42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a false-arrest suit against state and local officers, subject to a defense when the officer proves good faith and a reasonable belief that the arrest was valid and necessary.

Isaac Jaroslawicz and Joseph Jaroslawicz v. Seedman · filed 1975-12-19

This test applies to state and local officers sued for false arrest under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions based on false imprisonment permit a defense of reasonable good faith.

Bryan v. Clarence Jones, Sheriff, Henry Wade, District Attorney, Fidelity & Deposit Co.& Lena Giddens · filed 1976-04-30

We granted an en banc hearing of this case to reconsider the issue of good faith defenses in § 1983 actions based on false imprisonment. Concluding that a defense of reasonable good faith may be raised, we reverse.

In a § 1983 false-imprisonment claim, a jailer is entitled to a jury instruction on a reasonable-good-faith defense.

Warren C. Miller, Jr. v. Clarence Jones, Sheriff · filed 1976-07-12

We construe the Sheriff’s claim of action pursuant to a facially valid warrant and entitlement to use the date of arrest rather than the date the charges were dismissed as a contention that he acted in reasonable good faith so as to have entitled him to have the jury instructed on this defense to the federal tort claim.

Section 1983 affords police a qualified immunity from false-arrest and false-imprisonment liability when they acted in good faith and reasonably believed that probable cause existed and that the detention and verification procedure were lawful.

Pritz v. Hackett · filed 1977-11-17

Therefore, I hold that the defendants will be protected from liability for the § 1983 claim of false imprisonment if they prove a good faith and reasonable belief concerning the legality of both the detention and the verification procedure used to [identify the plaintiffs.

Judicial approval of a warrant does not absolutely bar Section 1983 liability for the officer who obtained it, though a later finding of no probable cause does not by itself establish liability.

James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs v. Malley · filed 1984-11-19

We now rule that judicial approval of a warrant cannot serve as an absolute bar to the § 1983 liability of the officer who obtained the warrant. We emphasize, however, that liability does not attach simply because there is a later determination of no probable cause.

Judicial approval of a warrant affidavit does not bar § 1983 liability when the officer supplied information known to be false or recklessly disregarded its truth.

Olson v. Robert Tyler and O.J. Foster · filed 1985-08-21

We hold therefore that judicial approval of a warrant affidavit cannot serve as an absolute bar to the section 1983 liability of the officer who submitted it. Where the judicial finding of probable cause is based solely on information the officer knew to be false or would have known was false had he not recklessly disregarded the truth, not only does the arrest violate the fourth amendment, but the officer will not be entitled to good faith immunity.

A facially valid arrest warrant does not itself shield an officer from § 1983 false-arrest liability when the officer intentionally supplies false or misleading facts to obtain it.

LoSacco v. City of Middletown · filed 1990-08-21

Thus, if a police officer in his affidavit applying for an arrest warrant intentionally supplies the judicial authorities with untrue or deliberately misleading facts, the warrant, although facially valid, would lack probable cause. The existence of a facially valid warrant is not necessarily sufficient to find that the officer acted in good faith.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations of a conspiracy to state a claim.

Fournerat v. Wisconsin Law Review · filed 2011-04-12

And his conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

Conclusory, vague, and general allegations of a conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights are insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Diederich v. Nyack Hospital · filed 2008-03-04

Finally, the Supreme Court properly found that the conclusory, vague, and general allegations of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights were insufficient to support claims under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and, in effect, granted those branches of the respective motions of the Orangetown defendants and the Hospital defendants which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for violations of 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and 42 USC § 1985, insofar as asserted against them, respectively (see Williams v Maddi, 306 AD2d 852 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 516 [2003], cert denied 541 US 960 [2004]; Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 278 AD2d 644 [2000]; Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 244 AD2d 606 [1997]).

A § 1983 claim based on a race-based conspiracy requires more than conclusory allegations.

Propes v. City Manager · filed 2006-02-23

Propes’s conclusory allegations of a race-based conspiracy are insufficient to support a viable § 1983 claim.

Conclusions alone are insufficient to plead a conspiracy claim under Section 1983.

McVay v. Lehman · filed 2005-12-16

The district court properly dismissed MeVay’s conspiracy claims because conelusory allegations are insufficient to state a section 1983 claim for relief.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations supporting a claimed civil rights conspiracy; conclusory assertions of conspiracy and bad faith do not state a claim.

Ellis v. Cassidy · filed 1980-08-26

Appellant has also failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Despite appellant's sweeping assertions of conspiracy and bad faith on the part of all involved, he has failed to allege facts which would permit the court to conclude that these assertions had substantive validity.

A plaintiff bringing a conspiracy claim under Section 1983 must allege facts sufficient to support the conspiracy.

Henderson v. Torres · filed 2002-04-17

Thomas Henderson appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of his third amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging that defendants conspired against him to fabricate charges resulting in his arrest and trial for stalking. ... The district court correctly concluded that Henderson failed to allege facts sufficient to support his conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy to support an action.

Garrett v. Raines · filed 2002-04-19

Moreover, Garrett’s allegations of a conspiracy are merely conclusional and hence insufficient to support his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Unsubstantiated allegations of a race-based conspiracy do not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Bagley v. Vance · filed 2000-12-13

Bagley’s unsubstantiated allegations of a race-based conspiracy among the defendants fail to give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations to support a conspiracy claim.

Brewer v. Montgomery · filed 2000-10-19

Brewer’s assertion of a conspiracy among the named defendants to deny him his right of access to the courts is not supported by anything other than his own conclusional allegations, an insufficient showing under § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss on conclusory, vague, or general allegations alone.

Sommer v. Correctional Officer R. Dixon, Sergeant Miner, Lt. McCasland · filed 1983-06-08

These allegations as to a conspiracy are, however, vague and unsupported by description of particular overt acts. A complaint containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.

