42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Trust Territory government and its High Commissioner are suable "persons" under Section 1983.

Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands · filed 1983-07-01

The Trust Territory government clearly is a "body politic" and it does not possess any federal constitutional or statutory immunity from § 1983 claims. Therefore, under Monell's rationale both the Trust Territory government and the High Commissioner must be considered to be "persons" against whom § 1983 actions may lie.

A Puerto Rico conjugal partnership is a “person” for purposes of Section 1983 because it is a separate legal entity capable of suing and being sued.

Mercado-Vega v. Martinez · filed 1986-09-22

Yet the remedial nature of section 1983 and the peculiar legal personality of a conjugal partnership in Puerto Rico, ... a ... sui generis ... entity having the capacity to sue and be sued, is sufficient for us to determine that a “sociedad de gananciales” is a “person” for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a territory or its officers acting in their official capacities as persons subject to liability.

Ngiraingas v. Sanchez · filed 1990-04-24

We hold that neither the Territory of Guam nor its officers acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.

Puerto Rico is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983 and cannot be sued for damages under it.

Font v. Yordan · filed 1991-04-25

Also, the Commonwealth is immune from damages in this case since it cannot be considered a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on immune judges, a county solely under respondeat superior for judges’ misconduct, or private parties who do not act under color of state law.

Sherry B. Callahan Jonathan E. Hughes v. Gayle Guynup Mark Tansil Patricia Gray · filed 1992-05-08

Second, the judges are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability. See Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). Third, the County of Sonoma cannot be held responsible on a respondeat superior theory under section 1983 for what the appellants allege to be misconduct by the judges. Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 275 (1991). Fourth, the attorneys and other private parties are not subject to suit under section 1983 because they are private persons who do not act under color of state law.

States and state agencies are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Cronen v. Texas Department of Human Services, Jean Roberts, Ann Valdez-Haines, Donna L. Burns, Socorro Alonzo · filed 1992-11-23

The state and the agency properly argue that they are not “persons” for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

State agencies are not persons subject to liability under Section 1983, and individual-capacity liability requires allegations of personal involvement in the challenged actions.

Driver v. Roy H. Page and Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board · filed 1993-08-16

He also ruled that the state agency was not a "person" made subject to liability under Sec. 1983. Alternatively, he held if the defendant had been sued in his individual capacity, plaintiff failed to allege he was personally involved in the challenged actions, and therefore without liability under Sec. 1983. 5 We agree with each of these rulings; hence, we do not even reach the due process and ex post facto issues.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state agency or a state official sued in an official capacity.

Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department · filed 1999-03-04

To begin with, a claim for damages (a refund of the tax) under § 1983 could not be pursued because only a “person” is liable under the statute. The word “person” in § 1983 does not include a state agency, nor does it include a state official sued for damages in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because the agency is not a person subject to liability under the section.

Tang v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe · filed 2002-02-22

Tang failed to state a claim against the Montana Child Support Enforcement Division because the state agency is not a “person” who can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state, but state officials sued in their individual capacities may be held liable.

Smith v. State · filed 2006-09-18

Thus, the State of Washington cannot be held liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the named individuals here sued in their individual capacities, may be held liable.

State courts are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Carroway v. State of NJ · filed 2006-10-18

In any event, none of these courts is a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 places liability for misconduct on individual public employees; state agencies are not persons under the section, and local governments are responsible only for their policies.

Fairley, Roger v. Fermaint, Evan · filed 2007-03-19

Things are otherwise under §1983. State agencies are not “persons” under §1983, see Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), and even units of local government are responsible only for their policies rather than misconduct by their workers. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Liability falls on the misbehaving employees—which of course is why they are keen to assert immunities from suit.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on states or divisions of state government because they are not persons under the statute.

Mawson v. Court of Common Pleas · filed 2007-07-10

And neither states nor divisions of state government are “persons” for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a judge protected by judicial immunity or on private parties who did not act under color of state law.

Bulah (Oliver) Harley, Individually v. Oliver · filed 1976-07-26

In short, since Judge Taylor was clothed with judicial immunity, and the father, Mr. Oliver and his attorney Mr. Evans were acting in purely private capacities and not under color of state law, their motions to dismiss were properly granted.

Section 1983 does not subject federal instrumentalities to liability as persons under the statute.

Birbeck v. Southern New England Production Credit Ass'n · filed 1985-03-29

Federal instrumentalities, however, are not “persons” subject to section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits the University of Alaska to be held liable as a person.

Brown v. Wood · filed 1979-04-10

In view of this, we have concluded that our earlier opinion should be modified so that, in accord with Monell, the University of Alaska can be held liable in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a state, its agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

CONCEPCION v. Rico · filed 2010-01-20

While this may be so, it is well-settled that a state, its agencies, and officials acting in official capacities are not “persons” under 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico because it is not a person under the statute.

Medina & Medina v. Rico · filed 2011-03-09

Because the Commonwealth is not a “person” for section 1983 purposes, plaintiffs do not have a cognizable cause of action against the Commonwealth under section 1983.

Territorial government entities and their officers acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Taitano v. Salas · filed 2011-06-28

Therefore, the Parole Board and Parole Board members acting in their official capacities are not “persons who would be liable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state university because the university is not a person under the statute.

Issaenko v. University of Minnesota · filed 2014-09-30

Specifically, the University is not a person within the meaning of § 1983, and therefore cannot be subject to liability under the statute.

State courts are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Travaline v. Travaline · filed 2016-05-05

The District Court concluded that Travaline’s claims against the state courts are barred because those courts are not “persons” for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and because, as instrumentalities of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239-41 (3d Cir. 2005). Those conclusions are correct, and there is no arguable basis to challenge them.

States and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under Section 1983.

E.B. v. W. Va. Regional Jail and Correctional Authority, etc. · filed 2017-01-27

We have explained that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under §1983” (see Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), and the circuit court acknowledged as much in its order.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against the West Virginia Regional Jail Authority, the Western Regional Jail, or the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation because they are not persons subject to liability under the section.

Deitz v. West Virginia Regional Jail Authority · filed 2019-09-10

None of these named defendants is a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show specific facts establishing deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Felber v. Foote · filed 1970-12-21

In short, the right to privacy asserted by the plaintiff is not supported by the Constitution or any federal law. This section of his complaint sets forth no specific facts to show a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity under the Constitution or federal law as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires allegations supporting a civil-rights claim to be sufficiently specific and nonconclusory to state a cause of action.

Mann v. Snyder · filed 1969-07-03

The allegations of petitioner that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights are too broad and conclusory to support a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act and to thereby justify our granting him leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege specific underlying facts sufficient to state a claim for relief.

Finley v. Rittenhouse · filed 1969-10-20

Appellant’s conclusory allegations, unsupported by any underlying factual details, were insufficient to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits relief when a prisoner's factual allegations and reasonable inferences, taken as true, state a claim for a constitutional violation.

