42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

State Ex Rel. Schumacher v. State Teachers Retirement Board · filed 1989-12-14

The trial court’s primary reason for denying relators relief pursuant to Sections 1983 and 1988, Title 42, U.S.Code, was its determination that STRB was not a person for purposes of Section 1983 claims. We agree with this determination, which is dispositive of this assignment of error.

Section 1983 does not allow suits against states or state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Group Health Plan, Inc. v. State Board of Registration for Healing Arts · filed 1990-01-02

Regarding the agency defendants, it is well settled that neither states nor state agencies are “persons” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not "persons" under the statute.

Lawson v. Ionia Correctional Maximum Facility C. Goodwin Lt. M. Houghton · filed 1990-01-23

Moreover, defendants, as state officials acting in their official capacities, could not be sued for damages as "persons" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

State employees sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages under Section 1983.

Hopkins v. Thomas Kerns Jacqueline E. Moss Sander Johnson Ronald Gach Theodore Anderson · filed 1990-04-09

Dismissal was also appropriate because state employees who are sued in their official capacities are not "persons" who are subject to damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the United States because it is not a person under the statute.

Fixel v. United States · filed 1990-04-23

The United States is not a “person” and cannot be sued under § 1983.

A county social services department that functions as an arm of the state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Wigger v. McKee · filed 1990-06-07

Under this statutory scheme, we conclude that the Arapahoe County Department of Social Services is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the § 1983 claim against it must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits civil rights suits against District of Columbia officials because Congress extended municipal liability principles to the District.

O'CALLAGHAN v. District of Columbia · filed 1990-06-22

In passing the 1979 amendments, Congress’ express intent was to extend the principles underlying Monell to the District, and thereby render District officials liable for civil rights deprivations under section 1983.

The Commonwealth is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Costopoulos v. Gibboney · filed 1990-07-26

The Commonwealth was also named as a party in this action; however, the Commonwealth is not a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The District of Columbia is a suable “person” under § 1983 as a municipal corporation.

Best v. District of Columbia · filed 1990-08-10

Nonetheless, for the reasons stated above, the District of Columbia falls under Monell’s holding for municipalities and not under Will’s holding with respect to states for purposes of the definition of “person” under § 1983.

Kentucky local school boards are persons subject to suit under § 1983 because they are not arms of the state.

Blackburn v. Floyd County Board of Education Ex Rel. Adams · filed 1990-08-17

Kentucky local boards of education are not arms of the state and, thus, they are not entitled Eleventh Amendment immunity. This result necessarily precludes the Board’s argument, under Will, that it is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state agency or state officials sued in their official capacities, but permits claims against officials sued as individuals.

Shields v. Gerhart · filed 1990-09-07

The § 1983 claims against SRS must be dismissed because SRS is not a person. The § 1983 claims against defendants Gerhart, Satink and Collier must be dismissed to the extent they were sued in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not treat an institution of a state as a person subject to suit.

Budd v. City University of New York, Baruch College · filed 1990-10-15

Baruch is an institution of New York State pursuant to New York Education Law section 6203 and therefore is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency and its commissioner when they are not persons within the meaning of the statute.

Amdahl Corp. v. Georgia Department of Administrative Services · filed 1990-12-05

Regarding Amdahl’s claim for relief under 42 USC § 1983 we conclude, based on Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, - U. S. _ (109 SC 2304, 105 LE2d 45) (1989), that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to DOAS and its commissioner.

Section 1983 does not treat states, state agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Love v. Hayden · filed 1991-02-11

Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently held that neither a state nor state agencies are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Additionally, state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state department of social services is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Collier v. Krane · filed 1991-05-01

The Court also determines that Defendants are not “persons” for § 1983 purposes. In addition to Plaintiff’s inability to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff is also unable to maintain suit against the Department of Social Services Defendants because the DoSS is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not allow suit against a state department of corrections because it is not a person under the statute.

Duke Woodley, A/K/A Lawrence Topal v. City of Richmond, City Jail, Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 1991-05-15

The magistrate judge was correct in holding that the state department of corrections could not be liable because it was not a person for Sec. 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Bayh v. Sonnenburg · filed 1991-06-12

The plaintiffs' § 1988 action therefore fails because the named defendants are not "persons" under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat Guam or its employees acting in their official capacities as persons who can be sued.

Bermudez v. Edward T. Duenas, Chief Parole Officer, Guam Parole Services Division · filed 1991-06-18

Neither the territory of Guam nor its employees acting in their official capacities are persons under section 1983.

State agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Stjernholm v. Colorado State Board of Chiropractic Examiners · filed 1991-10-24

Therefore, because the Board is an agency which is not subject to liability in this context, we conclude that plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state correctional center or its food services because they are not persons subject to a claim under the section.

Gardner v. Beale · filed 1991-12-19

This Court finds as a matter of law that neither the Center nor its Food Services are “persons” subject to a § 1983 claim and therefore are granted summary judgment on that basis.

A state university is an alter ego of the state and is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Kaimowitz v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois and Its Institute of Communications Research · filed 1992-01-03

Because this Court has determined in previous § 1983 actions that a state university is an alter ego of the state, and, under Will, a “State is not a person” under § 1983, it follows that a state university is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and therefore not subject to suits brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a multi-jurisdictional drug task force when its founding agreement does not create a separate legal entity.

Timberlake by Timberlake v. Benton · filed 1992-01-29

The 19th Judicial District Drug Task Force is, therefore, a joint undertaking of several counties and cities and not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

A bistate authority that is not an arm of either state is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Peters v. Delaware River Port Authority · filed 1992-03-06

Under the facts here, we must conclude that the DRPA is not an arm or instrumentality of Pennsylvania or New Jersey. Consequently, DRPA is not entitled to rely on the immunity from suit conferred by the Eleventh Amendment and is subject to suit as “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Territorial officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief are persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada · filed 1992-04-16

Accordingly, we conclude that Governor Ada, when sued as he is here in his official capacity fór injunctive relief, is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat an arm of the state as a person subject to suit.

Armstrong v. Meyers · filed 1992-05-19

The Regents, a corporation created by the California constitution, is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, and therefore is not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands or its officers in their official capacities because the Commonwealth is not a person under the statute.

Denieva v. Reyes · filed 1992-06-05

We conclude that, in light of Will and Ngiraingas, the CNMI is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, and Fleming is no longer good law on this issue. Neither the CNMI nor its officers acting in their official capacity can be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a territorial governor sued in an official capacity for prospective injunctive relief as a person subject to suit.

Guam Society Of Obstetricians And Gynecologists v. Ada · filed 1992-06-08

Accordingly, we conclude that Governor Ada, when sued as he is here in his official capacity for injunctive relief, is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

37 soc.sec.rep.ser. 362, Medicare & Medicaid Guide P 40,322 Eric Lett v. Magnant · filed 1992-07-10

We must dismiss the claims against the Department of Public Welfare and Board of Public Welfare. Personhood is an essential element of a § 1983 claim, and in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and therefore cannot be sued in its own name. This reasoning applies to arms of the state, such as state agencies, as well.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state child welfare agency because the agency is not a person within the meaning of the statute.

Ethan H. v. State of New Hampshire · filed 1992-07-21

The only named defendant, DCYS, is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983.

A state board is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Munger v. STATE BD. FOR REG. OF ARCHITECTS · filed 1992-09-04

Further, since the Board could not be a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Board regarding the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in Count II of Mr. Munger's complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a state corrections department because it is not a person under the statute.

Lail v. Lou Ann White Jane Doe 1 Jane Doe 2 Virginia Department of Corrections, Court and Legal Section · filed 1992-10-23

The claim Lail alleges against the Virginia Department of Corrections Court and Legal Section does not state a cause of action because that defendant is not a "person" within the meaning ofs 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or state officers sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Witmer v. University of Florida Police Dept. · filed 1992-12-14

Initially, we affirm the order of dismissal to the extent it dismisses the section 1983 action against the state and its officers sued in their official capacity. "[N]either a State nor its officers acting in their official capacities are `persons' under section 1983."

Section 1983 treats a state officer sued in his individual capacity as a person subject to suit.

Miles v. John Bollinger, Officer Diane Kulp, Officer, Queen Anne's County, and Maryland State Troopers · filed 1993-01-05

However, Miles also implicitly stated a claim against Bollinger in his individual capacity, 3 and Bollinger in his individual capacity clearly is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials sued in their official capacity because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Frederick v. State of Tennessee · filed 1993-01-22

Second, it must be assumed that the remaining defendants were served in their official capacity because the complaint does not indicate that they were being sued as individuals. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir.1989). In that capacity, the individual defendants are not "persons" who are subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against courts because courts are not persons within its meaning.

Clark v. Clark · filed 1993-01-28

Courts are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, if they were, the action would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, anyway.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state university because it is not a person under the statute.

Ndefru v. Kansas State University · filed 1993-02-10

Furthermore, as this court has previously held, a state university is not a “person” who may be sued for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability on persons acting under color of law, and a county jail is not a suable person because it is not a legal entity.

