42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights, but defamation alone and parole revocation alone do not create a claim under it.

Underwood v. Robert F. Pritchard, Etc. · filed 1981-01-21

Underwood’s complaint that a charge of driving while under the influence of drugs was filed against him and that as a result his parole was revoked states no cause of action under section 1983. ... defamation, per se, is not actionable under section 1983. ... Underwood’s contention that his constitutional rights were violated merely because his parole was revoked does not, of itself, give rise to an action under the civil rights statute.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under state authority.

Sanz v. Rico · filed 1982-04-06

A liberal interpretation of these facts in light of the jurisprudence related to this matter leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs have stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for violations of decedent’s due process rights.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of rights under color of state law.

Simpson v. Broglin · filed 1985-07-11

Thus, negligent injury to plaintiff’s person is not a protectable liberty interest under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and plaintiff’s complaint does not state a cause of action under § 1983.

An administrative appeal does not become a § 1983 action merely because it alleges a federal constitutional violation.

Rone Ex Rel. Roseboro v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education · filed 2012-05-01

Contrary to petitioners’ — and the superior court’s — assumption, the mere assertion of a federal constitutional violation does not transform a legal proceeding into a § 1983 proceeding that carries with it the right to seek fees under § 1988.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to actually assert a claim under the statute rather than merely cite it in background allegations.

MHA LLC v. HealthFirst, Inc. · filed 2015-11-17

Jurisdiction also cannot be asserted here on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While the complaint cites § 1983, this language appears in a background section, and none of the ... six counts assert a claim based on it. Moreover, the fact that HealthFirst did not move to dismiss a claim under § 1983, and MHA did not seek to avoid dismissal based upon the existence of a § 1983 claim, further reveals that no party viewed the complaint as seeking relief under § 1983. Thus, § 1983 does not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction in this action.

Sternaman v. County of McHenry · filed 1978-06-30

The court finds that jurisdiction does not exist in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action to remedy violations of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, but it does not itself confer federal jurisdiction.

Gonzalez v. Young · filed 1977-07-15

Section 1983 provides for a federal cause of action to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . .” We hold that it is not a jurisdictional statute; it only fashions a remedy. Thus, although Gonzalez may have asserted a claim under section 1983, she had to look to other authority to obtain jurisdiction.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action but does not itself confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Johnson Bonding Co., Inc. v. Com. of Ky. · filed 1976-09-22

Neither of the latter two statutes alone confers jurisdiction on the Court. They merely create causes of action.

Section 1983 and § 1985 create causes of action, while § 1343 supplies federal district-court jurisdiction over them.

Roena v. Camara De Comerciantes Mayoristas, Inc. · filed 1976-11-05

Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 create certain causes of action and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 grants original jurisdiction to the federal district courts to entertain such actions.

Section 1983 adds no substantive support to plaintiffs' claims and serves only as a jurisdictional base.

Davids v. Akers · filed 1977-01-13

Section 1983 of Title 42, U.S.C., adds nothing to plaintiffs’ case except a jurisdictional base. Plaintiffs point to no other provisions of the Constitution or the laws [of the United States] that might support their substantive claims.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action but does not itself confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Jensen v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary, Health and Human Services Dept. · filed 1983-06-22

Section 1983 does not itself grant jurisdiction.

Section 1983 creates a private cause of action but is not an independent source of substantive constitutional rights.

Levanti v. Tippen · filed 1984-05-07

That statute, of course, merely provides a private cause of action, and is not itself an independent source of substantive constitutional rights.

Section 1983 creates no independent substantive rights and only authorizes a cause of action for infringement of rights granted by another source.

Robideau v. South Colonie Central School District · filed 1985-03-28

This section does not create or secure any substantive rights, but merely authorizes a cause of action when rights granted by another source have been infringed.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action but does not itself confer federal jurisdiction.

Palmer v. City of San Antonio, Texas · filed 1987-02-23

Section 1983 is not itself a jurisdictional statute but instead merely creates a cause of action.

Section 1983 has no substantive content of its own; it is a vehicle for redressing violations of rights protected by the federal Constitution or federal law.

Lipsett v. Rive-Mora · filed 1987-09-16

In contrast to this specialized legislation, section 1983 is not a statute with any substantive content but merely the conduit through which individuals may obtain redress for violations to rights protected by the federal constitution or by federal law.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action but does not itself confer subject-matter jurisdiction on federal district courts.

Ronny J. Goldsmith v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore Wilbur E. Cunningham, Fred Morris Lauer, Jr. Harry Loleas · filed 1988-01-19

However, the federal cause of action creáted by this section does not itself confer jurisdiction upon the federal district courts to adjudicate these claims.

Section 1983 does not support equitable relief when the plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy, and federal intervention against state officers is unwarranted absent circumstances justifying it.