Dearman v. Woodson · filed 1970-07-14

Absent that critical information, the facts taken as true along with the reasonable inferences, state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations sufficient to state a claim; conclusory allegations alone are inadequate.

The Albany Welfare Rights Organization Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck · filed 1972-06-09

The facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S. C. Sec. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(3) (1970), and the district court properly dismissed the complaint. Mere conclusory allegations do not provide an adequate basis for the assertion of a claim for violation of these sections.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations sufficient to support a claim; conclusory allegations alone are inadequate.

Albany Welfare Rights Organization Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck · filed 1972-06-09

The facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) *623(1970), and the district court properly dismissed the complaint. Mere conclusory allegations do not provide an adequate basis for the assertion of a claim for violation of these sections.

Section 1983 provides a potential civil-rights cause of action for a prisoner's alleged denial of rights, and the claim should not be dismissed when it is not yet clear that no supporting facts could be proved.

United States ex rel. Priest v. Ziegler · filed 1973-11-28

We cannot say as a matter of law at this juncture that plaintiff cannot possibly adduce any facts which would establish a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to specifically allege conduct by the defendant that violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights; vague, general, and conclusory allegations are insufficient.

227 Book Center, Inc. v. Codd · filed 1974-06-13

In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must make specific allegations of conduct by a defendant which he claims violates his constitutional rights. Vague, general and conclusory allegations are not sufficient.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of administrative and state-court remedies, but vague and conclusory conspiracy allegations are insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction.

Hazzard v. Weinberger · filed 1974-09-27

While exhaustion of such remedies is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction of claims framed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, Powell v. Workmen’s Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1964), the conspiracy allegations here are so vague and conclusory as to foreclose that avenue towards federal court jurisdiction over the claim.

An allegation that defendants acted with malice, without more, is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Esser v. Jeffes · filed 1975-11-05

As for plaintiffs allegation that the defendants with respect to the above disciplinary action proceeded with “malice”, it is insufficient to make out a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege more than indefinite and conclusory language to state a claim against individual state actors for deprivation of property without due process of law.

Litton Industries, Inc. v. Rafael Hernandez Colon · filed 1978-11-20

Taking as broad a view of these allegations and the rest of the complaint as law and logic will permit, we are constrained to agree with the district court that the language is too indefinite and conclusory to allege a 1983 cause of action against the individual defendants.

Section 1983 permits a sufficiently specific claim for deprivation of due process through excessive force during an arrest, but it does not support an Eighth Amendment cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim for conduct before conviction.

Demetrius v. Marsh · filed 1983-03-23

The defendants’ second contention is that the complaint was not sufficiently specific to comply with the pleading requirements in a § 1983 claim. In civil rights cases, plaintiffs are required to plead facts with specificity. ... The plaintiff has alleged the conduct violating his civil rights, the use of excessive force, the time, April 5, 1980, and those allegedly responsible. The court has determined that although the complaint is far from being a model of specificity, it is sufficient to state a cause of action against the defendants for the deprivation of his civil rights by exercising more force than was reasonably necessary to effectuate his arrest. ... The Eighth Amendment applies only to punishment imposed after conviction of a crime. ... Since the plaintiff’s allegations relate to the deprivation of his civil rights during his arrest by the defendants rather than after he was a convicted inmate, the Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed. This leaves a viable § 1983 claim against the defendants based upon the deprivation of the plaintiff’s right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments through the excessive use of force against the plaintiff in arresting him.

Broad, conclusory allegations that prison officials tacitly approved constitutional violations are insufficient to state personal liability under § 1983.

Grady v. Charles E. Wilken, Stephen Korb, Timothy Dieters, Charles Harper and Rick Larkin · filed 1984-05-29

Because Grady alleges only that the two officials gave “tacit and/or direct approval” to the other violations he delineated, the amendment was properly denied as an insufficient statement.

Conclusory allegations that private witnesses conspired with a prosecutor are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Company Of New York · filed 1984-06-14

We therefore hold that plaintiff's conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to survive either a 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal, see Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163 (1st Cir.1980); Ellentuck v. Klein, supra; Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.1977) (per curiam); Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.1975), or in the alternative a motion for summary judgment in defendants' favor, see Baxter v. Lewis, 421 F.Supp. 504, 507 (W.D.Va.1976); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be treated as motion for summary judgment if matters outside pleadings are considered).

Routine witness-preparation meetings do not by themselves support a § 1983 conspiracy allegation against private witnesses.

San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 1984-06-14

We see nothing suspicious or improper in such meetings, which are routine and necessary in the preparation of evidence.

An official's lack of active interest in helping a prisoner locate missing newspapers does not establish malicious and intentional interference sufficient for a Section 1983 claim.

Johnson v. Nix · filed 1985-02-06

The district court correctly noted that although Forsythe may have indicated “a lack of active interest in helping plaintiff locate missing newspapers,” appellant’s assertion “did not establish a fact issue as to malicious and intentional interference with plaintiff’s receipt of newspapers.”

A section 1983 claim based on a liberty right must plead facts that would support the claimed deprivation.

Chandler v. Perry-Casa Public Schools District No. 2 · filed 1985-06-03

The allegation that appellant had a § 1983 action based upon a liberty right was dismissed along with the other allegations of the complaint. There were no facts pleaded upon which such action could have been maintained.

Conclusory allegations of intentional or reckless conduct unsupported by specific facts sound only in negligence and do not state a § 1983 claim.

Freedman v. CITY OF ALLENTOWN, PA. · filed 1987-01-07

Further, in the absence of specific factual allegations as to knowledge of the decedent’s mental state the averments that the officers acted intentionally and recklessly in failing to safeguard his Fourteenth Amendment right to life are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim under the pleading standards of this Circuit. ... Without the required specificity to support the allegation of intentional conduct, the complaint sounds only in negligence, thus rendering it frivolous for § 1983 purposes.

Conclusory allegations do not state a § 1983 claim; the complaint must plead facts supporting the asserted constitutional violation.

Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township · filed 1987-01-12

As earlier noted, it is well settled in this Circuit that conclusory pleadings do not suffice to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 such as the present one.

Conclusory allegations without supporting facts are insufficient to state a § 1983 cause of action, even when a pro se complaint is liberally construed.

Thompson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky William E. McAnulty Judge and Harold G. Wren · filed 1987-01-28

Although pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, ... they still must set forth a cognizable federal claim. ... Conclusory allegations such as those stated in plaintiff's complaint are insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Conclusory allegations of discrimination or bias are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

Schreane v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections · filed 1987-02-17

As to the allegations that there existed discriminatory treatment at the prison and that the disciplinary board was not impartial, it is clear that the district court did not err in stating that such conclusory allegations were insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Conclusory claims in a complaint are not sufficient to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Conclusory allegations unsupported by facts cannot survive summary judgment in a § 1983 action.

Herring v. Lyons · filed 1987-02-23

Conclusory allegations cannot survive a motion for summary judgment.

