42 U.S.C. § 1983

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for initiating a prosecution and presenting the government’s case when those acts are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.

Santini v. Gierbolini · filed 1996-07-26

Likewise, prosecuting attorneys are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for acts such as the initiation of the prosecution and presentation of the government’s case, acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.

A prosecutor who advises officers before a warrantless arrest has qualified, rather than absolute, immunity from a § 1983 claim based on that advice.

Hython v. City of Steubenville · filed 1996-08-12

The court below correctly held that Stern, acting as a prosecutor, was entitled only to qualified, rather than absolute, immunity for any advice that he gave prior to the warrantless arrest of plaintiff.

A prosecutor is not absolutely immune from a Section 1983 claim for preparing and filing a declaration in support of an arrest warrant.

Rodney FLETCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lynne KALINA, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-08-22

Kalina is not absolutely immune for her actions in filing a declaration for an arrest warrant.

A prosecutor receives no absolute § 1983 immunity for investigative conduct undertaken before any prosecution or judicial proceeding begins.

Robison v. Via · filed 1986-05-27

The activities undertaken by both defendants were entirely outside the framework of any criminal prosecution. The detention of the plaintiff’s children was prior to the commencement of any judicial function by court or counsel.

A prosecutor or investigator receives only qualified immunity for self-initiated investigative or administrative conduct rather than conduct intimately tied to judicial advocacy.

Joseph v. Patterson · filed 1986-07-02

However, when the nonjudicial official undertakes action on his own initiative or when he carries out administrative or investigatory functions of the prosecutor, he can only claim the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

A prosecutor lacks absolute § 1983 immunity for administrative or investigative conduct not undertaken to initiate a prosecution or present the state’s case.

Military Circle Pet Center No. 94, Inc. v. Cobb County · filed 1987-05-20

Because these alleged activities of Defendant Head and the Solicitor’s Office were not performed for the purpose of “initiating prosecutions and presenting the State’s case,” ... Defendant Head is not absolutely immune from plaintiff’s § 1983 suit.

A prosecutor receives only qualified immunity for giving legal advice to police officers in a § 1983 action.

Wolfenbarger v. Williams · filed 1987-08-03

Even assuming, arguendo, that the instructions were legal advice, the rule in this circuit is that a prosecutor is entitled to only qualified immunity for giving such advice to police officers.

A prosecutor receives only qualified immunity under § 1983 for giving legal advice to police officers.

Wolfenbarger v. Williams · filed 1987-08-20

Even assuming, arguendo, that the instructions were legal advice, the rule in this circuit is that a prosecutor is entitled to only qualified immunity for giving such advice to police officers.

A prosecutor has absolute § 1983 immunity for legal advice approving an arrest, but potentially only qualified immunity when personally participating in an investigative interrogation.

Thomas v. Riddle · filed 1987-10-23

Accordingly, Simpson is absolutely immune from liability for approving or ratifying Thomas’ war-rantless arrest. However, we find that the allegations as to the interrogation of Thomas raise an inference that Simpson’s activities were investigatory in nature.

Section 1983 affords prosecutors at most qualified immunity for administrative or investigative acts.

Lawson v. Abrams · filed 1988-12-20

On the other hand, no more than a qualified immunity is available with respect to acts of a prosecutor that are administrative or investigative in nature.

Section 1983 does not grant absolute prosecutorial immunity for police-like preliminary investigative misconduct that causes a false arrest.

Earl Edwin Gobel and Michael J. Defranco v. Maricopa County, Thomas E. Collins, David P. Stoller, and Frank Gary · filed 1989-02-09

If they also demonstrate that the prosecutors’ misconduct during this police-like investigative stage caused their false arrest, Gobel and DeFranco will have proved a claim that falls outside the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Section 1983 affords prosecutors only qualified immunity for press conferences and legislative committee appearances because those activities are not intimately associated with prosecuting criminals.

Levinsky v. Diamond · filed 1989-02-17

It is clear, under the functional analysis method, that the press conferences and appearances before the Joint Fiscal Committee by the prosecutors are not so “intimately associated” with the act of prosecuting criminals as to warrant absolute immunity from § 1983 liability. As to those activities, therefore, they are entitled only to qualified immunity.

A prosecutor is not absolutely immune from a Section 1983 damages claim for purely administrative acts, including obtaining a safekeeping order unrelated to prosecuting an appeal.

Allen v. Carroll R. Lowder Aaron J. Johnson Nathan Rice, and W. Franklin McGuirt David W. Chester Laura Perr · filed 1989-05-23

At best, Lowder was acting in a purely administrative capacity when he assisted the Sheriff’s office in obtaining the safekeeping order from the Superior Court and is, therefore, not entitled to absolute immunity.

A prosecutor’s statements to the press outside the advocate role receive at most qualified immunity from liability under Section 1983.

England v. Hendricks · filed 1989-07-21

Since the statements Gunnell allegedly made to the press were not made in his role as advocate, absolute prosecutorial immunity did not attach to him. Rather, he would at the most be entitled to qualified immunity.

A prosecutor’s statements to the press outside the advocate role do not receive absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim; at most, the prosecutor may receive qualified immunity.

England v. Hendricks · filed 1989-09-28

Since the statements Gunnell allegedly made to the press were not made in his role as advocate, absolute prosecutorial immunity did not attach to him. Rather, he would at the most be entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 gives prosecutors only qualified immunity for police-related functions, including gathering evidence and advising officers during a search.

Naugle v. Witney · filed 1990-12-31

Both participated in the preliminary gathering of evidence; they accompanied Sheriff’s Office deputies to the Naugle residence and advised officers whether particular items should be seized. These functions are not related to advocacy, and thus Madsen and Allan are only entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

A prosecutor performing investigatory functions has only qualified immunity from liability under § 1983.

Chavers v. Teggatz · filed 1992-03-11

Insofar as Mr. Chavers alleges that Ms. Hoffman tried to cover up police department investigation misconduct, the court believes that he has made allegations which if proved, could demonstrate that Ms. Hoffman was performing an investigatory function and therefore, enjoys only qualified immunity.

Prosecutors acting solely in an investigative capacity after their role in a prosecution has ended may assert only qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim for suppressing exculpatory evidence.

Elton Houston and Robert Brown v. Cecil A. Partee, Cook County State's Attorney, Thomas Dwyer and Larry Wharrie · filed 1992-10-27

The defendant prosecutors were acting solely in an investigative capacity; accordingly, they are only entitled to assert a qualified immunity.

Under § 1983, prosecutors have only qualified immunity for fabricating evidence during a preliminary investigation before probable cause to arrest exists and for statements to the press announcing an indictment.

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons · filed 1993-06-24

Respondents have not cited any authority that supports an argument that a prosecutor’s fabrication of false evidence during the preliminary investigation of an unsolved crime was immune from liability at common law, either in 1871 or at any date before the enactment of §1983. It therefore remains protected only by qualified immunity. ... Fitzsimmons’ statements to the media are not entitled to absolute immunity.

Under § 1983, a prosecutor has absolute immunity when acting as the state's advocate in presenting evidence for an arrest warrant, but only qualified immunity when personally vouching for the truth of the supporting affidavits.

David J. KOHL, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CASSON · filed 1993-09-28

We conclude from Burns and Malley that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for appearing before a judicial officer to present evidence in support of an application for an arrest warrant, insofar as he acts as the state's advocate in presenting evidence and arguing the law. ... Thus, where the prosecutor switches functions from presenting the testimony of others to vouching, of his own accord, for the truth of the affidavits presented to the judicial officer, the prosecutor loses the protection of absolute immunity and enjoys only qualified immunity, just as the police officer was held to have in Malley.

A prosecutor lacks absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim for administrative conduct involving the sale of seized property.

Guiffre v. Bissell · filed 1994-08-04

Bissell's actions in the allegedly improper sale of the property seized by the government clearly involved administrative duties, for which he is not entitled to absolute immunity.

