42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires an allegation that each defendant personally acted; a complaint alleging no action by a defendant states no claim against that defendant.

Meadows v. Miller · filed 1994-06-10

When a plaintiff completely fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief.”

A § 1983 complaint fails as to a defendant when it alleges no action by that defendant.

Meadows v. Gibson · filed 1994-06-13

When a plaintiff completely fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief.”

A § 1983 claim against a prison director fails when the complaint alleges neither personal responsibility for nor knowledge of the relevant prison conditions.

Tate v. Wilkinson · filed 1994-11-10

Finally, the dismissal of defendant Wilkinson was also proper because there were no allegations that Wilkinson was personally responsible for or had any knowledge of any conditions, pervasive or otherwise, that existed at MANCI prior to Tate's injury. This lack of involvement is fatal to a Sec. 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; summary judgment is proper when no allegations or specific facts link the defendant to it.

Landy v. Irizarry · filed 1995-04-05

Because Plaintiff fails to allege or offer specific facts linking either Defendant Irizarry or Lafferty to his requests and alleged denial of medical treatment, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege each defendant’s conduct and a resulting violation of a federal right.

Smith v. University of New Mexico · filed 2019-11-14

The Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... There are no factual allegations regarding Defendants May, Torrez, and Henke.

A § 1983 claim against a named defendant requires factual allegations about that defendant; naming someone only in the complaint’s caption is insufficient.

Brown v. George · filed 2020-02-05

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Ojo and George. ... Plaintiff makes no factual allegation against George other than naming George in the caption of the amended complaint.!’ On the complaint as written, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted against either Ojo or George.

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must identify each defendant by name or Doe designation.

Richmond v. Director of Nurses · filed 2020-02-06

To state a § 1983 claim against an individual or entity, Plaintiff must specifically identify them by name or Doe designation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the person responsible for the alleged deprivation and allege that the person acted under color of state law.

Dyer v. Napa State Hospital · filed 2020-02-07

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. ... Only stating that unidentified defendants denied medical care without identifying the defendants or the medical care is insufficient to state a claim.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must identify which defendant did what to whom; collective allegations do not state a claim.

Scott v. Lumpkin · filed 2020-10-09

The Tenth ... Circuit has made clear that a plaintiff alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must identify “exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom . . . as distinguished from collective allegations” in order to state a claim under the Twombly standard.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on multiple charges is not necessarily defeated by probable cause for one charge; the court must consider probable cause for the remaining charges.

Johnson v. Knorr · filed 2007-02-14

Overall, we are satisfied that notwithstanding the rule when a plaintiff is pursuing false arrest charges, a defendant initiating criminal proceedings on multiple charges is not necessarily insulated in a malicious prosecution case merely because the prosecution of one of the charges was justified.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on a civil administrative proceeding requires a Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty; possible criminal prosecution and employment stigma do not suffice.

Washington v. County of Rockland · filed 2004-06-25

We disagree that these possibilities implicate the Fourth Amendment to such a degree as to permit a § 1983 claim based on a civil administrative proceeding of the type at issue here.

Section 1983 permits liability for a police officer whose withholding of exculpatory information from a prosecutor causes a criminal prosecution to continue.

Goodwin v. Metts · filed 1989-11-28

A police officer who withholds exculpatory information from the prosecutor can be liable under both section 1983 and the state common law. The issue is causation.

Section 1983 damages claims against a private party for wrongful institution of legal proceedings require proof of malice beyond the use of an attachment procedure not yet declared invalid.

Welsh v. Kinchla · filed 1978-06-30

A plaintiff must prove malice when the wrong alleged to have been committed by a private party involves the institution of legal proceedings against the plaintiff. ... In light of these authorities, a plaintiff alleging a violation of his civil rights through a wrongful invocation of legal proceedings against him must, to obtain damages, prove more than the use of an attachment procedure which, although under attack in the courts as violative of recent Supreme Court interpretations of due process, had not yet been declared invalid. The plaintiff must show some kind of ulterior motive on the part of the defendant or other evidence of wrongfulness sufficient to establish malice.

Section 1983 does not make every negligent act actionable; gross negligence may support a claim in some circumstances, but this malicious-prosecution claim failed because the allegations showed neither malice nor gross negligence.

Atkins v. Lanning · filed 1976-05-28

Every negligent act of a state official does not, however, give rise to a § 1983 action. ... This Court recognizes that in certain circumstances conduct amounting to gross negligence is actionable under § 1983. ... However, the factual allegations in the case at bar do not support a finding of malice or gross negligence on the part of the defendants.

Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claims require proof that the defendant acted without probable cause; once probable cause is established, a malicious motive is immaterial.

Marlowe v. Village of Wauconda · filed 1980-12-22

Lack of probable cause is an essential element of a cause of action brought pursuant to section 1983, and once it has been established, evidence of a malicious motive on the part of a defendant becomes immaterial.

Section 1983 permits a malicious-prosecution claim only when the prosecution causes a deprivation of constitutional magnitude; a misdemeanor housing-ordinance proceeding without actual loss of liberty does not qualify.

Henry v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1981-04-18

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duty arising out of state tort law, absent a constitutional violation. Nor does a malicious prosecution offend the Constitution merely because the defendants are state officials. ... What is required to maintain a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution is a deprivation of “constitutional magnitude.” ... The instant case is not one that cries out for federal redress of plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff suffered no actual loss of liberty in connection with the proceedings instituted against him. ... All of these factors render this action inappropriate for an exercise of jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits malicious-prosecution claims when the prosecution is conducted with intent to deny equal protection or otherwise subjects a person to a denial of constitutional rights.

