42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires the challenged action to be taken under color of law.

Wallace v. DEBRON CORPORATION · filed 1973-08-30

A claim under this statute must be derived from actions taken under "color of law", 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of constitutional rights.

Brownley v. Gettysburg College · filed 1972-02-14

The essential elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are that the conduct complained of: (1) must have been done under color of state law and, (2) must deprive another of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action against a state actor who, under color of state law, deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution.

Bannister v. Paradis · filed 1970-09-10

There is no question, therefore, that the Pittsfield dress code is action by the State of New Hampshire. The serious question is whether or not the prohibition of wearing dungarees is a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. ... Since we have determined that a personal liberty is involved, and that the plaintiff has stated a claim under 42 U.S.C.-§ 1983, we now consider the second question, and that is whether or not the regulations against the wearing of dungarees is justified under these circumstances. ... The Court rules that the defendants have not justified the intrusion on the personal liberty of Kevin Bannister, small as that intrusion may be, and that the prohibition against wearing dungarees is unconstitutional and invalid.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to bring an action when the denial of access entails the denial of constitutional rights.

Folgueras v. Hassle · filed 1971-09-07

The fact that the denial of access entails the denial of constitutional rights entitles the plaintiffs to bring their action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy where state action has not deprived plaintiffs of a constitutional right; a corporation has no constitutional right to draw state water without paying for it.

Union Water Supply Corp. of Garciasville v. Vaughn · filed 1972-07-11

In addition to their attack upon the Wagstaff Act, Plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), alleging that the State has infringed upon their constitutional rights by terminating Union Water Supply Corporation’s temporary permit and by not allowing Union to draw water for the individual Plaintiff’s uses in the capacity of their agent. It does not appear to the Court that Plaintiffs have alleged deprivations of constitutional magnitude. Union certainly, as a corporation, is vested with no constitutional right to draw water from the Rio Grande without paying for it. ... The individual Plaintiffs here are possessed of the same rights to water as individuals state-wide, and are not treated differently.

Section 1983 relief requires an alleged deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, privilege, or immunity.

Luttrell v. Douglas · filed 1963-08-14

Taking the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and assuming that plaintiff’s claim is asserted under the Civil Rights Act, it must be dismissed because plaintiff has failed to aver the deprivation of any constitutionally protected right, privilege or immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide damages relief without proof that the defendants violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Dr. H. M. Don v. Okmulgee Memorial Hospital, a Charitable Institution, Defendants · filed 1971-05-11

The plaintiff failed to prove a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hence, his damage claim failed on this account.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action to adjudicate alleged deprivations of constitutional rights arising from the unconstitutional administration of a state statute.

Smith v. Cherry · filed 1973-11-27

Under these authorities it is apparent that the district court is obligated to resolve whether this Illinois statute has been administered in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits an action to secure rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Velez v. Amenta · filed 1974-02-15

The Court finds that this action may be maintained pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S. C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and its jurisdictional implementation, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), to secure to the plaintiffs their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for a breach of prosecutorial responsibility that does not deprive a person of rights secured by the Constitution or laws.

Martin v. Merola · filed 1975-01-23

If so, this breach of prosecutorial responsibility does not amount to a “deprivation of . rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability on state officials who, under color of law, deprive people of constitutional rights; police officers may be liable for warrantless arrests without probable cause when their conduct is not excused by good faith.

Manfredonia v. Barry · filed 1975-09-25

The subsequent arrest, charging and police processing of these plaintiffs were further deprivations of their civil rights under color of law, for they were made without a warrant, clearly were without probable cause and, in the court’s view of the evidence, not excusable on grounds of good faith.

Section 1983 provides a claim for violations of constitutional rights committed under color of state law.

Llewelyn v. Oakland County Prosecutor's Office · filed 1975-11-10

As to the probability of success on the trial, the issue is whether plaintiffs would probably succeed in establishing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Patterson’s raids violated their constitutional rights under color of state law. The court finds that until there has been an adjudication that the film is obscene, further arrests and seizures would constitute violations of plaintiffs’ first amendment rights and thus violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The likelihood of success on the merits is therefore high.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress alleged deprivations of Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Brumfield Ex Rel. Brumfield v. Dodd · filed 1975-12-02

The motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is denied because the plaintiffs have asserted a cause of action for which the Court can fashion relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs’ alleged deprivations of Fourteenth Amendment rights are capable of redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws.

Holmes v. Wallace · filed 1976-02-12

Under § 1983, Plaintiff can gain relief only for “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No such right, privilege or immunity is involved in the instant action. As previously set forth in this opinion, it is the finding of this Court that 36 U.S.C. § 175(c) does not create any rights in private individuals.

Section 1983 provides a claim for constitutional violations under color of state law.

Beck v. Mather · filed 1976-06-10

Since the court can find no allegations against defendants McCauley and Lintecum achieving constitutional magnitude or indicating any state action by said defendants they are hereby dismissed from this action. However defendants Dillon, Katenkamp and Easter, as Commissioners of the West Piedmont Planning District- Commission may have had some participation in the termination of plaintiff’s employment, and. thus a claim of constitutional magnitude against them has been stated.

Section 1983 applies to individual defendants who, under color of state law, deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Chavez-Salido v. Cabell · filed 1977-03-14

The individual defendants have denied these plaintiffs “under color of [a State] statute . . . [the] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . .” (§ 1983).

Section 1983 is violated when a state policy deprives people of First Amendment petition rights and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection.