A prosecutor sued under § 1983 is not absolutely immune for administrative duties involving the sale of forfeited property.

Giuffre v. Nicholas Bissell Richard Thornburg Robert Smith Russ Leffert Sam Debella Richard Meyers County of So · filed 1994-08-04

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Giuffre, we cannot hold that Bissell is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for his role in the sale of Giuffre’s forfeited property by the County. Bissell’s actions in the allegedly improper sale of the property seized by the government clearly involved administrative duties, for which he is not entitled to absolute immunity.

A prosecutor sued under § 1983 has only qualified immunity for investigative acts; absolute immunity depends on the function performed.

Hill v. City of New York · filed 1995-01-17

When acting as a criminal investigator, a prosecutor is accorded only the qualified immunity ordinarily granted to the police function. Thus, whether a district attorney is or is not entitled to absolute immunity for his or her conduct depends on the function being performed at that time.

Under § 1983, prosecutors have only qualified immunity for administrative handling of a prisoner after all criminal charges have ended.

Pinaud v. County Of Suffolk · filed 1995-04-06

Since the handling of a prisoner after the complete conclusion of all criminal charges is not a prosecutorial task but rather an administrative one, the district attorney defendants are entitled only to the protection of qualified immunity for any involvement in Pinaud's seemingly delayed transfer back into federal custody after the final dismissal of the state charges against him.

Section 1983 holds an investigating prosecutor to the same liability standard as a police officer when fabricated evidence proximately causes a due process violation at trial.

Whitlock v. Bruegge · filed 2012-05-30

Thus, a prosecutor whose investigatory conduct is the proximate cause of the due process violation that occurs when the false evidence is introduced at trial is held to the same standard of liability as a police officer who does the same thing.

Section 1983 provides a damages cause of action for a deprivation of civil rights under color of state authority, and allegations assumed true can be sufficient to state that cause of action.

Ackerman v. Putnam · filed 1969-02-11

It is necessary for the Court to assume all allegations in the complaint to be true, and, if so, a cause of action is stated under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, of which the District Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1343.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege that defendants acting under color of state or local law deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Kummer v. Bonarek · filed 1972-11-17

It is well settled that the requirements for a sufficient complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are that the defendants while acting under the color of ... state or local law subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 civil-rights claims should not be dismissed at the pleading stage unless it is certain that the plaintiff could obtain no relief under any provable set of facts.

Cromwell v. Ward · filed 1977-01-07

A case brought under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) should not be dismissed at this stage of the proceedings unless it appears “to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claims.”

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to pursue relief for alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations, and a complaint alleging such a deprivation may survive a motion to dismiss.

Bagby v. Beal · filed 1977-11-08

Bagby’s primary challenge, and the subject of Defendants’ motion, is that the procedures provided by the Civil Service Act are not adequate to satisfy due process. ... Therefore, because no pre-suspension opportunity to contest the charges was afforded Bagby, and because it is not clear to the Court that the statutory scheme provided a reasonable opportunity for her to be heard on the validity of the charges levied against her, the Court decides that she has stated a cause of action sufficient to withstand Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that she was afforded all the process due her. ... Because the Court has concluded that Bagby’s complaint states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is inadvisable at this time to consider the merits of Defendants’ contentions concerning the remedies which Bagby has sought.

A § 1983 complaint need not expressly invoke the statute if its allegations sufficiently state a claim, but component parts of a municipality lack capacity to be sued under § 1983.

Jones v. City of Greensboro · filed 1981-05-05

When the allegations in plaintiffs complaint are liberally construed in light of the foregoing rules of substance and procedure, we hold they are sufficient to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Apple, Briggs, Wrenn, Calhoun, and City of Greensboro. Defendants Greensboro Police Department and Greensboro Coliseum Complex would not be amenable to suit under § 1983 since they are component parts of defendant City of Greensboro and as such lack the capacity to be sued. Thus, we hold the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs ninth claim for relief for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted with respect to defendants Apple, Briggs, Wrenn, Calhoun, and City of Greensboro.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on an asserted right to be protected from disagreeable speech where the complaint fails to connect a valid constitutional right to the requested relief and the relief would infringe others’ First Amendment rights.

Catholic War Veterans of the United States, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 1983-06-15

The amended complaint fails to state a claim under sections 1983 and 1985(3) for a number of reasons. First, plaintiffs assert a dramatically overbroad interpretation of their own constitutional and civil rights, apparently assuming a right to be protected from speech and expression with which they disagree. Second, where plaintiffs have properly identified their constitutional and civil rights, they have failed to allege any reasonable link between the rights identified and the relief sought. The relief sought, furthermore, would impermissibly infringe upon private defendants’ First Amendment rights to free speech and expression.

A pro se § 1983 claim that prison officials labeled an inmate a snitch and exposed him to inmate retaliation is sufficient to survive pre-service dismissal as frivolous.

Harmon v. W.C. Berry and David Morse · filed 1984-04-02

Joseph Harmon, an Alabama state prisoner incarcerated at Staton Correctional Facility, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the prison warden and a correctional officer. ... Harmon’s claims, construed liberally as they must be, allege that prison officials have labeled him a snitch and are exposing him to inmate retaliation, perhaps because of his conduct in bringing prior lawsuits against the center. The claim, on its face, is sufficient to carry this cause of action through the service of process stage.

A § 1983 complaint fails to state a claim when it alleges wrongdoing only by a nonparty and alleges none by the named defendant.

Local IV-302 International Woodworkers Union v. Menominee Tribal Enterprises · filed 1984-10-11

Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the actions of the Tribal Court have deprived them of property without due process of law and have ... denied the plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Since no wrongdoing is alleged on behalf of the named defendant in this action, the complaint is hereby dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A pro se complaint alleging that a state licensing board intentionally denied a professional license because of race states a § 1983 equal-protection claim even without expressly citing § 1983.

Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners of California · filed 1985-11-26

He essentially alleges that the Board, a state agency, intentionally denied him a dental license because of his race.

At initial in-forma-pauperis screening, a pro se prisoner sufficiently alleges an Eighth Amendment § 1983 claim by asserting deliberate indifference to a known unsafe condition rather than mere negligence.

Jones v. Morris · filed 1985-11-27

Rather, the appellant alleged that his accident was the result of the defendants’ “deliberate indifference” in failing to repair a danger that they knew to exist.

Institutionalized persons state a Section 1983 claim by alleging confinement that subjects them to physical restraints, harm from other patients, and deterioration of basic skills.

Armstead v. Pingree · filed 1986-01-29

Plaintiffs allege that they have been committed to a state institution, that they have been subjected to physical restraints, that they have suffered physical harm from other patients, and that they have suffered a deterioration of skills as a result of their confinement. … These allegations are sufficient under … to state a claim for relief under the due process clause and § 1983.

A court may deny Section 1983 relief when the claimant advances no argument or authority supporting it and the court finds none.

Smith v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (In Re Smith) · filed 1986-02-20

The debtor has advanced no argument or case law in support of our granting relief under § 1983 and our cursu-ry review of the case law has revealed none. Consequently, relief must be denied under § 1983 as well as under the other bases for relief.

A complaint alleges a § 1983 property-due-process claim when it asserts that an official acting under color of law unlawfully destroyed the plaintiffs’ property.

Powe v. City of Albany · filed 1987-05-07

Though inartfully drawn, the complaint sets forth the material elements of a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 to vindicate plaintiffs’ right to be free of deprivations of property which do not comport with due process guarantees....

A poorly drafted complaint that also alleges breach of contract survives dismissal if, fairly read, its allegations could support relief under Section 1983.

Executive Art Studios, Inc. And Terry Whitman Shoultes v. State of Michigan · filed 1987-10-22

A motion to dismiss may not be granted when the complaint, fairly read, pleads a cause of action in which the plaintiffs could recover under any set of circumstances. While the complaint in this case is very poorly drafted and did include a claim for breach of an agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the fact remains that allegations were made which, if sustained by evidence, would entitle the plaintiffs to some relief under section 1983.

