42 U.S.C. § 1983

State courts are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Robinson v. The Lancaster County Court · filed 2020-01-03

Here, the court dismissed Robinson’s § 1983 Complaint because his claims against the state court Defendants were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and the state court Defendants are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Municipal departments, including sheriff’s departments, are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

(PC) Luther v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2020-01-06

Departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; therefore, a local law enforcement agency, like the SDSD, are not proper parties.

Prison and jail facilities are not persons subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

Husman (ID 75744) v. Brecken · filed 2020-01-08

The Court also found that Plaintiff’s claims against EDCF are subject to dismissal because prison and jail facilities are not proper defendants because none is a “person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Matney v. Haysi Regional Jail · filed 2020-01-13

A jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail administration because it is not a person subject to suit.

Harris v. Jester · filed 2020-01-13

Because the Milwaukee County Jail administration is not a “person” subject to suit under §1983, the court must dismiss it as a defendant.

Section 1983 permits suit against persons, but a correctional facility is not a person within the statute’s meaning.

Garza-Ovalle v. Detention Officer Armstrong · filed 2020-01-15

Conduct amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be conduct undertaken by a person. CDF is not a person within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, plaintiff’s claims against CDF cannot stand.

A police department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Pittman v. York · filed 2020-01-16

The Chesapeake Police Department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

BLEH v. GEORGE W. HILL CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2020-01-22

Thus, the § 1983 claim against GWH is dismissed because a jail is not a “person” under Section 1983.

A detention facility is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Hines v. Chesapeake Detention Facility · filed 2020-01-23

CDF correctly notes that is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A jail facility is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Greene v. Correct Care Solutions · filed 2020-01-29

It is well settled that jail facilities (such as CCDC) are not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the Ann Klein Forensic Center because it is not a person under the statute.

RUIBAL v. PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC. · filed 2020-02-10

However, AKFC is not a “person” amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims only against persons; a prison medical department is not a person under the section.

PAULSON v. THE GEO GROUP, INC. · filed 2020-02-11

The “GEO Medical Department” must also be dismissed with prejudice since it too is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a criminal justice center because it is not a person.

Taylor v. District Attorney Philadelphia · filed 2020-02-14

The CJC is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

A state corrections department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Leyba, Jr. v. State of New Mexico Department of Corrections · filed 2020-02-14

As a state agency, the “New Mexico Department of Corrections [NMDOC] is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state agencies or their units because they are not persons under the statute.

Lindsay v. University of Connecticut Health Center · filed 2020-02-18

Units of those entities, the Medical Department at Corrigan and the University of Connecticut Health Center, also are not persons within the meaning of section 1983.

A state department of correction is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Montgomery v. Officer Lockwood · filed 2020-02-18

In addition, dismissal is proper because the DOC is not a person for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because a state agency is not a person under the section.

TALLEY v. IONATA · filed 2020-02-19

The DOC, as a state agency, is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail or county corrections department because neither is a person under the statute.

ECHEVARRIA v. ESSEX COUNTY DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-02-20

Neither a county jail nor a county department such as the Essex County Department of Corrections are “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a person; a K-9 dog and a county detention center are not persons subject to suit.

Cutshall v. Little · filed 2020-02-20

At the outset, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against K-9 dog, Sig, or the Greene County Detention Center, as neither are considered a “person” for purposes of a § 1983 suit.

A work camp is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Chambers v. Clark · filed 2020-03-02

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the Johnson City Work Camp is not a proper Defendant, as a work camp is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state corrections department or state prison because neither is a person subject to suit.

Caudle v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2020-03-10

Neither the CDCR nor RJD are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

A state department is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Smythe v. Quebedeaux · filed 2020-03-13

In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, the Supreme Court held that neither a state nor state officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. ... For the reasons set forth above, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the DPSC.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against county courts because they are not persons subject to suit.

Mercado v. Orange County Courts · filed 2020-03-23

In the January 28, 2020 order to amend, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims arising out of his ongoing criminal proceedings for the following reasons: the Orange County courts are not a “person” who can be sued under § 1983; the judge, DA, and assistant DAs are immune from suit; and the Legal Aid Society does not qualify as a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability. ... The amended complaints are dismissed for the same reasons set forth in the January 28, 2020 order to amend.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a prison or jail facility because the facility is not a person under the statute.

Ortberg v. Groves · filed 2020-03-24

Prison and jail facilities are not proper defendants because none is a “person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state department of corrections because the department is not a person under the statute.

