42 U.S.C. § 1983

A county jail building cannot be held liable under § 1983 because it is neither a person nor a policymaking body.

Steels v. Watts · filed 2020-11-04

Mr. Steels also sues the St. Joseph County Jail, but this is a building, not a person or a policymaking body that can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Florida sheriff’s office is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Dimaio v. Jacksonville Sheriffs Office · filed 2020-11-05

In Florida, a sheriff’s office is not a legal entity subject to suit in a civil rights action brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a prison medical department as a person subject to liability.

GERHOLT v. WETZEL · filed 2020-11-05

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has made clear that a prison medical department is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 liability. ... Accordingly, Gerholt’s claim against SCI-Medical Department is dismissed with prejudice.

A local jail or office building is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Jones v. Roanoke City Sheriff Office · filed 2020-11-06

A local jail or office building, however, cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a local jail to be sued because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Thompson v. Southwest Virginia Regional Jail/Abingdon Regional Jail Facility · filed 2020-11-06

A local jail, however, cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983.

A state agency is not a person under Section 1983 and cannot be sued under it.

Burns v. Miranda · filed 2020-11-06

Therefore, the Alaska Department of Corrections is not a proper defendant and is terminated from this suit.

Section 1983 does not treat state prisons as persons that can be sued.

(PC) De La Cruz v. Superior Court of California · filed 2020-11-06

Prisons are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a police department that lacks the legal capacity to be sued separately from its city.

Holland v. Milone · filed 2020-11-09

A police department cannot be sued under §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a California superior court because it is not a “person” under the statute.

(PC) Kuykendall v. Superior Court of CA · filed 2020-11-10

The Superior Court of California is not a “person” and therefore cannot be sued.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a local jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

Phillips v. Roanoke City Jail · filed 2020-11-12

A local jail or office building, however, cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Adkins v. Watson · filed 2020-11-13

However, the Jail is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983; it is not even a legal entity.

A correctional institution is not a person or separate legal entity that can be sued under §1983.

Gould v. Leiter · filed 2020-11-16

The Wisconsin Resource Center is not a person, nor is it a separate legal entity that can be sued under §1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to sue a jail or correctional center because a building is not a person capable of being sued.

Sturgeon v. Wertz · filed 2020-11-16

Second, Plaintiff cannot sue a jail or a correctional center because they are buildings and not a person capable of being sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state correctional center because it is not a person under the statute.

Brown-Turner v. Pinckneyville Correctional Center · filed 2020-11-16

Based on this authority, Pinckneyville is not a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act and shall be dismissed from this action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a prison department that is neither a person nor a policy-making body.

Spann v. Indiana State of · filed 2020-11-16

“MCF Administration” appears to a be a department within the prison, not a person or even a policy-making body that can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a correctional facility’s medical department because it is not a person under the statute.

Palompelli v. Smith · filed 2020-11-16

A correctional facility’s medical department is not considered a “person” for the purpose of §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state department of correction because it is not a person subject to suit.

Ramsey v. Knox County Sheriff's Office Jails and Facilities · filed 2020-11-16

First, the TDOC is not a person subject to suit under § 1983, but instead an “arm” of the State of Tennessee.

Section 1983 permits suit against a person acting under color of state law; a prison health services unit within a state corrections department is not a suable person.

Claudio v. Ibirogba · filed 2020-11-17

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who, acting under color of law, violates his constitutional rights. The Wisconsin Department of Corrections is not a person, nor is it a separate legal entity that can be sued under §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state, a state agency, or a state official acting in an official capacity.

Cornel v. State of Hawaii · filed 2020-11-17

Neither the State of Hawaii, the HPA, nor Kauahi in his official capacity are amenable to suit for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state, its agencies, or state employees sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Crozier v. Westside Community Schools District · filed 2020-11-17

Generally, a state, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its employees in their official capacities are not “persons” “as that term is used in § 1983, and [are] not suable under the statute, regardless of the forum where the suit is maintained.” Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 200-01 (1991); see also McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008) (states, arms of the state, and state officials acting in their official capacities are not subject to suit under § 1983).

A county detention center is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Dutton v. Sullivan County Detention Center · filed 2020-11-17

First, the Court finds that the Sullivan County Detention Center is not a “person” subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not allow a county jail to be sued because it is a building, not a person or a policy-making body.

Zupko v. LaPorte County Jail · filed 2020-11-19

Finally, Mr. Zupko names the LaPorte County Jail as a defendant, but this is a building, not a person or a policy-making body that can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a prison building because it is neither a person nor a policy-making body.

Conway v. Indiana State Prison · filed 2020-11-20

As for the other defendants, he names the Indiana State Prison, but this is a building, not a person or a policy-making body that can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A jail medical department is not a person that can be sued under § 1983.

Vanover v. Haysi Southwest Virginia Regional Jail · filed 2020-11-23

Thus, the only defendant Vanover has identified, the medical department, cannot be sued under § 1983.

A state and its department of corrections, as an arm of the state, are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2020-11-23

Because the VDOC is properly considered an arm of the Commonwealth, it cannot be sued under § 1983 either.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Orange County Jail because the jail is not a person under the statute.

