42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is the exclusive statutory cause of action for a plaintiff seeking to compel a participating state to comply with the Social Security Act.

Silver v. Baggiano · filed 1986-11-24

Section 1983 is the exclusive statutory cause of action available to a plaintiff seeking compliance with the Social Security Act on the part of a participating state.

Violations of federal foster-care requirements are not actionable for § 1983 damages when children are removed from a home because of suspected sexual abuse.

In Re Scott County Master Docket · filed 1987-11-02

The Court concludes that the failure of defendants to comply with the statutory requirements pertaining to foster care is not actionable in a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the context of home removals resulting from suspected child sexual abuse.

Section 1983 encompasses claims alleging violations of the Social Security Act.

Mosley v. Bowen · filed 1989-02-06

Section 1983 encompasses claimed violations of the Social Security Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for civil rights allegations arising solely from the denial of Social Security benefits.

Stewart v. Barnhart · filed 2004-03-23

Stewart’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims fail because his civil rights allegations stem from the denial of social security benefits, and therefore his action arises solely under the Social Security Act.

Section 1983 does not permit a taxpayer to challenge municipal taxation when an adequate state remedy exists.

Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2000-03-06

Accordingly, taxpayers, like UNOCAL and Litton, may not maintain a 42 United States Code section 1983 action challenging municipal taxation when an adequate state remedy exists.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when tax officials purposefully and intentionally discriminate against identified classes of property owners in violation of equal protection.

Beverly Bank v. Board of Review of Will County · filed 1983-08-24

We therefore conclude that, on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint and admitted by the motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiffs have a cause of action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act for denial of their right to equal protection of the laws. Those portions of the complaint which we have quoted above assert a purposeful, intentional discrimination against two classes of property owners which is actionable conduct under Illinois and Federal law.

A taxpayer may not use Section 1983 in state court to enjoin, suspend, or restrain state tax assessment, levy, or collection when an adequate state remedy is available.

Linderkamp v. Bismarck School District No. 1 · filed 1986-12-02

We therefore hold that a taxpayer may not bring a § 1983 action in state court seeking to enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under state law where an adequate state remedy is available.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim against county taxing authorities when the claim rests on unequal or nonuniform ad valorem taxation.

Vann v. DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors · filed 1988-01-20

We are satisfied that the linchpin to appellant’s § 1983 claim is the alleged nonuniform and unequal appraisal procedure approved by the county and implemented by its agents. Accordingly, we find that the 42 USCA § 1983 claim in this case is not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for the administration of a state tax system when state law offers a plain, complete, and adequate remedy.

Tomaiolo v. Mallinoff · filed 2002-02-19

Under that standard, Tomaiolo cannot obtain damages for the administration of a state tax system under § 1983, even though that administration may have violated federal law, so long as state law provides her a plain, complete, and adequate remedy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of the plaintiff’s own federal right; a person may not sue or recover for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Quiles Ex Rel. Project Head Start v. Hernandez Colon · filed 1988-01-20

In order to state a claim cognizable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege “that some person has deprived him of a federal right.” ... One person may not sue, nor recover damages, for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Parents cannot assert their children’s school-disciplinary due-process rights as their own claims under Section 1983.

Boster v. Philpot · filed 1986-10-14

Their parents have no standing to now assert that their own due process rights were violated. The public school clearly had the right to impose discipline in compliance with the children's due process rights without first seeking permission or approval from the children’s parents. The parents received notice of the suspensions, and they were not entitled to more. Accordingly, the parents’ claims under § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a person to recover only for the deprivation of that person’s own federal rights, not another person’s rights.

Jenkins v. Carruth · filed 1982-09-16

The law seems clear that one person may not sue, nor recover damages, for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

A person or marital partnership generally may not sue under Section 1983 for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights without showing violation of its own federally protected right.

Serbia v. Lausell · filed 1986-09-11

The law seems clear that one person may not sue, nor recover damages, for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Section 1983 does not give an assignee standing to assert another person’s constitutional rights when the rights holder can assert those rights personally.

Jefferson County Department of Social Services v. Colorado State Department of Institutions · filed 1989-06-15

Here, no attempt was made to show that the parents were unable to assert their own rights. We therefore conclude that the county department failed to show it had standing to assert the rights of the parents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to sue on a spouse's behalf for alleged violations of the spouse's constitutional rights.

Greg Oliver, Kate Oliver v. Deputy Warden Pogats · filed 1992-04-13

Furthermore, Oliver does not have standing to sue on his wife's behalf for alleged violations of her constitutional rights.

In the First Circuit, a relative may pursue a § 1983 claim on a decedent’s behalf for the decedent’s pain and suffering, but may not recover personally for the death when state action was directed only at the decedent.

Natriello v. Flynn · filed 1993-11-18

A relative may bring a claim under § 1983 on decedent’s behalf, for decedent’s pain and suffering, but a relative may not bring a personal claim under § 1983 for the death of a relative. ... In light of the established precedent in this circuit, Ms. Natriello was not entitled to pursue a federal civil rights claim under § 1983 for wrongful death damages based upon her son’s suicide.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to base a civil rights claim on a violation of the plaintiff’s own protected rights, not another person’s rights.

K.U. Ex Rel. Michael U. v. Alvin Independent School District · filed 1998-01-06

However, a section 1983 claim for violation of civil rights cannot be predicated on the violation of another person’s protected rights.

