42 U.S.C. § 1983

A Section 1983 claim needs factual allegations; conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct are insufficient.

Templeton v. Cady · filed 1988-01-27

We agree with the conclusions of the district court for the reasons stated in its order. Mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct are not enough.

Section 1983 requires specific factual allegations supporting a claim against a county or sheriff before the plaintiff may take the sheriff’s deposition.

Bordas v. Washtenaw County · filed 1997-12-12

However, this misconstrues plaintiffs burden in pleading his claims under § 1983. ... To be entitled even to take Sheriffs Sehebil’s deposition, plaintiff must come forth with specific factual averments that would state a cause of action against Washtenaw County or Sheriff Schebil.

Section 1983 claims are subject to ordinary notice pleading, not a heightened pleading standard.

Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio · filed 2004-08-05

Claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not subject to heightened pleading standards.

A section 1983 claim must explain how a person acting under color of law violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Miles v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2004-08-12

Here, appellant vaguely references a constitutional violation under section 1983, but fails to explain how any person, acting under the color of statute, violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 actions are not subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Rivera-Torres v. Rey-Hernandez · filed 2004-08-17

In support of their argument, defendants mostly rely in a line of cases from the Court of Appeals which had established a heightened pleading standard for § 1983 actions. As plaintiffs correctly point out, however, that standard is no longer in effect.

Section 1983 claims are subject to ordinary notice pleading, not a heightened pleading standard.

Morneault v. Rochester, et al. · filed 2004-09-14

While section 1983 actions in this circuit are not subject to a heightened pleading standard, see Educadores Puertorriquenos en Accion v . Hernandez, 367 F.3d 6 1 , 62 (1st Cir. 2004), they of course are subject to the notice pleading requirements of F E D . R . C I V . P . 8(a)(2), under which “the complaint should at least set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where and why – although why, when why means the actor’s state of mind, can be averred generally.” Id. at 6 8 .

Section 1983 claims against entities that cannot assert qualified immunity do not require heightened pleading.

Terry Lee Passmore Swann v. Southern Health · filed 2004-10-21

Leatherman made it clear that any heightened pleading requirements in § 1983 actions against entities that cannot raise qualified immunity as a defense are improper.

A § 1983 complaint survives dismissal when it alleges facts that, if proven, could amount to a constitutional violation.

Lizama v. Rios · filed 1985-12-20

The pleadings in this case allege adequate facts which, if substantiated, could rise to the level of constitutional violations.

A section 1983 claim against an official in an individual capacity must plead a basis for liability and demand relief from that official.

Kwasnik v. Maine Dep't of Health and Human Servs. · filed 2004-11-18

Therefore, because the proposed amended complaint fails to adequately plead a claim under sections 1983 or 1985, petitioner’s motion to amend the petition to add current Commissioner John R. Nicholas is DENIED.

A § 1983 claim does not state a claim against officials whom the pleading merely identifies as employees without alleging substantive wrongdoing by them.

Edwards v. McNeill · filed 1995-02-07

Appellant’s § 1983 claim was contained within Count III of his petition. Count III identified Ordway and Hiatte as employees of the Department of Revenue but contained no substantive complaint against them.

Vague allegations of racial animosity and conspiracy that lack specific factual support are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

Wynn v. Wolf · filed 1994-03-28

First, Wynn's vague allegations of racial animosity and conspiracy are wholly conclusory and unsupported by any specific facts. As such, they are insufficient to state a claim under Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 damages claim against a government officer must, before discovery, plead specific, nonconclusory facts sufficient to give notice of the claim and allow a qualified immunity response.

Crawford-El v. Patricia Britton and District of Columbia Department of Corrections · filed 1992-02-14

Our heightened pleading requirement insists that, before discovery, plaintiffs suing government officers for damages set forth “ ‘nonconclusory allegations’ that are ‘sufficiently precise to put defendants on notice of the nature of the claim and enable them to prepare a response and, where appropriate, a summary judgment motion on qualified immunity grounds.’ ” Andrews v. Wilkins, 934 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (D.C.Cir.1991) (quoting Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 (D.C.Cir.1984)).

Section 1983 plaintiffs must plead specific facts sufficient to overcome an available immunity defense.

Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Department, Don Gordon, Officer, and E.R. Pachall, Officer · filed 1992-04-03

Accordingly, this circuit requires that § 1983 plaintiffs meet heightened pleading requirements in cases, such as this, in which an immunity defense can be raised.

A § 1983 complaint does not state a claim against a defendant through conclusory allegations that he supplied false information or conspired to violate constitutional rights.

Hunt v. Lt. Malcolm Thompson Mary S. Rowan · filed 1992-05-18

The conclusory allegations that Thompson disseminated false information and that there was a conspiracy between the defendants to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights failed to state a claim.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must plead specific facts sufficient to overcome that defense; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dept. · filed 1992-05-20

Especially in light of the heightened pleading requirement, Jackson failed to plead specific facts sufficient to overcome the officers' qualified immunity defense.

A § 1983 complaint challenging prison conditions can state a claim without expressly alleging a culpable state of mind such as deliberate indifference.

Handy v. Penal Institutions Commissioner · filed 1992-06-05

The complaint was not subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim that would entitle the plaintiffs to relief under § 1983. ... The absence of an explicit allegation concerning the defendants’ state of mind, such as “deliberate indifference,” is not fatal to the complaint.

A § 1983 plaintiff suing officials who may claim qualified immunity must identify which officials committed each alleged wrongful act so their immunity claims can be resolved promptly.

Daley v. Regional Transportation District · filed 1992-06-11

Each defendant has a possible defense premised on immunity. Generalized averments that “defendants” engaged in various wrongful activities do not provide individual defendants with an opportunity to effectuate their rights to an expedited resolution of their immunity claims.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege facts with enough specificity to state a valid claim.

Hunt v. Feld, Officer · filed 1992-06-16

The district court dismissed this complaint for lack of the requisite specificity to constitute a valid claim under § 1983. See Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987). Upon review, this court concludes that the district court's dismissal should be affirmed for the reasons stated by that court.