Batista v. Orange County Deparmtent of Mental Health · filed 2020-11-23

The Orange County Jail is not a “person” for the purpose of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state prison’s medical department because the department is not a person.

ABNEY v. WETZEL · filed 2020-11-23

A state prison’s medical department may not be sued under § 1983 because it is not a person.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state department of corrections because it is not a person under the statute.

Boulb v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-11-23

Moreover, the Illinois Department of Corrections is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

States, state agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons who may be sued under § 1983.

MERRILL v. STATE OF MAINE · filed 2020-11-25

As with Merrill’s § 1983 claims in Count One, the MSP, the MCCU, and Williams and Lang in their official capacities are entitled to dismissal of Counts Two and Three against them. They are not “persons” who may be sued pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for money damages against a state department because it is not a person under the statute.

Oben 753474 v. Corizon · filed 2020-11-30

In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county sheriff’s department because the department is not a person subject to suit.

Harper v. Giese · filed 2020-12-01

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who violates his constitutional rights under color of state law. A sheriff’s department is not a “person.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a person who violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; a jail cannot be sued because it is not a person.

Legg v. Putman Co. Sheriff Office · filed 2020-12-01

The Jail cannot be sued, because it is not a person; rather, under § 1983, a person or persons must be identified as having violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons, so a police dog cannot be sued under it.

Mota v. White · filed 2020-12-01

Because liability under Section 1983 is limited to “person[s]” who violate constitutional rights under color of state law, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a dog is not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state court because a state court is not a person under the statute.

McBride v. 23rd District Circuit Court, Charlotte TN · filed 2020-12-01

Plaintiff has named as a Defendant only a state court, which is not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Municipal police departments are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Saved Magazine v. City of Spokane · filed 2020-12-03

The Ninth Circuit has indicated, and this District has held, that police departments and other municipal departments are not “persons” for purposes of section 1983 liability. ... Therefore, the SPD is not an appropriate Defendant for purposes of Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a person; a state department of correction is not a person under the statute.

Butler v. Ramirez · filed 2020-12-03

Moreover, only a “person” may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state is not considered a “person” under that statute. ... Therefore, Plaintiff may not proceed against the Idaho Department of Correction on a policy-based claim or any other type of claim, and his motion to amend will be denied.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a correctional facility because the facility is not a person under the statute.

Clark v. Montgomery County Police Department · filed 2020-12-04

Conduct amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be conduct undertaken by a person, and MCCF is not a person within the meaning of the statute.

A prison medical department is not a person that can be sued under § 1983.

Clark v. Jones · filed 2020-12-04

But the Medical Department is not a “person” as that term is used in § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail department because it is not a suable person.

Parrish v. Louisville Metro Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-07

However, LMDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such as jails, are not suable under § 1983.

Prisons generally are not persons that can be sued under Section 1983.

Cromartie v. Massachusetts Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-07

Prisons and departments thereof generally are not deemed to be “persons” for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to recover monetary damages from a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Dotson v. Faulkner · filed 2020-12-08

A state is not a “person” from whom a plaintiff can recover monetary damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state correctional center because it is not a person under the statute.

McKinnon v. Big Muddy River Correctional Center · filed 2020-12-08

Big Muddy cannot be sued because it is a division of the Illinois Department of Corrections, a state government agency. Based on this authority, Big Muddy isnot a“person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act and shall be dismissed from this action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail because the jail is not a suable entity.

Robinson v. Green · filed 2020-12-09

Plaintiff cannot proceed on his claim against the Milwaukee County Jail, however, as it is not a suable entity under § 1983.

A state is not a suable person under Section 1983.

Williams v. Kentucky · filed 2020-12-09

Such entities are also not suable “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because it is a building, not an individual or a policymaking unit of government.

Grace v. Allen County Jail · filed 2020-12-10

To start, Grace cannot proceed against the Allen County Jail. Although the Allen County Jail is where these events occurred, the jail is a building, not an individual or even a policy-making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because the jail is a building rather than a suable person or policymaking unit of government.

Beaty v. Allen County Jail · filed 2020-12-10

Although the Allen County Jail is where these events occurred, the jail is a building, not an individual or even a policy-making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because the jail is a building, not a suable individual or government unit.

Veazey v. Allen County Jail · filed 2020-12-10

Although the Allen County Jail is where these events occurred, the jail is a building, not an individual or even a policy-making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail building because it is not a person capable of being sued.

Sturgeon v. Wertz · filed 2020-12-11

As the Court has previously advised Plaintiff, he cannot sue a building, therefore Plaintiff cannot proceed with his claims against either jail.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail or sheriff’s department as an entity.

Scrivens v. Lesenbee · filed 2020-12-11

However, neither a Jail nor a sheriff’s department is a suable entity under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Anderson v. Lowe · filed 2020-12-14

“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, the court will dismiss Anderson’s complaint against the Commonwealth.

Section 1983 does not treat states, state agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit, except for actions seeking prospective relief against officials.

