42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for constitutional violations under color of state law, including excessive force by police, assessed from the individual circumstances and the need, motivation, and injury.

Roberts v. Marino · filed 1981-09-21

To recover damages for a violation of constitutional rights under color of state law under § 1983, which governs the substantive aspects of this case, Roberts must establish that he was subjected to excessive force by the police officers. A determination of whether a constitutional violation has occurred through use of unreasonable force is based on the individual facts and circumstances. Reasonableness of force must be evaluated in light of the need, the motivation, and the extent of injury inflicted. “If the state officer’s action caused severe injuries, was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances and was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, it should be redressed under Section 1983.”

Section 1983 permits liability when a state prison officer’s use of force is unreasonable and excessive enough to constitute a constitutional deprivation.

Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Institute · filed 1982-04-30

If, on balance, the use of force was unreasonable and excessive, liability under section 1983 attaches.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for unjustified striking, beating, or bodily harm inflicted under color of state law, but excessive force does not automatically create a § 1983 claim merely because it violates state tort or criminal law.

Henderson v. Counts · filed 1982-08-02

[T]he unjustified striking, beating, or infliction of bodily harm upon a prisoner gives rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the part of one who, acting under color of state law, engages in such conduct without just cause. . . . [However,] not every instance of the use of excessive force gives rise to a cause of action under § 1983 merely because it gives rise to a cause of action under state tort law or is prosecutable under criminal assault and battery law.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim arising from an otherwise probable-cause arrest when the arresting officers' conduct is so offensive under the circumstances as to shock the conscience.

Alberts v. City of New York · filed 1982-10-05

Even though Ms. Alberts has failed to prove that her arrest was not based on probable cause, the arrest might still be violative of section 1983 if “the conduct of the arresting officers in making the arrest was so offensive, under the circumstances, as to ‘shock the conscience’ of the trier of fact.”

A prisoner’s § 1983 excessive-force claim survives dismissal and summary judgment when disputed facts could show repeated beatings after he was subdued and handcuffed.

King v. Meekins · filed 1984-04-09

Plaintiff’s allegations that he was beaten on these two occasions and that excessive force was used both on these occasions and when plaintiff was initially subdued by defendants in unit North One present genuine issues of material fact.

Physical force during an arrest violates § 1983 only when it is so unreasonable in the circumstances as to be arbitrary, brutal, or shocking.

Smith v. Garrett · filed 1984-04-30

Yet unless the force applied is so unreasonable in light of the situation presented as to be arbitrary, brutal, or shocking, this physical contact does not deprive a person of his or her constitutional rights.

A battery can support a § 1983 due-process claim when the defendant intended to infringe a specific constitutional right or could reasonably foresee that result.

Perry v. Walker · filed 1984-05-01

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must show that his constitutional rights were violated. To show a violation of due process in the context of an assault, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant intended to infringe a constitutional right through the battery or could reasonably have foreseen that infringement would be the result.

Whether a prison guard’s force is actionable under Section 1983 depends on the need for force, its proportionality, the injury, and whether the force served discipline in good faith or maliciously caused harm.

Bush v. Ware · filed 1984-06-19

In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.

A prisoner asserting a § 1983 claim for deprivation of Eighth Amendment rights must prove acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to show deliberate indifference to the prisoner's physical well-being.

Newby v. Serviss · filed 1984-06-21

Second, to state a claim under section 1983 for deprivation of eighth amendment rights, plaintiff must prove “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference” to plaintiff’s physical well being.

A prisoner’s § 1983 excessive-force claim requires deliberate indifference, and a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation defeats qualified immunity.

Albers v. Whitley · filed 1984-10-01

Therefore, a new trial must determine whether Albers was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the “deliberate indifference” standard by defendants’ use of excessive force against him. If it is determined that the prison authorities’ conduct did not violate this standard, they are absolved of all liability under § 1983. If an eighth amendment violation is found, there is no qualified immunity defense available.

Section 1983 permits compensatory and punitive damages when a prison officer acting under color of state law intentionally inflicts bodily harm that violates a federally protected right.

Hurd v. Officer Romeo. Appeal of Charles David Hurd · filed 1985-01-07

Fairly read, his complaint charges that Officer Romeo, acting under color of state law, intentionally inflicted bodily harm upon him. Such a charge, if proved, would permit Hurd to recover both compensatory and punitive damages.

An excessive-force claim under section 1983 must rise to constitutional dimensions through shocking or brutal conduct and cannot rest merely on conduct actionable as an intentional tort under state law.

Hurd v. Nolan · filed 1985-05-09

To be actionable under § 1983, the alleged excessive use of force must rise to “constitutional dimensions.” ... What this means to the plaintiff is that he must show more than that he has suffered some kind of intentional tort at the hands of the defendants who were acting under color of state law, he must prove acts which, in effect, amount to shocking or brutal conduct.

An officer's use of force is actionable under Section 1983 when it causes severe injury, is grossly disproportionate to the need, and is malicious enough to constitute an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience.

Fred Hendrix and Diane Scritchfield v. Matlock · filed 1986-02-18

If the state officer’s action caused severe injuries, was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances, and was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, it should be redressed under Section 1983.

A prisoner's Section 1983 excessive-force claim arising from a prison disturbance requires proof that force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.

Whitley v. Albers · filed 1986-03-04

Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance, such as occurred in this case, that indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff, we think the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically ... for the very purpose of causing harm.”

A Section 1983 excessive-force plaintiff must show that the force used during arrest was unreasonable under the circumstances or was used for an improper purpose.

Halk v. Hollins · filed 1986-03-10

To recover under § 1983 for excessive use of force during an arrest, plaintiff must demonstrate that “the degree of force used was unreasonable under the circumstances, or ... the force was used for an improper purpose.”

An excessive-force claim under section 1983 requires more than mere negligence but does not require a specific intent to cause physical injury.

Oliver Waggoner, Cross-Appellees (85-3240/3304), (85-3251) v. Howard Mosti, Cross-Appellants (85-3240/3304) (85-3251) · filed 1986-06-12

The court did not require that the officers must have specifically intended to injure Waggoner physically. We note that the instructions required that the jury find more than mere negligence in order to find a § 1983 violation.

A pretrial detainee’s section 1983 excessive-force claim does not require proof that the officer acted maliciously or sadistically.

Justice v. Dennis · filed 1986-06-16

To the extent that the instruction implies that malice or sadism is a requirement for imposing liability on Dennis, it misstates the law of this circuit.

Whether force gives rise to a Section 1983 claim depends on the need for force, the relationship between that need and the amount used, the injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in good faith to restore order or maliciously to cause harm.

Graham v. City of Charlotte · filed 1986-09-19

The factors to be considered in determining when the excessive use of force gives rise to a cause of action under § 1983 are identified as ... (1) The need for the application for the force. ... (2) The relationship between the need and the amount of the force that was used. ... (3) The extent of the injury inflicted. ... (4) Whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.

A Section 1983 excessive-force claim turns on the need for force, the relationship between the need and amount used, the injury, and whether force was applied in good faith or maliciously to cause harm.

