42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state, a state board, or a state university because they are not persons under the statute.

McNair v. State · filed 2014-08-21

Upon consideration, the Court concludes that Mississippi (a state), the Board of Trustees (a state entity), and MVSU (a state university) are not “persons” under sections 1983, 1985, or 1986.

A city police division that is merely a subunit of the city cannot be sued under § 1983.

Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Division · filed 2014-09-30

First, the Toledo Police Division is not an entity that is capable of suing or being sued, as it merely is a sub-unit of the City of Toledo.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities.

Gipe v. State · filed 2014-10-02

Neither the State nor state actors in their official capacity are subject to a damages claim under § 1983.

The court held that a Section 1983 complaint against the District of Columbia government failed where it named no individual who violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Hampton v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2014-10-08

Since plaintiff has not sued an individual, he has stated no claim under section 1983, which, by its terms, authorizes a private cause of action to be brought against "[e]very person" who violates an individual’s constitutional rights while acting "under color of . . . State . . . or [] District of Columbia" law.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons who, under color of state law, deprive people of constitutional rights, including local governmental bodies and officials sued personally.

Estate Frank P. Lagano v. Bergen County Prosecutors Offi · filed 2014-10-15

Accordingly, the District Court erred in holding that the amended complaint alleged that the BCPO and Mordaga acted exclusively in classic law enforcement and investigative functions so as to make them part of the State and thus not amenable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985. Even if the amended complaint could not be viewed as alleging conduct outside classic law enforcement and investigative functions, the dismissal as to Mordaga was incorrect for an additional reason. Mordaga is sued not only in his official capacity, but also in his personal capacity. (See Estate Br. 31.) Accordingly, he most certainly is amenable to suit as a “person” under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against immune judges or prosecutors, or defense counsel who is not a state actor.

Olivara v. Napolitano · filed 2014-11-20

Furthermore, none of the named defendants is amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Mirales v. Waco, 502 US. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam) (noting that “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages,” and that it “is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 US. 409, 427 (1976) (finding that prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity under § 1983); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F. 2d 606, 613 (DC. Cir. 1980) (finding that defense counsel is not a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983).

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against a state or a state official sued in an official capacity because neither is a person under the statute.

Aikens v. Ingram · filed 2014-12-04

Neither the State, nor a state official sued in his official capacity is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, therefore no money damages are available against either defendant in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a municipal police department that lacks a legal identity separate from the municipality.

Young v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2014-12-24

Because the APD is merely a department of the City of Albuquerque, it is not a proper party and cannot be held liable for the Young’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a California sheriff’s department for state law enforcement actions because the department is not a “person” under the statute.

Pierce v. San Mateo County Sheriff's Department · filed 2014-12-31

We therefore affirm the dismissal as to the County on the ground the Sheriff’s Department is not a “person” subject to a suit for damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against a state corrections department or a commissioner sued in an official capacity because neither is a person under the statute.

Wagoner v. Indiana Department of Correcti · filed 2015-02-04

IDOC and the Commissioner in his official capacity are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 permits claims against people who violate constitutional rights while acting under state or District of Columbia authority; private defendants without that connection are not liable.

Trazell I v. Espinto LLC · filed 2015-02-23

Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that statute authorizes a private cause of action against individuals who Violate constitutional rights while acting under the authority of a state or the District of Columbia. Nothing in the sparsely worded complaint suggests that the named private defendants are subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity and does not permit suits against states or state officials in their official capacities.

Smith v. Utah Valley University · filed 2015-03-20

Although Mr. Smith’s Complaint might be broadly construed as bringing an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of Utah. ... A State is not a “person” that can be sued under the meaning of § 1983. ... Likewise, state officials cannot be sued in their official capacity under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars suits against judges for judicial acts and imposes municipal liability only when a policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Scheib v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2015-04-27

It is well established that judges are immune from suit under § 1983 for actions arising from their judicial acts. ... Furthermore, to the extent that Scheib may have some other basis for naming the County as a defendant, a municipality such as Allegheny County can be liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), and Scheib has failed to allege that any County policy or custom violated any of her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons acting under color of state law, but a private hospital generally is not a statutory person or state actor.

Schoolcraft v. City of New York · filed 2015-05-05

Since JHMC was not a state actor, and also does not qualify as a “person” for the purposes of § 1983, Schoolcraft’s claims for involuntary confinement, due process violations, and municipal liability against JHMC fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits damages claims only against persons, so states and officials sued in their official capacities are not subject to such claims.

