42 U.S.C. § 1983

A plaintiff seeking damages for a constitutional violation need not expressly cite §1983 in the complaint to state a claim.

Johnson v. City of Shelby · filed 2014-11-10

In particular, no heightened pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional rights to invoke §1983 expressly in order to state a claim.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts supporting every material element of a viable claim and give defendants notice of its basis.

Brooks v. Roy · filed 2015-01-27

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff in his complaint must include “either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted); see Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1062 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that, even under liberal pleading standard, “plaintiff must allege facts . . . that, if true, would support the existence of the claimed torts”).

A plaintiff must plead more than constitutional buzzwords to state a Section 1983 claim.

Tower Lane Properties v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2015-02-13

To state a section 1983 cause of action a plaintiff must plead more than constitutional “buzzwords.”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to expressly identify it as the vehicle for a constitutional claim when the defendant has not been prejudiced.

Smith v. Campbell · filed 2015-04-01

Accordingly, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Johnson, the district court dismissal of Lilly’s constructive seizure claim on the ground that he failed to specifically identify § 1983 in that portion of the amended complaint was in error.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing government actors to identify who did what to whom so each defendant has fair notice of the claim.

Stone v. Simone · filed 2015-04-30

When alleging § 1983 violations against government actors, a plaintiff must “make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state.”

A § 1983 claim must identify a specific constitutional right or provision that the defendant allegedly violated.

Ramos v. City of Miami · filed 2015-07-20

Ramos must plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in accordance with a specific constitutional right or provision. He has failed to properly allege a violation of his First Amendment right to assemble peaceably.

Section 1983 complaints are assessed under the ordinary Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard.

Whitsett v. Cannon · filed 2015-09-30

In light of this Eleventh Circuit precedent and because Defendants do not assert that the heightened’ pleading standard applies) the Court will apply the stan■dard of review set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege facts showing what each defendant did to support a claim against that defendant.

Tommy L. Green, Sr. v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2015-10-07

We agree with the magistrate judge and the district court that the amended complaint falls far short of stating a cognizable claim under § 1983. The amended complaint contains no factual allegations as to any defendant, despite the magistrate judge’s instruction to Mr. Green to provide such details.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing that the defendant violated a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Tobkin v. Rudzik · filed 2016-03-23

Tobkin’s amended complaint was entirely devoid of factual allegations that give rise to a cognizable claim under § 1983. His only factual allegations were that Scott impersonated a state court’s deputy clerk and that the other defendants knew it. He failed to specify any “right secured under the Constitution or federal law” that their actions violated.

Section 1983 claims may proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that a defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right under color of state law.

Halley ex rel. J.H. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma State Department of Human Services · filed 2016-03-31

However, the Court finds Plaintiffs factual allegations to be sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing how each defendant violated the plaintiff’s federal rights while acting under color of state law.

Howard v. Paye · filed 2016-05-27

As for her § 1983 claims, Ms. Howard has not clearly set forth factual allegations as to how she believes each defendant violated her constitutional rights while acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint must identify the particular conduct by each defendant that allegedly harmed the plaintiff.

Parson v. Phelps · filed 2016-06-20

This means that plaintiffs must identify “the particular conduct” of defendants that is alleged to have harmed the plaintiffs. ... The court agrees that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this requirement but for the claim directed at defendant Pierce and his enforcement of a prison regulation limiting each prisoner to three (3) books.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.

Corona v. Verderosa · filed 2016-11-03

The district court properly dismissed the claims against defendants Gatie, Jones, Vinson, and Montgomery because Corona failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to make clear what each defendant allegedly did to the plaintiff.

Valdez v. Derrick · filed 2017-03-13

In asserting a § 1983 claim, it is important “that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.” Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250. Valdez’s allegations do not meet this standard.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to identify the right allegedly violated and the facts supporting the claim.

Folk v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-21

Plaintiffs first substantive claim—a violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983—must be dismissed for failure to provide Defendants, or this Court, notice regarding the substance of or factual basis for this claim.

A Section 1983 claimant in Delaware state court must plead enough facts to make the claim plausible.

Ekridge v. Warden Jim Hutchins · filed 2017-03-22

After considering the matter, the Court holds that a Section 1983 claimant in a Delaware State court must plead his or her claim with sufficient particularity to satisfy the plausibility standard.