Citizens Energy Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Sendak · filed 1978-10-16

A policy of the Attorney General of refusing to approve contracts for sub-grants or financial assistance between the Public Counselor and consumer groups who have employed lobbyists solely on the basis of their lobbying activity, and the Public Counselor’s refusal to consider applications for subgrants under 42 U.S.C. § 6805 by consumer groups who have employed lobbyists, by reason of the Attorney General’s policy, violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving plaintiffs of their first amendment right to petition the government and their right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy when a person, acting under color of state law, deprives someone of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Jech v. Burch · filed 1979-02-21

Section 1343 confers original jurisdiction on this court of an action brought to redress the deprivation, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States as prohibited by section 1983. ... Having earlier concluded that plaintiffs do assert a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution, I also conclude that jurisdiction lies to grant the requested relief. ... The refusal of the registrar of births to accept the surname “Jebef” as the child’s surname is a deprivation under color of state law of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 makes state-school officials' enforcement of unconstitutional speech policies actionable when it deprives teachers of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Hall v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COM'RS OF MOBILE · filed 1980-08-20

Policies KIA and KIB violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as they are applied, because they are administered in an arbitrary and inconsistent manner, and have been administered with the effect, if not the intent; of curtailing expression by members of the MCEA.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional deprivations by state actors, and these plaintiffs stated such a claim.

Tayyari v. New Mexico State University · filed 1980-08-29

There is no question but that Plaintiffs have stated a claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to vindicate constitutional deprivations, but respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under the statute.

Crow v. Washington County Board of Prison Inspectors · filed 1980-12-09

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 does provide a cause of action in circumstances such as these. ... Section 1983 is used to vindicate claims of constitutional deprivation rendering other “independent” causes of action superfluous. ... Respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of constitutional rights before a plaintiff may obtain relief.

Lumber Co. v. Brooks, Comr. of Labor · filed 1981-01-06

Simply stated, plaintiff has failed to show any deprivation of rights as required in order to claim relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; a speculative future injury is insufficient.

Reichenberger v. Rev. Richard Pritchard · filed 1981-10-21

Furthermore, the complaint must allege an actual deprivation of rights resulting from the defendants’ acts.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Williams v. Trimble · filed 1981-12-03

Section 1983 affords a remedy for the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws for liability to arise.

Rogers v. Scurr · filed 1982-05-05

Furthermore, title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute under which this action was brought, requires inter alia that, in order for liability to ensue, a person must be subjected to a "deprivation of ... rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws ...."

Section 1983 covers claims alleging that state actors deprived a person of substantive due-process rights secured by the Constitution.

Myre v. Board of Education of Seneca Township High School District No. 160 · filed 1982-08-09

To sustain a section 1983 claim a plaintiff must show that a defendant, acting under color of State law, deprived him of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. (42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1976).) ... Section 1983 speaks to the “deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” ... Due process rights, both procedural and substantive, are specifically protected by the Constitution. ... The court therein makes no statement or suggestion that substantive due process rights are “general rights” under the Constitution and thereby not entitled to relief under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a person deprived under color of law of rights secured by the Constitution and laws, so a claim requires a deprivation of such a right.

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education · filed 1982-09-07

The same is true of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Section 1983 provides a remedy for any person deprived under color of law of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” The only conceivable right, privilege or immunity that plaintiffs could have been deprived of was their Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. However, the court has held that the affirmative action plan at issue did not deprive them of that right. Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a civil action for a public authority’s denial of due process.

Hilf v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1982-10-13

Thus, the Authority unlawfully suspended Hilf without pay, action which constitutes a denial of due process actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must allege governmental action that caused the infringement of the plaintiff’s own rights.

Hadley v. County of Du Page · filed 1983-08-30

Because this suit is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hadley is required to allege governmental action which infringed upon his particular rights. If his injury does not result from governmental action, then he has no cause of action against the defendants under that section.

An on-duty police officer who uses official authority to coerce an unwilling victim into sexual intercourse violates constitutional rights under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Wedgeworth v. Harris · filed 1984-04-19

The Court entertains no doubt that an on-duty police officer who uses his position to exert pressure on an unwilling victim so as to force her into sexual intercourse has violated that person’s constitutional rights under color of State law.

State-law tort allegations do not state a Section 1983 claim unless the conduct also amounts to a deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Dunlap v. Beshear · filed 1986-10-01

Plaintiff clearly failed to state a violation of his constitutional rights which would be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Sec. 1985(3). At best, he has alleged state tort actions for medical malpractice, assault, defamation of character and abuse of process. His allegations may state a violation of state law, but they do not arise to a level of constitutional magnitude.

Section 1983 does not remedy state-law workplace-safety torts, and a voluntarily employed prison guard has no federal constitutional right to a safe working environment.

Preston A. Washington, Jr. v. District of Columbia · filed 1986-10-14

Whatever appellant’s rights may be under state law, he has no constitutional right to a safe working environment. Therefore, appellees’ failure to remedy safety problems at Lorton is not actionable under section 1983 as a deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest without due process of law.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must prove action under color of state law, deprivation of a federally protected right, and proximate causation by the defendant’s conduct.

Van Houdnos v. Evans · filed 1986-12-12

A successful claim under section 1983 requires plaintiff to prove (1) that defendants acted under color of state law, (2) that defendants’ actions deprived plaintiff of her rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution, and (3) that defendants’ conduct proximately caused plaintiff’s deprivation.

Section 1983 does not support an action when no constitutional rights have been violated.

Snyder Tank Corp. v. Superintendent of Insurance · filed 1988-06-02

There being no constitutional rights abrogated, an action under 42 USC § 1983 does not lie and is dismissed.

Section 1983 protects federal rights and provides no remedy for violations of a state constitution.

Waste Recovery Cooperative of Minnesota v. County of Hennepin · filed 1993-07-27

As discussed in the due process analysis above, section 1983 provides no remedy for violations of the state constitution.

Section 1983 applies only if the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution.