Powell v. Cook County Jail · filed 1993-03-02

Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person” who violates someone’s constitutional rights “under color of law.” Cook County Jail is not a “person” — it is not a legal entity to begin with.

Section 1983 permits claims for money damages, but a criminal defense attorney is not subject to suit for alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

Jones v. Scoggin · filed 1993-03-23

Although a claim for money damages may properly be brought under § 1983, this claim was nonetheless properly dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) as frivolous because attorneys are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim against a state parole board because the board itself is not a person subject to suit.

Martinez v. New Mexico Parole Board Dareld L. Kerby, Warden · filed 1993-04-23

To succeed in his action for damages, Mr. Martinez would have to prove a "person" acting under color of state law deprived him of a right guaranteed by the constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The impediment to his success in this case is that the parole board, as an entity, is not a "person." Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 232 (3d Cir.1977). Because his action for damages is asserted only against the New Mexico Parole Board and no person, Mr. Martinez has failed to state a claim for which he would be entitled to relief.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Arnzen v. State · filed 1993-05-13

Thus, it is clear that, in Idaho, the State, for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is not a “person.”

Section 1983 does not permit retrospective damages claims against the Virgin Islands or its officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Brow v. Farrelly · filed 1993-05-13

The dismissal of Brow’s petition was ultimately appropriate, however, because neither the Territory of the Virgin Islands, nor its officers acting in their official capacities are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims for retrospective damages against the Virgin Islands or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Brow v. Farrelly · filed 1993-05-26

The dismissal of Brow's petition was ultimately appropriate, however, because neither the Territory of the Virgin Islands nor its officers acting in their official capacities are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state court is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Ippolito v. State of Fla. · filed 1993-06-14

As an initial matter, it is important to note that a state court is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars monetary relief against a North Carolina county and its officials treated as the State or its officials acting in their official capacities.

Messick v. Catawba County, NC · filed 1993-07-06

Because the plaintiff in the instant case seeks monetary damages, he is not entitled to relief pursuant ... to section 1983 against the County, the Commissioners, or the sheriff and the officers sued in their official capacity.

A state court is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Mumford v. Joseph Zieba, Judge, in His Official and Individual Capacities Lorain County Common Pleas Court, Dom · filed 1993-09-01

Because this court has held that a state court is not a “person” within the meaning of that term as used in § 1983, plaintiffs claim against the Lorain County Common Pleas Court must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make a municipal police department liable as a person when it has no legal existence separate from the city.

Higgenbottom v. McManus · filed 1994-01-10

The Department contends that under Kentucky law it has no legal or corporate existence apart from the City of Paducah, and that the Department accordingly is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Plaintiff has made no response to this argument, and the Court has not identified any law that contradicts the Department’s assertions. The Court shall therefore dismiss that part of Plaintiffs Complaint that seeks to recover damages from the Department.

A police department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Hoffman v. Hunt · filed 1994-02-22

The Court finds that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court grants its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

An interstate port authority that is not an arm of either compacting state is a person amenable to suit under § 1983.

Walter T. Peters, Jr. v. Delaware River Port Authority of Pennsylvania and New Jersey · filed 1994-02-22

Consequently, because the DRPA is not an arm of either state, the position of the DRPA that it is not a “person” under § 1983 fails. We hold that the DRPA is amenable to suit under that statute.

Section 1983 does not treat the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas as a person subject to suit.

Washington v. Court of Common Pleas · filed 1994-03-10

The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas is not a "person” for the purposes of § 1983.

A state supreme court is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

McFarland v. Folsom · filed 1994-03-18

The court notes that a state supreme court, is not a "person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against states and state agencies and damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Carroll v. Robinson · filed 1994-05-12

However, we hold that plaintiffs section 1983 claim for deprivation of a protected liberty interest without due process should have survived the Motion For Summary Judgment because: 1) the defendant state and defendant state agencies are “persons” subject to suit under section 1983 for purposes of injunctive relief and 2) the individual defendants are “persons” subject to suit under section 1983 for purposes of compensatory damages.

Section 1983 does not treat a municipal court division that is part of the state judicial system as a person subject to suit.

Pittman v. Lower Court Counseling · filed 1994-05-27

Because LCC is a division of the City of Las Vegas Municipal Court which itself is part of the state judicial system and therefore a part of the state, LCC is not a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state board of trustees and a state university are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Laxey v. Louisiana Board of Trustees · filed 1994-06-13

We also note that the named defendants are not "persons" under § 1983, and the case could have been dismissed on that ground.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state correctional center or its medical department because they are not persons amenable to suit under the section.