Betty J. James and Raymond Miller v. Walter Headley, Chief of Police of the City of Miami · filed 1969-04-09

The legal remedy available here is adequate, or at least no less so than the equitable remedy sought. ... Circumstances justifying federal interference with the activities of state officers have therefore not been alleged by the plaintiffs. ... We conclude that the court below did not err in dismissing the § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 permits equitable relief only subject to equitable principles, so a plaintiff must pursue an apparently adequate legal remedy before invoking federal equity jurisdiction.

Appalachian Volunteers, Inc. v. Charles Clark, Edward Lee Blankenship v. Clarles Clark · filed 1970-09-11

Appellants sought relief pursuant to the grant of equity jurisdiction contained in section 1983. We therefore must apply equitable principles in determining whether appellants were entitled to equitable relief. We conclude that in light of their failure to pursue what appears to be an adequate remedy at law, appellants were not entitled to equitable relief.

Section 1983's equitable remedy is subject to the historic rule barring equitable relief when a plain, adequate, and complete legal remedy exists.

Gras v. Stevens · filed 1976-05-06

When § 1983 authorized a “suit in equity,” this carried the gloss that centuries had put upon that phrase. Notable in that connection was the historic principle embodied in § 16 of the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 82 (1789), and later in Rev.Stat. § 723 and 28 U.S.C. § 384 (1940 ed.), that suits in equity shall not be sustained in courts of the United States “in any case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”

Section 1983 claims challenging a tax assessment must be pursued in a legal action when the available state tax-objection procedure provides an adequate remedy, rather than in equity.

First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Rosewell · filed 1982-11-18

Because of our conclusion that the equitable action was improperly allowed it is unnecessary to address the merits of the taxpayer’s civil rights claim in count II, which was brought in equity for the same reasons alleged in count I. ... Accordingly, the taxpayer should have pursued its section 1983 claim in a legal action rather than in equity.

Once a § 1983 violation is established, a federal court has broad equitable power to remedy it.

Crook v. Baker · filed 1984-05-21

Once a violation of § 1983 is found, the court has broad equitable powers to remedy that violation.

A procedural-due-process claim under Section 1983 cannot proceed when adequate state remedies remain available because no constitutional deprivation occurs until the state denies a procedure for redress.

Gresham v. Dell · filed 1986-03-25

Thus, so long as a plaintiff has adequate state tort remedies available to him, there has been no constitutional deprivation, and a § 1983 claim in federal court cannot be maintained.

Section 1983 permits injunctions against a persistent pattern of police misconduct subject to equitable prerequisites, including the absence of an adequate remedy at law.

Daniels v. Southfort · filed 1993-10-01

While injunctive relief is appropriate in a § 1983 action where there is a persistent pattern of police misconduct, ... it is still considered an extraordinary remedy, especially when the plaintiff seeks to enjoin police conduct. ... Daniels has an adequate remedy at law for damages under § 1983.

A § 1983 damages action cannot be used as a guise or method to obtain release from custody and must await the complainant's release through other channels.

Still v. Nichols · filed 1969-06-05

However, a damage action cannot be prosecuted as a guise or method of obtaining release from custody, but must await the complainant’s release through other channels.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking immediate release from custody.

Eskridge v. Casson · filed 1979-02-13

Initially, it should be noted that to the extent that plaintiff’s general request for equitable relief amounts to a prayer for immediate release from custody it would not be cognizable under § 1983.

A state prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim that necessarily challenges his conviction should be dismissed without prejudice until he establishes the constitutional defect through habeas corpus.

Hadley v. Werner · filed 1985-01-28

Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to Hadley's opportunity to refile his section 1983 claim if and when he establishes, through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

A request for immediate release from imprisonment must proceed through habeas corpus rather than as a separate § 1983 claim.

de la Cova y Gonzalez Abreu v. United States · filed 1985-05-16

Petitioner also seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release from imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Inasmuch as this remedy is subsumed in his petition for habeas corpus, we need not entertain this claim.

An action challenging the fact or duration of confinement must proceed as habeas corpus rather than under § 1983.

Berndt v. Tom Sams, Sheriff of Hamblen County · filed 1985-06-07

This action, challenging the fact or duration of confinement, is properly construed solely as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

A prisoner's challenge to conditions of confinement is a civil-rights claim under § 1983 rather than a habeas claim when it does not attack the conviction itself.

Bomar v. Hatcliff · filed 1986-06-10

Finally, it is also apparent that the district court properly construed the plaintiff's habeas corpus petitions as civil rights claims as the plaintiff was attacking the conditions of his confinement and not his judgment of conviction.

A prisoner may not maintain a § 1983 damages claim that calls the validity of a state conviction into question before exhausting the habeas remedies required by § 2254.

Burgess v. Brown · filed 1987-02-05

More specifically, Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 claim for damages which calls into question the validity of a state court conviction until he has first complied with the exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

A prisoner may not pursue § 1983 damages for an alleged conspiracy to obtain a conviction through perjury until he successfully challenges the conviction through habeas corpus.

