofar as it is for injunctive relief, is not barred by Will.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a state official in his official capacity for prospective injunctive relief.

Arrington v. Fuller · filed 2002-11-13

Accordingly, the court concludes that this argument by Fuller is unavailing and that a claim can be brought under § 1983 against Fuller in his official capacity for prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity injunction against state officials who can provide the requested prospective relief.

Bond v. Aguinaldo · filed 2003-04-17

Thus, were Mr. Bond currently housed at Pinckneyville, I could enjoin Dr. Doughty and Dr. Gonzalez to provide him with treatment in conformity with federal law. As Mr. Bond is currently housed at Stateville, however, Dr. Doughty and Dr. Gonzalez are not proper defendants for official capacity suits seeking an injunction ordering treatment.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against state officials for injunctive relief.

Gray v. McCaughtry · filed 2003-06-25

Gray’s complaint, however, does at least name the proper defendants for purposes of the injunctive relief requested here-namely, the provision of medical care and cessation of brutal treatment. Official-capacity suits against state officials for injunctive relief are permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits equitable claims against state officials in their official capacities and does not require allegations of bad faith or knowing or reckless conduct for equitable claims against them individually.

Taliaferro v. Willett · filed 1976-02-17

Both arguments have been rejected, when the relief sought is equitable in nature, Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F.Supp. 91, 96-97 (E.D.Va.1975).

Government officials sued in their official capacity may be enjoined under § 1983 even when the government entity is immune from suit.

Santiago v. Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana Y Vivienda de Puerto Rico · filed 1977-05-18

Although the Supreme Court has not ruled, the circuit decisions are falling into a pattern very like the one that governs eleventh amendment cases: while many government entities are immune from suit under § 1983, their officials, even when sued in an official capacity, do not ... share the immunity, at least when only injunctive relief is sought. ... We reaffirm our earlier decision to follow these cases.

Section 1983 permits a suit against school officials in their individual capacities when the complaint sufficiently names them in that capacity.

Graham v. Houston Independent School District · filed 1970-01-21

The defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis of Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 300 F.Supp. 794 (S.D.Tex.1969), will be denied. The complaint in this case is sufficient to constitute suit against the named defendants in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their individual capacities when a plaintiff seeks to reach their individual actions.

Carr v. Blanchard · filed 1992-02-12

This decision must be reconsidered, as state officials who are sued in their individual capacities are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff seeks to reach individual action.

Section 1983 permits a suit for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in an official capacity because the official is a person under the section.

Hedgepeth Ex Rel. Hedgepeth v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2004-10-26

Ansche, however, has also named as a defendant WMATA’s General Manager in his official capacity, and ‘‘[o]f course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’ ’’ Id. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)).

Section 1983 treats state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief as persons whose claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

C.N. v. Wolf · filed 2005-11-28

Hence, the Individual Defendants are “persons” under § 1983, and Plaintiffs’ federal claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against those Defendants, in their official capacities, are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities for deprivations of Commerce Clause rights under color of state law.

Jones v. Gale · filed 2005-12-15

Because I have found that the Defendants, acting under color of state law, have denied the Plaintiffs rights secured to them under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against the Defendants in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including prospective in-junctive relief, and may apply for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities when only the State can provide that relief.

Rogers v. Haley · filed 2006-03-23

The only relief Rogers appears to seek is prospective injunctive relief against the defendants in their ‘individual’ and ‘officials’ capacities. Because only the State of Alabama can provide such relief and because the State is in this litigation only to the extent the defendants have been sued in their official capacities, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), (official-capacity lawsuits are, “in all respects other than name, ... treated as a suit against the entity”), the requested relief can be provided by the defendants in their official capacities only.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against state officials in their official capacities but permits claims against them in their individual capacities.

Force v. Hunter · filed 2006-04-17

The district court’s order denies Force leave to file in forma pauperis on the basis that official capacity suits for damages are barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While this is correct, Force’s complaint also names the defendants in their individual capacities, see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (state officials named in their individual capacities are persons for purposes of section 1983); Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185-86 (9th Cir.1999) (where a plaintiff is seeking damages against a state official, a strong presumption is created in favor of a personal-capacity suit because an official-capacity suit for damages would be barred).

Section 1983 damages claims against Virgin Islands police officers in their individual capacities do not require the legislature’s consent because recovery runs against the officers, not the territorial government.

Cruz Ocasio, Suzanna Santana and Rose L. E. Thomas v. Ethelbert Bryan, Olga Bailey and Samuel Caines · filed 1967-03-13

Since an award of damages on a recovery under the Civil Rights Act does not directly affect the Government or the public treasury, the immunity of the Government from suit is no bar to the private action.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a state officer when the complaint clearly seeks recovery from the officer, even if it does not expressly say “in his individual capacity.”