A § 1983 claim alleging that a private defendant conspired with state actors must plead facts about the alleged joint conduct; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Querry v. Messar · filed 1998-07-27

However, “in order to survive a motion to dismiss [a § 1983 .claim alleging a conspiracy], the complaint must contain more than mere conelusory allegations.” ... Such allegation is conelusory and cannot withstand a motion to dismiss, because Quer-ry does not specify who, on behalf of Oracle, took part in the conspiracy, where the conspiracy occurred, nor what was done in furtherance of the conspiracy nor when, where or how it was done. Querry’s allegations are therefore insufficient to state a claim against Oracle, a private entity, under the Equal Protection Clause.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement among the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Ivester v. Lee · filed 1998-01-26

In order to sufficiently plead a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a meeting of the minds among the defendants alleged to have conspired to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy do not support an action under § 1983.

Roberson v. Wexford Health · filed 1998-01-06

Roberson’s conclusional allegations ... that the defendants conspired to use him for medical experimentation do not support an action under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations to state a conspiracy claim; conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.

Ledesma v. Swartz · filed 1997-12-24

Mere conclusionary allegations of conspiracy do not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims alleging a conspiracy to retaliate require more than conclusional allegations to state a claim.

Tyler v. Scott · filed 1997-08-18

Tyler’s conclusional allegations that the defendants conspired to retaliate against him fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a factual basis for a conspiracy claim; conclusional allegations of conspiracy are insufficient.

Chandler v. Haney · filed 1996-08-23

We have examined Chandler's arguments and the record and affirm the district court’s decision on the grounds that Chandler’s conclusional allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim is without merit when the allegation of conspiracy is wholly conclusory.

Arthur Lee Gooden, II v. R.L. Boyers Lieutenant Cook Sergeant Day · filed 1994-03-11

To the extent Appellant is claiming a conspiracy, we find the claim wholly conclusory and therefore without merit.

Section 1983 does not support a conspiracy claim based only on conclusory allegations.

Wilson v. Al Budney, Sr. · filed 1992-11-09

Wilson’s allegations of a conspiracy are merely conclusional and do not support an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement among the defendants; conclusory allegations of conspiracy fail to state a claim.

Tate v. Bondurant · filed 1992-06-17

Similarly, Tate's contention that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim unders 1983 or § 1985(3) is meritless. ... The district court correctly noted that the complaint contained no allegation of any facts showing agreement between or among any of the Defendants, but merely made conclusory allegations of conspiracy. ... Because Tate's amended complaint contained no supporting facts of even the most general nature, the district court properly dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy to state a valid claim.

Kinnell v. Debra Hutches Dr. Grimes Raymond Roberts Virginia Russell Governor Finney Linden G. Appel · filed 1992-04-29

Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires more than conclusory allegations; the plaintiff must plead a factual basis and overt acts supporting the alleged conspiracy.

Polur v. Raffe · filed 1990-08-22

Polur relies on vague, prolix allegations of a conspiracy without pleading any overt acts or providing a basis in fact for his claim. It is incumbent on a plaintiff to state more than conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal of a claim predicated on a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require factual support; broad, conclusory allegations of a conspiracy do not state a claim.

Fuller v. Harding · filed 1988-09-06

Broad and conclusory allegations, without some form of factual support, will not state a claim based on a conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3).

Section 1983 conspiracy plaintiffs must allege and prove that each defendant committed an action constituting a civil rights violation in furtherance of the conspiracy within the limitations period, unless the limitations period was tolled.

Morales v. Pedro Hernandez Vega, Etc. · filed 1978-07-06

In fact, unless the statute of limitations somehow was tolled, plaintiff must allege and prove that each defendant to be charged committed an action constituting a civil rights violation in furtherance of the conspiracy within the limitation period.

Section 1983 conspiracy claimants must allege specific facts showing either the existence or execution of the claimed conspiracy.

Croy v. Skinner · filed 1976-02-12

In considering the allegations of the instant complaint, this court agrees that even under the liberal federal pleading rules, a complainant under § 1985(3) and/or § 1983 must allege specific facts showing “either the existence or the execution of the claimed conspiracy.”

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require at least minimum factual support of the existence of a conspiracy.

Mildred E. FRANCIS-SOBEL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF MAINE, Everett O. Ware, Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1979-05-03

Pleading conspiracy under sections 1983 & 1985(3) requires at least minimum factual support of the existence of a conspiracy.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require facts showing that defendants knowingly acted together to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights; conclusory labels are insufficient.

Johnson v. Fulcher · filed 1979-05-08

The appellant, acting pro se, filed a complaint based on 42 USC § 1983 in which he alleged that the appellees had conspired to violate his federal constitutional rights. ... The appellant’s complaint does not allege any facts in support of his conclusion that the appellees acted in knowing concert to deprive him of his constitutional rights. "Merely characterizing their conduct as conspiratorial or unlawful does not set out allegations upon which relief can be granted.”

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim to proceed when the complaint alleges facts sufficiently specific to infer a meeting of the minds, even if the plaintiff lacks firsthand knowledge of the conspiracy.

White v. Walsh · filed 1981-05-15

Because we determine that White’s complaint was sufficiently specific and stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we reverse the order of the district court and remand with directions to appoint competent counsel and reconsider White’s motion for leave to amend. ... Obviously, White was never in a position to adduce or allege firsthand knowledge of the necessary meeting of the minds. White did, however, state sufficient facts to give rise to the inference that there was such a meeting of the minds. Accordingly, the district court erred by dismissing White’s complaint for lack of specificity. ... Our holding is based only upon a determination that White’s complaint states facts sufficiently specific to withstand a motion to dismiss.

A § 1983 conspiracy allegation unsupported by facts showing a conspiratorial meeting of the minds cannot reasonably support an inference of conspiracy.

Collins v. Walden · filed 1987-12-28

The record is devoid of evidence as to the existence of a conspiratorial meeting of the minds on the part of the defendants to deprive Mr. Collins of any of his rights. ... Clearly, such an allegation, devoid of factual proof, cannot reasonably give rise to an inference of conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must plead operative facts supporting a prior illegal agreement; bare allegations of an agreement do not suffice.