HARRIS v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-03-25

Likewise, while Defendant DOC does not move to dismiss this claim as it applies to it, the court will dismiss this claim with prejudice as applied to DOC, as the DOC is not a “person” as that term is defined under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Municipal departments, including a county sheriff’s office, are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Upton v. County of El Dorado · filed 2020-04-01

Although municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; therefore, the Sheriff’s Office—a local law enforcement department—is not a proper party.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal department because the department is not a person under the statute.

Dunsmore v. State of California · filed 2020-04-06

Departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; therefore, a local law enforcement agency, like the SDSD, are not proper parties.

A state agency is not a person subject to liability under Section 1983.

Weatherwax v. Barone · filed 2020-04-06

Accordingly, the Department of Correction is not a person subject to liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a detention center because it is not a person under the statute.

Cubit v. Curry County Detention Center · filed 2020-04-06

First, CCDC is the only named defendant, and detention centers are not a ‘persons’ subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a prison library because it is not a suable entity.

Dunn v. NENMDF · filed 2020-04-10

A prison facility, including its library, is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation because it is not a person subject to suit.

Garrett v. West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2020-04-14

However, as this Court and its sister courts have previously held, the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation is not a proper defendant because it is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person subject to suit.

Cline v. State of Utah · filed 2020-04-16

Here, the State of Utah is not a person for purposes of Section 1983 and thus the Clines’ claims against the State of Utah are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Ray v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2020-04-16

Further, the Commonwealth of Kentucky is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and the Eleventh Amendment bars it from suit.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a prison because a prison is not a person under the statute.

HUYSERS v.GROSSMAN · filed 2020-04-16

A prison is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state department of corrections because it is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

Ferri v. New Mexico Department of Corrections · filed 2020-04-22

Defendant NMDOC enacted the offending Matrix policy, but “[NMDOC] is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983.” Blackburn v. Department of Corrections, 172 F.3d 62, 63 (10th Cir. 1999).

Section 1983 allows suit against persons, but inanimate facilities and collective terms such as “staff” or “agency” do not qualify as persons.

Smith v. HRRJ · filed 2020-04-30

Neither “inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds” nor collective terms such as “staff” or “agency” qualify as persons amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its department of correction because neither is a person subject to suit.

Lenti v. Connecticut · filed 2020-04-30

Neither the State of Connecticut nor the DOC is a “person” subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state corrections departments or prisons because they are not persons subject to suit.

Hammond v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 2020-04-30

As previously noted, IDOC and Western are not “persons” amendable to suit under section 1983 and they are dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the CDCR, RJD, or RJD departments because they are not persons subject to suit.

Williams v. Hampton · filed 2020-05-05

The CDCR, RJD, and departments of RJD are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983 and are entitled to immunity from suit for monetary damages under the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the State of Illinois or the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court of Illinois because they are not persons under the statute.

Eastridge v. Illinois · filed 2020-05-05

Plaintiff is placed on notice that the State of Illinois and the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court of Illinois are not “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows suit against a person acting under color of state law; a drug task force is not a person subject to suit.

Tolley v. Caldwell · filed 2020-05-14

The Rockbridge Regional Drug Task Force is not a person and is therefore not subject to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a State or state officials acting in their official capacity because they are not persons under the section.

O'Neal v. Missouri State Department of Corrections · filed 2020-05-26

Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a jail to be sued because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Brooks v. Kumer · filed 2020-05-29

A jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 or a legal entity, and Brooks cannot maintain this action against the defendant jail.

Section 1983 does not allow a detention center to be sued because it is not a person subject to suit.

Robles v. Curry County Detention Center · filed 2020-05-29

As a detention center, CCDC is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a detention center because it is not a person subject to suit.

Wilson v. Cleveland County Detention Center · filed 2020-06-08

Defendant Cleveland Count Detention Center is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against persons, and a county prison is not a person subject to suit.

Williams v. Dauphin County Prison · filed 2020-06-18

DCP is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state correctional center because it is not a person under the statute.

Dickerson v. Cecil · filed 2020-06-26

Second, Lawrence Correctional Center, a state entity, is not a proper party because it is not a “person” amendable to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary claims against state prisons or state departments of corrections because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

JACKSON v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-06-29

The NSP and the DOC are not “persons” subject to § 1983 monetary liability.

A detention center is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Ornelas v. Alaniz · filed 2020-07-13

As a detention center, CCDC is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state prison medical department because it is not a person under the statute.