Individual Section 1983 liability requires specific factual allegations of the defendant’s own acts; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Darlak v. Bobear · filed 1987-04-20

Dr. Darlak’s complaint fails to allege any acts on the part of these defendants which would impose individual liability. “In the now familiar cases involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983 we consistently require the claimant to state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations.”

Conclusory constitutional allegations without precise supporting facts do not state a § 1983 claim.

Cox v. Lamar Alexander, Governor of State of Tennessee Steve Norris, Commissioner Howard Cook and Bruce McDona · filed 1987-05-19

The complaint provided no precise factual support for his allegations, but stated only his general conclusions that the discriminatory classification of inmates constituted cruel and unusual punishment and that the classification panel deprived inmates of a just and equitable security level in violation of the constitution. Such conclusory allegations do not sufficiently state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A naked assertion of conspiracy is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Harris v. Manuel Menendez, Mr. Hermida, State Attorney, C.N. Pisano, Sheriff · filed 1987-05-27

Harris gives no other basis for his claim of conspiracy, and a naked assertion of conspiracy is an insufficient foundation for a section 1983 claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires more than vague or conclusory allegations that defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Zemsky v. City of New York · filed 1987-06-12

We agree that Zemsky’s conspiracy claims are so ... as to have warranted their dismissal by the district court.

A § 1983 political-discharge claim must plead a minimum factual setting supporting the inference that political affiliation caused the adverse action.

Marrero v. Roque · filed 1987-06-30

plaintiffs’ first amendment claims that their non-renewals were politically based must be dismissed insofar as plaintiffs have failed to present the “minimum factual setting” necessary to support such a claim.

Conclusory allegations that defendants violated due process do not state a § 1983 claim without facts identifying the federal right infringed.

Thomas v. Charles Haddle, Richard Deets, Darrell Ammom, Everett Lykins, Dana Kolter, and David Stengel · filed 1987-10-05

First, plaintiff's conclusory allegations simply do not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Plaintiff merely asserts that the defendants violated his due process rights during a fraud investigation and subsequent court proceeding, but he does not allege sufficient facts to identify any right that was infringed.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim based on allegations that state officials recklessly provided inaccurate information contributing to a person’s arrest, prosecution, and incarceration.

Dunn v. McFeeley · filed 1999-04-28

As we read Plaintiffs amended complaint, it encompasses allegations that the Individual Defendants acted recklessly and with willful disregard of Plaintiffs rights in providing inaccurate information that contributed to the arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of Plaintiff. ... The issue before us is whether the allegations could support a cause of action under § 1983. In our view, they could. Thus, dismissal for failure to state a claim was error.

Conclusory and unsupported § 1983 allegations may be disregarded even when a pro se pleading is construed liberally.

Sims v. Hickok · filed 1999-07-02

Despite the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, we generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, Walker v. Mather (In re Walker) 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992), or conclusory and unsupported §1983 allegations, Durre, 869 F.2d at 545.

Conclusional allegations are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Morgan v. Godwin · filed 1999-08-27

The district court did not err in dismissing his claims under § 1915(e)(2)(B) because his conclusional allegations were insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

A conclusory allegation that prison disciplinary charges were brought because of race cannot support a § 1983 claim.

Humphrey v. Carrillo · filed 1999-12-16

Humphrey’s allegation that disciplinary charges were brought against him because of his race is conclusional and will not support a claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim based on conspiracy or racial discrimination requires more than vague and conclusory allegations.

McKinley v. Bowlen · filed 2001-05-01

His vague and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy and discriminatory conduct are not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim can survive a motion to dismiss when submissions opposing the motion provide sufficient supporting factual allegations, even if the complaint alone alleges only negligence.

Small v. St. Barnabas Hospital · filed 2001-06-14

Although the complaint, standing alone, states no more than that St. Barnabas’s employees were negligent and careless, the submissions in opposition to the motion to dismiss sufficiently set forth factual allegations to support causes of action for negligence and violation of 42 USC § 1983 (see, Elie v St. Barnabas Hosp, 283 AD2d 364).

For jurisdictional purposes, a complaint sufficiently alleges a § 1983 claim when it alleges that defendants, under color of state law, caused or permitted a deprivation of federally protected rights.

Marzette v. McPhee · filed 1968-12-09

The complaint sufficiently alleges, for jurisdictional purposes, that the defendants, un...der color of state law, have caused or permitted the plaintiffs to be subjected to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations sufficient to support a racial discrimination claim; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

McMillanv. Togus Regional Office · filed 2005-01-07

Conclusory allegations of racial discrimination are insufficient to maintain a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations of a conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights to state a cognizable claim.

Misiak v. Washington · filed 2005-06-24

The district court properly dismissed the claim against his former defense attorneys, Bernstein and Kimberley, because Misiak’s conelusory allegation that they conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights is insufficient to state a claim cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against state or local officials for depriving a person of constitutional rights, including claims based on unlawful extradition or denial of meaningful access to legal materials.

Eldridge v. Block · filed 1987-12-22

These facts appear sufficient to state a section 1983 claim under the standard established in Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915 (9th Cir.1986).

Section 1983 requires sufficient allegations to state a civil rights claim.

Gill v. State of Texas · filed 2005-11-02

His conclusional allegations that the defendants’ slanderous statements resulted in lost friendships, lost livelihood, lost time, and physical injuries are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 relief cannot rest on conclusory allegations of retaliatory mistreatment.

Irby v. Corrtl · filed 2008-05-13

Irby’s conclusory allegations regarding retaliatory mistreatment are an insufficient basis for § 1983 relief.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, but the claim must be supported by sufficient factual allegations.

Dema v. City of Mesa · filed 2009-06-24

Dema’s conclusory allegations of conspiracies to violate his civil rights and defame him are insufficient to support a claim for relief against any defendant.

Section 1983 provides no basis for holding other defendants liable when no constitutional violation occurred.

Williams v. Jeff Davis Wayne Tucker Christie Vierregger Patrick Thomas Lee Polikopf John Davis · filed 2000-01-03

Absent a constitutional violation, there was no basis for section 1983 liability on the part of the other defendants.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for time spent in custody that was credited toward a lawful sentence.

CUMMINGS v. THE MARION COUNTY SHERIFF · filed 2020-04-30

Plaintiffs may not recover damages for time spent in custody that was credited toward a lawful and valid sentence.

Section 1983 permits damages for conviction and incarceration after a conviction is set aside if an officer’s actions proximately caused those injuries.

Carter v. Georgevich · filed 2000-01-05

While it is true that a § 1983 plaintiff generally cannot seek damages under the Fourth Amendment for conviction and incarceration if the conviction has not been overturned, this restriction does not apply to plaintiffs whose convictions have been set aside. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). If the officer’s actions in the period leading up to plaintiffs conviction proximately caused plaintiffs conviction and incarceration, this court cannot ignore the injuries plaintiff allegedly suffered during his imprisonment merely because he is now free.