Way v. Mueller Brass Company, Mississippi State Employment Service, and Judith Riley · filed 1988-03-23

Plaintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under the civil rights statutes must plead the “operative facts” showing a prior illegal agreement, and “bald allegations” of an agreement do not suffice.

A conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires at least minimum factual support in the pleadings.

Miller v. Szelenyi · filed 1988-08-26

A conspiracy under section 1983 “requires at least minimum factual support” in the pleadings.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim needs factual allegations supporting the conspiracy; conclusory allegations alone do not state a claim.

Robert E. Drinkard, Andrew D. Drinkard v. Marcia Drinkard, School District of Berkley, Michigan · filed 1990-06-06

However, Drinkard's complaint does not contain any specific allegations showing a conspiracy between the school district and Drinkard's ex-wife to deny his son's civil rights. Mere conclusory allegations are not enough to state a claim; there must be some factual basis for the claim.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims must allege with some particularity overt acts reasonably related to advancing the alleged conspiracy.

Burton v. Dyke Houseworth, Dennis Dyke, Chris Daniels, Louis Myers · filed 1991-06-14

Burton's allegation of a conspiracy is also insufficient to state a claim because he has failed to allege with some degree of particularity any overt acts which were reasonably related to the promotion of the claimed conspiracy.

A section 1983 conspiracy claim needs specific factual allegations supporting the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1992-02-19

Nor does the complaint allege specific facts to support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.

A conspiracy claim under Section 1983 cannot rest on legal conclusions or vague and conclusory allegations.

Watson v. Lecureux · filed 1993-11-15

A federal court need not accept as true legal conclusions, or vague and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy to create a valid claim under Sec. 1983 when none exists.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims must allege specific material facts; vague, conclusory allegations do not state a claim for relief.

Williams v. Kling · filed 1995-06-16

In general, conspiracy claims under Sec. 1983 must be pled with some degree of specificity. Vague, conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state a claim for relief.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim needs specific facts connecting a defendant to the alleged conspiracy; conclusory allegations of agreement or support are insufficient.

Labalokie v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit · filed 1996-01-19

However, Plaintiff alleges no specific conduct whatsoever connecting Frye to the conspiracy. While Plaintiff avers that his “termination” occurred with Frye’s “agreement” and “support,” and that Frye has since “continued, up-held, ratified, and approved the wrongful acts,” (Complaint at ¶¶ 26(c) and 28), these are precisely the type of conclusory allegations held to be inadequate in Freedman. Plaintiff has set forth no underlying factual scenario involving Frye about which the conclusions could be said to be true or false.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must plead the conspiracy in some detail and provide facts supporting its existence.

Spiegel v. City of Chicago · filed 1996-03-22

In order to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, the complaint must establish conspiracy in some detail and provide some factual basis supporting the existence of a conspiracy.

Section 1983 civil conspiracy liability requires joint action, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and a resulting deprivation of a constitutional right.

Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg · filed 1996-04-17

To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, Appellants must pres- ent evidence that the Appellees acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in Appellants' deprivation of a constitutional right (in this case the right to access the courts).

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific factual allegations suggesting that a conspiracy existed.

Schwartz v. U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney, David Meister, Nordstrom, Inc., Allen G. Reiter · filed 1996-05-21

Even assuming that Schwartz could present a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on conspiracy between federal and private parties, Schwartz has not alleged any specific facts suggesting that a conspiracy existed.

A conspiracy claim under Section 1983 must allege details of the time, place, events, and alleged effect of the conspiracy.

Deepwells Estates Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Head of the Harbor · filed 1997-08-16

However, the Court finds that the plaintiffs’ allegations in the present complaint are insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim for conspiracy under Section 1983. ... If the plaintiffs desire to amend this cause of action, they are required to give some details of the time, place, events and the alleged effect of the conspiracy.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires proof of a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.

Askew v. Millerd · filed 1999-09-15

Moreover, as Askew acknowledges, the plaintiff is additionally required to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 requires more than bald allegations of a conspiracy to state a claim.

Cordova v. Bolton · filed 1999-12-29

Cordova’s bald allegations regarding the existence of a conspiracy are insufficient to raise a § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a violation of federal rights, an agreement to violate those rights, and an actionable wrong.

Ruszala v. Walt Disney World Co. · filed 2000-04-25

To make a prima facie case for conspiracy to violate civil rights under section 1983, Plaintiff must show: 1) a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights; 2) an agreement among the Defendants to violate those rights; and 3) an actionable wrong.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require detailed factual allegations; conclusory allegations of a conspiracy do not survive a dismissal motion.

Ford v. Snashall · filed 2001-07-19

Furthermore, plaintiffs fourth and fifth causes of action, also pleading claims primarily under 42 USC § 1983, are similarly deficient. ... Since plaintiff failed to substantiate his fourth and fifth causes of action “with detailed factual information concerning the alleged conspiracy,” these claims were properly dismissed (Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 278 AD2d 644, 646).

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific allegations that, if proved, would show the defendants conspired against the plaintiff.

Hornsby v. Kaiser · filed 2002-05-29

Appellant has not pointed to any specific allegations that, if proved, would show that appellees conspired against him.

A civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an agreement to violate civil rights, a shared conspiratorial objective, and an overt act that causes injury.

Pizzuto v. County of Nassau · filed 2003-01-16

To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiff has the burden of showing (1) that two or more people entered into an agreement to violate the victim’s civil rights, (2) that the alleged co-conspirators shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and (3) that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to him.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a deprivation of a federal constitutional right.

Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Cumming · filed 2003-01-30

Because a deprivation of a federal constitutional right is an essential element of a section 1983 conspiracy claim, plaintiffs’ alleged section 1983 conspiracy claim of necessity was and must be DISMISSED.

Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim under Section 1983.

Fenlon v. Moskowitz · filed 2003-04-22

Fenlon’s conclusional allegations of a conspiracy are not actionable under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint's bald allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Scott v. Groomer · filed 2003-10-21

Moreover, a review of Scott's complaint shows that his bald allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not provide relief based solely on conclusory allegations of conspiracy.