Long v. Latzke · filed 2020-12-14

Alternatively, Long’s § 1983 claims against UTM Latzke and Lt. Coleton in their official capacities fail under Rule 12(b)(6) because he cannot prove an element of his prima facie case: that a person deprived him of his federally protected rights. The Supreme Court has held that states, state agencies, and—except in actions for prospective relief—state officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a person, but a detention center building is not a person under the statute.

Carrington v. Dorsey · filed 2020-12-14

Conduct amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be conduct undertaken by a person, and BCDC is not a person within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state correctional institution because it is not a person subject to suit.

Quinones v. Thompson · filed 2020-12-15

Because it is not a “person” subject to suit under §1983, the institution is dismissed.

State correctional departments and prisons are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Davis v. Fisher · filed 2020-12-17

As a preliminary matter, because neither MCTC nor DPSCS is a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 Davis’s claims against them must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against government entities protected by sovereign immunity.

Engel v. United States of America · filed 2020-12-18

Plaintiff’s complaint is legally frivolous because the defendant entities cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its correctional facility.

Elam v. Indiana State of · filed 2020-12-21

The State of Indiana and Westville cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state court absent a waiver of state immunity, and police and sheriff’s departments are not suable entities under the section.

Engel v. Missouri Courts · filed 2020-12-21

Plaintiff’s complaint is legally frivolous because the defendant entities cannot be sued under § 1983.

A jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

West v. Jones · filed 2020-12-22

Because a jail is not a legal entity, it is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 and West cannot maintain this action against the defendant Patrick County Jail.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or its corrections department because neither is a person under the statute.

Engel v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-22

Because neither the Missouri Department of Corrections nor the State of Missouri is a person, plaintiff is missing an essential element under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund because the Fund is not a person under the statute.

Earl v. Kinziger · filed 2020-12-23

Therefore, although the Fund is not a “person” subject to suit under §1983, it may be sued on the state-law claims in the event the plaintiff is awarded damages in excess of the Doe defendants’ insurance limit on those claims.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency must be dismissed because the agency is not an entity that can be sued.

Struthers v. Brann · filed 2020-12-23

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 does not permit a jail or its medical department, as a group of individuals, to be sued as a “person.”

Phillips v. Southwest VA Regional Jail Medical Department · filed 2020-12-28

Neither the jail nor its medical department, as a group of individuals, can qualify as a “person” subject to being sued under § 1983.

A prison building is not a person or legal entity subject to suit under Section 1983.

Hardy v. Fisher · filed 2020-12-29

To the extent the plaintiff seeks to state a claim against the prison, she cannot do so because the prison is a building, “not a ‘person’ or legal entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” McIntosh v. Camp Brighton, No. 14-CV-11327, 2014 WL 1584173, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2014) (collecting cases establishing that prison facilities are improper defendants under Section 1983).

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Engel v. St. Louis Sheriff's Dept. · filed 2020-12-30

Moreover, section 1983 provides for an action against a “person” for a violation, under color of law, of another’s civil rights, but neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows state employees to be sued in their personal capacities.

DO NOT FILE IN THIS CASE - TRANSFERRED TO CAMDEN - NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-1460 · filed 2020-12-30

Therefore, Vergara can properly amend her complaint to allege Count II against the unnamed NJSP Central Laboratory employees, as the amendment attempts to sue those unnamed employees in their personal capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county correctional facility because the facility is not a person subject to suit.

Ndaula v. Clinton County Correctional Facility · filed 2020-12-30

CCCF, however, is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

A police department is not a legal entity capable of being sued under Section 1983.

Mobley v. City of Frankfort Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2021-01-04

However, this is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

Section 1983 allows suit against a person acting under color of state law; a jail is not a suable person.

Maline v. Hooks · filed 2021-01-05

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who violates his constitutional rights under color of state law. A jail is not a “person.”

Section 1983 does not permit constitutional claims against the Wisconsin Department of Justice or the Dane County Sheriff’s Office because neither is a person subject to suit.

Lance, Antonio v. Wisconsin Department of Justice · filed 2021-01-05

Plaintiff names only the Dane County Sheriff’s Office and Wisconsin Department of Justice as defendants. However, neither entity is a person that may be sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat states or state agencies as persons who can be sued.

Jones v. State Of Delaware · filed 2021-01-05

In addition, dismissal is proper because the State of Delaware and the DOC are not persons for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or state agency because neither is a statutory “person.”

Gipson v. Indiana Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-05

Neither a state nor a state agency qualifies as a “person” suable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal department such as a jail because the department is not a suable person.

Hall v. LMDC · filed 2021-01-05

With regard to Plaintiff’s claim against LMDC, LMDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such as jails, are not suable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a person; states and state entities are not persons under the statute.

Jackson v. City of Twin Falls County · filed 2021-01-06

Finally, only a “person” may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state or state entity is not considered a “person” under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit for money damages against a state correctional center because it is not a person under the statute.