A complaint gives fair notice under Rule 8 of a § 1983 claim when, liberally construed, it alleges First and Fourth Amendment violations arising from the defendants' application requirements.

Starzyk v. Glenda McKinney and Six County Consortium for Employment and Job Training · filed 1987-12-15

Liberally construed, the plaintiff's complaint gives fair notice that a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action has been brought against the defendants for alleged violations of the plaintiff's first and fourth amendment rights arising from the defendants' application requirements. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has not made a short and plain statement of his claim sufficient to satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).

A § 1983 complaint alleging that a public college selectively denied an alumni group recognition may proceed when viewpoint or racial discrimination could be proved and the college has offered no justification.

Baruch Black And Hispanic Alumni Assn. v. Bernard M. Baruch College · filed 1987-12-22

When so construed, it does not appear beyond doubt that plaintiffs will be unable to present any set of facts to support their claims that their constitutional rights have been violated. For example, it is possible that plaintiffs could demonstrate that the College's selective denial of official recognition to their alumni association was improperly motivated by discrimination based on political viewpoint or race.

A complaint alleging that city officials refused to provide zoning documentation required for an adult congregate living facility license states a cause of action under § 1983.

Lamphear v. Wiggins · filed 1989-08-03

Appellants’ complaint stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, so the order dismissing that complaint is reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings.

Allegations that state regulations created a liberty interest, the state failed to follow them, and the plaintiff was harmed suffice to state a § 1983 claim.

O'Donnell v. Singletary · filed 1994-03-23

O’Donnell alleged in his complaint, although inartfully, that certain state regulations created a liberty interest, that the state failed to follow the regulations in his ease, and that he has been harmed by the state’s actions. ... these allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action under section 1983.

A complaint that facially states a cause of action under § 1983 survives a motion to dismiss.

Johnson v. STATE HRS · filed 1997-06-27

Applying this standard of review to Johnson's complaint, [2] we determine that she has used all the necessary words and phrases to facially state a cause of action as to count I pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and reverse the dismissal of that count.

Section 1983 allows a damages claim against deputy sheriffs when the complaint’s allegations of civil rights violations are accepted as true.

Wilson v. Simon · filed 1969-04-30

The Cook County State’s Attorney, on his own behalf and as attorney for defendants Nyden and Jakubowski, deputy sheriffs of Cook County, subsequently withdrew their motions to dismiss the complaint and filed an answer, in effect, admitting that the facts as pleaded in plaintiff’s complaint, if proven, state a claim for relief in the form of money damages against the defendant deputy sheriffs. I agree, accepting the facts as pleaded, that the complaint does state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a police officer acting under color of state law when the complaint alleges an arrest following protected pamphleteering and circumstances beyond an innocent false arrest.

Herschel v. Frank J. Dyra and Orlando W. Wilson · filed 1966-12-05

Having examined the circumstances of plaintiff’s arrest as set forth in his complaint and heeding the Supreme Court’s advice in Monroe v. Pape, supra, that § 1983 “should he read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions,” we hold that the complaint set forth a claim against defendant Dyra under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the District Court erred in ordering its dismissal.

A section 1983 complaint must allege specific conduct that caused a violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Pena v. Booth Gardner Lawrence Kincheloe Warden John Lambert Amos Reed · filed 1992-10-09

To survive a motion to dismiss, Pena must allege with greater specificity the particular conduct he contends caused a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims about prison conditions require specific factual allegations; vague and conclusory allegations do not state a claim.

Marnin v. Pinto · filed 1972-06-28

There were no specifics whatsoever alleged in the complaint which could merit a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 or the Eighth Amendment safeguards.

A § 1983 complaint must give defendants fair notice of the allegations against them.

Spittal v. Apel · filed 2007-03-16

The district court properly dismissed Spittal’s action because the complaint did not provide fair notice to defendants of the allegations against them.

A complaint can state a § 1983 claim by alleging deprivation of federal constitutional rights under color of state authority, even if it does not cite the section in its body.

Fairbanks Correctional Center Inmates v. Williamson · filed 1979-09-28

Combining the broad purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — to provide a cause of action upon allegations of facts constituting deprivation under color of state authority of federal constitutional rights ... with the liberal pleading provisions of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 8 ... — we think that the complaint did state a cause of action under § 1983.

A complaint need not specifically cite Section 1983 if it alleges the statute's essential elements: action under color of state law and deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Brower v. Wells · filed 1984-11-06

Other jurisdictions have held that failure to specifically plead 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not prevent recovery under its provisions so long as the essential elements of a 1983 claim are stated. ... We find Hughes' complaint sufficient to state a cause of action for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits constitutional-discrimination claims against state prison officials to proceed when, liberally construed, the pleadings allege facts that could entitle the prisoner to relief.

McCray v. L. B. Sullivan, Etc. · filed 1977-09-16

It is too well known to require supporting authority that such pleadings as plaintiff’s are to be liberally construed and, so construed, are not to be dismissed unless they are not subject to proof on any plausible state of facts. So construed, plaintiff’s pleadings may reasonably be read as asserting, in addition to those ascertained by the court below, claims that black prisoners are ... subjected to discriminatory parole criteria as compared to whites, that the parole board was intentionally constituted of racially prejudiced persons, and that prisoners such as he were administratively segregated for racial reasons and for filing writs. Such claims, however difficult they may be for plaintiff to prove, -are ones upon which, if proved, relief can be granted. They should not have been dismissed on a bare-bones basis.

Section 1983 requires a civil-rights complaint to allege facts rather than rely on conclusory allegations.

Carlisle v. Sielaff · filed 1974-03-26

Plaintiff makes several other prayers for relief, but he does not allege any facts whatsoever in support thereof. As Defendant notes, even if Plaintiff’s prayer itself is treated as an allegation it is only conclusory and, therefore, insufficient to support a claim under the Civil Rights Act.

A Section 1983 claim requires action under color of state law and specific facts showing a civil-rights deprivation, and the borrowed limitations period is tolled while the plaintiff exhausts required state administrative remedies.

Williams v. Interstate Motor Freight Systems · filed 1978-09-27

Section 1983 prohibits deprivation of civil rights by any person acting under color of state law. There is no allegation that Interstate acted under color of state law and so the Section 1983 claim is dismissed as to Interstate. Plaintiff’s 1983 claim against the Commission is presumably based upon the Commission’s decision upholding the discharge. This conclusory argument, with no “specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of civil rights” does not state a claim under Section 1983. ... In the Second Circuit, a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative remedies before presenting his Section 1983 claim in federal court, except where the administrative remedy is inadequate or where it is certainly or probably futile, which is not the situation before me. ... I find that the statute of limitations on plaintiffs Section 1983 action was tolled between the filing of his claim with the Department of Labor and the rendition of the decision by the Commission on Human Rights.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights complaint to proceed past a motion to dismiss when its allegations could support a valid cause of action.

Hughes v. Roth · filed 1974-02-21

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficiently specific to withstand a motion to dismiss; ... and we cannot say as a matter of law at this juncture that plaintiff cannot possibly adduce any facts which would create a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against state officials require a showing of purposeful discrimination, or at least allegations that the officials’ misconduct was knowing or reckless, when their judgment and discretion are at issue.

Tredwell A. Harrison and M. Gale Harrison v. Brooks · filed 1971-07-27

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the first eight counts because they do no more than allege “wrongful” conduct by the defendants. Where a state official’s judgment and discretion are of vital concern, we require a showing of purposeful discrimination or at least an allegation that his misdeeds were knowing or reckless.

A § 1983 damages complaint against public officials must allege highly specific facts; conclusory allegations of constitutional-rights deprivation are insufficient to survive dismissal.

Friedman v. Younger · filed 1969-02-11

It is well established that in an action for damages against public officials under the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must allege highly specific facts to defeat a Motion to Dismiss.

A § 1983 conspiracy complaint must allege overt acts with at least some particularity and facts showing purposeful discrimination in the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Valley v. Maule · filed 1968-12-26

It was made applicable to any complaint alleging conspiracy — whether under 1985 or 1983.