A § 1983 complaint must give fair notice that the claimed deprivation involves a federal right; allegations expressly based on the Alabama Constitution did not suffice.

Brazelton Props., Inc. v. City of Huntsville · filed 2017-04-21

Because Brazelton's amended complaint expressly alleged that the city had violated its rights under the Alabama Constitution and specifically requested relief pursuant thereto, we do not view the allegations set forth in its amended complaint as "fair notice" to the city that its claims were instead predicated upon alleged violations of the United States Constitution such that it sufficiently pleaded a § 1983 claim under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Leatherman.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a federally protected right allegedly deprived by the defendant.

Cory And Melissa Jespersen, V Clark County · filed 2017-07-05

Thus, because the Jespersens fail to identify a federal constitutional right and fail to plead a cognizable claim, we hold that the Jespersens’ 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim fails.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to cite it by name when the complaint otherwise states a plausible claim.

Saintcome v. Tully · filed 2017-11-08

There is no requirement to invoke § 1983 by rote in order to state such a claim.

A § 1983 complaint that fails to identify which magistrate allegedly caused the rights violation does not state a cognizable claim for relief.

Colburn v. Odom · filed 2018-12-21

All counsel alleged was that as to each client, one of the magistrates (unidentified) at some point in time (undisclosed) failed to determine that the client’s arrest was supported by probable cause. The Magistrate Judge should have dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint on his own initiative because it failed to state a cognizable claim for relief.

A § 1983 complaint must allege that the defendants acted under color of law and identify what they did to violate a federal right.

Birkhead v. Smith · filed 2019-05-01

In the Report and Recommendation, Judge Schanzle-Haskins found that, while Plaintiff purports to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff did not allege that the named defendants acted under color of law, when or where the defendants harmed her, what constitutional or other federal right the defendants violated, or what the defendants did that violated her rights. Accordingly, Judge Schanzle-Haskins concluded that the Complaint failed to state a claim under § 1983. After reviewing the Complaint and the Report and Recommendation, this Court finds no clear error. ... (1) The Court ACCEPTS the Report and Recommendation (d/e 4) in its entirety.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing what each named defendant did or failed to do to deprive the plaintiff of federal rights.

Washington v. Morton · filed 2019-05-09

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” ... Plaintiff does not make any comprehensible allegations against the named Defendants. It is not clear what these Defendants allegedly did or failed to do that harmed Plaintiff. The Court therefore dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege how the defendant acted under color of state law and violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Martin v. Morning Star, LLC · filed 2019-06-11

Plaintiff has failed to set forth a short and plain statement describing the Defendant’s alleged actions, how the Defendant was a state actor, how the Defendant has violated his rights under the color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint must plausibly allege that a person acting under color of state law proximately caused a violation of federal rights.

Rogstad v. Overguard · filed 2019-08-23

To state a plausible civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). ... Though sparse, Plaintiff’s allegations state a federal and state law claim upon which he can proceed.

Section 1983 requires more than vague or conclusory allegations to state a civil rights claim.

RUCKER v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2019-08-28

Plaintiff should note that, in civil rights cases, more than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead deprivation of a federal right under color of state law; legal conclusions without factual allegations do not state a plausible claim.

Love v. The Florida Department of Revenue · filed 2019-09-18

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that he was (1) deprived of a right; (2) secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (3) that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. ... The Amended Complaint is entirely devoid of any factual allegations and contains only legal conclusions.

Section 1983 claims are subject to ordinary notice pleading, without a heightened pleading requirement.

Smith v. City of Salem · filed 2004-06-01

Claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not subject to heightened pleading standards.

A § 1983 complaint must allege how the defendant acted under color of law and identify specific conduct that deprived the plaintiff of a protected right.

Ju v. Lacombe · filed 2019-10-18

However, Ju does not explain how Lacombe acted under color of law, nor does she describe specific actions that Lacombe took—beyond evicting her through valid legal process—that deprived her of any right, privilege or immunity that the Constitution guarantees. Consequently, the Court dismisses the fifth cause of action for failure to state a claim.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege more than vague, conclusory claims to state a cause of action.