AMIN v. SCI-PHOENIX MEDICAL DEPT. · filed 2020-07-13

Amin named the “SCI-Phoenix Medical Department” as a Defendant here, but the “SCI- Phoenix Medical Department” is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a correctional institution because it is not a person under the statute.

Milton v. W.C.I. · filed 2020-07-14

WCI is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a prison itself because a prison is not a person subject to suit.

Dawson v. Johnson · filed 2020-07-17

Nor can Dawson sue the MSDF itself because the prison is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a correctional facility that is merely a building because it is not a person.

Hailey v. Singleton · filed 2020-07-17

However, the South Central Correctional Facility is a building and not a “person” who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Hayes v. D.P.S, NC Corr · filed 2020-07-20

Neither the State of North Carolina nor its agencies constitute “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

A state prison is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Riley v. Diaz · filed 2020-07-23

A state prison, however, is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Cobbs v. Ellington · filed 2020-07-28

Finally, as to Defendant NCDPS, neither the State of North Carolina nor its agencies constitute “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state corrections department or one of its institutions because neither is a person under the statute.

Neibauer v. Lebouton · filed 2020-07-29

Because neither it nor the Department of Corrections is a “person” subject to suit under §1983, the court will dismiss them as defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state department of corrections because it is not a person under the statute.

Lanza v. Moclock · filed 2020-08-07

The Department of Corrections is not a “person,” who may be subjected to a lawsuit under § 1983 and will be dismissed as a defendant in this action.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or a state official sued in an official capacity for damages as a person subject to suit.

Jefferson v. Lee · filed 2020-08-10

Thus, Plaintiff's claims against the State of Tennessee and Governor Bill Lee in his official capacity are not alleged against “persons” within the terms of Section 1983, and the claims against these Defendants for damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state agencies or their subdivisions because they are not persons under the statute.

Mayo v. Doe · filed 2020-08-17

As state agencies or subdivisions thereof, the Statewide Narcotics Task Force Southeastern and Troop D are not persons within the meaning of section 1983.

Courts and a police department are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Neal v. Arkansas Supreme Court · filed 2020-08-19

The following Defendants are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983: the Arkansas Supreme Court; the Oswego County Family Court, the Circuit Courts of Sharp, Lawrence, Randolph, and Jackson Counties, and the Hardy Police Department.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county detention center because it is not a person subject to suit.

Golden v. Curry County Adult Detention Center · filed 2020-08-26

The remaining Defendant, CCDC, is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983.

A state and its department of corrections are not persons amenable to suit under § 1983, even when a plaintiff alleges a policy or custom.

PAGLIAROLI v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-08-27

The State of New Jersey and NJDOC are not local government units, and, unlike local governments entities, these State Defendants are not “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state prison building because it is not a person under the statute.

White v. Northeast Correctional Complex · filed 2020-08-27

The Court finds that NECX, a state prison within the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), is not subject to suit under § 1983, as a building is not a “person” under the law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Stanford v. Cuyahoga County Jail · filed 2020-08-28

County jails are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a municipal department because it is not a person under the statute.

Mitchell v. Chula Vista Parole · filed 2020-08-31

The CVP is a law enforcement agency or department of the City of Chula Vista, but it is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Indiana Family and Social Services Administration Jennifer Walthall, in Individual Capacity as Secretary of Indiana Fami · filed 2020-09-03

We conclude ... it was error for the court to deny the Appellants’ motion to dismiss Anderson’s complaint for damages setting out a § 1983 action because such action may not be maintained against the FSSA, the Bartholomew County Division of Family Resources, or Walthall in her official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state prison or prison staff named collectively because they are not persons subject to suit.

Maldonado v. Cuyahoga County Jail and Kitchen Staff Ect · filed 2020-09-08

A state prison and prison “staff,” as the plaintiff sues here, are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a Kansas county sheriff’s office because it lacks the capacity to sue or be sued and is therefore not a “person” under the section.

Walker v. Douglas County Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-09-14

Therefore, this court and others have held that it is not a “person” which may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state prison because the prison is not a person under the statute.

PARIS v. LAMAS · filed 2020-09-14

For that matter, SCI-Chester is not a “person” susceptible to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail because the jail is not a person amenable to suit.

SCHWENK v. CORRECTIONS OFFICER LOPEZ · filed 2020-09-21

A county correctional facility is not a “person” amenable to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a police or sheriff’s department because the department is not a person under the statute.