Section 1983 civil-rights complaints must allege concrete facts showing that defendants denied rights secured by the Constitution; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Asher v. Harrington · filed 1970-10-12

On this motion to dismiss, the court must determine whether the first two causes of action qualify as civil rights complaints. I am persuaded that the first and second causes of action do not sufficiently allege facts to show that rights and privileges secured to the plaintiffs by the first and fourteenth amendments and enforcedly § 1983 have been denied to the plaintiffs by the defendants. ... Paragraphs 9 and 11 of the complaint contain the assertion that the defendants’ actions “discriminatorily deprived plaintiffs of their rights of free speech, free inquiry, free thought and free assembly”, but such charge is a mere conclusion. There is no logical nexus between the conclusion and the statement of facts set forth in the first cause of action. Similarly, in the second cause of action, the plaintiffs conclude in paragraph 14 that they were denied equal protection of the laws by the defendants. There is a gap, too, between this conclusory assertion and the facts asserted in the second cause of action.

A § 1983 complaint need not identify the particular constitutional or statutory provision securing the allegedly deprived right if the court can ascertain that right from the Constitution or laws.

Williams v. Stone · filed 1971-12-15

It was not required that the plaintiff’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was enacted to enforce the Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, set out the particular portion of the Constitution or law securing the right of which he claims to have been deprived; all that is necessary is that the Court ascertain from the confines of the Constitution or law that such right exists.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based only on conclusory civil-rights allegations unsupported by substantial facts.

The People of the United States of America James J. Carr v. Thelma Sharp, President of the New Jersey State Civil Service Commission · filed 1971-12-28

The civil right allegations are unsupported by any substantial facts. The conclusory complaint was properly dismissed by the District Court for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum state's limitations period, and allegations must show deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right rather than generalized prison conditions or conclusory supervision claims.

Bussue v. Lankler · filed 1972-01-27

The period of limitation applicable to an action brought under § 1983 is “that which New York would enforce had an action seeking similar relief been brought in a court of that state.” ... The plaintiff’s cause of action derives from a statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and a three-year statute of limitations applies to “an action to recover upon a liability . . . imposed by statute . . .” ... Counts 1 and 3 are time-barred. ... The general claim that the Warden failed properly to enforce health regulations is insufficient to support a claim of deprivation of constitutional rights under Section 1983. ... Similarly, the alleged imposition of arbitrary standards on the plaintiff's attempts to communicate will not support a claim under Section 1983. ... The plaintiff’s assertion that the Warden failed “to supervise and control” is simply too general to meet the pleading requirement in a Civil Rights ease. ... Furthermore, the plaintiff’s more specific allegations of general disorder, discomfort' and inconvenience in the Manhattan House of Detention suggest the deprivation of no right “secured by the Constitution and laws . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal courts simply cannot enforce the opening or closing of windows in cold weather, occurrences alleged to be in violation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for denial of employment by a private hospital, even when the denial inhibits free speech.

Lucille C. Place v. Mrs. Mary C. Shepherd · filed 1971-08-17

However, the denial of employment by a private hospital even if such a denial inhibits free speech does not state a cause of action under § 1983, or constitute a denial of equal protection under § 1985(3).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when the alleged injury amounts only to misuse of state statutes and a state forum without a constitutional denial, and private attorneys participating in private litigation are not state functionaries under the statute.

Brown v. Dunne · filed 1969-02-13

Plaintiffs argue that the defendants used the Illinois statutes "as a mask and shield for the commission" of the "criminal" and "tortious" conduct charged in the complaint. This argument supports the district court's view that plaintiffs' real complaint is that defendants misused the statutes in a state forum. This does not present a denial of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, or a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Civil Rights Act. ... Attorneys Green, Partee and Anzalone under the facts alleged are lawyers who participated in the Circuit Court in private litigation, and consequently are not state functionaries within the meaning of the Federal Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law before the plaintiff may obtain relief under the statute.

Henderson v. Pate · filed 1969-03-26

As to the "goon" squad, counsel argues that these inmates must have been acting under some kind of authority in physically abusing the plaintiff. However, the allegations fall far short of alleging that these persons were acting under color of law.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct to be committed under color of state law and to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right; filing a private telephone company's regulations with state authorities, without state benefit, encouragement, request, or cooperation, is insufficient state involvement.

Thomas Kadlec, James W. Kadlec, and Isaac Grinstead v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company · filed 1969-04-01

It is well-settled that in order to establish a claim for damages under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act the conduct complained of must have been engaged in under color of law and such conduct must have infringed upon the rights, privileges or immunities secured to the complaining party by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Haldane v. Chagnon, 9 Cir., 345 F.2d 601, 603 (1968); Duzynski v. Nosal, 7 Cir., 324 F.2d 924, 930 (1963); Jemzura v. Belden, N.D.N.Y., 281 F.Supp. 200, 205-206 (1968). At least one of the two elements essential to maintaining a claim under § 1983 is missing in the instant case. Under the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that defendant telephone company was not acting under the authority or pretense of any Illinois state statute, regulation, custom or usage in discontinuing plaintiffs’ Call-Pak service. Thus, the second amended complaint, as amended, was properly dismissed by the district court for failure to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to a court-appointed defense attorney whose actions are not taken under color of state law.

Vance v. Robinson · filed 1968-11-27

However, his appointment and acceptance of the representation did not make him an officer or servant of the state. ... His actions, good or bad, were not done for the state nor under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage. Section 1983 is in the opinion of this Court, not applicable.

Section 1983 requires an invasion of civil rights by conduct under color of state law; private defendants acting for private interests are not covered.

Auld v. Mobay Chemical Company · filed 1969-06-05

Plaintiff has failed to plead facts which are the bases for any civil action for an invasion of civil rights under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The defendants have acted in a private capacity and for private interests and there is no averment that they were cloaked with public authority or acted under color of law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not impose liability for purely private conduct.

Schetter v. Heim · filed 1969-06-11

To constitute a violation of § 1983, the defendants’ alleged deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights must have been accomplished “under col- or of law.” This section does not protect one from invasion of his private rights by individual action. ... Section 1983 has been held to apply solely and exclusively to acts by state officers who use their authority, or misuse it, or purport to use their authority (although, in fact, acting outside their official function) to deprive a person of federally protected rights. Private persons, although they may in fact deprive another person of federally protected rights, are not liable under § 1983. ... Such being the case, the present action fails to come within the limits of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be committed by a person acting under color of state law, meaning a misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and enabled by state authority.

Tennessee ex rel. Davis v. Hartman · filed 1969-07-30

An essential element requisite to a recovery by the plaintiff against these defendants is that the conduct complained of must have been done by a person or persons acting under color of law. Basista v. Weir, C.A.3rd (1965), 340 F.2d 74, 79 [3]. For an act to be under color of state law, it must be a “ * * * [misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, * * * ” United States v. Classic (1941), 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043 [14], 85 L.Ed. 1368, 1383 [19].

Section 1983 does not apply to private citizens unless they acted under color of state law in conspiracy with a person who did.

Sheppard v. The E. W. Scripps Company, Louis B. Seltzer, Samuel R. Gerber · filed 1970-01-21

"At the outset, this court determines that the complaint must fail in its entirety if, for any reason, it is insufficient to state a claim as to Gerber, for, since defendants Scripps and Seltzer are chargeable only as private citizens and cannot be said to act ‘under color of any State Law,’ it is clear from nearly a hundred years of case law that the Civil Rights Act, affording protection against deprivation of civil rights by state action, is not applicable to them, absent a conspiracy with one so acting." ... We are in accord with this expression.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivation under color of state law of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose · filed 1970-03-23

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for the deprivation, under color of state law, of any right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires state action or action under color of state law, and the court found no such state involvement in the private college officials’ challenged actions.