Carpenter v. Horta · filed 2019-10-24

Plaintiff should note that, in civil rights cases, more than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff need not expressly invoke Section 1983 to state a claim under it.

Johnson v. City of Shelby, Mississip · filed 2014-12-23

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed ... our judgment, holding that a plaintiff need not expressly invoke Section 1983 to state a claim under the statute. ... Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion.

Section 1983 claims must allege a specific constitutional violation to state a cause of action.

FROMOSKY VS. TOWNSHIP OF LITTLE EGG HARBOR (L-0723-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-11-14

In the proposed amended third-party complaint, neither the federal CRA claims nor the amended NJCRA claims alleged a specific constitutional violation. As such, the amended third-party complaint did not properly articulate a cause of action under the NJCRA or the federal CRA.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing what each defendant did and identify the federal right allegedly violated.

Smith v. Brown · filed 2019-11-15

The Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... There are no factual allegations regarding Defendants Douglas M. Brown, University of New Mexico, University of New Mexico Police Department, Tim May, Nasha Torrez, Caitlin Henke or Jessica Hidalgo Holland.

A Section 1983 claim may be dismissed with prejudice when the plaintiff lacks facts to plead it and amendment would be futile.

Reed v. Gautreaux · filed 2019-11-21

Implicitly, Plaintiff concedes she lacks facts to plead a Section 1983 claim; hence, the Court finds that amendment would be futile, and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against EMS/EMS employees should be dismissed with prejudice.

A section 1983 complaint must identify the constitutional right each defendant violated and plead facts that plausibly support each violation.

Poochigian v. Steinheimer · filed 2019-12-05

To adequately plead the section 1983 elements, a complaint must identify what constitutional right each defendant violated, and provide sufficient facts to plausibly support each violation. ... Therefore, Plaintiff is also required to submit an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.

Baumgartner v. Larsen · filed 2019-12-09

First, there are simply not enough facts in the Complaint to support a reasonable inference that either Defendant acted with the requisite state of mind or that either Defendant’s actions violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A § 1983 claim challenging enforcement of child support orders must allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim.

Isbell v. Okdhs · filed 2019-12-13

The district court properly dismissed Isbell’s remaining § 1983 claims challenging defendants’ enforcement of the Oklahoma state court child support orders, and her disability discrimination claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, because Isbell failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim.

A plaintiff seeking damages for a constitutional violation need not expressly invoke § 1983 in the complaint to state a claim.

Livingston v. City of Chicago · filed 2020-01-07

Plaintiffs are not required to plead legal theories. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11, 135 S. Ct. 346, 190 L. Ed. 2d 309 (2014) (“[N]o heightened pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to state a claim.”). ... As such, Plaintiffs may amend their complaint to include their proposed § 1983 and ICRA claims.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory and vague allegations to state a claim.

Howard v. Centurion Physician · filed 2020-01-09

A plaintiff must offer more than conclusory and vague allegations to state a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations sufficient to state a claim; conclusory assertions that defendants violated the plaintiff’s rights are insufficient.

(PC) Dunbar v. California Corrections Department · filed 2020-01-21

Plaintiff has stated only conclusory allegations that defendants violated his rights. Such statements are not sufficient to state a cognizable claim.

Merely invoking § 1983 in a complaint’s jurisdiction and venue section does not state a claim.

EL v. PEOPLE'S EMERGENCY CENTER · filed 2020-02-06

This conclusory invocation of § 1983 is not sufficient to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived them of a federal right, with enough detail to give defendants fair notice of the claim.

Benitez-Giron v. Myer · filed 2020-02-28

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. ... Plaintiff's current complaint fails to provide the defendants with fair notice of the facts and law upon which their liability is based.

Section 1983 claims cannot rest on conclusory, vague, and general allegations.

Smith v. Village of Freeport Police Dept. · filed 2020-03-04

Finally, the plaintiffs' conclusory, vague, and general allegations were insufficient to support claims under 42 USC § 1983 ( see Diederich v Nyack Hosp. , 49 AD3d 491, 494; Incorporated Vil. of Ocean Beach v Maker Water Taxi, Inc. , 201 AD2d 704, 704).

A Section 1983 complaint must identify the defendants and allege how they caused the claimed deprivation of a federal right.