Switzer v. Vlahos · filed 2004-04-15

Furthermore, as the district court held, Switzer’s “[m]ere conclus[ional] allegations of conspiracy cannot . . . constitute grounds for § 1983 relief.”

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim needs factual support beyond a bare assertion that the defendants conspired.

Scott v. Norton · filed 2004-04-28

Third, Scott failed meaningfully to allege a conspiracy claim. ... Aside from Scott’s bare assertion of a conspiracy, he offered no factual support or evidence upon which a conspiracy involving the defendants could be based.

Section 1983 permits a civil conspiracy claim, but an agreement to act in concert alone does not support recovery without an injury caused by the defendants’ acts.

Andrew Putman and Donald Favors v. Sheriff Elmer Gerloff and Deputy Sheriff Jim Crowe · filed 1983-03-01

This Court has previously -indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may support a charge of civil conspiracy. ... In either case, the conspiracy instruction, assuming it was an otherwise appropriate one, would not have allowed any recovery against the defendants based simply on the finding that they agreed to act and did act in concert.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires evidence supporting an inference that the defendants reached an understanding to pursue a common unlawful plan.

Wahi v. Charleston Area Medical Center · filed 2006-09-29

In order to survive a properly supported summary judgment motion, plaintiffs evidence must, at least, reasonably lead to the inference that defendants positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. ... He has offered no evidence on this issue from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor. Therefore, the court GRANTS CAMC’s motion for summary judgment on Dr. Wahi’s § 1983 claim.

A section 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, an overt act by a coconspirator, and injury from that act.

Gunter v. Morrison · filed 2007-08-15

In order to prevail on a section 1983 civil conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must show, “that the defendant conspired with others to deprive him or her of a constitutional right; that at least one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and that the overt act injured the plaintiff.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must specify with particularity the overt acts allegedly committed by the defendants.

Guevara v. Ventura County Community College District · filed 2008-12-16

In his second cause of action (42 U.S.C. § 1983), he alleges that defendants conspired to terminate him for engaging in free speech. But Guevara had “to specify with particularity the overt acts allegedly committed by defendants in execution of the conspiracy.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires particularized facts showing an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right; general allegations of conspiracy are insufficient.

Leer Elec., Inc. v. PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF LABOR · filed 2009-01-30

Plaintiffs do not, however, identify the union officials allegedly conspiring with Defendants. Nor do Plaintiffs’ allege any facts relating to specific conversations, meetings or any other interaction between Defendants and union officials where a conspiracy was formed to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. For this reason, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not contain sufficient allegations of fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence satisfying the particularized pleading requirements for civil conspiracy claims. The Court will, accordingly, dismiss the claims in Count IX of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

A civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires a unity of purpose among the defendants.

Air Supply, Inc. v. Wahlder · filed 2009-06-10

With regard to the conspiracy by fraud allegations, like the trial court, we find the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the requisite “unity of purpose” among the governmental and non-governmental defendants required to support a cause of action for civil conspiracy under § 1983.

A § 1983 civil rights conspiracy claim requires factual allegations supporting an agreement; conjecture does not state a claim.

Basile v. Walt Disney Co. · filed 2010-06-14

These allegations are nothing but conjecture and are thus legally insufficient to state a claim for civil rights conspiracy.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires joint action, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and a resulting deprivation of a constitutional right.

Glassman v. Arlington County, VA · filed 2010-12-23

"To establish a civil conspiracy claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, [a plaintiff] must present evidence that the [defen- dants] acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in [the] deprivation of a constitutional right." Hinkle v. City of Clarks- burg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). Because we hold that the defendants’ actions in this case did not result in the "depri- vation of a constitutional right," we conclude that Glassman’s civil conspiracy claim was properly dismissed.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires particularized factual allegations of a conspiracy; bare assertions of discrimination are insufficient.

Kivisto vs Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC · filed 2011-01-25

A plaintiff claiming a conspiracy under § 1983 must make particularized allegations that a conspiracy exists. ... Finally, Kivisto declares that the defendants discriminated against him based on his Finnish origin, but besides his bare assertions, Kivisto’s second amended complaint contains no factual allegations showing that his constitutional or civil rights have been infringed by a conspiracy or otherwise. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing his various civil rights claims.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim involving private actors to proceed only if the underlying claims against the Commonwealth defendants survive.

Cramer v. Pruey · filed 2011-07-20

While we take this language to refer to an alleged civil conspiracy among the private parties and the Commonwealth defendants, see Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2010), to the extent the District Court correctly dismissed all of the § 1983 claims against the Commonwealth defendants, any § 1983 conspiracy claim involving the private actors must also fail.

A civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires a shared objective to deprive someone of federal rights, which a jury may infer from circumstantial evidence.

Bazzi v. City of Dearborn · filed 2011-09-29

A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.” ... Taking the facts and inferences in Bazzi’s favor, we conclude that these facts provide sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer the existence of a shared conspiratorial objective among Haidar, Saab, and Thompson to seize Bazzi without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement or concerted activity to deprive someone of a federally protected right.

Kenneth Ashton, Sr. v. City of Uniontown · filed 2012-01-25

Appellants’ conspiracy claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails because the Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegation showing an agreement or concerted activity by Tomi, Cox or Mayor Fike, a necessary element of a conspiracy claim.

Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state this § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.

Trans Rail America, Inc. v. Hubbard Township · filed 2012-05-08

Because conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, the district court was correct to dismiss Trans Rail’s claim on this basis.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim can survive summary judgment when the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, could establish that the defendants agreed to deprive him of a constitutional right.

McDaniel v. Arnold · filed 2012-08-21

Judge Bennett ruled on the basis of the pleadings but, as I see it, Judge B'ennett’s analysis remains fully applicable at the summary judgment stage. Plaintiff has now advanced evidence that, taken in the light most favorable to him, would establish the alleged facts that Judge Bennett held adequately framed a civil conspiracy claim. ... Accordingly, as to Count X, the Motion will be denied.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim does not require an independently illegal overt act; the unlawfulness lies in the agreement to violate federal rights.