Bates v. McKeon · filed 1986-11-21

In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, the court must “look[] to the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”

Immediate force or coercive measures used by prison officials do not support § 1983 liability when reasonably necessary for compliance or security and undertaken in good faith rather than maliciously or sadistically.

Ort v. Warden J.D. White, Ron Sutton, Tony Holliday, Officer Truman Mitman, Captain Shoemaker and J.W. Taunton · filed 1987-05-05

Prison officers must, however, have the authority to use that amount of force or those coercive measures reasonably necessary to enforce an inmate’s compliance with valid prison rules and to protect themselves and the other inmates. Thus, where such immediate coercive action is necessary, the conduct of a prison official does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment if it was undertaken not maliciously or sadistically, but in a good faith effort to restore order or prevent a disturbance, and if the force used was reasonable in relation to the threat of harm or disorder apparent at the time.

An officer’s use of force is actionable under Section 1983 when it causes severe injury, is grossly disproportionate to the need, and is malicious enough to constitute an abuse of power that shocks the conscience.

Ball v. Tong · filed 1988-01-21

If the state officer’s action caused severe injuries, was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances and was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excessive zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocked the conscience, it should be addressed under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against deputies for excessive force against a pretrial detainee.

Meade v. Grubbs, Badge No. 128, Individually and as a Deputy Sheriff of the County of Oklahoma · filed 1988-03-11

We hold that the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges a claim under § 1983 for the use of excessive force as against Deputy Sheriff Grubbs and John Does 1 and 2 in their individual capacities, and reverse the dismissal with respect to that claim.

Section 1983 does not support a claim for negligent or grossly negligent police conduct, but evidence that an officer intentionally used excessive force can sustain a claim.

Johnson v. Colgate · filed 1988-06-15

The claim of negligence or even gross negligence will not support a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Plaintiff has asserted the intentional use of excessive force in attempting to arrest him, which can provide a basis of a 1983 action. ... This is sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment insofar as it claims that the complaint does not state a constitutionally cognizable cause of action.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim against a county police officer arising from an investigatory stop.

Vaughn v. R.H. Allnutt · filed 1990-08-31

A claim of excessive force used by a county police officer incident to an investigatory stop states a cognizable claim under Sec. 1983.

A prisoner seeking injunctive relief for retaliation after filing a Section 2255 motion must pursue the claim under Section 1983 in the district where he is confined.

Evegelatos v. Thornburg · filed 1991-06-24

If Evegelatos decides to pursue that claim, he must do so in accordance with 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in the district court where he is confined. The district court below correctly concluded that the injunctive relief claim could not be pursued in Illinois; therefore, it properly dismissed the claim.

A prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim arising from administrative segregation need not be dismissed at the pleading stage when the court cannot determine whether success would invalidate a conviction or sentence.

York v. Huerta-Garcia · filed 1999-02-05

At this point in the proceedings it cannot be determined whether Plaintiffs action would render his underlying conviction or sentence invalid, as contemplated by Heck or as interpreted by Edwards. ... This Court finds the factual scenario in Plant similar enough to the instant case to warrant consideration and the legal reasoning in Plant persuasive enough such that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on cognizability grounds must be denied.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate excessive force claim when the alleged force is excessive solely because the underlying seizure was unlawful.

Cortez v. McCauley · filed 2006-02-10

Therefore, when an excessive force claim rests solely on an allegation that the force was excessive because the underlying seizure itself was unlawful the excessive force claim is derivative: it necessarily exists as a result of the unlawful seizure, and does not constitute a separate claim for relief.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to pursue an excessive force claim based on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the claim cannot proceed when that constitutional right was not violated as a matter of law.

Scales v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-06-18

Scales’s excessive force claim cannot proceed because his claim was and is predicated on the Fourth Amendment, the same right that Young specifically held was not violated as a matter of law.

A Section 1983 excessive force claim cannot be dismissed under Heck based on a resisting arrest guilty plea when the record lacks the plea’s factual basis needed to determine whether the claim would undermine the conviction.

Strong v. Pettengell · filed 2020-06-09

However, it is not clear from the face of the complaint or the fact of his guilty plea that his excessive force claim would necessarily call into question the validity of his conviction, because the specific factual basis for his guilty plea is not in the record.

Probation officers have absolute immunity from section 1983 damages suits for acts performed within the scope of their official duties.

Moore v. Yakima County · filed 1991-10-08

Probation officers have absolute immunity from damage suits under section 1983 arising from acts performed within the scope of their official duties.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of constitutional rights, and prosecuting attorneys are not absolutely immune based solely on status when alleged conduct is investigative.

Peterson v. Stanczak · filed 1969-03-28

To state a viable cause of action under the civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must assert that the defendants acted under color of law and that they deprived plaintiff of constitutionally protected rights, privileges, or immunities. ... Consequently, the facts alleged by plaintiff are sufficient to constitute a cause of action at least under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In sum, there is no doctrine of absolute immunity for prosecuting attorneys and the factual backgrounds of recent Seventh Circuit cases including those on which defendants rely are readily distinguishable from that which is before us in that they appear to have involved quasi-judicial, not investigative, behavior. ... At this stage of the proceedings, without having heard defendants’ answers, it would be improper to dismiss this complaint simply because of defendants’ status.

Section 1983 does not give state officials absolute immunity from suit merely because of the offices they hold, when they are neither judicial officers nor legislators.

Wheeler v. Glass · filed 1973-01-18

Defendants also broadly assert that as state officials they are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No basis for absolute immunity is shown by the nature of the offices held by these defendants. They are neither judicial officers nor legislators.

Section 1983 preserves judicial and quasi-judicial immunity and permits police officers to assert good faith and probable cause as a defense to civil-damages claims.

Wilhelm v. Turner · filed 1969-04-23

The doctrine of judicial immunity has long existed under our law. ... and it has recently been affirmed that this doctrine was not abolished by Title 42 § 1983. ... It has likewise been held that the doctrine of immunity of quasi-judicial officers such as prosecuting attorneys has not been modified by the civil rights statute, Title 42 § 1983. ... It is also clear that the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to them in an action under Title 42 § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to judicial and prosecutorial immunity: a prosecutor is immune for acts integral to the judicial process but may be liable for acting as a police officer, while judges are immune for acts within their judicial jurisdiction.

Valdez v. Black · filed 1971-07-08

The gist of the instruction was that the law grants immunity to a district attorney for acts done or ordered by him in the performance of his official duties as an integral part of the judicial process, but that if a district attorney abandons the performance of his official duties and commits or directs the commission of acts which are ordinary police activity instead of judicial activity and orders the arrest or detention of persons in order to prevent them, from exercising their constitutional rights then he is no less liable than those who carry out his instructions. We perceive no error in the giving of this instruction and believe it to be in line with such cases as Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir.). ... The judge who issued the arrest warrants is of course not a defendant in t}ie present proceeding, as it is well established that judges are immune from liability for damages in a civil rights proceeding for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288.

Section 1983 does not eliminate official immunity, including immunity for an executive officer performing quasi-judicial or discretionary acts within lawful authority.