Wayne Rush Meadows v. P. Ingram Augusta Correctional Center Medical Department · filed 1994-07-06

The district court dismissed Meadows's claims against ACC and ACC Medical Department on the ground that these Defendants are not "persons" amenable to suit under Sec. 1983. We find that the district court's determination was correct as to these named Defendants.

Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983.

Bagley v. Sumter County Sheriff's Department City of Durham Police Department · filed 1994-07-21

In addition to the grounds for dismissal stated by the district court, we note that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its agencies as persons subject to suit.

Aldrich v. Chris Knab, and University of Washington · filed 1994-08-29

The civil rights claim against the university also should have been dismissed because the state and its agencies are not persons under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state university or its employees acting in their official capacity because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Seare v. University of Utah School of Medicine · filed 1994-09-15

Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling that the University of Utah School of Medicine cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that its employees acting in their official capacity, as is the ease here, are not “persons” who can be sued under section 1983.

A state agency that is an arm of the state and its employees sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Tafoya v. Bobroff · filed 1994-09-28

Initially, Plaintiff can only bring suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against Defendants in their individual capacities, because Defendant APS, as an “arm of the state,” ... and Defendants APS employees in their official capacities, are not “persons” for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a Virginia city jail because the jail is not a person under the statute.

John Pete Perdue, Jr. v. B. L. Penalosa, Physician, Portsmouth City Jail Zabo Correction Food Service Portsmouth City Ja · filed 1994-10-13

The Jail is not a "person" for purposes of Sec. 1983, and is an arm of the Commonwealth of Virginia entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

A university that is not an arm of the state and its official-capacity director may be sued under § 1983 for prospective or retrospective relief.

Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory · filed 1995-09-11

Because we hold that the University and Nuckolls, acting in his official capacity, are fully hable to suit under § 1983, we need not address the question of whether reconsideration of Doe’s employment by the Laboratory constitutes prospective injunctive rehef. Doe may sue both the University and Nuckolls in federal court regardless of whether the rehef he seeks constitutes prospective or retrospective rehef.

An entity that is not an arm of the state is a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory · filed 1995-09-11

Because we hold that the University is not an arm of the state in this instance, it is a "person" under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat the Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority as a person subject to suit because it is an arm of the state.

Simon v. State Compensation Insurance Authority · filed 1995-10-10

In sum, we reject plaintiffs’ contention that the CCIA is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its officials acting in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Hiefner v. University of Tennessee · filed 1995-11-20

It is also well established that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”

A state agency and state officials in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983, but state employees may be sued in their personal capacities.

Harrison v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division · filed 1995-12-07

Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. ... However, a § 1983 action will lie against these employees in their personal, rather than their official, capacity.

State officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Flemming v. Oregon Parole Bd. · filed 1995-12-27

We reject Flemming's contention that the district court erred by dismissing his claims against the members of the Oregon Parole Board in their official capacities because state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Whether a defendant is a person subject to suit under § 1983 depends on the capacity in which the defendant is sued, not the capacity in which the defendant acted.

Kuhnert v. Fontenot · filed 1996-03-04

First, it must be noted that the related questions of whether the defendant is a “person” within the meaning of section 1983, and whether the Eleventh Amendment precludes this suit from being entertained in federal court, depend on the capacity in which the defendant is sued, not on the capacity in which he was acting at the time of the complained-of conduct.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state education department because it is not a person within the statute.

James v. Pine Plains Central School District · filed 1996-03-06

SED, as a political subdivision of New York state, is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore that statute cannot serve as the basis for an action against it.

Section 1983 does not permit an official-capacity claim against a state officer because the officer is not a person subject to liability under the section.

HARRIS BY TUCKER v. County of Forsyth · filed 1996-03-28

Because Sheriff Barker is not a “person” who may be liable for constitutional violations under section 1983, summary judgment on this claim is appropriate in his favor.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency because a state agency is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

Berkowitz by Berkowitz v. New York City Bd. of Educ. · filed 1996-04-03

Finally, plaintiffs’ claims against the SED under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 likewise must be dismissed because the SED, as a state agency, is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

The Virgin Islands and its officers acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Julien v. Committee of Bar Examiners for the Practice of Law · filed 1996-04-15

It is well established that neither the Territory of the Virgin Islands nor its officers acting in their official capacities are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the Commonwealth legislature because it is not a person within the meaning of the statute.

Sablan v. Tenorio · filed 1996-04-18

Because the legislature is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action against the legislature.

States and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983 for damages claims.

Schley v. College of Charleston Martin Perlmutter · filed 1996-04-23

Also, neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are persons within the meaning of § 1983.

A state bar grievance committee that is part of the state judiciary is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983.

Sassower v. Mangano · filed 1996-05-21

In addition, defendant Grievance Committee, as “part of the judicial arm of the state of New York,” ... is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a North Carolina county sheriff as a person subject to the statute.

Carter v. Good · filed 1996-06-07

Accordingly, this Court holds that the sheriff of a county in North Carolina is a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state college or its trustees sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Thornton v. Kaplan · filed 1996-06-07

4. Summary Judgment shall be, and is, GRANTED in favor of Defendants Metropolitan State College of Denver and defendants James Fleming, Ann Steinbeck, Aims C. McGuinness, John Roybal, Harriet Barker, and George Brantley, in their official capacities as Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, on plaintiffs claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the reason that they are not persons within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to damages liability.

Gyadu v. Workers' Compensation Commission · filed 1996-06-24

Thus, neither the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Commission nor Commissioner Mastropietro in his official capacity are “persons” subject to section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state retirement board that is an arm of the state because it is not a person under the statute.

Wirtz v. State Educational Retirement Board · filed 1996-07-02

Because the ERB is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court lacked authority to enforce an award of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 attorney fees against it.

State agencies and state employees sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages liability under Section 1983.

Messer v. Meno · filed 1996-07-08

It is well established that state agencies and their official capacity employees are not “persons” subject to liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Lal v. Nix · filed 1996-07-25

Second, Lai’s section 1983 claim for damages against the individual defendants in their "official capacities" and the board must be dismissed because a state official acting in his or her official capacity and a state agency are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency or its officials acting in their official capacities as persons subject to liability.

Louisiana Farms v. LA. Dept. of Wildlife · filed 1996-10-09

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that DWF and its agents, in their official capacities, were "persons" under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a state court because the court is not a person subject to suit; an official-capacity damages claim against a judge seeks recovery from that court.

McCrea v. Zieba · filed 1996-11-19

The Court also dismisses Mr. McCrea’s damage claims against Judge Basinski in his official capacity because the effect of such a claim is to recover damages only from the Common Pleas Court who was dismissed from this case because a state court is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state retirement system that is an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Sculthorpe v. Virginia Retirement System · filed 1997-01-17

Accordingly, because it is an “arm of the state” entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, VRS is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Sparks v. Family Services of Miles City, Montana Shirley Tiernan Terri Gable · filed 1997-01-24

In addition, Sparks's claims against Family Services and its officials, Gable and Tiernan, acting in their official capacity fail because they are not "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 excludes the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority and its employees in their official capacities from damages suits, but permits claims against those employees in their individual capacities.

Eddy v. Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority · filed 1997-02-05

However, this otherwise satisfactory claim must be dismissed against WAPA and the individual defendants in their official capacitity, as they are not "persons" as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This claim may only be pursued against the individual defendants in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 treats a state official sued in an official capacity for injunctive relief as a person who may be sued.

Haley v. Pataki · filed 1997-02-13

Governor Pataki is a state official who, when sued in his official capacity for injunctive relief, would be a “person” under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against the Virgin Islands Port Authority, its board, and board members in their official capacities because they are not arms of the Virgin Islands government and qualify as persons.

Ballentine v. Virgin Islands Port Authority · filed 1997-02-24

Weighing the Fitchik factors as applied to VIPA, the court concludes that the defendants are not "arms of the State"; hence, they are amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state department of corrections because an arm of the state is not a person under the section.

Glenn v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections · filed 1997-04-01

As an arm of the State, however, DOC is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state court because a state court is not a person under the statute.

Hawley v. Nelson · filed 1997-04-04

First, a state court is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state university or its board of trustees when the university is an instrumentality of the state.

State Ex Rel. University of Northern Colorado v. Zahourek · filed 1997-04-14

We therefore conclude that, because UNC is an instrumentality of the State, a § 1983 claim will not he against it or its board of trustees.

Section 1983 does not treat a detention center or a warden sued in his official capacity as a person subject to suit.

Ranson v. McPherson · filed 1997-06-11

And, the detention center and McPherson in his official capacity are not persons under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a State or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the section.

University of Texas System v. Courtney · filed 1997-06-12

Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official, versus individual, capacities are “persons” under section 1983.

A municipality is a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Martinez-Catala v. Cardona · filed 1997-06-18

The defendant Municipality of Florida is a unit of local government under the laws of Puerto Rico that is considered a person for purposes of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners because the board is not a person under the statute.

Zvenia v. Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1997-06-19

Because the defendant is not a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court did not err by dismissing Zvenia's action.

A local governmental entity that is not an arm of the state is a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Elam Construction, Inc. v. Regional Transportation District · filed 1997-10-17

RTD, which is not an “arm of the state,” but is rather a local governmental entity, is a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

A local governmental entity that is not an arm of the state is a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Elam Const., Inc. v. Regional Transp. Dist. · filed 1997-10-17

RTD, which is not an "arm of the state," but is rather a local governmental entity, is a "person" for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 allows suit against the Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority because it is a suable person rather than an arm of the state.

Simon v. State Compensation Insurance Authority · filed 1997-11-20

In conclusion, we hold that the CCIA is not an arm of the state and is therefore a “person” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state university or officials sued in their official capacities as persons for purposes of a claim under the section.

Stein v. Kent State University Board of Trustees · filed 1998-02-18

While § 1983 prohibits persons under color of state law from depriving litigants of their rights under the Constitution and federal law, the Court notes that Defendant KSU and the named defendants sued in their official capacities are not considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983 litigation.

Section 1983 treats municipalities, other local governmental bodies, and individuals as persons who may be sued.

Maricle v. Biggerstaff · filed 1998-04-01

Municipalities and other local governmental bodies, as well as individuals, qualify as "persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency or an official of that agency sued in an official capacity as a person.

De Jesus-Keolamphu v. Village of Pelham Manor · filed 1998-04-03

In addition, neither a state agency nor an official of that agency sued in his or her official capacity is a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Perry Center, Inc. v. Heitkamp · filed 1998-04-08

Neither a state, an entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity, nor state officials sued in their official capacity are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and neither is subject to suit under the statute in federal or state court.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Haynes v. Conley · filed 1998-09-15

Neither a state nor its officials sued in their official capacity are “persons” under § 1983.

State officials sued individually can be persons subject to suit under Section 1983 when they act under color of state law.

Melvin v. Brodeur, Comm'r · filed 1998-12-08

Thus, as individuals who act under color of state law, these defendants would qualify as "persons" from whom the plaintiff may recover under section 1983.

State agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Jones v. New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs and New York State Army National Guard · filed 1999-01-07

Further, as the district court noted, neither the DMNA nor the NYANG are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a park because a park is not a person under the statute.

Bowles v. New York · filed 1999-01-25

A park is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state department of corrections because it is not a “person” subject to suit under the statute.

Blackburn v. DOC · filed 1999-02-25

Defendant New Mexico Department of Corrections is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

A state school that is an arm of the state and its principal acting in his official capacity are not “persons” subject to damages liability under § 1983.

Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf & Blind · filed 1999-03-01

In sum, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the claim against the School for the Deaf and Blind, and the claim against Moore in his official capacity since they were not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state university that is an alter ego of the state because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Loeffler v. University of Illinois at Chicago · filed 1999-03-03

As for Section 1983, University is an “alter ego” of the State of Illinois (Cannon v. University of Health Sciences, 710 F.2d 351, 357 (7th Cir.1983)), and as such it is not a “person” amenable to a Section 1983 lawsuit (Kaimowitz v. Board of Trustees, 951 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.1991)).

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Chiavetta v. Iowa Board of Nursing · filed 1999-06-03

At the outset Chiavetta concedes this court is bound by the United States Supreme Court’s determination that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the § 1983 count of Chiavetta’s petition.

Section 1983 does not permit a cause of action against the Jefferson County Department of Human Resources or Jefferson County Food Stamp Office because they are not persons under the statute.

Sanders v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources · filed 1999-11-05

As the DHR and Jefferson County Food Stamp Office are not “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a cause of action can not be had against them.

Section 1983 does not treat Pennsylvania judicial entities as persons, even when they are largely funded locally.

Callahan v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2000-03-28

Thus, while it is true that the judicial defendants largely are funded locally, we hold that they are not persons within section 1983.

States and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Ruffin v. Deperio · filed 2000-03-30

“[Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its departments and agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Vermett v. Hough · filed 1984-03-08

Moreover, neither a state nor its departments and agencies are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and thus are not subject to suit under this statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state because a state is not a person under the section.

Nannay v. Rowan College · filed 2000-06-30

Insofar as plaintiff has alleged a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of New Jersey, such claim will be dismissed, as the United States Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting under their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Kenney v. Hawaii · filed 2000-07-31

Although Plaintiffs claims against the State of Hawaii and the defendant-physicians in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Section 1983 is also precluded because it only extends liability to “persons.” States and state officials in their official capacities are not “persons” under that section.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against an arm of the State because it is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division · filed 2000-09-18

The DRD was immune from suit under the ADA for the reasons discussed above, and it is not a “person” subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state court division because it is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas · filed 2000-09-18

The DRD was immune from suit under the ADA for the reasons discussed above, and it is not a "person" subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits only against persons: state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacities for damages are excluded, while officials may be sued in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief.