Kumssa v. Davidson County Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-09-22

With regard to the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office, a police or sheriff’s department is not a “person” who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state agency or state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit.

JAMES v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES · filed 2020-09-28

Here, both the DOH and the individual defendants in their official capacities are not subject to liability under the Constitutional Claims because none are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a youth detention center that is neither a separate legal entity nor a person subject to suit.

Lester v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2020-09-29

As a result, LMYDC is neither a separate legal entity nor a “person” who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Mathews v. Southwest Virginia Regional Jail · filed 2020-09-30

As the Southwest Virginia Regional Jail-Haysi is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, Mathews cannot maintain this action against the defendant jail.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state corrections department or prison because neither is a person under the statute.

Herring v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-10-07

She advised Plaintiff that PREA provides no private cause of action; she set forth the elements that Plaintiff must allege to state a failure to protect claim; and she explained that liability for monetary damages under section 1983 does not extend to either SCDC or TCI because they are not considered “persons.” ECF No. 7. ... The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are subject to summary dismissal and incorporates the Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 10, herein by reference.

Section 1983 permits suit against a person acting under color of state law, but a sheriff’s department or jail is not a person subject to suit.

Juarez v. Kenosha County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-10-08

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who violates his constitutional rights under color of state law. Neither a sheriff’s department nor a jail is a “person.” ... Because the plaintiff has sued defendants who are not subject to suit under §1983, the court must dismiss the complaint against those defendants.

A jail or detention center is not a person subject to suit under §1983; official-capacity claims against its officials are treated as claims against the county.

Wade v. Kenosha County · filed 2020-10-20

Because neither the jail nor KCDC are “persons” subject to suit under §1983, the court construes the plaintiff’s official-capacity claims as claims against Kenosha County.

Section 1983 does not permit suits for money damages against a county jail, a state, or a federal agency because they are not persons subject to suit.

Oliver v. Marcowitz · filed 2020-10-21

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the St. Clair County Jail, the State of Illinois, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons are not persons subject to suit for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state prisons or their health care units because they are not persons subject to suit.

Mrdjenovich v. Menard Correctional Center · filed 2020-10-22

Menard Correctional Center and Menard Health Care Unit are not persons subject to suit for money damages under section 1983 and will, therefore, be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a “person” under the section.

SANABRIA v. ST. LUKES HOSPITAL (SACRED HEART CAMPUS) · filed 2020-10-26

Additionally, the Commonwealth is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state court because a court is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

MARTIN v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2020-10-27

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against the New Jersey Appellate Division, because the Appellate Division is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a sheriff’s department because it is not a person subject to suit.

Culbertson v. Sullivan County Sheriff's Dept · filed 2020-10-29

Indeed, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Sullivan County Sheriff’s office fail because a sheriff’s department is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

A county jail is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Holton v. Tharp · filed 2020-10-30

The Madison County City Jail is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies or state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Tafoya v. Limon Correction Facility · filed 2020-11-09

As the institutional Defendants and the individual Defendants in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983, Plaintiff’s claim against them fails.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state prison medical departments because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Brandon v. HDSP Medical Unit · filed 2020-11-20

The H.D.S.P. Medical Unit and the S.D.C.C. Medical Unit are not subject to suit for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A detention center and its medical department are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

McDaniels v. J Reuben Long Detention Center · filed 2020-11-30

The Magistrate Judge found that neither named defendant is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because neither defendant is a “person” acting under color of state law as required to have a viable § 1983 claim. ... After careful review of the Report and the objections, and for the reasons stated by the Magistrate Judge, the Report, ECF No. 14, is ACCEPTED.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a prison facility that is a building or collection of buildings rather than a person or legal entity.

Arther v. Corizon Health Incorporated · filed 2020-12-03

However, ASPC-Florence is a building or collection of buildings, not a person or legally created entity capable of being sued. Thus, the Court will dismiss Defendant ASPC-Florence.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a prison clinical pharmacy because it is not a person subject to suit.

Greer v. The Tennessee Department of Correction · filed 2020-12-03

The Bledsoe Clinical Pharmacy, however, is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a person; a detention center is not a person within the statute.

Morris, Jr. v. Baltimore County Detention Center · filed 2020-12-07

Conduct amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be conduct undertaken by a person, and BCDC is not a person within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state corrections department that is an arm of the state because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Langford v. Dzurenda · filed 2020-12-17

The Court dismisses, with prejudice, the § 1983 claim alleging liability by the NDOC because the NDOC is an arm of the State of Nevada and is not a “person” subject ... to suit for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a Maryland county board of education because the board is not a person under the statute.