An order denying appointment of counsel to a plaintiff pursuing a § 1983 suit is not separately appealable before final judgment.

Welch v. Smith · filed 1987-01-27

In those circumstances, we think it plain that the law of this circuit is that an order denying a plaintiff the appointment of counsel to represent him in pursuing the merits of a suit under § 1983 may not be challenged separately by a direct appeal.

Section 1983 does not generally entitle an indigent plaintiff to appointed counsel unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Branch v. Cole · filed 1982-09-20

A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Section 1983 does not require a trial court to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Genus D. Ulmer v. George Chancellor, Sheriff, and Jones County Board of Supervisors · filed 1982-11-08

The trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. Ill 1979) unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.

The appealability analysis for denial of appointed counsel in a civil-rights case does not turn on whether the plaintiff sued under Title VII or § 1983.

Ronald SLAUGHTER, Appellant, v. CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, Appellee · filed 1984-04-13

In any event, we cannot discern any sensible reason for basing the appealability determination on whether a civil rights plaintiff brought a Title VII suit as opposed to a § 1983 suit.

A § 1983 plaintiff generally has no right to counsel, but counsel should be appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) when exceptional circumstances exist.

Robbins v. Maggio · filed 1985-01-14

Generally speaking, no right to counsel exists in Sec. 1983 actions. Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir.1975). However, this court has recognized that appointment of counsel should be made as authorized by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) where "exceptional circumstances" are present.

A plaintiff generally has no right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.

Robbins v. Maggio · filed 1985-01-14

Generally speaking, no right to counsel exists in § 1983 actions.

An indigent § 1983 plaintiff has no constitutional right to appointed counsel in the civil action.

Irby v. Winans · filed 1985-02-26

There is little doubt that there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil case.

An indigent Section 1983 plaintiff is entitled to appointed counsel only when the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Friend v. Rees · filed 1985-10-01

A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.

An indigent § 1983 plaintiff has no automatic right to appointed counsel; appointment is required only in exceptional circumstances.

Feist v. Jefferson County Commissioners Court · filed 1985-12-13

[a] civil rights complainant has no right to the automatic appointment of counsel. ... We find that this case did not involve any “exceptional circumstances.”

An indigent Section 1983 prisoner with a nonfrivolous claim may require appointed counsel when factual investigation, conflicting testimony, presentation ability, or unsettled legal issues make counsel necessary.

Johnson v. Williams · filed 1986-04-15

Although factual complexity is certainly a relevant factor for a district court to consider in determining an indigent litigant’s need for appointment of counsel, it is not the only factor. ... the district court should also consider the ability of an indigent to investigate the facts, ... the existence of conflicting testimony, ... the ability of an indigent to present his claim, ... and the complexity of the legal issues.

Appointment of counsel in a prisoner’s Section 1983 case is discretionary unless exceptional circumstances require appointment.

Summerville v. Correctional Officer's R. George Coii, Correctional Officer's D.D. Towne's Coii, Correctional O · filed 1986-12-15

Appointment of counsel in a prisoner's Sec. 1983 case is discretionary. ... And, although the district court is required to appoint counsel when there are "exceptional circumstances" present, there are no such exceptional circumstances here.

A prisoner pursuing a § 1983 action has no absolute constitutional right to appointed counsel; appointment requires exceptional circumstances.

Poole v. Lambert · filed 1987-06-19

A civil litigant, including a prisoner pursuing a section 1983 action, has no absolute constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. ... The appointment of counsel is instead a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.

In § 1983 cases, appointment of counsel is discretionary and necessary only when exceptional circumstances are present.

Owens v. W.D. Blankenship T.R. Williams R.A. Young · filed 1989-01-04

Appointment of counsel in Sec. 1983 cases is discretionary and is only necessary when exceptional circumstances are present.

A pro se litigant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to appointed counsel only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.

Curtis Leon Taylor, Sr. v. J.W. Jones D.W. Robertson, and Tony Anthony Danville Police Department · filed 1990-03-01

A pro se litigant is entitled to the appointment of counsel in a Sec. 1983 action only on a showing of "exceptional circumstances."

There is no automatic right to appointed counsel in a Section 1983 case; appointment requires exceptional circumstances.

Hastey v. City of Plainview,TX · filed 1995-06-07

However, there is no automatic right to the appointment of counsel in a case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jackson v. Dallas Police Department, 811 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1986). In fact, a court is not required to appoint counsel in the absence of "exceptional circumstances." Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 83, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). We see nothing exceptional in these circumstances and we decline to appoint counsel for Hastey.

Section 1983 does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to appointed counsel.

Wright v. Lucas · filed 1995-08-25

There is no automatic right to the appointment of counsel in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case.

An indigent plaintiff asserting a Section 1983 claim is entitled to appointed counsel only in exceptional circumstances.

Martinez v. Jackson · filed 1995-12-18

A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there are exceptional circumstances.

Section 1983 suits carry no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel.

McClellan v. Wilkinson · filed 1996-02-07

McClellan was not denied effective assistance of counsel because there is no constitutional or statutory right to the appointment of counsel in § 1983 suits.

In a § 1983 action, a court need not appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff unless exceptional circumstances exist.

George v. Lynaugh · filed 1996-03-26

A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff in a § 1983 action unless exceptional circumstances exist.

A court need not appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim absent exceptional circumstances.

Cole v. Wadley · filed 1996-11-08

Moreover, absent exceptional circumstances, a trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A court need not appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Brown v. Drewry · filed 1996-11-19

The trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a claim under § 1983 unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.

