42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 lets a person sue a state actor who, under color of state law, deprives the person of a constitutional or statutory right.

Law Offices of Christopher S. Lucas & Associates v. Disciplinary Board of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · filed 2004-06-09

In applying the principles set forth in these cases to the facts before us, we hold that the Disciplinary Board is not a “person” who can be sued within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits public entities not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity to be treated as persons subject to suit.

Gabor G. Kovats, Steven C. Procuniar, Joy L. Davis, Roberta M. Delson, Hace Tishler, and Anna Beck v. Rutgers · filed 1987-06-30

Our disposition of the Eleventh Amendment issue also disposes of Rutgers' contention that it, its Board of Governors and its Promotion Review Committee are not "persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 since public entities not entitled to immunity are considered "persons" subject to Sec. 1983 actions. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 & n. 55, 98 S.Ct. at 2035 & n. 55 (1978)

The state and its agencies are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Duesler v. Trebby · filed 1987-10-09

The State and its agencies are not "persons” under 42 USC § 1983, and therefore the court does not have jurisdiction over the defendant New York State Liquor Authority in this civil rights action (Richards v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 572 F Supp 1168, 1172 [SD NY 1983]; Diaz v Ward, 437 F Supp 678, 688, appeal dismissed 652 F2d 53).

The United States is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

United States v. Conrad E. Lebeau, an Individual · filed 1993-01-28

The United States, however, is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person subject to liability under the statute.

Wallen v. Olsen · filed 2004-06-21

As a threshold matter, we conclude that the magistrate judge correctly dismissed Wallen’s claims against the State of Texas because the state is not a “person” who may be sued for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the alleged wrongdoing to have been committed by a person; a state agency cannot be sued under it.

Odenwalt v. Gillis · filed 2004-07-27

Further, an essential element of any claim under § 1983 is that the alleged wrongdoing was committed by a “person.”

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a utilization review board because it is not a person under the statute.

Diaz v. Lee · filed 2004-08-11

We note that because the Utilization Review Board (“URB”) is not a “person” under § 1983, it was not necessary for the district court to address the merits of Diaz’s claims against it.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state or a state official sued in an official capacity because the state is not a “person” under the statute.

Hendrichsen v. Ball State University · filed 2004-08-19

But a suit against either Koslov in his official capacity or Ball State (the same thing, really) is tantamount to a suit against the state of Indiana, which is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against suable legal entities for constitutional violations committed under color of state law.

Whiting, Bobbi J. v. Marathon Sheriff · filed 2004-08-30

In short, the Marathon County Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity separable from the county government which it serves and is therefore, not subject to suit.

Section 1983 does not apply to a suit against a private company that alleges no violation of a constitutional or federal right.

Brown v. Trinity Industrial · filed 2004-09-02

Brown’s lawsuit does not fall under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, because his complaint named a private company or corporation as defendant and alleged no violation of a constitutional or federal right.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue another person who, under state law, deprives them of a federal right.

Holton, John v. Indiana Horse Racing · filed 2005-02-22

The Commission, which is part of Indiana’s state government, is not a “person” for purposes of §1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons who violate federal rights, but a state commission is not a person for this purpose.

John P. Holton, Jr. v. Indiana Horse Racing Commission and Joe Gorajec · filed 2005-02-22

The Commission, which is part of Indiana’s state, government, is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

A state board sued in its official capacity is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Brown v. Mortuary & Cemetery Board · filed 2005-05-16

The district court properly dismissed Brown’s claims against the Board in its official capacity because it could not constitute a “person” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not authorize a First Amendment retaliation action against a state university or its officials in their official capacities.

Constantine v. Rectors of George Mason University · filed 2005-06-13

With respect to Constantine’s First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, that statute does not authorize an action against GMU or the individual defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 allows people deprived of constitutional or statutory rights by someone acting under state authority to sue for redress.

Green v. Young · filed 2005-06-24

Since the Eleventh Amendment is a grant of sovereign immunity to the states, and since neither the State General Assembly nor Congress has waived Delaware’s immunity, HRYCI, as an institution of the State of Delaware, cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Ford v. TDCJ · filed 2005-08-09

As to the allegation regarding the ability of one to directly sue a State agency under 42 U.S.C. §1983, we note that neither a state nor its agencies are “persons” as contemplated in §1983.

Section 1983 does not treat States, State agencies, or State officials sued in their official capacities as persons who can be sued.

Wells v. Board of Trustees of the California State University · filed 2005-10-04

States, State agencies, and State officials sued in their official capacity are not considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit against the State because the State is not a person under the section.

