42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails the favorable termination requirement when charges are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.

Imbergamo v. Castaldi · filed 2005-10-04

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that, even considering all inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of his malicious prosecution claim, (i.e., that the criminal proceeding initiated against him ended in his favor).

A section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the prior proceedings.

Wilson v. Sullivan · filed 2006-02-22

The district court properly dismissed for failure to state a claim Wilson’s section 1983 claims based on alleged malicious prosecution because Wilson could not allege “favorable termination”; he conceded that his parole was revoked based on the unidentified woman’s complaints.

A section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires tortious conduct under state law and an injury resulting from a deprivation of Fourth Amendment liberty.

Fernandez v. Alexander · filed 2006-03-01

Under section 1983, a malicious prosecution claim has two elements. First, defendant’s conduct must have been tortious under state law. Second, plaintiffs injuries must have resulted from a deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 claims for wrongful arrest, detention, or prosecution require deprivation of a constitutional right, even when analyzed in light of analogous torts.

Grubbs v. Bailes · filed 2006-04-26

While constitutional claims for wrongful arrest, detention, and prosecution under § 1983 are analyzed in light of analogous torts, such as false arrest and malicious prosecution, the ultimate and indispensable element of such a claim is the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim only when the prosecution implicates Fourth Amendment rights.

Rolon v. Henneman · filed 2006-08-02

Only those malicious prosecution claims that implicate Fourth Amendment rights can be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims do not depend on varying state tort elements; probable cause for the arrest and prosecution defeats a claim based on the Fourth Amendment.

Bielefeld v. Haines · filed 2006-08-22

The existence of probable cause for an arrest and prosecution defeats a Section 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty consistent with seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

Laufgas v. Patterson · filed 2006-11-16

To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

Section 1983 permits a probable-cause defense to a malicious-prosecution claim, regardless of whether the complainant’s purpose was proper.

Anthony v. White · filed 1974-05-17

Since Mrs. Dickey's showing of probable cause is sufficient to warrant summary judgment in her favor on both the Section 1983 and the state law claims against her, it is unnecessary to consider whether her purpose in initiating criminal proceedings against the Anthonys was proper or improper.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires malice and a lack of probable cause.

Roberson v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2007-01-30

We grant plaintiffs motion to take judicial notice of the state court docket sheet in support of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. ... But to maintain such a claim, “a plaintiff ‘must show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause.’ ” ... The uncontested evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause that plaintiff was party to a drug transaction. Plaintiff thus failed to meet his pleading burden.

Section 1983 does not support a malicious prosecution claim based solely on an alleged deprivation of substantive due process rights.

Fiske v. Town of North Attleboro · filed 2007-02-14

Because the law does not recognize §1983 malicious prosecution claims for an alleged deprivation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, Fiske cannot assert Counts (l)-(4) on this theory.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show deprivation of a federally protected right.

LaFrenier v. Kinirey · filed 2007-03-20

To transform malicious prosecution into a claim cognizable under § 1983, “the plaintiff also must show a deprivation of a federally-protected right.”

Section 1983 uses common-law tort elements to guide a malicious-prosecution claim, but the plaintiff must establish a constitutional violation.

Boydston v. Isom · filed 2007-04-06

When evaluating a § 1983 claim based on a common law tort, the elements of the tort serve as “an important guidepost for defining the constitutional cause of action,” but “the ultimate question is always whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose malicious prosecution liability on an officer after a prosecutor independently decides to bring charges unless the officer misled the prosecutor.

Little v. City of New York · filed 2007-05-15

Thus, ADA Schwartz broke the chain of causation, and Officers Strong and Blain will not be held liable for malicious prosecution unless there is evidence that either of them misled the prosecutor.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires the criminal proceeding to have ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Shipley v. Orndoff · filed 2007-06-07

The claim fails for the simple reason that the Complaint does not allege that the criminal proceeding ended in Plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the defendant’s actions cause an unreasonable seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Pitt, Christopher v. DC · filed 2007-06-26

We join the large majority of circuits in holding that malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent that the defendant’s actions cause the plaintiff to be unreasonably “seized” without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the defendant’s actions cause an unreasonable seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Christopher G. Pitt, Sr. And Tela Hansom-Pitt v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-06-26

We join the large majority of circuits in holding that malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent that the defendant’s actions cause the plaintiff to be unreasonably “seized” without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on criminal charges dismissed before trial requires a Fourth Amendment violation.

Becker v. Kroll · filed 2007-07-19

Under the facts of this case, where criminal charges were brought but dismissed before trial, Becker must allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment in order to proceed on a theory of § 1983 malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding malicious prosecution claim, though initiating criminal charges without probable cause may lead to a constitutional violation.

Rodriguez v. Rutter · filed 2007-07-19

Although there is not a freestanding claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983, initiating “criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events” that violate the U.S. Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim for a Fourth Amendment violation only when the plaintiff establishes the required elements, including a qualifying deprivation of liberty.

Wiltz v. Middlesex County Office of the Prosecutor · filed 2007-09-19

The District Court was correct in holding that absent such allegations, the complaint failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution actionable under §§ 1983 or 1985.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require the elements of common law malicious prosecution and a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Harvey L. Boyd, Jr. v. Peet · filed 2007-09-25

“To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of [his] Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” ... Boyd’s complaint fails to allege either the existence of any criminal proceedings, or a termination of such proceedings in his favor. Accordingly, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a proceeding begun or continued without probable cause, terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, and instituted with malice.

Dawkins v. Williams · filed 2007-09-27

In order to prove a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) the defendant either commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against him; (2) that the proceeding terminated in his favor; (3) that there was no probable cause for the criminal proceeding; and (4) that the criminal proceeding was instituted with actual malice.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim starts with common law elements but ultimately requires proof that a constitutional right was deprived.

Cummisky v. Mines · filed 2007-09-28

“In this circuit, when addressing § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, we use the common law elements of malicious prosecution as the ‘starting point’ of our analysis; however, the ultimate question is whether plaintiff has proven the deprivation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 does not support a malicious prosecution claim when there is probable cause to prosecute.

Jolley v. Harvell · filed 2007-11-13

Although there is some dispute in this Circuit whether a malicious prosecution claim is valid under the Fourth Amendment, ... it does not matter here because “it nonetheless remains firmly established that where there is probable cause to prosecute, a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution will not lie.”

A federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires the elements of common law malicious prosecution and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure.

McCloud v. Fortune · filed 2008-01-18

“To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of [his] Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”

Section 1983 requires a federal malicious prosecution plaintiff to prove the common law tort's elements and a violation of a federally protected right.

Orban v. City of Tampa Florida · filed 2008-02-20

To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation [of a federally protected right].

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding malicious prosecution claim in the Fifth Circuit.

Bloss v. Moore · filed 2008-03-11

Her claim fails because this court no longer ... recognizes a freestanding § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

A plaintiff bringing a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must show that the prosecution was initiated without probable cause.

Cook v. McPherson · filed 2008-04-02

In order to succeed in a malicious prosecution claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Cook must show that his prosecution was initiated without probable cause.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the elements of the common law tort, an unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure, and a seizure related to the prosecution.

Eloy v. Officer Guillot · filed 2008-07-11

Accordingly, to prevail on a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, (2) an unlawful seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and (3) that the unlawful seizure was “in relation to the prosecution.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1234-35.

Section 1983 lets plaintiffs pursue federal malicious prosecution claims only if they prove sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint implicating Fourth Amendment rights.

Ellis v. La Vecchia · filed 2008-07-22

To sustain a federal malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must also prove a fifth factor: a “sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.”

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the prosecution was maliciously initiated because of race.

Bouquett v. Clemmer · filed 1985-07-10

Herein, the Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of a malicious prosecution and that he suffered a deprivation of his right to the equal protection of the laws because of his race. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, to the extent that he asserts that the prosecution was maliciously initiated by Defendants because of his race.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the plaintiff shows an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the elements of the common law tort.

Chaney v. City of Orlando, FL · filed 2008-08-26

Although malicious prosecution is a viable constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prevailing plaintiff must show both a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure and the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires an absence of probable cause and a violation of a federally protected right.

Drudge v. City of Kissimmee · filed 2008-09-25

Because an absence of probable cause is an element of a malicious prosecution claim, the probable cause discussion in the text disposes of this claim as well. Additionally, of course, the Court has found no violation of a federally protected right, which is also necessary for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim to succeed.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Olasz v. Welsh · filed 2008-10-14

Thus, our caselaw clearly establishes that the analysis of a malicious prosecution claim arising under § 1983 must begin with a determination of whether a constitutional violation exists.

A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires an absence of probable cause to arrest.

Titus v. Ahlm · filed 2008-10-28

The absence of probable cause to arrest is an essential element of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under §1983.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal process.

Holley v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, NY · filed 2009-01-14

To sustain a malicious prosecution claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the deprivation of liberty — i.e., the seizure— must have been made “pursuant to legal process.”

Section 1983 claims for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution based on probation revocation require a showing that the revocation lacked probable cause.

Heilman v. T.W. Ponessa and Ass · filed 2009-01-14

In order to establish a claim for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, Heilman must show that his probation was revoked without probable cause.

Section 1983 covers malicious prosecution intended to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws.

Usher v. City of Los Angeles, Richard A. Gonzales, Michael E. Melton, Jose E. Ramirez, Joe Rios, and Robert L. · filed 1987-09-21

Read liberally as they must be, Usher’s pleadings fairly bring his common law tort claim of malicious prosecution within the scope of section 1983, under the exception for a malicious prosecution intended to deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim may proceed on evidence of gross negligence or recklessness.

Peterson v. Littlejohn · filed 1989-11-13

The federal law, including that from the Ninth Circuit, is settled that gross negligence or recklessness will suffice to establish a prima facie case under § 1983.

A malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 is governed by state law when federal common law is absent.

Janetka v. Dabe · filed 1989-12-15

A claim of malicious prosecution brought pursuant to sections 1983 and 1988 is governed by state law in the absence of federal common law.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff must show that the criminal proceeding as a whole ended in a way indicating innocence of the alleged misconduct; an acquittal on one charge may not suffice when a simultaneous conviction concerns the same conduct.

Kossler v. Crisanti · filed 2009-04-21

The favorable termination element is not categorically satisfied whenever the plaintiff is acquitted of just one of several charges in the same proceeding. When the circumstances — both the offenses as stated in the statute and the underlying facts of the case — indicate that the judgment as a whole does not reflect the plaintiffs innocence, then the plaintiff fails to establish the favorable termination element.

Section 1983 requires a malicious-prosecution plaintiff to show a post-arraignment restraint on liberty that implicates the Fourth Amendment.

Tarantino v. City of Hornell · filed 2009-05-18

In addition, to make out a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, there must also be a showing of a “sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on the Fourth Amendment requires a constitutional deprivation; probable cause for the arrest and prosecution defeats the claim.

Darrah v. City of Oak Park, Russell Bragg, a Troy Police Officer · filed 2001-06-22

We need not enunciate a test for malicious prosecution under § 1983 either, however, for Darrah can show no constitutional deprivation in this case. Regardless of the specific elements of the federal malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff is unable to allege an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, i.e., that there was no probable cause to justify her arrest and prosecution.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim when the plaintiff proves the elements of the relevant state-law tort.

Castellano v. Fragozo · filed 2002-11-20

Thus, by pleading a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff pleads an actionable claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the underlying proceeding to have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Green v. Mattingly · filed 2009-10-21

To state a claim for malicious prosecution under either § 1983 or New York state law, plaintiff must allege, among other things, “termination of the proceeding in plaintiffs favor.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires both the elements of the common law tort and a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Shaarbay v. Palm Beach County Jail · filed 2009-10-23

In order to prove malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish “(1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of [his] Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003)).

A malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 requires a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure and the elements of the malicious prosecution tort.

ROCKEL v. Watkins · filed 2009-11-24

To establish a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution tort claim.

Section 1983 liability for malicious prosecution is not defeated merely because a prosecutor and judge approved the charges and arrest.

Fletcher v. Burkhalter · filed 2010-05-24

Accordingly, we reject Deputy Burkhalter’s argument that the approvals of the district attorney and the judge absolved him of liability, and we affirm the denial of summary judgment on that issue.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against a state actor requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Manganiello v. City of New York · filed 2010-07-23

In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, ... and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law, ... Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir.1989).

Section 1983 does not impose malicious prosecution liability on an arresting officer who did not decide whether to prosecute.

DeRosa v. Rambosk · filed 2010-08-11

A police officer who arrests a suspect but does not make the decision of whether or not to prosecute cannot be liable for malicious prosecution under § 1983. ... There is no evidence that Deputy George was involved in the decision of whether or not any of the plaintiffs should be prosecuted. Therefore, he is entitled to summary judgment as to the malicious prosecution component of the § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim as a constitutional tort in the Eleventh Circuit.

Brown v. Benefield · filed 2010-09-29

In the Eleventh Circuit, malicious prosecution is a viable constitutional tort recognizable under § 1983.

A court analyzing a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim may look to state law for the elements of the tort.

Harrington v. Wilber · filed 2010-10-18

When, as here, a district court discusses a § 1983 cause of action by analogizing it to a claim of malicious prosecution, it is appropriate for the court to look to the respective state law for the elements of the tort.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show malice, lack of probable cause, and a purpose to deny a specific constitutional right; probable cause defeats the claim.

Smith v. Almada · filed 2010-10-19

To maintain a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that “the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her [a] specific constitutional right.” ... For the same reason, probable cause supported Smith’s prosecution. Thus, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Sergeant Almada on Smith’s malicious prosecution claim.

A dismissal obtained through a plea agreement does not establish favorable termination for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

White v. Brown · filed 2010-11-04

That the dismissal of those charges resulted from White‟s plea agreement with the prosecution, and not his innocence, means that he cannot establish favorable termination for purposes of a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not require proof of malice for a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim.

Sykes v. Anderson · filed 2010-11-09

In the context of malicious prosecution, the Fourth Amendment violation that generates a § 1983 cause of action obviates the need for demonstrating malice.

Section 1983 does not provide a free-standing malicious prosecution claim; the claimant must allege a violation of a specific constitutional right.

Cuadra v. Houston Independent School District · filed 2010-11-17

Thus, Cuadra’s attempt to assert a free-standing § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim ripens only when the criminal proceeding terminates in the plaintiff’s favor.

Leonard vs FBI · filed 2010-12-14

Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint in this case because Leonard’s malicious prosecution claim ripens only if the state-court criminal proceeding is terminated in his favor.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim ripens only when the underlying criminal proceeding terminates in the plaintiff’s favor.

Leonard v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2010-12-14

Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint in this case because Leonard’s malicious prosecution claim ripens only if the state-court criminal proceeding is terminated in his favor.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim must show lack of probable cause; alleged misconduct by the defendant does not excuse that burden.

Mobilio v. NJ Division of Law Pub Safety · filed 2011-02-09

Mobilio cites no case, from this Court or any other, for the proposition that a defendant‟s conduct can relieve a plaintiff of the burden of showing lack of probable cause, one of the required elements of a malicious prosecution claim, and we are aware of no such authority.

Section 1983 does not support a freestanding malicious prosecution claim without a related constitutional violation.

Grimes v. Thomason · filed 2011-03-10

And, because Appellants assert no other viable claims that their constitutional rights were violated in connection with their claim of malicious prosecution, their malicious prosecution claim must also fail. Cuadra v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[A] freestanding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based solely on malicious prosecution [is] not viable.”).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires malice, lack of probable cause, and a purpose to deny a specific constitutional right; probable cause defeats the claim.

Smith v. Almada · filed 2011-03-21

To maintain a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that “the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her [a] specific constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[P]robable cause is an absolute defense to malicious prosecution.”).

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim fails if the plaintiff cannot establish the elements of a state-law malicious-prosecution claim.

Westwood v. City of Hermiston · filed 2011-04-15

Because Westwood has not established the elements of a state-law claim for malicious prosecution, she also has not established a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of liberty for a federal malicious prosecution claim.

Segreti v. Borough of Wilkinsburg · filed 2011-07-11

The District Court correctly concluded that Segreti did not state a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 because she did not allege the requisite deprivation of liberty.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to prove a constitutional violation and the absence of probable cause, with accrual governed by federal law.

McCarty v. Gilchrist · filed 2011-07-14

This Court has analogized a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim to the common law tort of malicious prosecution in articulating its elements: The elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, as applicable in a § 1983 claim, are: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) there was no probable cause to support the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages. Novitsky, 491 F.3d at 1258. Although Novitsky holds that lack of probable cause is an element of § 1983 malicious prosecution, McCarty argues that Novitsky does not apply to this case, and relying on Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004), asserts that he is not required to prove lack of probable cause. We disagree with McCarty’s characterization of the Pierce decision. Pierce expressly left open the issue of whether an absence of probable cause is required for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show that the criminal action ended in the plaintiff's favor.

Pittman v. Metuchen Police Department · filed 2011-08-02

To state a claim of malicious prosecution under section 1983 and New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show that the criminal action ended in his favor.

Section 1983 supports a malicious prosecution claim only when the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated.

Kaminski v. Commissioner of Oneida County Department of Social Services · filed 2011-08-05

Only violations of the Fourth Amendment, however, support § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a sufficient post-arraignment restraint on liberty that implicates the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Elek v. Incorporated Village of Monroe · filed 2011-09-27

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the fifth element of a malicious prosecution action under § 1983, that she suffered “a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint” that implicated her Fourth Amendment rights.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is actionable only if it results in seizure or confinement.

Miller v. Arbogast · filed 2011-10-25

A malicious prosecution claim is only actionable if it results in seizure or confinement. See Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1164–65 (10th Cir. 2009). This court therefore agrees with the district court’s conclusion that the scope of Miller’s claims against Arbogast, Spiers, and Fox is limited to allegations connected with his 2001 arrest and indictment because he was not seized or confined as a result of the 1999 or 2002 indictment attempts.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show initiation and participation, lack of probable cause, deprivation of liberty, and favorable resolution.

Cheolas v. City of Harper Woods · filed 2012-01-10

A plaintiff must show that: (1) a prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the defendant participated in the decision; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty as a consequence of the legal proceeding; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty through legal process that amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure; the common law tort alone is insufficient.

Moreno-Medina v. Toledo · filed 2012-01-17

In this circuit, a plaintiff seeking to bring a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 must do more than simply satisfy the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution. ... The plaintiff must "show a deprivation of liberty, pursuant to legal process, that is consistent with the concept of a Fourth Amendment seizure."

Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims require an absence of probable cause.

Marshall v. Twp of Penn · filed 2012-01-24

An essential element of both a false arrest and a malicious prosecution claim is the absence of probable cause.

In a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a prosecutor’s independent decision to file charges presumptively insulates the investigating officer from liability.

Christensen v. Armstrong · filed 2012-05-22

Our decision in Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981), established a rebuttable presumption that the decision to file a criminal complaint results from the independent determination of the prosecutor, insulating the officer that initiated the criminal prosecution from liability.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim only when the prosecution violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Graham v. City of New York · filed 2012-06-14

While New York recognizes the tort of civil malicious prosecution, a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 may only arise where there has been a violation of the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.

A malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 requires proof that a state actor committed the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

Curves, LLC v. Spalding County, Georgia · filed 2012-07-06

A federal malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proving that a state actor committed the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a lack of probable cause and the defendant’s participation in the decision to prosecute.

Burden v. Paul · filed 2012-08-08

Plaintiff fails to satisfy at least two of the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. As we explained, probable cause supported the institution of proceedings against Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendant did not participate in the institution of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not provide a malicious prosecution claim when state law supplies an adequate remedy.

Gutierrez v. City of Indianapolis · filed 2012-08-13

Because Indiana law recognizes the tort of malicious prosecution, Gutierrez cannot maintain a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a seizure or other intrusion on personal liberty; a prearraignment summons requiring five court appearances without further liberty or travel restrictions does not suffice.

Wilner v. Village of Roslyn · filed 2012-10-03

Here, the Village defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 42 USC § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action by demonstrating that the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff was commenced with a prearraignment, nonfelony summons which subsequently required the plaintiff to appear in court on five occasions without imposing any additional restrictions on her liberty or travel (see Parkash v Town of Southeast, 2011 WL 5142669, *5-6, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 128545, *14-16 [SD NY], affd 468 Fed Appx 80 [2d Cir]; Burg v Gosselin, 591 F3d 95, 97-98 [2d Cir 2010]; Mangino v Incorporated Vil. of Patchogue, 739 F Supp 2d 205, 228 [ED NY 2010]).

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a criminal proceeding initiated without probable cause, favorable termination, malice or an improper purpose, and a resulting deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure.

Minatee v. Philadelphia Police Department · filed 2012-11-01

To prove a claim for malicious prosecution brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy each of the following five elements: “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against a state actor requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Washington-Herrera v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 2012-12-19

“In order to prevail on a [42 USC] § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law”

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding federal claim for malicious prosecution.

Craig v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit Auth, et · filed 2012-12-27

Although a freestanding federal § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution fails as a matter of law, see Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812-13 (5th Cir. 2010), there remains the possibility that Craig’s claim is actionable under Texas tort law.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on a civil action requires a special injury.

McCaul v. Ardsley Union Free School District · filed 2013-02-26

Indeed, both state and federal malicious prosecution claims based on a civil action require a "special injury," as discussed below.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires both the elements of the common law tort and a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Kinzy v. Warren · filed 2013-03-02

To establish a federal malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove both (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.

Section 1983 does not support a civil rights claim based on an allegation of malicious prosecution alone.

Joseph v. Allen · filed 2013-04-15

Therefore, under our holding in Kurtz, Joseph’s allegation of malicious prosecution cannot sustain a valid claim under § 1983.

A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires a lack of probable cause to prosecute the plaintiff for the charged offense when the proceeding began.

Mott v. Lucas · filed 2013-04-17

The elements of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 when the claim is premised on a violation of the Fourth Amendment are as follows: ... Second, because a § 1983 claim is premised on the violation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require a sufficient post-arraignment restraint on liberty to implicate the Fourth Amendment.

Perez v. Duran · filed 2013-07-03

A claim for malicious prosecution under section 1983 requires the additional element of “(5) a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.”

Section 1983 does not provide a procedural due process malicious prosecution claim when state tort law supplies an adequate remedy.

Damon v. Hukowicz · filed 2013-08-09

In any event, a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim grounded in a procedural due process violation is not viable because, as demonstrated above, state tort law provides an adequate remedy.

Section 1983 does not support a federal malicious prosecution claim when state tort law provides a similar cause of action.

Rivera v. Lake County · filed 2013-09-26

The Seventh Circuit does not recognize federal malicious prosecution claims where, as here, state tort law supplies a similar cause of action.

Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claims require a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings; resolution through the ARD program does not qualify.

Boldrini v. Wilson · filed 2013-10-18

The malicious-prosecution claims are therefore not presently cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a federal malicious prosecution suit against public officers when the state provides no adequate remedy.

Julian v. Hanna · filed 2013-10-21

In holding that Indiana’s failure to provide an adequate remedy for malicious prosecution by public officers opens the door to federal malicious prosecution suits against such officers, we don’t mean to belittle the state’s interest in limiting officers’ liability.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof that the defendant initiated criminal proceedings without probable cause and acted with malice or an improper purpose.

Pritchett v. Warrender · filed 2013-11-04

In this circuit, a plaintiff seeking to recover for malicious prosecution pursuant to § 1983 must show that a defendant initiated criminal proceedings against him without probable cause. ... A plaintiff must also show that the defendant “acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a post-arraignment liberty restraint implicating the Fourth Amendment; required court appearances can satisfy that element.

Murphy v. City of Rochester · filed 2013-12-05

To state a cause of action for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must assert an additional element: a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate his Fourth Amendment rights. ... Although Plaintiff has not specifically addressed the required elements of a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, the Court finds that the fifth element may be inferred from the undisputed facts, insofar as Plaintiff was required to attend court appearances.

A § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim challenging a seizure after legal process is treated as malicious prosecution and accrues when the criminal proceedings end in the plaintiff’s favor.

Myers v. Koopman · filed 2013-12-20

Here, the district court fixed false imprisonment as the proper analogy for Myers’ § 1983 claim—even though his complaint asserted malicious prosecution. In fact, Myers correctly styled his claim as one for malicious prosecution because he was seized after the institution of legal process. ... A claim of malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Section 1983 does not allow a freestanding malicious prosecution claim.

Farmer v. Louisiana Electronic & Financial Crimes Task Force · filed 2014-01-16

The district court did not err in denying default judgment on the Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim. This claim fails as a matter of law because a freestanding claim for malicious prosecution may not be maintained under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a freestanding malicious prosecution claim.

Billy Farmer, III v. LA Elec & Financial Cr · filed 2014-01-20

The district court did not err in denying default judgment on the Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim. This claim fails as a matter of law because a freestanding claim for malicious prosecution may not be maintained under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a civil rights claim based solely on an allegation of malicious prosecution.

Strei v. Blaine · filed 2014-02-12

The Eighth Circuit has held that "an allegation of malicious prosecution without more cannot sustain a civil rights claim under § 1983,” ... and here Strei has provided nothing beyond this allegation to support this claim.

A section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty resulting from a legal proceeding; receiving a citation by mail and attending a hearing do not establish that deprivation.

Briscoe v. Jackson · filed 2014-02-24

Therefore, we find that no reasonable jury could determine that Plaintiffs suffered a deprivation of liberty as a consequence of a legal proceeding, as required to establish a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim against an officer who secures an arrest warrant without probable cause, even if the officer plays no further part in the resulting detention.

Carter v. Gore · filed 2014-02-28

Carter’s Amended Complaint therefore alleges a viable § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution against Gore, who allegedly secured an arrest warrant without probable cause, causing Carter to be detained for more than sixty days. The fact that Gore played no further part in Carter’s subsequent detention does nothing to undermine this claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to establish that the underlying criminal proceeding terminated in his favor.

Boans v. Town of Cheektowaga · filed 2014-03-14

In the instant case, although the issue of probable cause supporting Plaintiffs arrest prevents summary judgment on Plaintiffs § 1983 false arrest claim, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim because he has failed to establish the underlying criminal action was terminated in his favor as is Plaintiffs burden.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for malicious prosecution without a violation of a right secured by the Constitution.

Chisolm v. DeSoto Police Department · filed 2014-03-19

The district court correctly concluded that Chisolm could not raise a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 and that he was required to present a claim based on the rights secured by the Constitution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the elements of common law malicious prosecution, including damages, and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure.

Sevostiyanova v. Cobb County of Georgia · filed 2014-06-13

“To establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must prove two things: (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution; and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010). ... Because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to damages, Ayers was entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim.

Section 1983 does not recognize malicious prosecution as an independent claim; the plaintiff must allege the denial of a federally secured right.

Boyd v. Farrin · filed 2014-07-22

In any event, we have held that a claim of malicious prosecution, standing alone, is not a violation of the United States Constitution and that to proceed under § 1983 such a claim must rest upon a denial of rights secured under federal law.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution liability requires the defendant to have made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute.

Halasah v. City of Kirtland, Ohio · filed 2014-07-28

Halasah’s malicious prosecution claim fails because Fisher did not make, influence, or participate in the decision to prosecute Halasah for Disorderly Conduct.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on the Fourth Amendment requires facts plausibly showing that the criminal proceeding began without probable cause.

Gebhart v. Steffen · filed 2014-08-01

To state a claim for malicious prosecution, Gebhart had to allege the absence of probable cause.

A malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 requires a sufficient post-arraignment restraint on liberty to implicate the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Shepherd v. Powers · filed 2014-09-26

A plaintiff asserting a claim for malicious prosecution under Section 1983 must also demonstrate that he suffered a “sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate [his] Fourth Amendment rights.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to show a lack of probable cause.

Smith v. City of Payson · filed 2014-10-14

Finally, a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to show lack of probable cause.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the defendant’s actions cause an unreasonable seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Ronkin v. Vihn · filed 2014-10-16

“Malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent that the defendant’s actions cause the plaintiff to be unreasonably ‘seized’ without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” ... Because the Court has already determined that the defendant had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, her malicious prosecution claim is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the elements of a state-law malicious prosecution claim, prosecution by state actors, and a deprivation of liberty.

Welton v. Anderson · filed 2014-10-28

To state a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he has satisfied the elements of a state law cause of action for malicious prosecution; (2) the malicious prosecution was committed by state actors; and (3) he was deprived of liberty.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim may survive dismissal when the defense of prosecutorial independence remains unresolved.

Mazzetti v. Bellino · filed 2014-11-05

In sum, Mazzetti has alleged a valid § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action. The Rangers are attempting to obtain a dismissal based on what amounts to a defense. The defense is rebuttable, however, and there has not been adequate discovery surrounding the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails when probable cause supports the arrest.

Sperry v. Maes · filed 2014-11-17

Thus, the existence of probable cause defeats Sperry’s claims that Officers Maes and Elder violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a § 1983 malicious prosecution suit, the jury resolves conflicting accounts that determine whether probable cause existed.

Donell Prince v. Aiellos · filed 2014-12-02

The fact that Aiellos offered a very different version of the facts—and one that would well support a criminal complaint against Prince—is unavailing to Aiellos at this stage because the decision as to which version of the facts to believe is, as the District Court held, a task for the jury.

Section 1983 does not provide a malicious-prosecution claim when Illinois provides a tort remedy.

Huon v. Mudge · filed 2015-01-05

And, independent of probable cause, Huon’s § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution fail because Illinois provides a tort remedy.

Section 1983 permits a federal due process claim for malicious prosecution only when state law does not provide an adequate remedy.

Manuel v. City of Joliet · filed 2015-01-28

Only if state law fails to provide an adequate remedy can a plaintiff pursue a federal due process claim for malicious prosecution, id. at 764; cf. Julian, 732 F.3d at 846 (Indiana did not have an adequate remedy for malicious-prosecution claim), and Illinois has an adequate remedy.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show malice, lack of probable cause, and a Fourth Amendment seizure or violation of another explicit constitutional protection.

Yousefian v. City of Glendale · filed 2015-03-05

For such a claim to be cognizable under § 1983, in addition to showing that the defendants prosecuted him with malice and without probable cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate a Fourth Amendment seizure (or the violation of another such “explicit textual source of constitutional protection”).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires facts plausibly showing a deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure.

Hartpence v. Township of Madison · filed 2015-07-07

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 includes the same four elements listed above, see Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 349 (3d Cir. 1989), but it also contains an additional requirement: in order to state a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show a plausible “deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure.” Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 380 (3d Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). Hartpence fails to show such a deprivation.

Section 1983 does not permit a malicious-prosecution claim when the plaintiff has an adequate state-law remedy.

Howlett v. Hack · filed 2015-07-21

But this poses an insurmountable problem for How-lett: because he is entitled to pursue his malicious-prosecution claim in state court, he has an adequate state-law remedy and may not proceed with his federal § 1983 claim.

In a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the officer misled an intervening decision-maker.

Bryant v. Carico · filed 2015-09-18

Pursuant to Evans, we conclude that the district court did not err in holding that Appellants held the burden to demonstrate that the officer misled the intervening decision-maker rather than requiring that the officer establish the independence of the intervening decision-maker.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty resulting from the legal proceeding; a summons without arrest or pretrial restraint is insufficient.

Coles v. Carlini · filed 2015-09-30

Because the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to show that Plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty “as a consequence of a legal proceeding,” Plaintiffs § 1983 malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires a showing that the underlying criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Thorp v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-11-05

In light of that consideration, and because the weight of authority supports this approach, the Court will follow those circuits requiring a showing of favorable termination for a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require the common law elements of malicious prosecution and a Fourth Amendment violation involving a seizure related to the prosecution.

C.P. ex rel. Perez v. Collier County · filed 2015-11-18

To state a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff must allege: “(1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of [the plaintiffs] Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir.2003)).

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for malicious prosecution when the plaintiff adequately alleges the required elements, including malice.

Palmer v. Savona · filed 2015-11-27

Dismissal of Palmer’s state and federal malicious prosecution claims was proper because Palmer failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants acted with malice. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 919 (elements of malicious prosecution claim under § 1983); Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1975) (elements of malicious prosecution claim under state law).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to show that the prosecution lacked probable cause, caused a deprivation of liberty beyond the initial seizure, and ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Snow v. Nelson · filed 2015-12-10

To successfully prove a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim premised on a Fourth ... Amendment violation, Snow must show the following: (1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against him and that defendants made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) there was no probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal proceeding, he suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure; (4) and the criminal proceeding was resolved in his favor.

Section 1983 allows a malicious prosecution claim when state actors commit malicious prosecution under state law and cause a deprivation of liberty or another constitutional right.

Owens v. Downey · filed 2015-12-15

To state a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he has satisfied the elements of a state law cause of action for malicious prosecution; (2) the malicious prosecution was committed by state actors; and (3) he was deprived of liberty or was subject to some other constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for malicious prosecution violating the Fourth Amendment.

Sanchez v. Hartley · filed 2016-01-11

In our view, a cause of action exists under § 1983 for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires a favorable termination of the underlying prosecution; a speedy-trial dismissal does not automatically qualify.

Cordova v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2016-03-08

To prevail on a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiffs confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in the plaintiffs favor; (3) there was no probable cause to confine or prosecute the plaintiff; (4) malice; and (5) damages. ... We are thus in agreement with both Murphy and the majority of other courts in holding that speedy trial dismissals do not per se constitute favorable terminations.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim against an officer who acts as a complaining witness by initiating a baseless prosecution, even if another officer signed the criminal complaint.

Soomro v. City of New York · filed 2016-03-30

However, Kraus made direct statements to the NYDA. A police officer initiating a baseless prosecution as a “complaining witness” is liable to the victim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for constitutional violations, but a state remedy can preclude a due process malicious prosecution claim while leaving certain Fourth Amendment claims available.

Michael Parish v. City of Chicago · filed 2010-02-03

Thus, Johnson squarely disposes of Parish’s argument that the footnote referred to in Wallace requires us to revisit circuit precedent. Furthermore, in Johnson we noted that Newsome did not necessarily foreclose a federal claim under section 1983: “We held in that case that the ‘due process clause’ does not support the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution if state law provides a parallel remedy” but “left open the possibility of a Fourth Amendment claim against officers who misrepresent evidence to prosecutors, provided that the statute of limitations for such a claim has not expired.”

Section 1983 does not permit a freestanding malicious prosecution claim based solely on malicious prosecution.

Travis v. City of Grand Prairie Texas, et a · filed 2016-06-07

To the extent Travis alleges that the officers violated his constitutional rights by engaging in malicious prosecution, we have held that a freestanding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based solely on malicious prosecution is not viable. ... Accordingly, Travis’s freestanding § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claims use common-law elements as a starting point but require proof of a constitutional deprivation.

Goad v. Town of Meeker · filed 2016-07-01

Although the common-law elements of malicious prosecution are the “starting point” for analyzing Goad’s § 1983 claim, “‘the ultimate question’ in such a case ‘is whether plaintiff has proven the deprivation of a constitutional right.’” Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2007)).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires evidence that the defendant acted with malice.

Zane v. Kramer · filed 2016-07-19

Nonetheless, plaintiffs cannot prevail here on them malicious prosecution claims because of a lack of evidence of malice.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim based on a Fourth Amendment violation.

Burch v. City of Florence · filed 2012-12-17

The Eleventh Circuit recognizes malicious prosecution as “a violation of the Fourth Amendment and a viable constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires evidence of malice; negligence alone does not establish it.

Chavez-Torres v. City of Greeley · filed 2016-08-30

We have held that malice, in the context of malicious prosecution, requires evidence of intent, not mere negligence.

A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution lacked probable cause.

Trakhtenberg v. County of Oakland · filed 2016-11-17

The elements of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 when the claim is premised on a violation of the Fourth Amendment are as follows: ... Second, because a § 1983 claim is premised on the violation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a prosecution without probable cause for the purpose of denying equal protection or another specific constitutional right.

Riese v. County of Del Norte · filed 2016-12-01

To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Riese must show (1) a criminal prosecution by or at the direction of the defendant; (2) with malice; (3) without probable cause; and (4) for the purpose of denying him equal protection or another specific constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim that requires, among other elements, a prosecution unsupported by probable cause.

Jackson v. Hogan · filed 2016-12-07

“[W]e have . . . recognized a cause of action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.” Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750, 755 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 11, 2016) (No. 15-1281). The elements of such a claim include the following: “(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.” Id. at 754 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). The argument here centers primarily on the third element: the presence or absence of probable cause.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim challenging a conviction requires that the conviction first be invalidated.

Riley v. District Attorney Dauphin · filed 2016-12-20

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim may not challenge a purportedly illegal conviction unless the underlying conviction has first been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim does not accrue until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Blocker v. Velez · filed 2017-01-06

A “cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994). Blocker ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of selling a non-controlled substance represented as heroin, and that conviction has not been set aside; the District Court therefore properly dismissed this claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff cannot use an officer’s absolutely immune grand jury testimony to rebut an indictment’s presumption of probable cause; an allegedly false police report alone does not rebut it.

Sanders v. Jones · filed 2017-01-09

Therefore, while Rehberg does not provide Jones absolute immunity for his police report, the police report standing alone cannot rebut the grand jury’s finding of probable cause. In other words, Rehberg effectively defeats Sanders’s malicious prosecution claim based on the allegedly false police report because she cannot overcome the presumption of probable cause without using Jones’s absolutely immune grand jury testimony.

A Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires malice, lack of probable cause, and prosecution intended to deny equal protection or another specific constitutional right.

Yagman v. Garcetti · filed 2017-01-20

But to establish a claim for malicious prosecution under Section 1983, Yagman “must show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.”

Section 1983 allows a malicious prosecution claim based on a Fourth Amendment seizure pursuant to legal process without probable cause when the criminal proceedings end in the plaintiff’s favor.

April Smith v. Munday · filed 2017-02-03

A claim of malicious prosecution ... under § 1983 is a claim “founded on a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates elements of the analogous common law tort of malicious prosecution.” Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000). This Fourth Amendment claim requires “that [1] the defendant ha[s] seized plaintiff pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and [2] that the criminal proceedings have terminated in plaintiff’s favor.” Massey v. Ojanit, 759 F.3d 343, 356 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2012)).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a prosecution brought or continued with malice and without probable cause; an officer who had probable cause is not liable on that claim.

Chancy v. Bruno · filed 2017-02-13

“[F]or purposes of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the constituent elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution include[ ]: (1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” ... Because the undisputed evidence shows that Bruno did not act “without probable cause,” Bruno cannot be liable for the tort of malicious prosecution.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Harasz v. Katz · filed 2017-03-03

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff “must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.”

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims incorporate the elements of state malicious prosecution law.

Moore v. City of Oakland · filed 2017-03-16

The elements of a malicious prosecution claim brought under Section 1983 incorporate state law.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, but the claim fails when the officer lacked malice.

Williams v. Scott · filed 2017-03-21

Malicious prosecution is a constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983 for violations of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. ... The uncontradicted evidence, interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, clearly shows that Deputy Chesney lacked malice in obtaining the arrest ... warrant against Mr. Williams for the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination; a conviction on related traffic offenses can defeat that requirement despite acquittal on felony charges.

Noviho v. Lancaster County · filed 2017-03-20

Thus, while the jury acquitted Noviho of the felonies, his conviction on the underlying traffic offenses means that he cannot be considered innocent for the purposes of favorable termination.

A § 1983 Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty beyond the initial seizure; a summons to appear in court does not satisfy that requirement.

Noonan v. County of Oakland · filed 2017-03-24

Given that a summons to appear is even less a deprivation than an arrest, it stands to reason that it too is insufficient to satisfy this third element of a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983, pursuant to Sykes.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff must show a post-arraignment deprivation of liberty amounting to a constitutional seizure.

Coleman v. City of New York · filed 2017-04-21

Because a malicious prosecution claim brought under § 1983 is grounded in the Fourth Amendment, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1994), the plaintiff must also establish another element in addition to the state tort requirements: a post-arraignment1 deprivation of liberty that rises to the level of a constitutional “seizure.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the underlying criminal case.

Margheim v. Buljko · filed 2017-04-28

Mr. Margheim’s argument misses the important point that, in our circuit, the elements of § 1983 malicious prosecution claims are already established. See Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 799 (discussing the five elements). His failure to show a favorable termination is fatal.