Quair v. San Mateo County Jail · filed 2020-03-09

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). ... Plaintiff provides no other information and fails to identify any specific defendants. The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information. Plaintiff must identify named defendants and describe how they hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement.

A § 1983 complaint must give enough facts to identify what the defendants did or failed to do and what injury their conduct caused.

Burchard v. Woods · filed 2020-04-06

In other words, the amended complaint does not allow any of the named defendants or the court to understand what they are alleged to have actually done or not done that caused him injury. Plaintiff needs to tell the court and the defendants the who, what, when, and where of his claim, and what injury or damage the defendants’ actions actually caused the plaintiff.

A § 1983 complaint must explain what each defendant did, when they did it, how it harmed the plaintiff, and which right it violated.

Cameron v. Easter · filed 2020-04-10

In addition, Plaintiff did not adequately plead a cause of action under § 1983 against the defendants because he failed to “explain what each defendant did to him, when the defendant did it, how the defendant’s actions harmed him, and what specific legal right he believes the defendant violated.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the constitutional amendment supporting the claim.

MORGAN v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-04-24

To assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must identify the constitutional amendment at issue.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Wills v. City of Dupont Police Department · filed 2020-04-28

In order to state a claim for violation of a federal constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege that (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) the conduct deprived a person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under § 1983 for a violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law and to link the defendants to the alleged violation.

Williams v. Diaz · filed 2020-04-28

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. ... The complaint adequately links Defendants Richey, Koenig, and Min.

A complaint stating a § 1983 claim need not plead with specificity.

Campodonico v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-04-30

In addition, while the Report notes that Plaintiff does not allege which of Warden Eagleton’s “specific actions or inactions . . . amounted to constitutional violations,” ECF No. 65 at 41 (emphasis added), pleading with specificity is not required of a complaint stating a cause of action under § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint must identify the constitutional or federal right allegedly violated and provide enough detail about when and how the violation occurred to permit a response.

SHANER v. RUSSELL · filed 2020-06-22

Shaner has brought the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for vindication of the alleged violation of his civil rights. ... The Amended Complaint does not specify the constitutional or other federally-secured right that Shaner believes was violated by Defendant.

Section 1983 claims challenging jail conditions must identify the defendants and the policy or lack of policy challenged for each condition.

Gonzalez v. Ahern · filed 2020-07-30

The claim should identify who is being sued for that particular condition and the specific policy or lack thereof that is being challenged.

Conclusory allegations alone do not state a claim under Section 1983.

Vontz v. Rochowiak · filed 2020-07-31

Conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a civil rights claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

SADATI v. PRIMECARE MEDICAL, INC. · filed 2020-08-18

Therefore, to establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must plead facts which raise a plausible inference that Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived Plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. ... At this stage, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to allege the elements of a § 1983 claim. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations sufficient to state a claim; conclusory allegations of harassment do not suffice.

Taylor v. Effler · filed 2020-08-27

Moreover, to the extent that Taylor seeks to state a claim based on unspecified harassment, “conclusory allegations of continuing harassment are” insufficient to support a claim for relief under Section 1983.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing how a defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right under color of state law.

Watkins v. Copeland · filed 2020-08-28

Further, he does not make any factual allegations whatsoever describing how any of the Defendants allegedly violated his rights under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Morse v. O'Neil · filed 2020-09-04

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Tate v. Brandy · filed 2020-09-14

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived them of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Cunningham v. Bateman · filed 2020-10-19

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,! a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States.

A § 1983 claim requires more than conclusory and vague allegations to state a cause of action.

Carpenter v. Putnam County Jail · filed 2020-10-19

More than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege a deprivation of a federal right caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Perez v. Region 5 Nebraska · filed 2020-10-22

Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, this is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under this statute, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations of a violation of federal rights caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Perez v. Oasis Hotel · filed 2020-10-22

Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, this is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under this statute, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. ... Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no factual allegations from which the court may reasonably infer that her rights under the United States Constitution or federal statutes were violated.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Williams v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail · filed 2020-10-27

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. ... In his current complaint, Plaintiff does not identify a person acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Morse v. Carey · filed 2020-10-29

To state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a federal constitutional or statutory right allegedly violated to state a claim.