C. M. Clark Insurance Agency, Inc. v. David O. Maxwell, Safeguard Mutual Insurance Company v. David O. Maxwell · filed 1973-05-30

It is well established that judges are immune from liability for damages for official acts within their jurisdiction and that this immunity was not abolished by § 1983. ... It is true, as appellants argue, that the doctrine of official immunity should be applied sparingly and that to “hold all state officers immune from suit would very largely frustrate the salutary purpose” of § 1983. ... We conclude that appellee is entitled to the protection of official immunity on the grounds that (1) he was an executive officer performing a quasi-judicial function, and (2) he was performing a discretionary act in the exercise of his official duties and pursuant to lawful authority.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officials are subject to an official-immunity defense when the officials act in good faith within their discretionary authority.

Viera v. Sánchez-Vilella · filed 1971-06-03

The application of the immunity doctrine in civil rights cases is clearly set forth in Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (E.D.Va.1970) 309 F.Supp. 184, 189 where it was said: “* * * The defense of official immunity should be ‘applied sparingly in suits brought under § 1983’ * * * Nevertheless, it should be available to public officials who act in unquestioned good faith and in perfect accord with long standing legal principle only to find their discretionary conduct declared illegitimate under a later constitutional interpretation * * * Indeed, to hold public officials liable for acts that become unconstitutional ex post facto would tend to reduce popular respect for federally guaranteed rights rather than increase it.”

Section 1983 restricts official immunity because it applies to every person who, under color of state law, deprives another of constitutional rights.

Donaldson v. J. B. O'connor, M.D. And John Gumanis, M.D. · filed 1974-04-26

Official immunity has been restricted under § 1983, because that provision is directed at actions “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory”, and provides that “every person” subjecting another to a deprivation of constitutional rights shall be liable.

Section 1983 permits suit against city officers and employees in their official and individual capacities despite a claim that they acted within the scope of their duties, although specific immunities may apply.

Bunch v. Barnett · filed 1974-05-07

This Court must find that the officers and employees of the City of Rapid City, acting in their official capacities and as individuals, are not immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss in that regard.

Section 1983 immunity is governed by federal law and cannot be narrowed or expanded by state official-privilege rules.

Bell v. Charles Wolff, Jr. · filed 1974-05-17

It is pertinent to note at the outset that the measure, scope, and application of an asserted immunity under § 1983, arising, as it does, under a federally created cause of action, cannot be restricted or enlarged by state laws concerning official privilege or immunity.

Section 1983 permits injunctive and declaratory relief against a governor in his official capacity, although he has qualified immunity from damages for acts undertaken within the sphere of his executive authority.

James v. Wallace · filed 1974-09-30

While it is correct that the governor has a qualified immunity from damage suits arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts undertaken within the sphere of his executive authority, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Martone v. McKeithen, 413 F.2d 1373, 1375 (5th Cir. 1969), the governor may not interpose his official capacity as a bar to injunctive and declaratory relief.

Section 1983 damages claims against state executive officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified official immunity when their conduct was undertaken in good faith on reasonable grounds.

Jones v. Manson · filed 1975-05-07

In light of this broad discretion, I hold that the commissioner in this case is entitled to the benefit of an official immunity.

Section 1983 reaches state officials’ acts or omissions performed within their statutory duties, subject to qualified immunity determined from the circumstances.

Jones v. Diamond · filed 1975-09-26

This statutory duty brings the acts or omissions of the Supervisors within the reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless they are protected by absolute immunity. ... Qualified immunity therefore applies to state officers ranging from the Governor of Ohio, in Scheuer, to a local school board, in Wood. The availability of the immunity defense here is similarly dependent on all the circumstances. ... We simply conclude by saying that the trial court was not justified in declaring the Supervisors immune without a factual examination.

Section 1983 subjects damages claims against state officials to official-immunity rules: legislators and judges have absolute immunity for official duties, while governors and attorneys general have qualified immunity.

Donald Duane Johnson and Leo Roll v. Ronald Reagan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State o · filed 1975-10-20

Different immunity standards apply to different government officials. Absolute immunity is accorded legislators, ... and judges, ... when acting in the course of their official duties. The claim against the legislators and justices was properly dismissed upon immunity grounds. ... The governor and the attorney general are afforded only qualified immunity. ... Johnson’s claim against them, however, was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

A public official may lose the special immunity from § 1983 liability when the official disregards settled constitutional rights.

Pollard v. Panora · filed 1976-03-25

The official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right, but an act violating a student’s constitutional rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law on the part of one entrusted with supervision of students’ daily lives than by the presence of actual malice.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to exhaustion, and public officials are immune from damages when the alleged wrong arises from good-faith official conduct.

Carpenter v. State of South Dakota · filed 1976-06-03

Although petitioners’ pleading is styled “A petition for a writ of habeas corpus,” it states a colorable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Viewed as such, the claims are not subject to the exhaustion doctrine. ... Petitioners may be entitled to equitable relief, but they have not alleged the bad faith necessary to overcome the immunity of the defendants from damages. Public officials are immune from damages under section 1983 where the alleged wrong arises out of official conduct done in good faith.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against public officials for constitutional deprivations, subject to official immunity; malicious intent to injure can defeat that immunity independently of whether the official knew the conduct violated constitutional rights.

Adelberg v. Labuszewski · filed 1978-03-02

It is the intention to inflict the injury, not the knowledge that the injury is redressable under the constitution, which constitutes bad faith sufficient to defeat immunity. This view would sever the malice test from the knowledge test by making it possible, even absent knowledge, to defeat the immunity by showing malice.

Section 1983 reaches a state official according to his degree of participation in a constitutional deprivation, regardless of statutory authority or job title, but qualified immunity protects only an official who lacked malicious intent and did not know and reasonably need not have known his conduct violated constitutional rights.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ETC. v. Holso · filed 1978-08-28

Defendant Albert’s contention is without merit to the extent that it emphasizes his statutory duties as definitive of the parameters of his liability. On the contrary, we find that § 1983 is concerned with the degree of participation in a deprivation of constitutional rights. An individual’s status as a school superintendent does not, in itself, protect his or her activities in the context here considered. ... In order to qualify for this defense, Albert must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that he acted without malicious intention to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights or cause him to suffer other injury, and (2) that he did not know and reasonably need not have known that his conduct violated the constitutional rights of the party affected. ... The record supports such a finding, thus precluding Albert’s entitlement to the defense.

Section 1983 imposes liability on government officials for required omissions or unlawful, harmful acts, but officials who act reasonably and in good faith are protected by official immunity.

Moore-Beidl v. Beaudoin · filed 1981-06-02

Government officials may only be held liable under § 1983 for a failure to do what is required or for overt activity which is unlawful and harmful. ... Therefore, where defendants plead and prove that they acted reasonably and in good faith, they are entitled to the defense of official immunity.

Section 1983 permits damages claims subject to differing official immunities: a prosecutor facing an actual conflict who knowingly files baseless charges lacks absolute immunity, while a sheriff has qualified immunity unless he acted without good faith or probable cause.