Section 1983 does not allow damages arising from an allegedly unconstitutional conviction unless the conviction has been set aside.

Hall v. Gilmer-Jones · filed 2001-08-31

“no cause of action exists under § 1983 for the recovery of damages arising from an allegedly unconstitutional conviction where the challenged conviction has not been set aside”; ... We agree with the district court's analysis of the issues and AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons as stated in the district court's order entered April 30, 2001.

Section 1983 does not permit damages on a claim challenging a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Riley v. Yowell · filed 2002-05-15

Moreover, Mr. Riley may not claim damages on this basis absent a showing “that the conviction ... or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”

Section 1983 bars damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court.

Juarez v. Short · filed 2003-12-29

He cannot recover damages pursuant to § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence unless he proves that the conviction has been reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s ruling.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim for continued confinement unless that confinement has been overturned by a state tribunal or executive order, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Brownfield v. Stovall · filed 2003-12-30

With respect to damages, absent a showing that Mr. Brownfield’s continued Kansas confinement has been overturned by a state tribunal or executive order, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, no colorable claim for damages under section 1983 can be stated.

Section 1983 bars damages for allegedly unlawful confinement until the confinement has been declared unconstitutional in habeas or another proceeding.

Allen v. Musgrove · filed 2004-09-21

To the extent that Allen seeks monetary damages for his allegedly illegal incarceration, his claims are barred because he has not yet had his confinement declared unconstitutional in a habeas corpus action or other proceeding.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim based on an allegedly unlawful conviction unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by federal habeas relief.

Damian v. Park · filed 2005-05-10

To the extent Damian seeks money damages based on an alleged illegal conviction, his claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Damian has not shown that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Chavez v. University Medical Center · filed 2008-03-07

Because Chavez’s conviction has not been declared invalid by a state tribunal, called into question by a federal habeas court, or otherwise invalidated, Chavez cannot seek damages pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow incarceration-related damages for a period supported by a valid, unchallenged conviction and sentence.

Taylor v. County of Pima · filed 2019-01-17

A plaintiff in a § 1983 action may not recover incarceration-related damages for any period of incarceration supported by a valid, unchallenged conviction and sentence.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Quair v. San Mateo County Superior Court · filed 2020-06-16

A claim for damages relating to a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. ... To the extent plaintiff seeks money damages regarding his underlying conviction, his claim is barred by Heck. Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction has been reversed or expunged.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for claims challenging telephone rates approved by regulators under the filed rate doctrine.

Daleure v. Kentucky · filed 2000-02-09

Recognizing the application of the filed rate doctrine to this case has several ramifications. All Plaintiffs’ damages claims under the Sherman Act and Section 1983 are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right caused by action taken under color of state law.

James Lewis Johnson et al. v. Capitol City Lodge No. 74 · filed 1973-05-01

The Supreme Court has said that the presence of two elements is necessary in order to maintain successfully a section 1983 action. First, the plaintiff must have suffered deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and second, this deprivation must be the result of action taken by the defendant "under color of law." ... In the instant case, the District Court found that the Lodge had deprived appellants and others of their class of membership solely on the basis of race. ... We agree both that the Lodge has pursued a discriminatory membership policy and that the Lodge and police department are so closely entwined as to fulfill the state action requirement of Adickes.

Section 1983 provides equitable relief for deprivations of federal rights committed under color of state law.

United States v. State of Mich. · filed 1980-05-09

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the remedy available for such deprivations includes equitable relief.

Section 1983 reaches jointly undertaken conduct by otherwise private persons and state officials when the challenged conduct is under color of state law.

Hassan v. Town of East Hampton · filed 1980-05-06

Accordingly, the court determines that in applying for and obtaining enactment of Ordinance 27 the town trustees and the town board were acting jointly and together acted “under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats conduct by a state official who purports to act under official authority as action under color of state law even when the conduct exceeds the authority actually delegated by state law.

Lopez v. William Vanderwater and Howard Wheeler Gamble · filed 1980-04-29

Vanderwater’s prosecutorial acts were taken under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The “under color” of state law element of a § 1983 claim is identical to the “state action” requirement in an action based on the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Action taken by a state official who is cloaked with official power and who purports to be acting under color of official right is state action and is taken under color of state law whether or not the action is in fact in excess of the authority actually delegated to the official under state law.

Section 1983 requires action by a state, rather than a private party, to deprive a person of constitutionally protected rights.

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn · filed 1980-04-16

“A cause of action under § 1983 requires that a state, not a private party, act to deprive one of constitutionally protected rights.”

Section 1983 does not reach a private entity's conduct based only on governmental funding, tax exemptions, or general regulation; the state ties must directly encourage the challenged activity or show state involvement or control.

Naranjo v. Alverno College · filed 1980-04-16

These cases have clearly established that allegations of governmental funding and general regulation cannot support a finding of state action unless such ties to the state directly encourage the challenged activity. ... Since there are no facts before me suggesting that Alverno’s financial support from the state of Wisconsin and its other ties to the state led either to the state’s involvement in Alverno’s admissions policy or to the state’s de facto control of the college, the plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1983 must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not make every state-law assault or battery committed under color of law a constitutional violation; excessive force must be shocking and brutal enough to cross the constitutional line, assessed from the particular facts.

Shillingford v. Holmes · filed 1980-04-22

It is well established that not every action that constitutes a state law tort of assault or battery is a violation of a constitutional right under Section 1983 when it is committed under color of law. ... The conduct complained of must be “brutal” and “shock the conscience” to deprive the victim of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. ... A plaintiff, therefore, must show more than that he suffered an intentional tort at the hands of a defendant acting under color of state law; he must prove acts which amount to shocking, brutal conduct. Where the constitutional line should be drawn in any case is intimately related to the particular facts.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution.

Lassie Fay Wilkerson v. The City of Coralville, Iowa · filed 1973-04-30

The basic requirements of a § 1983 complaint are: (1) that complained conduct was under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct subjected plaintiff to a deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a constitutional or federal-law right under color of state law; entrapment alone is not such a violation, but allegations that state actors obstructed access to a defense witness and impaired Sixth Amendment preparation may state a claim.

Johnston v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc. · filed 1973-03-21

To succeed under Section 1983 plaintiff must establish “(1) that he has been deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; (2) that the defendants subjected plaintiff to this deprivation or ‘cause[d]’ him to be so subjected; and (3) that the defendants acted ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . . ’ ” Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969). ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by its terms protects only “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” It does not protect against deprivation of rights granted by state laws. ... Since the claim of entrapment does not state a violation of constitutional rights, plaintiff’s first cause of action, based upon Sections 1983 and 1985, must be dismissed. ... The claim will not lose its viability if it can be deemed an action under Section 1983. ... In effect, the complaint indicates a deprivation by these defendants of plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment right to prepare an adequate defense in his criminal case. ... Thus, we conclude that in view of the charge outlined, although vaguely, in the second cause of action in the complaint, plaintiff has set out a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that causes a deprivation of constitutional or federal rights.