Ad Craft, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals · filed 1998-03-27

The BZA is correct that this statute applies only if the trial court finds that the BZA has deprived Ad Craft of a “right, privilege, or immunity secured by the [United States] Constitution.”

Section 1983 does not provide damages for violations of rights secured by a state constitution.

Furfaro v. City of Seattle · filed 2001-08-02

Because section 1983 allows for the recovery of damages for violation of rights secured by the United States Constitution and federal law, a claim under article I, sections 5 and 7 of the Washington State Constitution does not come within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle to assert a state constitutional right.

Megna v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2002-05-28

However, plaintiffs designated §1983 asserted cause of action does not provide a ... state constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for violations of a state constitution.

Brown v. Blaine · filed 2003-10-15

To the extent that Brown is claiming some entitlement to damages under Section 1983 for violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, such relief is not possible because Section 1983 only provides for damages when a state actor violates rights of a citizen that arise under federal law.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for violations of rights based on a state constitution.

Lecrenski Bros. Inc. v. Johnson · filed 2004-04-09

It does not provide a remedy for a violation of a right based on a state constitution.

Section 1983 generally does not provide a cause of action for a mere attempt to deprive someone of First Amendment rights.

Andree v. Ashland County · filed 1987-05-05

Taken together, those two cases make clear that the mere attempt to deprive a person of his First Amendment rights is not, under usual circumstances, actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a state constitutional right.

Radvansky v. Olmsted Falls · filed 2005-01-14

Accordingly, a claimed violation of a state constitutional right is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state constitutional rights.

Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls · filed 2005-01-14

Accordingly, a claimed violation of a state constitutional right is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to vindicate rights under a state constitution.

Whitesell v. Town of Morrisville · filed 2006-07-14

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to use section 1983 solely to vindicate his rights under the North Carolina Constitution or the town’s Personnel Policy, that claim also fails because section 1983 is not a vehicle that can be used to vindicate rights under a state constitution.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Hamblett v. BD. OF SAV. AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS, ETC. · filed 1979-02-28

The court has concluded that the complaint does not allege the existence of facts sufficient to charge defendants with violation of the Civil Rights of plaintiffs within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so as to confer jurisdiction upon the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation by state officials of rights created by federal statutes.

Thompson v. Binghamton Housing Authority · filed 1982-09-03

It remains to be considered whether plaintiffs may litigate the BHA’s alleged violations of the Act and regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for it is now settled that § 1983 provides a cause of action to redress a deprivation by state officials of rights created by federal statutes.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights by someone acting under color of state law, including a private actor who conspires or acts jointly with state actors.

ABLE SECURITY AND PATROL, LLC. v. Louisiana · filed 2008-07-24

For a private citizen to be held liable under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state actors. ... These allegations accepted as true for purposes of this Motion, are sufficient to state a claim against the private actors for violations of Plaintiffs’ civil rights. Thus, the Motions to Dismiss are denied as to Plaintiffs’ claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for constitutional rights violations committed under color of state law.

Williams v. James · filed 1991-07-25

Because granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been determined to be inappropriate, this Court must find— following Cody, Simmons, and Diaz—that relief for any prejudice suffered by this petitioner is best obtained through a suit for damages, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 lets a person sue for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Rogers v. Apicella · filed 2009-03-26

Under § 1983 a plaintiff claiming false arrest must demonstrate that he was subjected to the “deprivation of a[ ] right[ ], privilege[ ], or immunity] secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a parole claim based only on a state statute that creates no federal liberty interest.

Male v. Haun · filed 1994-06-10

Accordingly, we hold that the Utah parole statute does not create a liberty interest entitling Malek to due process protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and thus cannot be used as a basis for relief under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a state constitutional right that directly conflicts with federal law.

Brown v. Ely · filed 2000-12-15

We conclude that Brown failed to state a claim under § 1983 because the alleged right Brown asserts under the Alaska Constitution directly conflicts with federal law.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for constitutional injuries and imposes municipal liability for policy or custom based failures to supervise or train only when they cause the injury and reflect deliberate indifference.

Quinlan v. City of Pensacola · filed 2011-12-22

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), this Court has made clear that a prisoner cannot bring a civil rights claim for damages under § 1983 “if the adjudication of the civil action in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply that his conviction or sentence was invalid unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” ... A municipality is “liable under § 1983 when its employees cause a constitutional injury as a result of the municipality’s policy – or custom-based failure to adequately supervise its employees.” ... But “the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against persons who, under color of state law, cause deprivation of federal rights.

Kopman v. City of Centerville · filed 2012-05-11

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, causes a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir.2009).

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce state constitutional rights.

Godby v. Basinger · filed 2013-09-10

However, Section 1983 actions cannot be used to enforce state constitutional rights.

Section 1983 creates a mechanism for citizens to enforce constitutional rights against their own state governments.

McGowan v. United States · filed 2015-03-23

In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress specifically sought to create a legislative mechanism by which citizens could enforce their constitutional rights against their own state governments.

Section 1983 allows a civil suit when a private actor acting under color of state law violates the Federal Constitution.

Kyle Conklin and A.C., a Minor, by Kyle Conklin, Her Father, Next Friend and Legal Guardian, Applicant-Appellant v. Stat · filed 2015-03-25

When a private actor, operating under color of state law, violates the Federal Constitution, the plaintiff may bring a civil suit against them. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Iowa 1996).

Section 1983 imposes liability on a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of federal rights, but the claim fails when the evidence cannot support a reasonable jury finding.

Johnson ex rel. Estate of Newsuan v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2015-04-30

Johnson’s first claim is brought against Dempsey under § 1983, which provides for the imposition of liability on any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... The § 1983 claim against Dempsey must fail at this stage, therefore, because “the evidence is [in]sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict” for plaintiff.