A plaintiff in a Section 1983 case has no automatic right to appointed counsel.

Miles v. Lamb · filed 1998-10-08

No automatic right to counsel exists in a § 1983 case.

Indigent plaintiffs in § 1983 cases are generally not entitled to appointed counsel absent exceptional circumstances.

Duke v. Gauge · filed 1999-01-13

Indigents are not generally entitled to the appointment of counsel in § 1983 cases, and Duke has not demonstrated the existence of exceptional circumstances requiring the appointment of counsel.

A court should appoint counsel for a § 1983 appellant only in exceptional circumstances.

Chapman v. Jeffcoat · filed 1999-04-06

A court should appoint counsel to represent a § 1983 appellant only in exceptional circumstances.

Appointment of counsel in a § 1983 action is not required absent exceptional circumstances.

Knod v. Roberts · filed 1999-06-18

Appointment of counsel in a § 1983 action is not required absent exceptional circumstances, and Knod has shown none.

A § 1983 complainant is entitled to appointed counsel only in exceptional circumstances.

Miller v. Johnson · filed 2000-02-11

A § 1983 complainant is not entitled to appointment of counsel absent exceptional circumstances.

A § 1983 plaintiff has no automatic right to appointed counsel; an appointment requires exceptional circumstances.

Lewis v. Lynn · filed 2001-01-11

Finally, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis’ request for counsel in his § 1983 suit. ... We see no reason to disturb that finding because Lewis has not stated any exceptional circumstances warranting a counsel here.

An indigent plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim is entitled to appointed counsel only in exceptional circumstances.

Sanders v. Myers · filed 2001-10-26

A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there are exceptional circumstances.

An indigent plaintiff in a § 1983 action must show exceptional circumstances to require appointed counsel.

Ponce v. Diaz · filed 2002-02-22

A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff in a civil rights action unless there are exceptional circumstances.

In § 1983 actions, appointment of counsel is discretionary, and an indigent plaintiff must present exceptional circumstances to show an abuse of that discretion.

Goodman v. Smith · filed 2003-02-14

The district court’s power to appoint counsel in § 1983 actions is discretionary, and the district court abuses its discretion only when the "indigent plaintiff presents excep- tional circumstances." Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiffs in § 1983 actions have no automatic right to appointed counsel.

Medrano v. Thomas · filed 2004-05-17

Generally, there is no automatic right to counsel in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not require appointed counsel for an indigent plaintiff unless exceptional circumstances are present.

Jones v. Cornutt · filed 2004-06-01

The court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff raising a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in the absence of “exceptional circumstances.”

Section 1983 does not guarantee counsel to an indigent plaintiff.

Sanders v. Robin Cherry, D.F. Kelly, Sued as Superintendent D.F. Kelly, Lieutenant Brown, Sued as Lieutenant Bro · filed 1992-06-26

An indigent's right to counsel in a section 1983 action is not guaranteed.

A trial court need not appoint counsel for an indigent § 1983 plaintiff absent exceptional circumstances.

Harris v. Cockrell · filed 2004-12-17

A trial court is not required to appoint ... counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim except in exceptional circumstances.

A court need not appoint counsel for an indigent § 1983 plaintiff unless exceptional circumstances exist.

Day v. Massingill · filed 2005-04-28

A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a claim under § 1983 unless “exceptional circumstances” exist.

A plaintiff seeking appointed counsel for § 1983 claims must demonstrate exceptional circumstances.

McBride v. Hilton · filed 2007-02-05

Finally, because McBride is not entitled to appointment of counsel for his § 1983 claims and he has failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances, the district court did not err in denying him appointment of counsel.

Section 1983 does not provide a statutory right to appointment of a federal investigator in a civil action.

Gray v. Grannis · filed 2008-01-10

There is no statutory right to appointment of a federal investigator in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an indigent plaintiff in a civil rights action to proceed without appointed counsel unless exceptional circumstances require appointment.

Hale v. Harrison County Board of Supervisors · filed 2008-04-23

A district court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff in a civil rights action unless there are exceptional circumstances. ... Hale has not shown that the issues in his case are complex, that he is incapable of adequately presenting his case, or that exceptional circumstances require the appointment of counsel in his case. He thus has not shown that the district court’s order denying appointment of counsel was a clear abuse of discretion.

Appointment of counsel for an indigent plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim is required only in exceptional circumstances.

Trejo v. Compton · filed 2008-11-14

A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Section 1983 permits appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant only when the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Davis v. Tucker · filed 2009-04-03

An attorney should be appointed to an indigent in a § 1983 case only if “the case presents exceptional circumstances.”

Section 1983 does not entitle indigent plaintiffs to appointed counsel absent exceptional circumstances.

Thayer v. Adams · filed 2010-02-04

Indigent plaintiffs proceeding under § 1983 are not entitled to appointed counsel absent exceptional circumstances, and we review the denial of such a motion for a clear abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 does not provide a right to appointed counsel, although a court may appoint counsel in exceptional circumstances.

Malpass v. Gibson · filed 2010-02-11

“[I]t is well settled that there is no right to the appointment of counsel in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ... And although the courts have the authority to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in civil cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), courts should only exercise this authority in “exceptional circumstances.” ... Here, because a genuine issue of material fact exists, and because this case involves complicated legal principles, the Court finds that “exceptional circumstances” warrant the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiffs motion.

