42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not cover claims seeking exculpatory evidence to challenge a conviction when those claims belong in habeas corpus.

Golden v. Judy Fox · filed 2016-03-08

Skinner, 562 U.S. at 536, held that Brady claims “ranked within the traditional core of habeas corpus and outside the province of § 1983,” so Golden’s reliance on Skinner is misplaced.

A Section 1983 damages claim cannot be brought in the same action as a request for habeas relief.

Schuenke v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2020-02-18

There are innumerable problems with the pleading, but the first and most obvious issue is that a claim for damages cannot be brought alongside a request for habeas relief.

Section 1983 provides a way to bring constitutional claims about prison conditions in federal court when those claims do not challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

McElrath v. Sette · filed 2020-03-12

Section 2254 is the exclusive vehicle for habeas relief, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the method by which claims for violations of constitutional rights may be brought in federal court.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for claims about a state court clerk’s handling of habeas filings or the processing of legal mail.

Robinson v. State of Nebraska · filed 2020-04-01

To the extent Robinson seeks to challenge the state district court clerk’s handling of his habeas filings or assert any other claims related to the processing and handling of his legal mail, such claims are not properly presented in a petition for habeas corpus; rather, such claims should be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 can provide a civil action against state officials for civil rights violations, but a person seeking both that relief and habeas relief must file separate actions.

Watson v. Jennings · filed 2020-05-01

Here, Watson has filed documents seeking both types of relief. While Watson may simultaneously seek both types of relief by filing separate civil actions, he may not proceed under both statutes simultaneously in a single action.

Section 1983 is the route for a prisoner’s challenge seeking a parole hearing when success would not necessarily shorten confinement.

Turner v. Foss · filed 2020-07-14

Accordingly, the Court adopts the reasoning of Johnson, Soun, Woods and Glass and concludes that Turner’s claim equal protection claim is not within “the core of habeas corpus,” and must be brought, if at all, via civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint that would shorten a prisoner’s sentence may be stayed until the prisoner exhausts state court remedies for the related habeas claims.

Cowherd v. Leidholt · filed 2020-07-15

Thus, like in Offet, this court stays Cowherd’s § 1983 complaint until he has exhausted his state court remedies in his habeas petition with respect to his claims of unlawful custody and reimbursement for equal month to month discharge credit.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against detention centers because they are not persons under the statute.

Dunn v. North Eastern New Mexico Detention Facility · filed 2020-06-26

It is well established that detention centers are not a ‘persons’ subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a detention center because an inanimate facility is not a person.

Sumpter v. Georgetown County Detention Center · filed 2020-06-08

However, the only defendant named in the Complaint—the Georgetown County Detention Center—is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983 because it is an inanimate facility.

Section 1983 does not authorize a money-damages action against an unconsenting state.

Mrs. Ronald F. Meyer v. The State of New Jersey · filed 1972-05-19

The State of New Jersey cannot be sued under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state without its consent, and state agencies that are arms of the state government are not "persons" within the statute's meaning.

Frank Hale Bennett v. People of the State of California · filed 1969-04-07

The State of California is immune from suit without its consent, and that immunity extends to suits against it under the Civil Rights Act. ... Moreover, state agencies such as the California Adult Authority and the California Department of Corrections, which are but arms of the state government, are not “persons” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not treat a state department as a suable “person,” and a challenge to a state statute itself does not bring the state commissioner within the statute’s scope.

Rosado v. Wyman · filed 1969-07-16

Moreover, it is clear that the defendant Department of Social Services for the State of New York is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-192, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966); Williford v. People of California, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965). Since the suit here constitutes an attack on a state statute, and not on action taken under it, the plaintiffs’ complaint is against the state and not against the Commissioner as an individual. He too is therefore not within the scope of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action when plaintiffs identify no federal right to a particular AFDC benefit, and it does not reach a state agency or an official sued only over a direct attack on a state statute.

Rosado v. Wyman · filed 1969-10-13

The complaint, properly read, does not allege the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. The burden of the complaint is that New York's Statute, Section 131-a, is not in conformity with the requirements of Section 602(a) (23) of the federal statutes and that therefore New York is not entitled to receive federal grants under the AFDC program. Plaintiffs have no rights under federal law to any particular level of AFDC payments or, indeed, to any payments at all. ... Moreover, it is clear that the defendant Department of Social Services for the State of New York is not a "person" within the meaning of Section 1983. ... Since the suit here constitutes an attack on a state statute, and not on action taken under it, the plaintiffs' complaint is against the state and not against the Commissioner as an individual. He too is therefore not within the scope of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action against an administrative agency.

Alexander v. The California Court Director of Correction, Adult Authority · filed 1970-11-06

Moreover, a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not lie against an administrative agency. (Monroe v. Pape (1961) 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492.)

Section 1983 permits suits only against “persons,” and the United States and other governmental entities are not persons within its meaning.

Teresa Accardi, by Her Guardian Ad Litem, Sam Accardi v. United States · filed 1970-12-28

Appellant’s Section 1983 claim, however, must be rejected on another ground. Under Section 1983, only “persons” may be sued for deprivation of civil rights. The United States and other governmental entities are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514, 81 S.Ct. 684, 5 L.Ed.2d 741 (1961); United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969); Broome v. Simon, 255 F. Supp. 434 (D.La.1966). Therefore, the United States is an improper party in this suit insofar as it is brought pursuant to Section 1983.

Section 1983 treats a school board or school district as a suable person when equitable relief is sought and provides a supplementary federal remedy that does not require prior exhaustion of state judicial remedies.

Adams v. School Board of Wyoming Valley West School District · filed 1971-08-16

The specific issue was answered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319, 323 (1970). The court held that where, as here, equitable relief is sought, a school district is a “person” under Section 1983. See also Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969). Perceiving no meaningful difference between a School Board and a School District, it is my view that in this action, the defendant is a “person” within the meaning of the statute. ... In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 482, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Supreme Court, in interpreting the nature of the § 1983 remedy, ruled that “ * * * The federal remedy is supplementary to the State remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked”. See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). It is thus clear that the plaintiff need not exhaust his state judicial remedies before turning to the federal forum for relief.

Section 1983 authorizes a federal district-court action for injunctive relief and damages without exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, but relief is available only against a "person," which does not include the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Harris v. Louisiana State Supreme Court · filed 1971-11-03

The plaintiffs have brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for injunctive relief and damages. That statute authorizes suit in federal district court, without requiring exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies. ... Plaintiffs’ suit is for injunctive relief and damages under the Civil Rights Act; however, such relief may be obtained only from a “person” within the meaning of the Act. ... Following the Court’s reasoning in the Zuckerman case, the Louisiana Supreme Court, being the highest judicial member in the body politic of the State of Louisiana, is beyond the cognizance of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a "person" that can be sued under the statute, and the applicable state limitations period governs a civil-rights action when no federal limitations period exists.

Phipps v. Armour · filed 1971-11-15

The state of Tennessee cannot be brought herein as party defendant in this manner. It is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... There is no federal statute limiting civil rights actions, and therefore the applicable statute of Tennessee controls.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy that a state civil-rights-suspension statute cannot take away from an incarcerated plaintiff.

Beyer v. Werner · filed 1969-01-22

It must be concluded that Section 79, which has but limited real effect (see, e.g., Kugel v. Kalik, 1941, 176 Misc. 49, 25 N.Y.S.2d 327, aff’d, 1st Dept. 1941, 262 App.Div. 823, 28 N.Y.S.2d 734; Foster v. State, 1954, 205 Misc. 736, 129 N.Y.S.2d 418), cannot suspend the right to present a Section 1983 action in a federal court.

Section 1983 reaches only a “person” acting under color of state law, so a state itself is not subject to suit and a former state employee who was no longer employed at the relevant time was not acting under color of state law.

Crafton v. Rose · filed 1972-07-12

Initially, we observe that the State of Tennessee is not a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act and not subject to suit under it. ... Mr. Davis was not employed by the State at the time of the trial. Therefore, he cannot be said to have been acting under color of state law as required by the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize relief against a school district that has the same status as a state, although officials may be sued.

Kerr v. CLARENCEVILLE SCH. DIST. OF OAKLAND & WAYNE CTYS. · filed 1972-07-12

However, the Sixth Circuit has said in Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1967) that the state is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. Since school districts in the State of Michigan are under the control of the state and the State Board of Education (see Michigan Constitution of 1963, Article VIII), they would have the same status as the State. Under these circumstances although plaintiff may be able to sue the officials of the school district under § 1983, he cannot sue the school district itself for any kind of relief under § 1983. Thus, Count II of plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not cover the District of Columbia because the District is not a “state or territory” within the statute’s meaning.

Marusa v. District of Columbia · filed 1973-08-21

After analyzing the purposes and scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court concluded that the District of Columbia is not a “state or territory” within the meaning of that statute. Thus, there is no federal statutory basis for Marusa’s action.

Section 1983 permits an action against a public official in an individual capacity when the official abuses his position and thereby causes a deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities, but a state is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

Rochester v. Baganz · filed 1973-10-01

Numerous Third Circuit cases have held that a state is not a “person” who can be sued under the Civil Rights Act. ... Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other things, authorizes an action against a public official in his individual capacity if he has abused his position and a deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities has resulted.

Section 1983 does not cover the District of Columbia because the District is not a “State or Territory” within the statute’s meaning.

The Washington Free Community, Inc., Paul Becker v. Jerry v. Wilson, Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police · filed 1973-11-05

The Supreme Court has recently ruled that the District of Columbia is not a “State or Territory” within the meaning of Section 1983. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 93 S. Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973). Appellant therefore does not state a cause of action over which the District Court, by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970), may exercise jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits a suit against an individual state official even when the official administers a state agency.

Haines v. Askew · filed 1973-12-11

This Court need not decide whether the Kenosha case allows suits under § 1983 to be brought against named individuals who collectively constitute a state agency. Plaintiff also seeks relief against the Administrator of the P.P.C. who, under any view of the ease, is an individual amenable to suit under § 1983. The court thus finds that it has jurisdiction of the case at least insofar as regards Mr. Ingram.

Section 1983 does not treat state instrumentalities as persons, and liability of individual officials requires personal causation under color of state law rather than respondeat superior, although a supervisor may be liable for directing or knowingly acquiescing in violations and the personal-involvement requirement is less rigid for equitable relief.

Downs v. Department of Public Welfare · filed 1973-12-28

Any argument that state instrumentalities are persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purposes of equitable relief is foreclosed by City of Kenosha, Wisconsin v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973). ... In order to prevail on the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must prove the defendants caused the alleged constitutional deprivations while acting under color of state law. ... However, it is clear that personal involvement is a necessary element of a § 1983 action and that a superior official is not held liable for the acts of his subordinates merely on the basis of that relationship. ... However, the requirement of personal involvement does not mean the official has to have committed the specific wrongful acts. When a supervisor personally directs his subordinates to commit acts, or when he has actual knowledge of their acts and acquiesces in them, he is regarded as having been personally involved and is liable for his own conduct, not on the basis of respondeat superior but because of his direct personal involvement. ... Moreover, when equitable relief is sought as opposed to monetary damages, the requirements of personal involvement and the allegation thereof are not as rigid. This is fundamental to the effective protection of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires an action to seek relief from a "person," and the South Carolina State Department of Public Welfare apparently does not qualify.

Burris v. State Department of Public Welfare of South Carolina · filed 1974-02-08

Of course an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must seek relief from a “person” which would apparently not include the named defendant, State Department of Public Welfare of South Carolina.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state that is not a statutory person, and an official is liable only when he personally participates under color of state law in depriving the plaintiff of federally protected rights.

Christian v. Anderson · filed 1974-02-14

The Court affirms this action of Judge Langley and in addition now dismisses the State of Oklahoma as a Defendant in this case for the reason that it is not a “person” suable under the Civil Rights Act. ... It is the general rule that an official will not be liable in a Civil Rights action unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of state law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured him by the Federal Constitution.

Section 1983 does not treat a municipal retirement system as a person that can be sued under the statute.

Surowitz v. New York City Employees' Retirement System · filed 1974-05-09

Accordingly, as the NYCERS is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, its presence as a defendant herein does not suffice to create federal jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not treat the Milwaukee Police Department, a division of Milwaukee's city government, as a person who can be sued under the statute.

White v. Flemming · filed 1974-05-07

First of all, it has recently become clear that the Milwaukee Police Department is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, is not' a proper party to this suit.

Section 1983, together with § 1343(3), permits federal courts to hear civil-rights actions seeking monetary or equitable relief against municipal officials in their official capacities.

Paxman v. Wilkerson · filed 1975-03-05

Suffice it to say that acceptance of defendants’ contention would emasculate the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and would effectively overturn the line of cases originating in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 161, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), which have considered the principle settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) confer jurisdiction upon federal district courts to hear civil rights actions for both monetary and equitable relief against municipal officials in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a suable person for damages; such claims must be directed at an appropriate individual.

State of Louisiana Ex Rel. Purkey v. Ciolino · filed 1975-04-17

A state is not a person for 1983 purposes and is not amenable to suit under 1983. ... A 1983 suit is properly directed toward a specific individual who may be a state official. Though 1983 requires action under color of state law, by acting in an unconstitutional manner, the state official is deemed to have acted outside of his official capacity and, therefore, the individual, not the state, may be liable for damages. ... No 1983 claim for damages can be asserted against the State of Louisiana.

Section 1983 permits an action for injunctive relief against a superintendent of schools sued in his official capacity because he is a person under the statute.

Wright v. Houston Independent School District · filed 1975-05-05

The suit is not only against the school district but also against the superintendent of schools in his official capacity. He is a person for 1983 purposes, for injunctive relief at the very least.

Section 1983 covers building inspectors as “persons” and permits claims for money damages against them, subject to good-faith and reasonable-grounds defenses.

Hanna v. Robert Drobnick, Building Commissioner · filed 1975-04-23

Plainly, the inspectors are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and the District Court had jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ complaint and claim for money damages against them. ... While police officers’ actions represent a problem separate from (and more complex than) those normally posed by building inspectors, we think that both are entitled to the defenses of good faith purpose and reasonable grounds for their actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on federal agencies, so it does not apply to a suit challenging foreclosure by a federal agency.

Robert Hoffman and Wife, Joanna Hoffman v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 1975-09-29

Likewise, a federal agency is also excluded from the scope of section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 applies to constitutional-rights deprivations by persons acting under color of state law, but a state is not amenable to suit under the statute, and good-faith enforcement of governmental regulations is a defense to a section 1983 claim.

Milton v. Nelson · filed 1976-02-02

Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to deprivations of constitutional rights by defendants acting under color of state law. ... [t]he State is not amenable to suit under the civil rights statute. ... It is clear that “good faith” enforcement of governmental regulations is a defense to a section 1983 Civil Rights Act claim. ... Once it is established that a defendant was acting pursuant to official regulations, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to assert that the defendant was not acting in good faith. ... Even if the regulations are subsequently found to be invalid a defendant’s good faith enforcement of these regulations can still be a defense to a section 1983 suit.

A state supreme court is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Ostroff v. New Jersey Supreme Court · filed 1976-06-23

.The New Jersey Supreme Court is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a civil rights action against a borough because a borough is not a person within the meaning of the statute.

Olson v. Borough of Homestead · filed 1976-07-07

Since the borough is not a “person” within the meaning of the statute, it is not a proper defendant in the civil rights action.

A private store cannot be liable under § 1983 merely as an employer or active participant because its conduct is not state action.

Holt v. Board of Mayor · filed 1976-09-16

If the store were an active participant, it could still not be state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a civil-rights suit against the District of Columbia or its officers.

Jones v. District of Columbia · filed 1977-01-06

That being so, neither the District of Columbia nor its officers are amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a state a suable person.

Millet, Pit & Seed Co., Inc. v. United States · filed 1977-05-30

Finally, the State of Tennessee correctly asserts that it is not a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The State of Tennessee and the United States Government are both dismissed as improper defendants in Millet, Pit and Seed Company’s civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a suit against individual defendants for alleged constitutional violations but not against SEPTA, which is not a statutory “person”; the claim was also timely under Pennsylvania’s six-year limitations period.

Lewis v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1977-09-16

The Section 1983 action against SEPTA must be dismissed because it is not a “person” for the purposes of that section and a direct Fourteenth Amendment claim may not be implied against it. But plaintiff can pursue this action against the individual defendants because she has alleged a violation of her First Amendment right of freedom of speech and the action was commenced well before the expiration of the applicable six-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 does not treat a municipal police department as a suable person.

Garnet Vinson v. Richmond Police Dept., and Richmond Commonwealth Attorney, Etc. · filed 1977-12-12

It is, however, settled that the Police Department of the City of Richmond, Virginia, is not a person within the purview of § 1983 and is not suable thereunder.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a political body that is not a statutory person.

Hamilton v. Covington · filed 1978-01-17

The action against the Quorum Court as an entity, must be dismissed because it is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against states or their political subdivisions as statutory “persons,” does not overcome the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, and does not federalize a claim alleging nothing more than breach of contract.

Building Engineering Services Co. v. Louisiana · filed 1978-09-28

Concerning the State and the District, the plaintiff states no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon which relief may be granted since states and their political subdivisions are not “persons” within the meaning of that statute. ... Moreover, the Court notes that by virtue of the eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution, the State of Louisiana is immune from suit brought under section 1983. ... Finally, the Court addresses the issue of whether or not the breach of contract, as styled in plaintiff’s complaint, is cognizable under section 1983. ... Circumstances, such as herein presented to the Court, which involve nothing more than an alleged breach of contract, are not to be unreasonably construed simply to bestow a jurisdictional basis upon a federal court. For these reasons, the Court declines to exercise its jurisdiction over this claim for breach of contract.

Section 1983 requires direct and personal action for individual board-member liability, and members of municipal boards and commissions are persons who may be sued under the statute.

Kohler v. Hirst · filed 1978-10-05

This type of conduct, even if true, does not subject the board members to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. More direct personal action is required. ... The last contention of defendants is that the members of the library board are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore cannot be sued. This is incorrect. ... If municipalities are now suable, so too must be members of municipal boards and commissions.

Section 1983 imposes liability only on persons who subject others to constitutional injuries or cause those injuries, and does not impose damages liability on officials whose role is purely ministerial.

Roslindale Cooperative Bank v. Greenwald · filed 1979-12-07

Section 1983 imposes liability only on those persons who subject others, or by their actions cause such others to be subjected, to constitutional injuries. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974). The role of Central Bank and its directors in this statutory scheme is purely ministerial: upon notification from the Commissioner that one of its member banks has been certified, Central Bank must intervene and must retain control of the certified member bank until further action by the Commissioner. The concentration of all discretionary powers in the Commissioner removes Central Bank and its board of directors from liability for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law and therefore does not apply to federal agencies.

Clark v. United States · filed 1980-01-08

However, by its terms § 1983 applies only in cases of persons acting under color of state law. There is no basis for its application to federal agencies.

Section 1983 does not treat a State as a person subject to suit under the statute.

Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. State · filed 1980-09-30

The State has moved to dismiss the action against it on the ground that it is not a person within the meaning of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, the statute Plaintiffs sue under. The State is correct, and its motion is granted.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages liability for a supervisory official who had no personal role in the alleged wrongdoing.

Billings v. Massachusetts · filed 1980-10-16

To the extent that the plaintiff intended the Commonwealth to be a named party, I rule that he has no action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... It is settled law in this Circuit that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not authorize “damages liability where an individual had no personal role in the wrongdoing.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege and prove an official policy or custom causing the constitutional violation, and permits liability for private individuals only when they are directly involved in or actively encourage official misconduct.

Hassell v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1981-02-11

In order to state a claim under § 1983, Hassell must allege and prove that the City has a policy or custom of engaging in the unconstitutional activities complained of. ... An allegation that city officials were acting in furtherance of their duty to enforce the Philadelphia Code at the time the alleged constitutional violations occurred only establishes that they were acting under color of law. ... Accordingly, the City is correct that Hassell has failed to state a claim against it under § 1983. ... As a general matter § 1983 does not extend to the actions of private individuals, and there must be action by the state itself or state officials to bring its provisions to bear. ... However, a private individual “acting in concert with public officials” is subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides an adequate and exclusive remedy for constitutional violations by federal officials acting in complicity with state officials and under color of state law.

Hampton v. Hanrahan · filed 1981-08-04

First, if the federal officials acted in complicity with the state officials, and the injury to the plaintiffs was perpetrated under color of state law, the federal officials are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... To the extent that the allegedly illegal actions of the federal officials were carried out under color of state law, § 1983 provides an adequate and exclusive remedy.

Section 1983 does not authorize claims against a state, protects a prosecutor with absolute immunity for initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's case, and requires a county claim to identify a county action, custom, or policy that caused the constitutional deprivation.

Prettyman v. STATE OF NEB., COUNTY OF CASS · filed 1982-04-15

Plaintiffs also allege a cause of action against the defendants under the Civil Rights statutes, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Even giving the complaint the liberal construction which federal notice pleading requires, it does not allege facts against any of the defendants which are actionable under 1983. The defendant State of Nebraska is, of course, not amenable to suit under the statute. ... The Cass County Attorney, Ronald D. Moravec “enjoys absolute immunity with respect to initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case.” ... And there is no allegation in the complaint that Mr. Moravec’s involvement in this matter is not limited to his official capacity. With regard to the defendant Cass County, there is nothing in the complaint which identifies any action, custom or policy of the county which allegedly deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. There is not even a specific reference to the County in plaintiffs’ allegations. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiffs’ 1983 claims should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make a private entity amenable to suit when no conspiracy is alleged.

Bryant v. St. Helena Parish School Board · filed 1983-03-30

The defendant, Regina Coeli Child Development Center, did not employ plaintiff and is a private concern not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the absence of an allegation of conspiracy.

A state judge acting as a neutral adjudicator ordinarily is not a proper § 1983 defendant in a prospective challenge to a state statute because the judge has no adversarial stake in defending the statute.

R.W.T. ex rel Cohn v. Dalton · filed 1983-07-21

In the typical prospective assault on the constitutionality of a state statute, the state judge is not a proper party defendant under § 1983 because he has no stake in upholding the statute: he is not the plaintiff's adversary, and the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 supplies jurisdiction for civil-rights claims against state actors, not the federal government or federal agencies.

Farquhar v. Food & Drug Administration · filed 1985-06-13

Statutes such as ... and other civil rights statutes cited by the plaintiff are an appropriate basis for jurisdiction only when the ... (not the federal government) are defendants.

Section 1983 remedies only wrongdoing under color of state law and does not cover conduct by federal officials or private parties acting under federal law.

Fehrmann v. Phillips · filed 1985-06-13

Section 1983 creates a remedy to redress deprivations under color of state law, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. The statute, by its express terms, is directed only to state wrongdoing. At best, defendant acted under color of federal law when it complied with the IRS instructions; but section 1983 does not protect against such acts.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against defendants who are immune from suit or are not state actors.

Hussey v. Sauls · filed 1997-04-24

Further, all of the named Defendants appear either to be immune from suit under federal civil rights statutes or are not state actors.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state prison, and a plaintiff must identify how another defendant was responsible for the alleged constitutional violations.

Hallquist v. South Dakota State Penitentiary Prison Health Services · filed 1997-05-21

Because the prison is immune from section 1983 liability, and Hallquist did not delineate how Prison Health Services was responsible for any alleged constitutional violations, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against WMATA because, as an arm of the state, it is not a person under the statute.

Lucero-Nelson v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1998-02-24

Moreover, the Court is persuaded that as an arm of the state WMATA is not a “person” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Frisby · filed 1998-03-25

MCI cannot rely on § 1983 as creating a cause of action against the State Commission officials because the Supreme Court has held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities, are 'persons’ under § 1983.”

A municipal police department is not a legal entity that can be sued under Section 1983.

Gorton v. Burlington Police Department · filed 1998-09-28

A municipal police department is not a legal entity which can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A company with eminent domain powers under the Natural Gas Act is a quasi-governmental entity for purposes of a § 1983 action.

Columbia Gas v. Drain · filed 2001-01-08

We note that because Columbia Gas has eminent domain powers under the Natural Gas Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), it is a quasi- governmental entity for purposes of a § 1983 action.

States and state agencies sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

K.S. v. Summers · filed 2001-05-23

Relator correctly contends that it could not be held liable under 42 USC § 1983 because states or departmental agencies such as relator sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state or its board of trustees because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Navarro v. UIC Medical Center · filed 2001-09-24

In that regard Board of Trustees is right in invoking the teaching of Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) that the State of Illinois (and hence Board of Trustees) is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because it is not a legal entity amenable to suit.

Owens v. Scott County Jail · filed 2003-05-13

We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to SCJ, because county jails are not legal entities amenable to suit.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment claim against social workers who deliberately or recklessly present false information to a judicial officer to obtain entry into a home.

Davenport v. Tunnell · filed 1988-10-28

In summary, the Court finds that m Section 1983 action can lie against social workers under the fourth amendment where false information is either deliberately or recklessly presented to a judicial officer for the purpose of obtaining entry into a home under the circumstances of this case.

Section 1983 damages claims cannot proceed against state court judges protected by absolute immunity or defendants who did not act under color of state law.

Williamson v. David Buckingham Don Brock, Judge Warren Hopkins Mike Ward Randy Hutchins James Lassiter · filed 1989-02-27

The two state court judges named as defendants are absolutely immune from monetary damages. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). The remaining defendants were not acting under color of state law and, therefore, were properly dismissed.

A state is not a person under Section 1983 and cannot be sued under that statute.

Thournir v. Meyer · filed 1989-03-08

In addition, Colorado is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and may not be sued under that statute.

A state agency cannot be sued under Section 1983, but its individual members may be sued.

BD. OF EXAMINERS OF CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS EX REL. JUGE v. Neyrey · filed 1989-03-30

Therefore, the Board itself is immune from suit under Section 1983. However, the individual members of the Board are not immune from suit under this section.

A county is a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Jackson v. Johns · filed 1989-06-08

I agree with the plaintiff that the County of Logan is a political subdivision of the State of Colorado and therefore a “person” subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit against a state agency that is an arm of the state because the agency is not a "person" under the section.

Lindas v. Cady · filed 1989-06-23

The DHSS is certainly such a governmental entity. We, therefore, find that Lindas's sec. 1983 action against the DHSS is barred because the DHSS is not a "person" subject to suit under sec. 1983.

Section 1983 governs who may be sued under it, so Florida law limiting suits against county commissioners to the county does not bar claims against the commissioners.

Wright v. Manatee County · filed 1989-08-07

Federal law in this instance is not incomplete on the subject of who may be sued under Section 1983. Even if it were incomplete, incorporation of Section 125.15, Florida Statutes, would be inconsistent with the policies underlying federal action on Section 1983 and Title VII claims.

States are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Sweatt v. State of Md. · filed 1989-10-17

States are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a personal-capacity claim against a state agent alleged to have caused a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, but does not permit claims against a state agency or a state agent in his official capacity.

Santiago v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1989-11-29

The motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is granted as to DOCS and Dr. Stein-hart in his official capacity and is denied as to Dr. Steinhart in his personal capacity.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Taylor · filed 1989-12-04

The allegation concerning the acts of the legislature clearly involves the action of the state itself, and the state is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Popek v. STATE, DEPT. OF HUMAN SERV. · filed 1990-01-31

Moreover, the State of New Jersey is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against the United States or its agencies for actions under federal law because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Scott v. United States Veteran's Administration · filed 1990-08-20

Defendants correctly note, however, that section 1983 does not provide a forum to redress actions taken by the United States government or its agencies under federal law. These entities are not “persons” that can be sued under the statute, and actions of the federal government are “facially exempt” from section 1983.

State officials sued for monetary damages in their individual capacities are persons under § 1983, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar those claims.

G-69 v. Degnan · filed 1990-08-21

Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment presents no jurisdictional bar to plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages from the Attorney General defendants in their individual capacities, and these defendants are “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a state department of corrections or an official sued only in his official capacity.

Gorden W. See v. James Collins, Department of Corrections · filed 1990-08-21

Moreover, this suit seeking only monetary damages against the Department of Corrections is barred as this defendant is not a "person" within the meaning of Sec. 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989). The defendant Collins was acting entirely within the bounds of his official capacity and was not named in his individual capacity in See's complaint and is, therefore, also not subject to damages in this Sec. 1983 action. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989).

Section 1983 does not treat a State’s Attorney sued in his official capacity as a person subject to suit.

Houston v. Cook County · filed 1990-09-24

Partee in his official capacity, then, is not a “person” for Section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 treats governmental units such as transit authorities as persons whose conduct it governs.

Manti v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1991-03-19

Governmental units such as the NYCTA are among those "persons” whose conduct is proscribed by statute.

Section 1983 claims against state agencies must be dismissed, while state officials may be sued for prospective injunctive relief.

Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Blanchard · filed 1991-04-11

The present lawsuit seeks prospective injunctive relief. Therefore, the claims against the individual defendants — Blanchard, Pitz, and the members of the Commission — are not precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. However, the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1983, and § 1981 claims against MDOT and the Commission will be dismissed because these entities are state agencies, not state officials.

A city police department that is an organizational division of the city is not a separate suable entity in a § 1983 action.

Smith v. City of Chicago Police Department · filed 1991-07-12

The district court also correctly determined that Smith's claim against the Police Department is a suit against an organizational division of the City and therefore not a separate suable entity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state agency or a state official acting in an official capacity.

Leroy H. Johnson, Jr. v. Alex Rodriguez, Etc. · filed 1991-10-09

It is settled beyond peradventure, however, that neither a state agency nor a state official acting in his official capacity may be sued for damages in a section 1983 action.

State officials sued in their individual capacities are persons who may be sued under § 1983.

Goodmon v. Rockefeller · filed 1991-10-29

Our order reaches only the question of whether the defendants in their individual capacities are persons as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We hold that they are.

Section 1983 permits suit against a bistate agency that is more like a local governmental entity than an arm of its compacting states and does not enjoy their sovereign immunity.

Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp. · filed 1991-11-07

We conclude Bi-State has not given us good reason to believe Missouri and Illinois intended Bi-State to enjoy sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, Bi-State is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person that can be sued under the statute.

Dunning v. Paccerelli · filed 1991-12-10

A state is not a "person" under the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow suit against a state civil service commission, but its individual members are persons who may be sued.

Kyle v. Civil Service Com'n · filed 1992-01-03

Accordingly, the Civil Service Commission is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. However, the individual members of the Commission are "persons" within the meaning of the statute and may be sued.

Section 1983 does not authorize a claim against the United States because the United States is not a person under the statute.

United States v. Vital Health Products, Ltd. · filed 1992-03-10

The United States, however, is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state or a state official acting in an official capacity because neither is a person subject to suit under the statute.

Wilkerson v. State · filed 1992-03-12

Initially, we note that neither a state nor a state official acting in his or her official capacity is a “person” who is subject to suit for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow suits against Virginia local jails because they are arms of the state and therefore are not persons under the statute.

McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional Center · filed 1992-04-13

After reviewing the applicable state'law, the Court finds that the level of state involvement in the regulation and administration of local jails in Virginia indicates that the local jails are arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and thus not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities.

MSA Realty Corp. v. State of Ill. · filed 1992-07-07

States and State officials acting in their official capacities are unamenable to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities and public defenders who conspire with state officials have an arguable legal basis.

Amlak v. Alameda County · filed 1992-08-06

Amlak's complaint also names as defendants Michael Ogul, a deputy public defender, James Rowland, the Director of the California Department of Corrections, and Daniel Vasquez, the Warden of San Quentin Prison. Amlak's claims for damages against these defendants have an arguable basis in law. See Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991) (state officials sued in their individual capacities are not immune from suit for damages under section 1983); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984) (public defender who conspires with state officials acts under color of state law and may be liable under section 1983). The district court erred by dismissing Amlak's claims against these defendants as frivolous.

Section 1983 does not permit an action, as asserted, against a state court judge and a state court.

Polyak v. Jim T. Hamilton, Individually and in His Judicial Capacity as Circuit Judge Circuit Court of Lawrence · filed 1992-08-18

The district court denied Mrs. Polyak's request to reopen the case on the grounds that "[n]o amount of new evidence can change the basic proposition that this action cannot be maintained, as asserted, against a state court judge and a state court." Upon review, we find no error.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state entity because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Oliver v. Superior Court of Plymouth County · filed 1992-09-11

A state entity for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against the District of Columbia Department of Corrections because it is not subject to suit.

Warren v. Stempson · filed 1992-09-18

As the Court noted in its Order of March 13, 1992, the Department of Corrections is not subject to suit. ... Thus, the claim against the Department of Corrections is dismissed.

State officials acting in their official capacities are not persons within the meaning of Section 1983.

Bapat v. Connecticut Department of Health Services · filed 1992-12-29

Moreover, state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

A police department with no legal existence separate from its city cannot be sued under § 1983.

Martin v. Fred Stone and Philip Mannion, 1 · filed 1993-03-03

Although listed in the complaint and the appellate briefs, the Chicago Police Department has no legal existence separate from the City of Chicago and therefore cannot be sued.

State courts are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Clark v. Clark · filed 1993-03-25

Courts are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, if they were, the action would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, anyway.

The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and its officers acting in their official capacities are not subject to § 1983 liability because the Commonwealth is not a person under the statute.

Tran v. Com. of Northern Mariana Islands · filed 1993-05-18

We have previously held that the CNMI is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. DeNieva v. Reyes, 966 F.2d 480, 482-83 (9th Cir.1992). Thus, neither the CNMI nor any of its officers acting in an official capacity is subject to § 1983 liability.

Court-appointed defense counsel is not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Meehan v. J. Paul Newman John Doe, Assistant District Attorney John Doe, Police Officer Ann Lacy Johns, Judge Su · filed 1994-03-21

His defense counsel is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981); the county prosecutor is entitled to immunity, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-26 (1976); and the state court judge is not subject to monetary damages.

Section 1983 treats a state officer sued in an official capacity for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief as a person.

Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota · filed 1994-05-13

The Band’s motion for summary judgment on the State’s defense that its officers acting in their official capacities are not persons under Section 1983 should be granted.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its agencies as persons subject to a claim for monetary relief.

Lindenman v. Umscheid · filed 1994-06-03

Under the facts of this case, where monetary relief is sought, a state and its agencies are not persons within the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may name specific prison employees or officials acting under color of state law, or private individuals who willfully participate in joint action with a state actor.

Harrison v. Dutchman Correctional Institution Perry Correctional Institution · filed 1994-08-16

We note that Harrison can save this action by amending his complaint to include allegations against specific prison employees or officials who acted under color of state law, or against private individuals who were willful participants in a joint action with a State or agent of a State.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Shaper v. Tracy · filed 1994-09-29

To the extent that appellant seeks monetary damages, her Section 1983 claim must fail. When sued for damages, state and state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” pursuant to Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a state or state governmental entity to be sued because neither is a “person” under the statute.

Young v. Larkin · filed 1994-09-30

It is well-established that a state or state governmental entity is not encompassed by the term “person” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Walter K. Wells Martha W. Wells Annie Wells v. Darrel J. Rexwinkel Carl Brady Oral Freeman John Kelsey Marilyn May Alask · filed 1994-11-07

We agree with the district court that plaintiffs' amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the state, the Department of Revenue and its employees acting in their official capacities. See Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir.1992) (eleventh amendment bars a federal court action for damages against a state and against an official acting in his official capacity). See also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983).

A local government hospital is subject to suit under § 1983.

Martin v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport · filed 1995-03-01

Memorial Hospital as a local government entity is subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an arm of the state or impose liability on a supervisor solely through respondeat superior.

Venable v. Rufus Fleming, Warden Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 1995-04-19

The district court properly found that the parties Venable named in his original complaint were not amenable to suit under Sec. 1983 on the facts alleged in the complaint. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) (arm of state not "person" for Sec. 1983 purposes); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (respondeat superior unavailable in Sec. 1983 actions).

Section 1983 does not allow suits against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Cipolla v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec. · filed 1995-06-09

Cipolla's claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the DES and all of the individually-named defendants in their official capacities were properly dismissed because neither a state nor any of its officials sued in an official capacity is a "person" suable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat the University of Puerto Rico or officials sued in their official capacities for damages as persons subject to suit.

Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 1995-06-13

Neither co-defendant University of Puerto Rico nor the other co-defendants sued in their official capacities for damages are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to a hospital organized under state law.

Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hospital · filed 1995-06-20

Hamilton County Hospital is organized under state law, thereby making it subject to Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state corrections department because the department is not a person under the statute.

Staples v. Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 1995-07-19

Accordingly, VDOC is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state department of correction.

McReynolds v. May · filed 1995-08-28

While dismissal was appropriate as to the Department of Correction, see Barnes v. Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 65 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam), we conclude the district court abused its discretion in dismissing McReynolds's complaint against the other defendants, see Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir.1994) (standard of review for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d)).

Section 1983 applies to a county hospital operating under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 339.

Martha Sabol Wright John C. Wright, Jr. v. Metrohealth Medical Center, Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. · filed 1995-09-01

MetroHealth is a county hospital operating under Chapter 339 of the Ohio Revised Code. As such, it is subject to the mandates of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state university as a person that can be sued under the statute.

Bartges v. UNIVERSITY OF N. CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE · filed 1995-11-06

First, UNCC is not a person within the meaning of § 1983, ... and further, UNCC is immune from suit from damages by reason of the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state agency or state officials in their official capacities, but permits suits against officials in their personal capacities.

Harrison v. TEX. DEPT. OF CRIM. JUSTICE · filed 1995-12-07

Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983. ... Therefore, TDCJ-ID is an improper party to appellant's § 1983 claim. However, a § 1983 action will lie against these employees in their personal, rather than their official, capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because a county jail is not a legal entity amenable to suit.

Owens v. Scott County Jail Richard D. Huff, Major · filed 2003-05-16

We affirm the grant of summary-judgment as to SCJ, because county jails are not legal entities amenable to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state agency because the agency is not a “person” under the statute.

Endres, Benjamin v. Indiana State Police · filed 2003-06-27

The Indiana State Police, as a unit of state government, is not a “person” as §1983 uses that term and therefore is not amenable to a suit for damages under that statute.

Section 1983 does not authorize a suit against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Wilson v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission · filed 2003-11-13

However, neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under section 1983.

Section 1983 bars a claim against the University of the Virgin Islands but permits a money-damages claim against a territorial employee in her individual capacity.

Bell v. University of the Virgin Islands · filed 2003-11-19

Therefore, Plaintiff can only bring a claim for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Bellone as an individual. ... Furthermore, Plaintiff is barred from bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendant UVI.

Section 1983 treats university administrative officers acting in their official capacity as persons subject to suit.

Channing Club v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech University · filed 1970-09-17

The memorandum in support of this motion took the position that administrative officers acting in their official capacity were not “persons” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relying on Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 300 F.Supp. 794 (S.D.Tex.1969) and Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School District, 309 F.Supp. 1034 (S.D.Tex.1969). ... holding that such officials were persons within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. ... The Motion to Dismiss is denied.

Section 1983 permits suits against individuals and associations acting under color of state law unless the claim is a ruse to assert personal jurisdiction over the state.

Keckeisen v. Independent School District 612 · filed 1975-02-28

Although the states are given immunity by the Eleventh Amendment from the prosecution of civil claims, individuals and associations acting under col- or of state law are not immune to the sanctions of the Civil Rights Act and may be sued, unless it is clear to the court that the claim is actually a ruse by which personal jurisdiction over the state is sought to be exercised.

A state corrections agency is not a person that may be sued under § 1983.

Retzlaff v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2004-03-04

However, appellant fails to otherwise satisfy the first prong of the test, because TDCJ is not a “person” who can be sued under section 1983.

A state official sued in an official capacity is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Houston v. Zeller · filed 2004-03-17

Houston’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities fail as a matter of law because a state official sued in his or her official capacity is not a “person” who can be sued for purposes of liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a local school board and its members sued in their official capacities to face claims for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief.

Hawkins v. Board of Public Education · filed 1979-03-14

After Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Board of Education “can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief . . .’’It follows that the members of the Board, in their official capacities, are in a similar position.

Section 1983 permits claims only against persons and does not allow claims against the MDOC.

Rumsey v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2004-05-28

Although there is no indication that Defendant Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) was properly served with the complaint, this Defendant is also dismissed because the MDOC is not a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims against the MDOC are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.