MTR Gaming Group, Inc. v. Arneault · filed 2012-09-27

Here, the "overt act" committed by the MTR Defendants was presumably the withholding of requested discovery; however, there is no requirement for § 1983 purposes that the "overt act” be an illegal one. Rather, the unlawfulness arises from the cpnspirators' agreement to violate the federal rights of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 allows a civil conspiracy claim when two or more people agree to deprive someone of constitutional rights and commit unlawful acts that cause damages.

Livers v. Dunning · filed 2012-11-08

To prove a civil conspiracy under § 1983, Livers and Sampson must show (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action to be taken; (4) the commission of one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result of the conspiracy.

A civil conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires an underlying violation of federal rights.

Fantone v. Herbik · filed 2013-06-12

The District Court properly found that because Fantone has not established any violation of his federal rights, he cannot have a claim for civil conspiracy under Section 1983.

A Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires evidence that defendants acted together and committed an overt act that deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Deakins v. Pack · filed 2013-07-12

The Magistrate Judge correctly set forth the applicable law concerning civil conspiracies under Section 1983. ... He noted that in order to establish such a claim, a plaintiff must present evidence that “the defendants conspired or acted jointly or in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, which resulted in plaintiff being deprived of the constitutional right.”

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires a showing that the conspiracy aimed to deprive the plaintiffs of constitutional rights.

Dukore v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-09-19

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must additionally show “that the purpose of the alleged conspiracy was to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.”

A Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement among the defendants; a conclusory allegation of joint action is insufficient.

Shimomura v. Carlson · filed 2014-02-14

To begin, a pleading that two or more individuals “took joint and concerted action” is a mere conclusory statement that the Court is bound to disregard.

A civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires a separate, actionable constitutional injury.

Rapp v. Dutcher · filed 2014-02-18

A claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983 exists only where the plaintiff has established a separate and actionable constitutional injury.

A civil conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendants acted together and committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Martin v. Byers · filed 2014-08-11

“To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, Appellant[] must present evidence that the Appellees acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in Appellant[’s] deprivation of a constitutional right . . . .” ... We agree with the district court that Martin’s allegations fail to meet these standards, and therefore affirm its resolution of the claim.

Section 1983 civil conspiracy requires a single plan, a shared objective to deprive constitutional rights, and an overt act.

Womack v. Matt Conley · filed 2014-12-11

The elements of a civil conspiracy under Section 1983 are “that (1) a single plan existed, (2) the conspirators shared a conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence of a shared plan and objective to violate federal rights; assistance with an official’s independent decision is insufficient.

Cummerlander v. Patriot Preparatory Academy Inc. · filed 2015-02-09

Although Plaintiffs have shown a violation of JT’s constitutional rights, Plaintiffs fail to present facts to meet the standard for a conspiracy under § 1983. ... These facts fail to show, however, a material disputed fact concerning the existence of a shared single plan to search JT in contravention of his Fourth Amendment rights, or Defendants’ alleged shared objective to search JT in contravention of his Fourth Amendment rights. The facts presented by Plaintiffs merely show that Smith relied on the assistance of others when making his independent, discretionary decision to search JT.

Section 1983 permits a civil conspiracy claim when the complaint adequately alleges a mutual understanding to violate constitutional rights, overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and resulting injury.

Davis v. Simmons · filed 2015-07-08

In sum, the Complaint sufficiently pleads a meeting of the minds between Defendants to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Defendants engaged in overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and Plaintiffs were injured as a result. Thereby all of the elements of a civil conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights have been adequately pled under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil conspiracy claim against an entity when the entity itself participated in the conspiracy.

Harris v. Goins · filed 2015-12-29

However, if the plaintiff claims that the entity itself participated in the conspiracy, then the conspiracy claim survives under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than a bare, conclusory allegation of an agreement to state a civil conspiracy claim.

Michtavi v. United States · filed 2009-09-21

Miehtavi based his civil conspiracy claim upon the conclusory allegation that prison officials agreed to act against him. Without more, the bare allegation of an agreement is insufficient to sustain a conspiracy claim. See Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir.1998) (conclusory allegations of concerted action are insufficient for a § 1983 conspiracy claim); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir.1989) (allegations supporting a conspiracy claim under civil RICO must be sufficiently specific). Dismissal was therefore appropriate.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the specific facts showing each defendant's liability for a civil rights violation.

Pete v. Tacoma School District No. 10 · filed 2016-07-29

To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth the specific factual bases upon which she claims each defendant is liable.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires proof of a constitutional deprivation; it fails when probable cause defeats the underlying arrest claim.

Hinshaw v. Moore · filed 2016-11-14

A plaintiff must also "prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim." Id. Since Borders had probable cause to arrest Hinshaw, he cannot prove a deprivation of a constitutional right. The district court thus properly granted the officers summary judgment on Hinshaw's conspiracy claim.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires facts showing that the defendants agreed to act together and took an overt act that deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Eve Davis v. Walmart Stores East, L.P. · filed 2017-05-01

Establishing a civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that Defendants “acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in [plaintiff’s] deprivation of a constitutional right.” ... Although Greer communicated with Harney and responded to some of his suggestions and requests, Davis failed to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that Greer conspired with Harney to arrest Davis without probable cause.

A § 1983 civil rights conspiracy claim requires an agreement and an actual deprivation of a federally protected right.

Censabella v Town of Weare · filed 2017-09-06

To assert a civil rights conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that “there has been, besides the agreement, an actual deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.”

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires a deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right and an agreement to cause that deprivation.

Rink v. Northeastern Educational · filed 2017-12-15

Here, Rink has failed to demonstrate that the evidentiary record before the Court allows for a reasonable inference that he was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right, nor for a reasonable inference that any of the Defendants made an agreement or plan to deprive Rink of such a right; accordingly, his claim for a civil conspiracy under § 1983 also fails.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a conspiratorial agreement and an actual deprivation of rights.

Dyette v. Shugrue · filed 2018-01-23

To succeed on a claim of conspiracy under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove both a conspiratorial agreement and an actual deprivation of rights.

A civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.

Brown v. Novak · filed 2019-03-05

As for Ms. Brown’s claim for “civil conspiracy,” it is not clear to the Court whether she is asserting the Arkansas tort by that name, or a federal cause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But either way, the claim must be dismissed. ... The federal cause is similarly derivative, and must be predicated on an actual deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.

Section 1983 civil conspiracy requires an agreement to deprive someone of a federal right; an agreement to take away a state license alone is insufficient.

Saucon Valley Manor, Inc. v. Miller · filed 2019-06-06

Even if the defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of their license, the plaintiffs cannot sustain a cause of action for section 1983 civil conspiracy unless the object of the conspiracy was to deprive them of their license without due process of law, equal protection, or to retaliate against them for their First Amendment activities.

Section 1983 permits a civil conspiracy claim when specific factual allegations show an agreement involving state action and a deprivation of civil rights.

Lefebure v. Boeker · filed 2019-06-26

Considering the specificity and details set forth in the above allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the heightened pleading standard and has pled sufficient factual allegations to state a claim of civil conspiracy. Therefore, Boeker’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim is DENIED.

Section 1983 permits a civil conspiracy claim for the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Horton v. City Of Rockford · filed 2019-08-06

And a plaintiff may bring a claim under § 1983 for civil conspiracy.

Section 1983 requires evidence that each alleged conspirator shared a conspiratorial objective and agreed with the others, even if that person committed no overt act.

Crowley v. Anderson Cty., Tenn. · filed 2019-08-20

Moreover, even though the defendant in question need not commit an overt act himself, a plaintiff must still point to some evidence that the defendant in question shared a conspiratorial objective and entered into an agreement with the codefendants who did commit the overt act.

Section 1983 does not support a civil-conspiracy claim without an underlying constitutional violation.

Dyson v. The City of Calumet City · filed 2019-08-20

There can be no § 1983 claim for conspiracy in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation. As outlined in the previous sections of this opinion, Dyson’s amended complaint has failed to state a claim under any of her proffered federal constitutional theories. As a result, she has failed to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983 as well.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim fails when the plaintiff cannot establish an underlying constitutional violation.

Clayland Farm Enterprises, LLC v. Talbot County, Maryland · filed 2019-08-29

Here, because Clayland fails to establish any of its underlying constitutional claims, it cannot prove a civil conspiracy under § 1983.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires facts supporting a reasonable inference of an agreement to violate a federally protected right; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Thompson v. State of Delaware Department of Services for Children Youth and Families · filed 2019-09-05

Because the civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 is based on conclusory allegations, it must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to cause a constitutional injury and an overt act causing damages.

Rosario v. City of New York · filed 2019-09-16

The Complaint fails to plead a § 1983 conspiracy. A civil rights conspiracy requires pleading “(1) an agreement between state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim can proceed when pleaded facts plausibly show that officers agreed to violate a person’s constitutional rights and acted on that plan.

Bickerstaff v. Cuyahoga County · filed 2019-10-21

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations to state plausible civil conspiracy claims against the Officer Defendants.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim may be barred by the intra-corporate immunity doctrine.

Harris v. Wingo · filed 2019-11-05

For the reasons set forth in the Court’s Opinion and Order (Doc. #173, pp. 30-33), the Court agrees that Count XII is barred by the intra-corporate immunity doctrine.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right; conclusory allegations without a meeting of the minds are insufficient.

Jordan v. Newman · filed 2019-12-17

Where the complaint makes only conclusory allegations of a conspiracy under § 1983 and fails to demonstrate any agreement or meeting of the minds among the defendants, the court may properly dismiss the complaint.

A Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires specific facts about each defendant’s role; vague, conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Jackson v. Romero · filed 2020-01-13

Claims based on vague and conclusory allegations, which fail to specify each defendant’s role in the alleged conspiracy, are subject to dismissal. ... He does not explain each Defendant’s alleged role in the conspiracy.

A Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires a predicate federal rights violation.

FROMPOVICZ v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROCTION · filed 2020-01-22

A Section 1983 civil conspiracy requires a predicate federal violation.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires an agreement among the alleged conspirators to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Dewitt v. Ritz · filed 2020-01-31

An essential element for a claim of conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of a constitutional right is an agreement to do so among the alleged co-conspirators. ... Plaintiff fails to allege the required agreement among Defendants and fails to allege that Defendants participated in any conspiracy.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires particularized facts showing that the defendants reached an agreement.

Austell v. City of Pagedale · filed 2020-01-31

Austell’s Amended Complaint fails to allege a meeting of the minds. ... These allegations do not plead with particularity and specifically demonstrate with material facts that Eddie’s Towing reached an agreement with the Pagedale defendants.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires proof that the defendants participated in a shared plan to deprive the plaintiffs of constitutional rights.

Sanders v. City of Pembroke · filed 2020-03-04

For the reasons stated in the prior section, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Ms. Holland, Ms. Monroe, and Ms. Perry were involved in a conspiracy against Mr. and Ms. Sanders. Thus, Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires evidence that defendants acted together toward a shared unlawful objective and committed an overt act that deprived someone of a federal right.

Thompson v. Clarke · filed 2020-03-06

To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff is required to produce evidence showing that the defendants acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, resulting in the deprivation of a federal right.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim fails without an actual violation of a constitutional right.

Abreu v. Ferguson · filed 2020-03-17

It follows, therefore, that in the absence of an actual violation of a constitutional right under § 1983, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim necessarily fails.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires evidence that defendants agreed to deprive someone of a federally protected right; speculation cannot defeat summary judgment.

Whalley v. Blazick · filed 2020-03-23

The standards to state a conspiracy claim under § 1983 are similar to those under Pennsylvania law. ... Whalley cannot meet either of these exacting standards required to set forth a successful civil conspiracy claim. The record before us is completely devoid of any evidence that these officers conspired among themselves to engage in the alleged assault on Whalley on August 14, 2016.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires specific factual allegations identifying the defendants’ actions.