A plaintiff in a § 1983 action has no absolute right to appointed counsel; appointment requires exceptional circumstances, such as novel or complex facts or legal issues.

Wells v. Cramer · filed 2010-10-01

Wells has “no absolute constitutional right to the appointment of counsel” in his § 1983 action. Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987). Rather, the appointment of counsel is a “privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.”

A Section 1983 plaintiff is not entitled to appointed counsel absent exceptional circumstances.

Bibbs v. Early · filed 2011-03-17

Although Bibbs argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for appointment of counsel, a § 1983 plaintiff is not entitled to appointment of counsel absent exceptional circumstances.

In a § 1983 case, a district court may appoint counsel if exceptional circumstances exist.

Geoghagan v. Wilkinson · filed 2011-03-17

A district court may appoint counsel in a § 1983 case if exceptional circumstances exist.

A plaintiff in a section 1983 case has no automatic right to appointed counsel; appointment requires exceptional circumstances.

Thomas v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2011-06-02

We have held that “[t]here is no automatic right to the appointment of counsel in a section 1983 case,” and that “a district court is not required to appoint counsel in the absence of ‘exceptional circumstances.’” Cupit, 835 F.2d at 86. ... Therefore, Appellants have failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for counsel.

Section 1983 permits a district court to appoint counsel when exceptional circumstances exist.

Lockamy v. Campos · filed 2011-07-06

A district court may appoint counsel in a § 1983 case if exceptional circumstances exist. Williams v. Ballard, 466 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The existence of exceptional circumstances depends upon “the type and complexity of the case, the litigant’s ability to investigate and present the case, and the level of skill required to present the evidence.” Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This court reviews the district court’s denial of appointment of counsel for an abuse of discretion. Id. Lockamy’s excessive force claim is not a particularly complex issue, and the record reflects that he was more than capable of competently proceeding without the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his requests for appointment of counsel. Id. (citing Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2001)).

Courts need not appoint counsel for an indigent § 1983 plaintiff absent exceptional circumstances.

Russell Kiser, Jr. v. Dearing · filed 2011-09-22

A court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a claim under § 1983 absent exceptional circumstances.

Section 1983 plaintiffs generally have no right to appointed counsel, though a district court may appoint counsel in its discretion.

Jones v. City of Austin · filed 2011-09-28

“Generally speaking, no right to counsel exists in Section 1983 cases.” ... “A district court has the discretion to appoint counsel if doing so would advance the proper administration of justice.” ... Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones court-appointed counsel.

Section 1983 does not require a district court to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff unless exceptional circumstances exist.

Stokes v. Tommy Strait · filed 2012-01-04

A district court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent ... plaintiff asserting a claim under § 1983 absent exceptional circumstances.

A district court may appoint counsel in a § 1983 case if exceptional circumstances exist.

Thieleman v. Rick Thaler · filed 2012-11-19

A district court may appoint counsel in a § 1983 case if exceptional circumstances exist.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff an automatic right to appointed counsel; a court need not appoint counsel absent exceptional circumstances.

Kinney v. Joe Shannon, Jr. · filed 2015-11-10

However, even if Kinney had filed a motion for appointment of counsel, “[t]here is no automatic right to the appointment of counsel in a section 1983 case.” Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). Absent exceptional circumstances, which depend upon the type and complexity of the case and the ... ability of the individual pursuing it, a district court is not required to appoint counsel. See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir. 2007). The record here does not indicate that appointment of counsel was warranted in the district court.

A court may appoint counsel for a § 1983 plaintiff when doing so advances the proper administration of justice, but appointment is not required unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Pena v. Brown · filed 2016-02-22

A district court, in its discretion, may appoint counsel to represent a § 1983 plaintiff “if doing so would advance the proper administration of justice.” Id. at 213. Appointment of counsel is not required “unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 212. Here, the district court found no such exceptional circumstances existed. This was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff an automatic right to appointed counsel.

Washington v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2016-06-30

There is no automatic right to the appointment of counsel in a § 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not give plaintiffs a right to appointed counsel.

King v. Burton · filed 2019-07-24

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

A plaintiff has no right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 case.

Griffin v. Stirling · filed 2019-07-31

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

A court may appoint counsel for an indigent § 1983 plaintiff when doing so would advance the proper administration of justice.

Williams v. Bexar County,et al · filed 2019-08-06

This Court has the discretion to appoint counsel for indigent plaintiffs in a Section 1983 civil rights case if doing so would advance the proper administration of justice.

Section 1983 does not give civil rights plaintiffs a right to appointed counsel.

Al-Haqq v. Johnson · filed 2019-09-10

There is no right to appointed counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights cases.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to appointed counsel.

Majid v. Richards · filed 2019-09-11

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

In a § 1983 case, a court may request a volunteer attorney for a plaintiff but cannot appoint one.

May v. Judd · filed 2019-09-24

“Courts are not authorized to appoint [attorneys] in § 1983 cases; instead, courts can only ‘request’ an attorney to take the case” as a volunteer. Rachel vy. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 397 (10th Cir. 2016). There is no basis for such an extraordinary request under the present circumstances.

An indigent § 1983 plaintiff is entitled to appointed counsel only when the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Leachman v. Harris County, Texas · filed 2019-10-02

A district court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent § 1983 plaintiff “unless the case presents exceptional circumstances.”

A plaintiff has no right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 case.

Wells v. Richarson · filed 2019-10-15

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to appointed counsel.

Hagos v. Parton · filed 2019-11-12

There is no right to have counsel appointed in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give plaintiffs a right to appointed counsel.

Mosley v. Mueller · filed 2019-12-04

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 plaintiffs have no right to appointed counsel.

Phillips v. Pattman · filed 2020-01-30

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to appointed counsel.

Brown v. Palmer · filed 2020-03-26

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to appointed counsel.

Rigsby v. Johnson · filed 2020-03-27

There is no automatic right to counsel in a § 1983 case.

A plaintiff in a Section 1983 action has no constitutional right to appointed counsel.

Jefferson v. Gilbert · filed 2020-04-14

No constitutional right to appointed counsel exists in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to appointed counsel in a civil rights case.

Al-Haqq v. Johnson · filed 2020-04-15

There is no right to appointed counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights cases.

Section 1983 does not entitle a plaintiff to appointed counsel.

Roberts v. Khounphixay · filed 2020-04-17

Mr. Roberts has previously been advised by this Court that there is no right to have counsel appointed in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... For the same reasons that the Court denied the prior three requests for appointment of counsel, the Court denies the three new requests for appointment of counsel.

Section 1983 does not give plaintiffs a right to appointed counsel.

Trueblood v. Cappola · filed 2020-04-21

There is no right to have counsel appointed in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs have no right to appointed counsel.

Saxon v. Archambault · filed 2020-06-08

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

A plaintiff in a Section 1983 action has no constitutional right to appointed counsel.

Callendret v. Department of Corrections Headquarters Classification Team · filed 2020-07-02

No constitutional right to appointed counsel exists in a § 1983 action.

A plaintiff in a § 1983 case has no right to appointed counsel.

Mosley v. Mueller · filed 2020-07-06

“The law is clear that there is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.” Robinson v. S.C. Dep’t of Public Safety, No. 8:05-cv-3198, 2011 WL 1225727, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2011).

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to appointed counsel in a civil rights action.

Hart v. Gallegos · filed 2020-07-13

There is no right to appointed counsel in habeas proceedings or § 1983 civil rights actions.

A plaintiff has no right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 case.

Aten v. Boan · filed 2020-07-21

There is no right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not give plaintiffs a right to appointed counsel.

Majid v. Means · filed 2020-07-24

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 plaintiffs have no right to appointed counsel, though exceptional circumstances may justify appointment.

Alexander v. Stirling · filed 2020-09-01

The Court also denies Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel, as there is no right to the appointment of counsel in § 1983 cases, and Plaintiff has not shown the existence of any exceptional circumstances to otherwise justify the appointment of counsel.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to appointed counsel.

Majid v. Richards · filed 2020-09-25

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not give plaintiffs a right to appointed counsel.

Rose v. Stirling · filed 2020-10-20

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

Plaintiffs in § 1983 cases have no right to appointed counsel.

Lyons v. Dennis · filed 2020-10-20

There is no right to appointed counsel in § 1983 cases.

A plaintiff in a § 1983 action has no right to appointed counsel; a court appoints counsel only in exceptional circumstances.

Payne v. Department of Social and Health Services · filed 2020-12-10

There is no right to the appointment of counsel in a § 1983 action, and a court will appoint counsel only in exceptional circumstances.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to appointed counsel.

Farnsworth v. Armstrong · filed 2021-01-06

There is no right to have counsel appointed in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials for threatened enforcement of an unconstitutional law before enforcement occurs.

Thorsted v. Gregoire · filed 1994-02-10

The State defendants are prepared to enforce Initiative 573 if it is upheld, and have defended its constitutionality in this case. Since the threatened enforcement would deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights, entitlement to injunctive and declaratory relief under Section 1983 has been shown.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for prospective injunctive relief against enforcement of an invalid statute.

Martin v. Strasburg · filed 1982-09-20

It is also clear, however, that the remedy of habeas corpus is directed to the unlawful custody of individuals, while prospective relief against enforcement of an invalid statute must be obtained in an action for an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public employee prevailing on a Section 1983 First Amendment claim may receive reinstatement or its monetary equivalent plus prospective salary and benefits until reinstatement or payment.

Patteson v. Johnson · filed 1986-04-02

Accordingly, Patteson is entitled to prospective relief, including salary, accrual time for retirement vesting, and other benefits, from March 22, 1984, the date of the district court’s judgment on remand, until such time as Patteson is either reinstated or receives the payment of damages in lieu of reinstatement.

Title VII does not preempt a state employee's § 1983 remedy for intentional employment discrimination that violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

Keller v. Prince George's County Prince George's County Department of Social Services, Equal Employment Opportunit · filed 1987-08-26

Congress was aware of the remedies for state employees such as § 1983 which preexisted Title VII, and it decided that those remedies should remain available.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a violation of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions without an independent federal right.

Foster v. Township of Hillside · filed 1992-01-30

At the outset it seems that Foster bases her § 1983 action only on the individual defendants violating the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII. Foster has never alleged how defendant’s retaliation violated her 14th Amendment rights. Thus, these § 1983 claims fail.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek money damages for employment discrimination under Title IX when Title VII provides a remedy.

Lakoski v. James · filed 1995-10-03

Given this compelling evidence that Title IX prohibits the same employment practices proscribed by Title VII, we hold that individuals seeking money damages for employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational institutions may not assert Title IX either directly or derivatively through § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to pursue a claim for a distinct constitutional violation even when the employee also has a Title VII claim.

Lococo v. Barger · filed 1997-03-24

In the case at hand, Lococo claims that she has been discriminated against based on her sex in violation of her equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, she has stated a “distinct violation of a constitutional right”, and she may bring her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 equal protection claims may proceed concurrently with Title VII claims when the asserted right comes from the Constitution.

Brennan v. City of White Plains · filed 1999-10-05

In the present case, as with Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 143, Brennan’s Section 1983 claims are predicated upon underlying equal protection violations, and may therefore be maintained concurrently with her Title VII claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for employment retaliation based solely on rights created by Title VII.

Hargrave v. County of Atlantic · filed 2003-05-12

However, to the extent that plaintiff also seeks to pursue her retaliation claims under § 1983, those claims must be dismissed as a matter of law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, including Fourteenth Amendment discrimination claims by public sector employees.

Enoch v. Inman · filed 2004-06-01

We, therefore, hold that public sector employees may sue for discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under § 1983. Title VII does not provide an exclusive remedy for unlawful employment discrimination.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff who exhausted Title VII procedures but failed to file a Title VII suit to pursue the same employment discrimination claim.

Shelton v. Richmond Public Schools · filed 2002-02-13

Nevertheless, until such a time as this circuit renounces or otherwise distinguishes Hughes in regard to the issue, this Court is compelled to follow its holding. ... Even though the Court holds that the present action cannot be maintained pursuant to § 1983, it is appropriate to address the merits of the Plaintiffs claim of racial discrimination in case the relevant Hughes authority is abandoned or qualified to the benefit of the Plaintiff or it is otherwise determined that the Plaintiffs equal protection allegations can be maintained.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to bring an Equal Protection Clause claim without also bringing a Title VII claim.

Toth v. City of Toledo · filed 2012-05-18

Here, Toth’s § 1983 claims are based not upon violations of Title VII – indeed, Title VII is mentioned nowhere in his complaint – but instead upon violations of the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. Day does not foreclose Toth from asserting a claim under § 1983 for alleged violations of these rights simply because he is not also asserting a claim under Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of Title VII.

Brooks v. City of Pekin · filed 2019-08-09

Title VII creates statutory rights, not constitutional ones, and § 1983 provides no remedy for violations of Title VII.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on Fourteenth Amendment rights distinct from rights protected by Title VII.

Ahmad v. White Plains City School District · filed 2020-09-24

The Court will therefore construe Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim as relating only to his constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, and will not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 as based “exclusively on the alleged violations of his rights under Title VII,” (Defs.’ Mem. 9), as Defendants suggest the Court should do.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional discrimination claim alongside a Title VII claim based on the same facts.

LIGHT JR. v. BLAIR · filed 2020-10-23

However, a plaintiff may bring concurrent § 1983 and Title VII claims supported by the same underlying facts.

Section 1983 treats a forced resignation amounting to constructive discharge as a deprivation of a protected interest.

Coston v. Hooper · filed 1989-09-19

In the case at bar, however, Coston's "resignation," unlike Professor Stone's, was so involuntary that it amounted to a constructive discharge. ... We find no voluntary relinquishment by Coston of his protected interest within the meaning of Sec. 1983.

An independent contractor without a protected right to continued employment cannot obtain reinstatement or damages under Section 1983 for termination of the contract.

Deryck v. Akron City School Dist. · filed 1987-06-09

We find it unnecessary to pursue this argument since we conclude that Deryck clearly was an independent contractor and that the resolution of this issue, which was addressed at length by both parties below, is dispositive.

Constructive discharge supports a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim only when the employer forces the resignation to avoid providing required pretermination procedures.

Fowler v. Carrollton Public Library · filed 1986-09-12

Constructive discharge in a procedural due process case constitutes a § 1983 claim only if it amounts to forced discharge to avoid affording pretermination hearing procedures. Constructive discharge, so limited, was not a viable cause of action in this case because there was no proof of the constitutionally proscribed purpose.

Section 1983 requires action under color of law and does not require a due-process hearing before termination of private at-will employment when no protected liberty or property interest exists.

Cashman v. Shinn · filed 1982-11-04

The count was premised upon the defendants, while acting under color of law, depriving plaintiff of property or liberty without due process of law. ... The United States Supreme Court has held that loss of a position of employment which is not held as a matter of right does not deprive a person of liberty or property. ... In order to have a cause of action under 1983 the defendant must have been acting under color of law. ... Even if they are deemed to have acted to terminate plaintiff’s private employment, there is no requirement that in doing so they would have had to grant such a hearing. ... Count II failed to state a cause of action against defendants Shinn, Griffin, or Wilson as it did against the others. The court properly struck the count.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a due-process deprivation when the challenged state action implicates no protected property right.

Zapata v. Quinn · filed 1982-12-07

Zapata further contends that the court should entertain this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which extends original jurisdiction to federal courts over all civil actions: ... The alleged right in issue here is one of due process. Zapata, however, has not set forth any authority for the proposition that she had a right to a lump sum payment of the Lottery prize. ... However, as indicated above, there is no property right implicated here and the Lottery terms are accessible and unambiguous.

A § 1983 due-process claim to public-employment disability benefits fails when the employee never asserted the state-law entitlement or requested an opportunity to be heard.

McElhinney v. Inhabitants of Town of Tisbury · filed 1983-06-16

At a very minimum, the plaintiff was required to inform the Town of Tisbury that he was asserting a claim under Mass.Gen.Laws c. 41, § 111F and that he wanted the town to give him an opportunity to be heard. ... However, the plaintiff has made no showing that he was deprived of due process.

Section 1983 due process requires an identifiable liberty or property interest, and state personnel rules did not create a protected interest in a particular state-trooper assignment.

Hughes v. Whitmer · filed 1983-09-15

Therefore, we hold that applicable Missouri statutes and Patrol general orders do not support Hughes' claim that he has a property interest in his assignment to Troop "G."

At-will public employees without contracts, tenure, or a reasonable expectation of continued employment have no property interest supporting a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim.

Brown v. Reardon · filed 1983-10-21

In the instant case, plaintiffs had no written contracts, no tenure and no reasonable expectations of continued employment with the City of Kansas City, Kansas. Consequently, plaintiffs were deprived of no property interest and were not deprived of any procedural rights which could result in a § 1983 violation.

Procedural protections alone do not create a property right in continued public employment for a § 1983 due-process claim; the employer’s discretion must be substantively restricted.

Asbill v. Housing Authority of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma · filed 1984-02-02

By themselves, however, these procedural protections do not support a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to future employment. At best, they merely support a claim of entitlement to the procedural protections themselves. At least five circuits have adopted the view that procedural protections alone do not create a protected property right in future employment; such a right attaches only when there are substantive restrictions on the employer’s discretion.

A municipal charter limiting dismissal to cause after a hearing can create a public employee’s property interest cognizable under § 1983.

Canning v. Butcher · filed 1984-04-05

The court in its original ruling held that Section 116 of the New Haven City ... Charter creates on behalf of police department “officers and employees” a property interest the taking of which is cognizable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A school board does not violate § 1983 due process merely by using the same attorney to present the superintendent’s dismissal case and advise the board.

Breitling v. Solenberger · filed 1984-04-19

In sum, the court finds that, as a matter of law, the School Board’s reliance on its attorney who also presented the case for the superintendent did not violate Brei-tling’s right to constitutional due process.

A section 1983 due process claim requires a constitutionally protected property interest grounded in a legitimate claim of entitlement under state law, so a plaintiff cannot use section 1983 to litigate what is really a state law breach-of-contract claim lacking such an entitlement.

Genesco Entertainment, a Div. of Lymutt v. Koch · filed 1984-08-17

Plaintiff's alleged entitlement to the delivery of a duly executed contract does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected property right.

A § 1983 due process claim requires the plaintiff to have a constitutionally protected property interest, and an applicant before an agency that retains discretion over the decision (rather than acting purely ministerially) has only a unilateral expectation, not an entitlement cognizable under § 1983.

Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson · filed 1984-09-04

Where a local zoning, planning or other agency enjoys discretion in determining whether applicable law or regulations have been satisfied, the applicant has been deemed to have but a unilateral expectation which does not merit constitutional protection and is thus not cognizable under § 1983.

For a Section 1983 due-process claim arising from a budgetary teacher layoff, thirty days’ notice and an available pretermination contractual grievance procedure provided sufficient process.

Hockney v. School Committee of Lynn · filed 1984-11-02

If we construe her argument to mean that the notice and hearing requirement such as that contained in § 42 should apply to her, we hold that the notice and opportunity for a hearing that she in fact received was sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause. She received notice that she would be laid off thirty days before she,, was terminated. Under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement she could have initiated a grievance before she was terminated.

In a Section 1983 public-employment claim, adequate post-layoff administrative and judicial procedures can satisfy due process without a pretermination hearing when advance hearings would unduly burden a reduction in force.

Smith v. Sorensen · filed 1984-12-06

We believe that the similar discharge procedures outlined above that were available to the employees after the implementation of the RIF guideline provided such protection of their rights that the absence of a pretermination hearing alone was not violative of due process.

A state regulation creates a federally protected interest for a § 1983 due-process claim when specific substantive criteria restrict officials’ discretion.

Spruytte v. Richard Walters and Ronald Schink · filed 1985-01-28

Because specific, substantive criteria restrict officials’ discretion, the Rule creates a federally protected interest.

An exempt state employee cannot base a section 1983 due-process claim on a property interest in a position that state law leaves outside the merit system.

Vaughn v. Shannon · filed 1985-04-29

The Alabama Mental Health Board has the authority to establish personnel policies and the authority to include or exclude certain positions from the Merit System in so setting the policy. Vaughn's position as Chief, Evaluation of Community Programs, was therefore exempt from the Merit System, which deprived him of the property interest that would entitle him to due process.

A public employee cannot establish a section 1983 due-process violation merely because departmental rules required a pre-demotion evidentiary hearing when the employee received constitutionally sufficient notice, an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to respond.

Williams v. City of Seattle · filed 1985-05-02

In summary, the evidence establishes beyond dispute that Williams was afforded notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to respond prior to the Chiefs decision to demote Williams from sergeant to police officer. Due process required nothing more.

A public employer's violation of a required termination procedure does not sustain a section 1983 property claim when state law otherwise creates no entitlement to continued employment.

Henderson v. Gavino Sotelo, Individually and as City Manager of Harlingen, Tx. · filed 1985-06-03

Further, the fact that his discharge may have violated the Charter’s “advice and consent” clause does not suffice to sustain appellant’s claim of deprivation of property without due process.

When a public employee receives only an abbreviated pretermination hearing, due process requires a substantially more meaningful posttermination hearing.

Carter v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center · filed 1985-07-11

Where, as here, a court has approved an abbreviated pre-termination hearing, due process requires that a discharged employee’s post-termination hearing be substantially more “meaningful”.

A fixed-term public employee has no § 1983 property interest in employment or reemployment beyond the contract’s expiration absent a mutually explicit entitlement.

Brew v. School Bd. of Orange County, Florida · filed 1985-12-12

Under her contract, plaintiff had no right to any employment or re-employment beyond the expiration of her 1981-1982 fixed-term contract.

Continued public employment after a contract expires may create a state-law expectation that the renewed employment retains the contract's dismissal procedures, producing a property interest protected through § 1983.

Moynihan v. Hickey · filed 1986-01-21

Accordingly, having furnished their services from the time of expiration of their former contracts until October 21, 1985, at the same pay rates provided in said expired contracts, the plaintiffs were entitled to presume that any changes in the terms and conditions of their employment would be in accordance with the due process provisions set forth in said contracts.

A § 1983 public-employment due-process claim depends on whether state law and tenure created a vested property right in the position.

Hover v. Westchester Community College · filed 1986-01-21

Similarly, petitioner’s claims pursuant to 42 USC §§ 1983, 1988, hinge upon his rights under Civil Service Law § 75 and cannot be resolved in the absence of the resolution of the above factual issues.

A probationary public employee ordinarily has no protected property right in continued employment and therefore cannot maintain a § 1983 due-process claim over discharge without a hearing.

McKendry v. Union Township · filed 1986-02-04

The result of this holding is that plaintiff can state no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Probationary employees commonly have no property right to be accorded due process protection.

A promise by an elected official to make a future political appointment does not create a constitutionally protected property interest supporting a § 1983 due-process claim.

Averitt v. Cloon · filed 1986-08-26

Accepting the plaintiff's allegations that Cloon promised to appoint him to the position of "friend of the court" of Gogebic Court after July 1, 1983 as true, this court nevertheless declines to extend the Toussaint doctrine to elected public officials in the exercise of their authority to make future political appointments as suggested by the plaintiff herein. Thus, this court concludes that the plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest and his Sec. 1983 claim must fail.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim concerning termination fails when the employee has no property right in continued employment.

Little v. Spaeth · filed 1986-10-17

Our determination that the plaintiffs did not have a contractual right to employment also disposes of their assertions that they were deprived of property without due process of law in violation of the United States Constitution, because their “federal constitutional claim depends on their having had a property right in continued employment.” ... That determination also disposes of the plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because, as they asserted in their brief to this court, “[plaintiffs’ claims against the State and Spaeth, in his official capacity, originate from the breach of a contractual relationship.”

A tenured public employee with a property entitlement to continued comparable employment is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to contest repeated rejection for comparable positions before the deprivation is finalized.

Hatcher v. Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County · filed 1987-02-17

The Board continues to deny that interest as long as she retains the right and remains in the lesser employment position. The private interest in being restored to a comparable position is substantial. The governmental interest in immediately filling vacancies does not outweigh this individual interest where the school reorganization is complete. Accordingly, appellant was entitled to a legitimate opportunity to contest the continued deprivation of her property before the decision to continue that deprivation was finalized.

A public employee states a Section 1983 claim when local employment rules create a protected property interest and the appointing board arbitrarily passes him over in violation of that interest.

Lewis v. Hayes · filed 1987-03-12

Therefore, we hold that because Lewis had a protectable property interest in the employment in Bradley and because the board acted erroneously in passing over Lewis for employment on the basis that he had not established residence at the time of the vacancy, Lewis stated a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

Procedural rights alone cannot create an independent substantive property right to continued public employment when no such entitlement otherwise exists.

Stow v. Cochran · filed 1987-06-01

It is clear to us, however, in view of Olim, Hewitt, and this Court's decision in Hogue, that Wilson v. Robinson has effectively been overruled insofar as it holds that "procedural rights" alone can create an independent substantive property right to continued employment when none would otherwise exist.

A § 1983 public-employment due-process claim requires notice that meaningfully apprises the employee of the nature of the charges and supporting evidence before an unpaid suspension.

Morton v. Beyer · filed 1987-06-24

We conclude that presentation of adverse evidence within minutes of ineffective notice simply does not comport with the due process requirements set forth in ... Loudermill. ... On the undisputed facts of this case, Morton was not afforded timely notice of the nature of the charges or the general evidence against him.

A § 1983 public-employment due-process claim requires timely notice of the nature of the charges and supporting evidence sufficient to permit a meaningful response before unpaid suspension.

Morton v. Beyer · filed 1987-07-02

We conclude that presentation of adverse evidence within minutes of ineffective notice simply does not comport with the due process requirements set forth in Loudermill. ... On the undisputed facts of this case, Morton was not afforded timely notice of the nature of the charges or the general evidence against him.

A public employee cannot maintain a § 1983 due-process claim over a subjective efficiency rating and lost promotion opportunity without a protected liberty or property interest.

Ellis v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1987-08-11

Ellis has not established a property or liberty interest entitled to protection of the fourteenth amendment.

An implied public-employment contract can create a property interest protected by due process and enforceable under § 1983 when official assurances reasonably support an expectation of continued employment.

Upadhya v. Langenberg · filed 1987-08-31

Accordingly, plaintiff acquired through the implied contract entered into with him by the defendants a property right protected under the Due Process Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.