Steel v. Alma Public School District · filed 2001-05-22

Only “persons” can be sued under section 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA). The Supreme Court has held that State agencies are not “persons.” ... Plaintiffs’ section 1983 and ACRA claims against the Department of Education are therefore dismissed from this suit. Plaintiffs’ section 1983 and ACRA damages claim against the Director of the Department of Education in his official capacity are likewise dismissed on the same grounds. ... However, the Director is a person within the meaning of section 1983 and ACRA and is subject to suit on Plaintiffs’ claims against him in his official capacity for the injunctive and declaratory relief sought in the complaint.

A state agency is not a person suable under Section 1983.

Carroll v. Detella · filed 2001-07-03

The Illinois EPA is a state agency and thus not a “person” suable under section 1983, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir.2001), and its two employees were not served.

Section 1983 does not treat states, state agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities as persons who can be sued.

Flayter v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2001-08-17

For example, neither the DOC nor any of its employees in their official capacities are proper parties to this action, because states and state agencies, as well as state officials acting in their official capacities, are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983 and are immune from suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the State of New York because the State is not a person under the statute.

Kirk v. State of New York · filed 2001-11-13

... and the State is not a "person" amenable to suit under 42 USC § 1983 (Will v Michigan De12t. of State Police 491 US 58).

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a state or state agency because neither is a person under the statute.

Hartman v. Kickapoo Tribe Gaming Commission · filed 2001-11-16

Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against the State and the KSGA may not go forward because a state or state agency is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state agency or a state official sued in an official capacity because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Massingill v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority · filed 2002-02-01

As Congress did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when enacting § 1983, neither a state, nor a state official sued in his official capacity is a “person” who is subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because the agency is not a “person” subject to suit under the section.

Rodgers v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2002-02-04

As Congress did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when enacting § 1983, neither a state, a state agency, nor a state official sued in his official capacity is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

A graduate academic status committee is not a “person” subject to a § 1983 claim.

Daboul v. Board of Visitors of the College of William & Mary · filed 2002-04-10

The Graduate Academic Status Committee is immune from this claim as it is not a “person” under the statute.

Section 1983 treats a local cemetery board as a person subject to suit.

Lower v. Board of Dir. of Haskell County Cemetery Dist. · filed 2002-10-25

We agree the Cemetery Board meets the definition of a person for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Meyers v. Colorado Department of Human Services · filed 2003-01-06

Regarding Ms. Meyers’ claims under § 1983, the magistrate judge and district court properly concluded that neither the state nor state officials sued in their official capacities are considered “persons” under § 1983 and therefore Ms. Meyers’ § 1983 claims against these defendants must fail.

Section 1983 does not treat the Michigan Department of Corrections as a person subject to suit.

Parker v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2003-03-12

We note, nonetheless, that the court properly found that the MDOC is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Smith v. Birdsall · filed 2003-06-23

In dismissing the § 1983 action with prejudice for failure to state a claim, the district court found that the state district judge and the state prosecutor were clothed with absolute immunity, that the state agencies were not “persons” as used in § 1983 (Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985)), and that interstate compacts are “laws or agreements adopted by various states.” ROA Doc. 13 at 3. ... We AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons as set forth in the district court’s orders filed January 24, 2003, February 3, 2003, and March 4, 2003.

South Dakota school districts are persons subject to suit under § 1983 because they are akin to municipalities.

Wigg v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5 · filed 2003-07-02

Like in Mt Healthy, on the balance of this record, the Court finds that school districts within the state of South Dakota are akin to municipalities and accordingly are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and do qualify as “persons” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state instrumentality is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983.

Jattan v. Queens College of University of New York · filed 2003-07-28

Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, the appellant Queens College of the City University of New York (hereinafter Queens College) presented sufficient evidence to establish that it is a senior college and an instrumentality of the State of New York ... and therefore is not a “person” amenable to suit within the meaning of 42 USC § 1983 (see Will v Michigan Dept, of State Police, 491 US 58 [1989]; Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 185 [1996]; Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 498 [2001]; Matter of Thomas v New York Temp. State Commn. on Regulation of Lobbying, 83 AD2d 723 [1981], affd 56 NY2d 656 [1982]).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice because it is not a person subject to suit.