Stewart v. Beaufort County · filed 2007-02-06

Although the Complaint does not use the magic words “in his individual capacity,” it clearly seeks recovery from Todd Calhoun, and not from the State of South Carolina. Accordingly, the court finds that the Complaint asserts a cause of action against a person, Todd Calhoun.

Section 1983 treats a state official sued in an official capacity as a person when the suit seeks prospective injunctive relief.

Flint v. Dennison · filed 2007-06-01

Will recognized one vital exception to this general rule: When sued for prospective injunctive relief, a state official in his official capacity is considered a "person" for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against state officers for injunctive or other prospective relief because they are “persons” for those suits.

McCloud v. Rosanne Kane of New York State Division of Parole · filed 2007-06-04

However, state officers sued in their official capacities are “persons” under Section 1983 in suits for injunctive or other prospective relief.

Section 1983 distinguishes individual capacity from official capacity claims in their legal standards, remedies, defenses, and responsibility for judgments, fees, and costs.

Figueras v. Autoridad De Energia Electrica · filed 2007-08-16

Furthermore, plaintiffs seem to ignore that the difference between individual capacity claims and official capacity claims under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 involves more ... than mere form . For instance, the applicable legal standards are different, the available remedies are different, the available defenses are different, and there is a significant practical difference as to whether the individual person or the governmental entity is legally responsible for paying an adverse judgment, fees, and costs.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief because they are persons under the section.

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Blanco · filed 2007-10-05

A state official sued in his official capacity for injunctive relief, however, is a “person” under § 1983 “because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’ ”

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials in their personal capacities for deprivations of a plaintiff’s rights.

Poirier v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2008-01-30

Thus, Dennehy remains suable in her personal capacity under § 1983 for damages flowing from any deprivation by her of the plaintiffs rights.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action in Nebraska state court must expressly and unambiguously plead that a public official is sued in an individual capacity; otherwise, the suit is treated as against the official in an official capacity only.

Holmstedt v. York County Jail Supervisor · filed 2008-02-29

In summary, the Eighth Circuit Court has adopted the rule that in order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must expressly and unambiguously state so in the complaint; otherwise, it will be assumed that the defendant is being sued only in his or her official capacity. Because such rule is reasonable and does not appear to conflict with Nebraska laws or rules of procedure, we conclude that such rule should be followed in Nebraska state courts.

Section 1983 permits claims for prospective injunctive relief against Virgin Islands officials acting in their official capacities.

Esso Virgin Islands, Inc. v. Government of the United States ex rel. Virgin Islands Department of Licensing & Consumer A · filed 2008-06-30

Therefore, to the extent Counts IV and V seek to prospectively enjoin the Defendants from implementing the 2004 Order, or an order similarly issued, those counts may proceed against the Commissioner acting in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits monetary relief for federal-law violations against defendants sued in their individual capacities, but not their official capacities.

Heffner v. Murphy · filed 2008-12-22

The Motion is DENIED insofar as the Complaint seeks monetary relief for violations of federal law and in-junctive and equitable relief for continuing violations of federal law from Defendants sued in their individual capacities; ... The Motion is GRANTED insofar as the Complaint seeks monetary relief from Defendants sued in their official capacities for violations of federal law; ... All Defendants may be sued for injunctive and equitable relief pursuant to all counts of the Complaint.

In a § 1983 suit, litigating a qualified-immunity defense can establish that defendants were sued in their individual capacities when the complaint is ambiguous.

Thomas "Jack" Fitzgerald v. John P. McDaniel and Wayne "Cowboy" Morris, as Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of Jackson County, · filed 1987-12-15

Examining the record in this case, we conclude as we did in Lundgren that because McDaniel and Morris raised, litigated, and submitted to the jury a defense premised on qualified immunity, the lawsuit was filed against them in their individual capacities. Qualified immunity is available only in an individual capacity lawsuit, not in an official capacity action.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in her official capacity without requiring proof of a municipal policy or custom.

Barachkov v. 41B District Court · filed 2009-02-20

The district court relied upon Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), for the proposition that in order to state a claim against a state official in their official capacity, Appellants had to establish that Judge Davis’ acts represented an “official policy or custom” of the 41B District Court. This reliance was misplaced, as Monell, which established the circumstances under which a municipality may be held vicariously liable as a person under § 1983 for injuries inflicted by its employees pursuant to a government policy or custom, is not relevant to whether a state official, sued in her official capacity, qualifies as a “person” under § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim alleging constitutional violations by state officials may be treated as a suit against them in their individual capacities.

Hatori v. Haga · filed 1989-11-17

Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is therefore deemed to be against Defendants in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against prison officials.