Agbara v. Prince George's County Public Schools (PGCPS) · filed 2020-12-18

Because the Board does not qualify as a “per- son” under § 1983, Mr. Agbara’s § 1983 claims against the Board are not viable and will be dis- missed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 does not treat states, state agencies, or state officials sued for damages in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

GROSS-QUATRONE v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2020-12-18

Neither “states, nor their departments and agencies, nor state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Onyiuke v. New Jersey, 242 F. App’x 794 (3d Cir. 2007) (granting motion to dismiss); see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ due process claims against the State and against Judge Grant in his official capacity must be dismissed with prejudice.

State corrections departments and their prisons are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Brown v. Anyanaso · filed 2020-12-21

In addition, dismissal is proper because neither the DOC nor the JTVCC are persons for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against prison facilities or state agencies because they are not persons subject to suit.

Streu v. Charles Egeler Reception & Guidance Center · filed 2021-01-05

It is well-settled that prison facilities are not person or legal entities subject to suit under § 1983. ... It is equally well-settled that governmental departments and agencies, such as the MDOC, are not persons or legal entities subject to suit under 1983.

A jail is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Jones v. Sullivan Co. Jail · filed 2021-01-05

However, a jail is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state corrections department or its prison because neither is a person under the statute.

Engel v. ERDCC · filed 2021-01-08

Plaintiff’s complaint is legally frivolous because the defendant entities cannot be sued under § 1983 for two reasons: (1) ERDCC and MODOC are not “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) plaintiff’s claim against ERDCC and MODOC are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

A state court, as a division of the state, is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

HINES v. FAYETTE SUPERIOR COURT · filed 2021-01-12

But Mr. Hines has not pleaded facts that could support a claim because Defendant Fayette County Superior Court, as a division of the State of Indiana, is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a detention center because it is not a person.

Harris v. B.C.D.C. · filed 2021-01-12

As a preliminary matter, BCDC is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit constitutional claims against Maryland’s OAG or DPSCS because neither is a person subject to suit.

Footes v. Neverdon · filed 2021-01-13

The Court begins by noting, more fundamentally, that neither OAG or DPSCS is a “person” subject to suit for constitutional violations brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against detention facilities or security and medical staff groups that lack separate legal existence.

Brown v. Knox County Sheriff's Office Detention Facilities · filed 2021-01-15

First, the Knox County Sheriff’s Office detention facilities, security staff, and mental and medical staff are not suable entities under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections because it is not a person under the statute.

Betts v. Brennan · filed 2021-01-22

Finally, Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff cannot succeed on his § 1983 claim against DPSC because DPSC is not a “person” within the meaning of that statute.

Section 1983 permits an award of damages against board members sued in their individual capacities.

Newborn v. Morrison · filed 1977-11-25

Since this suit is seeking damages against the members of the Board in their individual capacities, an award of damages under § 1983 is appropriate.

Section 1983 permits state officials to be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief.

Kenneth T. Rainey, Cross v. Jackson State College, Etc., Cross · filed 1979-03-20

The individual appellees, the President of Jackson State . College and the President, Executive Secretary and members of the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi, were properly sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 official-capacity actions against state officers are limited to prospective relief, while retrospective monetary relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Harrison v. Pyle · filed 1985-06-24

When against an individual in an official capacity, these actions are limited to suits for prospective relief and do not include actions for retrospective monetary damages which ultimately would have to be paid out of state treasuries. ... Therefore, Harrison’s suit against Pyle acting in his official capacity for monetary relief is barred in this court by the Eleventh Amendment.

A Section 1983 complaint against a public official solely in his individual capacity does not allege the governmental action required for constitutional liability.

Moss v. Robertson · filed 1986-03-28

However, all the alleged constitutional restrictions barring the appellee from firing appellants are down the drain and of no avail since neither appellant has sued ap-pellee in any manner except in his individual capacity. ... The constitutional constraints under which the appellants here seek protection ... prohibit governmental action, not individual or private action.

The Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 claims against state employees in their official capacities, but does not bar individual-capacity claims.

York v. Lamantia · filed 1987-11-18

The 11th Amendment, however, does not preclude suits against state officers or employees in their individual capacity. ... Immunity, therefore, bars action against Defendants in their official capacity, but not individually.

Plaintiffs state a § 1983 claim by adequately alleging constitutional violations, but state officials may not be sued for damages in their official capacities.