Retzlaff v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2003-10-23

However, appellant fails to otherwise satisfy the first prong of the test, because TDCJ is not a “person” who can be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against boards of trustees of state colleges and universities because they are not persons under the statute.

Gaby v. Board of Trustees of Community Technical Colleges, Booker T. Devaughn and Paul Susen · filed 2003-10-29

We agree with these decisions and hold that boards of trustees of state colleges and universities are not subject to suit under § 1983.

A North Carolina sheriff and his personnel sued in their official capacities are persons subject to suit under § 1983 when they are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Layman v. Alexander · filed 2003-11-21

In this case, then, since the Court has concluded that Defendants are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, they are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983, and no further analysis is warranted.

Section 1983 does not treat a state university or a state official acting in an official capacity as a person subject to suit.

Bates v. University of Texas Medical Branch · filed 2003-12-18

Furthermore, governmental entities and governmental officials acting in their official capacity do not constitute “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Retzlaff v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2003-12-18

However, appellant fails to otherwise satisfy the first prong of the test, because TDCJ is not a “person” who can be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state bar association acting as a state agency because it is not a person under the statute.

O'CONNOR v. State of Nev. · filed 1981-01-26

It has long been held that a state bar association, as an agency of the state, is not a “person” under the Civil Rights Acts § 1983 et seq.

Section 1983 treats a financially independent, substantially autonomous state-affiliated university as a person subject to suit.

Gordenstein v. University of Delaware · filed 1974-09-16

Based on the previous findings that the University of Delaware is a financially independent and substantially autonomous entity, the Court concludes that the University of Delaware is not a “state agency” in the context of Section 1983 and, accordingly, is a “person” as that term is there used.

Section 1983 permits suit against the office of a North Carolina sheriff because it is a person under the statute.

Boyd v. Robeson County · filed 2005-03-15

We are bound by Southern Railway and Hull and, accordingly, hold that the trial court properly concluded that the office of North Carolina sheriff is a "person" under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against the office of a North Carolina sheriff as a person under the statute.

Boyd v. Robeson County · filed 2005-04-05

We hold that a North Carolina sheriff is a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on their defense of qualified immunity when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state agencies or damages claims against state officials in their official capacities, but permits individual-capacity claims and claims for injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities.

Boone v. Pennsylvania Office of Vocational Rehabilitation · filed 2005-06-06

In sum, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against the Department and the OVR will be dismissed in their entirety. To the extent Plaintiff intended to seek money damages against Mr. Nasuti and Secretary Schme-rin in their official capacities under § 1983, those claims will be dismissed as well. However, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims for in-junctive relief against Mr. Nasuti and Secretary Schmerin in their official capacities will survive the instant motion to dismiss. Finally, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Mr. Nasuti and Secretary Schmerin in their individual capacities remain viable in all respects.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the Connecticut Department of Children and Families or the Connecticut Attorney General’s office because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Dutkiewicz v. Hyjek · filed 2005-06-22

With respect to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for constitutional violations, we conclude that: (4) DCF and the AG’s office are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983, ... and (12) plaintiffs have failed to allege that student educational records are subsumed within a federally protected privacy right.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state university because it is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

Costello v. UNIVERSITY OF N. CAR. AT GREENSBORO · filed 2005-06-29

This holding necessarily excludes UNCG from liability under § 1983. For this reason, Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted as to this claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state university because it is not a person subject to liability under the statute.

Costello v. University of North Carolina · filed 2005-06-29

This holding necessarily excludes UNCG from liability under § 1983. For this reason, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted as to this claim.

Section 1983 permits suit against persons, and a state is not a person under the statute.

Wennihan v. AHCCCS · filed 2005-07-05

Section 1983 requires that the action is allowed only against a person and the state is not a person.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state or its alter ego because it is not a person subject to suit.

Googerdy v. North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University · filed 2005-08-24

This holding necessarily excludes A & T, as an alter ego of the State of North Carolina, from liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats SAIF and an officer sued in her official capacity as persons because SAIF lacks Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Johnson v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2005-10-19

SAIF is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and, in consequence, is a “person” subject to suit under 42 USC section 1983. Because Rocklin is named in her official capacity, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity either and therefore is a “person” subject to suit under section 1983.

States, state agencies, and their employees acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Cline v. State, Division of Child & Family Services · filed 2005-11-17

It is well settled that a state and its agencies, as well as employees of that state and its agencies acting in their official capacities, do not fit within the meaning of a “person,” ... under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a medical unit because it is not a person.

Murphy v. Turpin · filed 2005-12-19

Finally, the medical unit cannot be sued under § 1983, because it is not a person.