McLeod v. College of Artesia · filed 1970-05-01

Strongly urged by the plaintiffs has been 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires state action or action under color of state law. To support their thesis that this section confers upon the court subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs have offered into evidence myriad facts relating to the origin, tax-exempt status, public purpose, public use cf. and present structure of the college. A review of these facts does not, as is shown below, establish the connections necessary to find that the actions of the defendant college officials are under color of state law and hence within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the alleged wrongdoing officer to have acted under color of state law for a cause of action to be stated.

Blaze v. Moon · filed 1970-06-26

Here, plaintiff contends that liability is created by § 1983. However, no cause of action is stated under that statute unless it is alleged that the wrongdoing officer is acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches private individuals who act under color of state law, including when explicit state authorization makes their conduct possible.

Klim v. Jones · filed 1970-07-17

The Reitman case is a clear authority on which to find the defendants herein amenable to jurisdiction under Section 1983. Not only does California Civil Code § 1861 outline the conditions applicable to the lien in question here, but it is only by virtue of Section 1861 that defendant Jones had the power to impose a lien on the plaintiff’s belongings, and it is only by virtue of Section 1861 that defendant Jones could impose such lien without subjecting himself to the forms of civil liability excluded by Section 1861. This is not just action against a backdrop of an amorphous state policy, but is instead action encouraged, indeed only made possible, by explicit state authorization.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law; conduct by federal officials or state officials acting under federal law does not qualify.

Stinson v. Finch · filed 1970-08-03

Under their view of the matter Defendant Finch, a federal employee, is acting under color of state law because he is acting in concert with state officials who are acting under color of state law (i. e., state policies formulated to give effect to the federal statute), but this circuitous reasoning does not bring either Finch or Burson within the provisions of § 1983 for purposes of challenging the constitutionality of the Social Security Amendments.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of constitutional rights.

Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Hackler · filed 1970-09-29

The Court is of the opinion that the action of the defendant principal is “state action” under these facts and that the plaintiff has stated a good cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since Pinkerton Academy is directly accepting state money as tuition payments in return for educating all of the young men and women from the Town of Derry who wish to attend it as a secondary school, since the State Board of Education has continuing authority to see to it that its facilities and equipment are such that it will be approved as a comprehensive high school, and since it is, by state statute (N.H. R.S.A. 194:22), a high school maintained by the school district of Derry, its students have the same constitutional rights as do the students of any public high school. For constitutional purposes, therefore, the faculty and trustees of Pinkerton Academy, the school board of the school district of Derry, and the State Board of Education are together maintaining and operating the Academy as a public high school in the school district of Derry. The action of the principal in prohibiting the plaintiff from registering as a student in his senior year because of his refusal to abide by the dress code is consequently action by the State of New Hampshire under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private individuals acting under a state statute unless they were state officials or jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action.

Weise v. Reisner · filed 1970-10-09

It is my opinion that liability cannot be imposed for acts done “under color of” state law absent a showing that the defendants were state officials or were “jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action.”

Section 1983 does not provide relief for actions by a private hospital and its personnel that were not taken under color of state law.

Shulman v. Washington Hospital Center · filed 1970-10-09

Last, for the same reasons discussed above in relation to the due process claim, none of the actions of the hospital or the individual defendants were taken “under color of law” in such a way as to violate plaintiff’s civil rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a state-authorized distress sale carried out by public officials as conduct under color of law.

Santiago v. McElroy · filed 1970-10-26

Further, since public officials perform sales and have power to do so because they are officials, Mortgage B. & L. Assn. v. Van Sciver, 304 Pa. 408, 416, 155 A. 920 (1931), we find that distress sales are performed “under color of law” as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to a claim against a privately retained attorney who was not acting under color of state law.

Dyer v. Rosenberg · filed 1970-11-25

Dyer rests jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which confers jurisdiction of actions for violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That section does not apply here. Rosenberg was not acting “under color of” state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a person acting under color of state law; conduct performed under federal law does not support a § 1983 action.

Phillips v. Rockefeller · filed 1970-12-02

Thus, in making this certification the defendants will not be acting pursuant to state law but in response to duties imposed by federal statute. Hence, even if it be granted that certification of Mr. Buckley will deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, such deprivation will be accomplished in obedience to federal, not state law. This does not suffice to maintain an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only for constitutional deprivations caused by persons acting under color of state law, not for all disputes between private citizens.

Huggins v. White · filed 1970-12-21

Turning to the claims asserted against the security guards, federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not extend to all controversies between individual citizens, Pritt v. Johnson, 264 F.Supp. 167 (M.D.Pa.1967) (§ 1983 action not maintainable against attorney, witness, and judge), but only to deprivations of constitutional rights arising from the actions of persons acting under color of state law, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941).

Section 1983 covers actions by state officials taken in the purported exercise of authority conferred by the state, because those actions are under color of state law.

Cruz v. Beto · filed 1970-12-23

Action taken by state officials in the purported exercise of authority conferred by the state is action under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Tyler v. Parks · filed 1971-09-10

It is the opinion of the Court that defendants’ perjury, if any, at plaintiff’s civil trial does not constitute action by defendants under color of state law which deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim to remain viable after equitable relief becomes moot, and a public institution’s alleged state funding and control can sufficiently plead action under color of state law without identifying a specific statute compelling the challenged conduct.

McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center · filed 1971-12-23

The cases make clear that the damage claim of Mrs. McCabe under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not mooted merely because she no longer needs equitable relief. ... The complaint thus sufficiently alleges that defendants are vested with and use power “possessed by virtue of state law,” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941), and that theirs was “conduct supported by state action,” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 163, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Therefore, the requirement of section 1983 that the invasion of plaintiff’s constitutional rights be “under color of” state law would appear to be met10 or at least to be sufficiently alleged to withstand a motion to dismiss. ... Where a public institution or government employees are involved, no such statute is necessary.

Section 1983 reaches official misconduct committed while a state official is acting as a state representative and wearing the state's badge of authority, even when the misconduct violates state law or abuses official power.

Lucarell v. McNair · filed 1972-01-07

The Supreme Court has made clear that official misconduct which amounts to a deprivation of civil rights may be found to be “under color of state law” within the meaning of Section 1983 even though the misconduct violates state law or constitutes an abuse of authority. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). ... There is no doubt, at this late date, that Section 1983 applies to conduct, such as that here ascribed to McNair, occurring while the state official is representing the state and “wearing its badge of authority.”

Section 1983 reaches a private hospital treated as a state actor and doctors acting as its agents or joint participants with a state agent.

Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital of Joliet, Illinois · filed 1972-01-17

As Illinois has a similar system of pervasive regulation of hospitals and health-care facilities as had North Carolina in Simkins, compare, N.C.Gen. Stat. § 131-126.1 et seq. (1958) with Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 111½, Sec. 143 et seq. and Ch. 127, Sec. 55.26 (1969), we conclude that any action taken by the defendant hospital that deprives a person of constitutionally protected civil rights must be deemed as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Because the “state action” required under the Fourteenth Amendment has consistently been equated with being “under color of law” under Section 1983, United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966), we further conclude that the defendant hospital is liable under the Civil Rights Act for any such constitutionally prohibited actions. ... Under this theory, therefore, the doctors act under color of law so far as Section 1983 is concerned whenever they act under the express direction and as agents of the hospital.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law for the civil-rights claim to proceed.

Thomas v. Harry R. Howard, Esquire · filed 1972-02-09

Furthermore, on the facts of this case, defendant, although acting voluntarily by assignment from a pool of attorneys of the Essex County Legal Aid-Criminal Division, was performing his duties solely for appellant, to whom he owed the absolute duty of loyalty, as if he were a privately retained attorney. ... Therefore, the affidavits demonstrate that defendant was not acting “under color of state law, custom or usage” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, see Pugliano ... v. Staziak, 231 F.Supp. 347 (W.D.Pa. 1964), aff’d per curiam, 345 F.2d 797 (3rd Cir. 1965), and no triable issue of fact upon which relief may be granted remained in the case.