Peterson v. Williams · filed 2020-04-15

The court finds that Mr. Peterson’s Complaint lacks the necessary specific factual allegations to state a valid § 1983 claim.

A civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an underlying deprivation of a constitutional right.

Rettig v. Henry County Board of Commissioners · filed 2020-05-31

To state a claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show a deprivation of an underlying constitutional right.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require specific facts supporting an inference that the defendants reached a meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.

Hurt v. Dade County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-06-08

The Eighth Circuit requires specific facts giving rise to an inference of a meeting of the minds. Murray, 595 F.3d at 870. There is no such allegation in the Complaint; therefore, Defendant Huffman’s motion to dismiss Count 4 for civil conspiracy is granted.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing that the defendants agreed to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Hankins v. Bredeman · filed 2020-06-12

Without alleging facts that Nurse Hill agreed to deprive plaintiff of any constitutional rights, plaintiff fails to state a claim for conspiracy against Nurse Hill under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.

Kingsley v. Lawrence County, Missouri · filed 2020-07-02

Because we have already determined that Kiman failed to establish that he was deprived of a constitutional right or privilege, his § 1983 civil conspiracy claim must fail as a matter of law.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires proof of an underlying constitutional deprivation; without one, the claim fails.

Woods v. The Circuit Attorney's Office of the City of St. Louis/The City of St. Louis, MO · filed 2020-07-28

A plaintiff is “required to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.” ... Because Woods has failed to show any constitutional violation, her conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights conspiracy claim when an agreement leads to an actual deprivation of a federal right; co-conspirators may be liable even if they did not personally carry out the deprivation.

Sanchez v. Foley · filed 2020-08-18

In other words, a conspiracy under section 1983 permits a jury to hold co-conspirators liable for the damages flowing from a constitutional deprivation that all of the co-conspirators may not have personally carried out.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim can proceed when officials allegedly agree to fabricate evidence and thereby cause a constitutional injury.

Marvaso v. Sanchez · filed 2020-08-21

For these reasons and those given in the district court’s order, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendants Adams and Reddy Jr. engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to fabricate evidence and thereby caused Plaintiffs’ constitutional injury.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires two or more people, an agreed objective, an unlawful overt act, and resulting damages.

Rindahl v. Noem · filed 2020-06-05

To plead a civil conspiracy under § 1983, Rindahl must show “(1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action to be taken; (4) the commission of one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result of the conspiracy.”

Section 1983 requires facts showing an agreement to deprive someone of constitutional rights to plead a civil conspiracy claim.

Goings v. Baldwin · filed 2020-09-14

Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to state a claim for civil conspiracy. He does not provide facts sufficient to allege that C/O Crabtree, Menard Placement Officer John/Jane Doe 9, Menard Internal Affairs Officer John Doe 20, Warden Butler, and IDOC Director John Baldwin agreed to a scheme to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim must plausibly allege a single plan among the defendants to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Goldwire v. Chambers-Smith · filed 2020-10-21

Even reading the Complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has not plausibly alleged that twenty different officials at four different ODRC institutions have conspired by engaging in a single plan to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights and overt acts that actually deprive the plaintiff of those rights.

Williams v. Jeffreys · filed 2020-11-02

For a civil conspiracy claim in a section 1983 claim, plaintiff must allege that the defendants reached an agreement to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and overt acts taken in furtherance of the same actually deprived him of those rights.

Section 1983 civil conspiracy claims require joint action and an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy that deprives someone of a federal right.

Baker v. Clarke · filed 2020-11-13

To establish a civil conspiracy claim actionable under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants “acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy,” resulting in deprivation of a federal right.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires specific facts supporting a shared plan to deprive the plaintiff of federal rights.

Riddick v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 2020-12-09

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must plead specific facts; vague allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient.

Ball v. Tilton · filed 2020-12-28

Thus, “[c]laims of conspiracy must be pled with some specificity: vague and conclusory allegations that are unsupported by material facts are not sufficient to state a § 1983 claim.” ... Plaintiff’s allegation that Code Inspector Smith told Plaintiff that he was instructed by the mayor and law director to not make a “deal” fails to satisfy these strict pleading standards.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires evidence that defendants acted together to deprive someone of a constitutional right.

Zhao v. McClain · filed 2021-01-04

Finally, Zhao’s civil conspiracy claim cannot survive summary judgment because he has not provided any evidence of an agreement between Detective Wilson and Sergeant McClain. “To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, [the plaintiff] must present evidence that the [defendants] acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in Appellants’ deprivation of a constitutional right (in this case the right to access the courts).”

A civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires evidence that people acting under color of state law agreed to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

McClenton v. Doe (1) Ms. Ryan · filed 2021-01-12

To maintain an action for civil conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must “prove that persons acting under color of state law ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive him of his constitutional rights.” ... Here, Plaintiff ha failed to introduce into the record any evidence which shows an agreement or plan created and executed by Defendants that rises to the level of a conspiracy.

Section 1983 permits suits against Virgin Islands government employees in their individual capacities.

Payton v. Public Defender Administration Board · filed 2007-01-22

As employees of the Territory of the Virgin Islands being sued in their individual capacities, Joseph, Frazer, and Webster amenable [sic] to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action and applies only to a person within the statute's meaning.

Hepperle v. Southern Methodist University · filed 1976-02-17

The district court dismissed this action against Southern Methodist University because there was a lack of state action. Likewise, that court held that appellant had not stated a cause of action against the city because it was not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. ... The district court did not err in its conclusions and the judgment is affirmed.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or any branch of the state as a person subject to suit.

Surmeli v. State of New York · filed 1976-04-07

Plaintiffs brought this action under the Fourteenth Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, as plaintiffs now concede, the state and any branch thereof are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state university such as the University of Missouri as a person subject to suit, but its individual officials are persons amenable to equitable suit when acting under color of state law.

Gay Lib v. University of Missouri · filed 1976-06-29

This Court concludes, for the foregoing reasons, that the University of Missouri is not a person under § 1983. This Court therefore, lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) over the plaintiff’s § 1981, § 1983 and § 1988 claims against the University of Missouri, and those claims must, accordingly, be and are dismissed. ... All individual defendants are persons for purposes of § 1983 and are amenable to suit thereunder if their actions occurred under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not authorize suit against Pennsylvania because the Commonwealth is not a statutory “person,” and claims under § 1983 borrow Pennsylvania’s two-year personal-injury limitation period.

Harris v. Commonwealth of Pa. · filed 1976-07-21

Plaintiff also asserts a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 contending that the practices and discriminatory acts of the Commonwealth in the Insurance Department contravene Sections 1983, 1985(3) and 1986 of the Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986). Clearly the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is pot a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and as such these entities are not properly subject to suit in a claim brought under that Act. ... Since the civil rights acts contain no statute of limitations, the limitation to be applied in this instance is that which would be applicable in the Pennsylvania courts under similar circumstances. ... The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint does not sound in breach of contract, but rather seeks damages, reinstatement and other equitable relief pursuant to § 1983 for personal injuries suffered as the result of the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. ... Therefore, we conclude that Pennsylvania’s two-year limitation period pertaining to suits brought “to recover damages for injury wrongfully done to the person” (12 P.S. § 34) is applicable in this case.

Section 1983 does not treat state agencies or the State as persons, but permits declaratory-relief suits against state officials in their official capacities.

Allah v. Commissioner of Dept. of Correctional Services · filed 1978-03-27

It is well established that state agencies are not “persons” for purposes of the Civil Rights Acts. ... The Department of Corrections (which is properly entitled the Department of Correctional Services) is clearly an agency of the state government. The two media review committees, which were created by the Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services pursuant to authority vested'in him by New York Correction Law § 7(1), are also properly characterized as agencies of the state government. Hence, the Department of Correctional Services, the Media Review Committee, and the Clinton Correctional Facility Media Review Committee are not “persons” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Acts, and therefore, are not subject to suit. ... A state is not a “person” within the meaning of this provision; and, in addition, a suit against a state is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ... Therefore, the suit against the Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services in his official capacity for declaratory relief can be maintained.

Section 1983 treats a local independent junior college as a statutory person subject to suit.

Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior College · filed 1980-09-10

San Jacinto College is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974).

A taxpayer-funded public agency created by state legislation acts under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Mosley v. Clarksville Memorial Hospital · filed 1983-08-31

The defendant, Clarksville Memorial Hospital is a public agency organized by an Act of the Tennessee General Assembly and funded by the taxpayers. Its acts constitute “state action”, for purposes of the plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public hospital entity acting under color of law is subject to suit under section 1983.

Eddins v. West Georgia Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1985-07-10

For the reasons set forth in ... the court concludes that the defendant is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a public entity acting under color of law.

A state university is a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Uberoi v. University of Colorado · filed 1986-01-31

We also hold that the university is a “person” under § 1983.

A private party does not become a state actor for Section 1983 merely by litigating in state court or invoking state judicial procedures.

Sam & Mary Housing Corp. v. New York State · filed 1986-04-16

The position in this circuit is that one does not become a state actor merely by being a litigant in a state court action, ... In the instant case plaintiffs have pointed to nothing other than defendant Jo/Sal’s defense of the state court action that would constitute state action. That is clearly insufficient to make defendant Jo/Sal a state actor.

A state board of regents is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, while individual regents may invoke qualified immunity against personal-capacity claims.

Aase v. State, South Dakota Board of Regents · filed 1987-01-28

The trial court concluded, and we agree, that the Board of Regents is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and may not be sued under that section. ... Further, the trial court correctly held that the Regents in their individual capacities enjoy a qualified or good faith immunity which applies to the claims made in this action.

Private defendants do not act under color of state law merely by using judicial process unless facts show that they took over and controlled that process.

Kraemer v. Padgett · filed 1987-05-08

Similarly, this court finds that there are no allegations which establish that the defendants took over and controlled the judicial process sufficient to state a cause of action under color of state law.

Officials, instrumentalities, and employees of a foreign government do not act under color of a U.S. state’s law and therefore cannot satisfy § 1983’s state-action element on that basis.

Gerritsen v. De La Madrid Hurtado · filed 1987-06-18

Clearly, as the district court recognized, “state action” or acts “under color of state law” refer to acts attributable to states of the United States. ... Therefore, the acts performed by the defendants, all of whom are officials, instrumentalities, or employees of the Mexican government, could not constitute acts under color of state law for purposes of section 1343.

Section 1983 does not treat the Government of Guam or the Guam Police Department as persons subject to suit.

Ngiraingas v. Sanchez · filed 1988-06-07

We affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims against the government of Guam on the ground that Guam is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. For the same reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims against the Guam Police Department.

Section 1983 does not treat the government of Guam or the Guam Police Department as a person subject to suit.

Ngiraingas v. Sanchez · filed 1988-09-28

We affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims against the government of Guam on the ground that Guam is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. For the same reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims against the Guam Police Department.

A municipal court is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Foster v. Lawrence J. Walsh, Clerk, Akron Municipal Court · filed 1988-12-14

The failure to plead the existence of such a policy or custom, coupled with the fact that the court is not a “person” under § 1983, makes the complaint fatally defective.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Muza v. Missouri Department of Social Services · filed 1989-03-28

A state is not a “person” under the Civil Rights Act and may not be sued directly under § 1983.

A Cook County State’s Attorney may be sued in an official capacity under Section 1983 because Illinois law does not equate that office with the State.

Santiago v. Daley · filed 1989-11-01

Illinois law does not equate the State’s Attorney with the State for Section 1983 purposes. Summary judgment is denied, and this action will continue against Daley in his individual capacity and against Partee in his official capacity as State’s Attorney of Cook County.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Jones v. State of RI · filed 1989-11-17

Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Will, it is clear that neither the State of Rhode Island nor any of its officials acting in their official capacities, are "persons" that can be held liable under § 1983.