E & E Construction Co. v. Illinois · filed 1987-11-26

Individual Plaintiffs have stated claims under the Privileges and Immunities, Commerce, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, and they have hence advanced a cause of action under Section 1983. ... Individual Defendants may not be sued for damages in their official capacities.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a Florida sheriff in his individual capacity despite Eleventh Amendment immunity, but bars a claim against him in his official capacity.

Majette v. Butterworth · filed 1988-04-25

Accordingly, Majette’s § 1983 action against Butterworth in his official capacity as sheriff must fail. ... Thus, Majette’s § 1983 action against Butterworth in his individual capacity will survive despite the Eleventh Amendment’s protections and prohibitions.

Section 1983 permits damages against state officials in their individual capacities despite a state law providing for their indemnification.

Blaylock v. Schwindon · filed 1988-09-07

The court may properly order the officials to pay damages under Sec. 1983, but if the officials desire indemnification under the state statute, they must bring their own action in state court.

Section 1983 permits constitutional claims against state officials in their individual capacities; a complaint that does not expressly sue them in that capacity is treated as suing them only in their official capacities.

Komutanon v. Coler · filed 1988-12-29

In addition, federal courts have jurisdiction over actions for violations of the United States Constitution against state officials acting in their individual capacities. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because the Complaint does not explicitly state that plaintiff is suing the officials in their individual capacities, the court assumes that plaintiff is only suing the officials in their official capacitites.

When a Section 1983 complaint does not make clear whether defendants are sued in their individual or official capacities, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.

Abdul-Wadood v. Jack Duckworth and Edward Cohn · filed 1989-01-09

When the nature of a section 1983 suit is unclear from the face of the complaint, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.

A § 1983 complaint may give sufficient notice that an officer is sued in his individual capacity through its language, even when the caption does not expressly state that capacity.

Jackson v. Gary R. Crews, a Fayetteville City Policeman, the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, a Municipal Corpo · filed 1989-07-13

We agree that the language of the complaint is sufficiently clear in this case to have given Crews notice that he was being sued in his individual capacity. We caution future § 1983 litigants, however, that it would be much better for them to clearly indicate both the parties being sued and their capacity in the caption.

Section 1983 permits claims against officials in their individual capacities as well as their official capacities for actions under color of state law.

Goodwin v. Debekker · filed 1989-07-18

Defendants also take the position that the plaintiff may not file this § 1983 action against them as individuals but only in their official capacities as sheriff and un-dersheriff acting under “color of state law.” They have not cited any legal authority in support of their argument. To the extent that this argument applies to the plaintiff’s seven claims for relief, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground is denied.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against state officials acting under color of state law, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar those claims.

Evans v. Celeste · filed 1989-08-24

Finally, he can be sued in his “personal” or “individual” capacity, that is, when he is acting under color of state law but not in his “official” capacity. ... Therefore, to the extent that the remaining individual defendants were acting in their “personal” or “individual” capacities, the claims against them are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the Court has no reason to await a determination by the Ohio Court of Claims.

Section 1983 permits claims against state board members in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief.

Konijnendijk v. Deyoe · filed 1989-12-11

The court, however, does find that plaintiffs second argument has merit and precludes the entry of summary judgment for the individual members of the Board of Regents. These defendants are sued in their official capacities solely for the purpose of prospective injunctive relief. This is proper.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a state official for acts during employment when the official acted outside the scope of office or grossly abused its lawful powers.

Gallipeau v. Berard · filed 1990-03-30

Official capacity suits do not, as defendants here suggest, encompass every suit involving acts performed during the course of a state actor’s employment. Defendants have confused “during the course of employment” with “within the scope of employment.” Courts must analyze whether the complaint alleges that the state official “acted either outside the scope of his respective office or, if within the scope, acted in an arbitrary manner, grossly abusing the lawful powers of office.”

Section 1983 permits monetary relief against prison officials sued in their individual capacities for an alleged assault outside the apparent or authorized scope of their official duties.

Travier v. L. Putnam, Inspector Everett Elkins Paul Deleeuw Maynard, Sgt. C/o Hart C/) Fath, Ian McDonald · filed 1990-04-24

In addition, we also conclude that plaintiff is properly suing the defendants in their individual capacity for monetary relief because the alleged assault does not fall within the apparent or authorized scope of their official duties.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a governor who was not named in his individual capacity.

See v. Wallace Wilkinson, Governor Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 1990-05-11

Likewise, Governor Wilkinson is not subject to suit for damages under Sec. 1983 because he was not named in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officers require suing them in their individual capacities.