Klingler v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2015-05-11

Accordingly, neither USM nor Lyman and Saunders, in their official capacities, are persons under § 1983 and the claims for damages against them must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability and requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

McKinney v. Prosecutor County Prosecutor's Office · filed 2015-05-12

McKinney claimed that “Chief John Doe Farrari” (Bracken’s superior) should be liable for Bracken’s actions, but liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a theory of respondeat superior. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. As the District Court concluded, McKinney’s claim against “Jane Doe, Howard Johnson Hotel Clerk,” for failing to give him a copy of the search warrant, failed because she was not a state actor. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Section 1983 authorizes a suit against a person who violates constitutional rights under color of state or District of Columbia law; the court required the complaint to name an individual defendant.

Taylor v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-06-22

Plaintiff also purports to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Comp]. 1] 1, but that statute authorizes a lawsuit against a “person” who violates one’s constitutional rights while acting “under color” of State or District of Columbia law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint does not name an individual and, thus, provides no basis for exercising jurisdiction under the federal question provision.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Kroncke v. City of Phoenix · filed 2015-06-30

The district court properly dismissed all claims against the State of Arizona because it is not subject to suit under § 1983.

States, state agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Felmlee v. State of Oklahoma Defendant's · filed 2015-07-14

As for Plaintiff’s due-process claims, the district court construed them as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and ruled that none of the Oklahoma state agencies and none of the individually named Defendants in their official capacities were “persons” subject to § 1983 liability. ... We affirm the judgment for substantially the same reasons relied on by the district court in its well-reasoned Opinions and Orders of September 15 and November 3, 2014.

Section 1983 does not make a state agency or its employees acting in their official capacities persons subject to liability.

Muhammad v. Jesse · filed 2015-07-24

But the district court properly noted that the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services and its employees acting in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.

A state agency is not a suable person under § 1983.

Abrahamson v. Neitzel · filed 2015-07-31

The DOA is a state agency, which is not a suable “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a public university that is an arm of the state.

Rex v. West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine · filed 2015-08-11

This Court, likewise, concludes that a public university is an arm of the state not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against states, arms of the state, or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC v. State of Hawaii Land Use Commission · filed 2015-08-25

A § 1983 claim for damages is not cognizable against the state, arms of the state, or state officials sued in their official capacities. Such parties are not “persons” under § 1983 and cannot be held liable for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats territorial officers sued in their official capacities as persons when the plaintiff seeks prospective relief.

Paeste v. Government of Guam · filed 2015-08-26

In sum, the official-capacity defendants in this case are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 for purposes of prospective relief.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or its agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Harper v. State ex rel. Department of Health & Hospitals · filed 2015-09-09

Because a State and its agencies are not considered “persons” pursuant to § 1983, we find that the trial court committed legal error by denying the Defendants’ exception of no cause of action.

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Shah v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical School · filed 2015-09-11

It is well-settled, however, that states and state agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state correctional center because it is not a person under the statute.

Carter v. James T. Vaughn Correctional Center · filed 2015-09-29

In addition, dismissal is proper because the VCC is not a person for purposes of § 1983.

A county detention center is not a person or legally created entity that can be sued under § 1983.

Dutton v. City of Midwest City · filed 2015-10-20

As for the OCDC, it is not a person or legally created entity that can be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of a federal right.

Boggs v. State · filed 2015-12-09

To the extent the claim rests on an alleged violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the claim must be dismissed as the State is not a “person” within the meaning of the enabling legislation (42 USC § 1983; Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 185 [1996], citing Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658 [1978]; see also Flemming v State of New York, 120 AD3d 848 [3d Dept 2014]; Shelton v New York State Liq. Auth., 61 AD3d 1145 [3d Dept 2009]; Markowitz v State of New York, 37 AD3d 1106 [4th Dept 2007]; Matter of Gable Transp., Inc. v State of New York, 29 AD3d 1125 [3d Dept 2006]; Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496 [2d Dept 2001]).

Section 1983 does not treat a state entity or state officials sued in their official capacities as a person liable for money damages.

Hess v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University · filed 2015-12-09

The Court agrees with Defendants that the law is well-settled that the Board of Trustees and the individuals in-their official capacities are claims against SIU, which is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for purposes of money damages.

Section 1983 does not authorize claims against federal officers; it extends to state and local officers.

Sai v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2015-12-15

As Plaintiff concedes, moreover, to the extent that his complaint can be read as stating claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for statutory violations, such claims also would not be viable, as § 1983 only extends to state and local officers.