Section 1983 lets an injured person seek damages from an individual who violated federal rights while acting under color of state law.

Batton v. Mashburn · filed 2015-05-12

Section 1983 “allows an injured person to seek damages against an individual who has violated his or her federal rights while acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action and requires deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Johnson v. City of Canton, Mississippi · filed 2015-11-24

Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but instead provides the mechanism for vindicating those rights. ... So for his section 1983 claims to survive summary judgment, Johnson had to show he was deprived a federal constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a civil action when a person acting under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Bell v. Management & Training Corp. · filed 2005-02-04

By its terms, § 1983 requires a plaintiff to show: (1) that the challenged conduct was attributable to a person acting under color of state law that (2) deprives the plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” or the laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of a state constitution.

Leora H. Bell v. City of Country Club Hills · filed 2016-11-08

As stated above, § 1983 remedies deprivations of federal constitutional rights; it does not contemplate state constitutional errors. Therefore, to the extent Bell is seeking a remedy for state constitutional violations, she would need to raise her claim in state court, as the district court here relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over any such claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state constitutional rights.

Snelling v. City of St. Louis, Missouri · filed 2019-10-24

Snelling also claims the damage to his property is in violation to Article 1, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution, but 42 U.S.C. §1983 does not apply to state constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of a state constitution.

BURDSALL v. WEST WHITELAND TOWNSHIP · filed 2020-04-29

A deprivation of rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution cannot form the basis of a Section 1983 claim.

For a personal-injury claim under § 1983 alleging an Eighth Amendment violation, mere negligence is insufficient; liability requires deliberate indifference, namely intentional indifference or reckless disregard.

Emory v. Duckworth · filed 1983-02-01

Because mere negligence would be insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an official would have to be intentionally indifferent or in reckless disregard before liability in a § 1983 action under the Eighth Amendment could be established.

Under § 1983, prison mistreatment or non-treatment must rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment to present a colorable claim.

Russell v. C.C. Sheffer, Superintendent Botetourt Correctional Unit, and Carolyn Maupia, L.P.N., Botetourt Correc · filed 1975-12-19

However, mistreatment or non-treatment must be capable of characterization as “cruel and unusual punishment” in order to present a colorable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to recover from a prison official who subjects or causes the prisoner to suffer discipline that violates the Eighth Amendment.

Schmitt v. Crist · filed 1971-11-02

Nevertheless, the eighth amendment guarantees a prisoner the right to be free from punishment which is cruel and unusual, and the prisoner may recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from that prison official who has subjected or caused him to be subjected to such discipline.

A § 1983 claim based solely on an alleged Eighth Amendment violation arising from a jail-law violation fails when defendants neither suspected nor should have suspected the prisoner's insanity.

Wright v. Wagner · filed 1981-03-30

The jury finding that defendants neither suspected nor should have suspected Mitchell of insanity is therefore sufficient to defeat the § 1983 claim in its entirety.

For a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment personal-injury claim, § 1983 liability requires deliberate or callous indifference—actual intent or recklessness—not mere negligence.

Risner v. Duckworth · filed 1983-04-22

Because mere negligence would be insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an official would have to be intentionally indifferent or in reckless disregard before liability in a § 1983 action under the Eighth Amendment could be established.

Section 1983 does not require proof of specific intent to deprive a plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Fashing v. Moore · filed 1980-01-23

However, a specific intent to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights is not a prerequisite to liability under § 1983.

General tort-law principles govern liability under § 1983.

Hibma v. Richard T. Odegaard, James Nikodem, and Michael Paul Szula, and Sawyer County, Wisconsin, Intervening · filed 1985-07-30

The general principles of tort liability govern the liability imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... and they provide guidance in the instant case.

Section 1983 itself has no state-of-mind requirement, though the underlying constitutional right invoked may require a particular mental state.

State Bank v. Camic · filed 1983-07-13

In short, even though Section 1983 embodies no state of mind requirement, ... the Eighth Amendment does.

Section 1983 permits a cause of action for a deprivation of federally protected rights caused by conduct under color of state law even when the deprivation was negligent rather than purposeful.

Apolinar Navarette, Jr., AKA Paul Medel Navarette v. Enomoto · filed 1976-07-29

Reading the statute in the prescribed fashion, we believe that a deprivation of rights need not be purposeful to be actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right.

Aldridge v. Mullins · filed 1972-04-27

No specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right is necessary for a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for mere negligence or a purely accidental act; the defendant must have acted consciously with some intent, even though specific intent to violate a constitutional right is unnecessary.

Jenkins v. Meyers · filed 1972-01-26

We hold that mere negligence involving an act void of not only specific intent but intent as such, is not grounds for a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not require proof that defendants intended the constitutional deprivation; it is enough that the deprivation was the natural consequence of their actions under color of law.

Ury v. Santee · filed 1969-08-25

In order to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is not necessary to allege or prove that the defendants intended to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights or that they acted wilfully, purposefully or in pursuance of a conspiracy. It is sufficient to establish that the deprivation of constitutional rights or privileges was the natural consequence of the actions of defendants acting under color of law, irrespective of whether such consequence was intended.

Section 1983 does not require an improper motive as a prerequisite to suit for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Roberts v. Williams · filed 1972-04-01

We therefore reaffirm our holding in Whirl v. Kern, that improper motive is not a prerequisite to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not require proof of specific intent and is read against tort principles that make a person responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.

United States v. Texas Education Agency · filed 1976-05-13

Second, in Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 484, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 505, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that specific intent is a necessary element of the cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute under which many school desegregation cases are brought. The Court held that § 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions". Id. We find no inconsistency between the rule applied in Monroe v. Pape and that applied in Keyes, nor do we find any reason for applying a standard different from Monroe v. Pape in school desegregation cases.