Section 1983 provides a judicial remedy for deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right by a person acting under color of state law, which requires significant state involvement; private repossession authorized and encouraged by state law can satisfy that requirement.

Adams v. Egley · filed 1972-02-11

The Civil Rights sections also asserted by plaintiffs provide for a judicial remedy where one is deprived of any constitutional or statutory right by any person acting “under color of state law.” It is fundamental, therefore, that for jurisdiction to lie on either ground, some significant state involvement in the alleged wrongful acts must be shown; the conduct of private individuals, however wrongful or discriminatory, does not come within the purview of those sections if the state has in no way authorized, sanctioned, or encouraged it. ... These Commercial Code sections set forth a state policy, and the security agreements upon which the instant actions rest, whose terms are authorized by the statute and which incorporate its provisions, are merely an embodiment of that policy. It is therefore apparent that the acts of repossession were made “under color of state law” as required by the Civil Rights statutes, and that the passage of Sections 9503 and 9504, which authorize such acts are sufficient state action to raise a federal question.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of a constitutional or statutory right; a private contract-based repossession is not state action merely because it complies with state law.

Oller v. Bank of America · filed 1972-02-29

In order to establish jurisdiction, therefor, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the action in question was “under color of State law” and also that such action deprives the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. ... The requirement of “State action” can rarely be satisfied when the action is taken by one not a State official. ... What we have here is a private act taken by a private organization to protect its security interest in personal property that is subject to a conditional sales contract. ... To say, as plaintiff seems to contend, that all human behavior which conforms to statutory requirements is “State action” or is “under color of State law” would far exceed not only what the framers of the Civil Rights Act ever intended but common sense as well. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction should be and hereby is granted.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of a constitutional right, and a zoning-created private monopoly plus retaliatory eviction may satisfy those requirements.

Lavoie v. Bigwood · filed 1972-03-03

Preliminarily, a cause of action under § 1983 is stated only if the plaintiff alleges both that a defendant’s action is “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” and that the action subjects the plaintiff “to the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution . . . .” ... Accordingly, we find that appellant has adequately alleged “state action” in asserting a town purpose to restrict sites for mobile homes and a concomitant private monopoly over the allocation of those sites. ... The “color of . statute” is hardly so faint here; we think that an ejectment action instituted to punish the exercise of a tenant’s rights of speech and association by a mobile home park owner whose monopoly has been created by zoning is an “invalid application” of the New Hampshire landlord and tenant statute.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to obtain injunctive relief against officials acting under color of state law who deprive him of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Morales v. Schmidt · filed 1972-04-06

I find that in denying the plaintiff the opportunity to correspond with his sister-in-law by mail, the defendant and his agents are acting under color of state law, and that they are depriving him, and threaten to continue to deprive him of a right secured to him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a basis for redressing actions taken under color of state law, not federal law.

Jones v. Perrigan · filed 1972-04-26

Jones’ sole jurisdictional allegation invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This plainly is an incorrect basis for jurisdiction, since § 1983 is limited by its terms to the redress of actions under color of state law. We hold that the court has no jurisdiction of this case under § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches conduct by a private utility when the particular activity is taken under color of state law or state action; pervasive regulation alone does not make every corporate action state action.

Palmer v. Columbia Gas Company of Ohio · filed 1972-05-02

This Court does not hold that where a gas company’s activities are pervasively regulated, any action taken by the gas company constitutes state action. Rather, this case stands for the proposition that only the particular activity which comes under the umbrella of a state statute or state authorized regulation constitutes state action, ... This Court concludes that it has jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act to grant injunctive relief as prayed for in the complaint.

Section 1983 does not reach a privately retained attorney's conduct when the attorney is acting as a private person rather than under color of state law.

Steward v. Meeker · filed 1972-05-02

Consequently, Mr. Meeker was acting as a private person in his representation of Mr. Steward, and was not acting under color of law within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 applies when the alleged deprivation is carried out under color of state law, and the plaintiff's status as a federally authorized employee does not determine whether the defendants acted under color of state law.

Lasher v. Shafer · filed 1972-05-11

His status, however, is not relevant for purposes of the applicability of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Appellant is protected by the Civil Rights Act because he is a person within the jurisdiction of the United States. Interference with his status as a “federal” employee, if he be such, will provide a measure of his injury. But that status does not inform us whether those injuring him acted under color of state or federal law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights through state action and conduct under color of state law; allegations against private parties that do not establish those elements fail to state a claim.

El Mundo, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild, Local 225 · filed 1972-06-20

The above stated allegations do not satisfy the “state action” requirement, indispensable element in Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983’s action predicated upon alleged deprivations of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. There is no allegation that, in this lawsuit against a private party, the defendant has reached any understanding with any state official to deprive the plaintiffs of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Adickes v. Kress, supra, 398 U.S. at page 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598. Neither is the requirement satisfied when the above stated assertions are read in conjunction with the affidavits attached to the complaint.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of civil rights under color of state law, and claims for damages against judicial officers and prosecutors are barred by their immunity for official acts.

Turack v. Guido · filed 1972-06-23

The judicial officers are immune from damage suits growing out of their official duties. ... The prosecutors are similarly immune. ... The claims against appellant’s own attorney are essentially malpractice contentions and do not allege a deprivation of civil rights under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits federal courts to redress deprivations of federal rights under color of state law through injunctive relief even when state judicial defendants are immune from damages.

Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond · filed 1969-02-17

Against this is the equally well settled principle that a judge exercising his judicial function is not liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We fail to perceive what interest would be served by holding federal courts to be powerless to enjoin state officers from acting under a statute that allegedly deprives citizens of rights protected by the Civil Rights Act or promulgating regulations that are alleged to have that result simply because some of them are robed and others have been appointed by those who are. ... To hold otherwise would be to leave without a remedy á significant class of the deprivations of federal rights under color of state law that Congress intended the federal courts to redress under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state agencies, and public officials acting in good faith within discretionary duties are immune from damages for conduct that was not clearly unconstitutional when undertaken.

Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia · filed 1970-02-09

Plaintiffs seek damages under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). Congress did not intend to bring municipal corporations or states within the ambit of liability created by Section 1983. ... Therefore, the defendant bodies corporate, which are agencies of state government, are not amenable to damages under Section 1983. ... Nevertheless, it should be available to public officials who act in unquestioned good faith and in perfect accord with long standing legal principle only to find their discretionary conduct declared illegitimate under a later constitutional interpretation. ... We hold that plaintiffs are not entitled to damages under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not create an express authorization for injunctive relief within the meaning of § 2283.

Pruitt v. Joseph H. Campbell, Commonwealth Attorney for the City of Norfolk · filed 1970-07-16

We therefore adhere to our decision in Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964) that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create an express authorization for injunctive relief within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Section 1983 requires a civil-rights complaint to allege specific underlying facts rather than only conclusory assertions of constitutional violations.

Reese v. Nixon · filed 1972-08-29

It is well settled that conclusionary allegations, unsupported by any underlying factual details, are insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege specific conduct by state officials violating a constitutional right; conclusory allegations unsupported by facts do not state a claim.

Buszka v. Johnson · filed 1972-12-06

In order to state a cognizable claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983, the complainant must por...tray specific conduct by state officials which violates some constitutional right. ... Although the courts have traditionally construed civil rights complaints written by those unlearned in the law as liberally as possible, the complaint in the instant case lacks the substance which is necessary for judicial relief in that it is wholly conclusory. ... where a plaintiff brings a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his conclusory allegations, without further support in the facts alleged, would not be enough to sustain a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.

A § 1983 complaint must allege specific supporting facts, not merely conclusions, to state a claim for relief.

Scott v. Larson · filed 1973-01-23

Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a plaintiff to set forth a short and plain statement of the claim which entitles him to relief. ... The instant complaint contains only the bald conclusions that the defendant and others denied the plaintiff his rights. ... Nowhere in the complaint is there a statement of any facts which might support these conclusions. ... Therefore, it is ordered that the complaint and this action be and hereby are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires more than broad and conelusory statements unsupported by factual allegations to support a cause of action.