A passing reference to § 1983 does not state a claim when the complaint supplies no supporting facts and the plaintiff alleges no constitutional violation.

Bangerter v. Orem City Corp. · filed 1992-08-05

As with the claim for injunctive relief, Mr. Bangerter makes no more than a passing reference in the opening paragraph of his Complaint to the alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He offers no factual support for that claim in the body of the Complaint. ... Moreover, at the hearing, counsel for Mr. Bangerter admitted that he was not alleging that any constitutional violations had taken place. On those bases the Court dismisses any claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims based on unconstitutional conduct require specific factual allegations; conclusory allegations alone fail to state a claim.

Raines v. Julia Goedde Anthony Brigano Holst, Mr. · filed 1992-08-06

Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right under color of law.

Wichman v. Naylor · filed 1992-08-14

However, Naylor’s position and contention are inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s longstanding recognition that only two factual allegations are necessary to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) a defendant’s deprivation of a plaintiff’s right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation occurred “under color of law.”

Section 1983 plaintiffs must specifically allege which rights under clearly established law the defendants violated.

Lowrey v. University of Texas Medical Branch · filed 1992-08-26

This is particularly true because plaintiffs alleging Section 1983 violations must specifically allege exactly what rights, under clearly established law, defendants violated. Neither side, moreover, argued or cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 before the trial court. Under these circumstances, we find that plaintiff did not allege violations of Section 1983 in his petition.

Section 1983 claims require factual allegations beyond mere conclusions.

Williams v. ICC COMMITTEE · filed 1992-08-31

Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting a conspiracy allegation; conclusory allegations alone cannot maintain a claim.

John J.G. Grames v. Supreme Court of the State of Alaska Warren Matthews, Chief Justice · filed 1992-09-08

Grames' conclusory allegations that the appellees conspired to "obstruct[ ] justice; [deny him his] constitutional right to due process, fair and speedy trial, [and] freedom from oppression" are insufficient, without supporting facts, to maintain a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a pleading to allege an actual injury from the deprivation of rights; a remote or speculative future injury is insufficient.

Bernard v. United Township High School District No. 30 · filed 1992-09-28

In a cause of action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a pleading alleging the possibility of remote or speculative future injury or invasion of rights is insufficient to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires more than vague allegations that an official participated in a civil rights violation to state a claim.

Schoka v. Demosthenes · filed 1992-09-28

Here, Schoka makes only vague allegations that a correctional counsellor falsified his parole report. These allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the district court properly determined that Schoka failed to state a valid section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims must allege more than mere conclusions and opinions to state a cause of action.

Jones v. Wigginton · filed 1992-10-07

Jones's mere conclusions and opinions do not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 complaints must plead claims with enough precision to notify defendants of their nature and permit a response.

Geir v. Educational Service Unit No. 16 · filed 1992-10-13

Additionally, even under the heightened pleading standard for § 1983 actions, plaintiffs need only plead with sufficient precision to put defendants on notice of the nature of the claims asserted and enable them to prepare a responsive pleading.

Section 1983 requires specific facts supporting an alleged rights violation; vague and general allegations fail to state a claim.

Hickman v. Los Angeles Unified School District Bierly & Associates · filed 1992-10-16

Hickman alleges no specific facts to support his allegations. Instead, despite several opportunities to correct the deficiencies, and clear instructions by the district court, Hickman continues to assert numerous vague and general claims of alleged errors and violations in the state proceedings. Even liberally construing his pleadings, Hickman fails to state an actionable claim under section 1983 or 1985.

A Section 1983 complaint that fails to allege the required elements of a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when filed in forma pauperis.

Thompkins v. Jay Douglas, Personnel Manager, Accuride Corporation · filed 1992-10-19

The complaint was filed in the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After careful review of the matter, this court has determined that plaintiff failed to allege the required elements for a § 1983 action; therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the in forma pauperis complaint as frivolous.

A Section 1983 claim based on temporary loss of legal property must allege resulting prejudice with specificity.

Oswald v. Dan Trudell M. Podeszwik · filed 1992-12-04

Moreover, Oswald's statements that he has been prejudiced by this temporary lack of his legal property is lacking in the specificity required to state a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege facts showing that defendants acted under color of state law and intentionally deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right to survive dismissal.

Williams v. Carol Demoss and Lela Harris-Higgs · filed 1993-02-24

To survive a motion to dismiss a § 1983 action, Williams must allege facts which show that the defendants, acting under color of state law, intentionally deprived him of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 claims alleging municipal liability are subject to ordinary notice pleading; federal courts may not impose a heightened pleading standard.

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit · filed 1993-03-03

We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal court may apply a “heightened pleading standard” — more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. We hold it may not.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead the facts supporting the claimed constitutional violation with specificity.

Rogers v. Mount Union Borough Ex Rel. Zook · filed 1993-03-03

A plaintiff bringing a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is held to a higher standard: he must allege with specificity the facts giving rise to his complaint. ... Again, plaintiff has not plead such a claim with the specificity required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We will, then, dismiss Count II of the complaint without prejudice to plaintiffs right to file an amended complaint.

A § 1983 complaint must identify a factual basis for imposing liability on the named defendants, including specific actions taken under color of state law.

Olson v. Whitaker · filed 1993-04-16

The district court found that plaintiff's claims were conclusory and, further, that plaintiff failed to identify an arguable factual basis for imposing liability on many of the defendants. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice so that Olson could "file a complaint which more clearly sets forth the factual basis of his claims with specific information which clearly identifies any action taken under color of state law which he asserts provides a basis for imposing liability on the named defendants under § 1983." Rec., doc. 4 at 2. Instead of amending his complaint, Olson filed this appeal. After reviewing the complaint and Olson's arguments on appeal 1 we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court.

A § 1983 complaint that details the events giving rise to the claim and identifies the specific constitutional violations withstands a challenge that it is too broad and conclusory.

Sheppard v. Beerman · filed 1993-05-21

As a preliminary matter, defendant challenges the complaint as being too broad and conclusory to support a § 1983 claim. A fair reading of the complaint, however, reveals that it sets forth in detail the particular events and transactions giving rise to this action, as well as the specific constitutional violations of which the plaintiff complains.

A section 1983 complaint against a municipality needs only a short plain statement showing entitlement to relief; no heightened pleading requirement applies.

Ashe v. Corley · filed 1993-06-01

The Supreme Court emphasized that, under the notice pleading system set up by the federal rules, a section 1983 complaint against a municipality need only include a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1162. The plaintiffs' complaint clearly meets this standard.

Section 1983 claims require specific factual allegations sufficient for a court to assess the substance of the claim.

Christianson v. Educational Service Unit No. 16 · filed 1993-06-04

Such pleading does not meet the heightened specificity requirements of § 1983, as demanded by the aforementioned federal courts. The plaintiffs’ § 1983 pleadings are insufficient to allow a court of this state to weigh the substantiality of the claims, nor do they comply with this state’s code pleading requirements.

Section 1983 claims against municipalities require ordinary notice pleading, not heightened factual pleading.

Ashe v. Joe Corley, Etc., Montgomery County, Texas · filed 1993-06-04

Whether the plaintiffs’ complaint should have been dismissed under this more stringent standard is now immaterial because the Supreme Court has rejected a heightened pleading requirement for section 1983 suits against municipalities.

A § 1983 complaint must allege specific facts supporting the claimed civil rights violations; vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient even from a pro se plaintiff.

Karim-Panahi v. California Dept. of Transp. · filed 1993-06-18

To state a section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the constitution. ... Our review of Karim-Panahi's first amended complaint supports the district court's dismissal of the action. In the complaint, Karim-Panahi raises numerous vague and conclusory allegations of civil rights violations by the defendants. See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Nowhere in the thirty-five page pleading does he allege any specific facts to support his allegations. See id.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of a federally secured right under color of state law.

Cabral v. Donice Neal Thomas Miller, Captain · filed 1993-06-22

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was undertaken "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory."

Section 1983 claims against individual government officials facing an immunity defense require specific factual pleading, and Leatherman's rejection of heightened pleading for municipal claims does not eliminate that requirement.

Idoux v. Lamar University System · filed 1993-07-13

Therefore, Leatherman only emasculates Elliott as to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions against municipalities. In fact, Leatherman really has no effect on Elliott at all, rather it instead overrules the cases that extended Elliott to suits against municipalities, such as Palmer v. San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.1987).

A Section 1983 complaint alleging deprivation of a federal right under color of state law need not expressly cite the Fourteenth Amendment to state a Fourth Amendment claim against state officials.

Enweremadu v. Reichlin · filed 1993-08-18

The events described in the Enweremadus' complaint, if accepted as true, adequately state a Fourth Amendment claim even without express reference to the Fourteenth Amendment. ... In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived her of a federal right and (2) that the defendant did so while acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 civil rights actions are not subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Ennis v. Dasovick · filed 1993-09-09

There is no heightened pleading standard in § 1983 civil rights actions.

A § 1983 claim requires allegations supporting that cause of action; merely invoking the statute without alleging a constitutional violation does not suffice.

Stellato Ex Rel. Rebecca v. Board of Education of the Ellenville Central School District · filed 1994-01-31

Apart from merely stating that plaintiffs are bringing a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs have not made any allegation pertaining to the said cause of action. Specifically, no constitutional violations have been alleged, and thus, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is dismissed.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege specific facts showing a deprivation of rights; broad, conclusory allegations do not state a claim.

Barnett v. Moon · filed 1994-03-03

Allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple, and eonclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims against municipalities require only ordinary notice pleading, not a heightened pleading standard.

Kinsley by Kinsley v. Beaumont Unified School Dist. · filed 1994-04-01

We further note that the district court erred by applying an unnecessarily strict standard in evaluating Kinsley's Sec. 1983 claim. The Supreme Court recently held that in Sec. 1983 suits brought against municipalities, a plaintiff need only provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993). In Leatherman, the Court explicitly refused to apply a heightened pleading standard in Sec. 1983 cases brought against municipalities, stating that a standard more stringent than the usual "notice pleading" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) was not contemplated in the rules. On remand, the district court should apply the Leatherman standard in evaluating Kinsley's amended complaint.

A Section 1983 complaint must identify the substance of the alleged federal deprivation; conclusory assertions of constitutional violations do not state a claim.

O'Hara III v. John T. Wigginton Wayne Dunn Al C. Parke and Fred Cowan · filed 1994-05-18

Such conclusory statements were insufficient to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 civil rights claims are subject to ordinary pleading standards on a motion to dismiss.

Abany v. Fridovich · filed 1994-07-12

On a motion to dismiss, civil rights claims are subject only to normal standards of pleading.

Section 1983 civil rights claims require only a short and plain statement under Rule 8(a), without heightened pleading.

Dell v. Board Of Education · filed 1994-08-09

Finally, we must refrain from imposing a heightened pleading requirement on this civil rights action. Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). A "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" under Rule 8(a) is sufficient.

A § 1983 civil rights complaint satisfies Rule 8(a) with a short and plain statement of the claim; no heightened pleading requirement applies.

Dell ex rel. Dell v. Board of Education · filed 1994-08-09

A “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ under Rule 8(a) is sufficient.

A § 1983 claim cannot rest on mere conclusions and opinions; specific factual allegations can sustain the claim against summary judgment.

Jacobs v. Metcalfe · filed 1994-08-11

This court has, indeed, held that, although a plaintiff may address the basic elements of a cause of action, he will fail to state an adequate claim under Sec. 1983 if his allegations are based upon mere conclusions and opinions. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987). In this case, however, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the basis of conclusory allegations. To the contrary, Jacobs's pleadings provide specific incidents and dates, case numbers of dismissed court actions, and evidence that mail to and from relatives and friends on the outside repeatedly failed to reach its destination.

Section 1983 claims are subject to ordinary notice pleading; courts may not require a more stringent pleading standard.

SHERWIN MANOR NURSING CENTER, INC. v. McAULIFFE · filed 1994-10-06

Further, a court may not, in cases under Sec. 1983, apply a pleading standard that is more stringent than the notice pleading required by the Federal Rules.

Section 1983 claims are governed by Rule 8(a) notice pleading and do not require heightened factual specificity.

Moser v. Bascelli · filed 1994-10-17

As a result, section 1983 pleadings are to be evaluated in accordance with the liberal standard enunciated in Rule 8(a).

Section 1983 claims need only meet ordinary federal pleading rules; supporting facts need not be pleaded with heightened particularity.

Frazier v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1994-12-01

Further, there is no requirement that the facts supporting a section 1983 claim be pleaded with a heightened degree of particularity. A section 1983 claim is sufficiently set forth as long as the facts supporting the claim are pleaded in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1983 claims of conspiracy and retaliatory transfer are insufficient when the allegations are wholly conclusory.

Williams v. Laura Bates Richard Maxwell Marjorie Van Ochten · filed 1994-12-02

Although prison officials may not retaliate against a prisoner for exercising a constitutional right, see Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 950 (6th Cir.1988), Williams's claims of conspiracy and retaliatory transfer are wholly conclusory and so are insufficient to state a cause of action under Sec. 1983.

A complaint states a § 1983 damages claim when it alleges that defendants acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of federal rights, caused damage, and seeks compensatory damages.

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Commission, Idaho · filed 1994-12-16

The Tribes therefore have alleged (1) acts by the defendants (2) under color of state law (3) depriving them of federal rights, privileges or immunities (4) causing them damage. The Tribes seek an award of compensatory damages in their prayer for relief. This is sufficient to state a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against government officials must satisfy a heightened pleading requirement; vague and unspecific allegations do not suffice.

Argon Financial Group v. Marro · filed 1995-01-13

This Circuit has imposed a heightened pleading requirement in civil rights claims against government officials, and the vague and unspecific allegations contained in Count III of the Complaint do not satisfy that requirement.

Section 1983 plaintiffs suing public officials must plead facts beyond conclusions and may be required to reply in detail to a qualified immunity defense.

Joseph M. Schultea, Sr. v. David Robert Wood, David Robert Wood, Homer Ford, W.F. "Slim" Plagens and Warren K. Driver · filed 1995-03-09

First, the district court must insist that a plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 file a short and plain statement of his complaint, a statement that rests on more than conclusions alone. Second, the court may, in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against individual government defendants involving qualified immunity require heightened factual specificity in this circuit.

Verney v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission · filed 1995-03-27

We conclude that there remains a heightened pleading standard in this circuit in section 1983 actions involving qualified immunity against individual government defendants.

Section 1983 civil rights claims are subject to ordinary pleading standards on a motion to dismiss.

Dominique v. Weld · filed 1995-03-31

On a motion to dismiss, civil rights claims are subject only to normal standards of pleading.

Section 1983 claims require factual allegations specific enough to identify the challenged conduct; conclusory allegations do not state a claim for relief.

L.S.T., INC. v. CROW · filed 1995-04-06

It is well-established that such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a Sec. 1983 claim for relief.

Section 1983 claims against state officials in their individual or official capacities do not require heightened pleading.

Douglas v. Evans · filed 1995-05-12

Moreover, because it is not the court’s function to rewrite the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but, rather, adhere to them, the court finds that claims against state officials in their individual, as well as official, capacity are not subjected to a heightened pleading requirement, as erroneously claimed by Defendant.

A § 1983 complaint against a municipality need not meet a heightened specificity standard, but it must satisfy Rule 8(a) to survive a motion to dismiss.

Frederick v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1995-06-30

Although a § 1983 complaint brought against a municipality is not held to a heightened level of specificity, a complaint under either § 1981 or § 1983 must still satisfy the requisites of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) to overcome a motion to dismiss.

A § 1983 complaint against a public college must give fair notice of the claim’s basis; vague allegations that the college acted under color of state law are insufficient.

Slater v. Marshall · filed 1995-11-08

Without more detail, we find MCCC does not have fair notice of what Slater’s claim is based on, not even whether she alleges that MCCC acted pursuant to a state law or an internal college procedure. For this reason, we must dismiss Count Three of the complaint against MCCC.

When a § 1983 defendant asserts qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead specific, non-conclusory facts that, if proved, would overcome that defense.

Veney v. Michael Hogan Carol Hernandez Frank D. Fleischer and Martha Knicely · filed 1996-01-24

Accordingly, when a plaintiff pleads his claim in generalized “notice” form, and the defense of qualified immunity is asserted through a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff is required to respond to that defense. If his original complaint is deficient in that regard, he must amend his complaint to include the specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact that will enable the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, will overcome the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against individual government officials are subject to ordinary notice pleading rather than a heightened pleading standard.

Gerakaris v. Champagne · filed 1996-01-30

Although Leatherman applies only to § 1983 claims against mumcipalities, the logic of the Court’s reaffirmation of the sufficiency of the rule of notice pleading in that context has no less force in cases involving civil rights claims against individual government officials.

A Section 1983 claimant must state specific facts warranting relief; conclusory statements alone do not suffice.

Stitt v. Klevenhagen · filed 1996-02-15

One advancing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim must state specific facts warranting relief;...mere conclusionary statements do not suffice.

A Section 1983 complaint seeking damages against government officials must describe the claims specifically enough to give the defendants notice of their nature.

Joos v. Schoeberal · filed 1996-03-04

Complaints seeking damages against government officials must be pleaded with sufficient specificity to put defendants on notice of the nature of the claims.

A § 1983 claim survives a motion to strike when the plaintiff sufficiently alleges a violation of federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Lestrange v. Kontout, No. Cv94 0046929 S (Mar. 4, 1996) · filed 1996-03-04

"`To state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'" See Wilson v. Hryniewicz , 38 Conn. App. 715 , 719-20 , ___ A.2d ___, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 918 , ___ A.2d ___(1995), quoting West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42 , 48 , 108 S.Ct. 2250 , 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). "If facts provable under the allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." RK Construction, Inc. v. Fusco Corp. , 231 Conn. 381 , 384 , 650 A.2d 153 (1994). The motion to strike count eight is denied as the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

A section 1983 claim must allege with at least some particularity overt acts by a person subject to suit under the section.

Khalil Adil M. Al-Furqan v. State of California · filed 1996-03-04

We affirm the district court's conclusions that Al-Furqan's claims against the police officer were barred under California's one year statute of limitations and his remaining claims, which Al-Furqan failed to amend, do not allege with at least some degree of particularity any overt acts by a person subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims meet minimum Rule 8 notice pleading requirements when the plaintiff alleges deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Curbelo v. Pendergraph · filed 2005-03-01

In a § 1983 civil rights case, the minimal Rule 8 notice pleading requirements are met when a plaintiff alleges “some person has deprived him of a federal right” and that “the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state . . . law.”

A § 1983 plaintiff need not meet a heightened pleading requirement when defendants assert qualified immunity.

Fairman v. Konteh · filed 2005-03-23

Following Swierkiewicz and Goad, the Court refuses to impose a heightened pleading requirement on Plaintiff.

A plaintiff can plead a Section 1983 claim without expressly naming the statute if the complaint alleges the facts underlying the claim.

Milligan v. City of Chandler · filed 2005-04-07

The district court also erred in concluding that Milligan failed to properly allege the elements of his constitutional claims, and to plead them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 civil rights claims have no heightened pleading requirement.

Torres-Rivera v. O'Neill-Cancel · filed 2005-05-03

There is no heightened pleading requirement for section 1983 civil rights claims.

Allegations in a supporting memorandum or affidavit can satisfy the minimum factual requirement of a § 1983 claim.

Williams v. Stewart · filed 2005-05-10

We have carefully reviewed the record and find that the factual allegations contained in paragraph (E) of the memorandum/affidavit supporting Williams’s complaint meet the minimum factual requirement of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims require material factual allegations; conclusory allegations alone do not state a claim.

White v. Wayne County Circuit Court Clerks · filed 2005-08-24

Conclusory allegations, unsupported by any material factual allegations, are not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 complaints need only allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right; naming individual defendants and describing them as a group can suffice.

Forras v. Andros · filed 2005-09-29

Plaintiffs complaint is sufficient. “A claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only need allege that some person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right.” ... The individual Defendants are both specifically named and described as a group.

A § 1983 claim for inadequate municipal supervision requires supporting factual allegations; conclusory assertions are insufficient.

City of Jackson v. Powell · filed 2005-11-10

We find that such conclusory language, unsupported by specific factual allegations is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for inadequate supervision by the City of Jackson.

Section 1983 suits against municipalities have no heightened pleading requirement.

Batiste v. City of Beaumont · filed 2005-11-10

There is no heightened pleading requirement for Section 1983 suits against municipalities.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights to state a cognizable claim.

Poole v. Moran · filed 2005-12-20

Poole failed to allege any violation of his constitutional rights and, thus, failed to state a cognizable section 1983 claim.

A § 1983 complaint is subject to Rule 8(a)’s liberal notice pleading standard.

Young v. New Sewickley Township · filed 2005-12-29

A § 1983 complaint need only satisfy the liberal notice pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

A complaint can state a § 1983 claim based on due process and freedom of association without expressly citing § 1983.

Nazario v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH OF COM. OF PR · filed 2006-02-23

More so, allegations of denial of Due Process and Freedom of Association are sufficient to state federal claims even though the complaint does not refer explicitly to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim requires specific factual allegations of wrongdoing; conclusory, unsupported allegations do not suffice.

Pack v. Martin · filed 2006-03-27

Pack fails to state with specificity a set of facts that give rise to an Eighth Amendment or a § 1983 claim. Nowhere in his complaint or briefs to this court did Pack proffer more than “conclusory, unsupported allegations” of wrongdoing by defendants. Because no claims have been established, the district court’s dismissal was appropriate.

A § 1983 complaint with only vague and conclusory allegations fails to state a civil rights claim.

Wagner v. Department of Corrections · filed 2006-04-17

...Wagner’s allegations were too vague and conclusory to state a civil rights claim.

Section 1983 suits have no heightened pleading requirement.

Simpson v. Janel Nickel · filed 2006-06-12

Simpson’s claim rests on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and there are no heightened pleading requirements for suits under that statute.

A § 1983 complaint is subject to ordinary notice pleading and need not identify the time and place of the alleged wrongdoing or the specific officials responsible.

Moeller v. Bradford County · filed 2006-08-10

We find that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is sufficient to place the defendants on notice because a civil rights complaint is not subject to heightened pleading standards, and thus, it need not identify the time and place of the alleged wrongdoing or the identity of the specific officials responsible.

A § 1983 complaint against a government official need only satisfy Rule 8(a) notice pleading, even when qualified immunity is available.

Thomas v. Independence Township · filed 2006-09-14

Hence, we now make clear that which was implied in Evancho: a civil rights complaint filed under § 1983 against a government official need only satisfy the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a), regardless of the availability of a qualified immunity defense.

A Section 1983 claim is not subject to a heightened pleading standard merely because defendants assert qualified immunity.

Moya v. Schollenbarger · filed 2006-09-26

And although the district court mistakenly applied a heightened pleading standard in evaluating the propriety of dismissal, we affirm because we conclude that the dismissal would also be proper under the correct standard.

A § 1983 complaint must allege that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right while acting under color of law.

Pesek v. Marzullo · filed 2006-11-02

To survive a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts which show that the defendants) deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or any law of the United States and that the deprivation of that right resulted from the defendants) acting under color of law.

A Section 1983 complaint fails to state a claim when it does not identify specific defendants and the specific actions they took.

Bach v. Teton County · filed 2006-11-14

Bach’s amended complaint failed to identify specific defendants and specific actions that violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 or RICO.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to a heightened pleading requirement.

Anderson v. Waddle · filed 2007-01-31

Common law heightened pleading requirements, while once enforced in § 1983 suits, have been eliminated.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege that a defendant acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right, privilege, or immunity.

Clark v. Beard · filed 2007-02-13

Third, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has pleading requirements. The complaint must state that the defendant, under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by federal statutory or constitutional law.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed on a Fourth Amendment theory the plaintiff did not allege in her complaint.

Kajander v. City of Phoenix · filed 2007-04-10

We decline to reach the question of qualified immunity since the plaintiff failed to allege any Fourth Amendment violation as part of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in her complaint.

A § 1983 complaint against officials asserting qualified immunity must allege specific facts; bare allegations do not satisfy the heightened pleading requirement.

Amnesty International, USA v. Battle · filed 2007-04-24

Such bare allegations do not satisfy the Eleventh Circuit’s heightened pleading requirement in § 1983 cases involving the defense of qualified immunity.

A § 1983 complaint sufficiently states a claim when it alleges an intentional arrest without probable cause motivated by religious animus, a resulting prosecution ending in acquittal, and conduct under color of law.

Oliver v. Alba · filed 2007-04-26

The court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action under section 1983.

A § 1983 complaint fails to state a claim against a defendant when it alleges no conduct by that defendant that violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Davis v. Williams · filed 2007-07-17

FCM is not mentioned at any time in the complaint or in any of the amendments. There are absolutely no allegations against FCM to suggest that it, in any way, allegedly violated plaintiffs constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court will grant FCM’s motion to dismiss on the basis of failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 claims against individuals require specific factual allegations and cannot rest on vague or conclusory allegations.

Epps v. Watson · filed 2007-07-18

Our circuit, however, imposes a heightened pleading requirement in section 1983 claims against individuals and plaintiffs cannot rely on “vague or conclusory” allegations.

Section 1983 claims against participants in an alleged conspiracy require facts connecting each defendant to specific acts in furtherance of it.

Kadar Corp. v. Milbury · filed 1977-02-15

But as for the fourteen defendants in question, we agree with the court that the complaint is fatally lacking, for failure “to allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in which were reasonably related to the promotion of the claimed conspiracy”.

Section 1983 actions against individuals who can assert qualified immunity are subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Lawson v. Sheriff Chris Curry · filed 2007-08-10

However, we apply a heightened pleading standard to § 1983 actions brought against individuals to whom qualified immunity is available as a defense.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing deprivation of a federal right by an individual acting under color of state law.

Furby v. Patifoot · filed 2007-09-14

... we nonetheless affirm the district court’s order on the grounds that Furby failed to particularize his complaint to allege facts indicating he was deprived of a federal right by an individual acting under color of state law.

When a defendant raises qualified immunity, a § 1983 complaint must allege its supporting facts with some specificity.

Jorge T. v. Florida Department of Children & Families · filed 2007-10-12

Accordingly, while Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 gives plaintiffs considerable leeway in framing complaints, we require that, in response to the qualified immunity defense, a § 1983 complaint allege its supporting facts with some specificity.

A § 1983 complaint is subject to Rule 8’s notice-pleading standard, which requires fair notice of the claim and its grounds.

Bradberry v. Alridge · filed 2007-12-21

We have reviewed the opening brief and the response to the court’s September 12, 2007 order to show cause, and we conclude the district court erred in dismissing appellant’s complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (to provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must simply give defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs complaint is and the grounds upon which it rests).

Section 1983 claims require sufficient focus and detail to state a claim for relief.

Valdez v. Marshall · filed 2008-01-11

Additionally, the claims for relief under § 1983 lack sufficient focus and detail to transform them into claims for relief.

A § 1983 complaint challenged under Rule 12(b)(6) must satisfy heightened pleading when the defendant may be entitled to qualified immunity.

Hayden v. Coppage · filed 2008-02-04

Defendants are correct that in the Eleventh Circuit, heightened pleading applies to a complaint’s § 1983 allegations when challenged upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by a defendant who may be entitled to qualified immunity.

A Section 1983 claim must allege supporting facts; merely citing the statute does not state a claim.

HURTER v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-02-13

By that standard, references to statutes with nothing more cannot possibly state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Since plaintiff does not articulate any facts whatsoever supporting her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act, those claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires factual support for allegations of a retaliatory conspiracy; vague and conclusory allegations fail to state a claim.

Boetti v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc. · filed 1984-07-24

Count IV should also be dismissed because the allegations contained therein are so vague and conclusory that they fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 complaints must allege specific facts showing a deprivation of civil rights; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Kirkland v. Bianco · filed 1984-10-09

Complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are plainly insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of civil rights. Conclusory pleading is insufficient.

In a § 1983 suit against multiple government actors, the complaint must identify what each defendant allegedly did so each receives fair notice of the claim.

VanZandt v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services · filed 2008-05-05

As multiple governmental actors are involved in this §1983 action, notice and plausibility are best served by specifically stating “who is alleged to have done what to whom.”

Section 1983 claimants must plead specific facts rather than merely conclusory allegations.

James Elliott and Joseph Defley v. Leander H. Perez, Jr., Etc., Eugene E. Leon, Jr., Etc., and Frank Klein · filed 1985-02-07

In the now familiar cases invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 we consistently require the claimant to state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations.

A Section 1983 claim must identify a specific federal constitutional or statutory right allegedly violated; a general assertion of violated rights is insufficient.

Pappas v. Township of Galloway · filed 2008-06-27

Plaintiffs conclusory allegation that Defendants’ conduct violated his “Constitutional and Statutory rights” under section 1983 fails to “assert a specific federal constitutional or statutory right” that he alleges was violated.

Section 1983 does not provide relief on vague and conclusory allegations lacking facts to support the asserted federal-rights claim.

Knatt v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of East Baton Rouge Parish · filed 2008-07-24

We find no basis upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 from the vague and conclusory allegations in the complaint.

Section 1983 requires a civil rights complaint to plead the specific circumstances of the alleged deprivation and identify the personal or property right invaded.

Chambers Development Co. v. Municipality of Monroeville · filed 1985-09-13

Therefore, when judicial mandate requires civil rights allegations to be pleaded with particularity, we will interpret that to mean that the civil rights count in the complaint itself be so pleaded. ... The complaint must assert the specific circumstances under which plaintiff was denied due process or equal protection, and what personal or property right has been invaded.

Section 1983 requires a civil-rights complaint to identify the defendant's alleged acts, when they occurred, and the resulting injuries sufficiently to avoid dismissal as conclusory.

Andrew B. Ely El v. State of Ohio Arnold R. Jago, Superintendent Captain Swigert George Smith Mr. Beechold Mr. Tickle · filed 1986-01-16

However, even under a liberal construction, plaintiff's pleadings failed to comply with the district court's order and were properly dismissed as conclusory.

A complaint can adequately allege a § 1983 action without expressly citing the statute.

Nogeiro v. Commissioner of the Department of Transitional Assistance · filed 2008-08-29

We disagree because the complaint adequately alleged a § 1983 action.

A § 1983 claim challenged on qualified immunity grounds is subject to a heightened pleading requirement as well as the regular Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc. · filed 2008-09-02

When a § 1983 claim is challenged on qualified immunity grounds, “we are guided both by the regular 12(b)(6) standard and by the heightened pleading requirement.” Id.

A complaint can state a § 1983 claim without expressly citing the statute when its allegations give sufficient notice of the claim.

Garrett v. Judson Independent School District · filed 2008-11-10

The fact that she did not specify that her claim was brought under § 1983, much as she had not specified that her age claim was appropriately brought under the ADEA, is of no moment.

A § 1983 claim must be pleaded with factual specificity; citing the section only as a basis for jurisdiction does not state a claim.

Ige v. City of Philadelphia School District · filed 1986-10-20

Nowhere in the complaint, other than as a basis for jurisdiction, did plaintiff refer to section 1983 nor did she allege facts that would constitute a § 1983 claim. I will not review the merits of her 1983 allegations unless and until plaintiff amends her complaint to plead such claims properly.

Section 1983 claims require factual allegations beyond notice pleading, particularly when official immunity or supervisory or municipal liability is at issue.

Haas v. Berrien County Sheriff's Department · filed 1987-04-30

Yet I must impose a somewhat higher standard of pleading than merely “notice” pleading to accomplish my duty of disposing of meritless claims before defendants incur substantial expense or inconvenience. Plaintiffs complaint, which consists primarily of conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct, fails to meet this standard, and I accordingly will dismiss the complaint, without prejudice and with leave to amend, because plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish her entitlement to relief under section 1983.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts supporting a plausible claim; confusing, conclusory assertions of constitutional violations are insufficient.

Fuentes v. Chavez · filed 2009-02-25

Confusing, conclusory statements of constitutional violations will not sustain a § 1983 claim beyond a motion to dismiss.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing a deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment right under color of state authority.

Collins v. Haga · filed 1974-03-18

Although this Circuit adheres to a policy favoring liberal construction of pro se petitions, nevertheless, in order to state a claim for relief under § 1983 “there must be alleged facts (1) constituting a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the 14th Amendment (2) under color of state authority.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1963) (emphasis supplied).

Section 1983 requires factual allegations sufficient to support relief; broad, conclusory allegations about jail conditions are inadequate.

Lovern v. Cox · filed 1974-04-02

Various petitioners’ complaints relate to matters cognizable under § 1983, but are inadequate as presented, because they fail to establish facts upon which relief can be granted. Absent a minimum factual presentation, a federal court does not have the authority to conduct a general inquiry into the operation of state prisons.

Section 1983 complaints must allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right.

Hahn v. Sargent · filed 1975-01-10

The complaint must also allege facts which support its allegations and which, if believed, would show (1) that the defendant was acting under color of state law and (2) that his conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right which is actually protected by the Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to identify the substantive constitutional right at issue and plead facts supporting its deprivation; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach v. Maker Water Taxi, Inc. · filed 1994-02-28

Thus, it was incumbent upon the defendant to specify the substantive constitutional right upon which its claim was based and, further, to allege facts in support of the claimed constitutional deprivation (see, Courtemanche v Enlarged City School Dist., 686 F Supp 1025, 1028). However, given the conclusory nature of the defendant’s allegations, the defendant wholly failed to meet these prerequisites.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege specific conduct by state officials that violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Mathis v. DiGiacinto · filed 1977-03-15

In order for the plaintiff to state a claim for relief pursuant to this Act, his complaint must necessarily allege specific acts and conduct by state officials which violate some constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 claims must allege a federally protected constitutional right and facts indicating that the defendants infringed it.

DeLuca v. Sullivan · filed 1977-06-28

First, the claim must involve a federally protected constitutional right. Second, the plaintiff must allege facts which indicate that defendants have infringed upon that right.

Section 1983 claims seeking damages from government officials must plead sufficient specific facts to put the defendants on notice of the claim.

Edgington v. Missouri Department of Corrections Mel Carnahan Robert Schoenen Donna Schriro Cranston Mitchell · filed 1995-04-21

Complaints seeking damages against governmental officials, however, are subject to a heightened standard of pleading with sufficient specificity to put defendants on notice of the nature of the claim.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to heightened pleading standards.

Smith v. City of Salem · filed 2004-08-05

Claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not subject to heightened pleading standards.

A § 1983 claim against a county is not subject to heightened conspiracy pleading when the plaintiff is no longer asserting a conspiracy among defendants.

Turner v. County of Suffolk · filed 1997-02-20

The motion is denied as to the § 1983 claim because no heightened pleading requirement applies to the plaintiffs claim, and granted as to the § 107 claim due to plaintiffs failure to file a notice of claim.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against government officials for constitutional violations when the complaint specifically alleges what each defendant did.

Wright v. Simon Leis, Jr. · filed 2009-06-30

In analyzing qualified immunity, “[t]his court has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” ... These allegations suffice to avoid dismissal at the pleading stage.

Section 1983 claims require more than vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations to survive a motion to dismiss.

Williams v. Doe · filed 2009-08-17

The district court properly dismissed Williams’s conspiracy and equal protection claims against defendants Inland Cardiology and Nadar for failure to state a claim. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982) (“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”).

A § 1983 complaint against individual government actors must identify who did what to whom so each defendant has fair notice of the claim.

Bridges v. Lane · filed 2009-10-27

In § 1983 and Bivens cases against individual government actors, there is a peculiar risk that the complaint will fail to provide adequate notice because such cases typically involve complex claims against multiple defendants. ... In such cases, “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.”

Section 1983 requires a claim that a person acting under color of state law deprived someone of a federal right; pleadings alleging only tort claims do not state a Section 1983 claim.

Sweed v. City of El Paso Police Department · filed 2009-10-29

A cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires the conduct complained-of to be committed by a person acting under color of state law, and the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... After a review of the Appellant’s Original Petition and in line with the trial court’s findings, Appellant failed to allege a proper Section 1983 claim. We find the pleadings raise only tort claims, to which the trial court properly applied the Texas Tort Claims Act.

A § 1983 complaint need only satisfy Rule 8’s liberal notice pleading requirement.

Washington v. Grace · filed 2009-11-25

In a § 1983 case, a plaintiff need only satisfy the liberal notice pleading requirement of Rule 8.

Section 1983 claims require enough factual allegations to make the claim facially plausible.

Martínez-Díaz v. Doe · filed 2010-02-04

Nevertheless, this Court finds that Plaintiff did in fact provide enough factual allegations in its complaint to give the claim under Section 1983 facial plausibility.

Utah procedural rules do not impose heightened pleading for § 1983 claims.

Peak Alarm Co., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp. · filed 2010-04-16

We think the federal conclusion is appropriate and therefore hold that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure likewise do not impose a heightened pleading standard on claims sounding in § 1983.

Section 1983 complaints against defendants who can assert qualified immunity must meet the pleading standards described in Iqbal.

Randall v. Scott · filed 2010-06-30

Pleadings for § 1983 cases involving defendants who are able to assert qualified immunity as a defense shall now be held to comply with the standards described in Iqbal.

A complaint can state a § 1983 claim without citing the statute if it plausibly alleges a violation of a federal right under color of state law.

Advocacy Center for the Elderly & Disabled v. Louisiana Department of Health & Hospitals · filed 2010-08-09

The Court cannot find that a failure to cite § 1983 dooms their complaint.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege facts sufficient to state a claim; dismissal is proper when the plaintiff fails to cure identified deficiencies after repeated directions.

Driver v. Martel · filed 2010-09-07

The district court properly dismissed Driver’s action because he failed to allege facts to state a section 1983 claim, and failed to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies despite detailed directions on multiple occasions on how to do so.

A complaint need not cite § 1983 expressly if it pleads deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Acorn Land, LLC v. Baltimore County, Maryland · filed 2010-09-21

We disagree. “Federal and state court decisional law is virtually unanimous that a complaint need not specifically refer to § 1983, so long as the essential elements of the claim are [pled].” Hill v. North Tex. State Hosp., No. 7:09-CV-158-0, 2010 WL 330209, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2010) (emphasis in original); see, e.g., Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 68 F. Supp. 2d 602, 626 (D. Md. 1999). To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish “(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997). Acorn pled these essential elements.

A section 1983 claimant must plead specific facts rather than conclusory allegations.

Adams v. Bryan Collier and Rissie Owens · filed 2010-11-04

However, to bring an action under section 1983, a claimant must state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations.

A complaint can state a Section 1983 claim without expressly citing the section when it alleges a violation of federal rights.

Smith v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2011-02-23

Although the complaint does not reference section 1983, that omission is not fatal to the plaintiffs case at the pleading stage.

Section 1983 need not be expressly cited in a complaint that pleads a violation of federal law.

Gonzales v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2011-03-23

The Plaintiffs have pled a violation of federal law, even though they have not expressly pled 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The Court therefore will not grant summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ due-process claims on this ground.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead sufficient factual matter making a claim for relief plausible.

Muldrow v. Davis · filed 2011-07-14

In this case, Blue Chip made only conclusory allegations against Fuller in Count II and failed to provide any factual basis to support the claim that Fuller engaged in her audit “for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.” Id. at 1949. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot survive dismissal on vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations.

Boren v. Bocca · filed 2012-09-25

The district court properly dismissed Boren’s conspiracy claim for failure to state a claim. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand dismissal).

A Section 1983 claim cannot rest on conclusory allegations or legal conclusions presented as facts.

Hoffman v. Rick Thaler, Director · filed 2013-09-04

“[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions” are insufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

A complaint alleging constitutional violations under color of state law must invoke § 1983 to state a claim.

Johnson v. City of Shelby, Mississip · filed 2013-11-19

A “complaint is fatally defective in that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” when it does not invoke § 1983 for claims of constitutional violations under color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint must allege a violation of a particular federal right; merely repeating the statute’s language is insufficient.

Viveiros v. Town of Easton, et al. · filed 2014-02-28

Such a conclusory statement that merely repeats the language of § 1983 is insufficient to show that the Viveiroses are entitled to relief.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory references to constitutional rights to state a claim.

Downs v. Indy Mac Mortgage Services · filed 2014-03-20

As for federal question jurisdiction, Downs invokes the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as unspecified “constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983,” and “false writing and misleading statements” in violation of the FDCPA. But as the district court properly explained, these conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

A bare allegation of a Section 1983 violation does not state a claim without facts showing how the elements could be met.

Yoder v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA · filed 2014-05-09

If they attempted to plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (which the Strunks and Yoder seem to maintain), their stating “violation of Sec. 1983” did not state a claim. There is no explanation of how the elements of this cause of action could be met, and it is not apparent how they could be satisfied.