A state employee’s common-law tort becomes actionable under § 1983 only when motivated by a further intent to deprive the plaintiff of an independently protected constitutional right.

Brooks v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, Va. · filed 1983-09-08

In hopes that it makes sense we shall continue to follow our understanding of ... and demand that each such tort, before it becomes actionable under § 1983, be motivated by a further desire to deprive the plaintiff of independently protected rights.

Section 1983 itself imposes no intent requirement; scienter is required only when the underlying constitutional provision incorporates it.

McKAY v. HAMMOCK · filed 1984-03-30

Thus, an intent requirement is not part of a section 1983 action unless the action is based on a constitutional provision which itself incorporates an element of scienter.

Section 1983 has no state-of-mind requirement; the controlling question is whether the alleged conduct amounts to a constitutional violation.

Spallone v. Village of Roselle · filed 1984-04-11

However that resemblance vanishes when it is recalled, as even ... Parratt ... reiterates (451 U.S. at 534, 101 S.Ct. at 1912), Section 1983 has no state-of-mind requirement. As always the question is and should be whether the plaintiff has described constitutional violations.

A defendant’s intent or state of mind is irrelevant in a § 1983 action unless the plaintiff first shows deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

Stone Mountain Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt, III · filed 1984-11-13

First, inquiry into the state of mind of a defendant in a section 1983 action is wholly immaterial and irrelevant absent a showing of deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prison official’s mere negligence that causes a prisoner personal injury.

Davidson v. O'Lone · filed 1984-12-27

In summary, we hold that § 1983 retains its central role in affording remedies for victims of constitutional deprivation, but that such a role does not extend to providing a remedy for the type of negligence found in this case.

A public-employment sex-discrimination claim under Section 1983 requires proof that the challenged decision was purposefully discriminatory.

Hervey v. City of Little Rock · filed 1984-12-31

Her claim of sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the only possible claim she might maintain) requires proof of purposeful discrimination.

A § 1983 claim does not require proof of willfulness or specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right.

Hardmon v. County of Lehigh · filed 1985-06-17

An action pursuant to § 1983 does not necessitate proof of willfulness or specific intent to deprive the person of a federal right.

When the deprivation of liberty is intentional, a § 1983 due-process claim does not require proof that the separate failure to provide constitutionally required process was intentional or negligent.

Sourbeer v. Robinson · filed 1986-05-28

Here the defendants deliberately deprived Sourbeer of liberty, and failed to provide process that was constitutionally required — it was unnecessary for the district court to determine whether that failure was intentional, grossly negligent, or without fault at all, because there would be a constitutional violation in any event.

Negligent damage to property is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Tomkins v. Village of Tinley Park · filed 1986-07-21

Thus, plaintiff would state only a claim for negligence, which is insufficient to state a claim under Section 1983.

Claims based on negligent official conduct are not cognizable under § 1983.

Ballard v. Woodard · filed 1986-08-01

Thus, the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants based on negligence are not cognizable under § 1983 and judgment should be entered in the Defendants’ favor on these claims as a matter of law.

A § 1983 due-process claim requires more than mere negligence by the state official.

Griffin v. Gregory Hilke and Officer Francis Stoll · filed 1987-01-22

Thus a plaintiff must show more than mere negligence to recover for a due process violation under section 1983.

A failure-to-protect claim under § 1983 requires conduct amounting to gross negligence or deliberate indifference.

Ochko v. Michigan Department of Corrections Perry Johnson, Barry Mintzes, Robert Brown, Dan Bolden, D.E. Housewor · filed 1987-01-29

Furthermore, it is equally clear that appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as this Court has recently determined that facts virtually identical to those alleged by appellant are insufficient to establish gross negligence or deliberate indifference by appellees necessary to give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Negligent opening of a prisoner's legal mail does not rise to a constitutional deprivation actionable under § 1983.

Averhart v. Shuler · filed 1987-02-12

The plaintiff has only shown a negligent opening of his legal mail. The negligent ... opening of legal mail does not rise to a constitutional level.

Negligence alone is not a Fourteenth Amendment deprivation cognizable under § 1983.

Chesney v. Timothy Hill and Ronald Andrus · filed 1987-03-10

The plaintiff’s cause of action at best alleged negligence on the part of the defendants not cognizable as a Fourteenth Amendment “deprivation” of liberty in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a defendant to act with specific intent.

Ortega v. City of Kansas City, Kansas · filed 1987-03-18

The language of section 1983 itself contains no “knowingly” language, nor does the case law (as defendants concede) require that the defendants act with specific intent. We therefore hold that no error was committed when the court deleted the word “knowingly” from the defendants’ proposed instruction.

The rule barring Section 1983 due-process claims based on negligence does not shield officials from a claim alleging an intentional arrest without probable cause.

Max v. Paladino · filed 1987-03-13

The Supreme Court explicitly limited the reach of those decisions to § 1983 claims arising from negligent conduct. Plaintiffs claim is different because it alleges intentional conduct; by its nature an arrest is an intentional act.

Section 1983 has no independent state-of-mind requirement, and a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim does not require intentional conduct or gross negligence because probable cause does not turn on the officer’s subjective intent.

McKenna v. Clayton County, State of Ga. · filed 1987-03-23

As the above quotation indicates, ... Daniels ... did not alter ... Parratt ... to the extent the latter case holds that section 1983 does not include a state-of-mind requirement. Because a police officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant to a finding of probable cause, a plaintiff need not establish intentional conduct or even gross negligence to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Negligent or grossly negligent conduct causing unintended injury does not implicate procedural or substantive due process and therefore does not state a Section 1983 claim.