Cline v. Brusett · filed 1981-11-09

The general rule is that malicious prosecution does not constitute a deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law and, therefore, is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... However, an exception to this rule exists for malicious prosecutions conducted with the intent of denying a person equal protection or which otherwise subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for malicious prosecution under color of state law only when the injury involves a federal constitutional right.

Whelehan v. County of Monroe · filed 1983-02-22

A malicious prosecution under color of state law may give rise to a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if injuries of federal constitutional dimensions are involved.

State tort claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution are not actionable under Section 1983 without deprivation of a federal right.

Nesmith v. Taylor · filed 1983-09-19

These two causes of action are, of course, state tort claims. It is fundamental to our federal jurisprudence that state tort claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff under section 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right.

A Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires a favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.

Hickland v. Endee · filed 1983-09-28

It is well settled that this element of the state tort of malicious prosecution claim is equally applicable to § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 reaches only conduct under color of state law that deprives a plaintiff of a right of constitutional magnitude; conduct that merely amounts to a common-law tort, such as malicious prosecution or abuse of process, does not by itself support a cause of action under the statute.

Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Senn · filed 1984-06-29

Whether abuse of legal process or malicious prosecution rises to the level of a constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 depends upon whether, “acting under color of state law, the defendant has subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude.” ... “conduct which merely engenders common law tort liability, without infringing on constitutionally'protected interests, is not a sufficient basis to support a cause of action under Section 1983.”

A common-law tort such as malicious prosecution or abuse of process is actionable under Section 1983 only if, acting under color of state law, the defendant's conduct subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude, not merely common-law tort liability.

Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Senn · filed 1984-07-30

Whether abuse of legal process or malicious prosecution rises to the level of a constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 depends upon whether, "acting under color of state law, the defendant has subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude." Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d at 630.

A plaintiff barred by state tort law from recovering for malicious prosecution (no favorable termination) or false arrest (valid warrant) may still recover under section 1983 if the criminal proceeding against her was fundamentally unfair and worked a denial of due process.

Morrison v. Lefevre · filed 1984-08-20

The question remains, however, whether these barriers also prevent Mrs. Morrison from obtaining relief under § 1983. In light of the fundamental distortion of the judicial process involved in this case, relief should be afforded under § 1983.

When no federal rule governs a Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim, Section 1988 directs the court to apply the forum state's malicious-prosecution rules.

Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco, New York · filed 1984-12-11

Because there are no federal rules of decision for adjudicating Sec. 1983 actions that are based upon claims of malicious prosecution, we are required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 to turn to state law--in this case, New York state law--for such rules.

When no federal rule governs a Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim, Section 1988 directs the court to apply the forum state's malicious-prosecution rules.

Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco · filed 1984-12-11

Because there are no federal rules of decision for adjudicating § 1983 actions that are based upon claims of malicious prosecution, we are required by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to turn to state law — in this case, New York state law — for such rules.

A malicious-prosecution claim under Section 1983 must implicate deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

Nunn v. City of Chicago · filed 1985-03-06

Under § 1983, a malicious prosecution claim must implicate the deprivation of some constitutionally protected right.

A malicious-prosecution theory may support Section 1983 relief when the alleged detention constitutes a deprivation of liberty of constitutional magnitude.

Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco · filed 1985-03-15

Those allegations are quite sufficient to constitute a constitutional deprivation of liberty actionable under § 1983.

The inconvenience of defending an allegedly malicious prosecution, without denial of a constitutionally protected right, is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Vasquez v. City of Hamtramck · filed 1985-03-21

To state a section 1983 cause of action, a plaintiff must show a constitutionally protected right which he has been denied. Vasquez has shown no such right. ... In addition, Vasquez’ inconvenience in defending the allegedly malicious prosecution is an insufficient basis for a section 1983 claim.

A malicious-prosecution complaint alleging a liberty deprivation may state a Section 1983 claim despite the possible existence of adequate state postdeprivation remedies.

Farrell v. Miklas · filed 1985-03-28

Consequently, we are compelled by the ... decision to hold that the instant complaint states a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff has not alleged that the state could have prevented the alleged actions by defendants, and notwithstanding the possibility that there may exist adequate post-deprivation remedies under state law.

Common-law malicious prosecution does not itself create a federal constitutional wrong actionable under § 1983.

Friedman v. Village Of Skokie · filed 1985-05-15

Even if Friedman were to so amend Count II, the common law tort of malicious prosecution does not give rise to a federal constitutional wrong remedied by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding, and accelerated rehabilitation is not a favorable termination.

Konon v. Fornal · filed 1985-05-17

One of the elements that a plaintiff must show in order to maintain a section 1983 action for malicious prosecution is that the criminal proceeding at issue was terminated in his favor. ... Disposition of a case through section 54-56e is not a termination favorable to the accused for purposes of bringing a later section 1983 action for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 provides relief for misuse of legal process only when the misuse is sufficiently egregious to cause a constitutional deprivation and the defendant acts under color of state law.

Anthony v. Baker · filed 1985-06-17

Nevertheless, if the misuse of the legal procedure is so egregious as to subject the aggrieved individual to a deprivation of Constitutional dimension, and the tortfeasor is acting under color of State law, Sec. 1983 may be employed.

Malicious prosecution is actionable under § 1983 when it rises to a constitutional denial of due process.

Bussard v. Neil · filed 1985-09-06

It is clear in the Third Circuit that malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The tort rises to constitutional dimensions because it results in a denial of due process.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires a favorable termination of the criminal proceeding, and completing a pretrial intervention program is not a favorable termination.

Lindes v. Sutter · filed 1985-11-21

This Court holds that to maintain either a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution or a state common law action based on the same theory of recovery, plaintiff must establish a favorable termination of the criminal proceeding, and completion of P.T.I. does not constitute such a favorable termination.

A Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim must allege that the criminal proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Loveday v. Orbin Smith Bob Summit Randy Lockmiller D.W. Harris, Warden John Doe, Alias David Dake Mark Stevens · filed 1986-04-07

The district court correctly held that a claim for malicious prosecution under section 1983 must include an allegation that the criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.

A criminal charge dismissed after the accused voluntarily completes a federal pretrial-diversion program is not a favorable termination supporting an analogous Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim.

Cissell v. Hanover Insurance · filed 1986-11-04

The narrow question presented is whether a prosecution which has resulted in dismissal following defendant’s voluntary participation in a federal pre-trial diversion program may be considered as having been terminated favorably to that defendant when he later becomes a plaintiff in a common law malicious prosecution action or an analogous § 1983 action. This court hereby holds that such a disposition of a prosecution is not such a favorable termination.

Malicious prosecution supports a Section 1983 claim only when the factual circumstances implicate a constitutional right, as allegations intertwined with arrest without probable cause, excessive force, and extended detention do.

Pryor v. Cajda · filed 1987-03-23

It is true as a general proposition that a claim for malicious prosecution is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim unless the corresponding factual circumstances clearly implicate the deprivation of a constitutionally-protected right. ... Pryor’s malicious prosecution claims are intertwined with elements of an arrest without probable cause followed by use of excessive ... force ... and a fairly extensive detention. Because these elements all implicate the deprivation of constitutional rights, we deny defendants’ motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution aspect of Pryor’s § 1983 complaint.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires allegations that the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff's favor.

Artise v. City of Chesapeake, Va. · filed 1987-09-21

Artise has not alleged facts that would state a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... plaintiff must show that prosecution terminated in some way favorable to him.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination; an acquittal on a more serious charge need not satisfy that element when closely related charges arising from the same conduct were tried together and resulted in a conviction.

Janetka v. Dabe · filed 1989-04-28

At the outset, the Court notes that the elements of a Section 1983 civil rights claim based upon malicious prosecution are identical to the elements required to prove such a claim under New York State law. ... Instead, the Court holds that where, as here, the offenses are so closely related to each other and to the defendant’s conduct, an acquittal on the more serious offense does not necessarily require a holding that the termination of the criminal proceeding was favorable for purposes of a subsequent malicious prosecution claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a complaining witness who, under color of law, brings a malicious suit that the target must answer or potentially face incarceration.

Harmon v. Holmes · filed 1989-05-02

We hold that although a malicious prosecution action cannot be maintained in New Jersey for the ordinary expense of defending a civil suit, see id. 230 N.J.Super. at 146, 553 A.2d at 36 (quoting Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 382, 386 (Sup.Ct.1816)), an individual who is the target of a malicious suit brought by a complaining witness under color of law and who must answer the suit or potentially face incarceration can maintain a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate malicious prosecution claim for charging-related harm already redressed by a false arrest claim.

Quinn v. Cain · filed 1989-05-19

Put another way, Quinn’s allegations regarding false arrest and malicious prosecution do not constitute separate claims, but merely separate episodes in the same claim. Accordingly, we will grant summary judgment on Quinn’s claim of malicious prosecution under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a malicious prosecution claim based on the tort alone; the prosecution must cause a deprivation of constitutional magnitude.

Yaworski v. Pate · filed 1989-08-04

Malicious prosecution, alone, does not give rise to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim only when the challenged conduct also violates the Constitution or federal law.

Gunderson v. Schlueter · filed 1990-05-23

Therefore, malicious prosecution can form the basis for a section 1983 action only if the defendants' conduct also infringes some provision of the Constitution or federal law.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim arising from parole revocation requires favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice; it fails when those elements are not proved.

Purdie v. Tierney · filed 1991-02-28

However, “where a section 1983 claim is essentially for deprivation of civil rights through malicious prosecution, we look to common law elements of a malicious prosecution claim in judging the merits of the section 1983 action.” ... The proceedings, while initiated by defendant, were not concluded in plaintiff’s favor.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on procedural due process requires the plaintiff to show that no adequate state postdeprivation remedy is available.

Guy L. Smith, Jr. v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 1991-06-25

Smith’s complaint did not allege, however, that there was no adequate state law remedy available to him. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that an action for the common law tort of malicious prosecution, which is recognized in Massachusetts, would not have been an adequate remedy in these circumstances. Hence, under Torres, no section 1983 claim would lie.

Probable cause for arrest bars a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Fernandez v. Perez · filed 1991-07-19

Thus, the existence of probable cause for arrest is an absolute bar to the plaintiffs § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution against Officer Perez.

Section 1983 does not extend to malicious civil prosecution allegations that do not show misuse of legal process severe enough to cause a constitutional deprivation.

Easton v. Sundram · filed 1991-10-18

We do not hold that civil malicious prosecution can never give rise to a cause of action under § 1983, although we suspect it normally will not. Our focus is on the circumstances of this case, where we do not find that Easton was subjected to a misuse of the legal process so egregious as to work a deprivation of a constitutional dimension. Accordingly, we decline Easton’s invitation to extend § 1983 to his allegations of malicious civil prosecution.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on malicious prosecution.

Williams v. DiVittoria · filed 1991-11-05

It is clear that plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1983 based on malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof that the underlying prosecution terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Brummett v. Jimmy Camble, Jim Boles, Doug Sanders, Dan Boulware, John R. MacLean First State Bank of Cleburne, Texas · filed 1991-12-20

Finding nothing in the common law rule that undermines the policies fostered by § 1983, we likewise hold that a plaintiff may not state a claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution absent proof that the prosecution terminated in his favor.

A plaintiff seeking to recover for malicious prosecution under § 1983 must show that the underlying criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Delaney v. Gerdon · filed 1992-03-19

Under New York law, a plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution must establish, among other things, that the underlying criminal proceeding was terminated in his favor. ... The same is true for a plaintiff who seeks to recover for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the prosecution to have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor under applicable state law.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit · filed 1992-04-09

A plaintiff alleging the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution in an action pursuant to § 1983 must establish termination of the prosecution in his favor in accordance with applicable state law.

Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claims require termination of the prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor under applicable state law.

Hygh v. Jacobs · filed 1992-04-09

A plaintiff alleging the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution in an action pursuant to § 1983 must establish termination of the prosecution in his favor in accordance with applicable state law.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a criminal proceeding; a probation revocation proceeding does not qualify.

Felker v. Christine · filed 1992-04-22

Here, the defendant participated in a proceeding to revoke probation, a gMasi-criminal proceeding at best, which does not rise to the level of a criminal proceeding as that term is understood in the context of a malicious prosecution. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to make the necessary showing of proof as to at least one element of his case.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require the elements of the state law tort and a resulting deprivation of constitutionally protected rights.

Haupt v. Dillard · filed 1992-05-12

In order to maintain a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must demonstrate the elements of the tort under state law, as well as a resulting deprivation of constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim based on a charge classified as a violation when the proceeding is criminal in nature.

Lacara v. Town of Islip · filed 1992-05-21

Although New York courts have held that a violation is not a “crime” for certain purposes, ... this Court finds that for purposes of a party’s right to bring a § 1983 action based on malicious prosecution, a charge of a violation is a “criminal proceeding.”

Section 1983 permits claims for malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process.

Garner v. Township of Wrightstown · filed 1993-04-16

Plaintiff is correct that viable actions for malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process can be maintained under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires issued process, such as an arrest or criminal charges, for a malicious prosecution or abuse of process claim based on a criminal investigation.

Puricelli v. Borough of Morrisville · filed 1993-04-19

Plaintiff can not maintain a Section 1983 claim for “abuse of process/malicious prosecution” against defendants for initiating a grand jury investigation of his involvement in an allegedly unlawful abandoned car scheme because he has not identified any facts establishing any process, such as an arrest or the filing of criminal charges, that deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest without due process of law.

Section 1983 does not make malicious prosecution actionable when the claim stands alone.

Vukadinovich v. Richard Zentz, Ronald Kurmis, John Ross, William Collins, and City of Valparaiso · filed 1993-06-09

Standing alone, malicious prosecution is not actionable under § 1983.

A judicial officer’s finding of guilt conclusively establishes probable cause and defeats a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Hamidian v. Occulto · filed 1994-05-10

While Hamidian does not adequately address this issue, it is clear that the overwhelming authority, including decisions in our circuit, follows the general rule that the neutral and experienced determination by a judicial officer of a person’s guilt conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause, thereby defeating a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

A pre-trial diversion agreement does not favorably terminate a criminal action for a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Taylor v. Gregg · filed 1994-10-27

We agree with the Second Circuit and adopt its holding and reasoning. Entering a pre-trial diversion agreement does not terminate the criminal action in favor of the criminal defendant for purposes of bringing a malicious prosecution claim.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a favorable termination of the criminal action, and a pre-trial diversion agreement does not satisfy that requirement.

Dwayne Taylor and Charles D. Dixon v. Greg Gregg and City of Lubbock, Texas, Municipality · filed 1994-11-28

We agree with the Second Circuit and adopt its holding and reasoning. Entering a pre-trial diversion agreement does not terminate the criminal action in favor of the criminal defendant for purposes of bringing a malicious prosecution claim.

At the time of the complaint, a plaintiff seeking § 1983 damages for malicious prosecution had to prove every element of malicious prosecution under state law.

John Hehemann, Jennifer C. Young Hehemann v. City of Cincinnati, Swallen's, Inc. · filed 1994-12-21

As a threshold matter, a party seeking Sec. 1983 damages based on a claim of malicious prosecution had to prove each element of malicious prosecution under state law.

Section 1983 does not impose malicious-prosecution liability on police officers who neither made nor improperly influenced the decision to prosecute.

Eubanks v. Gerwen · filed 1994-12-22

But they did not make the decision as to whether or not to prosecute Eubanks; nor did they act in such a way as improperly to influence the decision by the State Attorney in that regard. Thus, pursuant to the principles set forth in Post, they are entitled to summary judgment in connection with the malicious prosecution claim of Eubanks pursuant to Sec. 1983, which was denied to them by the court below, 771 F.Supp. 1216.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying proceeding terminates in the plaintiff’s favor.

Treece v. Village of Naperville · filed 1995-10-12

Because a cause of action cannot accrue until all the elements of a plaintiffs claim come into existence, claims such as these do not accrue until the proceeding has been terminated in plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to allege and prove a post-arraignment deprivation of liberty that rises to a constitutional violation.

Murphy v. Lynn · filed 1995-11-09

Where, as here, malicious prosecution is pleaded as a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege and prove, as an additional element of his claim, “some post-arraignment deprivation of liberty that rises to the level of a Constitutional violation”.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof of malicious prosecution under state law resulting in a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Asuncion v. City of Gaithersburg, Md. · filed 1996-01-03

To prove his claim under Sec. 1983, Asuncion must show a malicious prosecution under Maryland law that resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim must be supported at summary judgment by allegations and evidence negating probable cause.

Moore v. Hayes · filed 1996-04-24

Thus, we affirm the district court on this issue because the Plaintiff failed to make allegations and provide evidence negating probable cause as required for surviving summary judgment in a malicious prosecution action under § 1983.

In a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against police officers, an indictment breaks the causal chain from an arrest unless the officers pressured or influenced the prosecution or knowingly misstated facts to the prosecutor.

Reed v. City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation, John Griffin, Detective, W. Murphy, Detective · filed 1996-05-02

However, the chain of causation is broken by an indictment, absent an allegation of pressure or influence exerted by the police officers, or knowing misstatements made by the officers to the prosecutor.

Section 1983 allows a malicious prosecution claim that starts with common-law tort elements but requires proof of a constitutional violation.

Taylor v. Meacham · filed 1996-05-07

Reconciling these various cases, we conclude that our circuit takes the common law elements of malicious prosecution as the “starting point” for the analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, but always reaches the ultimate question, which it must, of whether the plaintiff has proven a constitutional violation.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to establish the elements of the common law tort.

John A. Hilfirty Martha L. Miller v. David C. Shipman Kenneth R. Schriner Brett O. Feese Stephen C. Schopfer Betty A. No · filed 1996-07-31

In order to state a prima facie case for a section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must establish the elements of the common law tort as it has developed over time.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the relevant criminal proceeding terminates in the plaintiff’s favor.

Darryl L. Wright v. Larry E. Oliver, Lieutenant Eddie Frazier, Detective · filed 1996-08-15

Wright's malicious prosecution claim, however, requires a different result. Such a claim accrues at the favorable termination of the relevant criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claims are not cognizable until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Ephrain Reliford, Jr. v. Charlie Truesdale, in His Individual and Official Capacity · filed 1996-08-20

Accordingly, because Appellant alleges only malicious prosecution which is not cognizable until the criminal proceedings against Appellant are terminated in his favor, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when an arrest under legal process lacked probable cause and the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Wright v. Oliver · filed 1996-09-18

In addi- tion, Wright's allegations that the Defendants arrested him pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceeding terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the criminal proceeding; reversal for a new trial does not satisfy that element.

DiBlasio v. City of New York · filed 1996-12-13

We turn then to DiBlasio’s claim of malicious prosecution against the police officers which we will adjudge in accordance with the four elements of a common law tort for malicious prosecution: (1) commencement or continuance of a criminal proceeding, (2) lack of probable cause, (3) existence of malice, and (4) termination in plaintiffs favor. ... Although in some instances a habeas court may terminate a criminal proceeding in the defendant’s favor, the reversal of a conviction and remand for a new trial does not constitute such a termination.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the criminal proceeding; reversal and remand for a new trial do not meet that requirement, and a conviction on retrial defeats the claim.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit · filed 1996-12-13

Although in some instances a habeas court may terminate a criminal proceeding in the defendant's favor, the reversal of a conviction and remand for a new trial does not constitute such a termination. ... In view of the fact that in granting the writ this Court contemplated a retrial, which was held and resulted in a conviction for unlawful possession, a substantial issue in the case from its outset, we hold that the criminal proceeding terminated when DiBlasio was convicted on the retrial.

A malicious prosecution theory can describe a valid section 1983 claim when contested seizures occur pursuant to legal process.

Anderson v. STEVEN R. ANDREWS, PA · filed 1997-04-23

Therefore, characterizing a claim as one for "malicious prosecution" can constitute a description of a legitimate section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to satisfy state law elements, show prosecution by state actors, and prove a deprivation of liberty.

Carter v. Becker · filed 1997-06-09

In order to recover for malicious prosecution pursuant to the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Carter must satisfy the state law requirements for setting forth a cause of action for malicious prosecution, show that the prosecution was committed by state actors, and prove that he was deprived of liberty.

Section 1983 does not permit a malicious prosecution claim challenging a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Gipson v. Callahan · filed 1997-10-31

Because Gipson’s conviction has not been overturned, Gipson has no cognizable claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police officer for malicious prosecution without allegations that the officer committed an improper act after the arrest.

Sterling v. Kazmierczak · filed 1997-11-25

Absent allegations that a police officer committed an improper act after arresting the defendant, the officer is not liable for malicious, prosecution and, by extension, is not liable for a section 1983 claim based on malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires factual allegations beyond an arrest without probable cause and a conclusory assertion of malicious prosecution.

Sneed v. Richard Rybicki, Tom O'grady, G. Sperekas, Joseph Hernandez, G. Harris, and City of Chicago · filed 1998-06-08

To plead malicious prosecution he must allege more than that he was arrested without probable cause and eventually convicted. He must also do more than state conclusively that the defendants maliciously prosecuted him. He must allege some action that supports the conclusion that a malicious prosecution occurred.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim has both common-law and constitutional components.

Daoust v. McWilliams · filed 1998-08-11

In contrast, the claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 contained in the plaintiffs federal complaint consists of both common-law and constitutional components.

An overturned municipal conviction does not create a presumption of probable cause in a § 1983 malicious prosecution action.

Montgomery v. De Simone · filed 1998-10-16

We hold today that the Restatement’s rule that an overturned municipal conviction presumptively establish probable cause contravenes the policies underlying the Civil Rights Act and therefore does not apply to a section 1983 malicious prosecution action.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require a seizure resulting from a legal proceeding.

Gallo v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1998-11-23

Because under the common law, the tort of malicious prosecution concerns "perversion of proper legal procedures," Gallo must show that he suffered a seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims may be based on violations of the Fourth Amendment, procedural due process, or other explicit constitutional text.

Torres v. McLaughlin · filed 1998-12-15

Accordingly, a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim may also include police conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, the procedural due process clause or other explicit text of the Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming prosecution unsupported by probable cause to show that the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff's favor.

Evans v. Ball · filed 1999-03-12

A plaintiff attempting to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for prosecution unsupported by probable cause must establish, as with a common law malicious prosecution claim, that the prosecution terminated in his favor.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof of a Fourth Amendment violation.

Powell v. Carter · filed 1999-05-19

In order to establish a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must also prove a Fourth Amendment constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim based on a baseless serious charge even when probable cause supports lesser charges brought at the same time.

Luthe v. City of Cape May · filed 1999-05-25

Therefore, I conclude that the existence of probable cause to arrest Luthe on the charges of harassment and criminal mischief does not prevent her from maintaining a cause of action for malicious prosecution on the baseless charge of burglary.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a constitutional deprivation, conduct by state actors, and the elements of a state-law malicious prosecution claim.

Matherne v. Larpenter · filed 1999-06-02

To state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, Matherne must allege that: 1) she suffered a deprivation of constitutional magnitude; 2) the malicious prosecution was committed by state actors; and 3) she satisfies the requirements of a state law claim for malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff must show the elements of a state law malicious prosecution claim, malicious prosecution by a state actor, and a deprivation of liberty.

Cervantes v. Jones · filed 1999-08-13

To withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution under § 1983 must create a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of this constitutional tort. That is, he must provide some evidence that: (1) he has satisfied the requirements of a state law cause of action for malicious prosecution; (2) a state actor committed the malicious prosecution; and (3) he was deprived of liberty.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the plaintiff satisfies the state law requirements for malicious prosecution, state actors committed it, and it deprived the plaintiff of liberty.

Ewing v. O'BRIEN · filed 1999-08-19

Deciding that a federal malicious prosecution claim exists is the first half of the equation; we still have to determine whether Ewing’s complaint actually satisfies the elements of such a claim. “To state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he has satisfied the requirements of a state law cause of action for malicious prosecution; (2) the malicious prosecution was committed by state actors; and (3) he was deprived of liberty.”

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim stemming from a violation of Fourth Amendment rights.

Keko v. Hingle · filed 2000-01-14

Further, Keko has sufficiently stated a cause of action for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stemming from the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim is barred under Heck when the plaintiff was convicted of lesser-included offenses, because those convictions do not constitute a favorable termination.

St. Germain v. Isenhower · filed 2000-05-30

In sum, Mr. St. Germain’s convictions on the lesser-included offenses of false imprisonment and misdemeanor battery do not constitute a favorable termination, and his § 1983 claims are therefore precluded under Heck.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires an absence of probable cause.

Fridley v. Horrigs · filed 2000-08-02

In addition, the non-existence of probable cause is an element of Plaintiff’s state and federal law claims of malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not create an independent malicious prosecution claim; a claim styled that way arises from a Fourth Amendment violation.

Lambert v. Williams · filed 2000-08-07

We now hold that § 1983 does not empower a plaintiff to bring a claim for malicious prosecution simpliciter. What is conventionally referred to as a "§ 1983 malicious prosecution" action is nothing more than a § 1983 claim arising from a Fourth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require a proceeding initiated or maintained without probable cause that terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Wilkerson v. Hester · filed 2000-08-30

In the context of the remedy provided by § 1983, malicious prosecution requires a showing that the initiation or maintenance of a proceeding against the plaintiff by the defendant was without probable cause to support it and a termination thereof occurred in favor of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, or false imprisonment require the elements of the common-law claim and a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Trimble v. Park County · filed 2000-12-04

To maintain a malicious prosecution, false arrest, or false imprisonment claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate the elements of a common law claim and show that their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure has been violated.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims against police officers require an alleged improper act after arrest, beyond arrest and detention without probable cause.

Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force · filed 2001-02-07

However, in order to state a claim for malicious prosecution against the police officers under sec. 1983, Snodderly must do more than merely claim that they arrested and detained him without probable cause. See Sneed, 146 F.3d at 481 (7th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); rather, he must allege that the officers committed some improper act after they arrested him without probable cause, for example, that they pressured or influenced the prosecutors to indict, made knowing misstatements to the prosecutor, testified untruthfully, or covered up exculpatory evidence.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim that is not defeated merely by probable cause to arrest.

Hutchins v. Peterson · filed 2001-03-14

Thus, Movants’ simple assertion that they, had probable cause to arrest Hutchins, even if it could defeat a claim of false arrest under § 1983, would not defeat Hutchins’ § 1983 claim in its entirety, since the existence of probable cause to arrest a person does not dispose of a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for malicious prosecution alone without an alleged constitutional injury.

Kurtz v. City Of Shrewsbury · filed 2001-03-23

Moreover, this court has uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury. ... Thus, plaintiffs' allegation of malicious prosecution cannot sustain a civil right's claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails when probable cause supported the arrest and prosecution.

Abrams v. Walker · filed 2001-04-09

Probable cause defeats an action for malicious prosecution under both Illinois and federal law. ... Because Walker had probable cause to arrest and prosecute Abrams, his § 1983 claims fail.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate malicious prosecution claim when the claim is based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation.

Frantz v. Village of Bradford, Shane Duffey · filed 2001-04-18

In fact, we hold only that in cases based on alleged Fourth Amendment violations, plaintiffs do not have a separate § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to satisfy the elements of a state law malicious prosecution claim.

Ienco v. City of Chicago · filed 2001-05-02

To bring a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege that he has satisfied the requirements of a state law cause of action for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim only when the plaintiff shows a deprivation of a federal right, such as an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Price v. Roark · filed 2001-07-18

Thus, to succeed on this § 1983 malicious prosecution suit, Price must show that he was exposed to an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to establish a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Freeman v. Murray · filed 2001-08-31

Under Third Circuit Court of Appeals law, the plaintiff must also establish that he was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for malicious prosecution by itself because it does not allege a constitutional injury.

Berglund v. City of Maplewood, MN · filed 2001-10-25

Moreover, this court has uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the prosecution to have ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Brown v. Dillion · filed 2002-01-29

Further, in order to establish a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the prosecution ended in his favor.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for malicious prosecution alone because malicious prosecution does not itself allege a constitutional injury.

Stagemeyer v. County of Dawson · filed 2002-03-20

“It is well established in this circuit that ‘[a]n action for malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.’ ”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Fulton Jr. v. Robinson · filed 2002-05-09

In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, see, e.g., Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 944 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1115, 118 S.Ct. 1051, 140 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998), and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law, see, e.g., Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.1995); Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir.1989).

In the Fifth Circuit, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof of the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution.

Gordy v. Burns · filed 2002-06-17

But in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff in a § 1983 malicious prosecution action need establish only the elements of common-law malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not support a malicious prosecution claim based solely on the prosecution; the plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right.

Penn, David v. Harris, Veronica · filed 2002-07-10

A plaintiff therefore may not state a § 1983 claim simply by alleging that he was maliciously prosecuted. Instead, he must allege the violation of one of his constitutional rights, such as the right to a fair trial.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Lewis v. Rock · filed 2002-10-03

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), Lewis and Woodman must establish a violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment to prevail on their malicious prosecution claims under § 1983.

A section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the elements of a state-law cause of action, prosecution by a state actor, and deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills · filed 2002-11-25

A plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution under section 1983 must establish: (1) all of the elements of a state law cause of action; (2) a state actor committed the prosecution; and (3) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim separate from a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim.

Collins v. Guinther · filed 2002-12-18

Despite the body of cases that reasonably led the Defendants to believe that their statement of the law was accurate, the Court finds that the Plaintiff may assert, a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution separate and apart from her claim for unreasonable seizure.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require a criminal proceeding initiated without probable cause, favorable termination, an improper purpose, and a resulting deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure.

Estate Robert Smith v. Marasco · filed 2003-01-29

To prove malicious prosecution under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff ’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a prosecution without probable cause; probable cause bars the claim.

Wood v. Michael Kesler, individually and in his capacity as an Alabama State Trooper, Brian Jones · filed 2003-03-04

While a seizure (i.e., an arrest in fact) occurred in the course of the prosecution, Wood has not shown that Kesler acted without probable cause, which is a required element of Wood’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a malicious-prosecution claim where state-law remedies for wrongful prosecution are available.

Smith, Michael B. v. Lamz, Douglas · filed 2003-03-05

We begin by noting that Smith may not maintain an action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the effective holding of Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), in accordance with its narrowest ground of decision, to be that the opportunity for state-law remedies for wrongful-prosecution claims precludes any constitutional theory of the tort).

Section 1983 does not provide a malicious prosecution action when state law offers a remedy for wrongful prosecution.

Smith v. Douglas Lamz and the Village of Algonquin, a Municipal Corporation · filed 2003-03-05

We begin by noting that Smith may not maintain an action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not recognize malicious prosecution as a claim in itself.

Shultz v. Smith · filed 2003-03-07

A claim for malicious prosecution is not, as such, cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim applying New York law requires a final, favorable termination of the criminal proceeding; the mere expiration of the time to bring charges does not satisfy that requirement.

Neal v. Fitzpatrick · filed 2003-03-13

To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) the proceeding terminated in plaintiffs favor; (3) there was no probable cause for the criminal proceeding; and (4) the defendant initiated the criminal proceeding out of actual malice.” ... The mere lapsing of the statute of limitations does not establish a formal abandonment of charges and is therefore insufficient to demonstrate a final, favorable termination.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when all elements of the state law tort are present and probable cause was lacking under Fourth Amendment standards.

Akers v. Bishop · filed 2003-05-02

A claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under § 1983 where all elements of the state law tort are present and probable cause was lacking as defined by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in the Fifth Circuit requires favorable termination; a guilty plea followed by dismissal under Mississippi’s diversion statute does not satisfy that requirement.

Scribner v. Dillard · filed 2003-05-08

“But in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff in a § 1983 malicious prosecution action need establish only the elements of common-law malicious prosecution.” ... In the present case, the only real issue for summary judgment purposes is whether the third element is met; whether the criminal proceeding terminated in Plaintiffs favor. ... Under Mississippi law, the criminal proceeding did not terminate in Plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment claim alleging malicious prosecution.

Price v. Cochran · filed 2003-05-12

A plaintiff may state a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 by alleging that he or she has been subjected to a malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim based on liability for that tort.

Savino v. the City of New York · filed 2003-05-22

Liability for the tort of malicious prosecution also gives rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

False arrest and malicious prosecution claims under § 1983 have substantially the same elements as those claims under New York law.

Boyd v. City of New York · filed 2003-07-09

The elements of false arrest and malicious prosecution under § 1983 are “substantially the same” as the elements under New York law.

Section 1983 permits recovery for malicious prosecution only when the prosecution was conducted with intent to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Foster v. Ball · filed 2003-10-20

Dr. Foster cannot recover for malicious prosecution under section 1983 unless the prosecution was conducted with the intent to deprive Dr. Foster of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not allow a malicious prosecution claim based on due process violations alone.

Rybak v. Luxury Motors, Inc. · filed 2003-10-31

However, as the district court observed, § 1983 does not allow an action for “malicious prosecution” based on due process violations alone.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution claim to rest on the denial of a federal right; malicious prosecution alone is insufficient.

Castellano v. Fragozo · filed 2003-12-05

We decide that "malicious prosecution" standing alone is no violation of the United States Constitution, and that to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such a claim must rest upon a denial of rights secured under federal and not state law.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require conduct that is tortious under state law and an injury resulting from a Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty.

Weinstock v. Wilk · filed 2003-12-16

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires two inquiries (1) whether a defendant’s conduct was tortious under state law, and (2) whether a plaintiffs injuries resulted from a deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution claim to rest on the denial of a federal right; the state law tort alone does not establish a claim.

Castellano v. Fragozo · filed 2003-12-30

We decide that “malicious prosecution” standing alone is no violation of the United States Constitution, and that to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such a claim must rest upon a denial of rights secured under federal and not state law.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must rest on a denial of rights secured by federal law; malicious prosecution alone does not establish a federal constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Stephen F. Austin State University · filed 2004-02-11

To the extent plaintiff attempted to state a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 upon these facts and the order of the district court allowed the claim of malicious prosecution to proceed, we must reverse. As we recently explained in an opinion filed after the district court’s order: “Malicious prosecution” standing alone is no violation of the United States Constitution, and ... to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such a claim must rest upon a denial of rights secured under federal and not state law.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not satisfy every requirement of an analogous common law tort to state a constitutional claim.

Pierce v. Gilchrist · filed 2004-03-02

We thus join the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in rejecting the view that a plaintiff does not state a claim actionable under §1983 unless he satisfies the requirements of an analogous common law tort.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution incorporate the elements of those torts under relevant state law.

Tartaglione v. Pugliese · filed 2004-03-11

Section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest incorporate the elements of those torts under the relevant state law.

Section 1983 may provide a remedy for conduct underlying a state malicious prosecution claim when that conduct deprives someone of federal constitutional rights.

Somers v. Strader · filed 1977-08-25

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal remedy which protects only federal constitutional rights. While state tort claims do not necessarily constitute § 1983 claims, various federal court decisions have recognized that the facts underlying state tort claims for false arrest, abuse of process and malicious prosecution may also provide the basis for a § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim rests on a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure.

Misty Kingsland v. City of Miami · filed 2004-05-11

Thus, in § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, the constitutional right at issue is not the “right to be free from malicious prosecution,” but rather the underlying Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Section 1983 permits malicious prosecution claims based on specific constitutional rights beyond the Fourth Amendment.

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto Scott Burnell Ted Hartz Richard Althouse, Michael Sakamoto, Does I-X, Inclusive · filed 2004-05-20

We hold that the district court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment injuries cannot provide a basis for asserting a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not cover malicious prosecution when a state judicial remedy is available, unless the prosecution was intended to deny constitutional rights.

Steve Meyers Keith Meyers v. Gregory Nagel, and City of Circle, Montana McCone County, Montana Mark Speer · filed 1992-04-30

Generally, a claim of malicious prosecution is not cognizable under section 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987). An exception to this principle exists, however, "when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights." Id. at 562 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, but the claim cannot proceed when no prosecutorial action followed the arrest.

Robinson v. City of Memphis · filed 2004-06-18

This Court considers itself bound by the decisions in Spurlock and Darrah, which permit a Plaintiff to bring a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. ... Since there was no prosecutorial action taken in this case after Plaintiff was arrested, it is evident that Plaintiff can not maintain an action for malicious prosecution against Officer Berryhill.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim based on a civil or administrative proceeding only when the proceeding violates the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Washington v. County Of Rockland · filed 2004-06-25

As we have noted, our case law does not forbid a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim premised on a civil or administrative proceeding; however, because such claims must, under Albright and Singer, be premised on a violation of Fourth Amendment rights, it is unlikely that a civil proceeding of the kind at issue here would implicate constitutional rights in a manner that would warrant redress under § 1983. Because the circumstances of this case do not constitute a deprivation of liberty sufficient to constitute a violation of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim fails.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding claim for malicious prosecution in the Fifth Circuit.

Figgs v. Vrazel · filed 2004-07-28

There is no longer a freestanding section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution in this circuit.

A plaintiff cannot establish favorable termination for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim if the prosecutor dropped the charges as part of a compromise with the accused.

Taylor v. Winters · filed 2004-10-14

However, if the prosecutor drops the charges as part of a compromise with the accused, the accused will fail the favorable termination prong necessary to maintain a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.

An independent trial court finding of probable cause does not by itself defeat a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, even if it could defeat a claim under state common law.

Becker v. Kroll · filed 2004-10-19

The court agrees that an independent finding of probable cause by a trial court could be fatal to a claim for malicious prosecution under Utah common law, but the Gilchrist decision makes clear that it is not fatal to a § 1983 claim.

A plea agreement dismissing charges does not, by itself, establish the actual innocence required for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Steele v. City of Erie · filed 2004-10-20

Without more, the revelation that a plea agreement has been reached does not demonstrate the actual innocence that is required under Hector.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires a favorable termination; a negotiated dismissal in exchange for concessions generally does not qualify.

Jaisinghani v. Byrne · filed 2005-01-07

“[A] dismissal resulting from negotiation, settlement or agreement is generally not deemed a favorable termination of the proceedings” because such a settlement specifically avoids a determination on the merits. ... Therefore, Jaisinghani cannot establish a favorable termination of the proceedings and the district court correctly granted summary judgment against him.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires an associated Fourth Amendment seizure.

Smith v. McCluskey · filed 2005-03-11

With no associated seizure, there can be no cognizable malicious prosecution claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to show that the underlying criminal convictions were overturned.

Wilkins v. Denver Department of Safety · filed 2005-03-28

Fourth, Mr. Wilkins cannot maintain a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 without showing that his criminal convictions were overturned. ... We agree with the district court that Mr. Wilkins’ § 1983 complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that dismissal without prejudice was the appropriate resolution of his case.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution requires a Fourth Amendment seizure; attending trial alone does not qualify.

DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood · filed 2005-05-12

Attending one’s trial is not a government “seizure” in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution action for violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require a post-arraignment liberty restraint; restrictions on travel or required court appearances may satisfy that requirement.

Davis v. City of New York · filed 2005-05-31

Restrictions on the right to travel, as well as required court appearances, may satisfy the restraint requirement for § 1983 malicious prosecution actions.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Holman v. Cascio · filed 2005-08-29

It is well settled that in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.