Larry Curtis Wayne Chamberlain v. Jones · filed 1987-02-17

appellant must first pursue relief through a 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 petition for habeas corpus. ... The dismissal of the complaint is affirmed for the foregoing reasons, without prejudice to appellant's opportunity to refile his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 should he first secure the successful adjudication of his constitutional claims by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

A prisoner cannot pursue civil damages under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction until he successfully establishes the invalidity of that conviction through habeas corpus.

Simpson v. Judge Robert H. Gorman, Common Pleas Court Arthur M. Ney, Jr. Robert P. Mecklinborg · filed 1987-02-19

Those matters, however, are more properly the subject of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and may not give rise to a civil cause of action for money damages until appellant has first secured the successful adjudication of his constitutional claims in such a proceeding.

A § 1983 damages claim implying that a state conviction is illegal must be dismissed without prejudice and may be refiled if the conviction is successfully challenged through habeas corpus.

Hinkston v. Claude N. Crowe, Arthur N. Ney, Jr., Ronald Ottinger, and Harry Frisby · filed 1988-01-11

In this case, resolution of the plaintiff's claim for damages pursuant to Sec. 1983 could imply that plaintiff's state court conviction was illegal. Therefore, as in Hadley, the case must be dismissed without prejudice. ... Accordingly, the plaintiff may refile his Sec. 1983 claim based on an illegal conviction if he successfully challenges his conviction through a habeas corpus proceeding.

A claim brought under Section 1983 that seeks release from custody is treated as a habeas corpus claim and requires exhaustion of state remedies.

Hill v. Phillip G. Dantes, Parole Commissioner for the State of Maryland, Defendant · filed 1988-02-19

Hill has also failed to obtain release when he has brought the claim under Sec. 1983. Regardless of how it is styled the claim seeks habeas corpus relief and exhaustion of state remedies is required.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a sheriff in his official capacity for an unreasonable administrative delay in releasing a prisoner after the basis for detention has ended; reasonable time is allowed for release processing.

Sandy Lewis v. James O'grady, in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, 1 · filed 1988-07-21

There must be a reasonable time allowed for processing the release of a prisoner when the basis for detention has ended. However, based on the facts in this ease, it is a question for the jury to determine whether the time involved in processing the release of Sandy Lewis was reasonable. In order to allow a jury to make such a determination, the decision of the district court in granting a directed verdict is REVERSED and the § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his official capacity is REMANDED for retrial.

Section 1983 does not provide a state prisoner with immediate release from confinement; a challenge to the fact of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies.

Washington v. Sheinberg · filed 1989-07-21

Plaintiff’s prayer for immediate release from confinement is clearly not cognizable in § 1983. Determination of the legality of the fact of his confinement must be brought by way of a habeas corpus petition, upon exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to obtain release from custody based on a claim that his confinement is unconstitutional; he must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Wetmore v. McElwee · filed 1990-10-10

Besides seeking money damages, appellant also maintains that because his confinement is unconstitutional, he should be released from prison. This type of claim may not be brought in a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for immediate or speedier release from imprisonment; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Rush v. United States · filed 1991-11-07

Petitioner-Appellant Albert Rush appeals an order of the district court dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus that was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal, Rush seeks only "an automatic release" from custody. The sole remedy for either immediate release or a speedier release from imprisonment is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to secure release from prison.

Surface v. State of Okl. · filed 1994-11-15

Finally, to the extent Mr. Surface seeks release from prison as the remedy in this case, he may not maintain a Sec. 1983 action to secure such relief.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek release from custody; a challenge to the fact or length of custody must proceed under § 2254.

Campbell v. State of Oklahoma · filed 1999-04-30

Claims seeking release from custody could not properly be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because, as the magistrate judge correctly noted, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the exclusive vehicle for challenging the fact or length of custody.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek release from custody; that relief requires a habeas corpus petition.

Keyes v. Juul · filed 2003-06-28

Finally, insofar as plaintiff seeks release from custody, he can do so only on a properly submitted petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus, not in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Wiltisie v. California Department Of Corrections · filed 1969-02-19

While Wiltsie also asks for release from custody, this remedy is not available under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate release from custody.

Walton v. Michigan · filed 2004-09-23

The district court properly noted that, because Walton sought his immediate release, the complaint was not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies.

Carter v. Bickhaus · filed 2005-07-27

As for Carter’s request for release, we agree with the district court that such relief is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but is properly sought in a habeas corpus petition after exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from custody.

King v. Rouse · filed 1970-08-14

Release from custody may not be sought under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate release when the request calls into question the validity or duration of confinement; that claim belongs in habeas.

Curry v. Director of Parole Rissi Owens · filed 2008-06-10

Because Curry’s requested relief is immediate release to mandatory supervision, he is calling into question the validity or duration of his confinement, which should be raised in habeas.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking release from custody; the prisoner must seek habeas corpus.