Section 1983 permits civil claims against persons acting under color of state law but excludes states, judges for judicial acts, and attorneys acting as officers of the court.

Virgil Rushing v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2016-01-04

First, states are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. ... Second, “judges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.” ... Finally, attorneys are not subject to § 1983 claims on the basis that they are officers of the court.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed against a police department that is not sui juris and cannot be sued.

Heenan v. Leo · filed 2007-11-30

Although plaintiff has named the MPD as a defendant, it is well settled that the MPD is non sui juris and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.

Section 1983 permits civil rights claims against legal entities that can be sued.

Dorr v. Weber · filed 2009-07-07

Here, the First Amended Complaint merely makes conclusory allegations that Sheriff Weber acted pursuant to policies of the Osceola County Sheriffs Department. Such conclusory allegations are not enough to state a claim against the Osceola County Sheriffs Department, that is, to demonstrate that the Osceola County Sheriffs Department is a legal entity that can be sued.

WMATA cannot be sued under § 1983 because its signatories conferred their sovereign immunity on it.

Cutchin v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-03-31

As is discussed above, the signatories to the WMATA Compact conferred their sovereign immunity on WMATA, and therefore its “sovereign immunity means that [WMATA] cannot be sued under § 1983.” Headen v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 741 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (D.D.C. 2010) (citations omitted).

Section 1983 does not treat state courts and agencies as persons subject to suit.

Alston v. Administrative Offices of the Delaware Courts · filed 2016-04-18

Moreover, defendants the Administrate Offices of the Delaware Courts, Superior Court, Supreme Court of Delaware, Court on the Judiciary, State Department of Justice, and State Human Relations Commission are not persons for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a named defendant violated his liberty interests.

Covell v. Menkis · filed 2010-02-08

We further note that even if 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permitted an entity like the Commission to be named in a lawsuit, Coveil would still need to establish that a named defendant violated his liberty interests.

Section 1983 does not treat states or officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Moore v. Plock · filed 2010-06-02

After careful de novo review, see Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), we agree with the district court that Moore’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (because Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suit, neither state nor its officials acting in their official capacity are “persons” under § 1983); Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state agency for any kind of relief); Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 939 n.3 (8th Cir. 2005) (Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 lawsuit against state agency even if entity is moving force behind deprivation of federal right (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985))); Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (unless pleading expressly and unambiguously states public official is sued in individual capacity, it will be assumed that defendant is sued only in official capacity).

Section 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation by a person acting under color of state law and does not apply to federal entities or officials acting under federal law.

Walton v. Secretary Veterans Administration · filed 2016-05-11

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege deprivation of constitutional rights, and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not allow suits against states or state governmental entities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Williams v. DOC · filed 2016-05-12

Neither states nor state governmental entities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Thus, DOC is not subject to suit here.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit against a state department of corrections because the department is not a person under the statute.

Myers v. Indiana Department of Correcti · filed 2016-07-05

Myers cannot sue the Indiana Department of Corrections under § 1983 because it is not a “person” within the meaning of that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state department of corrections because the department is not a person under the statute.

R.A. Williams v. PA DOC · filed 2016-07-20

Accordingly, Williams failed to state a claim under Section 1983 since the Department is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983.

An Ohio county sheriff’s office is not a legal entity that can be sued under § 1983.

Noffsinger v. Landers · filed 2016-07-22

Under Ohio law, “a county sheriffs office is not a legal entity capable of being sued for purposes of § 1983.” ... Recovery from the PCSO is therefore not possible.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons, excluding States, state arms, and state officials sued in their official capacities.

Didiano v. Balicki · filed 2012-07-17

Interpreting the comparable language of § 1983, 2 the Supreme Court has held that the States, arms of the States, and state officials acting in their official capacities, are not ... “persons” within the meaning of the statute. ... Thus, in the face of this binding Supreme Court authority, he does not dispute that his § 1983 claims against the prison and Balicki (in her official capacity) must fail.

Section 1983 does not treat judicial actors as persons who may be sued under it.

O'Callaghan v. Hon. X · filed 2016-08-11

In addition, judicial actors are not persons under § 1983.

State agencies are not persons that may be sued under § 1983.

O'Neill v. King · filed 2016-08-23

The Corrections Department and New Mexico Parole Board are entities of the state, not persons, and may not be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Cullen v. Saddler · filed 2016-09-12

But, as the district court properly observed, these state agencies are not “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983.