Medearis v. Pinckneyville CC · filed 2021-01-07

Additionally, Pinckneyville is not a “person” subject to suit for money damages under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail because the jail is not a person under the statute.

Brumfield v. Brumfield · filed 2021-01-08

The jail is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Brumfield v. Bauwns · filed 2021-01-08

The jail is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail because the jail is not a person under the statute.

Brumfield v. Black Hawk County Sheriff's Department · filed 2021-01-08

The jail is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons, but state courts are not persons who may be sued under it.

GRANT v. WILLIAMS · filed 2021-01-08

Thus, constitutional claims in federal court may only be asserted against a “person” and not the state, which includes state courts, state agencies, and state actors sued in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against county sheriff’s offices or detention centers because they are not persons under the statute.

Villarreal v. Bigsby · filed 2021-01-11

Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims may not be asserted against the Seward County Sheriff’s Office and the Seward County Detention Center because they are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus not amenable to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Collymore v. D.O.C. · filed 2021-01-14

As a state agency, the Department of Correction is not a person subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency is not a suable entity.

DeJesus v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-14

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail’s medical staff as an entity.

Howland v. Frasier · filed 2021-01-14

First, the Medical Staff is not an entity subject to liability under §1983.

A state agency or entity is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Williams v. Osborn Medical Dept. · filed 2021-01-18

Neither a State nor a state agency or entity is a “person” who may be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an Indiana county jail because the jail is not a suable entity.

JOHNSON v. PLASSE · filed 2021-01-19

In Indiana, a county jail is not a suable entity.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against correctional facilities because they are not persons subject to liability under the section.

Turane v. The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision · filed 2021-01-19

Correctional facilities are not “persons” for the purpose of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail or its jail staff as an entity.

Markland v. City of Elizabethton TN · filed 2021-01-21

Further, neither the Carter County Jail nor its Jail Staff is a person that may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a sheriff's department because the department is not a person under the statute.

HUGHLEY v. PLASSE · filed 2021-01-22

To the extent Mr. Hughley asserts a damages claim against the Department, it fails to state a claim because the Department is not a "person" who can be sued under Section 1983.

States and their departments are not persons who may be sued for money damages under § 1983.

Hardrick 606507 v. Mohrman · filed 2021-01-22

In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state or its agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

FRANKLIN ARMORY, INC. v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2021-01-22

The State of New Jersey, the State Police, and the Department of Law, are not “persons” amendable to suit for monetary damages under Section 1983.

A county prison facility is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Armstrong v. Dauphin County Prison · filed 2021-01-22

Specifically, a county prison facility is not a “person” within the meaning of the statute.

A state is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Gregory v. State of Montana · filed 2021-01-25

The Unopposed Motion reflects the rule that the State does not qualify as a “person” for purposes of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against private medical defendants fails when the complaint alleges no basis for treating them as state actors.

Taylor v. University Hospitals of Cleveland Inc. OH. · filed 2021-01-25

As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against any of the named Defendants. This statute provides a cause of action against state government entities, officials and employees for violation of constitutional rights. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). None of the Defendants is a state government entity, official or employee.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the United States or a state as defendants.

Brown v. United States · filed 2021-01-26

Further, neither the United States nor the Commonwealth of Virginia is a proper defendant to a § 1983 action.

A municipal police department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Rodriguez v. Wawa Inc · filed 2021-01-26

As the District Court correctly concluded, a municipal police department is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a Commonwealth Attorney for actions within the scope of quasi-judicial prosecutorial functions.

Kipps v. Ewell · filed 1975-02-20

This court will not put an onus on such cooperation and therefore holds that under the facts of this case the Commonwealth Attorney is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against prosecuting attorneys for actions taken in performance of their official role.

Guerrero v. Barlow · filed 1974-05-31

It is well settled that prosecuting attorneys, as “quasi-judicial officers”, are immune from suit under section 1983 for actions taken in performance of their official role.

Section 1983 does not impose civil liability on a prosecuting attorney for acts committed as an integral part of the judicial process.

Marlowe v. Coakley · filed 1969-01-28

A prosecuting attorney is immune from civil suit for acts committed in the performance of duties constituting an integral part of the judicial process.

Section 1983 does not confer absolute prosecutorial immunity for alleged acts outside a prosecutor’s quasi-judicial capacity and beyond duties integral to the judicial process, including deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence.

Lilly Mae Onie Lee Whitelaw Hilliard v. Williams · filed 1972-11-20

We hold that factual averments of the complaint as summarized above, considered in a light most favorable to plaintiff, charge the District Attorney General with acts which were outside his quasi-judicial capacity and beyond the scope of “duties constituting an integral part of the judicial process.” We are not willing to extend the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity to a complaint charging deliberate suppression of an FBI laboratory report establishing the innocence of the defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal damages suit against a state prosecutor for actions taken in connection with official prosecutions.

Phillips v. Nash · filed 1962-12-28

We adhere to our prior decision in Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237, and hold the defendant Nash is and was not amenable to this suit in a federal District Court brought under the federal Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not abolish traditional judicial immunity, and that immunity extends to prosecutors for acts within their jurisdiction.