George T. Haynie, Jr. v. Tennessee State Penitentiary and Hospital James Vandever, Assoc. Warden Lyle Craft, Hosp. Admin · filed 1990-06-19

As for Messers Vandever and Craft, not only is there no evidence that they were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical needs, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), but the plaintiff failed to sue them in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 provides no basis to sue officials individually when the only relief sought is equitable relief they can provide solely in their official capacities.

James M. Scott, Jr. v. Flowers · filed 1990-08-20

The commissioners can expunge the subject language from the reprimand only while acting in their official capacity. Hence, there is no basis for suit against them as individuals.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity action against a state official for prospective injunctive relief allowed by the Eleventh Amendment.

Hazel Sutton, Kenneth Holland, Edith Odom, and Kevin Qualls v. Jimmy M. Evans, John H. Burke, Jr., Jimmy P. Rice, and Wi · filed 1990-11-08

However, the Court recognized that “a State official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would he a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state.’ ” Id. at 2311 n. 10 (emphasis added). Thus, Will leaves ample room for an action against state officials insofar as it seeks prospective relief allowed by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities, but not against them in their official capacities.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1990-12-12

Defendants are not subject to suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in their official capacity. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12 (1989). However, the defendants are subject to suit to the extent plaintiff sought monetary damages from them in their individual capacity.

Individual defendants in a Section 1983 action are sued in their official capacities unless the complaint explicitly states otherwise.

Gongolewski v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, John P. McFadden Michael Delaney, Michael Sweeney, Terry · filed 1990-12-12

Individual defendants in a section 1983 action are sued in their official capacities unless the complaint explicitly states otherwise.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue a state officer individually for wrongs committed while performing official duties.

Price v. Akaka · filed 1991-03-21

Clearly, under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff may sue a state officer in his individual capacity for alleged wrongs committed by the officer in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits an individual capacity suit against a state official when the complaint alleges that official’s own tortious conduct under color of state law, even without an express capacity designation.

Hill v. Shelander · filed 1991-03-26

The reasoning of Kolar and Akins thus suggests a corollary — namely, that in a suit where the complaint alleges the tortious conduct of an individual acting under color of state law, an individual capacity suit plainly lies, even if the plaintiff failed to spell out the defendant’s capacity in the complaint.

Section 1983 permits personal liability suits against state officials without requiring an allegation that they acted outside their official authority.

Harrington v. Grayson · filed 1991-04-30

However, the requirement that the plaintiff must somehow allege an aberration of authority to establish personal liability under § 1983 is absent in the jurisprudence to date.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Folse v. Delgado Community College · filed 1991-10-29

Lest there be any mistake, it is here reiterated that plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief pursuant to section 1983 against the individual defendants in their official capacity remains the subject of these proceedings.

Section 1983 permits prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Johnson v. Wefald · filed 1991-11-15

However, this does not affect the court’s ruling that the individual defendants in their official capacities may be sued for prospective relief.

Section 1983 permits prospective equitable relief against a state official sued in an official capacity and monetary damages against the official sued in an individual capacity, but not monetary damages against the official in an official capacity.

Corum v. University of North Carolina · filed 1992-01-31

Thus, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff can only obtain prospective equitable relief against Durham sued in his official capacity and monetary damages against Durham sued in his individual capacity. Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages under section 1983 against Durham sued in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits damages actions against state officials in their individual capacities, and a complaint seeking damages for their alleged misconduct may be construed as an individual-capacity suit even without an express designation.

Krause v. Finch · filed 1992-01-31

Neither Will nor the eleventh amendment, however, bars actions for damages against officials in their individual capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 362-65 (1991). Although Krause did not specify in his complaint that he was suing the defendants in their individual capacities, he sought damages for the alleged misconduct, which we construe as an action against the defendants in their individual capacities. See Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828-29 (9th Cir.1991).

In a Section 1983 suit against state officials, a complaint describing only their official roles does not assert individual-capacity claims, and raising that intent in a response to a motion to dismiss does not cure the complaint.

Mays v. Richards · filed 1992-06-04

Moreover, the conduct described in the complaint can only relate to the prison superintendent and the hospital administrator in their official roles as the supervisors of the employees who Mays claims caused his injuries. ... As a result, Mays's argument in his response to the motion to dismiss that he meant to include an individual-capacity claim came too late in the day to correct his faulty complaint.

Section 1983 permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities.