Gaytan v. State of New Mexico · filed 2020-11-03

Plaintiff has not alleged “a violation of rights protected by the federal Constitution or created by federal statute or regulation,” as required to state a § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege specific facts showing each defendant’s involvement in the claimed constitutional violation.

GAY v. LORI · filed 2020-11-17

Plaintiff should note that, in civil rights cases, more than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims remain subject to the ordinary Rule 8 pleading standard when an officer asserts qualified immunity.

Summers v. Hinds County, Mississippi · filed 2020-12-21

But “Section 1983 claims implicating qualified immunity are subject to the same Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal as all other claims; an assertion of qualified immunity in a defendant’s answer or motion to dismiss does not subject the complaint to a heightened pleading standard.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 590 (5th Cir. 2016)). ... As noted, Defendants incorrectly argue that a heightened pleading standard applies.

A § 1983 complaint must identify the specific constitutional or federal right allegedly violated.

SANCHEZ v. ELIZABETH BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2020-12-23

It is important for the plaintiff to identify a specific constitutional or federal right that was violated; otherwise, the Court is unable to evaluate the sufficiency of the complaint and defendants are not properly put on notice of Plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or other federal right.

Pope v. Well Path · filed 2020-12-31

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. ... In his current Complaint, Plaintiff does not identify the particular constitutional right that was violated by the defendants’ conduct.

Section 1983 permits claims against NYC Health + Hospitals as a municipal corporation.

Vickers-Pearson v. City of New York · filed 2019-06-21

Section 1983 claims can be brought against NYC Health + Hospitals Corp. because it “is a municipal corporation Oe New York City municipal hospitals.

Section 1983 treats a local government as a person that can be sued for depriving someone of a federal right under color of state law.

Tyko Johnson, App. v. City Of Seattle, Dept. Of Planning And Development, Res. · filed 2014-10-13

A local government is a person for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits private citizens to sue counties and municipalities.

Lawson v. Shelby County · filed 2000-05-03

Suits may be brought by private citizens against counties and municipalities under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for equitable relief against a municipality as a proper party defendant.

Bruno v. City of Kenosha · filed 1971-10-21

Plaintiffs assert jurisdiction of this court under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343. I find that such jurisdiction is present pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City of Kenosha is a proper party defendant in a § 1983 cause of action seeking only equitable relief. Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1961).

Section 1983 treats a city as a person that may be sued for equitable relief.

McCue v. City of Racine · filed 1971-07-28

The City of Racine is a proper defendant in McCue, as a city is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief is sought.

Section 1983 treats a municipality as a person subject to suit for constitutional violations under color of state law.

Carolina Action v. Pickard · filed 1979-02-12

Further, the court has jurisdiction over the City of Charlotte as a “person” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats cities and counties as persons because they are sufficiently removed from the state.

Allsup v. Knox · filed 1980-11-18

The City of Georgetown and Scott County claim that they are not persons under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. These contentions are without merit. ... Cities are persons under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. ... For this purpose, however, counties and cities should be treated alike. Both are sufficiently removed from the state to be considered persons under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

Section 1983 treats a municipality as a person that may be responsible for damages.

Swope v. Bratton · filed 1982-05-26

A municipality is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Punitive damages are unavailable in a Section 1983 action against a municipality.

Sanchez v. City of Riverside · filed 1984-10-04

Although plaintiff purports to seek punitive damages against the City, they are unavailable in a § 1983 action against a municipality.

Municipalities and other local governmental units are persons subject to § 1983.

Simpson v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1985-07-18

Municipalities and other local governmental units are included among those "persons” to whom section 1983 applies.

A city is a person amenable to suit under § 1983.

Williams C. Hall and Jean G. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara · filed 1987-03-09

The City of Santa Barbara is a "person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A municipality cannot be liable for punitive damages under Section 1983.

Rock Against Racism v. Ward · filed 1987-04-16

A claim against a municipality for punitive damages under section 1983 does not lie.

Municipalities are persons that may be sued under § 1983.

Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, Ohio · filed 1989-07-27

The district court dismissed this claim on the basis that § 1983 claims can be brought only against a “person” and a municipality is not a “person” within the terms of the statute. The trial court relied upon Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), which, as to the issue of municipal liability, has been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court in Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). ... Accordingly, the lower court’s decision must be reversed on this issue.

A municipality is a person subject to a damages claim under § 1983.

City of Lewiston v. Bergamo · filed 1990-09-10

As previously noted, the trial court did not reach the merits of their damage claim because the court concluded that the City of Lewiston was not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. ... Therefore the trial court’s determination must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for consideration of the Bergamos’ damage claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A home-rule municipality is a person that may be sued under Section 1983.

Black v. Village of Park Forest · filed 1998-02-23

It is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A city is a person under § 1983, and its criminal citation under an ordinance is action under color of state law.

Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights · filed 2001-09-07

The City is construed as a person for purposes of federal law, and one may not seriously deny that the criminal citation filed against Berger constitutes an action under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a municipality as a person that can be sued under the statute.

Homans v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2002-08-22

The City is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the State of New Mexico and is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a municipality as a person that may be sued when it causes a deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Angell v. Leslie · filed 1986-12-09

The City of Hinton is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a city to be sued as a person.

Williams C. Hall and Jean G. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara · filed 1986-08-22

The City of Santa Barbara is a "person’’ amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats municipalities as persons subject to suit over their ordinances.

McFadden v. City of Bridgeport · filed 2006-03-20

The United States Supreme Court has held that municipalities such as the City of Bridgeport are “persons” subject to the strictures of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus, Bridgeport is not immune to a challenge to its Ordinance.

Section 1983 treats a municipality as a person subject to liability.

Mount St. Scholastica v. City of Atchison, Kansas · filed 2007-03-12

Under § 1983, a municipality is a person subject to liability.

A county is a person suable under § 1983.

Wincamp Partnership v. Anne Arundel County, Md. · filed 1978-09-07

The County is a person suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Section 1983 treats municipalities as persons subject to suit.

Velázquez-Vélez v. Molina-Rodríguez · filed 2018-08-29

A municipality is a "person" pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes a federal judge to interfere with a state landlord's decision not to renew a lease only when the tenant has been deprived of due process of law.

Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc. · filed 1974-06-18

It is well to repeat at the outset that the Civil Rights Act does not empower a federal judge to interfere with a “state” landlord’s deci...sion not to renew a lease simply because he thinks the decision harsh or unwise; he is authorized to do this only if the tenant has been deprived of due process of law.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff challenging exclusionary housing practices to allege discrimination directed toward a particular housing project.

Planning for People Coalition v. County of DuPage · filed 1976-02-04

The individual plaintiffs, in this case, have alleged that defendants’ practices precluded them from obtaining adequate housing in DuPage County. They have alleged a cause of action against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1985(3). Since none of these sections requires that a plaintiff allege discrimination in regard to a particular housing project, the individual plaintiffs have standing although they do not allege discrimination directed toward a specific development.

Public-housing tenants cannot enforce the Brooke Amendment’s utility-allowance requirements against a local housing authority through Section 1983 when Congress intended HUD to provide the enforcement remedy.

Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority · filed 1984-12-21

Because Congress has “manifested an intent” to foreclose private enforcement, the plaintiffs have no enforceable rights within the meaning of section 1983 against a public housing authority such as RRHC.

Public-housing tenants' § 1983 utility-overcharge claims state claims against local housing authorities, but not against HUD or federal officials.

Hill v. Ogburn · filed 1987-03-17

Although plaintiffs' section 1983 claims against the local authorities properly state claims upon which relief can be granted, we do not believe that plaintiffs are entitled to any relief against HUD and its officials.

Section 1983 has no minimum jurisdictional amount of damages.

Hill v. McIntyre · filed 1989-09-08

§ 1983 does not state a minimum jurisdictional amount of damages.

A suit under § 1983 does not require an allegation of a jurisdictional amount.

Davis v. Caldwell · filed 1971-08-24

It is not necessary to allege a jurisdictional amount in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supports the action without a required financial amount in controversy.

Mitchell v. Donovan · filed 1968-10-02

Although in voting cases, proof of the monetary value of the denial of the right to vote to one or to many people perhaps can or at least might well be presumed to be worth the jurisdictional $10,000 amount, sections 1983 and 1343 require no financial amount to be involved.

Section 1983 actions alleging constitutional infringement of personal liberty are not subject to the statutory jurisdictional amount required in diversity cases.

Cap S. McElroy v. Swan · filed 1972-04-03

The statutory jurisdictional amount required in diversity cases does not apply to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, suing for constitutional infringement of a right of personal liberty.

Section 1983 makes physical abuse by a state officer actionable when the force, injury, and motive show a severe, disproportionate, malicious abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, rather than an ordinary state tort.

Charles v. Shillingford v. Van E. Holmes, Etc. · filed 1981-01-15

In determining whether the state officer has crossed the constitutional line that would make the physical abuse actionable under Section 1983, we must inquire into the amount of force used in relationship to the need presented, the extent of the injury inflicted and the motives of the state officer. If the state officer’s action caused severe injuries, was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances and was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, it should be redressed under Section 1983. ... In this case, the assault by the policeman was unprovoked and unjustified. It was patently taken because, as a bystander on the public streets, Shillingford was photographing what the policeman did not want to be memorialized. That the results of the attack on Shillingford’s person were not crippling was merely fortuitous. The same blow might have caused blindness or other permanent injury. Therefore, we find the physical abuse in this case sufficiently severe, sufficiently disproportionate to the need presented and so deliberate and unjustified a misuse of the policeman’s badge and bludgeon as to transcend the bounds of ordinary tort law and establish a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a claim when prison guards unjustifiably and brutally beat a prisoner under color of state law.

Butler v. Bensinger · filed 1974-06-14

Assuming the facts in the pleadings are true, an unjustified brutal beating by prison guards is sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy when a state official, acting under color of state law, deprives a person of a constitutional right through reckless excessive force during custody.

Fults v. Pearsall · filed 1975-03-03

As Mr. Kirby shot Mr. Fults without justification, he, under the color of Tennessee law, subjected the latter, a citizen of the United States, to the deprivation of a right secured to Mr. Fults by the Constitution, and is found and concluded to be liable to the party injured in this action at law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The arbitrary conduct of a state law enforcement officer in subjecting a citizen to the reckless use of excessive force while undertaking to keep him in custody is a constitutional violation, usually described as a violation of the right to due process of law.

Section 1983 imposes liability for state-action violations of constitutional rights, including a police officer’s excessive force against a prisoner.

Mrs. Carnell Russ, Etc. v. Charles Lee Ratliff, Etc. · filed 1976-07-27

Under any version of the incident, ... the police officer, Ratliff, who struck Russ with a pistol and then shot him, whether accidentally or otherwise, must be held to have used excessive force upon his prisoner. ... Yet, if the applicable section of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is to have any meaning ... in the face of these aggravated circumstances, the jury’s verdict exonerating Ratliff cannot be permitted to stand.

A complaint alleging that an officer shot a decedent negligently and without reasonable cause adequately states a § 1983 claim, although the evidence may fail to prove unreasonable or excessive force.

Willis v. Tillrock · filed 1976-09-20

The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the defendant shot the decedent “negligently and without reasonable cause or justification” and the court finds that this language adequately states a claim in this circuit under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights cause of action for claims that state defendants used excessive force or committed assault in arresting plaintiffs.

Manis v. United States · filed 1979-03-03

For the benefit of the parties, the Court observes that the only portions of the complaint surviving the motions to dismiss are plaintiffs Day’s and Manis’s claims of excessive force and assault against defendants Hill and Tripp, since these allegations were not litigated in the criminal trial and are valid claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner alleging excessive force by a correction officer to show conduct so abusive that it shocks the conscience, involving evil intent, recklessness, or at least deliberate indifference.

Santiago v. Yarde · filed 1980-03-25

In order to succeed on his Section 1983 claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant correction officer’s acts were so abusive as to “shock the conscience;” “[tjhere must be present ‘circumstances indicating an evil intent, or recklessness, or at least deliberate indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under his control or dependent upon him.’ ”

Section 1983 imposes liability when a person acting under color of state law unjustifiably strikes, beats, or inflicts bodily harm on a prisoner without just cause, in violation of constitutional protections.

Emmitt G. King v. W. D. Blankenship, Superintendent Louise D. Hall, Magistrate James e.johnson, Treatment Supr. S. L. To · filed 1980-12-05

Lest there be doubt as to the rule in this circuit, we specifically hold that the unjustified striking, beating, or infliction of bodily harm upon a prisoner gives rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the part of one who, acting under color of state law, engages in such conduct without just cause.