Ellingburg v. Johnny King and Kenneth Taylor · filed 1974-01-22

Broad and conelusory statements unsupported by factual allegations are not sufficient to support a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a person denied ballot access to sue for civil-rights violations, but conclusory allegations are insufficient; the complaint must allege particularized intentional and purposeful overt conduct.

Lizak v. Kusper · filed 1974-01-29

Likewise, denial of Plaintiff’s petition to be listed as a committeeman candidate in the primary election constitutes sufficient aggrievement to grant Plaintiff standing to sue under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... To sustain a complaint such as this, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to allege, with particularity, intentional and purposeful overt actions committed by the defendant in the course of the alleged violation. ... In short, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of improper conduct do not state a claim of invidious discrimination necessary to support relief under the Civil Rights .Act.

A § 1983 plaintiff must plead and prove conduct that intentionally, or perhaps negligently, violated constitutional rights, but need not plead facts negating the defendant’s immunity from damages; immunity is a defense for the defendant to assert and prove.

Carey v. White · filed 1974-05-08

The plaintiff in a Section 1983 case must, of course, allege and prove that the defendant intentionally, or perhaps negligently, engaged in conduct which in fact constituted a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir. 1972). The complaint in this action, fairly read, meets the pleading requirement in this respect. It was not necessary for the plaintiff to go further and plead facts showing that the defendants are not entitled to immunity from money damages.

Section 1983 requires more than broad and conclusory allegations to support a cause of action.

Jones v. Ault · filed 1974-11-19

Broad and conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a cause of action under § 1983.

A complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must allege detailed facts showing an intentional purpose or deprivation of constitutional rights.

Moore v. Kibbee · filed 1974-11-19

It is also true that in a complaint grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must set forth in detail facts showing some intentional purpose or deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 claims must be dismissed when they are pleaded only as a vague and conclusory allegation.

United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman · filed 1975-10-06

Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against petitioner New York State Housing Finance Agency. We agree with the District Court that this count must also be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation under color of state law of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws, and allegations that conceivably satisfy those requirements may avoid dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Strain v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1975-09-30

Both § 1343(3) and § 1983 require a deprivation, under color of state law, of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The complaint has made allegations which conceivably could tend to meet the requirements of a § 1983. action and the court finds that these allegations are not so implausable and completely without merit as to justify dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

A § 1983 complaint need not identify the precise constitutional provision allegedly violated; it is enough that the court can determine the asserted right from the Constitution or federal law.

Gregg v. Tennessee · filed 1976-09-16

It is unnecessary that a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was enacted to enforce the Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, set out the particular portion of the Constitution or law of which the plaintiff claims he was deprived; all that is necessary is that the Court ascertain from the confines of the Constitution or law that such right exists.

Section 1983 claims require supporting factual allegations; broad, conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim.

Stene v. Beresford School District No. 61-2 of Union County · filed 1977-02-14

It is well settled in the Eighth Circuit that the allegation of broad, conclusory statements without supporting facts is insufficient to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires specific factual allegations connecting particular defendants to the alleged constitutional deprivation; broad conclusory assertions are insufficient.

Gardner v. Benton · filed 1977-08-29

Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations that they have been deprived of their assigned jobs, statutory work pay, trusty consideration, use of prison gym, right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, right to be secure in their person, right to equal protection of the laws, right to participate in an adequate medical program and right to be informed of all written rules and procedures of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary are merely conclusory. Broad conclusory assertions unsupported by specific factual allegations which implicate particular defendants are not sufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 requires specific factual allegations rather than conclusory claims of arbitrary and capricious conduct, and parole officials are immune from damages suits under the statute.

Johnson v. Selma Wells · filed 1978-01-30

But the mere statement in a complaint that the Parole Board has taken arbitrary and capricious action is not sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The applicant must set forth specific facts that would, if proved, warrant the relief he seeks. ... It is also to be noted that the parole officials are immune from suit for damages under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is invoked by a complaint alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law and satisfying the statute’s pleading requirements.

Armstrong v. Candon · filed 1978-04-19

It is clear that the complaint alleges a deprivation, under color of state law, of constitutional rights. In so doing, the pleading requirements for invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have been met.

Section 1983 requires a civil-rights complaint to allege specific facts indicating a deprivation of civil rights rather than merely state legal conclusions.

Citywide Education Action Project v. Community Services Administration · filed 1980-09-19

Civil rights complaints are plainly insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of civil rights, rather than stating legal conclusions.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to assert due process and equal protection claims based on state interference with a fundamental right to employment.

Duranceau v. City of Tacoma · filed 1980-12-08

Duranceau's complaint does, however, state prima facie due process and equal protection claims under section 1983 regarding his fundamental right to employment.

Section 1983 claims must be pleaded with specificity, including the rights-violating conduct, when and where it occurred, the responsible persons, and each defendant's direct involvement or active knowledge and acquiescence.

Shoemaker v. Allender · filed 1981-08-26

Clearly, plaintiff has a duty to plead violations of his civil rights with a greater degree of precision than federal courts otherwise require. ... Plaintiff must identify the conduct violating plaintiffs’ rights, the time and place of these actions, and the people responsible therefor. ... Moreover, plaintiff must specify “direct personal involvement by the defendant in conduct depriving [him] of his rights as well as active knowledge or acquiescence”.

Section 1983 claims borrow the most appropriate state statute of limitations, and a complaint need not expressly cite § 1983 to state a constitutional claim under it.

Thorn v. New York City Department of Social Services · filed 1981-10-06

Because section 1983 contains no statute of limitations, a federal court must apply the most appropriate statute of limitations “of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such ... cause is held.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); ... Consequently, because abduction does not “fall within the precise terms” of section 5524(1), ... plaintiff’s section 1983 claims are not subject to the two-year limit imposed by that subsection. ... Under the six-year statute the federal claims were timely filed. Defendants’ motion to dismiss those claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is denied. ... Plaintiff Bethea has stated a claim under § 1983. ... The statute itself need not be cited in the complaint, “for particular legal theories of counsel yield to the court’s duty to grant the relief to which the prevailing party is entitled, whether demanded or not.”

A § 1983 complaint must allege constitutional torts with particularity rather than only general and conclusory allegations.

Allen v. Coughlin · filed 1981-12-15

The allegations of the complaint, from my reading are in my judgment ones that are only general and conclusory, and cannot be upheld under settled law as stating viable and valid claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim must allege minimal facts showing who did what to whom and why, rather than rely on conclusory or subjective characterizations.

Dewey v. The University of New Hampshire · filed 1982-11-26

We recognize the great utility of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an instrument of justice in the hands of the weak against the mighty, but we also are aware of the impact of its misuse. Therefore, although we must ask whether the “claim” put forward in the complaint is capable of being supported by any conceivable set of facts, we insist that the claim at least set forth minimal facts, not subjective characterizations, as to who did what to whom and why.

A prisoner’s § 1983 retaliation claim supported by specific, detailed facts ordinarily warrants full discovery, while a wholly conclusory retaliation claim may be dismissed on the pleadings.

Flaherty v. Coughlin, III · filed 1983-07-21

For example, a retaliation claim supported by specific and detailed factual allegations which amount to a persuasive case ought usually be pursued with full discovery. However, a complaint which alleges retaliation in wholly conclusory terms may safely be dismissed on the pleadings alone.

Conclusory assertions that civil or constitutional rights were violated, without supporting factual allegations, do not state a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Lynch v. JOHNSTON · filed 1983-07-27

Much of Plaintiff’s brief is devoted to a discussion of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983. W*e must note again the complete absence of any factual allegations which would form the basis of cognizable rights under that statute.

A § 1983 complaint need not identify the particular constitutional or statutory provision securing the asserted right if the court can ascertain that right from federal law.