Ames v. Vavreck · filed 1973-02-23

To state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 there must be an allegation of 1) action taken under color of state law and 2) a resulting deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or by federal law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show both deprivation of a constitutional right and action under color of law.

Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club · filed 1973-03-30

To state a claim under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the elements which must be proven are deprivation of a constitutional right by defendants and the fact that defendants acted under color of law.

Section 1983 requires state action, which may be shown by the facts and circumstances connecting a nominally private hospital to public functions, funding, property, and obligations.

O'Neill v. The Grayson County War Memorial Hospital · filed 1973-02-02

Although neither the original complaint nor the amended complaint suggests that the Appellee members of the Hospital Foundation’s board of directors are appointed by the county Fiscal Court or any other governmental body, this fact alone does not preclude a finding of the requisite state action in this case. ... Significantly, one provision of the lease set forth in the amended complaint requires that the board of directors shall at all times contain at least one member from each of the County’s magisterial districts, revealing an element of the public function served by the Hospital. Moreover, the other provisions of the lease, including the nominal consideration, the Foundation’s assumption of all obligations and agreements made by the Fiscal Court to secure funds under the Hill-Burton Act, the agreement that all donations received by the Foundation shall revert to the Fiscal Court should the former cease to exist, and the requirements relating to the Foundation’s maintenance and operation of the Hospital, indicate that the Hospital is not a purely private institution, immune from the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... we conclude that the amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to support a finding of the requisite state action under Appellant’s Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires the challenged deprivation to qualify as state action, including action under color of state law.

Weigand v. Afton View Apartments · filed 1973-02-15

Accordingly, we hold that the facts stated in Weigand’s complaint do not fall within the perimeters of “state action” as required for assertion of a federal civil rights claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action connected to the challenged injury; government funding or regulation of a private institution alone does not make its conduct actionable under the statute.

Gene A. Ward, M. D. v. St. Anthony Hospital · filed 1973-04-04

But in any event, we do not feel in the present case the Hospital has received governmental funding sufficient to invoke § 1983 jurisdiction. ... State action does not arise merely because private hospitals receive governmental aid; more is required than that. ... Dr. Ward has failed to show that Colorado is involved in his dismissal from the St. Anthony Hospital. ... Without this proof we do not believe receiving Hill-Burton or state funds is sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction under § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a separate federal cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Cook v. Cox · filed 1973-04-16

The Court concludes that the latter position is correct, that is, that § 1983 creates a separate federal right.

Section 1983 permits a damages action when a person acting under color of state law actually deprives someone of a constitutional right, and the plaintiff need not prove malice or ill-will.

Johnson v. Greer · filed 1973-04-24

Since it is admitted that Greer was acting “under color of law” as Administrator of the Clinic, his actions in depriving Johnson of his constitutional right to liberty provide ample basis for this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As a corollary, the plaintiff need not show malice or ill-will to prove his action under Section 1983. All that is required is that he demonstrate state action which amounts to an actual deprivation of Constitutional rights or other rights guaranteed by law.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue state officials for constitutional deprivations caused by state action, including neglect as well as intentional misconduct.

Wallace v. McDonald · filed 1973-02-27

The Supreme Court has said quite recently that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act is to give federal courts power to deal with the day-to-day operations of state agencies and may invoke federal jurisdiction to remedy neglect as well as intentional misconduct. ... It is sufficient that some neglect of duty or participation in the delay of trials is charged against them.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law, and appointed defense counsel's representation of a criminal defendant does not satisfy that requirement.

Barnes v. Dorsey · filed 1973-02-01

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a defendant must be alleged to have acted under color of state law. Plaintiff has so alleged in conclusory form regarding defendant Hadican. However, the specific acts of this defendant, as alleged, show him to have acted only in performance of his duties as Court appointed counsel in representing plaintiff. Such actions are not performed under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches a private defendant when the defendant's conduct involves sufficient state involvement to constitute action under color of state law.

Auerbach v. African American Teachers Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1973-04-05

The proof established that the defendant, a private organization of blacks, used a public facility to carry out its discriminatory practices. This facility, partially financed by State funds, was used by the defendant for its private actions which were made known to the school principal, responsible pursuant to the State Educational Law for operating this public school. Furthermore, he took no action to stop the discriminatory practices. It follows, therefore, that sufficient evidence was adduced to show State involvement, under color of law. United States v. Price, supra.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Dr. Ina Braden, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. The University of Pittsburgh · filed 1973-04-11

Whether as a grant of a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) or as a grant of summary judgment, the order dismissing the complaint must be reversed insofar as the complaint relies on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. At the least, whether the University of Pittsburgh is engaged in state action is a substantial factual question.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law for a plaintiff to maintain an action.

Ehrlich v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. · filed 1973-04-13

It is crucial to a proper action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 that the defendant acted under the color of state law. If the plaintiff fails to make this essential allegation the complaint should be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private refusal to provide legal assistance is insufficient without a basis showing state action.

Hall v. Asher · filed 1973-02-26

Further, in any event, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against all defendants except Elsbeth Bothe must be dismissed for failure to allege, or to indicate any basis for suggesting, that any of them (other than defendant Bothe) acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State” in refusing to provide plaintiff with legal assistance.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal authorities because their conduct is not under color of state law.

Rivera v. E. O. Toft, Warden · filed 1973-04-23

The district court dismissed the petition after determining that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not apply in actions against the United States, that federal authorities do not act under col- or of state law therefore jurisdiction is lacking, and administrative remedies must be pursued in the first instance. We agree.

Section 1983 provides relief only when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a federally secured right, privilege, or immunity.

LeBeauf v. STATE BD. OF EDUCATION OF LOUISIANA · filed 1965-07-27

Relief under §§ 1981 and 1983 is available only when, under color of some statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, a person is deprived of the rights, privileges, or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. It may well be that the rights and privileges secured by the United States Constitution to these plaintiffs or to members of the class whom they represent are, under the present state of the law, being denied by certain Parish School Boards throughout the state who have thus far refused to abide by the law of the land requiring an end to forced segregation in public schools. If such is the case, plaintiffs must seek redress against the responsible Parish School Boards. There simply is no right, privilege, or immunity secured to these plaintiffs by the Constitution and laws of the United States being in any way denied by these respondents when they allocate and disburse funds pursuant to the provisions of Article 12, Section 14 of the Louisiana Constitution, and LSA-R.S. 17:14 and LSA-R.S. 17:193.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

LeBeauf v. State Board of Education of Louisiana · filed 1965-07-27

Relief under §§ 1981 and 1983 is available only when, under color of some statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, a person is deprived of the rights, privileges, or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... There simply is no right, privilege, or immunity secured to these plaintiffs by the Constitution and laws of the United States being in any way denied by these respondents when they allocate and disburse funds pursuant to the provisions of Article 12, Section 14 of the Louisiana Constitution, and LSA-R.S. 17:14 and LSA-R.S. 17:193.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage and to have deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Tyson v. Cazes · filed 1965-02-26

In order for there to be recovery against the Stewarts under Section 1983, plaintiff must prove that they, the Stewarts, were acting under color of some statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the state.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal constitutional right under color of state law; state officials are not liable for purely private tortious conduct merely because they are state employees.

Cole v. Lavern Smith, Bernard Danner and Allen Vogel · filed 1965-05-26

State officials can only be held accountable under the Civil Rights Act, supra, in the federal courts for conduct and actions taken pursuant to their official duties and where a clear showing is made of a violation of some federal constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Johnson Ex Rel. Johnson v. Hackett · filed 1968-05-22

The essential elements of a claim under § 1983 are set forth in Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1965) : ... “* * * (l) the conduct complained of must have been done by some person acting under color of law; and (2) such conduct must have subjected the complainant to the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” ... Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the allegations of the instant complaint fail to establish either (a) that the acts of Hackett and Thompson were committed under color of law, or (b) that their conduct subjected Johnson to deprivation of rights secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... The complaint fails to charge acts committed by Hackett and Thompson under color of law and fails, therefore, to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action that causes a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law; a mere failure to give Miranda warnings, without use of the resulting evidence in a criminal proceeding, is not enough.

Ambrek v. Clark · filed 1968-07-18

Consideration in both actions will accordingly be restricted to the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 to the allegations recited in the complaints. ... Consequently, unless evidence so obtained were used against the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding, there has been no deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, which is a requisite for stating a cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965). But the mere failure to warn, as alleged in the complaint, does not create a cause of action.

Section 1983 reaches defendants acting under color of state law pursuant to a state legislative resolution, which may qualify as a state statute or usage for purposes of the statute.

Goldman v. Olson · filed 1968-06-28

Defendants contend that § 1983 reaches only to persons who act “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory”, and that a resolution of one house of the bicameral Wisconsin legislature is neither a statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, nor usage of a state. This historic remedial Act of 1871 is not to be so strictly construed. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Thus, a resolution of the Wisconsin Senate is a “statute” for purposes of § 1983, despite questions whether it is a statute for other purposes, such as those reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 2281. In any event, it is not the Resolution alone under which defendants act. It is an implied power or “usage”, presumably having its roots in the state constitution, State ex rel. Rosenhein v. Frear, 138 Wis. 173, 176-177, 119 N.W. 894 (1909), by which the legislature is authorized to conduct investigations.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; state funding and state-related operations alone do not make a private university a state actor absent state participation in the challenged conduct.

Powe v. Miles · filed 1968-09-25

This court must first determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction of this case under the relevant statutes. The question to be determined then is whether or not Alfred University acted “under color of” state law in suspending the student plaintiffs. If Alfred University did not act under state law, this court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of plaintiffs’ case. ... Implementing the approach outlined by the Supreme Court, the court concludes that Alfred University acted as a “private” institution in this situation, and not “under color of” state law. ... But receipt of state funds for the Ceramics College is simply not sufficient to make Alfred University an instrument of the state for purposes of the Civil Rights Act. ... It is vital in this case that there is no evidence of state participation in the formulation of the “Policy on Demonstrations” and there is no showing that the Dean’s action suspending the seven plaintiffs was taken “under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” (28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).) ... Therefore, the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction under the relevant federal statutes.

Section 1983 makes a police officer liable in federal court for an arrest made under color of state law that violates the federal Constitution by lacking a warrant and probable cause, without requiring additional flagrant or malevolent conduct.

Joseph v. Rowlen · filed 1968-10-14

We conclude that under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, where a police officer makes an arrest which is unlawful under the federal constitution because made without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that the person arrested had committed or was committing an offense, sec. 1983 imposes on the officer a liability which is recoverable in federal court. Additional circumstances coloring the officer’s action as flagrant or malevolent are not required.

Section 1983 provides a claim against individual state actors who, under color of state law, deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Board of Trustees of Arkansas a & M College, a Body Corporate, and Dr. Homer Babin, President of Arkansas a & M College · filed 1968-11-25

We have carefully examined the complaint in light of the controlling authorities and are persuaded to hold that it does state a claim for relief under § 1983 against the individual members of the Board and Dr. Babin.

Section 1983 reaches constitutional-rights deprivations inflicted by state officials acting under color of state law.

Jones v. Wittenberg · filed 1971-02-17

Even if it were a case of first instance, there can be no doubt that what is being done to the plaintiffs is being done by state officers, and under the color of state law. The Court finds that the case comes clearly within the Civil Rights statutes. ... This Court therefore finds that the class of plaintiffs have shown themselves, by the evidence, to be deprived of their constitutional rights by state officials acting under color of state law, and to be entitled to relief at the hands of the Court.

Section 1983 does not require proof of bad faith when a state actor, under color of state law, deprives a person of constitutional rights.

Hammond v. Brown · filed 1971-01-28

It is equally true that bad faith is not a requisite of plaintiffs’ claim that the Special Grand Jury Report deprives them of constitutional rights amounting to a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).

Section 1983 provides the proper action for a student to enforce constitutional rights against state university officials acting under color of state law.

Gardenhire v. Chalmers · filed 1971-02-01

As a result of the decision in the Dixon case, a multitude of similar decisions in other federal courts during the past decade, and the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), there is little doubt but that students maintain their constitutional rights in their relationship with the university and the proper procedure for enforcement of these rights is an action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies when a state actor, acting under color of state law, deprives a person of a federally protected constitutional right.

Dawson v. Hillsborough County, Florida School Board · filed 1971-02-04

1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... 5. In suspending minor plaintiffs from Plant High School for violation of the Code, defendant school board has acted under color of state law to unlawfully deprive minor plaintiffs of a fundamental constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires that the challenged action be taken under color of state law; a private repossession exercised independently under a contract is not action under color of state law.

McCormick v. First National Bank of Miami · filed 1971-02-05

The second ground upon which the Court concludes that the action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction is the well-established principle that jurisdiction based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its companion 28 U.S.C. § 1343 must arise from a situation where the action complained of was taken under color of state law. ... In this case it is apparent from the pleadings that the plaintiffs’ automobile was not repossessed “under color of state law” as alleged. ... Thus, repossession was a remedy the Bank had under the contract and in exercising that remedy it was acting independently and not under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law before a civil-rights cause of action can be maintained.

Sullens v. Carroll · filed 1970-01-21

Moreover, numerous cases hold that an appointed attorney acting in his official capacity is not a person acting under color of state law within the meaning of the Act. ... Therefore, the plaintiff cannot base his cause of action on 42 U.S.C § 1983.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law; purely private conduct does not support a claim.

Huftstetler v. Davies · filed 1970-01-23

To the extent that he may be attempting to set forth a claim under § 1983, plaintiff fails because there is no allegation that the above-named defendants were acting under color of state law. Indeed the complaint leaves no doubt that they were private citizens and were acting in a purely private capacity. There is therefore no way plaintiff could have a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and jurisdiction of this case is not present under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 applies to officers and trustees of a public university because administering a public facility constitutes action under color of state law.

Brown v. Strickler · filed 1970-02-19

Moreover, because the officers and trustees of the University “administer a public facility, their actions must be regarded as having been taken under color of law. Hence, the provisions of § 1983 * * * are applicable to them.”

Section 1983 permits a damages action against an officer acting under color of state law who deprives a plaintiff of a constitutional right; in a wrongful-arrest action, good faith and probable cause are a defense, and a factual dispute over probable cause goes to the jury.

Giordano v. Harry J. Lee; James Giammanco v. Charles McKeone; James Giammanco v. Harry J. Lee · filed 1971-01-12

Before considering each of the issues raised, we take cognizance of some general principles concerning civil rights actions for wrongful arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In order to recover it must be shown that the arresting officer was acting under color of state law and that he deprived plaintiff of a constitutional right. ... In Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, the Supreme Court held that "good faith and probable cause" is a defense to the action. ... Our research also leads us to conclude that in civil rights actions of this nature, where a genuine issue of fact on the existence of probable cause for arrest is presented, the question should be submitted to the jury.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for a person deprived of constitutional or statutory rights by someone acting under color of state law; conduct that is not a civil-rights violation, including a lawful arrest, does not support recovery.

Adickes v. Leary · filed 1971-01-07

"The first claims that defendants Clermont and Oak actively supported the initial arrests of plaintiffs and illegally pressed charges, thereby depriving plaintiffs of their first amendment right to teach. Damages were sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides: ... \"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.\" ... The claim of Miss Adickes against District Attorney Hogan is frivolous and was properly dismissed. Affording an opportunity to take a polygraph test, or failing to carry out an alleged promise by a prosecutor to abide by its results can by no stretch of the imagination be elevated to a civil rights violation. ... Nor is there any basis in the complaint for recovery on the other claims. ... The trespass arrests were therefore not illegal, and no question survives as to section 35.27, for the resistance was not to an illegal arrest."

Section 1983 requires a substantive deprivation of a federally secured right by conduct under color of state law.

Acosta v. Swank · filed 1971-03-30

After due consideration of all facts and circumstances set out above and of the several briefs of the parties submitted on the issues defined by the remand order, this court holds that plaintiffs have failed to state an action under 42 U.S.C., § 1983, and that simultaneously there is no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requires that plaintiffs not only allege a deprivation of right, privilege or immunity secured by federal law, but also that there be substance to the allegation. In the absence of an express federal regulation and during the pendency of correspondence and negotiations on the subject of the thrust of general terms of the Social Security Act and regulations pursuant thereto, this court cannot see that any right, privilege or immunity secured by Federal law accrued to these plaintiffs. To do so, would in this court’s opinion give the force of law to the ex-parte reasoning of employees of the federal department to an extent that even they did not insist upon by the simple expedient of enacting their underlying rationale into an explicit determinative regulation. Nor by the same token can this court see that the action of the state agency was pretentious, i. e. under “color of law,” in enforcing its former policy to the date of negotiated abandonment.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for relief against defendants whose challenged conduct is federal rather than action under color of state law.

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the U. S. ARMY · filed 1971-01-21

It is true that the plaintiffs seek relief under the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Looking at the latter contention first, it is the Court’s view that the plaintiffs’ allegations under their “Ninth Cause of Action” form an inadequate basis for restraining the defendants under section 1983 from constructing the embankment across the Cossatot. The role of the Tri-Lakes Water District— the plaintiffs’ predicate for state action —is such that it has no power or control over the construction of the dam. The argument is makeweight. This is a federal project being pursued under federal law and the plaintiffs are not threatened in any significant way by any action under color of state law. No state agency, or agency acting under color of state law, is even named as a defendant in the case.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim against a private institution absent the state action necessary to invoke it.

Story v. Tate · filed 1971-04-29

As a result of that hearing the court now finds that plaintiff has failed to show the state action necessary to give this court jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, but it does not protect a claimed right to have state officials strictly obey state law.

Nationwide Amusements, Inc. v. Nattin · filed 1971-03-19

Assuming — without in any way deciding and with no inference intended — some ambiguities or discrepancies in application of the zoning ordinances here, the right-to have state law strictly obeyed is not a federal right protected by Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires that the defendant act under color of State law while depriving another of rights secured by the Constitution or laws.

Post v. Payton · filed 1971-01-20

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action against any person who under color of State law deprives another of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. The complaint, however, does not allege that the defendants acted under color of State law nor, upon analysis, can we find any factual allegations which would justify an inference that the defendants, in committing the acts complained of, acted under color of State law.

Section 1983 reaches conduct by heavily subsidized private parties performing a specific governmental function when contract and continuing governmental oversight substantially constrain their decision-making, because that conduct is under color of state law.

McQueen v. Druker · filed 1971-02-24

We view our task of “sifting facts and weighing circumstances” as one to be done to the end of determining when it is fair and reasonable to hold an individual subject to the same duties of observance of constitutional rights as are imposed on a governmental unit. Mere receipt of financial subsidy and subjection to some regulation are the conditions of much of our societal life. Neither factor — or both together — is dispositive of “state action”. But, while we disavow any effort to be definitive, we conclude that at least when a specific governmental function is carried out by heavily subsidized private firms or individuals whose freedom of decision-making has, by contract and the reserved governmental power of continuing oversight, been circumscribed substantially more than that generally accorded an independent contractor, the coloration of state action fairly attaches.

Section 1983 requires the defendants to have acted under color of state law.

Conway v. I. Slaughter, Psychiatrist, California Medical Facility, and Fifty-Eight Others · filed 1971-04-09

Moreover, there is no allegation that the defendants, or any of them, acted under color of state law as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of constitutional or equal-rights secured rights under color of state law, so a private school's expulsion without a significant relationship to the state is not actionable under the statute.

Morgan v. St. Francis Preparatory School · filed 1971-05-24

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and its substantive corollary 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to entertain an action to redress the deprivation under color of state law of any right secured by the Constitution or by an act of Congress providing for the equal rights of citizens. ... The expulsion here was by a private preparatory school with no significant relationship to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and thus the expulsion was not under color of state law. ... 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are inapposite.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal laws; a mere state-law violation is insufficient.

Marvin Jones, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of Those Similarly Situated v. Fred R. Diamond, Etc. · filed 1979-04-26

The federal statute protects all persons from “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”, if those deprivations are caused by persons who are acting under color of state law. ... With nothing more, the mere violation of state law by a state official is not a violation of a federal right, and the federal courts would lack jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. If, however, under color of state law, someone violates a “specific constitutional guarantee”, then 42 U.S.C. § 1983 becomes applicable.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a private party’s conduct is not covered merely because a state statute permits it absent compulsion or overt state involvement.

White v. Scrivner Corporation · filed 1979-04-30

Absent some compulsion or some overt state involvement, no state action can be found because of the mere existence of the statute. ... The plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants’ actions were performed under color of state law. The district court was therefore correct in denying them any recovery under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches state actors, including school committee members, and supplies the cause of action for their constitutional violations.

Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League · filed 1979-05-01

The actions of defendant school committee members are undeniably within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because section 1983 provides plaintiff with a cause of action, this Court need not reach the issue of whether Title IX independently provides an implied right of action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights under color of state law and does not apply when defendants are acting under color of federal law.

Seibert v. D. T. Baptist, District Director of Internal Revenue Service · filed 1979-05-03

However, we agree with the district court’s ruling that these statutes provide a remedy for deprivation of rights under color of state law and do not apply when the defendants are acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 permits a claim for deprivation of procedural due process rights by state officials acting with private parties.

Florence v. Krasucki · filed 1982-02-25

In general, it is well established that a deprivation of procedural due process rights may be the basis of a claim under section 1983. ... Plaintiffs’ version of the facts shows state officials acting in conjunction with private parties to wilfully, deliberately, and maliciously deprive the plaintiffs of the procedural safeguards of the RPAPL. ... Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires both a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right and action by someone under color of state law.

Williams v. Heard · filed 1982-03-08

There are two elements necessary to establish a cause of action under section 1983: 1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law, and 2) deprivation caused by one acting under the color of ... state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a defendant acting under color of state law.

Baxley v. City of North Charleston · filed 1982-03-11

Thus, in a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must show that the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and, secondly, that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 imposes liability for a constitutional deprivation by a private person only when the person acts under color of state law; merely using a state-recognized self-help remedy does not make the conduct attributable to the state.

Luria Brothers & Company, Inc., a Corporation v. Thomas R. Allen, Jr. And Morton J. Greene, Trading as Economy Industria · filed 1982-03-15

We hold that when a private person merely takes advantage of a self-help remedy recognized by the state, his actions are not attributable to the state. We therefore conclude that no state action was presented by Economy’s posting of the notice of distraint or by its counterclaiming in the district court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 protects corporations as persons entitled to challenge state action that deprives them of constitutional rights.

Northeast Georgia Radiological Associates, P. C. v. Tidwell · filed 1982-03-15

Accordingly, corporations are “persons” whose rights are protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats private persons who willfully participate in joint action with a state official as acting under color of state law.

Peters v. Township of Hopewell · filed 1982-03-19

However, if private persons willfully participate in joint action with a state official they are acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party's improper use of a state eviction procedure as state action under Lugar.

Higbee v. Starr · filed 1983-02-02

The Supreme Court recently considered Sec. 1983 and the state action requirement in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). There, the Court held that whether a constitutional deprivation is effected by state action depends on two things: one, whether the deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority, and two, whether the private parties may appropriately be characterized as state actors. Lugar, 102 S.Ct. at 2755. Higbee's complaint appears to be directed toward the defendant's improper use of the Arkansas eviction statute--i.e., using a state procedure for the improper purpose of evicting a month-to-month tenant in retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights. Under Lugar, this would not be state action.

Section 1983 requires state action or conduct under color of state law in an action against state officials, and those requirements are identical and merge into one.

Coon v. Froehlich · filed 1983-01-25

A related and more difficult question, raised in Defendants’ previous motion to dismiss (doc. # 4, p. 2), is whether Defendants Froehlich and Fodal took “state action” against Plaintiff, for purposes of the Four-. teenth Amendment, or were acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” of the state, for purposes of § 1983. In a § 1983 action against state officials, such as Froehlich or Fodal, these requirements are identical and merge into one.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional violations caused by state action, but it does not impose liability for purely private conduct; a private actor is covered only when its conduct may fairly be treated as state action.

Watkins v. Reed · filed 1983-02-04

Section 1983 provides a civil action to protect persons against constitutional violations through state action but it does not protect against purely private actions. ... The action suspending the plaintiffs was that of a private entity. Therefore, the suspensions were not deprivations of rights under color of state law, which this court has power to redress under the Civil Rights Acts.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution, including First Amendment rights.

Mitman v. Glascott · filed 1983-02-18

Mitman’s political activities are protected by the first amendment. The defendants’ actions are clearly under color of state law. Mitman therefore has stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional-rights violations committed under color of state law.

Munoz v. Orr · filed 1983-02-08

However, § 1983 provides a remedy against individual to violate a citizen’s constitutional rights “under color of state law.” Here, Plaintiff makes no claim that Defendants were operating under color of state law. Plainly, he is not entitled to assert a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and permits a claim against a private citizen only when the citizen acts in concert with or in the place of state actors.

McKinney v. George · filed 1983-02-08

Claims brought under § 1983 must allege that abuses were perpetrated under color of state law in order to state a cause of action. ... However, such an allegation must show that the private citizen acted in concert with or in the place of state actors.

A private entity that contracts with the state to perform a function the state is constitutionally obligated to provide acts under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

Lombard v. Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center for Mental Retardation, Inc. · filed 1983-02-09

Because the state bore an affirmative obligation to provide adequate medical care to plaintiff, because the state delegated that function to the Shriver Center, and because Shriver voluntarily assumed that obligation by contract, Shriver must be considered to have acted under color of law, and its acts and omissions must be considered actions of the state.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of constitutional rights by defendants acting under color of state law.

Mines v. Kahle · filed 1983-02-11

The prerequisites of a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require that the plaintiff demonstrate a deprivation of constitutional rights by the defendants while they were acting “under color of state law”.

Section 1983 provides a means of redress for a person arrested without probable cause under color of state law.

Adams v. Thompson · filed 1983-02-16

A person arrested without probable cause has been deprived of a right under the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides him a means for redress. Accordingly, the court finds that both plaintiffs have established their right to recover from the defendant under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private corporation's actions as state action merely because the corporation is subject to pervasive state regulation.

Heflin v. Kentucky State Racing Commission · filed 1983-03-11

The fact that state regulation may be pervasive does not alone transform a private corporation's actions into state action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of federally protected rights, and private conduct is actionable only when state compulsion or involvement makes it state action.

Olsen v. Communications Workers of America (CWA) · filed 1983-03-16

The statute upon which plaintiffs rely, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a cause of action based upon conduct by a person acting under color of state law which subjects the complainant to deprivation of federally protected rights, privileges or immunities— in this case a deprivation of First Amendment rights of free speech, rights made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Conduct of a private party, not acting against a backdrop of state compulsion or involvement, does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. ... In the present case there can be no doubt that the conduct of the personnel officers and of plaintiffs’ supervisors constituted state action. In addition, there was sufficient union involvement with state officials in the actions designed to prevent plaintiffs from communicating their views to constitute the conduct of the union state action for § 1983 purposes. ... This is sufficient to constitute the actions of the union state action within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach private conduct.

Brown v. Vaniman, Unpublished Decision (8-20-1999) · filed 1999-08-20

An action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not reach private conduct.