Muhammad v. McNeil · filed 2009-06-09

Muhammad may sue appellees in their official capacity only under the RLUIPA and individually under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits for prospective injunctive relief, but not for retrospective relief or money damages; individual-capacity suits have no comparable limit.

ISENALUMHE v. McDuffie · filed 2010-03-17

As defendants correctly point out, § 1983 allows official-capacity suits for prospective injunctive relief, but not for retrospective relief or money damages. ... Accordingly, the Court construes all claims against defendants as individual-capacity claims, but only those seeking prospective injunctive relief as official-capacity claims.

Section 1983 permits claims against officials in their individual capacities.

Mpoy v. Fenty · filed 2012-07-02

It is permissible, moreover, for Count I to proceed only against Rhee and Presswood in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits claims for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacity.

Dharod v. Los Angeles City College · filed 2013-02-19

However, given her pro se status, Dharod should have been allowed leave to amend her § 1983 claims for alleged constitutional violations against Dean Peters in his official capacity to the extent that she sought prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity suit against a state official for prospective injunctive relief, including reinstatement.

Moonin v. State · filed 2013-04-15

This last proposition is subject to one exception: where the state official is sued for prospective injunctive relief, the action is properly brought under section 1983. ... Finally, Perry is subject to suit in his official capacity because the complaint seeks injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement.

A state officer sued in an individual-capacity § 1983 claim cannot invoke sovereign immunity.

Mulero-Carrillo v. Roman-Hernandez · filed 2015-06-17

Unlike an official-capacity § 1983 claim, in which the state itself is liable for damages, an individual-capacity § 1983 claim threatens the personal assets of the state officer only. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). For that reason, a state officer sued in his personal capacity cannot invoke a defense of sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief.

White v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 2015-06-19

Liberally construing the language of the amended complaint, as germane here, Mr. White appears to be seeking injunctive relief from the individual Defendants in their official capacities. This category of action has a solid footing in the law.

Section 1983 permits a state official to be sued in an official capacity for prospective injunctive relief.

Fisher v. Overton · filed 2005-02-10

Under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908), a state actor like Overton may be sued in his official capacity for prospective, injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits prospective declaratory or injunctive relief claims against state officials in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson · filed 2008-10-01

Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has held that while state defendants sued in their official capacity for monetary damages under § 1983 are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, they are not immune from claims seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. ... Here, the Plaintiffs’ suit against Defendant Bronson in his official capacity for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief meet the “straightforward inquiry” requirement under Verizon.

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials in their individual capacities for actions taken under color of state law.

Jay Gerow, V Wa State Gambling Comm · filed 2017-01-18

But a plaintiff may assert § 1983 claims ... against government officials in their individual capacities for actions taken under color of state law.

For injunctive relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff need not allege a state official’s personal involvement if the plaintiff identifies the challenged policy and an official who can respond to the relief sought.

California Parents for the Equalization of Educational Materials v. Torlakson · filed 2017-07-13

A plaintiff seeldng injunctive relief against the State is not required to allege a named official’s personal involvement in the acts or omissions constituting the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 claims seeking prospective injunctive relief against a state official cannot proceed when the alleged violations concern only past conduct.

Adams v. Ohio Univ. · filed 2018-03-12

Because all allegations in the Complaint are predicated on past conduct, this Court finds that the § 1983 claims against Professor McLaughlin in his official capacity for injunctive relief cannot proceed.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief against a state officer without alleging that the officer personally committed the underlying misconduct.

Quintanilla v. Bryson · filed 2018-04-05

But Quintanilla also alleged an official-capacity claim against the Commissioner seeking injunctive relief under the Ex Parte Young Doctrine. And “[p]ersonal action by [defendants] is not a necessary condition of injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity.” Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1015 (11th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the district court erred in failing to address Quintanilla’s official-capacity claim.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against school employees fall with the claim against the school board, while individual-capacity claims may proceed separately.

D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. Toledo Pub. Sch. · filed 2019-01-18

Because the parties agree that I must dismiss the constitutional claim against the Board, I must dismiss any official capacity claims against the individual defendants. ... To the extent, however, that plaintiffs have sued the individual defendants in their individual capacities (See Doc. 7 at 14-15), I decline to dismiss those claims.

A § 1983 complaint may be construed as suing state officials in their individual capacities when it attributes injuries to their own actions and seeks only damages.

Walton v. Doaks-Robertson · filed 2019-05-31

The Court therefore presumes that Walton intends to sue the Defendants in their individual capacities and will analyze his claims accordingly.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state officials in their official capacities; a court may find an individual-capacity claim from the complaint and course of proceedings.