Brown v. Charles · filed 1970-02-17

It is clear that the action against the judge and the court reporter cannot ... be maintained because of the traditional doctrine of judicial immunity, which was not abolished by § 1983. ... Since the court of appeals for the seventh circuit in Cawley v. Warren, supra, has previously found that prosecutors “were protected by the same rule of immunity which is applicable to judges”, I conclude that the jurisdiction test also applies here.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against prosecutors for acts committed in their official capacity.

Fowler v. Vincent · filed 1973-11-19

It is now well settled that prosecutors are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts committed in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against prosecutors for conduct arising from their official prosecutorial duties because prosecutors have absolute immunity.

Corby v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1974-04-16

The doctrine of absolute official immunity has been somewhat eroded in actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. ... It is significant, however, that none of these cases dealt with prosecutorial immunity, and the decisions of the Second Circuit establish a broad rule of prosecutorial immunity in Civil Rights Act cases. ... We see no circumstances justifying a departure from this well-established rule.

Section 1983 does not abolish prosecutorial immunity, and an assistant state’s attorney is immune for discretionary acts within the scope of prosecutorial duties, including decisions about warrants, investigations, plea bargaining, and parole-board communications.

Lundblade v. Doyle · filed 1974-04-17

This principle was not abolished by § 1983 which makes liable “every person” who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. ... This immunity has been extended to prosecutors who are considered part of the judicial process. ... It is clear that the decision whether or not to seek a warrant or further investigate an allegation is a matter within the duties assigned to an Assistant State’s Attorney and not the proper subject matter of a Civil Rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Further, “plea-bargaining” and letters to the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board are matters which are part of the duties of an Assistant State’s Attorney and within the prosecuting attorney’s discretion. Such activities are not the proper subject matter of a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 shields a prosecutor from civil liability for conduct within the scope of the prosecutor’s normal function.

Tyler v. Witkowski · filed 1975-02-26

Therefore, if the conduct charged in plaintiff’s complaint is within the scope of a prosecutor’s normal function, he is cloaked with quasi-judicial immunity from civil liability under the Civil Rights Acts.

Section 1983 preserves criminal prosecutors’ common-law immunity from civil-damages suits for conduct in the exercise of their judicial function.

Daves v. Scranton · filed 1975-03-12

It is well settled that criminal prosecutors are entitled to common-law immunities from suit for civil damages under the Civil Rights Acts for conduct in the exercise of their judicial function.

Section 1983 does not immunize a prosecutor from damages for leaving an NCIC entry after deciding not to extradite, because that conduct is outside the prosecutorial function.

Maney v. Ratcliff · filed 1975-09-03

The conduct of leaving the entry on the NCIC system after having decided not to extradite plaintiff is not within the prosecutorial function and is outside the scope of prosecutorial immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prosecutor for acts within prosecutorial discretion, even when malice is alleged, and private persons are not acting under color of state law merely because they acted in concert with that immune official.

Grow v. Thomas G. Fisher, Individually and in His Capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for the 30th Judicial Circuit · filed 1975-10-09

The law of this circuit is clear: a state prosecutor has quasi-judicial immunity even where malice is alleged so long as he is acting within the scope of his prosecutorial discretion. ... In sum, we conclude that entirely apart from Fisher’s immunity, the simple conclusionary allegation that various private torts were committed “in concert” with a state official was not sufficient to cause the private tort-feasors to be acting under color of state law, nor was there any showing that the individuals violated any constitutional rights of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against officials whose judicial or quasi-judicial immunity bars claims for money damages.

Timmerman v. Brown · filed 1975-12-15

This immunity, however, protects qualified defendants only from claims for money damages. It 'does not extend to plaintiff's action for injunctive and declaratory relief under Section 1983, 42 U.S.C.' Fowler v. Alexander, 478 F.2d 694, 696 (4 Cir. 1973).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages action against a state prosecutor for acts within prosecutorial jurisdiction, even when the prosecutor knowingly uses perjured testimony.

United States ex rel. Moyer v. McCann · filed 1976-02-17

The law is quite clear in this Circuit that state prosecuting attorneys are immune from damage suits unless the alleged wrongful acts are clearly outside the scope of their jurisdiction. ... It is also clear that state prosecutors are immune even if they knowingly use perjured testimony in their attempts to secure convictions. ... Notwithstanding, such a distinction is entitled to no legal significance as Russell was acting within his jurisdiction in bringing criminal charges against plaintiffs entitling him to immunity, regardless of whether the perjured testimony was the sole piece of evidence used to prosecute plaintiffs.

A quasi-judicial officer is not immune from a § 1983 suit for employment actions solely because of that status.

Sprague v. Fitzpatrick · filed 1976-01-09

The question .here, then, is whether defendant solely by virtue of his status as a quasi-judicial officer, is immune from suit under Section 1983 for his actions in...the capacity of an employer. I think quite clearly he is not, and I so hold today.

A prosecutor is immune from a civil damages suit under § 1983 for initiating a prosecution and presenting the state’s case.

Imbler v. Pachtman · filed 1976-03-02

We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.

A prosecutor’s absolute immunity in § 1983 litigation extends to acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of a criminal case.

John N. Flood, M.D., J.D. v. Harrington · filed 1976-03-19

We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of absolute immunity protects the defendant attorneys in this case if their allegedly improper conduct was “intimately associated with the judicial phases” of Flood’s tax litigation.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a prosecutor for acts within the prosecutor’s official prosecutorial responsibilities.

Clark v. Brandom · filed 1976-07-07

Prosecutor Brandom, named individually and in his capacity as prosecutor of Clay County, Missouri, enjoys absolute immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 resulting from his official prosecutorial responsibilities.

Section 1983 provides no remedy against a prosecutor for acts performed within the scope of the prosecutor's prosecutorial duties because those acts are protected by absolute immunity.

Tyler v. Ryan · filed 1976-07-08

This Court is bound to follow Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) which held that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from § 1983 suits when he acts within the scope of his prosecutorial duties.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity for prosecutors and their investigative staff when they perform functions tied to initiating, preparing, and presenting a criminal case.

Atkins v. John Gibson Lanning, Kenneth D. Fouts and Randall Craig Ruark · filed 1977-06-08

We conclude that the considerations outlined above dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983 that the prosecutor enjoys at common law. ... The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that the function being performed by the district attorney was that of preparing and presenting a case, or in other words, those judicial functions for which absolute immunity is granted. ... As to the district attorney’s investigators, it would hardly seem reasonable to exculpate the district attorney and to not immunize his underlings.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a defendant’s direct and personal responsibility for subordinates’ misconduct, and prosecutors acting within their prosecutorial duties are absolutely immune.

Ostrer v. Aronwald · filed 1977-06-21

In an effort to limit vexatious litigation and to minimize interference with the orderly workings of government, it is required in suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the plaintiff allege the defendant’s direct and personal responsibility for the purportedly unlawful conduct of his subordinates. ... We conclude that the considerations outlined above dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983 that the prosecutor enjoys at common law.

Section 1983 provides no damages remedy against an Attorney General who is absolutely immune for conduct arising from prosecutorial duties.

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Lefkowitz · filed 1977-06-29

This court holds that the Attorney General is absolutely immune from damage claims under the facts of this case.

Section 1983 immunity for a prosecutor turns on the function performed: investigative work receives qualified immunity, while advocacy tied to initiating and presenting a particular case may receive absolute immunity.

Briggs v. Goodwin · filed 1977-12-01

When a prosecutor is engaged in essentially investigative as opposed to advocatory activities, the considerations of public policy which necessitated a grant of absolute immunity in Imbler no longer control. Regardless of his official status, a prosecutor functioning primarily as an investigator should be accorded only the qualified immunity typically conferred on other investigative officers. The crucial inquiry concerns the nature of the official behavior challenged, not the identity or title of the officer responsible therefor.

Section 1983 does not impose civil liability on prosecutors for the decision to prosecute or to maintain criminal charges solely to pressure a defendant to incriminate another person.

Clark v. Lutcher · filed 1977-12-28

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ contentions that Defendants Brittain and Kreisher can be held liable under § 1983 for their decision to prosecute David F. Clark and their decision not to drop the charges against him solely to maintain pressure on him to incriminate Harold Ashton may not form the basis for civil liability.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against prosecutors for acts performed in the course of their prosecutorial duties because absolute immunity applies.

Cleve Heidelberg, Jr. v. Lawrence Hammer, Larry Gray, Robert Lee Watson, William Hill and Paul J. Hibser · filed 1978-07-18

Three were prosecuting attorneys who are alleged to have done various acts in the course of performing their prosecutorial duties and who are protected by immunity from a civil suit for damages under § 1983 by Imbler v. Pachtman,supra, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984.

Section 1983 bars damages suits against prosecutors for actions within the scope of initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions because absolute prosecutorial immunity applies.

People Ex Rel. Snead v. Kirkland · filed 1978-12-27

However, like the district judges, these defendants acted within the scope of their duties in initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions against the plaintiffs and, therefore, are absolutely immune from civil suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of an accused’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an assistant city attorney for acts performed as a prosecutor because prosecutorial immunity is absolute.

FRONT RUNNER MESSENGER SERV. INC. v. Ghini · filed 1979-03-22

Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, an assistant city attorney while performing his duties as a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity to state prosecutors for actions taken in their official prosecutorial duties, including decisions not to prosecute criminal activity.

Jones v. Benton · filed 1979-07-20

The United States Supreme Court held that a state prosecutor was absolutely immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C., § 1983, where he initiated a prosecution and presented the State's case. 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995. For the purpose of our decision on this issue, it is not significant that the appellee allegedly has failed to prosecute criminal activity instead of wrongfully prosecuting criminal activity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a prosecutor for injuries arising solely from initiating a prosecution or presenting the State's case, but absolute immunity does not attach when the alleged harm is inflicted independently of the prosecution.

Lee v. Willins · filed 1980-03-17

Imbler held that "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983." 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995. The Court, however, recognized that absolute immunity from suit might not attach to a prosecutor's acts performed in an investigative or administrative capacity. Id. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 995. ... We believe Judge Nickerson sensibly distinguished these two concepts in his opinion below. Although he recognized that prosecutorial and investigatory activities are necessarily interrelated to some degree, he separated them for purposes of applying the Imbler test for triggering the defense of absolute immunity by reference to the type of harm allegedly suffered. We endorse this useful and sensible approach. Under this analysis, a prosecutor is immune from a suit to recover for an injury arising solely from the prosecution itself e. g. being compelled to stand trial or to suffer imprisonment or pretrial detention. Such harm must always result in substantial part from the protected prosecutorial activities of initiating prosecution or presenting the state's case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. at 985. ... Where the alleged harm is inflicted independently of the prosecution, however, absolute immunity will not attach. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, supra. If, for example, a prosecutor violates the Fourth Amendment by conducting an illegal search, the victim is harmed by the invasion of his zone of privacy, whether or not the evidence unlawfully obtained is introduced at trial. Redress for this harm is not barred by Imbler. See J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice, 450 F.Supp. 1125 (E.D.Pa.1978).

Section 1983 immunizes prosecutors from liability for acts within the scope of their prosecutorial duties.

C. R. "Jake" Cook, T. W. Cook and Lee Deforke v. The Houston Post, Ralph Williams, Joseph Perino, Marvin Kent and Terry · filed 1980-05-07

Prosecutors are immune from liability in suits under § 1983 for acts that are within the scope of prosecutorial duties.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against prosecutors for alleged misrepresentations made during plea bargaining because prosecutorial immunity applies.

Taylor v. Kavanagh · filed 1980-06-26

I therefore hold that a prosecutor is entitled to immunity from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged misrepresentations to a criminal defendant during the plea bargaining process.

Section 1983 gives a prosecuting attorney absolute immunity from damages liability for acts within the scope of duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.

Winters v. Palumbo · filed 1980-09-30

As regards prosecutorial immunity, a prosecuting attorney who has acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution enjoys absolute immunity from liability for damages in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 damages suits are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity for conduct performed during the judicial phase of a criminal process, even if the conduct was improper or unlawful on its face.

Gutierrez v. Vergari · filed 1980-10-16

Conduct performed by a prosecutor during the judicial phase is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit, even if it was improper or unlawful on its face.

Section 1983 suits against prosecutors and their assistants are barred by immunity when the challenged actions fall within the scope of their prosecutorial duties.

Keating v. Martin · filed 1980-12-09

Prosecutors and their assistants also enjoy immunity from section 1983 actions so long as the actions complained of appear to be within the scope of prosecutorial duties.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for injuries consisting solely of prosecution-related imprisonment or pretrial detention caused by a prosecutor’s misconduct, because absolute prosecutorial immunity applies.

Taylor v. Kavanagh · filed 1981-01-26

Thus, if as a result of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant is compelled to face prosecution, or to suffer imprisonment or pretrial detention, the harm cannot be redressed via a § 1983 civil rights suit.

Section 1983 claims for damages against a state prosecutor are barred by absolute immunity when the challenged statements are intimately associated with the judicial phase of a criminal prosecution.

Strong v. Slaton · filed 1981-03-17

The statements, therefore, were “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” and entitled to the protection of absolute immunity provided to a prosecutor acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages actions against prosecutors for advocacy-related actions taken in connection with an agreement to continue criminal cases without a finding.

Lopez v. Droney · filed 1981-06-17

Since the section 1983 claims against these defendants are barred, we do not consider the pendent state claims. ... Accordingly, we hold that the defendants Droney and Codhina are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for actions taken in connection with the agreement to continue the plaintiffs’ cases without a finding.

Section 1983 permits claims against prosecutors for administrative conduct, such as disposing of seized property, because absolute prosecutorial immunity does not apply.

Bushouse v. County of Kalamazoo · filed 1982-04-12

The disposal of property held as evidence during the pendency of trial is clearly an administrative function of prosecutors for which absolute immunity does not lie.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against judges and prosecutors for acts within the course and scope of their official duties.

Ballentine v. Crawford · filed 1983-05-06

In this case the petitioner has brought claims against defendants who are immune from damage suits in Section 1983 actions when acting within the course and scope of their official duties — a judge and a prosecutor.

A state prosecutor acting within the scope of duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability.

George Freeman, Individually and on Behalf of the Sanctuary, a Universal Life Church Monastery v. Leroy Hittle, I.H. Red · filed 1983-06-13

A state prosecuting attorney acting within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights.

A prosecutor who invokes an unauthorized statute remains immune from a Section 1983 damages suit if the prosecutor could arguably prosecute the conduct under some statute and the invoked statute also arguably applies to that conduct.

Lynn Lerwill and Penny Lerwill v. Joslin · filed 1983-07-11

Accordingly, we hold that a prosecutor who initiates a prosecution under statutes he is not authorized to invoke is immune from a section 1983 suit for damages when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the prosecutor is arguably empowered to prosecute the alleged conduct under... statute, and (2) the statute he incorrectly invokes also arguably applies to the criminal defendant’s alleged conduct.

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from section 1983 damages liability for their discretionary decisions of whether and when to initiate a criminal prosecution, including delay in prosecuting.

Ryland v. Shapiro · filed 1984-08-15

The Court concludes that the defendants are absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under section 1983 based upon their mere failure to initiate a criminal prosecution with greater dispatch.

A prosecutor is not absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability for conduct beyond the scope of prosecutorial authority and wholly unrelated to the advocate's role.

Smith v. Updegraff · filed 1984-10-01

We conclude that Whitehead is not immune from the charges here, arising from conduct clearly beyond the scope of his authority and wholly unrelated to his role as an advocate.

A prosecutor has no absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct clearly beyond the scope of prosecutorial duties and wholly unrelated to the advocate’s role.

Smith v. Updegraff · filed 1984-10-25

He contends that he has absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because he was acting as the duly-elected Jasper County Attorney at all times material to the case at bar. We conclude that Whitehead is not immune from the charges here, arising from conduct clearly beyond the scope of his authority and wholly unrelated to his role as an advocate.

In determining prosecutorial immunity under Section 1983, the prosecutor’s function and conduct control rather than the prosecutor’s asserted bad faith.

David Maglione, Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Ronald Briggs, Appellee-Cross-Appellant · filed 1984-11-16

Since it is Briggs’ conduct rather than his state of mind that is in issue, summary judgment was properly granted.

A prosecutor performing police-related investigative work receives only qualified, not absolute, immunity in a Section 1983 action.

Rex v. John P. Teeples, Donald E. Johnson, Jr., and Edward Rupert, Defendants · filed 1985-03-27

We conclude that giving Miranda warnings to a general suspect and participating in his interrogation is “police-related” work and does not fall within the category of a prosecutor’s quasi-judicial functions.

A prosecutor acting primarily as an administrator or investigator receives only qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, dependent on a good-faith, reasonable belief in the challenged conduct.

Edgar v. Wagner · filed 1985-05-08

A prosecutor who functions primarily as an administrator or investigator is accorded qualified immunity, that is, protection from liability depends upon a showing that the prosecutor entertained a good faith, reasonable belief in actions taken in an administrative or investigative capacity.

A state prosecutor is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for presenting evidence to a grand jury, even when the presentation is allegedly malicious and calculated to clear a suspect.

Mrs. Susie Lite Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge · filed 1985-05-28

This case presents the question whether a state prosecutor may be liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for maliciously presenting evidence to a grand jury in a manner calculated to clear a suspect of wrongdoing. We conclude that in such circumstances a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for damages.

Absolute prosecutorial immunity under Section 1983 does not cover pre-indictment searches and seizures.

Hooper v. Sachs · filed 1985-09-16

... this court declines to extend the doctrine of absolute immunity to cover pre-indictment searches and seizures like the one alleged herein.

A prosecutor is not absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for investigative conduct such as attending an interrogation.

Johnson v. Rex · filed 1985-11-04

a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity from liability in a civil rights suit brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 based upon the prosecutor’s presence during questioning of the plaintiff.

Prosecutors lack absolute § 1983 immunity for precharging investigative acts such as directing an identification procedure or preparing warrant affidavits.

Higgs v. District Court In & For the County of Douglas · filed 1985-12-02

In summary, we conclude that Deputy District Attorney Florey was not absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for his role in approving or directing the photo identification procedure in which Sandra Price identified Higgs as her assailant, and that Deputy District Attorneys Florey and Miller were not absolutely immune for their conduct in preparing affidavits in support of the Crim.P. 41.1 order for nontestimonial identification evidence, the arrest warrant for Higgs, and the search warrant for his home.

A prosecutor is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for decisions to initiate or dismiss criminal charges made as an advocate for the state.

Brodnicki v. City Of Omaha · filed 1996-03-25

The decisions relating to the initiation and dismissal of cases are at the very heart of a prosecutor's function as an advocate for the state, and absolute immunity thus attaches to those decisions.

Section 1983 damages claims against a prosecutor in his personal capacity are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity when they challenge decisions about whom to prosecute or charge.

Bowman v. Warren County Regional Jail · filed 1996-06-20

Determining to bring a prosecution against one person and not to charge others is the quintessential prosecutorial function, and the claim against Wilson thus falls squarely within the immunity granted by Imbler.

Section 1983 claims against prosecutors are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity to the extent they arise from filing and pursuing a civil enforcement complaint.

State v. Superior Court · filed 1996-06-27

For reasons discussed in the previous section, defendants are absolutely immunized from Ford’s § 1983 and § 1985 claims (“civil rights claims”) to the extent these claims were based on the filing and pursuit of the complaint.

State prosecutors have absolute immunity from § 1983 actions for conduct intimately associated with the judicial phase of a criminal case.

Peterson v. Rasmussen · filed 1996-07-26

State prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 actions based on conduct "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."