Keniston v. Richard L. Roberts, Bendt A. Pedersen, Vince Hecox, the County of San Bernardino, and Southern Cal · filed 1983-10-05

It is not necessary that a complaint drawn under section 1983 set out the particular portion of the Constitution or law securing the right of which plaintiff has been deprived, so long as the court can ascertain from the confines of the Constitution or law that such rights exist.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and deprivation of a federal right.

Burgess v. City of Houston · filed 1983-10-28

In order to state a claim under § 1983, the complainant must allege facts showing that the conduct complained of was committed by one acting under color of state law and that this conduct deprived the complainant of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A § 1983 complaint against a municipality must give factual support for the alleged policy or custom; conclusory policy allegations are insufficient.

Borenstein v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1984-10-11

Such complaints must contain some minimal factual presentation which supports the broad conclusions asserted. ... Not a single “fact” is presented in any of these paragraphs which would tend to establish the existence of any of these alleged policies. Therefore, I will dismiss the § 1983 claim against the City of Philadelphia.

A pleading fails to state a Section 1983 claim when it neither invokes the statute nor identifies a protected right of which the plaintiff was deprived.

City of Aurora v. Commerce Group Corp. · filed 1984-12-06

Finally, CGC’s counterclaim makes no reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and fails to allege deprivation of any specified protected right. Thus, it fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A complaint need not cite Section 1983 expressly when its allegations establish a deprivation under color of state law of rights secured by federal law.

United States v. State of Washington · filed 1985-01-01

Specific citation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the complaint or pre-trial order is not necessary in order to bring the action under the Civil Rights Acts.

A § 1983 complaint must make specific factual assertions about the claimed civil-rights deprivation rather than rely on conclusory allegations.

Milstein v. City of New York · filed 1985-01-31

The law in this circuit is that a complaint alleging a § 1983 civil rights violation must make specific factual assertions regarding the civil rights deprivation being claimed.

A wholly conclusory complaint does not state a valid claim for relief under § 1983.

Ronald George Taylor, Jr. v. Perry Johnson, Theodore Koehler, Al Marshall, Deputy Hawley and Walt Aho · filed 1985-03-11

The complaint is wholly conclusionary and, as such, cannot serve to state a valid claim for relief.

A § 1983 complaint must identify with factual specificity each named defendant’s conduct that caused the constitutional violation.

District Council 47 v. Bradley · filed 1985-08-15

In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth, with sufficient factual specificity, the conduct of each individually named defendant alleged to have resulted in a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A § 1983 complaint must allege with specificity the people and events involved in the claimed civil-rights deprivation.

Ulysses Green v. Perry Johnson, Bill Abshire, B. v. Ritenour, Bruce R. Wright, S. W. Lee, C. W. Lee, Dr. Colberto, Nurse · filed 1985-10-03

In 84-1703 the face of the complaint supports the finding that plaintiff has failed to allege with any degree of specificity the persons or events involved in his claimed civil rights deprivations.

Conclusory allegations about overcrowding and cruel and unusual punishment do not state a § 1983 claim.

Harley v. Paul Barry and Dale E. Foltz · filed 1985-10-31

Appellant's conclusory allegations concerning overcrowding and cruel and unusual punishment are insufficient to set forth a claim under Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 civil-rights complaint must allege specific facts rather than subjective and conclusory assertions about a defendant’s acts or motives.

Christensen v. Lawrence F. Quigley Memorial Hospital · filed 1985-11-01

A plaintiff’s subjective and conclusory allegations regarding a defendant’s acts and motives do not alone make out a civil rights claim.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging selective enforcement must plead each defendant’s participation and action under color of state law, or facts showing a conspiracy with state actors.

Franklin v. State of Oregon · filed 1996-03-26

We conclude, therefore, that Franklin should be allowed to replead his equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. He should first be informed that, to state a claim for selective prosecution or enforcement, he must allege specific facts that: (1) defendants referred Blacks to federal court for prosecution and more severe sentences when persons of other races engaged in the same conduct were treated more leniently; or that Blacks were otherwise investigated or arrested when others engaged in the same conduct were not; (2) the instances must be sufficiently numerous to permit an inference of discriminatory intent, or he must allege other facts permitting an inference of discriminatory intent; (3) he must allege the connection and participation of each named defendant in the allegedly discriminatory activity; and (4) he must allege that the defendants acted under color of state law or allege facts showing that particular defendants conspired with those acting under state law.

A complaint stating facts that support a § 1983 claim need not name § 1983 to survive dismissal.

Milazzo v. O'CONNELL · filed 1996-04-26

Milazzo has alleged facts which would meet the pleading requirements of § 1983, at least insofar as she has stated valid constitutional violations, as discussed below. Therefore, her complaint may not be dismissed for failure to mention § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint may be dismissed when, despite an opportunity to amend, it alleges official participation in a rights violation only vaguely and conclusorily instead of identifying specific acts.

Karriem Shabazz, AKA Willie Shabazz v. L. Demasi Joe Brown, Officer Shad Canington, Officer · filed 1996-04-26

The district court had previously told Shabazz that any second amended complaint would have to allege "with specificity the acts which he claims resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights." See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.1982) (district courts must notify pro se litigants of deficiencies in initial complaints to "ensure that the pro se litigant can use the opportunity to amend effectively"). Shabazz failed to comply with this requirement. The district court correctly dismissed the vague and conclusory claims.

Section 1983 requires specific factual allegations; merely conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim.

Herbert W.G. Clanton v. The People of the City of East Lansing East Lansing Police Department · filed 1996-05-21

It is well established that a pleading is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983 if the allegations are merely conclusory.

Section 1983 claims based on a judge’s alleged conspiracy require more than conclusory allegations of bias.

Wright v. State of Texas · filed 1996-05-31

The allegations that the state court judge conspired with the defendants solely because she favors legalized abortion are conclusional and are insufficient to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against municipalities are subject to the ordinary pleading standard of Rule 8(a), without a heightened pleading requirement.

Pisello v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 1996-07-10

At the outset the Court notes that section 1983 claims brought against a municipality are not subject to a higher pleading standard than required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).

Section 1983 requires a pro se plaintiff to allege sufficient facts, rather than conclusions, showing a violation of a constitutional right.

Germany v. Colorado DOC · filed 1996-08-29

For a pro se litigant to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts (not conclusions) to show a right guaranteed to the plaintiff under the United States Constitution was violated.

Section 1983 allows a constitutional rights claim against a person acting under color of law to proceed without citing the statute when the complaint satisfies Rule 8.

Jennings v. Patton · filed 2010-02-23

First, the fact that plaintiff failed to cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the statutory basis of his cause of action does not warrant dismissal of his claim. Plaintiff has alleged that Patton, acting under color of law, violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which in the court’s view is sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must identify each defendant by name or Doe designation; naming a group of officers is insufficient.

Brand v. Robinson · filed 2019-12-11

To state a Section 1983 claim against an individual or entity, Plaintiff must specifically identify them, by name or Doe designation.

Section 1983 complaints require notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to amend before dismissal.

Orozco v. Edmund Brown, Jr. · filed 2015-12-02

We vacate the dismissal order and remand for the district court to provide Orozco with notice of the deficiencies in his § 1983 complaint and an opportunity to file a new § 1983 complaint with the benefit of that notice.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to a heightened pleading standard.

Dubay v. Wells · filed 2007-11-06

We do not apply a heightened pleading standard for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner's failure-to-protect and medical-treatment claims to be treated as a civil rights complaint even when filed as a habeas petition.

Lawrence v. James N. Rollins, Warden, Division of Correction State of Maryland · filed 1986-09-30

Lawrence appeals the district court's entry of summary judgment on his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim for failure to protect and failure to provide specific medical treatment. Lawrence filed the claim as a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Mislabeling pleadings will not of itself result in dismissal. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.) cert denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). The district court properly considered Lawrence's claim as a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A constitutional claim under Section 1983 survives dismissal if the plaintiff could prove a set of facts supporting relief.

Dunn v. White · filed 1989-08-01

At the same time, however, "[a] constitutional claim under Sec. 1983 should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief."