42 U.S.C. § 1983

A Section 1983 complaint must allege specific conduct constituting a constitutional violation; vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Crawford v. John Doe, AKA (Major Palmer) John Doe, (Unknown) Officer · filed 1986-11-14

Crawford's vague and conclusory allegations would not entitle him to relief, even under the most liberal construction. Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir.1979). He fails to allege any specific conduct which might state a violation of his constitutional rights.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must plead or demonstrate facts sufficient to establish a civil-rights violation and invoke federal jurisdiction.

Ely & Ely Company v. Queen City Metro Judy Van Ginkel Rita Potts Larry Haggins, Defendants · filed 1986-11-14

Plaintiff fails to plead or demonstrate facts sufficient to sustain a cause of action for a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985 or any other statute to invoke federal jurisdiction.

A Section 1983 complaint fails when it alleges only opinions and mere conclusions rather than facts showing a federal constitutional violation.

Pablo Jose Antonio Morales v. Mary Wilson Noami Gant City of Detroit Detroit Police Department · filed 1986-11-18

Liberally construed, plaintiff's allegations clearly failed to state a violation of his rights cognizable under the Federal Constitution. ... They also failed to state a cause of action because they were allegations of opinions and mere conclusions.

Conclusory allegations, without supporting factual matter, do not sustain a Section 1983 action.

Butler v. Bill Kelly, Sheriff, Fayette County and Jeff Holt, T.C.I., Fayette County · filed 1986-09-22

Moreover, the conclusory nature of his allegations will not sustain an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Hence, the action was properly dismissed for failure to prosecute.

A Section 1983 claim is not tried by implied consent when the evidence is equally relevant to expressly pleaded claims and nothing at trial signals that Section 1983 relief is being pursued.

Ball v. School Dist. of City of Grand Rapids · filed 1986-08-07

First, there was no evidence presented at trial that was relevant to a § 1983 claim that was not also relevant to plaintiffs’ claims under §§ 2201 and 2202. Secondly, I find that plaintiffs’ alleged § 1983 claim was not tried by the express or implied consent of the defendants. This finding is supported by the fact that nothing occurred at trial to suggest that plaintiffs’ cause of action was anything more than it purported to be — one for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

A § 1983 plaintiff must assert a violation of his own constitutional rights and support the claim with facts rather than conclusory allegations.

Cotner v. Hopkins · filed 1986-07-15

In this case, we agree with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff failed to allege violations of his personal constitutional rights. In addition, plaintiff's allegations were conclusory and unsupported by underlying facts.

Vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

Threet v. Perry Johnson Theodore Koehler Michigan Corrections Organization Gerald Fryt Michael Heuy and David Boka · filed 1986-01-17

A pleading will not be sufficient to state a claim for relief under Section 1983 if its allegations are but conclusions.

A § 1983 due-process claim concerning denial of public benefits fails when it does not satisfy the governing pleading requirements.

Morrow v. Scott Bassman, John Lauer · filed 1986-01-31

We have examined the record and hold that the district court has correct in finding that the equal protection claim was without merit and that the due process claim must be rejected for noncompliance with pleading requirements set forth in Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984).

Section 1983 plaintiffs must plead specific facts showing unconstitutional conduct rather than legal conclusions.

Centrella v. Barth · filed 1986-04-08

In this Circuit, plaintiffs are required to be specific in their allegations of unconstitutional conduct in the context of suits based upon the Civil Rights Acts. ... Only factual averments are entitled to the presumption of truthfulness.

A race-discrimination claim under section 1983 must allege facts showing intentional racial discrimination.

Johnson v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1986-05-08

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must, at minimum, allege intentional discrimination on the basis of race.

A Section 1983 complaint need not identify every act of each individual defendant when it names officials logically responsible for the challenged policy and alleges enough facts to permit an answer.

District Council 47 v. Bradley · filed 1986-07-09

Where, as here, the complaint identifies those state officials who logically were (and which further discovery will no doubt establish) individually and personally responsible for ordering and approving the drafting and giving of allegedly discriminatory promotional examinations, the complaint is more than adequate to fulfill even the stringent pleading requirements established in this Circuit for civil rights complaints.

A § 1983 challenge to a search warrant's validity and probable-cause finding must rest on more than conclusory allegations.

Everette v. W.W. Kingston Bobby Sparks · filed 1986-07-23

The challenge to the validity of a search warrant, and the finding of probable cause must consist of more than mere conclusory allegations as presented by plaintiff.

A complaint need not cite § 1983 expressly when its well-pleaded facts sufficiently allege a claim under the statute.

Maldonado v. Nebraska Department of Public Welfare · filed 1986-08-01

We hold, however, that the petition sufficiently states facts which allege a claim under § 1983. In Nebraska’s code system of pleading, the facts well pled, and not the theory of recovery, state the cause of action.

Conclusory allegations unsupported by particularized facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation do not state a § 1983 claim, even when the plaintiff is a pro se prisoner.

Gravitt v. Wayne W. Stine Tom Osier · filed 1986-08-13

Although civil rights pleadings filed by pro se prisoners are to be construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), even pro se litigants must set forth a cognizable federal constitutional claim. ... Conclusory allegations not supported by particularized facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation do not state a claim under Sec. 1983.

A personal-capacity § 1983 complaint must plead that an official acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Soffer v. City of Costa Mesa · filed 1986-08-22

In a personal-capacity suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead a deprivation of a federal right by an official acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint need only provide the short statement required by Rule 8, and evidence relevant to a sufficiently pleaded claim cannot be excluded merely because every evidentiary fact was not included in the pleadings.

Lovejoy v. Michael Goodrich, Charles Johnson, City of Pagedale and Mary Hall · filed 1986-08-25

We know of no rule, especially applying to section 1983 claims, overruling the requirement of a short statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief. ... Resorting to the pleadings, rather than the Federal Rules of Evidence, is an incorrect basis for evidentiary rulings.

A complaint does not state a Section 1983 claim merely because plaintiffs later characterize it that way; the pleading must allege the statute and facts establishing a constitutional or other federally based claim against the defendant.

Kennedy v. United States · filed 1986-09-19

Nowhere in plaintiffs’ Complaint is there any allegation of a claim under § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, the corresponding jurisdictional provision. Nor, even accepting plaintiff’s position this was merely an error (presumably typographical), can the substantive allegations contained in the various claims set forth in the Complaint reasonably be interpreted as establishing any constitutional or otherwise federally-based claims against the County.

A § 1983 claim consisting only of vague and conclusory allegations fails to state a claim for relief.

Federal Land Bank v. Gibbs · filed 1987-01-14

The Gibbs’s RICO claim, like their section 1983 and antitrust claims, is both vague and conclusory; consequently, it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

Vague, confusing, and conclusory allegations that omit the essential elements of a § 1983 action do not state a claim.

Ruby H. Harris v. Cuyahoga County Board of Health · filed 1987-03-24

Appellant has not alleged the essential elements of a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. ... Her pleadings are vague, confusing and conclusory, and, therefore, insufficient to state a claim under Sec. 1983.

General, conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts are insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim.

McFall v. Collins · filed 1987-05-13

It is well established, however, such general, conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec.l983.

A complaint states a § 1983 cause of action by alleging deprivation of a federal right under color of state law even if it does not expressly cite § 1983.

Tarkanian v. NAT. COLL. ATHLETIC ASS'N · filed 1987-08-27

A cause of action under § 1983 requires an allegation that someone deprived the plaintiff of a federal right under color of state law. ... Tarkanian's complaint met these criteria, even though his complaint did not mention § 1983.

A civil-rights complaint need only give fair notice through a short and plain statement; § 1983 claims are not subject to heightened fact pleading merely because qualified immunity may later apply.

U.S. Health, Inc. Holiday Universal of Rockville, Inc. Holiday Universal, Inc. v. Cohen · filed 1988-01-15

We deem this holding also applicable to other actions seeking redress of an alleged denial of civil rights.

A complaint states a Section 1983 claim without citing the statute when it alleges that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Americans United For Separation Of Church And State v. The School District Of The City Of Grand Rapids · filed 1988-02-25

In addition to relying on Sec. 1343(a)(3) for jurisdiction the plaintiffs pled a claim under Sec. 1983 in paragraph 25 of their complaint, without specifically relying on that statute. The Supreme Court has stated that only two allegations are required to state a cause of action under Sec. 1983: (1) a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right; and (2) he must allege that the person so depriving him acted under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). Under Gomez, the allegations in paragraph 25 were sufficient to state a cause of action under Sec. 1983.

A complaint can state a § 1983 claim without citing the statute if it alleges a deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Wilder v. Tanouye · filed 1988-03-23

Although Wilder’s complaint does not mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it alleges that Tanouye, acting under the “color of Hawaii law,” deprived him of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Consequently, we will treat Wilder’s claim as a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a person acting under color of law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Buckeye Quality Care Centers, Inc. v. Fletcher · filed 1988-05-19

A complaint alleging Section 1983 as the basis for an action must meet two requirements. First, there must be an allegation that the conduct in question was performed by a person under color of law. Second, the conduct must have deprived appellant of a federal right.

A § 1983 complaint must identify the right allegedly deprived; a bare allegation of deprivation of rights does not state a claim.

Klein v. State Bd. of Educ. · filed 1988-06-01

Specifically, her section 1983 claim alleged only that she had been deprived of her rights. She failed, however, to allege what "right" was deprived.

Section 1983 requires a specific, nonconclusory showing that the challenged acts deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Duffy v. City of Long Beach · filed 1988-06-09

In order to state a cause of action under 42 United States Code sections 1983 or 1985(3), the pleader must show, in a specific and nonconclusory way, that the alleged acts deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal Constitution and laws.

A complaint can state a § 1983 claim without citing the section if its allegations show deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

L.K. v. Gregg · filed 1988-06-10

In summary, when the pleadings are considered as a whole, the veterans, while not specifically citing to section 1983, appear to have met the minimum requirements for establishing a claim for relief thereunder as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court.

Conclusory allegations of mail censorship do not state a claim under § 1983.

Ganey v. Sam P. Garrison, Director of Prisons, Secretary of Corrections, Director, Social Services of New Hano · filed 1988-10-03

Ganey's complaints about mail censorship are too conclusory to state a claim and, in any event, are time barred, as the last occurrence was in 1981.

Vague and conclusory allegations fail to state a cognizable claim under Section 1983.

Baber v. Emma Corbett, Richard Washburn, Cliff Harris · filed 1988-10-04

Upon review, we conclude that the vague and conclusory allegations of the complaint failed to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A Section 1983 complaint must plead specific facts supporting the claim, including facts identifying who committed the alleged violation.

Mosier v. John Gillard Post Office Staff, W.T.R.C. · filed 1988-10-17

He does not identify who opened the letter; nor does the record disclose whether the letter was opened intentionally or inadvertently. Therefore, we conclude that plaintiff failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983 because he did not plead specific facts in support of his claim.

Section 1983 pleadings must contain more than conclusory allegations; a conspiracy claim should provide some details of its time, place, and alleged effect.

Salahuddin v. Cuomo · filed 1988-11-04

Finally, we note that, in reviewing any amended complaint filed by Salahuddin, the court should bear in mind that we have required pleadings under Sec. 1983 to contain more than mere conclusory allegations, see, e.g., Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.1977); Albany Welfare Rights Organization Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620, 622-23 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944, 93 S.Ct. 1393, 35 L.Ed.2d 611 (1973), and that while a plaintiff should not plead mere evidence, he should make an effort to provide "some details of time and place and the alleged effect of the conspiracy," 2A Moore's Federal Practice p 8.17, at 8-123 to 8-124.

A § 1983 claim cannot rest on vague, conclusory allegations.

Carson v. C. Little Kathleen Schaefer · filed 1988-11-21

Plaintiff's vague, conclusory claims were not sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 complaints must allege a factual basis for claims of unconstitutional conduct; conclusory allegations do not state a claim for relief.

Haliburton v. Robert Brown, Jr., Director, Michigan Department of Corrections, Defendant · filed 1988-11-21

Hence, having failed to allege any factual basis for his conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct, plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim for relief.

Section 1983 claims cannot rest on vague and conclusory allegations of a due process deprivation.

Moss v. Arbogast · filed 1988-12-07

The district court dismissed the action because plaintiff's allegations of being deprived of due process were vague and conclusory and not capable of sustaining a Sec. 1983 action. Upon review, we find no error in the district court's judgment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead specific facts that, if proven, would support relief; conclusory allegations alone do not state a claim.

Sisk v. Levings · filed 1989-03-21

It should be noted, however, that to state a cognizable claim under section 1983, a plaintiff may not merely plead conclusory allegations, but must instead set forth specific facts, which if proven, would warrant the relief sought.

Section 1983 complaints must plead facts identifying the particular conduct by each defendant that allegedly harmed the plaintiff.

DeFerro v. Coco · filed 1989-04-14

However, there is an added pleading requirement in section 1983 cases that “the complaint contain a modicum of factual specificity, identifying the particular conduct of defendants that is alleged to have harmed the plaintiff[ ].”

Section 1983 claims cannot rest on vague, conclusionary accounts of conspiracies and unconstitutional conduct.

E. Tyrone Collins, Also Known as Allen-Erick T. Peoples v. Patrick Doolan, Detective City of Saginaw Saginaw County · filed 1989-05-31

Vague, conclusionary accounts of conspiracies and unconstitutional conduct are insufficient to state a civil rights claim.

A § 1983 plaintiff must plead specific facts rather than merely conclusory allegations.

Meyer v. Foti · filed 1989-07-10

It is well established that a § 1983 plaintiff must state specific facts and not merely conclu-sory allegations.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on conclusory allegations alone.

Hopewell v. Steve Berry Rebecca K. Owen Joe Stuart · filed 1989-11-15

Plaintiff's remaining allegations are mere conclusions not actionable under Sec. 1983.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege facts sufficient to state a claim; general conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Louis Butler O'Neal v. R.E. Barnes · filed 1989-12-04

The third amended complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim that the appellant's constitutional rights have been violated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. General conclusory allegations are not sufficient.

Section 1983 requires specific facts supporting a claim; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Jones v. State of Washington · filed 1990-01-04

Moreover, plaintiffs must set forth specific facts in support of their claims. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a claim for relief under § 1983.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 action must plead the facts underlying its allegations with some specificity.

Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, Ga. · filed 1990-01-09

Moreover, since this is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must provide some specificity as to the facts underlying its allegations.

Section 1983 requires a complaint alleging inadequate emergency medical services to identify a law or policy the defendants violated.

Williams v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1990-01-31

Although the estate contends that the city's failure to provide competent medical emergency services is a valid section 1983 claim, it has not cited any law or policy which any of the defendants violated. Therefore, there is no sufficient averment of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than vague, conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct to support a civil rights claim.

Long v. Kentucky State Penitentiary · filed 1990-01-31

Vague, conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct will not support a civil rights claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that a state actor violated a federal right; it provides a remedy but creates no substantive rights.

Estate of Himelstein · filed 1990-03-28

A Sec. 1983 claim does, indeed, require an allegation that some state actor deprived a plaintiff of a federal right. But, in order to state such a claim sufficiently, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if believed, would show that a federal right was actually violated. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 confers no substantive federal rights; rather, it is a remedial provision designed to afford redress for state deprivation of federal rights.

Section 1983 complaints must give defendants enough factual notice to frame an answer, but need only avoid frivolity.

Coffman v. Wilson Police Department · filed 1990-06-04

In cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the pleading requirements are somewhat stricter than usual. ... To meet this requirement, the complaint need only avoid frivolity and provide the defendants enough notice to frame an answer.

A section 1983 plaintiff must plead specific facts rather than conclusory allegations to state a claim.

City of Dallas v. Cox · filed 1990-06-13

A section 1983 plaintiff must state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must plead minimal facts showing an alleged constitutional violation under color of state law.

Perez v. AUTORIDAD De ENERGIA ELECTRICA De PR · filed 1990-06-27

Thus, in a section 1983 case, the plaintiff must state the minimal facts of the alleged constitutional violation which occurred under color of state law.

Section 1983 plaintiffs, including those proceeding pro se, must plead specific facts supporting their claims of civil rights violations.

Malley v. McGonigle · filed 1990-07-03

Leaving aside the question whether the named defendants could properly have been held liable under Sec. 1983, appellants' complaint is defective on a more basic level. ... Even though pro se plaintiffs' pleadings are held to less stringent standards then those of lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), this court has required "even pro se plaintiffs to plead specific facts backing up their claims of civil rights violations." Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 684 (1st Cir.1980) (emphasis added).

Conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Spaulding v. Gary Dixon, Sgt. Allen, Lt. Salmon, John Doe · filed 1990-09-04

Spaulding's discrimination claim was properly dismissed as frivolous because his conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Conclusory allegations of malicious prosecution and verbal threats by prison officials do not state a claim under Section 1983.

William H. Wyatt, Jr. v. J. Reed, Lt. A.W. Snyder, Sgt. Robert Ferguson, Deputy James E. Branch, Jr., Deputy · filed 1990-11-09

Wyatt's threats of malicious prosecution and verbal threats by prison officials were too conclusory to state a claim under Sec. 1983.

A claim need not expressly cite § 1983 to avoid dismissal.

Turner v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 1991-03-08

Contrary to defendants' argument, no claim will be dismissed because plaintiffs failed to expressly label any claim as one pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or because some claims may have been mislabeled as First Amendment instead of Fourteenth Amendment claims.

A § 1983 complaint alleging mandatory employee drug testing without reasonable suspicion adequately pleads a Fourth Amendment claim at the threshold stage.

Laverpool v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1991-03-30

Here, the Amended Complaint clearly sets forth an alleged constitutional deprivation, namely, based on the Fourth Amendment, by reason of the TA’s drug testing policy of requiring mandatory urinalysis of employees without any degree of reasonable suspicion and without regard to whether the position is “safety related” or not. In this Court’s view, consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and assuming the truth of the allegations, the plaintiffs have sufficiently set forth a cause of action under section 1983, at least at this threshhold pleading stage, based upon the alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.

A § 1983 complaint must state facts with enough particularity to identify what happened, who was involved, and when and where it occurred; legal conclusions alone are insufficient.

Moore v. J.W. Trapp, Sheriff of Choctaw County, Oklahoma, Choctaw County Commissioners · filed 1991-04-24

Courts have promulgated a rule requiring civil rights suits be backed by facts stated in the complaint. ... Before a trial court is entitled to start the wheels of justice turning in a case such as this, the plaintiff must do more than claim a foul. He must state with sufficient particularity what the foul involved, who was involved, and when and where it took place. It is not sufficient to use legal jargon and bald conclusions.

Section 1983 claims may survive dismissal when the complaint adequately sets forth a claim for relief.

Irving v. School District No. 1-1A · filed 1991-06-04

On the basis of the District Court’s memorandum, it is impossible to discern the exact reasons for the dismissal of Steffam’s § 1983 claims. Her complaint, however, appears to adequately set forth a ... claim for relief. We therefore reverse the District Court’s order of dismissal and order further consideration of these allegations to determine which, if any, can proceed to ultimate resolution in trial.

Section 1983 claims must plead the basis of the claim with factual detail and particularity.

Avins v. Jenifer · filed 1991-07-17

Appellant's complaint fails to meet the heightened pleading standard applicable to cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which the plaintiff must state with " 'factual detail and particularity the basis of his claim.' " Streetman v. Jordan, 918 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir.1990) (quoting Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir.1985)); cf. Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 200 (D.C.Cir.1986) (in damage actions against government officials, claims of unconstitutional motive are subject to a heightened pleading standard requiring "nonconclusory allegations of evidence of such intent" in the complaint); Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 802 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("if alleged constitutional violation turns on some element of subjective intent, then [plaintiff] must plead the unconstitutional motivation and do so with the offer of proof required by our heightened pleading standard"), aff'd on other grounds, 59 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. May 23, 1991).

A claim for money damages under Section 1983 must invoke and plead the statute; citing it only in a brief does not preserve the claim.

Meriden Redevel. Agency v. Capital Video, No. Spm9105-3027 (Sep. 4, 1991) · filed 1991-09-04

A claim for money damages will lie if the plaintiff has invoked and pleaded the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , which provides for such redress for depreciation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution. Although the defendant has cited such statute in its brief, it has not done so in any pleading, and is therefore barred from any relief thereunder.

Section 1983 pleading requirements are met when a complaint alleges that defendants acted under color of law and deprived plaintiffs of constitutional rights.

L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow · filed 1991-09-12

In paragraph Seven of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, it is alleged that at all times material to the Complaint, Defendants acted under color of law. Further, it is throughout the Complaint that Plaintiffs were deprived of their rights, privileges and immunities secured them by the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court finds that all Plaintiffs have met the pleading requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and as such denies the motion to dismiss by Defendants as to this issue.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to plead that a person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right; a court cannot supply an omitted essential element through liberal interpretation of the complaint.

Matter of Tina T. · filed 1991-09-30

A claim for relief under § 1983 need allege only that some person acting under color of state law has deprived the claimant of a federal right. ... Even a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply an essential element of a § 1983 claim which was not initially pled.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations, rather than unsupported conclusions, to state a claim.

Marcus v. Donna Carlton, Medical Assistant · filed 1991-10-08

Conclusory allegations unsupported by facts are insufficient to state a claim under section 1983.

A pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint must allege specific facts; conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct fail to state a claim.

Hawk v. Carmen Palmer Betty Goodson Dennis Davis G. Greer Raymond G. Toombs, Warden · filed 1991-11-18

Although a pro se prisoner's civil rights pleadings are liberally construed, conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific facts fail to state a claim.

A Section 1983 complaint must identify with some factual specificity the particular conduct by each defendant that allegedly harmed the plaintiff.

Simmons v. Township of Moon · filed 1991-12-18

Moreover, it is required that the “complaint contain a modicum of factual specificity, identifying the particular conduct of the defendants that is alleged to have harmed the plaintiffs.”

A § 1983 equal protection claim fails when it rests only on conclusory allegations without a factual basis.

Clark v. Melody Turner · filed 1996-12-13

Finally, Clark has made only conclusory allegations of his equal protection claim. Such allegations, made without factual basis, fail to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against local governments or officials in their official capacities do not require heightened pleading.

Denno Ex Rel. Denno v. School Board of Volusia County · filed 1997-02-03

The Court rejects the Defendants’ argument that a heightened pleading requirement exists for § 1983 allegations against local governments (or individuals in their official capacity).

A Section 1983 complaint must specifically identify the constitutional or federal right allegedly violated.

Clark v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1997-02-25

While in Heinly, we could make out by the use of the phrase “due process”, a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a better way to explain and clarify our holding in that case is that for plaintiffs to state a Section 1983 claim, they must specifically identify the particular constitutional or federal right allegedly violated.

A § 1983 claim must specify the substantive constitutional right on which it is based to state a claim for relief.

Pokoik v. Department of Health Services · filed 1997-03-10

Insofar as the petitioner’s seventh cause of action, purporting to state a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, fails to specify the substantive constitutional right upon which his claim is based, it must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (see, Incorporated Vil. of Ocean Beach v Maker Water Taxi, 201 AD2d 704).

Section 1983 claims against government officials in their individual capacities are subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Andre v. Castor · filed 1997-03-27

Rather, this Court is persuaded by the well-reasoned conclusion of another court in this district that section 1983 claims involving government officials in their individual capacities are subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Section 1983 claims against individual defendants require specific facts connecting each defendant to the alleged deprivation; conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient.

D'AURIZIO v. Palisades Park · filed 1997-04-29

Indeed, as Superintendent and lead custodian, respectively, neither Nichols nor Verdiechio had the power to hire or fire D’Aurizio. In short, D’Aurizio has failed to set forth any facts to support his allegations that Nichols and Verdiechio, each in their respective individual capacity, conspired with the other defendants to violate, and actually did violate, D’Aurizio’s rights under the Constitution or pursuant to federal law. Accordingly, D’Aurizio’s section 1983 claim against Nichols and Verdiechio are dismissed, in the first instance, for lack of specificity.

Section 1983 claims against municipalities follow ordinary notice pleading; allegations of racial discrimination need not satisfy a heightened pleading standard.

Homan v. City of Reading · filed 1997-05-20

This argument may have had considerable force in the time when the Third Circuit imposed heightened pleading requirements for § 1983 claims against municipalities. ... Thus, because Plaintiffs need only make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” we find their allegations sufficient to withstand the instant Motion.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Lawton v. Cochran · filed 1997-06-25

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Lawton has met his burden of pleading that he was deprived of rights protected by the Constitution and that there was a causal connection between Cochran’s procedures and the deprivation.

A § 1983 complaint must allege specific facts indicating a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Davidson v. Connie Mann Walter R. Kelly Thomas Coughlin, III Unknown Correspondence Dept. Personnel L-5 Charles B · filed 1997-11-10

“[I]t is well settled that to state a civil rights claim under § 1983, a complaint must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights.”

A § 1983 complaint must state a factual basis for its claims; conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct do not suffice.

Bradfield v. Compton · filed 1997-12-02

“[i]t is not enough for a complaint under § 1983 to contain mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons acting under color of state law. Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the pleadings.” ... Therefore, because Bradfield’s complaint contains only conclusory allegations unsupported by any articulated factual basis, the decision of the trial court is affirmed on this basis as well.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must plead facts supporting the claim with detail and particularity.

Sloan v. Sharp · filed 1998-01-12

Therefore, under Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995), Sloan has not pled her claim with factual detail and particularity.

Section 1983 claims against individual government officials are subject to a heightened pleading requirement.

Givens, et.al. v. Glickman, et.al. · filed 1998-02-09

At the heart of the dispute between the parties on appeal is the following legal question: is a civil rights complaint against a government official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or a federal official under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), subject to a heightened pleading standard? ... In response to this language in Leatherman, this court has expressly indicated that it will continue to apply a heightened pleading requirement in cases involving individual government officials.

Section 1983 claims require a factual basis; mere conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Luther v. Compton · filed 1998-03-17

A plaintiff alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not ... rely on “mere conclusory allegations” in the complaint.

A § 1983 complaint must identify the federal rights allegedly violated and how they were violated; this court also requires a complaint against an agency and its employees to allege conduct outside the employees’ official capacities.

Madera v. State Industrial Insurance System · filed 1998-04-02

Dimario fails to state which federal rights he believes have been violated and the specific manner in which they were violated. He also fails to point to actions engaged in by the SIIS employees outside of their official capacities. We conclude that Dimario’s § 1983 cause of action was properly dismissed because he failed to make sufficient allegations upon which a § 1983 claim can be based.

Section 1983 claims are subject to ordinary notice pleading, without a heightened standard for civil rights cases.

Kyle v. Morton High School, District 201, Margaret A. Kelly, Judy Thompson · filed 1998-05-11

Before Leatherman, on occasion we would apply a more stringent standard for notice pleading in civil rights cases; we no longer do so. We judge Kyle’s complaint by the same standards we would apply in non-civil rights cases, and would reach the same result if it were, for example, a negligence or contract dispute.

Section 1983 claims in the Fifth Circuit are subject to a heightened pleading requirement under which vague and conclusional allegations are insufficient to state a claim.

Eason v. Puckett · filed 1998-10-15

Eason’s Eighth Amendment allegations, which concern prison officials’ removal of an electric fan from his cell and the health risks this removal allegedly created, remain vague and conclusional and are insufficient to state a claim under this court’s heightened pleading requirement for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead facts showing deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

L.R. Bretz v. Zollie Kelman, Jack R. Lande, Eugene R. Welborn, Donald Zeman, James Cook, and the City of Great Falls, Mo · filed 1983-12-20

As a matter of pleading a § 1983 action, plaintiff must allege facts establishing a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A plaintiff alleging a conspiracy under § 1983 must plead its occurrence with some degree of specificity.

Culberson v. Doan · filed 1999-04-08

In order to state a claim based on the existence of a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff need only plead with some degree of specificity that the conspiracy occurred.

A plaintiff invoking § 1983 to enforce statutory or regulatory rights must identify the specific provisions at issue; a broad allegation of violated rights is insufficient.

Flores v. Arizona · filed 1999-04-14

Here, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint fails to identify with any specificity the statutory or regulatory provisions which Plaintiffs seek to enforce, but charges broadly that Plaintiffs’ rights under the EEOA and Title VI regulations, 34 C.F.R. part 100, have been violated. ... The old-age of this case factors into this Court’s decision to dismiss the § 1983 claim, without leave to amend.

A § 1983 complaint must allege a deprivation of federal rights and identify the constitutional or statutory right infringed.

Martinez v. City of Hartford, No. Cv98 0583310 (May 5, 1999) · filed 1999-05-05

The plaintiff's complaint falls to allege that a deprivation of federal rights has occurred and fails to identify the constitutional or statutory right allegedly infringed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person deprived them of a federal right while acting under color of state law.

McKinley v. Kaplan · filed 1999-06-14

In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege only two things: (1) some person has deprived him or her of a federal right; and (2) that he or she acted under color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint must identify which defendants are responsible for the alleged acts, though it need not list every specific act.

Miami International Realty Co. v. Town of Mt. Crested Butte · filed 1984-01-23

Count V must be dismissed as to all defendants for lack of specificity in pleading. It is of course not necessary for Miami to set out every specific act depriving it of its constitutional rights. The Rules of Civil Procedure require no such specificity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right; a conclusory allegation is insufficient.

Otworth v. the Florida Bar · filed 1999-09-29

This allegation, in and of itself, will not satisfy the requirement that Plaintiff allege a violation of his constitutional or federal statutory rights. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege anything within the four corners of Plaintiffs Complaint that would constitute a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing unconstitutional conduct; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Cobb v. Wilson · filed 1999-10-06

The complaint is not sufficient if it merely states conclusory allegations.

Section 1983 must be invoked to seek relief for federal constitutional claims against state officials.

Hunt v. Smith · filed 1999-10-13

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the necessary vehicle through which a plaintiff must assert a Constitutional claim. If the plaintiff does not assert 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs federal Constitutional claims should be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims require specific allegations; conclusional allegations alone are insufficient to state a claim.

El v. Brazoria Cty Sheriff · filed 1999-10-21

On appeal, Feist has failed to identify any specific allegation showing that the district court erred in dismissing his claims because his conclusional allegations were insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

A complaint need not specifically cite § 1983 if its allegations support a claim under that section.

Hill v. Government of the Commonwealth · filed 1984-02-21

Although the pleadings are inartful, the failure to specifically cite § 1983 is not fatal.

A Section 1983 complaint against a public official must rest on more than conclusions alone.

Shipp v. McMahon · filed 2000-01-07

A plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 must file a complaint that rests on more than conclusions alone.

Section 1983 claims cannot rest on conclusory and unsupported allegations, even when a pro se complaint is read liberally.

Wright v. McCotter · filed 2000-01-10

Despite the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, we generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, Walker v. Mather (In re Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992), or conclusory and unsupported § 1983 allegations.

A plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 must plead facts beyond conclusions alone.

Shipp v. McMahon · filed 2000-01-31

A plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 must file a complaint that rests on more than conclusions alone.

A § 1983 cause of action must be properly pleaded; failure to do so supports judgment for the defendants.

Paul J. G. v. County of Nassau · filed 2000-07-10

We agree that the plaintiffs failed to properly plead Kaia G.’s cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see, Monell v Department of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 694; Batista v Rodriguez, 702 F2d 393, 397). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly awarded judgment to the defendants on that cause of action.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among the defendants; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

O'Hayre v. Board of Educ. Jefferson School Dist. · filed 2000-08-18

To the extent a conspiracy may form the basis for a § 1983 claim, conclusory allegations of conspiracy are not enough. Rather, “a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants.”

Section 1983 claims based on conspiracy or retaliation require more than conclusional allegations.

Nubine v. Stringfellow · filed 2000-11-29

Nubine’s allegations of conspiracy and retaliation are conclusional and thus fail to give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims require factual allegations; conclusional allegations alone are insufficient.

Kelly v. Scott · filed 2000-12-13

Conclusional allegations are insufficient to give rise to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff must allege a constitutional violation to plead a Section 1983 claim, but need not cite Section 1983 expressly.

Harper v. Summit County · filed 2001-02-06

A party must allege a constitutional violation but need not refer specifically to section 1983 to successfully plead a violation of it.

Section 1983 claims against municipalities are governed by notice pleading.

Lee v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2001-02-14

Therefore, the modest requirements of notice pleading under Leatherman govern our review of the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' § 1983 claims in this case.

Vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Kolocotronis v. Canadian Lotteries · filed 2001-02-21

Even after amending his complaint, his allegations were too vague and conclusory to state a civil rights claim.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not meet a circuit-imposed heightened pleading requirement when a defendant raises qualified immunity.

Currier v. Doran · filed 2001-03-01

We conclude that this court’s heightened pleading requirement cannot survive Crawford-El.

Section 1983 claims do not require facts to be pleaded with heightened particularity.

Wagner v. Waitlevertch · filed 2001-03-30

There is no requirement that the facts supporting a Section 1983 claim be pleaded with a heightened degree of particularity.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege specific facts showing a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Sonds v. ST. BARNABAS CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES · filed 2001-05-21

Thus, a complaint alleging a civil rights violation under Section 1983 must contain specific allegations of fact that demonstrate a deprivation of constitutional rights, or it will be dismissed.

Section 1983 need not be cited expressly when a petition alleges a violation of federal constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law.

Londono-Rivera v. Virginia · filed 2001-06-04

The Petition does not invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as its predicate, but it alleges the violation of federal constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law. Hence, it would elevate form over substance to find that federal jurisdiction is lacking and, even if dismissed for that reason, the Petitioner would have to be given leave to amend to perfect the jurisdictional allegation.

Section 1983 does not require a public employee to plead that speech did not interfere with job performance or the employment relationship.

Sierra v. State, No. Cv00 0803588 S (Jun. 4, 2001) · filed 2001-06-04

Those cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of course do not require ... the lack of interference with job performance or the working relationship between the employer and the employee to be pleaded, because the statute does not mention such elements.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging retaliation must plead facts identifying the protected speech with enough specificity to satisfy Rule 8.

Gainer v. City of Winter Haven, Fla. · filed 2001-06-13

This statement cannot withstand the scrutiny of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to a § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 claim requires specific factual allegations sufficient to state a claim against a defendant.

Smith v. Lambert · filed 2001-06-25

Because Smith fails to allege specific factual allegations to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court did not err by dismissing his claims against defendants Stanley, Wood, and Lambert.

Section 1983 claims against government officials in their individual capacities must satisfy the heightened pleading requirement when qualified immunity is at issue.

Laurie v. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals · filed 2001-07-12

Not only would further delays ensue, but the court finds that, in the face of a qualified immunity ... challenge, Plaintiffs' proposed Count 5 did not satisfy the heightened pleading requirement.

A § 1983 complaint must allege sufficient facts to support the claim; bare conclusions may be insufficient.

Smith v. Plati · filed 2001-07-30

Rather, like Lessman, it stands for the proposition that plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to support their § 1983 claims. Bare conclusions, even read in the light most favorable to plaintiff, may prove insufficient.

A Section 1983 complaint states no claim against a named defendant when it makes no allegations concerning that defendant.

Boomer v. City of New Haven, No. Cv 001-0451260 S (Sep. 5, 2001) · filed 2001-09-05

In light of the fact that the plaintiff has not made any allegations in his Complaint concerning the defendant Wearing or the Defendant City of New Haven, the Complaint does not state a legally sufficient cause of action against them.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a civil rights claim even when the complaint does not cite the statute.

Garnett v. Coyle · filed 2001-10-11

The district court considered Garnett's civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 despite the fact that Garnett did not even cite to the staiute in his complaint. Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper vehicle to assert such a cause of action, we will follow the district court's lead.

Section 1983 requires a civil rights complaint to allege specific facts supporting the claimed violation; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Heck v. Penn Lake Park Borough · filed 2001-11-08

Similarly, other than setting forth “conelu-sory allegations” of civil rights violations, the civil rights count of Petitioners’ complaint fails to aver specific facts sufficient to support a civil rights action.

Section 1983 claims alleging unconstitutional conduct under color of state law must plead a factual basis; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Sharp v. Ingham County · filed 2001-12-04

It is not enough for a complaint to contain mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons acting under color of state law. Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the pleadings.

A § 1983 complaint must plead facts supporting its claim; conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct are insufficient.

Turnboe v. Gundy · filed 2001-12-12

We agree with the district court that Turnboe’s complaint did not state an equal protection claim. “It is not enough for a complaint under § 1983 to contain mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons acting under color of state law. Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the pleadings.” ... His conclusory allegation without any factual support failed to state an equal protection claim.

Section 1983 claims require specific factual allegations; conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.

Seils v. Rochester City School District · filed 2002-01-23

Because plaintiffs have offered nothing other than conclusory allegations, their claims premised upon § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims cannot rest on conclusional allegations.

Penigar v. Johnson · filed 2002-02-22

Conclusional allegations are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against individual government officials are subject to Rule 8(a)’s pleading standard, without a heightened specificity requirement.

In Re Bayside Prison Litigation · filed 2002-03-13

For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the Supreme Court’s recent reiteration of the purpose of the simplified pleading system embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the conclusion that Plaintiffs can not be held to a “heightened pleading standard” for their § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege facts showing that a specific defendant acted under color of state law and violated a particular person’s constitutional rights.

Trujillo v. Owens · filed 2002-03-21

A complaint brought pursuant to § 1983 must state facts showing that a specific defendant acting under color of state law violated the constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities of a particular person.

A prisoner bringing a § 1983 civil rights claim need only plead enough facts to put the defendant on notice; no special pleading requirement applies.

Walker v. Bertrand · filed 2002-06-28

There are no special pleading requirements for prisoners’ civil rights cases, however, and “[a]ll that need be specified is the bare minimum facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so he can file an answer.”

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not meet a heightened pleading requirement merely because a defendant raises qualified immunity.

Carlos D. Goad and Robert J. Wuchich v. Betty Mitchell, Jacqui Visintine, and M.A. Gilbert · filed 2002-07-25

We therefore hold that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Crawford-El invalidates the heightened pleading requirement this circuit enunciated in Veney v. Hogan for civil rights plaintiffs in cases in which the defendant raises the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

A § 1983 complaint must identify the constitutional right allegedly violated or face dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Bower v. Village of Mount Sterling · filed 2002-07-26

We do not reach the First Amendment issue here because Plaintiff did not plead a First Amendment claim in his complaint. ... “A failure to identify a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution that was violated merits dismissal of the cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

A § 1983 complaint must allege deprivation of a constitutional or federal right; a conspiracy claim must also sufficiently allege a meeting of the minds among defendants.

Lamb v. City of St. Louis · filed 2002-09-04

Upon careful de novo review, see Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1349 (8th Cir. 1993), we conclude that the complaint did not state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because Lamb failed to allege the deprivation of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or federal law, see Wade v. Goodwin, 843 F.2d 1150, 1151-52 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 854 (1988), or to allege sufficiently a meeting of the minds on the part of defendants, see Manis v. Sterling, 862 F.2d 679, 681 (8th Cir. 1988).

Section 1983 claims against individual officers alleging improper motive are not subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2002-10-09

Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir.1991), and Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir.1994), have been overruled by subsequent controlling Supreme Court authority to the extent that they require heightened pleading of improper motive in constitutional tort cases against individual officers.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not meet a heightened pleading standard, but must allege enough facts to support a reasonable inference of liability.

Torres-Viera v. Laboy-Alvarado · filed 2002-11-20

While plaintiffs are not held to higher pleading standards in § 1983 actions, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-69 (1993), they must plead enough for a necessary inference to be reasonably drawn.

A § 1983 retaliation complaint need not plead a chronology of events if it sufficiently notifies the defendants and the court of the claim.

Hunter v. Welborn · filed 2002-11-21

In cursory fashion, the district court here dismissed Hunter’s retaliation claim because it “fail[ed] to present a chronology of events from which retaliation [could] be inferred.” But as we have recently pointed out, such a chronology is unnecessary (and indicative of a heightened pleading standard inapplicable to civil rights claims) as long as the complaint sufficiently notifies the defendants and the court of the nature of the claims.

Section 1983 claims cannot rest on broad allegations that unspecified constitutional rights were violated.

Rodriguez v. Stevenson · filed 2002-12-27

Further, the complaint’s broad allegations of violations of other “constitutional rights” are not sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim for inadequate municipal supervision requires specific factual allegations; conclusory assertions of action under color of law and a constitutional violation are insufficient.

City of Jackson v. Powell · filed 2003-02-04

We find that such conclusory language, unsupported by specific factual allegations is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for inadequate supervision by the City of Jackson.

Conclusory allegations in a complaint do not state an actionable claim under § 1983.

Estate of Apolinar v. Household Finance Corp. · filed 2003-04-15

The district court properly concluded that the conclusory allegations in the complaint failed to state actionable claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 First Amendment claims requiring proof of improper motive must plead specific, nonconclusory facts from which that motive may reasonably be inferred.

Data Research Corp. v. Hernandez · filed 2003-04-30

In Judge, the First Circuit held that, in civil rights cases alleging constitutional violations that call for proof of improper motive, the plaintiff must plead the element of improper motive “by alleging specific non-conclusory facts from which such a motive may reasonably be inferred, [and] not merely by generalized assertion alone.” ... Accordingly, the Court will treat Judge’s heightened pleading requirement as controlling when evaluating plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.

A § 1983 conspiracy complaint must allege the participants, general purpose, and approximate date to give defendants notice of the accusation.

McMillian v. Litscher · filed 2003-06-25

In pleading a conspiracy under § 1983, Mr. McMiUian needed only to allege the parties involved, its general purpose, and the approximate date to provide the defendants with notice of what they were accused of.

A § 1983 due process claim may proceed when the complaint gives adequate notice of the claimed constitutional deprivation.

Citizens for Fair Share v. STATE, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2003-07-01

Citizens' complaint gave at least as much notice of a § 1983 claim based on due process as Dean did. Thus, we consider the merits of Citizens' § 1983 due process claim.

Under notice pleading, a § 1983 due process claim may proceed when the complaint gives adequate notice of the claim.

Citizens for Fair Share v. Department of Corrections · filed 2003-07-01

Citizens’ complaint gave at least as much notice of a § 1983 claim based on due process as Dean did. Thus, we consider the merits of Citizens’ § 1983 due process claim.

Section 1983 claims require a factual basis; conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct are insufficient.

Carnes v. Engler · filed 2003-09-19

Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim based on workplace persecution must allege facts identifying who committed it, when, and how.

Lambert v. Andrews · filed 2003-10-31

Lambert’s vague allegations of “excessive scrutiny” and “a hostile environment” are not sufficient to state a § 1983 claim because they fail to identify and facts regarding who persecuted him, when he was persecuted, or how he was persecuted.

A § 1983 plaintiff must plead specific facts rather than conclusory allegations, even when proceeding pro se.

Taylor v. Cockrell · filed 2004-02-12

Although pro se complaints and arguments must be liberally construed, see Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994), a plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action must plead specific facts, not “conclusory allegations.”

A § 1983 complaint alleging denial of parole because of legal activities must specify the nature of the claimed injury.

Lott v. Dalsheim · filed 1979-08-09

We agree with the State that this claim should be repleaded to specify the nature of the injury complained of.

A Section 1983 complaint that gives adequate notice of claims entitling the plaintiff to relief if factually supported satisfies pleading requirements.

Thomson, Brian v. Washington, Odie · filed 2004-04-01

The complaint in this case, though artless (the plaintiff is not a lawyer and did not have the assistance of one in drafting the complaint), provides adequate notice of legal claims that, if factually supported, would entitle him to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 complaints are subject to notice pleading under Rule 8, without a heightened factual specificity requirement.

Alston v. Parker · filed 2004-04-05

Alston's § 1983 complaint should have been considered not under a heightened pleading requirement, but under the more liberal standards of notice pleading.

A section 1983 complaint must allege a violation of a federal right.

Loadholt v. Cribb · filed 2004-04-12

Loadholt has not alleged that any federal right has been violated by the Respondents. Accordingly, he has failed to properly plead a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to Rule 8(a) notice pleading, without a heightened pleading standard.

EPA v. Hernandez · filed 2004-05-10

All civil rights actions are subject to Rule 8(a)'s notice pleading regime.

Section 1983 claims are subject to Rule 8(a) notice pleading regardless of the defendant’s capacity, the availability of qualified immunity, or the need to prove improper motive.

Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández · filed 2004-05-10

The rule that we announce today is not contingent on the type of civil rights case, the capacity in which a particular defendant is sued, the availability vel non of a qualified immunity defense, or the need (or lack of need) for proof of illegal motive. All civil rights actions are subject to Rule 8(a)’s notice pleading regime.

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action for people deprived of constitutional or federal rights by persons acting under color of state law.

Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio · filed 2004-06-01

Claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not subject to heightened pleading standards.

A section 1983 claim based on race requires facts showing how race entered the challenged decisions; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency Of The City Of Los Angeles · filed 1984-05-15

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed Jones' section 1983 claim. His allegations are conclusional and unsupported by any facts as to how race entered into any decisions.

A § 1983 complaint must allege supporting facts showing a substantial, identifiable federal constitutional deprivation.

Cotner v. Campbell · filed 1985-09-20

They have submitted no supporting facts or any details at all which would support the maintenance of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any of the other statutes cited by them.

A § 1983 claim too vague to determine whether it is barred may be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to refile it more specifically.

HMK Corp. v. Walsey · filed 1986-06-09

The § 1983 claim is so vague that the Court cannot determine whether or not it is barred. Although the claim probably is barred, the Court dismisses it without prejudice and grants plaintiff leave to refile it with greater specificity, should it be so advised.

A Section 1983 complaint need not identify every action taken by each named defendant to state a claim, even though the plaintiff must prove personal involvement to prevail at trial.

District Council 47 v. Bradley · filed 1986-07-09

Anela's requirement that a Sec. 1983 plaintiff prove that the specific named defendants personally harmed him in order to prevail at trial does not mean that a civil rights plaintiff must identify each specific action taken by each specific individual defendant in his complaint in order to state a cognizable claim.

Section 1983 plaintiffs must plead facts showing the defendants’ participation in the alleged wrong.

Jacquez v. R.K. Procunier · filed 1986-10-10

In order to successfully plead a cause of action in § 1983 cases, plaintiffs must enunciate a set of facts that illustrate the defendants’ participation in the wrong alleged.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts supporting unconstitutional conduct by persons acting under color of state law.

Chapman v. City of Detroit · filed 1986-12-30

It is not enough for a complaint under Sec. 1983 to contain mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons acting under color of state law. Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the pleadings.

Section 1983 requires a civil rights complaint to allege specific facts showing a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward · filed 1987-03-25

First, it is well settled that to state a civil rights claim under § 1983, a complaint must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple, and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Conclusory allegations do not state a valid claim under Section 1983.

Roy v. Butler County · filed 1987-10-09

We also hold that Roy's conclusory allegations did not state a valid 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim.