42 U.S.C. § 1983

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim generally accrues when the prosecutor enters a nolle prosequi, which terminates the prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor.

Spak v. Phillips · filed 2017-05-22

We agree with the district court that as a general matter a nolle prosequi constitutes a “favorable termination” for the purpose of determining when a Section 1983 claim accrues.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment violation.

Fisher v. Koopman · filed 2017-05-23

But we explained in Becker that a plaintiff “must allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment in order to proceed on a theory of § 1983 malicious prosecution.” 494 F.3d at 919. Becker thus presents an insurmountable obstacle to the § 1983 claims: Because Ms. Fisher did not (and cannot) allege a Fourth Amendment violation, her federal malicious prosecution claims have no constitutional violation to sustain them.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure and the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

Reed v. Clough · filed 2017-06-02

To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures in addition to the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires, among other elements, that the defendant acted with malice.

Hale v. Duvall · filed 2017-07-27

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim inéludes the following elements: “(1) the defendant caused the plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecution;'' (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, br prosecution; (4) the. defendant acted with malice; and (5) the' plaintiff sustained damages.”

Section 1983 permits a malicious-prosecution claim for continued detention without probable cause, even when an indictment initially supported detention.

Randall Mills v. Barnard · filed 2017-08-28

But the § 1983 version of “malicious prosecution” is not limited to the institution of proceedings; it can also support a claim for “continued detention without probable cause.”

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim against officers who conceal or fabricate evidence to create probable cause, even when a prosecutor or grand jury intervenes.

Braswell v. Medina · filed 2017-09-05

Accordingly, in cases where law enforcement officers conceal or fabricate evidence in order to falsely show that probable cause exists to prosecute a criminal defendant, the intervening decision of the prosecutor or grand jury will not immunize the officers from liability on a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for malicious prosecution by itself when the claim alleges no constitutional injury.

Riggs v. Gibbs · filed 2017-09-29

As noted above with respect to Defendant Majors, a claim for malicious prosecution under §1983 is not recognized in the Eighth Circuit, which has “uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.” Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in defendants’ favor on plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a freestanding malicious prosecution claim; the claim must rest on a denial of rights secured under federal law.

Graham v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit · filed 2017-12-28

Thus, to proceed under section 1983, a malicious prosecution claim must be based on a denial of rights secured under federal law.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require the common law elements of malicious prosecution and a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.

Jannuzzo v. Glock, Inc. · filed 2018-01-04

In order to establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) the common law elements for malicious prosecution and (2) that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s seizure; independent warrant and indictment decisions can break that causal chain.

Mead v. Shaw · filed 2018-01-11

Mead failed to establish that Appellees caused his arrest and trial, as the intervening acts of the magistrate who issued arrest warrants and the grand juries that issued bills of indictment insulate Appellees from liability.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires a lack of probable cause for the arrest.

Jordan v. Secretary, Florida Department of Children and Family Services · filed 2018-01-19

We have determined that, among other elements, a lack of probable cause for the arrest is a required element of a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim. ... Since Jordan ... does not deny that he engaged in conduct satisfying this description, probable cause for his arrest and prosecution existed. As a result, Jordan did not have a viable claim for malicious prosecution under Florida law or § 1983.

A malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983 requires a lack of probable cause, among other elements.

Hedger v. Kramer · filed 2018-02-28

To maintain their malicious-prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs “must show: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) there was no probable cause to confine or prosecute the plaintiff; (4) malice; and (5) damages.” Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 650 (10th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). The claim fails on the third prong because, as discussed above, even if Whitaker had disclosed the allegedly exculpatory statements, there was clearly probable cause to institute proceedings to seize S.H.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment seizure after prosecution begins; release on bond without a significant ongoing deprivation of liberty does not suffice.

Robert F. Abercrombie, Jr. v. Trey Beam · filed 2018-03-15

Under the facts of this case, Abercrombie cannot maintain a separate § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. The record does not show that Abercrombie suffered a Fourth Amendment “seizure” after the prosecution began. It appears that, after arraignment, Abercrombie was released once he posted bond. At some point thereafter, the prosecutor dismissed the charge. Nothing in the record indicates any significant or ongoing deprivation of liberty imposed as a condition of pretrial release. Consequently, Beam is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the defendant to have caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or prosecution.

Shed v. OK Dept. of Human Services · filed 2018-04-05

But the child-welfare reports did not cause Shed’s arrest. We therefore agree with the district court that “the proposed amendment would be futile, in that it still does not state a plausible allegation of causation.”

Section 1983 malicious prosecution liability requires an officer’s culpable conduct to be sufficiently connected to the decision to prosecute.

Meeks v. City of Detroit, Mich. · filed 2018-04-09

Based on the unique facts of this case, we conclude that even if Cross-Nelson’s conduct was reckless, it was too far removed from the decision to prosecute Meeks to constitute participation for malicious prosecution purposes.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails if the plaintiff cannot show that the defendant initiated the criminal proceeding without probable cause.

Finneman v. Septa · filed 2018-04-13

For that reason, Finneman has failed to establish that Campbell initiated the proceedings against him without probable cause under § 1983. Accordingly, his claim under § 1983 fails.

Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Frank v. City of Henderson · filed 2018-05-18

At the time Farley submitted the warrant affidavits, therefore, he had probable cause to arrest Frank for violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 207.280. This is an absolute defense to a claim for malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the elements of the common law tort and a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Hardaway v. Dickerson · filed 2018-05-30

To establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, Hardaway must prove “(1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution; and (2) a ... violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the plaintiff establishes an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment in addition to the elements of the common-law tort.

Livingston Manners v. Officer Ronald Cannella · filed 2018-06-04

In addition to establishing the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution -- “(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused” -- a plaintiff asserting malicious prosecution under § 1983 must establish that there was an unreasonable seizure made in violation of the Fourth Amendment, such as an arrest made without probable cause.

Section 1983 requires a federal malicious prosecution plaintiff to prove the elements of the common law tort and a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Robert H. Wright, Jr. v. S/A Jerald Watson · filed 2018-07-11

“To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim follows federal law; denial of a directed-verdict motion in the criminal case does not conclusively establish probable cause.

Blue v. Lopez · filed 2018-08-28

Federal law, not state law, governs the resolution of § 1983 claims. And federal law does not allow the denial of a motion for directed verdict to serve as conclusive evidence of probable cause.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim following a warrantless arrest requires arraignment or indictment; arrest alone is insufficient.

Cottam v. Pelton · filed 2018-09-10

To establish a malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of common law malicious prosecution and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. ... Here, Cottam was never arraigned or indicted, but was merely arrested. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment against Cottam’s malicious-prosecution claim because Cottam was never seized in violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding claim for malicious prosecution.

Porter v. Lear · filed 2018-09-28

Porter first argues that a federal cause of action exists under § 1983 for a malicious prosecution. But “no such freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution exists.”

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the elements of common law malicious prosecution and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure.

Hails v. Dennis · filed 2018-11-21

To establish a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, “a plaintiff must prove: (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” ... Thus, there is no evidentiary basis to reject the indictment as prima facie evidence of probable cause for purposes of the malicious prosecution claim. As a result, Dennis’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the malicious prosecution claim is GRANTED.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution requires an unreasonable Fourth Amendment seizure and the elements of common-law malicious prosecution, including lack of probable cause.

Tanner Damali v. City of East Point, Georgia · filed 2019-03-13

To establish a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure in addition to establishing the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires the defendant to have caused the prosecution or confinement, favorable termination, lack of probable cause, malice, and injury.

Moses-El v. City of Denver · filed 2019-03-25

To prove a claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Moses-El must show that: (i) the named defendant caused his continued confinement or prosecution; (ii) the criminal action terminated in his favor; (iii) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (iv) the defendant acted with malice; and (v) Mr. Moses-El suffered injury as a result.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution claim to allege a violation of a specific constitutional right; filing charges without probable cause alone is insufficient.

Oscar Ortega, Roggie Law, Steven Murdock, and Don Egdorf v. Pean · filed 2019-04-11

This is essentially a malicious prosecution claim, which is not actionable under § 1983 absent allegations that the Investigating Officers “violated specific constitutional rights in connection with” the claim that they caused charges to be filed without probable cause.

A § 1983 complaint alleging wrongful arrest and resulting injuries does not give fair notice of a malicious prosecution claim unless it identifies the criminal proceeding as a basis for liability.

Collins v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2019-04-18

Under the circumstances, Collins’s complaint failed to give Appellees fair notice of any claim premised on a malicious prosecution theory of liability. ... Collins did not identify the criminal proceeding as itself giving rise to any cause of action.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof that the defendant caused the prosecution and that it lacked probable cause.

Clifton v. Jeff Davis County, Georgia · filed 2019-06-05

As Plaintiff has failed to put forth sufficient evidence to establish that Defendants instituted his prosecution or that Defendants did so without probable cause, he cannot prove essential elements of his § 1983 and state law malicious prosecution claims.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a favorable termination of the underlying criminal case.

ZISA v. HAVILAND · filed 2019-06-17

To state a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that the underlying criminal conviction was terminated in his favor.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against a nonprosecutor requires a sufficient causal connection between that person’s actions and the decision to prosecute.

Brown v. Truelove · filed 2019-06-24

Although it is not impossible that Halsell’s directive for Plaintiff to register a sex offender could be the first step towards a malicious prosecution, absent a claim that Halsell played more of an essential or influential role in seeking or procuring the arrest warrant or the charges, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient causal connection between Halsell’s actions and the prosecutor’s decision to pursue charges.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails when the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of malicious prosecution under state law.

Smith v. Ware · filed 2019-06-26

Accordingly, the Court may resolve its inquiry into both Smith’s Section 1983 and state law malicious prosecution claims by examining whether Smith has produced facts sufficient to go to a jury on the elements of common law malicious prosecution. ... Because Smith cannot establish an essential element of a New York state law malicious prosecution claim, namely that the prosecution against him was initiated without probable cause, his malicious prosecution claims premised on state law and Section 1983 both fail as a matter of law.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying criminal proceeding terminates in the plaintiff’s favor; reducing a charge within the same proceeding does not start the limitations period.

Peralta v. City Of New York · filed 2019-07-18

Without more, the reduction was the continuance of a single criminal proceeding. It was not until the Court acquitted Peralta of the misdemeanor charge in February 2013 that “the underlying indictment or criminal information [was] vacated” and gave rise to a cause of action for malicious prosecution under section 1983.

A misdemeanor appearance ticket that compels a court appearance can satisfy the Fourth Amendment seizure element of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Daniels v. City of New York · filed 2019-07-31

This meaningful restraint on Wade’s personal liberty constitutes a seizure sufficient to support his claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires proof that the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute.

Fineout v. Del Kostanko · filed 2019-08-02

As to any continued prosecution, we note that plaintiffs have not shown that the police defendants had the requisite role in the decision to prosecute where the record includes letters from the prosecutor to defense counsel.

An officer’s testimony at a preliminary hearing can establish participation in the decision to prosecute for a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim.

Coffey v. Carroll · filed 2019-08-05

As the two officers testified at the preliminary hearing, a jury reasonably could conclude that the officers influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute Coffey.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a seizure pursuant to legal process; a warrantless arrest alone is insufficient.

Romine v. Officer Clint Dieball · filed 2019-08-06

The Fourth Amendment violation must be established via a seizure in relation to the prosecution; a warrantless arrest cannot support a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim without a subsequent warrant, indictment, or arraignment.

Section 1983 does not provide a malicious prosecution claim based only on negligence or mistake.

Martinez v. Morgan · filed 2019-08-07

Prosecution based on negligence or mistake does not amount to a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983 does not impose malicious prosecution liability on an officer when a prosecutor’s independent actions break the causal chain between the officer’s conduct and the plaintiff’s seizure.

McRavion v. Cline · filed 2019-08-14

Rather, the subsequent acts of the prosecutor insulate Cline from liability.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal process; a warrantless arrest before legal process does not qualify.

Watson v. Kirsch Liquors · filed 2019-08-20

Where, as here, a person is arrested without a warrant and before the issuance of any legal process, that arrest does not form part of a Fourth Amendment seizure upon which a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim may be premised.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the criminal proceeding.

JOHNSON v. BILOTTA · filed 2019-08-28

Here, Plaintiffs malicious prosecution claims against Defendants Iemmello and Cronin fail for the same reason. Plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction has been overturned, and he has therefore not pled a plausible entitlement to relief on such a claim.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires an officer to have made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute in more than a passive or neutral way.

Parnell v. City of Detroit, Mich. · filed 2019-09-05

An officer is not liable for malicious prosecution under § 1983 unless he “made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff,” Webb, 789 F.3d at 659, “in more than a passive or neutral way,” Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2015).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a favorable termination; a dismissal without prejudice qualifies only if the failure to proceed implies a lack of reasonable grounds for prosecution.

Bickford v. Hensley · filed 2019-09-20

Dismissal without prejudice is not a termination in favor of a plaintiff for purposes of malicious prosecution unless the failure to proceed implies a lack of reasonable grounds for the prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof that the prosecution was intended to deny equal protection or another specific constitutional right.

Santana v. County of Yuba · filed 2019-09-27

Therefore, to establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show that the purpose of the allegedly malicious prosecution was to deny “equal protection or another specific constitutional right.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim satisfies the favorable termination requirement when the state dismisses the charges because it cannot prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Virgil v. Police Officer Tinina Alexander · filed 2019-09-27

Therefore, the Court finds that post-Lanning, a dismissal based on the state’s express inability to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to show a favorable termination for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution requires a seizure in relation to the prosecution that violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Taylor v. Villegas · filed 2019-09-28

Thus, because the record before the Court establishes that Plaintiff “was [not] seized in relation to the prosecution, in violation of h[is] constitutional rights,” Plaintiff does not have a cognizable Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the defendant to have caused a seizure pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause; an independent magistrate’s warrant determination can break that causal link.

Wilson v. Woods · filed 2019-09-30

In order to establish a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.” ... Therefore, the probable cause determinations of the magistrate, rather than Officer Woods, were the proximate cause of Wilson’s arrest and detention.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the criminal proceeding to have ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Schneider 181658 v. Poulin · filed 2019-10-15

He has not and he cannot allege that they have been resolved in his favor. Accordingly, he cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is barred by Heck when the criminal proceeding did not terminate in the plaintiff’s favor and success on the claim would call the conviction into question.

KINDER v. MARINEZ · filed 2019-10-23

Because the criminal proceeding did not terminate in Kinder’s favor, his malicious prosecution claim is barred by Heck since Kinder’s success in asserting a racial bias claim would necessarily call that conviction into question.

Section 1983 does not support a freestanding malicious prosecution claim without an underlying constitutional violation.

Murray v. McNutt · filed 2019-10-24

As an initial matter, to the extent Mr. Murray contends his complaint should be construed as a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution separate and apart from his alleged constitutional violations, the Court rejects that contention.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of a state-law malicious-prosecution claim; under New York law, a traffic infraction does not supply the required criminal proceeding.

Azeez v. City of New York · filed 2019-10-29

To prevail on a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, “a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.” ... But Azeez has not shown that a criminal prosecution has been initiated against him. Nor could he, since the underlying traffic infractions are not a crime. ... That fact alone is fatal to Azeez’s malicious-prosecution claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires criminal proceedings to terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Anderson v. Roop · filed 2019-11-13

Inasmuch as Anderson’s state criminal proceedings are ongoing, his criminal proceedings have not “terminated in [his] favor.” Accordingly, the court will dismiss this claim without prejudice.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a prosecution brought with malice and without probable cause for the purpose of denying equal protection or another specific constitutional right.

Capolupo v. Eills · filed 2019-12-05

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any of the elements necessary to make out a claim of malicious prosecution, under § 1983, or otherwise. Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Defendants instigated any sort criminal proceeding against her; nor has Plaintiff therefore alleged that such proceedings were instigated with malice or for the purpose of denying a constitutional right.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a lack of probable cause; probable cause defeats the claim.

Early · filed 2019-12-06

As the Court has already found probable cause with regard to the false arrest claim, the Court finds that probable cause also defeats the Plaintiffs’ claim of malicious prosecution.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on falsified evidence requires the false evidence to be material to a finding of probable cause.

Flores v. City of Bakersfield · filed 2019-12-20

Given Plaintiff’s failure to establish any falsified evidence that was material to the findings of probable cause—and thus satisfy elements identified by the Ninth Circuit to support a claim for malicious prosecution under Section 1983—summary adjudication of the First Claim for the Relief, on these grounds, is GRANTED.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires facts showing that the prosecution lacked probable cause.

Fiori v. Peoria Police Department · filed 2020-01-08

An essential element of either a Section 1983 or state malicious prosecution claim is a prosecution without probable cause.

Section 1983 does not provide an independent malicious prosecution claim in the Fifth Circuit.

Rouse v. Ard · filed 2020-01-08

First, in the Fifth Circuit, there is no independently cognizable claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not support a malicious prosecution claim when Illinois law provides a remedy for malicious prosecution.

Gallagher v. Gentile · filed 2020-01-13

Gallagher also brings a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983. ... But any such claim must proceed under Illinois law (which Gallagher cites and therefore is addressed below).

A dismissal on speedy trial grounds satisfies the favorable termination requirement for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Scott v. The City Of New York · filed 2020-01-14

The cases against Scott and M. Mejia were both dismissed on speedy trial grounds. ... Scott and M. Mejia may thus proceed with their § 1983 malicious prosecution claims; they cannot, however, assert these claims against all Individual Defendants.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution liability requires the defendant to have initiated or continued the criminal prosecution.

Clark v. N.Y.C.P.D. · filed 2020-01-29

The Court concludes that no reasonable trier of the facts could conclude that Officer Sikorski initiated or continued the prosecution of Clark, and therefore, summary judgment in Officer Sikorski’s favor on the malicious prosecution claim is proper.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for malicious prosecution under prevailing Seventh Circuit law.

Sanchez v. The Village of Wheeling · filed 2020-01-30

Sánchez is correct that, under prevailing law, there is no § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty caused by the challenged prosecution; a new charge does not satisfy that requirement when it has no effect on the plaintiff’s existing incarceration.

Smith v. John Doe Police Officer · filed 2020-02-24

Plaintiff was already incarcerated when he was arrested and arraigned on May 10, 2016 for the April 11, 2016 robbery. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim must also be dismissed because he is not able to show that he suffered the necessary deprivation of liberty.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim must plead facts supporting each element, including that the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

JONES v. MURPHY · filed 2020-02-27

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must provide facts to support each element of a malicious prosecution claim. “To prove malicious prosecution under [§ ] 1983, a plaintiff must show that: ... (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; ... (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the underlying criminal case to terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Mondragon v. Sena · filed 2020-02-27

A claim for malicious prosecution is viable only where the original action terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Section 1983 does not create a separate malicious prosecution claim; that label describes a Fourth Amendment seizure claim that incorporates a favorable termination requirement.

Taylor v. Cudd · filed 2020-02-28

In other words, what Plaintiff refers to as a “1983 malicious prosecution” claim “is simply a claim founded on a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates elements of the analogous common law tort of malicious prosecution—specifically, the requirement that the prior proceeding terminate favorably to the plaintiff.” Id. at 262.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to identify a specific constitutional violation; malicious prosecution alone is insufficient.

Carter, Jr. v. Point Coupee Parish Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-03-03

Given the foregoing, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s federal “malicious prosecution” claim, as Plaintiff has not identified with any clarity the specific constitutional violations on which it is premised.

Federal law defines the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim; state tort law is persuasive authority.

Diaz v. Grady · filed 2020-03-09

Federal law defines the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, and a State’s tort law serves only as a source of persuasive authority.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty amounting to a Fourth Amendment seizure; attending a criminal hearing alone does not suffice.

JOHN DOE v. EVANCHICK · filed 2020-03-19

Like the plaintiffs in DiBella, Doe was only compelled to attend his criminal hearing, and so did not experience a Fourth Amendment seizure. Because seizure is a necessary element of malicious prosecution under § 1983, Plaintiffs’ claim fails.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the criminal charges to have ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Jones v. Odom · filed 2020-03-25

Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint can be construed to state a claim for malicious prosecution, this claim also fails. In order to establish a claim for malicious prosecution, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the criminal charges brought against him have been resolved in his favor.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the defendant to make, influence, or participate in the decision to prosecute; merely providing information to law enforcement did not satisfy that requirement here.

Adams v. Osborne · filed 2020-03-26

A claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires: (1) that the defendant "ma[d]e, influence[d], or participate[d] in the decision to prosecute" the plaintiff; (2) a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty as a consequence of the legal proceeding; and (4) the criminal proceedings were resolved in the plaintiff's favor. ... Plaintiff’s claims, both federal and state, fail in the first instance. These Defendants did not initiate a criminal proceeding. At most, they provided information to law enforcement.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Thomas v. Heid · filed 2020-03-31

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, "a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment . . . and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law." Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails when the criminal proceedings were supported by probable cause.

MALHAN v. PORRINO · filed 2020-04-02

Therefore, the existence of probable cause for both the 2015 and 2016 complaints precludes a finding of malicious prosecution against Bayonne and the city’s motion for summary judgment as to Count IV will be granted.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is assessed charge by charge, so probable cause for one charge does not foreclose a claim based on another charge.

Bertram v. Viglas · filed 2020-04-16

Based on this case law—and without contrary binding authority from the First Circuit—the Court adopts the majority, charge-specific approach to analyzing Bertram’s malicious prosecution claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires facts showing that the criminal charges terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Lloyd v. Gerhard · filed 2020-04-21

The district court properly dismissed Lloyd’s malicious prosecution claims against defendants Warner and the City of Beaverton because Lloyd failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the criminal fraud charges were terminated in Lloyd’s favor.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in New York requires favorable termination of the criminal proceeding.

Falls v. Pitt · filed 2020-05-01

In New York State, “termination of the proceeding in plaintiffs favor” is an essential element of a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

In a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the prosecutor’s decision to charge breaks the chain of causation absent improper influence or knowing misstatements to the prosecutor.

Taylor v. Thomas · filed 2020-05-04

In this case, the prosecutor’s commencement of legal proceedings against Taylor broke the chain of causation.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires allegations that the defendant caused the prosecution and acted with malice.

Jibrin v. Husseina Jibin Akubakar, al · filed 2020-05-14

And Jibrin’s complaint simply fails to set out the predicate elements of a malicious-prosecution claim: he does not show that ... Mayall improperly influenced the prosecutor or that he acted with malice.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim can satisfy the favorable termination requirement when the government abandons the prosecution because acquittal has become improbable.

Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky. · filed 2020-05-18

We have good reason independent of state or tort law principles to find that a showing that the government abandoned the prosecution because acquittal became “improbable” is enough to meet this element of § 1983 malicious prosecution actions.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding claim for malicious prosecution; such a claim is subsumed by a Fourth Amendment claim.

Laymance v. Taylor · filed 2020-06-11

Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim was subsumed by their Fourth Amendment claim, as a freestanding claim for malicious prosecution is not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not recognize a claim for malicious prosecution.

Reed v. Municipality of Taylorsville, Mississippi · filed 2020-06-15

As defendants correctly argue, a claim for malicious prosecution is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show a seizure pursuant to legal process without probable cause and a favorable end to the criminal proceedings.

Quarles v. C.W. Weeks · filed 2020-06-16

A claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 “is properly understood as a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the common law tort” of malicious prosecution. Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on such a claim, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a state law malicious prosecution claim, misconduct by state actors, and a deprivation of liberty.

Cole v. Grandberry · filed 2020-06-16

To state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he has satisfied the requirements of a state law cause of action for malicious prosecution; (2) the malicious prosecution was committed by state actors; and (3) he was deprived of liberty.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on fabricated information requires factual allegations describing the information; conclusory accusations do not suffice.

Williams v. The City of Syracuse · filed 2020-07-01

And, to the extent Williams claims that defendant officers “created fictions,” “falsehood[s],” and made “fraudulent misrepresentations” to the district attorney’s office, (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 48, 50), there are no allegations concerning the form or substance of the information claimed to have been fabricated.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim can survive dismissal when the alleged circumstances plausibly show that the prosecution ended in a manner indicating innocence.

Manes v. Onondaga County · filed 2020-07-10

“[E]xamining the totality of the[se] circumstances”— the Court cannot say as a matter of law that Plaintiff could not prove that Rivas’s prosecution terminated in a manner that indicated his innocence.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to show a lack of probable cause for at least one charge; probable cause for another offense does not defeat the claim.

Williams v. Aguirre · filed 2020-07-13

Nothing in the Fourth Amendment counsels against applying the common-law rule to claims of malicious prosecution under section 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim must allege that the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Pyatt Jr v. Gimenez · filed 2020-07-14

Moreover, the Complaint does not allege, in any event, how there was a bona fide termination of the original criminal proceeding in his favor.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require the elements of the common law tort and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure; a charge withdrawn as part of a plea agreement does not establish favorable termination.

WILLIAMS v. BRAZIL · filed 2020-07-14

“To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of h[is] Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” ... Plaintiff cannot establish the fifth element of malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails when probable cause supports the charges; officers need not consider complex affirmative defenses when assessing probable cause.

Wagner v. Northern Berks Regional Police · filed 2020-07-17

This outcome is consistent with settled precedent that the presence of probable cause supporting the subsequent charges bars a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania law, Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998) (§ 1983); Corrigan v. Cent. Tax Bureau of Pa., Inc., 828 A.2d 502, 505 (Pa. Commw. Ct. ... 2003) (Pennsylvania law), and our caselaw absolving officers from having to consider complex affirmative defenses, like Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder rule, when making a probable-cause determination.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim can proceed when the plaintiff adequately alleges that an officer helped initiate charges without probable cause and satisfies the claim’s other elements.

Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg d/b/a Bureau of Police · filed 2020-07-22

Thus, Plaintiff has properly alleged all the elements for malicious prosecution under both § 1983 and Pennsylvania common law.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a favorable termination; a nolle prosse alone does not establish one, but circumstances indicating innocence may.

Salley v. Myers · filed 2020-08-10

South Carolina law—which informs our inquiry because § 1983 malicious prosecution claims sound in common law—tells us that a nolle prosse alone will not establish favorable termination.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim against a police officer who wrongfully caused a prosecution if the plaintiff shows malice, lack of probable cause, and a purpose to deny a specific constitutional right.

Brown v. Diaz · filed 2020-08-17

“To maintain a § 1983 action9 for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that ‘the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her [a] specific constitutional right.’” Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). A plaintiff can bring a malicious prosecution claim not only against prosecutors but also against police officers who wrongfully caused his prosecution.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim does not require the prosecution to end in a way that affirmatively supports the plaintiff’s innocence.

Joy Laskar, PH.D. v. Hurd · filed 2020-08-28

After considering both the common law and Fourth Amendment, we hold that the favorable-termination element of malicious prosecution is not limited to terminations that affirmatively support the plaintiff’s innocence.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a state law malicious prosecution claim and proof that the defendants intended to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Anderson v. Pastuna · filed 2020-08-31

A malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires the plaintiff to establish the state law claim and an additional element that the defendants prosecuted the plaintiff with the intent to deprive him of a constitutional right.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires continued confinement or prosecution caused by the defendant, a favorable termination, lack of probable cause, malice, and damages.

Mglej v. Garfield County · filed 2020-09-09

To state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.”

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require a favorable termination; a speedy trial dismissal does not satisfy that requirement without an affirmative indication of innocence.

Minus v. Howard · filed 2020-09-22

After reviewing the relevant precedent, I find more persuasive the line of cases concluding that a speedy trial dismissal does not constitute favorable termination for Section 1983 purposes, particularly under the circumstances of this case.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires a corresponding constitutional violation.

Martin v. Julian · filed 2020-10-13

Because plaintiffs’ complaint fails to plead plausibly any other constitutional violations corresponding with their malicious prosecution claim, Eighth Circuit precedent dictates dismissal of this malicious prosecution claim brought pursuant to § 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the criminal case; the court held that dismissal must indicate the plaintiff’s innocence to satisfy that element.

Ciempa v. Del City City of · filed 2020-10-20

Thus, only if the circumstances of the dismissal indicate Ciempa’s actual innocence can the termination be considered favorable.

A section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the criminal proceedings.

Tyler v. Maggio · filed 2020-12-04

Although Plaintiff asserts that ADA Kleidman acted in an investigatory capacity, he does not allege that the prosecution terminated in his favor. Accordingly, based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff fails to state a malicious prosecution claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails when the officer had probable cause to believe the prosecution could succeed.

Zuccarino v. Town of Hector, New York · filed 2020-12-14

Because the Court agrees that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Deputy Yessman had probable cause to believe the proceeding could succeed, he is entitled to summary judgment, and the Court will not reach the other elements.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a favorable termination of the original action and a lack of probable cause for the arrest, confinement, or prosecution.

Fenn v. City of Truth or Consequences · filed 2020-12-29

To state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff, and that no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a favorable termination; reversal of a conviction for jurisdictional defects does not satisfy that requirement.

Cuthbert v. The Town of East Hampton New York · filed 2021-01-06

Nothing in Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration changes the Court’s de novo determination that “the Second Department’s decision reversing the disorderly conduct and resisting arrest convictions is not a termination in Plaintiff’s favor.” (See Adoption Order at 7-8.) Therefore, the claims for malicious prosecution based on those charges were properly dismissed.

A Section 1983 claim challenging an arrest and detention under a warrant proceeds as a malicious prosecution claim.

Rahmaan v. McQuilkin · filed 2021-01-11

Here, Rahmaan was arrested and detained under the authority of a warrant; therefore, his § 1983 cause of action can only be based on malicious prosecution, which is a “shorthand way of describing certain claims of unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1157.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim against an investigating officer to proceed when the plaintiff alleges that the officer knowingly supplied false information, overcoming the presumption that the prosecutor exercised independent judgment.

(PS) Robinson v. Bryant · filed 2021-01-13

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must allege “that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.” ... The allegation that Defendant knowingly supplied false information is sufficient at the pleading stage to overcome the Smiddy presumption.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim based on a deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights.

Givens v. Loeffler · filed 2021-01-13

A claim of malicious prosecution is cognizable under § 1983 when based upon a deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution requires a post-arraignment deprivation of liberty attributable to the challenged prosecution.

Rosario v. City of New York · filed 2021-01-20

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a post-arraignment “seizure or other perversion of proper legal procedures implicating [his] personal liberty and privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment” and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.

Section 1983 provides no due-process claim for denial of work or home furlough when state law leaves release to official discretion and creates no protected liberty interest.

Baumann v. Arizona Department of Corrections · filed 1985-02-28

We hold that Baumann has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in custodial release on work or home furlough.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for deprivations of federal constitutional rights by state actors, but does not convert ordinary defamation by state officials into a federal claim.

Slegeski v. Ilg · filed 1975-05-13

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights which may be brought in the federal courts without regard to the amount in controversy. ... It does not create a federal remedy for ordinary state law claims; federal law is not violated by defamatory statements. ... Standing alone — unrelated to the earlier dismissal proceedings — these subsequent statements by the defendants are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.

A libel claim does not support a § 1983 action without a constitutional injury to liberty or property.

Ray v. Time, Inc. · filed 1976-09-15

Thus, plaintiff’s libel claim will not support an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defamation that injures reputation alone does not deprive a person of Fourteenth Amendment liberty or property protected through § 1983.

Lee Dell Walker v. Cahalan · filed 1976-11-05

That being the case, [appellees’ alleged] defamatory publications, however seriously they may have harmed [appellant’s] reputation, did not deprive him of any ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests protected by the Due Process Clause.

A prisoner cannot obtain § 1983 relief for denial of furlough when corrections officials retain discretion over furlough and no state-created liberty interest exists.

Fort v. Reed · filed 1985-12-12

Because the Department of Corrections may exercise discretion in the grant or denial of furlough, there is no state created liberty interest in such status. ... Plaintiff therefore may not obtain relief under § 1983 for any infringement upon his request for furlough.

Section 1983 permits a student to bring a claim against school authorities for an academic dismissal shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, but requires positive evidence of ill will or bad motive beyond disagreement with the academic judgment.

Greenhill v. Bailey · filed 1974-06-25

However, plaintiff is not without remedy when it is alleged that a decision by the school authorities to dismiss a student, supposedly for academic deficiencies, was in fact made arbitrarily and capriciously and in bad faith. Plaintiff may, as in the instant case, bring an action so alleging and the Court will receive and consider evidence on this issue. See the above cited cases. ... In my opinion there must be some positive evidence of ill will or bad motive before the Court could hold the action arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith. The absence of such evidence coupled with the authorities’ discretion to determine scholastic grades requires a decision in favor of defendants.

An academic dismissal is actionable under § 1983 only when the university lacked a rational basis or acted from bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance.

Ikpeazu v. University of Nebraska · filed 1985-11-26

An actionable deprivation in an academic dismissal case is proved only if there was no rational basis for the university's decision, or if the decision was motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance.

An academic dismissal withstands a Section 1983 challenge on summary judgment unless evidence permits a finding that it lacked any rational basis or rested on bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance.

Clements v. County of Nassau · filed 1987-12-23

In cases involving academic dismissal, educational institutions have the right to receive summary judgment unless there is evidence from which a jury could conclude that there was no rational basis for the decision or that it was motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance.

Section 1983 permits a broad challenge to pretrial detention procedures without habeas exhaustion when the requested relief does not itself entitle detainees to release.

Odonnell v. Harris County · filed 2017-05-11

But “broad-based attacks,” such as class actions challenging regulatory procedures that do not “automatically entitle” claimants to release but only “enhance eligibility for accelerated release,” may be brought under § 1983 without a habeas exhaustion requirement. ... The plaintiffs mount a broad-based challenge to Harris County’s administration of its bail procedures, but they do not seek or assert “entitlement” to pretrial release.

A prisoner who meets the applicable procedural requirements may ordinarily include a § 1983 claim in the same filing as a habeas claim.

Whitmore v. Parker · filed 2012-06-07

If an inmate complies with the applicable procedural requirements (including those in the Prison Litigation Reform Act) in asserting a claim under § 1983, ordinarily he may assert such a claim in the same filing with his habeas claims.

A prisoner's § 1983 claims may be dismissed without prejudice to refiling after the prisoner obtains habeas relief.

Field v. City of Manistique · filed 1989-08-15

Field, a Michigan prisoner, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. ... Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the appeal and strike Field's brief is hereby denied and the district court's final order dismissing plaintiff's complaint, as herein modified to be without prejudice to his right to refile, is hereby affirmed.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for challenging the fact of an execution when the claim is actually a successive habeas petition under § 2254.

Bryan v. Mullin · filed 2004-06-08

This court concludes that Bryan’s § 1983 complaint is, in actuality, a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights action to be refiled after the plaintiff first secures successful adjudication of his constitutional claims through habeas corpus.

Hughes v. Officer Southworth · filed 1987-02-12

The dismissal of the complaint, however, is affirmed, with such dismissal being without prejudice to appellant's opportunity to refile his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 should he first secure the successful adjudication of his constitutional claims by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 is not the exclusive avenue for challenging conditions of confinement; habeas may also be available.

Coleman v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division · filed 2005-05-13

Preiser’s rationale does not support the proposition that the more general § 1983 should be exclusive of the more specific habeas in some situations.

Section 1983 is not the exclusive avenue for challenging conditions of confinement when habeas relief is available.

Coleman v. Dretke · filed 2005-05-31

Preiser’s rationale does not support the proposition that the more general § 1983 should be exclusive of the more specific habeas in some situations.

Section 1983 cannot be used for a lethal-injection claim that is the functional equivalent of a successive habeas petition.

Hill v. James v. Crosby, Jr. · filed 2006-01-24

Also on January 20, 2006, appellant brought this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. ... It is clear to us that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s claim because it is the functional equivalent of a successive habeas petition and he failed to obtain leave of this court to file it.

Section 1983 permits a suit seeking access to evidence for DNA testing when granting access would not necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Alley v. Key · filed 2006-04-20

Therefore, Plaintiffs § 1983 action is not the functional equivalent of an application for habeas corpus relief, and this Court may properly exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1983 permits an inmate to challenge parole review procedures without first obtaining habeas relief when success would not necessarily speed release.

Overman v. Beck · filed 2006-06-21

Here, as well, Overman’s claims do not “spell speedier release,” and therefore, he may proceed under § 1983 without first successfully challenging the more recent procedures under habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner seeking damages to sue without treating habeas corpus as the sole remedy.

Love v. Black · filed 1984-11-08

Thus, where, as here, the plaintiff has filed suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, application for a writ of habeas corpus is not the sole remedy for plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits claims for damages or prospective relief to proceed alongside habeas claims.

Faheem-El v. Klincar · filed 1984-12-04

Plaintiff’s claims for damages or prospective relief, however, can be brought concurrently under sec. 1983.

A petitioner may seek relief under § 1983 and a habeas statute in a single pleading.

Thompson v. Choinski · filed 2008-05-08

We note only that the Fourth Circuit’s ruling is not a basis, and we know of none, for the view that a petitioner may not seek relief under both a habeas statute and § 1983 in a single pleading.

Section 1983 claims that impinge on the validity of a prisoner’s current confinement are premature until the prisoner first pursues habeas corpus relief with exhaustion of state remedies.

Sheppard v. State of Louisiana Board of Parole · filed 1989-04-27

The district court in this case correctly determined that Sheppard’s allegations concerning the parole supervision fees must first be pursued under habeas corpus, with exhaustion of state remedies. The district court also correctly noted that, under Serio, Sheppard’s civil rights allegations were premature.

A § 1983 Miranda claim may be dismissed without prejudice until the plaintiff obtains habeas relief after exhausting state remedies.

James C. Leveye, Jr. v. Barry Keathly Ross Rexroad Sandra Rexroad Robert Garlock, Detective David Beard, Officer · filed 1989-11-14

However, we affirm the dismissal of Leveye's claim asserting a Miranda violation without prejudice to his right to assert the claim if and when he obtains a writ of habeas corpus on this claim under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 following exhaustion of his state court remedies.

Section 1983 permits a pretrial detainee to seek a probable cause hearing when the requested relief does not necessarily result in release; habeas corpus is not the exclusive remedy.

Eusebia Fernandez Etc. v. Honorable Jose Trias Monge Etc. · filed 1978-09-28

Plaintiff explicitly selected a sec. 1983 action in preference to a federal habeas corpus petition, presumably to obtain the advantages of a class action and to avoid habeas’ exhaustion requirement. Conceding that habeas was a viable alternative, cf. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973), it was not, however, the exclusive avenue of relief since plaintiff did not seek release from detention but simply an order mandating a probable cause hearing, Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. at n.6, 95 S.Ct. 854.

Section 1983 can provide a civil rights action for injunctive and declaratory relief concerning parole hearing procedures that does not directly seek release from confinement.

Claud M. Brown v. W. R. Vermillion · filed 1979-02-23

These claims for relief do not bear as directly on Brown’s release from confinement as would a new parole release hearing. Since they are virtually identical to claims considered by this court in the context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action in Greenholtz, supra, and Williams, supra, the district court’s dismissal of these claims on the ground that they sound exclusively in habeas corpus is incorrect.

Section 1983 permits a wrongful-arrest damages claim to proceed without exhausting state remedies when success would not necessarily affect the conviction.

Brooks v. Doe · filed 1999-06-03

Moreover, Brooks' wrongful arrest claim does not necessarily bear on the validity of his conviction because he could successfully challenge the arrest without affecting his conviction.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, subject to dismissal when the claim improperly challenges the fact or duration of confinement.

Barnes v. Parr · filed 2011-07-18

Mark A. Barnes appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint without prejudice. The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), finding that the complaint challenges the fact or duration of Barnes’ confinement and thus should have been raised in a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 following exhaustion of state remedies. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to removal from a prison treatment program when success would not necessarily cause immediate or speedier release.

Persechini v. Callaway · filed 2011-08-10

We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that habeas corpus was the exclusive federal remedy for some of Persechini’s claims. Success on those claims “would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release” from custody because, at the time of his allegedly wrongful termination from the treatment program, there were two uncertain prerequisites to a term of probation, successful completion of treatment and approval by the sentencing judge.