SAMMUT v. VALENZANO WINERY LLC · filed 2019-06-17

A closely related principle exists under Section 1983. That principle bars suits against state officials in their official capacities because those suits are really suits against the State, and the State is not a “person” amenable to suit under Section 1983. ... At bottom, the pleadings and Plaintiff’s representation in the course of the proceedings fairly alerted the State Defendants that he intended to sue them personally.

Section 1983 allows a defendant to be sued in an individual capacity, an official capacity, or both.

Griffin v. Cash · filed 2019-07-10

Under Section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his individual capacity, or in his official capacity, or in both.

An official capacity claim under Section 1983 seeking prospective injunctive relief fails when the requested injunction is moot after the plaintiff leaves the prison where the alleged harm occurred.

Dean v. Bearden · filed 2019-09-17

The Court finds Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Precythe in her official capacity must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief fails.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials sued in their individual capacities for acts taken within their official duties; sovereign immunity does not bar those claims.

DERRICK v. GLEN MILLS SCHOOLS · filed 2019-12-19

Liability under § 1983 turns not on the capacity in which defendants acted when injuring the plaintiff but on the capacity in which the state official is sued.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Alvarez v. University of Oregon · filed 2020-01-06

The Court may also hear plaintiffs claims for monetary damages brought against the individual defendants in their individual capacities.

When a Section 1983 complaint does not specify an officer’s capacity, the course of proceedings can establish that the officer had notice of an individual-capacity claim.

Roberts v. Morvac · filed 2020-01-24

Therefore, after reviewing all of these factors, the Court agrees with Judge Ingram that Morvac was on sufficient notice that Roberts brought his claims against Morvac in his individual capacity, but not his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity claims against state officials for prospective injunctive relief from ongoing violations of federal rights.

Porter v. Crow · filed 2020-02-10

However, to the extent Plaintiff asserts official-capacity claims against Movants who are state officials and seeks prospective injunctive relief for what she alleges are ongoing violations of her federal rights, neither the § 1983’s “person” requirement nor the Eleventh Amendment bars those claims.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for prospective injunctive relief against a state official sued in an official capacity.

Minnesota RFL Republican Farmer Labor Caucus v. Freeman · filed 2020-03-23

And there is no question § 1983 provides Plaintiffs a cause of action in view of the nature of their claims: “Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.”

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief against a prison warden who can implement the requested order.

Paz v. Ramirez · filed 2020-04-23

The Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’s naming of the state of Idaho to include an official capacity claim for injunctive relief against Al Ramirez, the warden of the Idaho State Correctional Institution, where Plaintiff is housed, because Warden Ramirez has the authority to order implementation of a court order regarding Plaintiff’s psychiatric treatment.

Section 1983 permits claims against officers in their official capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for damages.

Frickx v. Venegas · filed 2020-05-28

Section 1983 only permits a plaintiff to sue individual officers in their official capacities for injunctive relief or individual capacities for damages. Also, as noted above, supervisory officers are not typically liable for the actions for their subordinates. However, given that Plaintiff has alleged his arrest and the search of his car was unreasonable and lacked probable cause, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful arrest and illegal search and seizure to be made against the four named officers in their individual capacities and permit it to proceed past screening.

State officials sued in their individual capacities may be sued for damages under § 1983.

Russell v. Butcher · filed 2020-07-17

The Amended Complaint, however, clearly sues Defendants Butcher, Jividen, Ballard, and Ames in their individual capacities. ... Dismissal on this basis is therefore improper.

Section 1983 allows suits against state officers in their individual capacities.

Foley v. Pacchiega · filed 2020-07-22

However, Section 1983 does allow suits against state officers in their individual capacities. ... IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest is permitted to proceed against Pacchiega, Mikalonis, and Gillespie in their individual capacities, along with against LVMPD, and CCDC.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities when the plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief.

Ruggles v. Ige · filed 2020-09-21

As Plaintiff seeks only prospective injunctive relief, see Dkt. No. 1 at 68–70, the Court considers his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against State Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against an official when the complaint and a prompt clarification give the official sufficient notice despite an imprecise caption.

Duncan v. Wayne County of Detroit · filed 2020-10-26

In light of the variations in captioning by both parties since this suit was filed and Plaintiff’s speedy clarification, Defendant Pfannes will not be dismissed in his individual capacity merely because of Plaintiff’s imprecise language.

Section 1983 allows an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief against a warden responsible for carrying out that relief.

Thornton v. Jeffreys · filed 2020-11-18

The First Amended Complaint includes a request for injunctive relief and Plaintiff has filed a separate motion for injunctive relief. Anthony Wills, in his official capacity as the Warden of Menard Correctional Center, is a proper defendant for that claim.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities, but permits such claims against them in their individual capacities.

Plumb v. University of Utah · filed 2020-12-02

Mr. Whitaker cannot be sued for damages in his official capacity as director of the School of Computing. But a government official sued in his personal capacity is a “person” under § 1983, so Mr. Plumb’s request for damages for deprivation of his due process rights can be asserted against Mr. Whitaker as an individual.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a state official when the complaint’s caption clearly states that the official is sued in that capacity.

American Atheists Inc v. Rapert · filed 2020-12-15

In sum, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ complaint includes the requisite clear statement that State Senator Rapert is being sued in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 reaches race-based denial of prison visitation privileges.

John-Tyrone Martin v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections · filed 1976-01-08

The refusal to permit visitation privileges because the visitor and the visitee are of different races constitutes racial discrimination within the meaning of...Henry v. Van Cleve.

A prisoner states a viable § 1983 claim by alleging that visitation was denied arbitrarily based on officials’ mistaken belief that a visitor violated prison rules.

Morgan v. DeRobertis · filed 1984-04-06

In this case, however, Morgan has alleged facts which, if proven at trial, would entitle him to relief. Morgan alleges that he has been denied visiting privileges because of defendants’ mistaken belief that Morgan’s wife violated legitimate prison rules. Morgan, therefore, has alleged sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).

Section 1983 permits an arguable claim that prison officials fired an inmate from a prison job because of his race, depriving him of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Rodriguez v. James C. Spaulding Van Skike James Blodgett · filed 1992-10-27

Liberally, construing Rodriguez's complaint, however, Rodriguez states an arguable section 1983 claim that prison officials discriminated against him on the basis of race, a deprivation of his constitutional rights under color of state law.

Section 1983 complaints filed by pro se inmates receive liberal construction and are subject to the rigorous standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Hudspeth v. Donald Figgins, Sergeant Nesselrodt, Correctional Officers of Virginia Department of Correction · filed 1978-10-05

This “concededly rigorous standard,” ... applies to pro se inmate complaints filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A pro se prisoner's pleading alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights may be construed as a Section 1983 civil-rights complaint regardless of its label.

Bin-Rilla v. Israel · filed 1983-07-01

This petition could also be construed as a complaint alleging violations of civil rights. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

A pro se § 1983 complaint alleging overcrowded and unsanitary pretrial detention cannot be summarily dismissed as frivolous without meaningful consideration merely because similar class litigation is pending.

John v. Norris v. E. Paul Slothouber · filed 1983-10-04

For the reasons we have indicated, however, Norris’ complaint should not have been dismissed without any real consideration. We therefore reverse the district court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Prisoner § 1983 complaints must be construed liberally on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

McIntosh v. Carter · filed 1983-12-05

The Supreme Court has directed lower courts to view prisoner complaints under Section 1983 in a liberal manner under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

A pro se prisoner's section 1983 complaint must be read liberally and may be dismissed only when no provable set of facts could entitle the prisoner to relief.

Potter v. Herman C. Davis, Warden · filed 1985-04-26

Dismissal of a civil rights complaint is proper if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff cannot prove a set of facts in support of a claim which would entitle him to relief. ... That determination must be made through a liberal reading of Potter's pro se prisoner complaint.

A pro se prisoner need not cite a constitutional provision by name when the facts alleged in a § 1983 complaint state a constitutional claim.

Toombs v. Hicks · filed 1985-09-26

We vacate the order of dismissal and remand.

A court may treat a suit alleging constitutional violations under color of state law as a § 1983 action even when the complaint does not cite the statute.

Smith v. Onondaga County Support Collection Unit · filed 1985-10-09

it is a suit to redress constitutional violations inflicted under color of state,law and the court will treat the action as one commenced pursuant to § 1983.

A pro se prisoner's § 1983 allegations of prehearing solitary confinement, coerced evidence, threats, and denial of court access cannot be dismissed when the record does not conclusively establish that no relief is available.

Owens v. Maschner · filed 1987-02-17

These allegations may have been sufficient to state a claim for which relief could be granted. ... The record does not conclusively show that plaintiff is not entitled to relief.

A pro se § 1983 plaintiff must use a reasonable opportunity to amend and particularize vague allegations; the district court need not litigate the claim for him.

Albert McThadus Perry, Jr. v. Kincaid · filed 1987-11-13

Although a pro se litigant must be given a reasonable opportunity to amend his complaint and particularize his claims the district court is not required to litigate the claims for him. ... We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in dismissing this complaint and, accordingly, affirm.

Section 1983 does not support expungement of isolated, valid convictions that are accurately recorded and no longer affect the plaintiff’s incarceration.

Carter v. Ray Hardy, District Clerk of Harris County, Texas · filed 1976-02-25

Under the circumstances, we find that Carter’s complaint falls outside the “exceedingly narrow scope” of expunction mentioned in...Rogers...and that it fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A claim under Section 1983 seeking expungement of a prison disciplinary conviction for escape is frivolous.

Miller v. Thomas · filed 2002-02-22

The district court did not err in concluding that Miller’s contention that the disciplinary conviction for escape should be expunged from his record was frivolous.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations such as excessive force during arrest and unreasonable restraint or force in police custody.

Classon v. Krautkramer · filed 1977-11-03

It has long been clear that the use of excessive force in making an arrest is actionable under § 1983 and under the Fourth Amendment as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Applying the above standard to the instant case, it is clear that the conduct alleged by plaintiff does constitute a violation, under color of law, of the Fourteenth Amendment, and is therefore actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to recover for unjustified use of force without proving actual malice.

Ladnier v. Murray · filed 1983-09-27

Accordingly, the Court holds that actual malice is not an essential element of a § 1983 claim for unjustified use of force.

Section 1983 liability based on a deficient policy requires the policy itself to repudiate constitutional rights and be the moving force of the violation.

Morgan v. State of Mississippi · filed 2011-06-03

And, certainly, the claims failed to show that the defendants implemented a policy so deficient that the policy itself was a repudiation of constitutional rights and was the moving force of the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 liability based on an unconstitutional policy requires proof that the policy was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Peters v. Singh · filed 2020-02-20

Establishing liability based on an unconstitutional policy under § 1983 requires a showing that the challenged policy was the moving force of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not support a damages claim against court-appointed defense counsel for ineffective assistance because the attorney is not a state actor.

Palmer v. Harris County · filed 2020-07-31

Palmer’s claims against Lourdez Rodriguez for ineffective assistance of counsel cannot support a damages suit under section 1983 because the attorney is not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against court-appointed defense counsel performing the traditional role of representing the accused because that counsel does not act under color of state law.

Raab v. Lambros · filed 2020-01-10

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s court- appointed attorney does not act under color of state law, and no claim under § 1983 can be maintained against her.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a public defender for acts performed in the public defender's judicial function.

Austin v. Armstrong · filed 1979-07-06

A public defender is absolutely immune from damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts done in the performance of his judicial function as a public defender.

Section 1983 gives a public defender absolute immunity from damages actions for acts within the scope of official duties, while allowing liability for acts outside that scope.

Caruth v. Geddes · filed 1978-01-16

In view of these considerations, we hold that a public defender enjoys an absolute immunity from § 1983 actions for damages when acting within the scope of his or her official duties. Liability may attach only when the acts complained of were done outside the scope of duty.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action against a court-appointed attorney for conduct within the scope of the attorney's function because the attorney has absolute immunity.

Minns v. Paul · filed 1976-08-09

In addition to contending that he did not act under color of state law so as to give the district court jurisdiction under § 1983, Paul argues that by virtue of his position as a court-appointed attorney, he should enjoy absolute immunity from suits alleging that he violated § 1983. Because we agree with the latter contention, we do not reach the question of whether Minns acted under color of state law.

A conclusory ineffective-assistance allegation does not state a § 1983 claim against public defenders.

Gilbert v. Honorable James S. Corcoran, Individually and as Judge of the 22nd Judicial Circuit · filed 1976-03-03

We hold that dismissal as to the public defenders was also proper. We need not reach the question of whether public defenders have any form of immunity from liability for damages; Gilbert’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are too conclusory to state a claim against the public defenders under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a public defender for acts performed in the defender's judicial function, including plea bargaining.

Miller v. Joseph Barilla, Ass't District Attorney · filed 1977-01-31

We believe, like the Third Circuit and Fourth Circuit, that a public defender should be accorded absolute immunity from § 1983 damage claims for acts done in the performance of his judicial function as a public defender.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a public defender for actions taken in the quasi-judicial capacity of representing a client.

Nash v. Signore · filed 1981-05-28

In each of these instances the purported misconduct by Signore occurred while he was discharging his duties as a public defender, and the law is plain that a public defender is immune from liability for any civil rights claim predicated upon actions taken in the course of representation of a client.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions as acting under color of state law.

Rogers v. Neil J. Bruntrager, Janet Fanetti, Brendan Ryan, Charles D. Kitchin, Philip Kramer, James L. Sanders, · filed 1988-03-14

The claims against the public defender were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Public defenders do not act “under color of state law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing the traditional functions of defense counsel.

A public defender performing traditional counsel functions in a criminal case does not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that representation.

Claybourn v. Rouse · filed 1988-11-01

To maintain this lawsuit, Claybourn must establish that Rouse’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct amounted to state action. ... Consequently, Claybourn cannot sue Rouse under § 1983 based on any actions she took while representing Claybourn.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against public defenders acting in their traditional role of representing a criminal defendant because they are not acting under color of state law.

Depineda v. Garcia · filed 1991-04-24

An individual acting in his or her traditional role of representing a criminal defendant is not a person acting under color of state law and therefore is not subject to an action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim against a public defender for actions taken on behalf of a client because the defender does not act under color of state law.

Driver v. Howard County Public Defender's Office · filed 1991-06-18

Under the statute, a party is not entitled to recover damages unless he or she was deprived of a right under color of state law. The United States Supreme Court has held that a public defender does not act under color of state law when acting on behalf of a client, even if the defender's actions on behalf of the client are arguably negligent and subject to state tort remedies.

Public defenders are private persons for purposes of § 1983, so allegations that they rendered ineffective assistance of counsel do not state a claim under the section.

Blevins v. Philip S. Vavalides, Maricopa County Deputy Public Defender · filed 1992-06-17

Blevins does not state a section 1983 claim because public defenders are private persons for purposes of section 1983.

A public defender who conspires with state officials may be liable under § 1983, but vague allegations of conspiracy do not state a claim.

Irk v. Harris · filed 1992-08-14

Nevertheless, a public defender who conspires with state officials does act under color of state law and may be liable under section 1983. ... Here, Irk makes only vague allegations that public defenders conspired to secure his conviction. These allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a public defender who conspires with state officials because the conspiracy constitutes action under color of state law.

Smith v. Clark County Public Defender's Office · filed 1993-06-04

Nevertheless, a public defender who conspires with state officials does act under color of state law and may be liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against an attorney who essentially occupies the position of a public defender while providing legal services to inmates.

Pilon v. Taylor Braslow Gary L. Banning Ruben Cedeno Chase Riveland · filed 1994-11-25

Summary judgment also was appropriate as to defendant Symone Scales, a private attorney employed by the State of Washington to provide legal services to inmates. As the magistrate judge concluded, Scales essentially occupied the position of a public defender and therefore was not subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat an assistant public defender performing ordinary defense counsel duties as a state actor.

Beacham v. Annerino · filed 1996-04-11

His only acts alleged were those normally performed by counsel. An assistant public defender is not a state actor for purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for actions as a defense attorney because those actions are not under color of state law.

Bell v. State of Okl. · filed 1998-09-15

The district court dismissed appellant's claim as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, adopting the magistrate's conclusions that ... the public defender is not subject to § 1983 liability because her actions as a defense attorney are not "under color of state law," see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981). Upon review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth by the district court.

Section 1983 does not reach a state public defender representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding because the defender does not act under color of state law in that role.

Lynn v. Kunen · filed 1998-10-19

The court also found that as a state public defender involved in a criminal proceeding, Kunen did not act under color of state law and thus was not susceptible to a claim under § 1983. ... We have reviewed the record and considered plaintiff’s arguments and find his arguments unpersuasive. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for substantially the same reasons as stated in the district court’s July 25, 1997 order.

Section 1983 claims against a prosecutor for filing a charge are barred by prosecutorial immunity, and claims against an appointed defense lawyer require action under color of law.

Rogers v. Bruntrager · filed 1984-03-05

The former claim is barred by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), and the latter claim fails to allege any action “under color of law” as is required in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for traditional work as criminal defense counsel because that work is not performed under color of state law.

Langston v. Littlefield · filed 2000-11-28

The Supreme Court has held that the public defender is not subject to § 1983 liability because “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Because Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant Wright was based on such activities, the district court properly dismissed it.

Section 1983 does not treat public defenders or court-appointed defense counsel as state actors while they act in that capacity.

White v. Robertson-Deming · filed 2001-05-16

It is firmly established that a public defender or a court-appointed defense counsel, while acting in that capacity, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a court-appointed attorney performing traditional defense counsel functions because the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Taylor v. Windsor Locks Police Department · filed 2003-07-22

First, the district court properly dismissed all claims against Davis because a court-appointed attorney “does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding” and therefore, is not subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not cover an attorney acting in the traditional role of defense counsel in a criminal proceeding because that attorney is not acting under color of state law.

William Washington, Sr. v. Sautter · filed 1989-02-03

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because an attorney who serves in the capacity of public defender and who is acting within the traditional function of counsel in a criminal proceeding is not acting under color of state law.

A public defender appointed to represent an indigent defendant in the traditional adversarial role is not a state actor and cannot be sued under Section 1983 for that representation.

Wilson v. Pima County Superior Court · filed 2004-07-15

Dismissal of Wilson’s claims against Alicia Cata was proper because a public defender, when appointed to represent an indigent defendant in the traditional adversarial role as here, is not a state actor and therefore not a proper party to a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s traditional criminal defense work because the defender does not act under color of state law.