Nomi v. Regents for the University of Minnesota · filed 1992-06-16

Similarly, section 1983 claims may not be asserted against states, state entities, and state officials acting in their official capacities, because such defendants are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute. ... Because plaintiff seeks prospective relief from state officials acting in their official capacities, defendants are subject to suit.

A § 1983 complaint may sue a public official in an individual capacity even without expressly naming that capacity if the complaint as a whole and the course of proceedings show that intent.

Heideman v. Wirsing · filed 1992-06-23

The general rule of this circuit, then, appears to be that a complaint should be read in its entirety to determine whether the alleged wrongful conduct was carried out in an individual or an official capacity. Also relevant is the course of proceedings.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities because they are persons for that remedy.

Akers v. Caperton · filed 1992-07-30

State officials in their official capacity are “persons” under Section 1983 for purposes of Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief since “official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state.”

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities, including expungement of unconstitutional prison discipline from inmate records.

Wolfel v. Morris · filed 1992-09-23

The district court in this case ordered that the records of the punished inmates be cleared of any mention of the discipline imposed for circulating these petitions. As such, the district court awarded only prospective relief against the defendants. As a practical matter, the district court's order merely prevents the prison system from considering the discipline imposed in this case as part of the inmates' records in the future. As such, the district court's action is permitted pursuant to § 1983.

State officers sued in their individual capacities may be liable for damages under § 1983 even when they acted in an official capacity.

Jones v. Peter W. Vidor Gerald Stiffler R. Parteet R. Montalvo Meinke, Lt. · filed 1992-10-05

As an initial matter, we note that the complaint clearly indicates that the defendants were sued in their individual capacity. Thus, the defendants are amenable to damages under § 1983, even though their affidavits indicate that they were acting in an official capacity.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity suits against state officers for actions taken in their official capacities.

Mayberry v. Robert N. Clement Everett Perry, Jr. · filed 1993-01-28

To the contrary, the defendants can be sued in their individual capacities, as alleged, for actions taken in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal-court suit against a State, but permits prospective injunctive relief against state agents sued in their official capacities.

Corrigan v. Rhode Island, Department of Business Regulation · filed 1993-04-14

The State is not susceptible to suit in federal court under 1983 claims, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), however, state agents can be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief, id. at 491 U.S. 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2311 n. 10.

Section 1983 permits prospective declaratory relief against a state official without treating the claim as an action against the state.

Pechiney Corp. v. Crystal · filed 1994-01-13

I conclude that a declaratory action for prospective relief should not be treated as an action against the state for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not subject state officials sued in their official capacities to monetary relief.

McGee v. Wilkinson · filed 1994-04-29

It is also noted that to the extent McGee sued the defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages, the state officials sued are not subject to suit for monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 & n. 10 (1989).

Section 1983 allows claims for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Williams v. Commonwealth Of Kentucky · filed 1994-05-26

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Sec. 1983 actions brought against state officials in their official capacities seeking prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief.

Xerox Corp. v. Town of Webster · filed 1994-07-15

A State official may be sued in his or her official capacity in a 42 USC § 1983 action seeking injunctive relief "because 'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State’ ” (Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58, 71, n 10, quoting Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159, 167, n 14).

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho · filed 1994-12-09

Injunctive relief is available against state officials in their individual capacities under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not subject state officials sued in their official capacities to monetary relief.

Sanders v. Bradley · filed 1995-01-24

We also note that to the extent Sanders sued the defendants in their official capacity for monetary relief, the defendants are not subject to suit in that capacity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in the official’s official capacity.

Kirsch v. Smith · filed 1995-07-14

Unlike a claim for damages, a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official is properly asserted against that official in his official capacity.

In a § 1983 action, a defendant may be treated as sued in her individual capacity when the district court denies her qualified immunity while granting summary judgment to the county, even if the substitution order does not specify capacity.

Sanderfer v. Nichols · filed 1995-08-08

However, because the district court ordered Jansen substituted as a party defendant but denied her summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds while granting summary judgment to the county, we will assume, for purposes of this action, that the district court's intent was to substitute Jansen in her individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to expressly plead whether a state official is sued in an individual or official capacity.

Biggs v. William C. Meadows Nurse Cartwright Superintendent Barnes Mr. Weeks · filed 1995-09-18

Because we find the majority view to be more persuasive, we hold today that a plaintiff need not plead expressly the capacity in which he is suing a defendant in order to state a cause of action under § 1983.