Greg Myers, Etc. v. R. Kathleen Morris, Scott County Attorney, Etc. · filed 1987-04-09

Thus allegations that the sheriff or other defendants deprived plaintiffs of procedural or substantive due process interests through negligent or “grossly negligent” conduct does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A lack of due care by police, prosecutors, or supervisors does not support Section 1983 liability because negligent conduct causing unintended property loss does not implicate due process.

Coffel v. Clallam County · filed 1987-04-13

The shortcomings or omissions demonstrated in the County's, prosecutor's and sheriff's response to plaintiffs' situation rise at most to the level of a lack of due care. ... Again, a demonstration of failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person is insufficient to support a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require proof of a specific intent to deprive a person of federal rights.

Diaz v. Houck · filed 1993-10-22

It is well settled that there is no requirement under Section 1983 to show a specific intent to deprive a person of his or her federal rights, Heinly, and injury to an individual’s liberty interest in safe confinement by negligent conduct does not implicate the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

Section 1983 does not require proof of intentional or willful misconduct to bring an action.

Seguin v. Donald L. Eide, Et Ux. · filed 1981-08-28

Proof of intentional or willful misconduct is not a prerequisite for bringing either a § 1983 or Bivens action.

Section 1983 does not require specific intent to violate federal rights when the plaintiff was actually deprived of those rights.

Honeywell, Inc. v. San Francisco Housing Authority · filed 2001-04-12

In this regard the Court notes that specific intent to violate federal rights is not a necessary element under Section 1983 where the plaintiff was in fact deprived of such rights.

Section 1983 does not require a defendant to intend to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Visser v. Magnarelli · filed 1982-01-19

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), however, forecloses that argument. Canvassing the language of section 1983, its legislative history and case law, the Court found that section 1983 does not contain a state of mind requirement.

Section 1983 requires an intentional act, but does not require a specific intent to deprive someone of a federal right.

Edwards v. Shanley · filed 2014-09-25

In fact, the undisputed evidence establishes that Shanley intentionally ordered Rosco to bite Edwards, and the mens rea component of § 1983 liability requires nothing more.

Section 1983 adds no intent requirement beyond what the underlying constitutional right requires.

Dancy v. McGinley · filed 2016-12-07

What mental state a § 1983 plaintiff is required to prove depends on the right at issue. Section 1983 "does not itself import an intent standard into an underlying constitutional deprivation that lacks such a requirement."

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim even when state law provides a partially overlapping tort remedy.

Murphy v. Lynn · filed 1997-07-08

Finally, we reject defendants’ additional contention that Murphy is barred from pursuing this § 1983 action because New York State law provides a remedy for the partially overlapping tort of malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 liability is subject to state immunity for child abuse reporters that Congress authorized through 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(1)(B).

Thomas v. Chadwick · filed 1990-10-16

Thus, while the more general remedy provided by section 1983 might have provided an avenue for damage claims against reporters, we interpret the more specific congressional enactment of 42 United States Code section 5106a (b)(1)(B) as engrafting an immunity defense for reporters upon section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action against a witness for allegedly perjurious testimony in a judicial proceeding because witnesses are absolutely immune from such suits.

Myers v. Bull · filed 1979-06-11

Without engaging in an unduly detailed discussion of the history of the common law rule granting absolute immunity to witnesses, we agree that the majority position is correct and that witnesses should be immune from civil rights suits alleging perjurious testimony.

Section 1983 gives witnesses in state judicial proceedings absolute immunity from civil liability for their testimony.

Burke v. Jerry Miller, M.D. · filed 1978-07-06

Our theorem is that any witness in a State judicial proceeding enjoys an absolute immunity — not qualified in any degree— from liability under the pleaded Civil Rights Acts.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to a common-law privilege governing police use of deadly force unless that privilege is unconstitutional.

Jones v. Marshall · filed 1974-10-08

These common law principles, if constitutional, are applicable here: in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), a suit under § 1983 for damages for false imprisonment, the Court emphasized that the section “should be read against the background of tort liability” and recognized the common law privilege of a police officer to make an arrest, in good faith and with probable cause, of one whose innocence is later proved. Similarly, this Court must allow Marshall to use the common law privilege enunciated by Martyn v. Donlin as a shield against liability unless that common law privilege itself be unconstitutional.

Section 1983 does not abolish established common-law immunities for public officials acting within their official roles.

Martone v. McKeithen · filed 1969-07-11

We do not believe that this settled principle of [the immunity of public officers from suit] was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable “every person” who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.

Section 1983 does not abrogate common-law immunities, so officials immune from damages suits at common law are likewise immune under the statute.

Johnson v. Warden Noah Alldredge and Corrections Officer Cronrath · filed 1973-12-12

This panel feels similarly constrained by our decision in Bauers to hold that officials immune from damage suits at common law would also be immune from such suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions analogous to false arrest or false imprisonment do not permit a probable-cause challenge when there is a valid conviction.

Pouncey v. Ryan · filed 1975-06-20

The present action, as plaintiffs concede, is similar to the common law actions of false arrest and false imprisonment, and in neither of these actions is a plaintiff permitted to challenge probable cause in the face of a valid judgment of conviction.

Section 1983 is interpreted in light of common-law tort liability when applicable.

Colton v. John B. Swain, and Third-Party v. Pacific Indemnity Co., a Corporation, Third-Party · filed 1975-12-17

In addition, we note that the nexus between section 1983 violations and the common law has long been recognized. The Civil Rights Act is to be interpreted in light of common law tort liability when applicable.

Section 1983 does not make an assault and battery allegation based solely on a common law tort cognizable.

Hardin v. Deputy Bemis, Wayne County Jail Administrator, Internal Security Bureau of Interviewers, Deputy Underwo · filed 1990-10-11

Hardin's assault and battery allegation is a common law tort which is not in itself cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a common law tort.