Nicholson v. Lenczewski · filed 2005-02-16

Because public defenders do not act under color of state law while defending a criminal action, these claims against defendant McWhiter are not cognizable under section 1983.

Public defenders and court-appointed attorneys performing traditional functions as counsel do not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that work.

Browdy v. Karpe · filed 2005-05-16

First, public defenders and court-appointed attorneys “performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel” to a defendant do not act “under color of state law” and, therefore, are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because that work is not under color of state law.

Karboau v. Lawrence · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly entered judgment for defendant Deborah Burdzik because Karboau’s allegations failed to state a cognizable claim against Burdzik under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (a public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law).

A public defender sued for inadequately defending state criminal charges is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

Stackhouse v. Kravich · filed 2007-04-18

We agree with the District Court that Kravich is not a proper party to this action, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), and that even if he were, the instant challenge to the validity of the state conviction would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state-appointed public defender for representing a client because the defender is not a state officer.

Vasquez Arroyo v. Kaul · filed 2008-05-09

As the district court explained, it is well settled in this circuit that public defenders cannot be sued under § 1983 because they are not state officers.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Padilla v. Enzor · filed 2008-05-13

Thus, Padilla’s public defenders are not state actors subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional functions as defense counsel as acting under color of state law.

Calhoun v. Young · filed 2008-08-01

Accordingly, Calhoun’s claims against Young regarding his ineffective representation were properly dismissed because it is well established that a public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant is not acting under color of state law.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Martin v. Lori Adkins Edie Freeman Roger Bourne George Parham August Cahill · filed 1994-01-10

A public defender, although paid by the state, does not act under color of state law for Sec. 1983 purposes when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

A public defender is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Thomas v. Pugh · filed 2001-05-09

The Supreme Court has determined that a public defender is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. ... Therefore, defendant Johnson is simply not subject to suit at all under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for actions taken while representing a defendant because those actions are not under color of state law.

Burns v. Jorandby · filed 2009-08-25

Therefore, taking the allegations in his complaint as true, neither defendant was acting under color of state law, and neither may be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Nelson v. Dauphin County Public Defender · filed 2010-05-24

As noted by the District Court, criminal defense attorneys, including public defenders, do not act “under color of state law” and are not liable under section 1983 when performing traditional functions as defense counsel.

A public defender performing traditional defense functions is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Santos v. State of NJ · filed 2010-08-31

Finally, the District Court properly held that Santos fails to state a claim against his public defender, who is not a state actor for ... purposes of § 1983 when performing his traditional functions.

A public defender representing a client does not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Townsend v. Jacks · filed 2011-06-03

After careful de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we agree with the district court that Townsend failed to state a claim because ... the public defender was not acting under color of state law when representing Townsend, see Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

A court-appointed public defender is not a state actor and cannot be sued under § 1983 for representing a criminal defendant.

McDonald v. White · filed 2012-02-15

In any case, it is frivolous because a court-appointed public defender is not a state actor, and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions are not state actors subject to suit under Section 1983.

Ceasar v. Public Defender Service for Dc · filed 2012-06-11

The complaint does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction because PDS and its attorneys are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983.

Public defenders are not state actors subject to damages liability under Section 1983 for their defense work.

Smith v. Leibovitz · filed 2012-06-22

Second, the named public defenders are not subject to suit for constitutional violations because they are not state or federal actors who may be held liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or its federal analogue established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders performing traditional lawyer functions because they are not state actors.

Rodriguez v. Creed · filed 2012-07-11

The district court properly dismissed Rodriguez’s § 1983 claim against defendants Bratty and Brinkley because public defenders performing traditional lawyer functions are not state actors.

A public defender does not act under color of state law for § 1983 when representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Rogers v. Denecke · filed 2012-10-23

The magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because, as set forth in Polk County. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), Defendant, as a public defender, was not acting under color of state law when he represented Plaintiff in the criminal proceeding. ... Nothing in Plaintiff’s brief or the appellate record persuades us there was any error in the magistrate judge’s analysis or the district court’s order. Therefore, for substantially the same reasons given by the magistrate judge and the district court, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender who was not acting under color of state law.

LaGordian Brown v. Dove · filed 2013-04-17

The public defenders cannot be sued under § 1983 because they were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders for conduct arising from their representation of a client in parole revocation proceedings.

Harris v. Fulwood · filed 2013-05-30

Since plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against Edmonson and Douglass is predicated on their representation of him during the revocation proceedings, it fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders for actions taken while representing a defendant in court because they do not act under color of state law in that role.

Grider v. Cook · filed 2013-06-17

Consequently Cook and Azfal may not be sued under § 1983 for their actions taken in connection with representing Grider before the state trial and mental health courts.