Beard v. Udall · filed 1981-06-26

Absolute prosecutorial immunity now exists if the prosecutor was acting within the scope of his or her authority and the prosecutor was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. ... We hold only that, where a prosecutor faces an actual conflict of interest, and files charges he or she knows to be baseless, the prosecutor is acting outside the scope of his or her authority and thus lacks immunity. ... A sheriff enjoys only a qualified immunity from liability for damages under section 1983. ... Thus, if Sheriff Lee was involved in the investigation and arrest of Beard, he may be liable, unless his actions were taken in good faith and with probable cause.

A Section 1983 claim requires action under color of law and deprivation of a federally protected right; a jail deputy’s assault on a prisoner is under color of law even if outside the deputy’s specific authority, and an intentional, unjustified, unprovoked assault may violate substantive due process despite available state remedies.

Shah v. County of Los Angeles, Deputy Sheriff W. Corette, Deputy Sheriff Matsumoto · filed 1986-08-15

There are two essential elements to a section 1983 action: first, that the defendant acted under “color of law”; and, second, that the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right. ... Shah need not show that the deputies acted specifically within the scope of their authority to prove that they acted under color of law. ... An assault on a prisoner by a deputy is conduct under color of law. Shah therefore satisfies the color of law requirement. ... An “intentional unjustified, [and] unprovoked” assault by a prison guard on a prisoner may be a violation of substantive due process. ... The doctrine of ... does not bar section 1983 suits based on violations of substantive due process.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against Hawaii state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities where the state has not waived sovereign immunity.

MOW BY MOW v. Cheeseborough · filed 1988-10-07

The State of Hawaii has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to § 1983 damage liability. ... Because plaintiffs are suing the DSSH and the various state officials in their official capacities, this Court concurs with defendants’ contention that counts six, six (sic), eight and nine should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Section 1983 affords no relief against state officials sued only in their official capacities because they are immune from liability.

Rice v. Chandra Doyle, Diane Pierce, Lt. A. Overstreet, Al C. Parke · filed 1990-05-11

It is clear that these prison officials are being sued in their official capacity. Rice has made no allegation that he is suing these officials in their individual capacity, and no such allegation can be inferred from his pleadings. State officials, acting in their official capacity, are absolutely immune from liability.

Section 1983 monetary claims against state employees in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Rogers v. Oestreich · filed 1990-05-15

As a threshold matter, the court notes that the plaintiff is seeking only monetary relief. Therefore, because the defendants are all state employees, the claims against them in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

State defendants sued in their official capacities are immune from money damages under § 1983.

Mott v. Indiana · filed 1991-05-08

In their official capacities, each of the state defendants are entitled to immunity for claims for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state officials sued only in their official capacities because they have Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Johnson v. Lt. G. Bently, C. Doyle, Kathy McDaniel Al C. Parke, Norman C. Clampitt, Jr. · filed 1991-09-27

State officials sued in their official capacities are immune from liability for damages under the Eleventh Amendment. ... Since Johnson did not proceed against the appellees in their personal capacity, this court has no jurisdiction to consider his damages claim.

Local government officials sued in their official capacities are not entitled to immunity from liability under Section 1983.

Rumbold v. Town of Bureau · filed 1991-10-31

Moreover, local government officials sued in their official capacities, like the governmental bodies they represent, are not entitled to immunity.

State employees sued in their official capacity are immune from monetary damages under Section 1983.

Staffney v. Mary Robledo Norma Edmond M.G. Feiling · filed 1993-02-01

Under the Eleventh Amendment, state employees are immune from damages when a § 1983 action is brought against them in their official capacity.

In a Section 1983 official-capacity suit, state law determines whether an officer acted for the state or a county for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Gray v. Laws · filed 1994-01-20

Determining whether an officer acts on behalf of the state or a county is a question of state law.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action cannot first raise official immunity after trial; the defense must be raised before or during trial.

Gooden v. Michael v. Neal · filed 1994-03-07

Defendants did not rely on immunity before or during trial; the subject first arose in post-trial practice. That is too late.

State officials sued in their official capacities are immune from § 1983 damages claims but can be sued for prospective relief.

Bodiford v. State of Ala. · filed 1994-05-17

Accordingly, the court finds that the individual defendants are immune from suit in their official capacities for any claim of money damages under § 1983. However, the court finds that the defendants are not immune from suit in their official capacities for plaintiffs claims of prospective relief.

Officials are immune from a Section 1983 employee free speech claim unless the employee’s interest outweighs the state employer’s interests enough to establish a clearly established right.

Bolton v. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, STATE · filed 1995-03-29

An official is entitled to immunity when the official has not violated clearly established law. ... We conclude that Bolton has not counterbalanced respondents’ interests to such a degree as to penetrate their official immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Roberts v. Samardvich · filed 1995-11-21

In their official capacities, each of the state defendants are entitled to immunity for claims for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages or retroactive injunctive relief against a state or its employees acting in their official capacities.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1996-08-05

The court also concluded the Eleventh Amendment precludes imposition of monetary damages and retroactive injunctive relief against the state and its employees who are acting in their official capacities. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). ... We find that the district court did not err in dismissing this action and affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the magistrate court and adopted by the district court.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the same official immunity rules as Bivens claims.

Bear v. Wydra · filed 1999-02-11

Claims brought pursuant to Bivens and § 1983 are identical for purposes of official immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public official who acts in good faith within the scope of official duties.

Ago · filed 1974-06-13

The conclusion that can be drawn from cases construing s. 1983, supra, is that a public official acting in good faith and within the scope of his or her official duties will be immune from liability under the section.

Official immunity does not bar a § 1983 suit for compensatory damages to the extent defendants expended the plaintiff's assets.

No. 169 · filed 1971-02-19

While we do not intimate any opinion as to defendants' immunity in a case where consequential or punitive damages are sought, we do hold that the defendants are not immune from suit for compensatory damages to the extent that they have expended plaintiff's assets.

Section 1983 allows state school board members sued for damages to assert a qualified privilege when they act within their discretion, in good faith, without malice, and on valid grounds.

Smith v. Losee · filed 1973-08-22

We thus hold that the defendant board members were entitled to a qualified privilege as a defense in this damage action. This defense may be established, and was here so done, by an affirmative showing that the decision not to renew or to discharge was board action representing an exercise of its discretion vested in it by state law, made in good faith, and without malice, when the official facts before them showed a good and valid reason for the decision although another reason or reasons advanced for nonrenewal or discharge may have been constitutionally impermissible.

Section 1983 gives prison guards broad, nonabsolute immunity for custodial acts unless they join a conspiracy to deprive a person of civil rights.

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company v. Paul E. Rhodes and Harry W. Edmondson · filed 1969-04-07

We conclude that the trial judge was manifestly correct when he instructed the jury that, as a prison guard, Edmondson was immune from liability unless the jury found that he joined in a conspiracy to deprive Rhodes of his civil rights.

Section 1983 permits civil-rights liability claims against a correctional-institution warden; the warden is not immune from civil liability for violations of the Act.