State agencies, including WMATA as an arm of its signatory states, are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Tapp v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2016-09-30

And there is no question that, as an interstate compact agency created by Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, WMATA is an arm of its signatory states for Section 1983 purposes and, as a result, cannot be sued under that statute.

Section 1983 permits claims against Guam officials, but GMHA is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Atesom v. Guam Memorial Hospital Authority · filed 2016-09-30

Guam officials are “persons,” for Section 1983 purposes, but GMHA is not a “person.”

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a branch of state government.

Sweeney v. David C. Long, President Pro Tempore, Indiana General Assembly (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-12-06

The Indiana General Assembly, a branch of state government, could not be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors, including IRS employees.

Polsky v. United States · filed 2016-12-15

That provision, however, does not apply to federal actors, such as IRS employees.

A dog cannot be liable under § 1983 because it is not a person within the statute’s meaning.

Montanez v. City of Orlando · filed 2017-02-02

In any event, Joker cannot be liable, both because no constitutional violation occurred and because a dog is not a "person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against states or state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Jones v. Crisis Intervention Services · filed 2017-03-06

The claims against Defendants are barred by Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), which holds “that neither states nor state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983,” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Deal v. Velez · filed 2017-03-20

Insofar as Velez and Davey have been sued in their official capacities for damages, the claims against them, all brought under § 1983, must be dismissed because they are not amenable' to suit.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on offices that are not suable persons or legal entities, or on a county solely because it employs the people who allegedly caused a constitutional violation.

Jacobs v. Clayton County Solicitor General Office · filed 2017-04-17

Alternatively, we agree with the district court that dismissal of Jacobs’s amended complaint with prejudice was also appropriate under § 1915(e)(2)(B) because, for the reasons the district court explained, the named defendants could not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations alleged in her amended complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Jones v. Justice of the Peace Court Num · filed 2017-08-09

We also agree with the District Court that Jones failed to state a viable claim because Delaware is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state university or its police department because they are not suable persons.

Mutter v. Rodriguez · filed 2017-08-21

But UIC and its police department are not state officials and thus are not “suable persons” under the § 1983 statute or under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.

Section 1983 does not make the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas a person subject to liability.

Fake v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2017-08-22

And we further agree with the District Court that the Court of Common Pleas is not, in any event, a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

A city police department that lacks capacity to be sued under state law cannot be sued under § 1983.

McCants v. City Of Mobile · filed 2017-09-29

In Alabama, a city’s police department “is not a suable entity or a proper party under state law or for § 1983 purposes.” ... Inasmuch as the MPD is not a suable entity under Alabama law, Plaintiffs’ claims against it are due to be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state department of correction because the department is not a person subject to suit.

Griffin v. Indiana Department of Correcti · filed 2017-10-12

Yet the Department is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

A police department that is not a separate suable entity is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Mohammad v. Albuquerque Police Department · filed 2017-10-27

But the Albuquerque Police Department is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against the West Virginia Regional Jail Authority or the Western Regional Jail because neither is a person subject to liability under the section.

Williams v. West Virginia Regional Jail Authority · filed 2017-11-06

Neither the Jail Authority, nor the Jail, is a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail building because it is not a person subject to suit.

Newton v. Hempstead County Jail · filed 2017-11-08

The Hempstead County Jail is a building and not a person subject to suit under 42. U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity suits against individual Parole Commission members acting under the Revitalization Act, but not against the Commission itself.

Boling v. United States Parole Commission · filed 2017-11-30

They are mistaken. The D.C. Circuit has held that while the Commission itself is not subject to suit under § 1983, “a cause of action . . . will lie against the individual members of the Commission when acting pursuant to the Revitalization Act § 11231, 111 Stat. at 745.” Settles, 429 F.3d at 1104 (citing Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 370 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).

State agencies and state officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Roybal-Mack v. N.M. Dep't of Pub. Safety · filed 2017-12-12

The Court finds and concludes that Defendants DPS (including NMSP) are immune from suit because they are not "persons" under § 1983, and that the individual defendants in their official capacity must be dismissed for the same reason.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state court because an arm of the state is not a person under the statute.

Leslie v. Superior Court of Massachusetts · filed 2017-12-22

Similarly, because the Superior Court is an arm of the state, see M.G.L. ch. 218, § 1 ef seq., it is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

New York City agencies cannot be sued in their own names under Section 1983.

Hirsch v. City of N.Y. · filed 2018-01-10

As an initial matter, the Court notes that "agencies of New York City are not suable entities in § 1983 actions." ... Accordingly, the DOB and DEP must be dismissed from this action on this basis alone.

An arm of the state is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

Karns v. Shanahan · filed 2018-01-11

Where, as here, the entity claiming immunity is determined to be an arm of the state, however, it is beyond dispute that it is not a “person” for § 1983 purposes.

A county jail is not a suable entity under Section 1983.

Scaife v. Favre · filed 2018-01-25

Finally, named-Defendant “DeKalb County Jail” is not a suable entity.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a prison building because a building is not a person.

Donyall White v. Knight · filed 2018-01-29

As for the defendant prison, the Correctional Industrial Facility, a building is not a person capable of being sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes constitutional claims against state officials, not federal officials.

Van Allen v. Mueller · filed 2018-02-05

It is true that on the cover sheet filed with the complaint, plaintiff identifies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for his cause of action. Dkt. # 1-1. But since that statute authorizes the filing of constitutional claims against state, and not federal, officials, Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992), it cannot provide the predicate for subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a regional jail because the jail is not a person subject to liability.

Warrix v. Western Regional Jail · filed 2018-02-08

The Western Regional Jail is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state parole board is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Estep v. Baker · filed 2018-03-05

The Parole Board is an agency of the Commonwealth; it is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a Missouri sewer district, but its board of trustees cannot be sued.

The Lake Hills Motel, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Benton County Sewer District 1 · filed 2018-03-14

The Court finds that, under the statutory framework, the Benton County Sewer District #1 is the proper party for Plaintiffs to bring their § 1983 claims against, and not the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees is not capable of being sued, under § 1983 or otherwise, and therefore Plaintiffs’ claims in counts I and II must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Sparkes v. Idaho Dept. of Fish & Game · filed 2018-03-29

Because IDFG, the Board, and Wadley and the officers in their official capacities are not persons for purposes § 1983, they are not subject to suit pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against WMATA because, as an arm of the state, it is not a “person” under the statute.

White v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2018-03-31

Since WMATA is an arm of the state, it does not qualify as a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, and cannot be sued under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against an arm of the state because it is not a person under the statute.

White v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. · filed 2018-03-31

Since WMATA is an arm of the state, it does not qualify as a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, and cannot be sued under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against WMATA or monetary damages claims against government officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Hawkins v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. · filed 2018-04-27

Thus, the Court will dismiss any Section 1983 claims against WMATA and against O'Brien in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against governmental sub-units that are not separate legal entities.

Owens v. San Juan Cnty. · filed 2018-05-03

San Juan County Detention Center and San Juan County Sheriff's Department are governmental sub-units and, therefore, they are not persons or legally created entities capable of being sued under § 1983.

A school board can be a person acting under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty. · filed 2018-07-26

The School Board is a "person" acting under color of law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Lakin Correctional Center and the West Virginia Division of Corrections are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Snyder v. Lakin Head of Medicine (Jane Doe) · filed 2018-07-30

However, neither the Lakin Correctional Center, nor the West Virginia Division of Corrections, is a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Western Regional Jail or the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority because neither is a person subject to liability under the statute.

Sowards v. Western Regional Jail Authority · filed 2018-07-30

However, neither the Western Regional Jail, nor the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, is a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against Pennsylvania judicial districts because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Little v. Hammond · filed 2018-08-06

Moreover, the 37th Judicial District is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

State agencies and state officials acting in their official capacities are not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Lundgren v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · filed 2018-08-10

State agencies and state officials acting in the their official capacity, such as the MPDH and Pechter, are not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a police department that lacks a legal identity separate from its municipality.

Chacon v. Albuquerque Police Dep't · filed 2018-08-31

First, the APD is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state agency or state officers in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Knouse v. Primecare Med. of W. Va. · filed 2018-09-24

Consequently, the plaintiff's Counts alleging constitutional violations under § 1983 against the WVRJA and against defendants Douglas and Chandler in their official capacities fail.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state.

Eugene Arnold, III v. Circuit Court of Cook County · filed 2018-11-02

And a state is not suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the only plausible legal basis for his claims.

Police departments, sheriff's offices, and jails are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Johnson v. Brookings Police Dept · filed 2018-11-02

It is well-settled law that police departments, sheriff's offices, and jails are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are thus not amenable to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a sheriff’s department that lacks separate legal status under state law.

Elkins v. Miller County, Arkansas · filed 2018-11-05

In the instant case, it is clear that the Miller County Sheriff’s Department, by virtue of being a sheriff’s department, is not a person or other entity subject to suit under § 1983 or the ACRA.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state jail because the jail is not a person subject to liability under the statute.

Villalobos v. Western Regional Jail · filed 2018-11-06

As an arm of the State of West Virginia, the Western Regional Jail is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes claims against a person, and a state is not a person subject to suit under the section.

DeMaille v. State of New York · filed 2018-11-29

The Court of Claims properly dismissed claimant's federal and state constitutional claims. " [F]ederal constitutional claims may not be asserted in the Court of Claims, given that the statutory basis for such claims, 42 USC § 1983, authorizes claims only against a 'person' and defendant is not a person within the meaning of this statute" ( Oppenheimer v State of New York , 152 AD3d 1006, 1008 [2017]; see Haywood v Drown , 556 US 729, 734 n 4 [2009]; Brown v State of New York , 89 NY2d 172, 184-185 [1996]).

Section 1983 does not allow a suit against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to liability under the statute.

Salmons v. Western Regional Jail · filed 2018-11-30

The Western Regional Jail is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a “person” subject to liability under the section.

Turley v. Western Regional Jail · filed 2018-11-30

The Western Regional Jail is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A jail is not a person subject to liability under Section 1983; the plaintiff must name the responsible individuals as defendants.

Baxley v. Marshall · filed 2018-12-20

The Western Regional Jail is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a regional jail because the jail is not a person subject to liability.

Puskas v. Western Regional Jail · filed 2018-12-26

The Western Regional Jail is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize claims against states, state agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Phillips v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation · filed 2019-01-16

Like states and state agencies, a state official acting in his or her official capacity is also not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims only against “persons”; the CNMI and its officers acting in their official capacities are excluded.

Manila v. CNMI Department of Corrections · filed 2019-01-24

Because the Commonwealth and any official capacity defendants are immune from suit for damages under § 1983, the claim against them must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state or an arm of the state because neither is a person under the statute.

Patterson v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bo · filed 2019-02-12

In so holding, Patterson's claim fails for a separate reason: a state, including an entity that is an arm of the state, is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore cannot be sued for damages under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state, an arm of the state, or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Kaul v. Christie · filed 2019-02-25

New Jersey, a state, is not a "person" under section 1983. The Board, as an arm of the state, is not a "person" under section 1983. The Governor, ALJ Solomon, Chiesa, Roeder, and Lomazow are not "persons" under section 1983 to the extent they are sued in their official capacities for damages. Accordingly, and with these caveats in mind, defendants' motions to dismiss Count Eight based on lack of 1983 "person" status are granted.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a prison intake department because the department is not a person subject to suit.

Dimaio v. George W. Hill Intake Dept · filed 2019-03-18

The intake department, however, is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a correctional facility because the facility is not a person under the statute.

Washington v. City of New York · filed 2019-04-26

Rikers Island is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons; WRJ, SCRJA, and SWRJ do not qualify.

Sorrell v. WRJ · filed 2019-04-30

Magistrate Judge Tinsley filed his PF&R on April 5, 2019, recommending that this Court find that Defendants WRJ, SCRJA, and SWRJ “are not persons who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are further immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment” and dismiss them from the case. ... Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the PF&R, (ECF No. 13), in full and DISMISSES Defendants WRJ, SCRJA, and SWRJ from the action.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

William Spencer and Spencer Bros. LLC v. New Hampshire State Police, et al. · filed 2019-05-07

Because the state is not a person and cannot be sued for damages in a § 1983 claim, state agencies and individuals sued in their official capacities as officers, employees, or agents of a state are also not persons for purposes of § 1983.

State agencies and state officers sued in their official capacity are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Toney v. Guerriero · filed 2019-05-14

A claim against Trooper Guerriero in his official capacity is therefore treated as a claim against the Massachusetts State Police, an arm of the state. As set forth above, the Massachusetts State Police is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a police precinct detective squad because it is not a person under the statute.

Bey v. NYCe Wheels · filed 2019-05-15

The 17th Precinct Detective Squadis not a“person” within the meaning of § 1983.

A correctional institution is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Hughes v. Madison County Detention Facility · filed 2019-05-24

As to Defendant Madison County Detention Center, a correctional institution is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

A regional jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Atkinson v. Thornhill · filed 2019-06-03

Magistrate Judge Tinsley filed his PF&R on May 3, 2019, recommending that this Court find that Defendant South Central Regional Jail (“SCRJ”) “is not a person who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is further immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment” and dismiss it from the case. (ECF No. 10 at 4.) ... Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the PF&R, (ECF No. 10), in full and DISMISSES SCRJ from the action.

A regional jail is not a person who can be sued under Section 1983.

Alexander v. Thornhill · filed 2019-06-03

Magistrate Judge Tinsley filed his PF&R on May 3, 2019, recommending that this Court find that Defendant South Central Regional Jail (“SCRJ”) “is not a person who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is further immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment” and dismiss it from the case. (ECF No. 6 at 4.) ... Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the PF&R, (ECF No. 6), in full and DISMISSES SCRJ from the action.

Section 1983 does not create a cause of action against a state or its agencies.

Deuerlein v. CPS · filed 2019-06-06

Thus, § 1983 does not create a cause of action against the State of Nebraska or Nebraska CPS.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a prison building because it is not an individual or a suable government unit.

Martin v. Westville Correctional Facility · filed 2019-06-07

Though the Westville Correctional Facility is where these events occurred, the prison is a building, not an individual or even a policy-making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail building because it is neither an individual nor a policy-making unit of government.

Bilbee v. Jay County Jail · filed 2019-06-17

Though the Jay County Jail is where these events occurred, the jail is a building, not an individual or even a policy-making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail because the jail is not a person under the statute.

Cox v. Mecklenburg County Jail · filed 2019-06-17

As to Defendant Mecklenburg County Jail, this entity is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983, and therefore cannot be sued in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Woods v. Department of Public Safety · filed 2019-06-17

As to Defendant Department of Public Safety, which the Court assumes references the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, neither the State of North Carolina nor its agencies constitute “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against UAMS.

Hurlbut v. Arkansas Attorney General · filed 2019-06-19

UAMS is not a party that may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat Rikers Island as a person who can be sued.

Adams v. NYC Department of Corrections · filed 2019-06-20

Rikers Island is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Adkins v. Jordan · filed 2019-07-03

A state and its agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

SOTO v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2019-07-08

First, I have now twice dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the State and Borg and Patoe in their official capacities and I instructed Plaintiff not to again assert such claims. These claims are barred pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), and they are again dismissed with prejudice.

A jail is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Quillen v. Carswell · filed 2019-07-11

Sullivan County Jail, as a jail is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state circuit court because the court is not a person under the statute.

Chukwurah v. Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland · filed 2019-07-12

Defendant Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, however, is not considered a “person” within the meaning of the statute, and is not a proper defendant.

A state is not a person that may be sued under Section 1983.

Ferguson v. State of Idaho Department of Transportation · filed 2019-07-17

Moreover, only a “person” may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state is not considered a “person” under the statute.

A correctional facility is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Jones v. Downstate Correctional Facility · filed 2019-07-22

Downstate Correctional Facility is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages claims against a state agency or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not suable persons.

Bush v. Department of Human Resources · filed 2019-07-23

A suable “person” under the statute does not include a state, state agency, or state official to the extent sued in her official capacity for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to liability under the section.

Bowman v. Hawkins County Jail · filed 2019-07-23

As an initial matter, the Court notes that although Plaintiff named Hawkins County Jail as a Defendant, a jail is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a correctional facility that is merely a building, rather than a person or a government policy-making unit.

Eckiss v. Miami Correctional Facility · filed 2019-07-24

The Miami Correctional Facility is a building, not a person or even a policy-making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a prison building because it is neither a person nor a policymaking unit of government.

Ward v. Indiana State Prison · filed 2019-07-25

Furthermore, although the ISP is where these events occurred, the prison is a building, not a person or even a policy-making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Monell liability under Section 1983 is limited to local governments and does not authorize suits against states, state courts, or state court judges.

Day v. State of Minnesota · filed 2019-07-26

But Monell is “limited to local government units,” 436 U.S. at 690 n.54, and it does not permit suit against a state, state courts, or state court judges, see, e.g., Harris v. Mo. Court of Appeals, 787 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 1986).

Section 1983 does not treat a state or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons amenable to suit.

YUN v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2019-07-29

Relatedly, the State defendants are not “persons” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state agencies or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Bruton v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2019-07-29

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to recover from the Department of Corrections or any of the individual Defendants, in their official capacities, under § 1983, they are not “persons” and any such claim would be subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a correctional facility that is only a building, rather than an individual or a policymaking unit of government.

Brazier v. Miami Correctional Facility · filed 2019-07-31

Though the Miami Correctional Facility is where these events occurred, the correctional facility is a building, not an individual or even a policy-making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat South Carolina sheriffs’ offices or deputies sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Souffrant v. Iseman · filed 2019-08-01

As the Magistrate Judge correctly noted in the Report, Iseman and CCSO are not “persons” under § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), and they are immune from suit in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not treat a state, its departments or agencies, or its employees acting in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Sosa v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2019-08-02

A state, its departments or agencies, and its employees acting in an official capacity are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against entities that are not persons under the statute.

Capps v. Crenshawm · filed 2019-08-02

This argument is insufficient to extend the boundaries of § 1983 over non-persons.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a municipal police department because the department is not a suable entity.

Grap v. Rapid City Police Dept · filed 2019-08-05

Municipal police departments are not suable entities.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because the agency is not a “person” under the statute.

Francisco of the family Santos v. Essex County · filed 2019-08-05

A state (including its agencies and departments) is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Child Support Enforcement Division is an agency of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See M.G.L. ch. 119A, § 1.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail because a jail is not a legal entity amenable to suit.

Grap v. Pennington County Jail · filed 2019-08-05

The court must dismiss this case because plaintiff is attempting to sue an entity that cannot be sued. “[C]ounty jails are not legal entities amenable to suit.”

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons amenable to suit under Section 1983.

BAQUERO v. MENDOZA · filed 2019-08-06

Relatedly, such State officials are not considered “persons” amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against state agencies because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Martin v. Cook County, Illinois · filed 2019-08-08

OCJ is part of the Circuit Court of Cook County, which in turn is a unit of state government. ... It follows that OCJ is not subject to § 1983 liability.

A Section 1983 claim fails against defendants who are not state actors and a judge who is immune from suit.

Archuleta v. Chavez · filed 2019-08-08

The Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Defendants Chavez, Titenburg, and de Anda are not state actors, Defendant Sedillo is immune from suit, and Plaintiff has not alleged the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state prison because the prison is not a person subject to suit under the section.

SCHWARZ v. PULASKI STATE PRISON · filed 2019-08-12

Further, Pulaski State Prison is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state cannot be sued under § 1983.

Jackson v. County of Washoe · filed 2019-08-12

Plaintiff simply cannot sue the State of Nevada in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not allow a police or sheriff’s department to be sued because it is not an entity capable of being sued.

Armstrong v. DCSO · filed 2019-08-13

However, a police or sheriff’s department is not an entity capable of being sued under 42 U.S.C § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a circuit court because it is not a person or legal entity subject to suit.

West v. Jackson · filed 2019-08-15

A Circuit Court is not a person or a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A district court is not a person or legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

West v. Ramsey · filed 2019-08-15

A District Court is not a person or a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A police department is not a separate entity subject to suit under § 1983 apart from its county.

Gauldin v. Dyersburg City Police Department · filed 2019-08-15

Gauldin seeks to sue the DPD, which is not a separate entity subject to suit under § 1983 apart from Dyer County itself.

A state is not a person subject to damages under § 1983, and a judge has absolute immunity from liability for judicial acts.

Bell v. Young · filed 2019-08-16

As explained in the MOSC, Mr. Bell’s complaint is subject to dismissal because he cannot pursue a claim under §1983 against either defendant. Defendant Young, as Saline County District Judge, enjoys absolute immunity from liability under § 1983. Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of New Mexico, 520 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2008). The State of Kansas is not a “person” that Congress made amenable to suit for damages under § 1983. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail medical department because it is not a person under the statute.

Barnes v. Correct Care Solutions · filed 2019-08-16

The Orange County J ail Medical Dept. is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail building that is neither an individual nor a government policy-making unit.

Williams v. Marshall County Jail · filed 2019-08-19

Though the Marshall County Jail is where these events occurred, the jail is a building, not an individual or even a policy-making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A sheriff’s department that is not a legal entity capable of being sued cannot be a defendant under § 1983.

Sisk v. Holden · filed 2019-08-20

As to Defendant Transylvania County Sheriff’s Department, the sheriff’s department is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal police department because it is an arm of the municipality.

Howard v. Lockerbie · filed 2019-08-20

The MPD, however, is not subject to suit under § 1983 because it is merely an arm of a municipality.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a correctional center because it is not a person under the statute.

Bilal v. Lawrence Correctional Center · filed 2019-08-21

Lawrence is not a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, and is therefore not subject to a Section 1983 lawsuit.