Riley v. Kaye · filed 1987-07-30

A proceeding under § 1983 is not the appropriate method for obtaining this remedy, rather plaintiff should file for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek release from custody; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Cummings v. Jenkins · filed 2009-08-04

Additionally, Cummings’s request for “an emergency injunction in the form of release” is also without merit. As the District Court correctly noted, such a request may only be brought in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and not a § 1983 action.

A former prisoner who can no longer seek habeas relief may pursue a § 1983 claim challenging past confinement when barring the claim would leave him without access to federal court.

Campbell v. Beckley Police Department · filed 2010-08-05

Because he would otherwise be left without access to federal court, his § 1983 claim may proceed, and the district court committed reversible error in finding to the contrary. See id.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain release from prison; that relief requires a writ of habeas corpus.

Huber v. Ohio · filed 2012-09-27

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for injunctive relief, i.e., seeking to be released from prison, against the Warden, given that such relief can be granted only by a writ of habeas corpus, not by way of a § 1983 claim as set forth herein.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from state prison; a prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Crabtree v. State of Oklahoma · filed 2014-04-25

The first difficulty Mr. Crabtree faces is that the statute he invokes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, doesn’t provide the first remedy he seeks. Hastened release from state prison can be secured in court only through a writ of habeas corpus, not through a civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody; a person seeking release must pursue habeas relief.

Johnson v. State of Georgia · filed 2016-09-09

And, to the extent Plaintiff sought release from the Spalding County Jail, the district court concluded properly that Plaintiff’s “sole federal remedy [was] a writ of habeas corpus.” See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1973).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for immediate release from detention; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Johnson v. Burlew · filed 2019-07-23

Because Plaintiff is seeking immediate release from detention, a § 1983 claim for such relief cannot lie and will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a prisoner with immediate or speedier release from custody; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Crockett v. Walker · filed 2019-09-03

But this relief is not available under Section 1983 because a prisoner seeking “immediate release or a speedier release” must do so “through a writ of habeas corpus, not through [Section] 1983.” Wershe v. Combs, 763 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)).

Section 1983 permits a claim for damages, but a claim seeking release from custody must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Robinson v. King · filed 2019-09-19

To the extent Robinson seeks release, he must pursue such relief through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ... To the extent Robinson seeks damages, the case may be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Robinson’s § 1983 claim for damages will proceed in this civil action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate release from prison.

Cleveland v. Indiana State · filed 2019-09-24

Lastly, to the extent that Cleveland is seeking his immediate release from prison, that relief is not available to him in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for immediate release from confinement; a challenge to the fact of confinement must be brought by habeas petition.

Harden v. Jeffreys · filed 2019-10-29

To the extent he challenges the fact of his confinement and seeks immediate release, Plaintiff has a single federal remedy—a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Section 1983 provides him with no avenue to this relief.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody to a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of imprisonment; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Taylor v. Clark · filed 2019-12-18

This request for relief must be dismissed because when a “prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release from custody; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Harris v. State of Tennessee · filed 2020-01-09

That relief is not available under Section 1983, as a prisoner seeking “immediate release or a speedier release” must do so “through a writ of habeas corpus, not through § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide an injunction ordering immediate release from custody after parole revocation.

Graham v. Waters · filed 2020-02-25

The district court was also correct in holding that Graham’s request for an injunction ordering his immediate release from custody is not a cognizable request for relief in this § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for immediate release from custody; a prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

(PC) Jones v. Aung · filed 2020-02-25

Any claim seeking such relief can only be brought by way of a habeas action and not as part of a civil rights complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from imprisonment; a prisoner seeking release must pursue habeas relief.

Strader (ID 66677) v. Reno County District Court · filed 2020-03-09

Therefore, any claim seeking release from imprisonment is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody, so a petition seeking release should not be recast as a Section 1983 claim.

Griffin v. Warden · filed 2020-03-10

Because Griffin seeks release from custody, he properly styles this action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241. The Court declines to recharacterize this § 2241 habeas petition, in whole or in part, as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Thompson v. Sholar · filed 2020-03-25

To to the extent that Plaintiff’s first request is for a release from custody, this is not an available remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief to a prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release from incarceration; the prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Williams-Bey v. Fender · filed 2020-04-23

Accordingly, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks an immediate or speedier release from his incarceration in this case, his sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and he is not entitled to any relief by way of a civil rights action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief that would invalidate a prisoner’s sentence or result in immediate or speedier release; the prisoner must seek habeas corpus relief.

Henson v. Corizon Health LLC · filed 2020-04-28

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks the invalidation of his sentence, or any relief which would result in his immediate or speedier release, his exclusive remedy is a petition for habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking release from custody; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

ARNDT v. RUSELL · filed 2020-05-05

Accordingly, because Arndt cannot seek his release from custody under § 1983, his Complaint is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to § 1915A.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Dale v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2020-05-08

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks release from custody, this is not an available remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 is a vehicle for conditions of confinement claims, but immediate release from custody is a habeas remedy.