Velez v. Roque · filed 2005-10-21

Ahora bien, bajo la Ley Federal de Derechos Civiles, 42 USC § 1983, el Estado no es demandable por no ser considerado “persona”.

Section 1983 permits claims only against a person, and a county court's domestic relations division is not a person.

Kliesh v. Bucks Cty Domestic · filed 2005-10-27

As the District Court concluded, the named Defendant, the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division, is not a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a police department that is not a suable entity.

Qader v. People of New York · filed 2005-10-31

Because the New Rochelle Police Department is not a “suable entity” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs action effectively is against the City of New Rochelle.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” subject to suit.

Gable Transport, Inc. v. State · filed 2006-05-11

Petitioner brought the action against respondent State of New York and two state officials acting in their official capacity, none of which are “persons” subject to suit under 42 USC § 1983 (see Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58, 71 [1989]).

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Winters v. Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2006-06-02

A State or state agency is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. ... The Court agrees.

Section 1983 permits a suit for equitable relief against a public university, its president, and its board of regents as persons under the statute.

Wolfe v. O'NEILL · filed 1972-01-06

This Court finds that for alleged equitable relief the University of Alaska, William R. Wood, President of the University of Alaska, and the Board of Regents of the University of Alaska are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that it does have jurisdiction over the cause of action.

A school board that is not a municipal corporation is not excluded from § 1983 coverage on that ground.

Aurora Education Association East v. Board of Education of Aurora Public School District No. 131 of Kane County, Illinoi · filed 1974-01-04

We note that at least one of the points pressed by defendants is unsound. The Board is not a municipal corporation and in that capacity outside the coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as construed in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).

A Puerto Rico government department that is an arm of the Commonwealth is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Vazquez v. Ferre · filed 1975-11-19

The Department of Labor, as an arm of the executive, is the alter-ego of the government of Puerto Rico. ... Therefore, no cause of action under § 1983 exists against this defendant.

An Ohio county sheriff’s office cannot be sued as a separate entity under § 1983, but the sheriff may be sued.

Petty v. Oh · filed 2007-02-16

Unlike a county sheriff’s office, the sheriff himself may be considered a proper legal entity for purposes of suit under § 1983.

The Pennsylvania Department of Education is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution · filed 2007-03-21

We do so because, as Plaintiff concedes, PDE is not a “person” against whom suit may be brought under § 1983.

States are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Bauerle v. City of Tucson · filed 2007-06-14

States are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), and the State of Arizona has not consented to this suit.

Section 1983 requires a state official as a defendant, and judges performing judicial functions and marshals following judicial orders are immune from suit.

Delgado v. De Jesus · filed 1976-11-05

No conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is alleged, and no state official is a defendant, a prerequisite for action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The only state officials who could be joined are judges who are immune in the performance of their judicial functions, or marshals who would be also immune in following judicial orders.

Section 1983 permits a suit against a person acting under state authority, but not against a federal actor.

Maglietti v. Nicholson · filed 2007-09-29

Such a claim must be brought against a state, not federal, actor. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (permits suit against a person acting under the authority of any “State or Territory or the District of Columbia”).

Section 1983 does not allow suits against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

McCabe v. MacAulay · filed 2007-10-01

It is settled that state agencies such as the Iowa State Patrol are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983 and § 1985.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state or an arm of the state because neither is a person under the statute.

Griffin, Inez v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2007-10-05

Griffin’s claims against the State of Wisconsin and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court (an arm of the state, see Wis. Stat. 753 (2005-06)) must fail because a state is not a “person” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on state agencies or supervisors without personal involvement or a direct causal link.

Reznickcheck v. North Cent. Correctional Inst., 9-07-22 (12-3-2007) · filed 2007-12-03

The United States Supreme Court has previously held that a state agency is not a person under the meaning of § 1983 and cannot be the subject of this type of action. ... Without a direct link between the actions of Warden Jefferys, Inspector Knight, Officer Kegley, Officer Keasler, Lab Technician Ballenger, or Nurse Moore and the search of the cell we find that with respect to these defendants judgment on the pleadings was proper.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person who can be sued under the statute.

Schisler v. State · filed 2007-12-31

Even if appellants’ undecided bill of attainder claim satisfies the three-part test outlined in Maryland Green Party, which is very doubtful, appellants cannot recover under § 1988 because the State was the only named defendant, and a state is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against WMATA because it has sovereign immunity and is not a person subject to liability under the statute.

Plater v. District of Columbia Department of Transportation · filed 2008-01-02

WMATA has moved to dismiss this count, arguing that WMATA is not a “person” under § 1983 and that it retains sovereign immunity against suits brought under § 1983. The Court concurs.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a detention center as an institution.

Jones v. LEXINGTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER · filed 2008-01-24

Plaintiff does not object to the R & R’s recommendation that this court dismiss the action against Lexington County Detention Center as being an institution which is not subject to liability under § 1983. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim against Lexington County Detention Center is dismissed.

State entities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Rolle v. Raysor · filed 2008-03-07

Rolle’s complaint against the Florida agencies and their officers also fails because these state entities are not “persons” within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Young v. Hawaii · filed 2008-03-11

The State of Hawaii is not a “person” for purposes of liability under Section 1983.

States and their agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Miller v. Davis · filed 2008-04-02

The district court also correctly held that Miller’s claims against the state agencies are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997), and that states and them agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).

Section 1983 does not allow suits against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Bailey v. Ohio State University · filed 1980-04-10

The fact that Congress did not intend to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity for the states means, necessarily, that a state is not a “person” under § 1983 and no suit for any relief may be maintained against the state under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against responsible state officials or judges, while the state itself is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Fediuk v. New York · filed 1983-11-28

Defendant also contends that plaintiff cannot assert a section 1983 claim against the state because the state is not a “person” for the purpose of maintaining a section 1983 action. Nevertheless, plaintiff adequately asserts his action against the Clerk or other state official or judge responsible for the denial of in forma pauperis applications.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a state or state agency because neither is a person under the section.

Lyons v. Trooper Jason Henderson, the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the State of Texas · filed 2008-05-19

An action under section 1983 may not be maintained against a state or a state agency because neither are “persons” for purposes of section 1983.

A municipal police department is not a separate entity that can be sued under section 1983.

Lynch Ex Rel. Lynch v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2008-06-13

The claims against the Department are dismissed because the Department, as an agency of a municipality, is not a “suable entity” under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits only against a “person,” so a state is not subject to suit under it.

Davenport v. Illinois · filed 2008-10-02

First, the district court properly dismissed all claims against the State of Illinois because a state is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that a government official acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Kramer v. Stelter · filed 2008-11-25

There could be no section 1983 claim against the Pugi Defendants or the additional named defendants since clearly none are government officials.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state agencies because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Christman v. Micheletti · filed 2008-12-09

The district court properly dismissed Christman’s claims against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation because the state agency is not a “person” under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against states, state agencies, or state officers acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Francis v. State of California · filed 2008-12-11

States, state agencies, and state officers acting in them official capacities are not “persons” and cannot be sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A police department is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Larry Best, Jr. v. Portland Police Dept · filed 2009-02-03

The caption in the district court listed the Portland Police Department as a defendant, but a police department is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law, while claims against federal officials proceed under Bivens.

Newsuan v. Levi · filed 2009-03-11

The District Court mentioned 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but Newsuan’s constitutional claims against the federal FDC defendants lie pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 permits claims against persons acting under color of state law for deprivation of federal rights, and the United States is not a person subject to such claims.

Fountain v. United States · filed 2009-03-26

As plaintiff lists only the United States as a defendant, plaintiffs claim under § 1983 will be dismissed because defendant is not a “person” subject to claims made under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats municipal officials, including city council members, a mayor, and a city manager, as persons who may be sued.

Adams v. City of Colorado Springs · filed 1970-02-10

These individuals are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and it is alleged that their conduct pursuant to a purportedly unconstitutional state statute deprives citizens of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits suits only against persons, excluding states and state arms.

Whiteford v. Penn Hills Municipality · filed 2009-04-08

This argument fails, given that the Commonwealth is not a “person” subject to suit under section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1989) (states or governmental entities that are “arms of the State” are not “persons” for purposes of section 1983).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state-created public benefit corporation that performs a governmental function because it is not a “person” under the section.

Sams v. New York State Board · filed 1972-12-11

Since the City Transit Authority, state-created, is a public benefit corporation and performs a governmental function, the court holds that it is not a “person” within the ambit of section 1983, and accordingly the claim against it for money damages... under that section is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits suit against a pension fund and its members when the fund is legally separate from the municipality.

Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio · filed 1974-07-01

Nevertheless, jurisdiction still obtains under §§ 1983 and 1985 as to the Pension Fund and its individual members, as it expressly is not a municipal entity under Texas law, as has been, in fact, acknowledged by the defendants in their Trial Brief at Page 6.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against states or state officials acting in their official capacities, while municipalities and local officials in their official capacities are persons who may be sued for unconstitutional policies.

William Scott and Rosemary Scott v. James E. O'grady, Sheriff of Cook County, and Kelvin Branch, Deputy Sheriff of Cook · filed 1993-01-05

In addition, since the Supreme Court has held that neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), this suit is not authorized by federal statute if O'Grady and Branch are deemed to be state officials.

Section 1983 lets a former probationer sue a government entity over unconstitutional probation conditions resulting from an informal policy of a local state agent.

Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation · filed 1994-12-14

Before deciding the substance of plaintiffs claim, we must consider defendant’s argument that plaintiff has failed to state a claim against it because the court which sentenced him, not the Probation Department, determined the conditions of his probation. This argument is unconvincing. Certainly, former probationers can sue the state over the constitutionality of conditions of probation which are set forth in a state statute. See, e.g., Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). We do not see why former probationers should not also be able to sue the government over conditions of probation which are the result of an informal policy of a local agent of the state.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state board that is an arm of the state because the board is not a person covered by the statute.

McLaughlin v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges · filed 2000-06-26

Having sued only the Board rather than the individual trustees, Mr. McLaughlin has failed to state a claim against a person covered by section 1983.

A state department is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Association of Settlement Companies v. Department of Banking · filed 2009-07-24

The Department, as a branch of the Commonwealth, is not a person for purposes of Section 1983 and, therefore, Challengers may not be awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to Section 1988 in this case.

Section 1983 permits suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against government entities and their officers responsible for implementing and enforcing a state statute.

Weston v. Cassata · filed 2001-07-05

Thus, in actions for declaratory or injunctive relief, such as here, government entities and their officers are properly considered "persons" under § 1983 so long as they are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of a state statute.

Philadelphia’s District Attorney’s Office is not an entity subject to liability under § 1983.

Allen v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFF. OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2009-08-03

The first option is not possible as it is clear that the District Attorney’s Office “is not an entity for purposes of § 1983 liability,” and it should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against WMATA because WMATA is not a person under the statute.

James v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2009-08-11

As a threshold matter, WMATA is not subject to claims arising under Section 1983 because it is not a “person” for purposes of that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state entities, state officers sued in their official capacities for damages, or federal defendants acting under federal authority.

Mendez v. Draham · filed 2002-01-31

Counsel for the State Defendants warned Malat that, in their opinion, his § 1983 claims against certain state entities and officers acting in their official capacities, as well as Ms § 1983 claims against all of the federal Defendants, were frivolous. Ragonese Cert. Exh. A at 2-3. Malat made no response at all. Because I agree with the State Defendants, Rule 11 sanctions are warranted in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on the Virgin Islands government or territorial entities functioning as its arms because they are not “persons” under the statute.

McCauley v. University of the Virgin Islands · filed 2009-08-21

Since the Virgin Islands government is not a “person,” entities functioning as “arms” or “alter egos” of the territory will be similarly immune from liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits only against persons and does not allow claims against a state or its agencies.

CS EX REL. SCOTT v. Missouri · filed 2009-09-08

"Section 1983 provides a cause of action against `persons' only." ... A state is not "a person" under § 1983. ... Consequently, Plaintiff cannot bring claims against State Defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits local governmental entities to be sued as persons when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

C.S. ex rel. Scott v. Missouri State Board of Education · filed 2009-09-08

Jefferson, as a school district in Missouri, qualifies as a “person” for § 1983 purposes. Plaintiff has alleged a policy of discrimination against Jefferson and therefore, the Motion to Dismiss as to Count IV will be denied.

A Pennsylvania domestic relations section is not a person subject to suit under § 1983 because it is part of the Commonwealth’s unified judicial system.

Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Section · filed 2009-09-22

Therefore, Domestic Relations is entitled to immunity from Plaintiffs § 1983 claims under the Eleventh Amendment and is also not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

States and state agencies are not “persons” who can be sued under Section 1983.

Illinois Dunesland Preservation Society v. Illinois Department of Natural Resources · filed 2009-10-14

The agency was properly dismissed because states are not “persons” within the meaning of section 1983 and so cannot be sued under that section.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state university or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Nichols v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2009-10-26

In conclusion, USM and the other Defendants in their official capacities, are immune from suit for damages under § 1983 and thus, summary judgment is appropriate for all these claims.

Section 1983 does not treat the Government of the Virgin Islands as a person, but permits a suit for injunctive relief against its governor in his official capacity.

Iles v. de Jongh · filed 2009-11-24

The Government of the Virgin Islands is not considered a “person” under § 1983. ... However, Governor de Jongh, in his official capacity, may be sued for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits suits against Ohio counties despite a state-law argument that counties cannot be sued.

Turner v. City of Toledo · filed 2009-12-02

Thus, Mt. Healthy (as the Court has noted in both of its previous decisions on this issue) precludes the argument that Lucas County cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against the United States because the United States is not a person under the statute.

Gonzalez v. United States · filed 2009-12-16

The 1983 claim can not be brought against the United States, the only remaining defendant in this case. It must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits suits only against persons; a state and its officials sued in their official capacities solely for money damages are not persons under the section.

Jackson v. New Mexico Public Defender's Office · filed 2010-01-22

Second, § 1983 applies only to “persons” and, when sued solely for money damages, as in this case, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”

Section 1983 bars claims against defendants who are immune or otherwise not subject to suit under the section.

Doyle v. Egelhoff · filed 2010-02-05

The district court’s order dismissing this action explained why the various defendants were either entitled to immunity or were otherwise not subject to suit under § 1983. It further explained why Mr. Doyle’s claims against his defense attorneys were legally frivolous and subject to dismissal for that reason. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order of dismissal, for substantially the reasons set forth in its decision.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on state agencies or state officers sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Romano v. Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2010-03-03

To the extent that Romano attempts to state a claim under Section 1983 against the Department or the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, he fails because neither a state agency nor state officers acting in their official capacities are “persons” susceptible to liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the USPC itself because the federal agency is not a state actor.

Hunter v. Reilly · filed 2010-03-12

The USPC is not a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

States and state agencies are not persons who can be sued under § 1983.

Alleman v. Louisiana, Department of Economic Development · filed 2010-03-17

Under Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 63-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), a state and its agencies are not persons who can be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its officials acting in their official capacities as persons who can be sued under the section.

Jones v. Kelly A. Guidry, Jr., Mariangelina Martinez · filed 2010-03-18

Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state agencies or state employees sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the section.

Ross v. THE BOARD OF REGENTS, UNIVER., NEW MEXICO · filed 2010-03-23

We first address the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983. ... It is undisputed that this suit names only agencies of the State of New Mexico and state employees in their official capacities. Thus, we conclude that the district court was correct in holding that the plaintiffs have failed to state a constitutional claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Hardy v. Fischer · filed 2010-03-31

However, New York State and its agents and officers acting in their official capacities are not "persons” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claims against Fischer and Annucci in their official capacities and addresses the remaining claims only insofar as they are alleged against defendants in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities.

Wanzer v. Sanchez · filed 2010-07-21

Because Wanzer’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities fall outside the scope of section 1983, there is not a reasonable probability that Wanzer would have prevailed on such claims.

A territorial university that is an arm of the territory, and its employees acting in their official capacities, are not “persons” under § 1983.

McCauley v. University of the Virgin Islands · filed 2010-08-18

UVI is an arm of the Territory of the Virgin Islands and, therefore, not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. Ragster and Georges, as employees of UVI acting in their official capacities, were likewise not “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacity are not persons subject to damages claims under Section 1983.

Marshall Burgess, Jr. v. Mar · filed 2010-09-07

The district court properly dismissed Burgess’s section 1983 damages claims against prison officials in their official capacity, and against various Nevada prison agencies, medical departments, and pharmacies. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons for purposes of money damages claims under section 1983); Montana v. Goldin, 394 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (unless they specifically waive their immunity, states and state agencies are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from private actions for damages or injunctive relief in federal court).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against WMATA because its sovereign immunity means it is not a person under the statute.

Headen v. Washington Area Transit Authority · filed 2010-09-24

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Will, WMATA’s sovereign immunity means that the Authority cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the United States or a federal employee acting under color of federal law.

Martinez v. United States · filed 2010-09-30

However, a Section 1983 suit cannot be brought against the United States or a federal employee.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Irwin v. Miami-Dade County Public Schools · filed 2010-10-04

Furthermore, the state agencies are not “persons” who can be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state governmental units because they are not persons under the statute.

McBride Sr. v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division · filed 2010-10-07

Accordingly, the Departm ent was not a proper party to McBride’s section 1983 claim s.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state police agency because the agency is not a person under the statute.

MONTAE v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2010-11-04

Although the plaintiff has not directly invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, her claims could be construed as falling under the purview of that section. Such claims, however, cannot be pursued against the MSP because it is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim against a Court of Common Pleas because it is not a person.

Slewion v. Court of Common Pleas Philadelphia County · filed 2010-12-07

Slewion cannot bring civil rights claims against the Court of Common Pleas because it is not a “person” and cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a claim against state officers for constitutional violations; claims against federal officers proceed under Bivens.

Lora-Pena v. Denney · filed 2011-01-10

Therefore, constitutional claims against federal officers are properly brought under Bivens and any claims against state officers are § 1983 claims.

The Fortville and McCordsville police departments were not proper defendants in this § 1983 action.

Sow v. Fortville Police Department · filed 2011-02-11

We agree that the McCordsville Police Department and the Fortville Police Department were not proper parties.

A police department that lacks a legal identity separate from its municipality is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Draper v. Darby Township Police Department · filed 2011-03-07

Third, the motion argues that the Darby Township Police Department is not a “person” subject to suit in a § 1983 civil rights action because it lacks an identity separate from the municipality of which it is a part. The court agrees. ... Accordingly, the court dismisses plaintiffs § 1983 claim against the Department.

Section 1983 applies to state and local officials, not federal officials.

MARCAVAGE v. National Park Service · filed 2011-03-09

However, § 1983 applies to state and local officials, not to federal defendants like Saperstein and Crane.

Section 1983 claims may be asserted only against a person; Rowan University and its police department cannot be sued under it.

Cottrell v. Rowan University · filed 2011-04-05

Because both § 1983 claims and N.J. Civil Rights Act claims may only be asserted against a “person,” see Fields v. Essex County Probation Dept., 2011 WL 677255, *2 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2011), these claims fail against Rowan University and its police department.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or state agencies.

Wemple v. All Illinois Judicial Circuits · filed 2011-04-21

To the extent that the pro se Complaint is construed specifically as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the outcome would be the same, because states and state agencies are not capable of being sued under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits constitutional claims against employees of the Parole Commission and CSOSA, but not against the United States or those agencies themselves.

(Leave of Court is Needed for Plaintiff) Chandler v. Williams · filed 2011-05-04

As for Mr. Chandler’s constitutional claims, such claims may be brought against employees of the Parole Commission or of CSOSA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Such claims may not be brought against the United States itself or against either the Commission or CSOSA. ... Mr. Chandler’s constitutional claims against those entities will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a person subject to suit.

Grissom v. Roberts · filed 2011-06-09

The district court then dismissed two defendants, Correct Care Solutions and the El Dorado Minimum Clinic, because neither was a “person” for § 1983 purposes, a necessary element of a § 1983 claim. ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for substantially the same reasons set out in its screening order and its dismissal order.

State agencies are not persons who may be sued under § 1983.

Mayo v. Board of Educ. of Prince George's County · filed 2011-07-14

State agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), and the Eleventh Amendment bars damage claims against state agencies and their officials, see Huang v. Bd. of Governors, 902 F.2d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir.1990).

Section 1983 permits suits only against persons, and the CNMI is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Royal Crown Insurance v. Northern Mariana Islands · filed 2011-07-21

Only “persons” are subject to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). The CNMI “is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983.” DeNieva v. Reyes, 966 F.2d 480, 483 (9th Cir. 1992) The district court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Royal Crown’s § 1983 claim against the CNMI.

Section 1983 lets a person sue someone acting under color of state law who deprives them of constitutional or federally protected rights.

O'MALLEY v. City of Flint · filed 2011-07-26

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an individual may bring a private right of action against anyone, who, under color of state law, deprives a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the ... Constitution or conferred by federal statutes.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on federal agencies because they are not “persons” within its meaning.

Jachetta v. United States · filed 2011-08-01

To the contrary, §§ 1983 and 1985 impose liability upon a “person,” and a federal agency is not a “person” within the meaning of these provisions.

Section 1983 preempts state law that would bar an otherwise valid claim against a county.

Peart v. SENECA COUNTY · filed 2011-08-18

Section 1983 preempts Ohio law where it imposes a barrier to bringing an otherwise valid claim, and therefore Rule 17(b) does not bar this suit against the county.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because a state is not a person under the statute.

Texas Department of Transportation v. Dyer · filed 2011-08-31

While the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and section 1983 are separate issues, the Supreme Court has held that neither the state nor a state official acting in his official capacity is a ―person‖ for purposes of section 1983, and therefore a citizen cannot sue the State pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state, its agencies, or state officials in their official capacities.

Toledo-Colon v. Rico · filed 2011-09-21

Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, Plaintiff cannot maintain claims for monetary damages against the Commonwealth, DOJ, DOL, VRA, and the individual defendants in their official capacities.

The Maxton Police Department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Hall v. Burney · filed 2011-11-18

As a preliminary matter, we agree with the district court that the Maxton Police Department was not subject to suit under § 1983.

The Boston Fire Department is not a separate entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Barry v. Moran · filed 2011-11-22

The BFD, as a department of the City of Boston, is not an entity subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives when no state officials are named.

Gordon v. Miller · filed 2011-11-23

Because plaintiffs have named no state officials, a section 1983 claim cannot lie.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons acting under color of state law but generally does not permit claims against private actors or state agencies.

Valentine B. Andela v. University of Miami · filed 2012-01-10

We first note that the district court properly rendered summary judgment on Andela’s claims against Miami and UNC under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. As the district court noted, Miami, which is a private university, is not a state actor and none of the “rare circumstances” allowing a § 1983 claim against a private actor were alleged. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the § 1983 claim against Miami was properly dismissed.

New York City agencies are generally not suable entities under § 1983.

Mordukhaev v. Daus · filed 2012-01-17

Although we conclude that Plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, prevail on the merits of their federal claims, as to their assertion that the district court erred by dismissing the TLC as a party, we reiterate that “[i]t is well settled in this Court that, as a general matter, agencies of New York City are not suable entities in § 1983 actions.” Nnebe, 644 F.3d at 158 n.6 (citing Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007)).

Section 1983 does not permit claims against the Commonwealth, its departments, or officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Judges Professional Ass'n v. Executive Board of the Commonwealth · filed 2012-01-19

This Court has repeatedly held that the Commonwealth, a department of the Commonwealth, and officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A county jail is not an entity that can be sued under Section 1983.

Smith v. Knox County Jail · filed 2012-01-23

Finally, the district court was correct that, in listing the Knox County Jail as the sole defendant, Smith named a non-suable entity.

A county jail that is not a legal entity cannot be sued under § 1983.

Mahoney v. Kitsap County Jail · filed 2012-07-09

The district court properly granted Kitsap County Jail’s motion to dismiss with prejudice because the jail is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of law and allows individual liability.

Passananti v. Cook County · filed 2012-07-20

For example, only persons “acting under color of law” may be ... sued under § 1983, while Title VII applies to all employers with more than 15 employees.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state police agency because the agency is not a person under the statute.

Mitchell v. Miller · filed 2012-08-03

The PSP is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Indian tribes are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Hester v. Redwood County · filed 2012-08-06

Therefore, Indian tribes are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against CSOSA employees acting under federal law.

Ford v. Mitchell · filed 2012-09-10

However, the D.C. Circuit has not extended Settles to CSOSA employees and, therefore, CSOSA employees are not ameneable to suit under Section 1983.

States and state agencies are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Janaszak v. State · filed 2013-01-07

Because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983,”... neither the State nor the Department can be held liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Mosi Tyrone Wells v. Columbus Technical College · filed 2013-02-27

Neither a state nor state officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

City police officers sued in their official capacity are persons under § 1983.

Holmes v. Meleady · filed 2013-04-12

Because the police officers in this case are city and not state officials they are considered “persons for purposes of § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not treat an arm of the state as a “person” subject to suit.

Michael T. Brandenburg . Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia · filed 2013-04-24

The district court did not err in dismissing Brandenburg’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1981 as to MCG because MCG, as an arm of the State of Georgia, is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to nongovernmental entities that do not act under color of state or District of Columbia law.

Horn v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2013-04-26

By its terms, § 1983 does not apply to the non-governmental entities plaintiff has sued.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico because it is not a person under the statute.

Burgos v. Fontánez-Torres · filed 2013-06-27

Because the Commonwealth is not a “person” for section 1983 purposes, plaintiffs do not have a cognizable cause of action against the Commonwealth pursuant to section 1983.

State agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Williams v. Berry · filed 2013-07-19

The claim against MDHS is due to be dismissed, as MDHS, an arm of the State, is not a “person” under § 1983, and has immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not treat states or state officials acting in their official capacities as persons who may be sued under the statute.

Brown v. State · filed 2013-09-30

It is well-settled that states and their officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” under section 1983 and, therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity is not abrogated by that statute.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not permit claims against a judge entitled to judicial immunity.

Kramer v. Vigil · filed 2013-10-10

The district court dismissed the claims because (1) there was no state action by Rio Grande, its manager, or its attorney; and (2) the magistrate judge is entitled to judicial immunity. ... For the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion, we affirm the judgment below.

A sheriff’s department that is an administrative arm of a county cannot be sued separately under Section 1983.

Dudek v. Nassau County Sheriff's Department · filed 2013-11-19

Indeed, the Complaint concedes that the Sheriffs Department is an “administrative arm” of the County (Compl. ¶ 6), and, as such, the department cannot be sued separately.

WMATA is not a person subject to liability under § 1983 and is protected by sovereign immunity.

Rowland v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2013-12-18

Plaintiff has not named any individuals, and the complaint against WMATA must be dismissed because WMATA is not "a person" subject to liability under § 1983 and furthermore "possesses the sovereign immunity of each of its signatory states." Headen v. WMA TA, 741 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing cases); see accord M€Millan v. WMATA, 898 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69-70 (D.D.C. 2012) ("Numerous courts in this District have held that WMATA is immune from suit under Section 1983.") (citing cases).

Section 1983 provides an action against state actors but not federal actors.

Rodriguez v. Giles W. Dalby Correctional Facility · filed 2014-01-23

Section 1983 provides for an action against state but not federal actors.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state or a state official sued in an official capacity because neither is a person under the section.

Stauffer v. Gearhart · filed 2014-01-24

Neither a state nor a state official sued in an official capacity is a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a sheriff and deputies acting as an arm of the state in their official capacities as persons who can be sued.

Thornton v. Jackson · filed 2014-02-21

Thus, the sheriff Defendants in their official capacities are not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state and District of Columbia actors, but not federal entities.

Dade v. United States Parole Commission · filed 2014-02-25

Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but this statute, by its terms, creates a cause of action against state and District of Columbia actors who are alleged to have violated one’s constitutional rights, not the federal entities sued here.

States and state agencies cannot be sued under § 1983.

Ramsey v. Hawaii Paroling Authority · filed 2014-03-12

First, the district court correctly concluded that states and state agencies may not be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county social services department that is not a legal entity.

Schweitzer Ex Rel. Schweitzer v. Crofton · filed 2014-03-13

The District Court also properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims against DSS because DSS is not a legal entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against state and District of Columbia actors alleged to violate constitutional rights or federal law, but does not cover the nongovernmental defendants named here.

Taylor v. Catholic Charities Organization for the Archdiocesan of Washington · filed 2014-03-20

Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but this statute, by its terms, creates a cause of action against state and District of Columbia actors (as opposed to the non-governmental defendants named here) who are alleged to have violated one’s constitutional rights or federal law.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons, but states and their agencies are not persons under the statute.

Basak v. New York State Department of Health · filed 2014-03-26

It is not available as against the DOH since (1) § 1983 permits suits only against “person[s]”, a term that does not encompass the states or their agencies, see, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of Police, 491 U.S. 58, 62-71, 109 S.Ct 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), and (2) the Eleventh Amendment bars such claims against the states or their agencies.

Section 1983 permits suit against a California sheriff’s department for its criminal investigative activities because it acts as a county entity.

Jackson v. Barnes · filed 2014-04-15

Thus, we follow our decision in Brewster: a sheriff’s department is a county actor when it investigates crime. Therefore, the Sheriff’s Department is subject to suit under § 1983 for Jackson’s claim that it violated his Fifth Amendment rights in the course of its investigative activities.

Section 1983 does not treat Texas or its agencies as a person that can be sued under the statute.

Spicer v. Texas Workforce Commission · filed 2014-04-22

In any event, neither the State of Texas nor its agencies are a “person” within the purview of section 1983.

Section 1983 covers claims against state defendants; claims against federal defendants must be brought under Bivens.

Rogel Grant v. Baldwin · filed 2014-05-01

Although Grant’s claims against the state defendants were properly characterized as § 1983 claims, the claims against the federal defendants should have been characterized as claims brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for injuries occurring under color of state law; a complaint against the federal government must allege facts bringing it within the statute.

Wilson v. United States · filed 2014-06-04

But § 1983 only provides a damages remedy against individuals to redress injuries “when they occur under color of state law.” Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) (emphasis added). Mr. Wilson’s complaint against the federal government alleges no facts that would bring his complaint within the reach of the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a person capable of being sued under the statute.

Cruz v. New York · filed 2014-06-06

Furthermore, with regard to Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the State of New York “even putting Eleventh Amendment considerations aside, the State of New York cannot be considered a ‘person’ capable of being sued under § 1983.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action fails to state a claim against the State of New York.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against departments of government units.

Green v. Chvala · filed 2014-06-30

But the district court correctly concluded that those entities, as departments of government units, cannot be sued under § 1983.

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

BBF Engineering Services, PC v. State of Mich. · filed 2014-07-16

Furthermore, neither the State nor MDOT qualify as “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state universities or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the section.

Min Li v. Jiang · filed 2014-08-13

“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” ... Section 1983 claims may not be brought against instrumentalities of a state, such as state universities. ... Li’s claims against YSU and Jiang in her official capacity are, therefore, dismissed.