Marshall v. Joseph R. Brierley, Supt., State Correctional Institution, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania · filed 1972-05-24

The warden of a correctional institution is not immune from civil liability for violations of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits liability against a prison guard who acts under color of state law and unjustifiably inflicts bodily harm on a prisoner.

Oses v. Fair · filed 1990-07-09

A prison guard's unjustified striking, beating or infliction of bodily harm upon a prisoner gives rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the part of one who, acting under color of state law, engages in such conduct without just cause.

Section 1983 does not give qualified immunity to guards employed by a private prison management firm operating for profit with limited government supervision and potential competition.

Richardson v. McKnight · filed 1997-06-23

The issue before us is whether prison guards who are employees of a private prison management firm are entitled to a qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. We hold that they are not.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for alleged violations of jail policies alone.

Bailey v. Schmidt · filed 2007-05-29

Further, the sheriff’s or his subordinates’ alleged violation of jail policies does not result in section 1983 liability.

A finding that a police officer violated a departmental regulation does not, by itself, establish liability under § 1983.

Meyers v. Montgomery County Police Department · filed 1993-07-01

Consequently, the Board’s finding that Officer Meyers violated the Montgomery County Police Department Regulation does not, in itself, expose him to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not turn an ordinary state-law contract dispute involving lost profits into a federal civil-rights action absent interference with a constitutionally protected right.

Contemporary Music Group, Inc. v. Chicago Park District · filed 1972-01-19

The mere recital that the Park District “singled out” rock concerts does not in itself show “invidious discrimination” within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... The Constitution of the United States need not be invoked to make the fact determination whether rock concerts in themselves are more likely to create disturbances of the peace as contrasted to an afternoon devoted to Strauss waltzes. A state court would be as competent as a federal court to hear evidence and to decide this interesting musical and sociological question. The Civil Rights Act was not designed to permit litigants a choice of forum for ordinary civil litigation where no diversity jurisdiction exists.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for deprivation of a state-law employment right when the plaintiff alleges no deprivation of a federal right.

Dorsey v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People · filed 1969-04-14

Whatever “rights” Dorsey may have to be reinstated as a New Iberia policeman derives solely, under the facts alleged in this record, from the law of Louisiana. Their deprivation, therefore, is not the subject of a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of purely state-created rights, such as an ordinary defamation claim.

Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1972-12-29

Indeed, it is fundamental that where violation of purely state created rights is alleged, § 1983 is inapplicable.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation under color of state law only when the plaintiff's asserted right is secured by the Constitution or federal law; the claimed right to become a candidate for state office is not federally protected.

Vandross v. Ellisor · filed 1972-08-10

Plaintiff’s only possible vehicle by which to attain jurisdiction is the familiar 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This court, however, is of the opinion that the right or claim alleged to have been violated in this case does not properly fit within the scope of Section 1983 and, therefore, the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is apparent that the basic right asserted and the core issue raised involves the opportunity to become a candidate for State office and is not a right which rises to federal protection.

Section 1983 does not turn a dispute over state-law interpretation into a federal issue, but it permits litigation when a state-law violation infringes federal rights.

Roberts v. Arledge · filed 1975-09-26

Whether school district officials correctly interpreted and applied Mississippi law does not raise any federal issue cognizable under § 1983. ... The existence of a state remedy, however, does not foreclose the litigation of state law violations of federal rights under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law unless they also infringe a federally protected right.

Gonzales Ex Rel. Gonzales v. McEuen · filed 1977-03-02

Title 42, U.S.C. § 1983 is not concerned with violations of state law unless such violations result in an infringement of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for state interference with national banks’ authority under 12 U.S.C. § 85, a purely economic regulatory right.

First National Bank v. Marquette National Bank · filed 1980-11-25

On the other hand, rights incidental to the National Bank Act are qualitatively different and not within the contemplation of section 1983.

Section 1983's scope is not controlled by state tort law or state-law privileges and immunities that would allow an officer to escape liability for a constitutional deprivation.

Jacobs v. City of Wichita · filed 1982-02-02

It has long been understood that in interpreting the scope of § 1983 we are not bound by the state law of torts or the defenses of privilege that law provides. In an unbroken line of Supreme Court cases . . . the conduct of police officers and other state officials has, both civilly ... and criminally . . ., been held subject to standards demanded by the Constitution of the United States, regardless of approbation by state law .... A state rule of immunity or privilege which allows a state officer to escape liability for a deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States” is simply not controlling under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state-law claim that a school board acted arbitrarily in not renewing a teacher’s contract cannot be bootstrapped into Section 1983 when state procedures provide a full remedy.

Sutton v. Marianna School District A · filed 1983-08-30

To hold otherwise would be to provide a basis for bootstrapping every cause of action based on state law into a § 1983 case.

A common-law tort committed by state officials does not by itself constitute a constitutional tort actionable under § 1983.

Harris v. Friedline · filed 1983-12-22

The mere allegation of a common law tort, though allegedly committed by State officials, does not in and of itself constitute a § 1983 constitutional tort.

Section 1983 remedies only infringements of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution and federal laws, not rights secured solely by state law.

City of Huntsville v. Certain · filed 1984-04-20

However, we need not consider any contention, made in support of the § 1983 claim, that Certain's rights secured by state law were infringed upon, because § 1983 provides a remedy for infringement of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States only.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a vested-rights theory that depends solely on state law.

Scott v. City of Sioux City, Iowa · filed 1984-06-08

This theory is a matter of state law not actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 reaches only conduct taken on behalf of a state, not conduct by federal government actors.

Marcucci v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 1984-07-09

Since section 1983 applies only to conduct on behalf of a state, the court dismisses all claims filed under section 1983.

A failure to comply with state law does not by itself state a claim under § 1983.

Limerick v. Carol S. Greenwald, Roslindale Cooperative Bank of Boston v. Carol S. Greenwald · filed 1984-12-03

The mere fact that state law ... may ... not have been complied with does not itself state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state law’s general statement of public policy does not create a property or liberty right protected by § 1983 without specific intent to create such a right.

Hill v. Shelby County · filed 1984-12-14

Legislative recognition of a general, salutary public policy does not, without specific intent to do so, create a state property or liberty right to be protected under § 1983.

A § 1983 due-process claim based only on violation of state parole procedures fails without a substantive interest in parole to which the prisoner has a legitimate entitlement.

Watson v. Robert Brown, Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections Edward Turner, President of Michigan · filed 1985-06-07

The appellant has not alleged a legitimate claim of entitlement to parole but has merely challenged state procedural defects. Consequently, the claimed deprivation of right does not rise to a constitutional dimension and the district court properly dismissed the action.

A § 1983 claim based solely on unsuccessful state-law tort claims fails with those predicate claims.

Hansen v. Garcia, Fletcher, Lund and McVean · filed 1985-11-01

Hansen’s claim of a § 1983 violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights was based solely upon his state law claims discussed above for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and negligence, and since he cannot prevail on those claims, summary judgment was properly granted as to his federal claims.

Failure to follow state or university procedures does not by itself establish a federal due-process violation under § 1983.

Picozzi v. Sandalow · filed 1986-01-02

Due process is a matter of federal constitutional law; failure to comply with state procedures does not, by ... itself, violate due process.

A violation of state law alone does not state a § 1983 claim unless it causes deprivation of a right protected by federal law or the Constitution.

Paoli v. Lally · filed 1986-05-23

Generally, the mere violation of state law does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state’s failure to follow its own administrative procedures does not itself establish a Section 1983 due-process violation when the procedures actually used satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment’s minimum requirements.

Wooten v. Ralph W. Packard, Warden Office Burrell · filed 1986-09-17

Even assuming that state administrative procedural regulations were not observed to the letter, the procedures utilized by the state nevertheless comported with Fourteenth Amendment minimum due process requirements. In establishing administrative procedural rules, the state does not create an independent substantive due process right.

A state employee’s failure to comply with state law does not itself violate the federal Constitution and is not independently actionable under Section 1983.

McNear v. Coughlin · filed 1986-09-16

A state employee’s failure to conform to state law does not in itself violate the Constitution and is not alone actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 supplies a cause of action for deprivation of rights secured by the federal Constitution or federal law, not for violations of a state constitution alone.

Eldridge v. Bouchard · filed 1986-10-09

A violation of the Virginia Constitution is not a violation under the United States Constitution, therefore, such a violation will not support a recovery under § 1983. To succeed in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal law.

Violations of state procedural requirements do not themselves establish federal constitutional rights or § 1983 liability.

Michael A. Bolden, Sr. v. Al Alston, Superintendent, Lincoln Correctional Facility, Nathaniel Hayes, Sergeant and Edward · filed 1987-01-28

Finally, Bolden’s state law claims are not a basis for liability in this suit. State procedural requirements do not establish federal constitutional rights. ... At most, any violation of state procedural requirements would create liability under state law, and, since the section 1983 claims fail on the undisputed facts, this is not an appropriate case for the exercise by the District Court of pendent jurisdiction over state law claims.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for deprivation of rights protected only by state law.

Quinlan v. Fairman · filed 1987-03-30

Second, section 1983 provides no remedy for deprivations of state protected rights.

A violation of state law is not independently actionable under Section 1983 and does not defeat qualified immunity from a federal constitutional claim unless clearly established federal law was violated.

Galyon v. Alexander · filed 1987-03-30

Initially we point out that if Commissioner Wood's interpretation of the statute were incorrect as a matter of state law, the violation of state law would not be cognizable under 42 u.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Nor would commissioner Wood be deprived of qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) ("Officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.") Rather, the relevant question is whether Commissioner Wood violated "clearly established constitutional or federal statutory rights" by interpreting T.C.A. Sec. 55-5-108(b)(1) as applying to private individuals.

A state agency’s breach of an employment contract does not create a Section 1983 claim when an adequate post-deprivation contract remedy exists, because Section 1983 does not federalize every state breach of contract.

Attao v. Palacios · filed 1987-04-09

If the state had merely breached a contract with Braden he' would have had no cause of action under Section 1983. Relief is predicated on a denial of a constitutional right. ... Just as Section 1983 does not create a cause of action for every state-action tort, ... it does not make a federal case out of every breach of contract by a state agency.

Slander and invasion-of-privacy allegations that implicate no constitutionally protected right are not actionable under Section 1983, while a claim seeking jail-time credit must proceed through habeas corpus.

Privett v. Trammell · filed 1987-04-10

Appellant's claims of slander and invasion of privacy, while possibly tort actions under state law, implicate no constitutionally protected right. ... As appellant's claim for 21 days of jail time credit essentially changes the legality of his confinement, it was properly dismissed without prejudice for future action by writ of habeas corpus.

A valid state-law claim does not state a § 1983 claim without a meritorious federal constitutional deprivation.

Burke v. Marion D. Campbell, Jack Lesley, D.L. Baker, and Lieutenant Don Woodall · filed 1987-05-13

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Even though plaintiff may have stated a valid claim under Kentucky law, his federal claims are without merit.

A violation of state procedural law alone does not establish a Section 1983 claim; the plaintiff must show a violation of the federal Constitution.

Harris v. Birmingham Board Of Education · filed 1987-06-01

Harris must show not just a violation of a state statute, but a constitutional violation in this section 1983 action. ... Yet, we emphasize that the violation of a state statute outlining procedure does not necessarily equate to a due process violation under the federal constitution.

A state-law battery committed under color of law is not automatically a constitutional violation for which § 1983 provides a remedy.

Trujillo v. Goodman · filed 1987-08-07

It is equally clear, however, that “not all state law torts are constitutional violations for which section 1983 provides a remedy.”

Defamation and battery allegations do not by themselves state a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Khabiri v. Toll · filed 1987-08-18

The district court properly granted summary judgment against Cyrus and Priscilla Khabiri on the grounds that they lacked standing to pursue their daughter's claims, see, e.g., Hale v. North Little Rock Housing Authority, 720 F.2d 996, 998 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983), that their defamation and battery claims failed to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-82 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976), and that any state law claims before the district court pursuant to its pendent jurisdiction should be dismissed upon dismissal of the federal claims, see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

A state prisoner cannot use § 1983 to enforce a state freedom-of-information request when state courts provide a suitable post-deprivation remedy.

Birrell v. Robert Brown, Director Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1987-09-18

As the district court properly observed, 'Plaintiff's remedy lies with the state circuit courts in an action to enforce his request, not with the federal courts through a Sec. 1983 action.

A violation of state involuntary-commitment procedures, without more, is not actionable under § 1983; the federal question is whether officials provided federal due process.

Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hospital · filed 1987-09-24

But violations of state law, without more, are not actionable in federal court. The issue confronted by a federal court in a case pursuant to § 1983 in the circumstances of this case is whether the municipal officials’ conduct was consistent with federal due process.

A violation of state prison procedural rules does not state a § 1983 claim unless those rules create a right secured by the federal Constitution.

Hechavarria v. Quick · filed 1987-09-29

Having concluded that the Morris Rules in question do not endow plaintiff with a right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, two conclusions immediately follow. First, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since by the terms of that statute, in order to possess a right to judicial relief plaintiff must allege that he has been “deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States____”

A violation of state privacy law alone cannot support a § 1983 claim without infringement of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Dr. Rosario C. Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High School, District 201, Cook County, Il · filed 1987-11-02

Pesce cannot claim any section 1983 violation based solely on an alleged violation of state privacy rights.

A state official's legal error or failure to follow state procedural law, without more, does not establish a § 1983 claim.

Staples v. Young · filed 1987-11-12

We agree with defendants that an error of law by state officials does not, without more, establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. The allegation that the state officials have failed to follow procedural provisions of state law, "without more,” does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

A violation of rights derived solely from state law does not support relief under Section 1983.

County of Wright v. Kennedy · filed 1987-12-01

“Rights which derive solely from state law * * * cannot be the subject of a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [or § 1985]”. ... In this case the violation of Minnesota law does not give rise to a claim by Kennedy for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for deprivation of rights guaranteed only by state law.

Beard v. Baum · filed 1990-08-03

Deprivation of rights guaranteed by state law are not actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 enforces federal constitutional and statutory rights, but not rights arising solely under state law.

Perry v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1997-05-29

Because the rights enforceable under § 1983 are only those recognized either by the federal constitution or by a federal statute, § 1983 cannot be used to enforce purely state rights, including rights arising under state statutes.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a right created by state law.

Manogg v. Stickle, Unpublished Decision (12-29-1999) · filed 1999-12-29

Based on our decision in Manogg, supra, we conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment as appellant can not maintain a Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code claim based on a statutory violation.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress existing federal rights but does not itself create rights.

Brian A. Ex Rel. Arthur A. v. Stroudsburg Area School District · filed 2001-03-26

Accordingly, Section 1983 does not create rights; it serves as a vehicle for the redress of an already established right.

Section 1983 authorizes federal equitable relief for constitutional-rights deprivations under color of state law, subject to ordinary equitable limits such as discretionary abstention.

Bateman v. South Carolina State Ports Authority · filed 1969-04-17

The civil rights statutes under which the plaintiffs are before this court are grants of equity jurisdiction, and a court vested with equitable jurisdiction may in its sound discretion refuse to assume jurisdiction of a matter when the interests of justice would thereby be furthered. Such a grant of equitable jurisdiction is compatable with the doctrine of abstention. Abstention is a tool of discretion and the doctrine should be invoked only when to do so will not prejudice constitutional rights. Since litigation through which plaintiffs’ constitutional rights can be vindicated is in progress before the State courts, this is a proper occasion for a discretionary refusal to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the civil rights statutes.

A conspiracy is not required for a § 1983 claim, but it may be used to impose liability on all defendants for acts of one conspirator.

John Madison and Kim Madison v. E. Wilson Purdy and Richard E. Gerstein · filed 1969-04-21

“Of course, for a claim under [42 U.S.C.] •§ 1983, a conspiracy as such is not an indispensable element as it is under § 1985. But it may be charged as the legal mechanism through which to impose liability on each and all of the Defendants without regard to the person doing the particular act. Conspiracy is asserted in that situation on more or less traditional principles of agency, partnership, joint venture, and the like.”

Section 1983 gives federal courts jurisdiction, including equitable jurisdiction, to enforce federal constitutional rights against unconstitutional state action.

Krahm v. Milton Graham, Etc. · filed 1972-06-27

There can be no doubt that the civil rights act confers upon the federal courts not only jurisdiction, but equitable jurisdiction, to enforce federal constitutional rights against state action which violates those rights.

Section 1983's authorization of an equitable remedy does not itself confer equitable jurisdiction when the action is not a proper proceeding under the circumstances.

Scott v. Palmerton Area School District · filed 1981-12-30

The fact that a Federal statute authorizes an equitable remedy does not confer equitable jurisdiction where such an action is not “a proper proceeding” under the circumstances of the particular case.

Section 1983 gives plaintiffs an alternative federal forum that courts may not withdraw through abstention contrary to Congress's purpose.

Duke v. Fob James, Governor of the State of Alabama Charles Graddick, Attorney General of the State of Alabama · filed 1983-09-09

It is not for the courts to withdraw that jurisdiction which Congress has expressly granted under section 1983 where such a withdrawal is contrary to the purpose of Congress in extending that alternative forum.

A federal court may stay a § 1983 constitutional challenge while the plaintiff obtains an authoritative state-court construction of an unclear local ordinance when that construction could avoid or materially alter the federal issue.

Waldron v. Mcatee · filed 1983-12-22

The judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is remanded with directions to stay further proceedings in the district court while Waldron sues the defendants in an Indiana state court to determine the applicability of the loitering ordinance to his conduct.

A federal court hearing a § 1983 constitutional challenge need not abstain merely because a state enforcement action is pending when the state proceeding may not adequately protect all federal plaintiffs' claims.

W.C.M. Window Co., Inc. v. E. Allen Bernardi, Director of the Department of Labor, State of Illinois · filed 1984-05-11

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the equities did not require the district judge to abstain; we need not decide whether they would have permitted him to do so.

A federal court must abstain from a § 1983 action when a state judicial proceeding was ongoing at filing, implicated important state interests, and afforded an adequate opportunity for constitutional challenges.

Joseph Despain, Cross-Appellants v. Marlin Johnston, Cross-Appellees · filed 1984-05-11

We find that the district court should have abstained and dismissed the complaint in this case, because (1) a state judicial proceeding was ongoing at the time that the plaintiffs initiated the federal action, (2) that proceeding implicated important state interests, and (3) the proceeding presented an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.

A federal court may invoke Burford abstention in a § 1983 action when equitable intervention would disrupt a state’s administration and supervision of its own courts and the federal claims can be heard in a pending state proceeding.

Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti · filed 1985-02-11

In sum, therefore, this Court should exercise its equitable discretion and abstain from hearing Planned Parenthood’s action against the judicial defendants.

A federal court may not use abstention merely to require exhaustion of state remedies before deciding a section 1983 action, particularly after the federal case has already been tried.

Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School Corporation · filed 1985-05-31

If they held that the Mazanecs really had provided equivalent instruction to their children, that would indeed wash out the federal suit. But to make this possibility a controlling consideration would be to require exhaustion of state remedies before a federal civil rights suit could be brought, and that is not, as a general rule anyway, required.

When a court defers a section 1983 damages and attorney-fee action to a related state proceeding that cannot provide those remedies, it should retain jurisdiction and stay rather than dismiss the federal case.

Crane v. Fauver · filed 1985-05-28

For the reasons that follow, we hold that the district court should have retained jurisdiction over this action while staying it pending the outcome of a related state proceeding. Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

A federal court may stay a section 1983 action when earlier state cases present nearly identical issues and proceeding federally would duplicate discovery and risk piecemeal resolution.

Rattner v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF VILLAGE OF PLEASANTVILLE · filed 1985-06-12

The facts as pleaded by Rattner establish that the federal case is inextricably intertwined with the state cases. ... I therefore find that a stay of the federal action, until determination by the state courts of the mutual issues currently pending in those cases, is the proper course.

A federal court may stay a section 1983 action when earlier state cases present nearly identical issues and proceeding federally would duplicate discovery and risk piecemeal resolution.

Rattner v. Board of Trustees of the Village of Pleasantville · filed 1985-06-12

The facts as pleaded by Rattner establish that the federal case is inextricably intertwined with the state cases. ... I therefore find that a stay of the federal action, until determination by the state courts of the mutual issues currently pending in those cases, is the proper course.

A federal court may retain jurisdiction but stay a § 1983 zoning and utility case when unclear state-law issues in a substantially identical, more advanced state case may eliminate or materially alter the constitutional questions.

East Naples Water Systems, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1986-01-06

In light of unclear issues of Florida law, the substantial identity of the material allegations in the two suits, the progress of the respective cases, and the interest of judicial economy, we find that this Court should abstain pending the conclusion of the state court Case No. 83-1856. We hasten to add, however, that we retain jurisdiction rather than dismiss the instant case.

When a federal court abstains from a § 1983 injunctive claim, it should stay rather than dismiss accompanying damages and attorney-fee claims unavailable in the state proceeding.

Monaghan v. Deakins · filed 1986-07-31

It is settled in this circuit that a district court, when abstaining from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief, should stay and not dismiss accompanying claims for damages and attorney fees when such relief is not available from the ongoing state proceedings.

Although federal courts ordinarily must exercise jurisdiction over Section 1983 actions, abstention and dismissal may be proper in exceptional circumstances when the asserted injury is speculative and the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with ongoing parallel state litigation.

Eitel v. Holland · filed 1986-08-29

The exceptional circumstances surrounding Eitel’s § 1983 action, however, do call for abstention. We cannot say the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the claims against the defendant attorneys on this ground. ... Indeed, at the time the federal suit was filed, the state case had not even been tried. The existence of a due process violation at that point was speculative at best and, even assuming such a violation could be shown, determining the extent, if any, of the damage suffered would have been difficult.

A federal court may abstain from deciding a § 1983 constitutional challenge when a definitive state-court interpretation of an ambiguous state statute could eliminate the constitutional issue.

Mandrell v. Baer · filed 1987-01-08

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court shall abstain from considering this cause until plaintiff has sought and received a definitive interpretation of the state statute in question from the appropriate state court(s).

A federal court should abstain from a § 1983 challenge that would interfere with enforcement of a pending state-court judgment when the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to present the federal claims.

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. · filed 1987-04-06

So long as those challenges relate to pending state proceedings, proper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal questions presented in state-court litigation mandates that the federal court stay its hand.

Younger abstention is inappropriate in a § 1983 action when no state judicial proceeding is pending.

Centifanti v. Nix · filed 1987-05-28

Thus, Younger abstention is inappropriate where there is no state judicial proceeding.

Federal courts may abstain from a § 1983 child-custody suit when the core dispute concerns domestic relations, parallel state actions can hear the constitutional claims, and federal intervention risks incompatible decrees.

Coats v. Woods · filed 1987-06-05

The strong state interest in domestic relations matters, the superior competence of state courts in settling family disputes because regulation and supervision of domestic relations within their borders is entrusted to the states, and the possibility of incompatible federal and state court decrees in cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state makes federal abstention in these cases appropriate.

A federal court may dismiss a § 1983 zoning and takings action under Burford and Pullman abstention when it implicates a complex local regulatory scheme and unsettled state law could avoid the constitutional question.

Meredith v. Talbot County, Maryland · filed 1987-09-08

Although appellants assert that they are only seeking compensation for the "taking" of their property, they are also seeking an injunction that significantly involves local zoning law and which, for the reasons stated above, makes both Burford and Pullman abstention appropriate.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a state official for violating the person's rights, and a coerced confession may support such a claim.

Kerr v. City Of Chicago · filed 1970-04-07

All of the acts of commission and omission — the totality of all the circumstances — are of great importance in determining whether plaintiff's confession was coerced in violation of his civil rights and thereby cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights claim based on extended, oppressive solitary confinement by state custodial officials, without requiring allegations of beatings or starvation.

Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services · filed 1970-12-18

But it is not necessary to present evidence of beatings or starvation to state a § 1983 claim. It is sufficient, for example, to show, as here, that plaintiff was held for two weeks in isolation which, according to a Family Court ^ Judge of New York inspecting the situation, was “augmented by surroundings {so oppressive as to destroy the integrity | and the identity of the child. * * * ” Quite obviously, the conditions in which plaintiff was held shocked the conscience of that judge.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law and, while doing so, cause the plaintiff to be deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law.

United States Ex Rel. Hoss v. Cuyler · filed 1978-05-01

This section imposes two requirements for recovery: first, that a defendant have acted under color of state law (statutory or otherwise), and, second, that while so acting he caused the plaintiff to be deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when conduct under color of state law deprives a person of a constitutional property or liberty interest without due process.

Riedy v. Sperry · filed 1978-05-02

We conclude that the plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action under sec. 1983, because it alleges conduct under color of state law which, without due process of law, deprived the plaintiff of property, and arguably of liberty interests, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 makes a due-process claim cognizable only when the plaintiff alleges deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law, requiring analysis of the right and the process due.

Downing v. Arnold · filed 1978-08-04

Violation of due process claims have consistently been considered under § 1983. But consideration need not be automatic just because claims of due process are involved. It is the denial of a right secured under the constitution or laws of the United States that is cognizable under this section. There is therefore a twofold analysis which must be made to ground this Court’s jurisdiction under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights against a person who, under color of law, subjects or causes another person to that deprivation.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Reber · filed 1978-08-14

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an action for deprivation of constitutional rights is available against one who under color of law “subjects or causes to be subjected” a person to such deprivation.

Section 1983 requires proof that a defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right while acting under color of state law; municipal liability requires an official policy or custom and cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Samuels v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, NYC · filed 1982-06-21

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a cause of action against any person who acts under color of state authority to deprive rights, privileges, or immunities protected by the United States Constitution or by federal law. In order to recover, therefore, a claimant must prove two elements: first, that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the defendant acted under color of law. ... While there may indeed have been a wrong to the claimant, allegations of tortious conduct are insufficient to sustain a section 1983 violation — the wrong must be of a federally protected right. ... Section 1983 requires that, to bring a claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that his rights were violated in pursuit of a policy or law officially adopted and promulgated by officers of the municipality, or pursuant to government custom.

Section 1983 authorizes damages for a deprivation, under color of state law, of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, which can include a due-process violation from the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to the accused.

Reese v. Chicago Police Department · filed 1984-07-23

Section 1983 provides for damages for the deprivation, under color of state law, of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ..." Such a deprivation may be sustained by the suppression of evidence favorable to an accused by the prosecution.

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show a constitutionally protected property interest of which the defendant deprived them while acting under color of state law, and that the deprivation lacked due process.

Hornbuckle v. Harris · filed 1984-07-25

To prevail on a § 1983 claim plaintiffs must first show that their right to redeem is a constitutionally protected property interest and that defendants deprived them of that interest while acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for an unsuccessful attempt to enforce an ordinance that allegedly violates constitutional rights under the circumstances described.

Andree v. Ashland County · filed 1987-05-05

Thus we hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the unsuccessful attempt to enforce the ordinance was not itself a deprivation, within the meaning of section 1983, of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to vindicate federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. William · filed 2004-09-01

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for the vindication of federal rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to vindicate federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish · filed 2004-09-01

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for the vindication of federal rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... “Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by governmental officials.” Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.2002). Cholla has no cause of action under § 1983 because it has not stated a viable claim that defendants violated its federal rights.

A state-law estate settlement dispute does not become a § 1983 action merely because it requires interpreting federal Medicaid law.

In re the Estate of Tomeck · filed 2006-03-09

Although requiring an interpretation of the state and federal statutes governing Medicaid benefits, we hold that this action does not equate with a claim asserted under 42 USC § 1983, rendering counsel fees under 42 USC § 1988 unavailable.