Thomas v. Ferguson · filed 2004-12-02

Even if true, Plaintiff's claims would at most give rise to a common law tort, which does not on its own establish a claim under § 1983, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), even if the victim is a prisoner with limited other options for recourse.

Section 1983 claims are not established by an allegation that officers acted under an allegedly invalid zoning ordinance without malice or bad faith.

Harvey v. Town of Waitsfield · filed 1979-02-14

That section of the U.S.C. is not dependent upon the zoning appeal mechanism set out in 24 V.S.A. § 4472, and the part of the complaint relying on its provisions was, accordingly, properly before the superior court. ... Absent a claim of malice or bad faith, the mere allegation that town officers acted under the authority of an allegedly invalid zoning ordinance does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not make an officer liable for a constitutional tort merely because the officer serves a facially valid warrant.

Plampin v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1978-12-27

The fact that the officer then served the warrant does not create a constitutional tort.... If it did, every time a defendant was acquitted the officer who arrested him under a valid warrant could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 gives a law enforcement officer a defense to a damages action by proving that the officer acted in good faith with a reasonable belief that the conduct was constitutional.

Brubaker v. Thomas King, Individually and in His Capacity as Special Agent for the United States Bureau of Customs · filed 1974-11-07

We conclude, therefore, that it is a defense to an action for damages under § 1983 or the Fourth Amendment for a law enforcement officer to prove that he acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the constitutionality of his conduct.

Section 1983 actions allow officials a good-faith, reasonable-belief defense to liability.

Vincent Anderson and Christine Anderson v. Jack Decristofalo, Thelma Black, Patrick Murphy, Efendants · filed 1974-03-13

The Andersons argue against the claims of the appellants policemen that the good faith-reasonable belief defense set forth in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 456 F.2d 1339 (2 Cir. 1972), and relied on below, is not available in § 1983 actions, and that the defense in any event could not have been met on the facts of this case. We reject both claims.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a peace officer who, in good faith and reasonably, executes a search warrant issued by a judicial officer, even if the issuing officer erred.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sincavage · filed 1971-03-24

A peace officer who acts in good faith and in a reasonable manner in executing a search warrant issued by a judicial officer is not made liable in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon a showing that the judicial officer erred.

Section 1983 permits officers sued for civil-rights violations to assert a good-faith and probable-cause defense.

Butler v. United States · filed 1973-11-08

These principles apply whether the action is a common-law tort suit, a § 1983 civil rights suit, or a Bivens-type constitutional suit. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), held specifically that the defense of “good faith and probable cause” which was available to officers in a common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment is also available in actions under § 1983, and Bivens (on remand at 456 F.2d 1339) held specifically that this same defense is available in an action under the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 gives a police officer no greater defenses than those available under pertinent state law.

Thamel v. Town of East Hartford · filed 1974-02-25

Accordingly, this Court concludes that a police officer’s defenses to a § 1983 action are no greater than those available to him under pertinent state law.

Section 1983 permits liability for law enforcement officers who execute a search warrant unreasonably even when they have a good-faith, reasonable belief in the warrant's validity.

Duncan v. Barnes · filed 1979-04-13

Law enforcement officers having a good faith and reasonable belief in the validity of the search warrant may nonetheless incur liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), if the warrant is executed in an unreasonable manner.

A police officer is not liable under § 1983 when he reasonably and in good faith believed that his detention of the plaintiff was constitutional.

Diehl v. Gavin · filed 1984-05-16

While it is regrettable that the incident occurred, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be imposed on the defendant, whose actions, we have concluded, were taken in good faith.

Police officers may assert good faith and probable cause as defenses to Section 1983 liability.

Luera v. Snyder · filed 1984-12-27

In ... Pierson v. Ray, ... the court stated that good faith and probable cause are defenses available to police officers under § 1983. Defendants were entitled to have the jury instructed on that defense.

An arrest supported by probable cause is constitutional under section 1983, and an officer's bad faith or evil intent cannot turn it into a constitutional violation.

Frank Jureczki, Cross-Appellee v. The City of Seabrook, Texas, Cross-Appellants · filed 1985-05-20

If there exists probable cause at the time, the arrest is constitutional. The evil intent or bad faith of an officer in obtaining or executing a valid warrant cannot transmute an arrest made with probable cause into a section 1983 violation, just as an officer’s good intent is irrelevant when he contravenes settled law.

For Section 1983 immunity, an officer executing a search warrant obtained by fellow officers may assume the warrant is valid.

Kenneth George Morris and Judy Irving Morris v. County of Tehama · filed 1986-07-28

We similarly conclude that for purposes of section 1983 immunity, an officer is entitled to assume the validity of a ... warrant secured by fellow officers.

An officer seeking an arrest warrant receives qualified immunity when the asserted facts provide an objectively reasonable basis for probable cause, including when competent officers could disagree whether the warrant should issue.

Howell v. Roberts · filed 1987-03-27

Immunity is contingent on the officer’s having an objectively reasonable basis for his belief that the facts alleged in his affidavit are sufficient to establish probable cause. ... But, if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether a warrant should issue, immunity is recognized.

Private parties sued under § 1983 for using state attachment procedures cannot claim good faith immunity, but good faith reliance on counsel can establish a defense to liability.

James E. Duncan, Cross-Appellee v. Mr. & Mrs. Harold Peck, Cross-Appellants, Highland Coal & Chemical Corporation · filed 1988-04-25

Because we find no evidence that private parties were immune from suit at common law, and because the various rationales for good faith immunity are inapplicable to private parties, we hold that private parties are not eligible for immunity from suit. ... Therefore, if defendant, in good faith relied on his attorney’s advice that attaching plaintiff’s property was a valid legal procedure, then the defendant has shown probable cause for his actions, which defeats plaintiff’s malicious prosecution suit.

Officers sued under § 1983 may assert a defense of good faith and probable cause for an arrest.

Ford v. Wells · filed 1972-05-18

The defense of good faith and probable cause is available to officers in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Police officers sued under § 1983 may assert a defense of good faith and probable cause.

Kipps v. Ewell · filed 1976-03-03

Defendants Keyser and Williams enjoy no immunity from suit, but they may avail themselves of the defense of good faith and probable cause in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not establish jurisdiction for a complaint based solely on the loss of money.

Thomas v. Elza H. Papp, Circuit Judge of Genessee County, Thomas E. Bell, Sheriff · filed 1972-02-28

A complaint based upon the loss of money does not establish jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights plaintiff to proceed without proving a minimum amount in controversy.

Abbit v. Bernier · filed 1974-12-24

Since the suit is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is no jurisdictional requirement that the plaintiff prove a minimum amount in controversy, Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 161, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943), and the statutory prohibition, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, on federal court injunctions against state court proceedings ... does not apply, Michum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972).

Section 1983 actions do not require a $10,000 amount in controversy.

Stone v. City of Wichita Falls · filed 1981-06-04

It is clear that causes of action based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not require a $10,000 amount in controversy.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to claim or show that any minimum dollar amount is due.

Thomas v. Yonkers Police Dept. Transportation Unit · filed 1993-04-02

The general federal question jurisdictional statute (28 U.S.C. § 1331) does not now contain any monetary threshold, nor does 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require that any dollar amount be claimed or shown to be due.

Counties and their officials are persons under § 1983 and ordinarily do not share a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Crane v. Texas · filed 1985-07-22

In sum, we hold that neither Dallas County nor its officials are protected by the immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment and that both the County and its officials are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A municipality is not merely a nominal Section 1983 defendant because it may remain liable even when an individual officer has qualified immunity or is exonerated, if the officer acted pursuant to municipal policy or regulation.

Hewitt v. City of Stanton · filed 1986-08-29

As a municipality, the City could be held liable even if the good faith qualified immunity defense would shield Sperl from liability. ... The City could also be liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), even if Sperl were exonerated, as long as Sperl had, in fact, acted pursuant to municipal policy or regulation. ... Thus, there is no legal basis for arguing that the City is a nominal party.

Section 1983 permits local government units to be sued as persons.

Kennibrew v. Russell · filed 1983-12-29

Thus, the governmental units named as defendants in plaintiff’s action may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An entity with eminent domain powers under the Natural Gas Act is a quasi-governmental entity for purposes of a § 1983 action.

Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation v. Deana Wing Field Drain · filed 2001-01-08

We note that because Columbia Gas has eminent domain powers under the Natural Gas Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 7171(h), it is a quasi-governmental entity for purposes of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against a state or its supreme court because neither is a “person” under the statute.

Louis v. Supreme Court of Nevada · filed 1980-04-16

Further, a state is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. ... The state’s supreme court, likewise is not a “person” under said statute. ... As an agency of the State of Nevada, the Supreme Court of Nevada is not such a “person”. Therefore, the motion of the Supreme Court of Nevada to dismiss the complaint against it must be granted.

Section 1983 permits suits only against persons, so a state agency is not a proper defendant.

Fischer v. Hon. William T. Cahill, Governor of New Jersey · filed 1973-03-01

That state agency may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since it is not a person.

Section 1983 does not authorize suit against a state because a state is not a “person” within the statute.

Williford v. People · filed 1965-10-28

The allegations of fact contained in the amended complaint, as summarized above, do not state a claim against the State of California under the Civil Rights Act. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-192, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, it was held that a municipal corporation is not a “person” subject to suit within the meaning of R.S.1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipal corporation is but a political subdivision of a state, and if a state’s political subdivisions are not “persons” under the statute, then neither is the state. See, also, Charlton v. City of Hialeah, 5 Cir., 188 F.2d 421, 422-423. The district court therefore did not err in granting the Rule 12(b) (6) motion as to the defendant state.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages claims against a state or state agencies because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Horn v. People of California · filed 1968-09-23

The motion to dismiss will be granted as to defendants “State of California”, “The People of California” and “State Department of Corrections.” Such entities are not persons and are not subject to damage suits under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a person; a state is not a person for purposes of the statute.

Pavlak v. Duffy · filed 1969-12-19

A suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be against a person. A state is not a person for the purposes of this statute. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Serrano v. People of the State of California, 361 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1966).

Section 1983 does not treat a State itself as a “person” subject to suit.

Williams v. Lloyd Eaton, as Football Coach of the University of Wyoming · filed 1971-05-14

With respect to the State of Wyoming, we are satisfied that the dismissal was proper. In view of the principles of the Eleventh Amendment relief could not be granted against the State itself, and the State is not a person within the meaning of the civil rights statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 29 (9th Cir.).

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a state agency's alleged overstepping of its authority when the plaintiff received the constitutionally adequate notice and hearing required by due process.

Sucesion Suarez Through Its Members v. Gelabert · filed 1983-03-09

As long as plaintiffs were given the procedural protection to which the Constitution entitles them, and they do not dispute the fact that they were given constitutionally adequate notice and a hearing, the fact that one state agency may have overstepped its authority in exercising appellate review over another state agency does not state a claim for which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 permits this inmate’s claim against the state corrections department to proceed for relief other than monetary damages.

Burke v. ND Dept. of Correcti · filed 2002-06-25

Thus, Mr. Burke’s action should have been allowed to proceed against NDDCR for relief other than monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Benedetto v. Indiana University · filed 1999-04-05

For purposes of § 1983 the State is not a “person”. Therefore, neither the State nor its officials when sued in their official capacity can be sued for money damages under this section.