CRUZ v. DECKER · filed 2020-05-15

That said, it is not lost on this Court that conditions of confinement claims, like the ones Petitioner asserts, are traditionally brought through a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Here, Petitioner seeks immediate release from ICE custody, which is a remedy available through a habeas petition, not in a civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from custody; a prisoner seeking release must use habeas corpus.

WALKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2020-05-15

Walker’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983 to the extent he is seeking release.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Sanders, Jr. v. Wolff · filed 2020-05-19

Plaintiff cannot proceed with his request for release from custody under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but this relief is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Section 1983 can address prison conditions, but a claim seeking only immediate release from custody belongs in habeas.

Cobb v. Wolcott · filed 2020-05-29

Because Cobb is proceeding pro se and because his petition challenges the conditions of his confinement, the Court briefly addresses Section 1983, as well. ... But he does not seek an order directing prison or state officials to improve or correct any alleged deficiencies in those conditions; he seeks only immediate release from physical custody. ... Accordingly, Cobb’s claims fall “squarely within th[e] traditional scope of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Steward v. Wolcott · filed 2020-06-02

Section 1983, however, does not afford claimants the opportunity to seek release from custody.

Section 1983 does not provide release from state custody as a remedy for conditions of confinement.

Harrison v. Wolcott · filed 2020-06-04

Therefore, the Court agrees that the relief Petitioner seeks is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy for a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of imprisonment.

Madison v. Wolcott · filed 2020-06-11

Therefore, the relief Petitioner seeks is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Court declines to dismiss the Petition on the grounds that, as Respondent suggests, it is more properly the “subject of a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” ECF No. 12-5 at 6.

Section 1983 does not provide release from state custody as a remedy for a prisoner challenging conditions of confinement.

Holloway v. Wolcott · filed 2020-06-15

Therefore, the Court agrees that the relief Petitioner seeks is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody; a person seeking that relief must pursue habeas corpus.

Newman v. St. Louis County 21st Circuit Clayton, MO · filed 2020-06-16

To the extent that plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such a request is not properly before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Rather, plaintiff’s remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 is not a proper means to seek release from prison based on conditions of confinement.

Brady v. Wolcott · filed 2020-06-17

For the reasons discussed in Llewellyn v. Wolcott, No. 20-cv-498, 2020 WL 2525770, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not the proper procedural mechanism for Brady to seek release from Orleans based on the conditions of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Teague v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2020-06-22

Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Teague has no likelihood of success on the merits of his § 1983 claim in obtaining the relief that he seeks – release from custody.

Section 1983 does not provide outright release from prison; a prisoner seeking that remedy must pursue habeas corpus.

Hamby v. Parker · filed 2020-06-24

However, because the relief Plaintiff seeks is properly pursued through a habeas corpus petition rather than under Section 1983, and due to the nature of his claim, the Court will dispose of this matter without addressing the filing fee.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement and seeking release; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Pilton 806822 v. Washington · filed 2020-07-07

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release on parole as a remedy.

Winnett v. Khimes · filed 2020-07-09

Release on parole is not an available form of relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to seek release from custody through a civil rights action.

Mai v. Troxler · filed 2020-07-10

In addition, to the extent Plaintiff seeks her release, she may not do so via a civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from custody based on an allegedly unlawful conviction; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Eden v. Stoker · filed 2020-07-10

Plaintiff’s request for early release from custody because of an alleged unlawful conviction must be presented in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 does not provide a means to obtain release from custody.

(PC) Washington v. Fresno County Sheriff · filed 2020-07-13

plaintiff may not seek release from custody by way of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 is not the proper procedure for a prisoner to seek release from custody based on conditions of confinement.

Kabir v. Walcott · filed 2020-07-14

For the reasons discussed in Llewellyn v. Wolcott, No. 20-cv-498, 2020 WL 2525770, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not the proper procedural mechanism for Kabir to seek release from Orleans based on the conditions of his confinement.

Section 1983 is not the proper procedure for a state prisoner to seek release based on the conditions of confinement.

Lawry v. Wolcott · filed 2020-07-15

For the reasons discussed in Llewellyn v. Wolcott, No. 20-cv-498, 2020 WL 2525770, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not the proper procedural mechanism for Lawry to seek release from Orleans based on the conditions of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as the sole remedy for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

Tripathy v. Schneider · filed 2020-07-17

Therefore, the Court finds no reason to depart from its previous decisions holding that relief under Section 1983 is unavailable to a state prisoner who, due to allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement, seeks release from custody as his or her sole remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide release from prison as a remedy.

RAY v. WHITE · filed 2020-07-21

Instead, he seeks release from prison; a remedy which is not available in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from prison as a remedy.

ASKEW v. WHITE · filed 2020-07-21

Instead, he seeks release from prison; a remedy which is not available in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from prison.

PARTLOW v. WHITE · filed 2020-07-21

Instead, he seeks release from prison; a remedy which is not available in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from prison as a remedy.

ADAMS v. WHITE · filed 2020-07-21

Instead, he seeks release from prison; a remedy which is not available in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy of release from prison.

RIDLEY JR v. WHITE · filed 2020-07-21

Instead, he seeks release from prison; a remedy which is not available in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide immediate release from custody; a request for that relief must be brought through habeas corpus.

Aultman v. Shoop · filed 2020-07-27

Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks immediate release from custody, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42. U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a way to challenge unconstitutional prison conditions, but release from custody must be sought through habeas corpus.

Porter 165867 v. Washington · filed 2020-08-24

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

A prisoner seeking only immediate release from custody must pursue habeas relief rather than a Section 1983 action, even when the claim concerns prison conditions.

Brooks v. Wolcott · filed 2020-05-20

But he does not seek an order directing prison or state officials to improve or correct any alleged deficiencies in those conditions; he seeks only immediate release from physical custody. See Dkt. 1, at 5. Accordingly, Brooks’s claims fall “squarely within th[e] traditional scope of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy; a person seeking release must pursue habeas relief or relief in the underlying criminal case.

York v. Kansas, State of · filed 2020-09-10

Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for release is not cognizable in this civil rights case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue release, he must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or seek relief in his underlying criminal case.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody; a prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Petties v. Smalls · filed 2020-10-02

Plaintiff may not obtain release from custody in a § 1983 action; instead he can only obtain such relief by bringing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Sloat v. Benzing · filed 2020-10-08

Plaintiff’s request for release from custody is unavailable in this Section 1983 action and is therefore DENIED with prejudice in this action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain release from custody; a prisoner seeking release must pursue habeas relief.

Johnson v. State of Nevada Dept Parole & Probation · filed 2020-10-19

A person may not obtain release from custody through a § 1983 action and must instead pursue release through a habeas petition.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim seeking release from imprisonment.

Stickle v. Shawnee County District Attorney · filed 2020-10-20

Therefore, any claim seeking release from imprisonment is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot provide release from state custody; a prisoner seeking release must pursue habeas corpus.

Collins v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2020-10-29

If what the plaintiff seeks is release from custody, he must file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not a lawsuit under §1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody; a person seeking release must pursue habeas relief.

Townsend v. Lucas · filed 2020-10-29

It is appropriate for the plaintiff to seek release from custody by filing a habeas petition in federal court, but he cannot obtain release from custody through this §1983 case.

Section 1983 does not provide release from incarceration as a remedy.

Meredith v. IDOC · filed 2020-11-04

Accordingly, release from incarceration is not an available remedy in § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide prisoners with release from prison.

(PC) Hicks v. Miller · filed 2020-11-09

Prisoners cannot obtain release from prison by filing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from custody; a person seeking release must use habeas corpus.

Kennedy v. Villarreal · filed 2020-11-17

If Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, his exclusive remedy is a habeas corpus proceeding, not an action for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Faircloth v. CDOC · filed 2020-12-02

But, “release from custody is not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.” ... The Court declines to follow decisions from other Circuits, to the extent they hold otherwise.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from custody.

Safran v. Nassau County District Attorney's Office · filed 2020-12-04

Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff seeks to be released from custody, such relief is not available in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide an order releasing a state prisoner or changing the duration of confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Doolin v. Neal · filed 2020-12-08

As an initial matter, to the extent that Mr. Doolin is seeking an order directing that he be released from incarceration (or, as he phrases it, that his release date be reset to a date that his already passed), that relief is not available in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from detention through a civil rights action.

ALEXANDER v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2021-01-08

To the extent Petitionerseeks to use this civil rights action to challenge his denialof bail or his ongoing criminal proceedings, however, this Court has no jurisdiction to grant him the relief he seeks, i.e., release via this civil rights matter,1 see, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973), and in any event is precluded by binding Supreme Court authority from interfering with ongoing state court criminal proceedings,see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for prisoners seeking immediate release from custody; they must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Ware v. Weary · filed 2021-01-15

Ware cannot seek “immediate release from custody” though a §1983 lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy of release from custody.

Wiley v. Larry · filed 2021-01-22

First, the remedy of release from custody is not cognizable in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from custody; a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus.

HURDLE v. RUSSELL · filed 2021-01-26

Accordingly, to the extent that Hurdle seeks an order from this Court directing he be released from custody, that is not a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 and must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge to the validity of confinement that seeks release from custody.

Lee v. Tennessee, State of · filed 2021-01-26

However, the plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of his confinement is within the sole province of habeas corpus; his release from custody is not properly sought under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

Wylie v. Bonner · filed 2021-01-26

Overall, because Plaintiff requests relief which is not available under § 1983, the Court finds that he fails to state a claim for injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a federal district court to exercise jurisdiction over a school case alleging violations of constitutional rights, whether or not the alleged discrimination is racial.

Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School District · filed 1969-06-20

Hence there seems to be adequate authority for the fact that a federal district court can assume jurisdiction of a school case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when there is a charge of a violation of constitutional rights, regardless of whether the charge has racial implications.

Section 1983 supports a civil-rights action when a defendant’s conduct is alleged to deprive a person of rights secured by the Constitution, regardless of the character of the person’s own conduct.

Soglin v. Joseph F. Kauffman, Etc. · filed 1969-10-24

Plaintiffs’ conduct is not determinative of jurisdiction. The proper question here is whether defendants were depriving plaintiffs of any constitutional rights regardless of the character of their behavior. In our view, jurisdiction existed because the complaint alleged that defendants’ use of the doctrine of misconduct as a basis for its disciplinary proceedings subjected plaintiffs to “deprivation of * * * rights [and] privileges * * * secured by the Constitution” (42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 makes a complaint alleging a denial of constitutional due process, seeking damages and an injunction, cognizable.

Canty v. Board of Education · filed 1970-05-04

In substance, however, the complaint charges a denial of the constitutional right to due process and presumably seeks money damages and a permanent injunction directing defendant to reinstate plaintiff. The action is, therefore, cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and jurisdiction is based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343.

Section 1983 applies to a state prisoner's suit alleging that prison officials violated constitutional rights when the prisoner challenges the conditions of confinement rather than the legality of detention.

Thompson v. Blankenship · filed 1972-01-07

Since Thompson does not challenge the legality of his detention in the prison system, respondent has at all times handled this complaint as an “extraordinary prisoner suit” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). ... The court finds that such consideration is proper.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek federal-court relief for unfair treatment by state officials, including an injunction against discrimination, but it does not authorize a court to order the issuance of a liquor license.

James R. Berry and Lucille Berry v. Bert Allen, James R. Watts, William P. Lusk and Joe Jones · filed 1969-06-20

To put it bluntly, although an individual has the right under that Section to be treated fairly by State officials and may seek the aid of the federal courts to vindicate his right to fair treatment, this does not mean that he has a right to a liquor license. ... Although the District Court had jurisdiction to enjoin Kentucky officials from discriminating against Appellees, it had no power to order them to issue a liquor license.

Section 1983 supports jurisdiction when a complaint plausibly alleges that defendants acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiffs of a constitutional right.

Miloszewski v. Sears Roebuck & Co. · filed 1972-06-30

Having found that the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply to this search, and that the alleged search and seizure would be unreasonable, this Court concludes that the plaintiffs may have been deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 claims alleging the denial of constitutional rights by a state agency cannot be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction unless the claim is patently frivolous or wholly insubstantial.

Giulini v. Blessing · filed 1981-07-02

A complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 charging denial of constitutional rights by a state agency may not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction unless it appears that the claim is patently frivolous or wholly insubstantial.

A jail official's breach of a promise to award wages or good-time credit is not actionable under § 1983 when no state or federal law creates the promised entitlement.

Holton v. Fields · filed 1986-07-24

Nonpayment of wages or a disallowance of promised good time at best amounts only to an allegation of breach of contract, in the absence of public policy requiring payment of wages or allowance of good time for work performed while in jail. Neither West Virginia law nor federal law requires payment or good time credit under the circumstances. Accordingly, denial of the relief sought is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 pleading supplies federal jurisdiction and a means to seek damages and litigation costs for constitutional violations.

Chicago Board of Realtors v. City of Chicago · filed 1987-11-04

This pleading, of course, gives clear federal jurisdiction, and provides a means for which the plaintiffs can later seek damages and costs for having brought this action.

Section 1983 does not support pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim against a party lacking an independent federal jurisdictional basis.

Leopold v. Birkett · filed 1981-10-13

The Court concluded that Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) had “by implication declined to extend federal jurisdiction over a party” such as a county. ... Here Sylvie Leopold has no legal interest in her husband’s federal claim. Both spouses can obtain all the relief they seek in a state court. The court will therefore grant the motion to dismiss. ... The motion to dismiss the claims of Sylvie Leopold is granted.

Section 1983 claims may be heard only in federal district courts.

Schweitzer v. United States · filed 2008-07-18

Likewise, this court does not have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 or 1986 (2000), because it is well-settled that jurisdiction over such claims lies exclusively in the district courts.

Section 1983 provides for civil rights damages claims heard in district courts.

Del Rio v. United States · filed 2009-06-25

Similarly, “[the Court of Federal Claims] do[es] not have jurisdiction over civil rights claims,” Wildman v. United States, 28 Fed.Cl. 494, 495 (1993); only “[district courts have been given jurisdiction to hear claims for civil rights damages ...; the Court of Federal Claims has not.” Osborn v. United States, 47 Fed.Cl. 224, 232 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Consequently, this court is without authority to render judgment or otherwise provide relief relating to any potential claims premised on the statutory provisions cited in Mr. Del Rio’s complaint.

Section 1983 discrimination claims fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and belong in federal district court.

Pleasant-Bey v. United States · filed 2011-07-26

However, it is well-settled that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear discrimination claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Such jurisdiction has explicitly been given to the United States District Courts, not the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Section 1983 claims belong in district court and are outside the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction.

Grayton v. McDonald · filed 2015-01-09

Jurisdiction over § 1983 claims lies with district courts, not the Veterans Court.

Federal jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims lies in the district courts, so the Court of Federal Claims cannot hear them.

Ajamian v. United States · filed 2015-02-20

Accordingly, this court does not possess jurisdiction to hear claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district courts.

Gullett-El v. United States · filed 2016-04-20

However, the Federal Circuit has explained that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear civil rights claims and claims arising under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 because the federal district courts possess exclusive iurisdiction ... oversuchmatters.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983.

Brashear v. United States · filed 2019-06-10

However, civil rights claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are under the exclusive jurisdiction of federal dis- trict courts.

Section 1983 treats municipal employees as persons who may be sued for equitable relief; qualified immunity from damages does not shield them from that relief.

Scoma v. Chicago Board of Education · filed 1974-11-13

In that case, however, the Supreme Court conferred an immunity only from liability for damages; there was no indication whatsoever that such employees would be immune from equitable relief. Accordingly, this court finds that the defendant employees of the Board of Education are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore subject to federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 does not provide an inverse-condemnation claim against a private contractor that performed government-directed work within governmental specifications.

O'GRADY v. City of Montpelier · filed 1979-06-28

In these circumstances, the court finds that no cause of action for inverse condemnation can lie against defendant Munson, whether plaintiff sues directly under the Constitution or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state political subdivisions because they are not persons within the statute.

Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota · filed 1974-12-06

We also note that jurisdiction is premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Although the defendants have not raised this jurisdictional question, we think it is fundamental that the University of South Dakota and the corporate body constituting the Board of Regents, both political subdivisions of the state, may not be sued under the Civil Rights Act since neither entity constitutes a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state hospital because it is not a person within the statute.

Brown v. Farview State Hospital · filed 1974-12-11

I fully agree, and accordingly hold that Farview State Hospital is not a “person” within the comprehension of Section 983 and therefore is not subject to liability under that Act.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against a state or its supreme court because they are not persons within the statute.

County of Lancaster v. Philadelphia Electric Co. · filed 1975-01-03

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are entitled to dismissal for two additional reasons which require little or no discussion": (1) neither the Commonwealth nor the Supreme Court are “persons” against whom suit may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969) cert. denied 396 U.S. 1046, 90 S.Ct. 696, 24 L.Ed.2d 691 (1970); Meyer v. New Jersey, 460 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1972); Safeguard Mutual Insurance Company v. Pennsylvania, 372 F.Supp. 939 (E.D.Pa. 1974); Zuckerman v. App.Div., Second Dept., Supreme Ct. of State of N.Y., 421 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1970); Harris v. Louisiana State Supreme Ct., 334 F.Supp. 1289 (E.D.La.1971); and (2) neither the County nor the School District may bring suit againt the state or the judicial arm of the state asserting claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Williams v. Mayor, 289 U.S. 36, 53 S.Ct. 431, 77 L.Ed. 1015 (1933); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S.Ct. 534, 67 L.Ed. 937 (1923); Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 43 S.Ct. 539, 67 L.Ed. 943 (1923); New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Lavine v. Lindsay, 412 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 3012, 37 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1973).

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person within the statute's contemplation.

Buda v. Saxbe · filed 1975-01-06

The state is not a “ * * * citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof *. * * ” within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ... holding that the state of Tennessee is not a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights' Act.

Section 1983 does not permit a State to be sued as a defendant.

Hinish v. State of Maryland · filed 1975-03-26

(a) The State is not a proper defendant in a section 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights action against persons acting under color of state law, but not against federal officers.

Felder v. Daley · filed 1975-11-28

An action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not lie against federal officers. ... In a federal civil rights action against defendants acting under color of state law brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New York statute of limitations that is borrowed is the three-year statute provided by N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(2) for liability based upon a statute. ... This three-year period is not applicable to any action against Biss since his liability cannot be based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a defendant only when the record provides a basis linking that defendant to the alleged constitutional violation; an official’s lack of knowledge or participation defeats the claim.

United States Ex Rel. Ratchford v. Mazurkiewicz · filed 1978-05-23

With respect to Lieutenant Shilling’s presence during the conference between Phillips and the attorney, Ratchford nowhere alleges that Mazurkiewicz even knew of, much less that he ordered, this “interference” with Ratchford’s assistance of Phillips. ... Finally, although Ratchford alleges that Mazurkiewicz ordered the lockup on the evening of October 6, 1976, Mazurkiewicz’ affidavit explicitly refutes this allegation: “The defendant, Mazurkiewicz, did not order the plaintiff confined to his own cell pending disposition of the hearing.” ... As I noted earlier, Ratchford has submitted no affidavits or other material in opposition to the Mazurkiewicz affidavit.